BY THE SWORD AND THE CROSS

The Historical Evolution of the Catholic World Monarchy in Spain and the New World, 1492–1825

Charles A. Truxillo

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Courtesy of Michael Gienger.

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

Courtesy of Michael Gienger.

Introduction

SETTING THE STAGE

In this work, I will attempt to present a macrohistorical overview of Spanish America within the context of the Catholic Monarchy of Castile. Macrohistory is the study of the past, emphasizing the "big picture"—the great movements and interrelations of peoples, countries, ideas, economies, and civilizations. In effect, my book will place Spanish America's historical evolution in a global perspective, which is only appropriate for a universal state such as Spain. Unfortunately, in a treatment such as this one, much detail is sacrificed as well as analysis in order to delineate the overall flow of events. Over the last fifty years, many particular monographic studies have appeared in academic publications; they cover almost every aspect of Spanish American history. The time has, therefore, arrived to stand back and take stock of what has been accomplished, then proceed to some major conclusions. It is my hope that this concise but insightful survey will show the way towards placing Spanish America in the mainstream of world history.

A general survey of so large a topic is, of course, built on the work of others, most of whom are greater scholars than the author. In order to give credit to my sources, I have listed every work consulted in the preparation of this manuscript. I have, however, dispensed with standard footnoting, because most of the ideas and facts incorporated in the book are well known to scholars and the learned public—much of the information is also of a general nature; I have cited author and date within the text. *By the Sword and the Cross* is a synthesis, relying primarily on secondary sources, but these in turn rest on primary research.

By the Sword and the Cross is also an ideological history in two senses. First, the historical development of Spanish America is studied primarily within the context of the Indies' changing relationship to the Castilian metropolis. The evolution of Spain's theory of empire, church-state relations, and the emergence of Creole

patriotism unfold within the context of the narrative. However, the complexity and erudition of recent ideological histories, replete with titles and authors, is not the objective of this work. Rather, a succinct and clear approach to the subject emerges, in which a periodization of Spanish America's imperial history is used to highlight the various phases of the Catholic Monarchy's ideological evolution. This manuscript is also an ideological history in a second sense; it embodies the author's particular loyalties and interests, and indeed, about one's precommitments, one must return to academic literature. These clearly follow a well-worn path—the philosophy and ideology of *Hispanismo* and the *Hispanidad* movement.

I consider myself to be a mestizo son of the Creole culture of New Spain. My paternal grandfather, Aquiles Jesus Truxillo, fled Mexico during the Revolution (1910–1929). My mother's family—the Candelarias and the De La Os—is Hispano from Albuquerque and southern New Mexico. I feel that I am a product of the world monarchy that taught my mestizo ancestors the doctrines of the Catholic religion and the noble sound of the Spanish language. My people took these gifts from Spain and became pioneers in the northward sweep of Spain's empire, settling in the arid lands of northern Mexico—Zacatecas, Durango, New Mexico, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Texas, and California. They mixed with the native peoples in those regions, becoming *hijos de la tierra* (sons and daughters of the land). Though I would never deny the strong Indian and African roots of the *Mexicano* people, nevertheless, their primary cultural traits remain those brought from Castile—the Spanish language, the Catholic faith, the extended family, the code of masculine honor, and the caballero ethic. Until such time as Americanization or globalization erase these signposts of Hispanic identity, the *Mexicanos*, *Hispanos*, and *Chicanos* of the north will remain children of the *Hispanidad*. I, therefore, offer this work of history in the spirit of those Creole patriots, who for centuries fought with pen and ink—*letras dan nobleza*—to defend and exalt the good name of their American homelands, against those critics who sought defame or dishonor the New World.

By the Sword and the Cross consists of six unequal parts. The book begins with an introduction that briefly sets the stage for the work and then proceeds to a succinct overview of pre-Columbian civilizations. The second part—also the first two chapters—presents a lengthy essay delineating Spain's role in world history; some of the most important points are made in this section. "The Age of Discovery, Exploration, and Conquest, 1492–1556"—Chapter 3—also includes a review of Italian contributions to this era and, by way of comparative development, a survey of Portugal's imperial venture; however, Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with the society of the Conquistadores. Chapter 4 covers the subsequent periods of the *Pax Hispanica*: The Imperial Zenith (1556–1640), the Baroque Age (1640–1760), and the Bourbon Reforms and Independence (1760–1825). Finally, I conclude with a concise essay concerning the history of Spanish America since independence. The sixth part of *By the Sword and the Cross* is a comprehensive bibliography.

New Spain, or rather Mexico, will loom large in the text because that kingdom was Spain's premier possession in the New World. It should be remembered that by the middle of the eighteenth century, Mexico City had become the Hispanic

world's largest metropolis, surpassing Madrid, Seville, and Lima in both population and splendor (Lynch 1991).

ANCIENT AMERICA

The area of the New World effectively incorporated into the Catholic World Monarchy of Castile was vast, covering over four million square miles. The geography of the empire was diverse, and physical obstacles were formidable; burning deserts, tropical rainforests, high mountains, and humid coastlands often in close proximity to each other presented the Spaniards and native inhabitants with various challenges and opportunities. At the end of the fifteenth century, the New World, or the Americas, was an area of unexploited resources and rich environments full of people and teeming with wildlife. The human imprint on the Americas was ancient. Its origins stretched back across the centuries to the last Ice Age, fifteen thousand years ago. Since that time, bands of Siberian hunters had spread across two continents, developing various cultures and complex societies.

Native Americans developed unique and appropriate lifestyles in the regional ecologies where they settled. In the North American arctic and subarctic, hunting bands predominated over the wide arc of northern Canada and Alaska, including the sophisticated culture of the Eskimos. Further south in the forested northeast, societies based on mixed economies—hunting and seasonal farming—thrived around semipermanent villages. West of these villages were the great plains, where small groups of nomadic hunters followed the great herds of plains animals such as bison and elk. They also did some farming around the region's many river valleys. Similarly, the tribes that inhabited the Rocky Mountains were mostly food gatherers and hunters. In the southeast of North America, complex chiefdoms evolved, centered around ceremonial sites constructed on mounds; these were primarily agricultural societies. In the desert southwest, oasis cultures emerged based on rainwater and irrigated farming, clustered around adobe villages, and engaged in long distance trade with the high cultures of Meso-America.

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were also inhabited by a variety of Native American peoples who in turn developed an amazing array of cultures. The Caribbean peoples ranged in life ways from almost idyllic tropical food gatherers to warlike and predatory island nomads. Northern Mexico, like the American Southwest, was the site of the interaction of oasis farmers and nomadic (desert and mountain dwelling) hunter-gatherers. Central Mexico and northern Central America were regions of advanced civilizations. In Meso-America there were cities, trade networks, literate cultures, and massive social engineering (Adams 1991). South of modern Guatemala through Panama into northern Colombia existed chiefdoms of an intermediate range of social complexity.

Moving eastward and south of Colombia into Venezuela and Brazil, the lands of the Amazonian rainforest, one would have encountered cultures like those of the Caribbean. Moreover, the Amazon basin—an area as large as the continental United States—was and is the most complex regional ecology on the planet. Hunting bands mingled with savannah farmers; along the southern borderlands,

seminomadic chiefdoms ruled over the tribes of Paraguay and the Brazilian pampas.

West of Amazonia in the high mountains of the Andes and along the coastal deserts of Peru, a second core land of civilization prospered (Conrad 1984). From the tropical highlands around Quito to the burning deserts of northern Chile, societies such as those that developed in central Mexico evolved—based on ruling elites, coercive economies, and surplus-producing agriculturalists. South of Andean civilization in the temperate lands of southern Chile, martial chiefdoms ruled over mixed farming and food-gathering societies. East of Chile on the Argentine pampas, bands of nomadic hunters followed herds of deer, cameloids, and rheas. These were groups similar to those on the great plains of North America. Finally on the sub-Antarctic tip of South America, seal hunting and fishing cultures, such as those on the Canadian tundra, eked out a living of sorts.

Among all the variegated cultures of the Americas, the Spaniards were primarily interested in the civilizations of Meso-America and the Andean highlands. For here were peoples whose sedentary lifestyle and habitual subordination were complementary to the Castilians' ambition to become lords over vassals. Furthermore, the peculiarities of pre-Columbian social evolution guaranteed a wide effectual disparity between European and American levels of technological development (Crosby 1972).

The first age of world history is that of the Theocratic Civilizations which arose in the six core regions of world culture; they are the Middle East, India, Europe, China, Mexico, and Peru. The period of Theocratic Civilizations began with the rise of city-states in lower Iraq—Sumeria—and ended around 1500 B.C., when Aryan chariot-warriors overran Minoan, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Indus River Valley, and Hsia Chinese societies. Nothing similar transpired in the New World civilizations of Mexico and Peru. The isolated character of social developments in the Americas contributed to the prolongation of the first stage of world history (Truxillo 1995).

Native Americans were the descendants of prehistoric hunters from Siberia. From the end of the last Ice Age, these migrants had spread out to occupy the whole of the New World. Eventually, Amerindians created societies of great diversity, parallel to but largely independent of developments in the Old World. A similarly isolated quality was manifest in the social evolution of cultures in sub-Saharan Africa and Australia—Pacifica, where less developed societies survived into modern times (McNeill 1963).

The stimulus of warfare, trade, and cultural interchange were factors in the rise of civilization in pre-Columbian America. In the lowland jungles of Vera Cruz along Mexico's Gulf Coast, the Olmecs, around 1500 B.C., built elaborate ceremonial centers. They traded widely in the region while acting as the first agents of a new type of complex society in Meso-America—a regional civilization. Further south in northern Peru, the Chavin people played a similar role in the Andean world around the same time. Both the Olmecs and the Chavin people evolved out of earlier village cultures based on tropical agriculture, river valley farming, or coastal fishing.

New World civilizations apparently owed little to outside stimuli. Low population density in so large an environment did not, however, require intensive exploitation of resources on the scale of Old World societies. Such a process accelerates technical and social developments, and it is cumulative over many centuries. In the Americas, an absence of outside influences (with the exception of the Norse and possibly some Chinese Buddhist monks), lowered the necessity of radical cultural reappraisal (Fagan 1991).

Amerindian civilizations waxed and waned over the centuries, isolated from the cultures of Afro-Eurasia. Furthermore, their change from theocratic societies to more militarized cultures was not so different from the patterns of Old World history (Truxillo 1995). In the ancient Middle East, Pharonic Egypt underwent the same process at an earlier stage of its development. During the eighteenth dynasty (ca. 1600–1200 B.C.), the rulers of Egypt responded to the humiliation of foreign occupation—that of the Hyksos—by waging offensive warfare in Syria, and by adopting the full panoply of chariot-warfare (McNeill 1963). Another example of Amerindian history paralleling events in Afro-Eurasia was that provided by the empire of Teotihuacán (100 B.C.–A.D. 750); that central Mexican imperium was roughly equivalent in its own world to the Roman Empire in the ancient Mediterranean (Conrad 1992).

The Inca Empire was a theocratic kingdom like that of Egypt, the Indus river valley, and possibly Minoan Crete. Moreover, in this kind of society's ideology, divine kingship was based on the idea that the services its rulers provided were so great as to enable them to participate in divinity. The realms of divine monarchs were characterized by rigid centralization with few urban centers—perhaps as in Egypt or the Inca Empire only one great capital city was built. And the Andes mountain range, running along the whole length of western South America, played a role similar to the Nile in Egypt, facilitating the unification of the Andean world. Its terraced fields were equivalent to irrigation works along river valleys. Furthermore, divine monarchies were considered to be the actual domains of their gods who, in turn, ruled on earth through royal incarnations (Collier 1982).

Among the six core areas of civilization, those cultures that originated in Mesopotamia, China, and Mexico were characterized by multiple urban centers and the tradition, not of divine kingship, but of sacred monarchy. Sacred monarchies arose in response to the inability of rulers to completely control or determine the course of events in their territories. The capriciousness of nature as manifest in disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and the instability of human affairs gave rise to a sense of human inadequacy before the fickle nature of the gods (McNeill 1963).

In sacred monarchies, rulers were representatives of inscrutable divinities. Empire building was a prolonged affair that contributed to the complexity of politics and exacerbated inhabitants' belief in the transitory quality of life and the cruelty of fate. Nature itself contributed to this sense of insecurity insofar as Mexico's central valley was affected by volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and terrible floods. And unlike the secluded realms of Egypt, Crete, Tibet, and Peru—protected as they were by seas, wide deserts or guarded by impassible mountains—the lands of Mesopotamia, China, and Mexico were also subject to repeated invasion from

outside their domains. In response to this, sacred monarchs along with their subjects were supplicant and expectant before their gods (McNeill 1963).

The Inca Empire in the Andes (A.D. 1300–1530) resembled a confessional state, in so far as a state-church complex informed its cultural outlook (Conrad 1984). Andean kingdoms conformed in general to a profile similar to that of medieval Tibet or the rice-kingdoms of Southeast Asia. In spite of these apparent similarities, periods of pre-Columbian history do not appear to be in sync with those of the Old World; this creates the impression that the Americas entered the mainstream of world history when the Iberians conquered their societies (Truxillo 1995).

Subsequent to the Age of Theocratic Civilizations (3500–1400 B.C.), Old World societies passed through two other stages—the Chariot-Warrior Invasions (2000–1000 B.C.) and the Iron Age (1400–600 B.C.) until the great Axial Age (800–200 B.C.). According to Karl Jaspers, during the Axial Age, each of the four core areas of civilization in the Old World simultaneously underwent a revolution of conscience, which led to the formation of their respective cultures' traditions of philosophy and religion. For a while in the sixth century B.C., Pythagoras in Greece, Deutero-Isaiah in Israel, the Buddha in India, and Confucius in China may have been contemporaries (Jaspers 1953). Why the Axial Age occurred at all is not clear. In another work, *Periods of World History*, I speculated that the terrible trauma caused by the rise of totalitarian statecraft—modeled on the Assyrian Empire (900–600 B.C.)—may have been the catalyst that impelled individuals of conscience to rethink the nature of the human condition in the world at large.

Nothing like the Axial Age took place in the Americas. The New World cultures of Mexico and Peru remained at the stage of theocratic civilization throughout the period of the Axial Age in the Old World; this can be partially explained by the late start of civilizations in the New World (ca. 1400 B.C.). However, the main reason that these societies remained at the first stage of world history was their relative isolation in a natural environment that was largely unexploited. Societies in the Americas, outside the range of cultural influences emanating from Meso-American and Andean civilizations, found the available resources sufficient to support their low-intensity economies (Fagan 1991). Cultural diffusion from Meso-American and Andean centers into their surrounding hinterlands was very incomplete when European conquest cut short those civilizations' lives.

As of yet, knowledge of pre-Columbian history remains fragmentary. Interestingly the recent decipherment of the Mayan Script has revealed a world (100 B.C.–A.D. 900) not unlike that of the Iron Age (1400–600 B.C.), in which warring city-states competed for trade routes, booty, sacrificial victims, and productive lands (Hassing 1992). Another, even closer, parallel can be found in the tropical temple-states of Southeast Asia that were contemporaries of the Mayan city-states (Conrad 1992). Even with these breakthroughs in archaeological knowledge, no evidence has been revealed of an Amerindian Axial Age.

The absence of a moral crisis equivalent to Assyrian imperialism spared Native Americans the necessity of shocked consciences and forced realizations. Later, when the disaster of the Iberian conquest did provide them with an Assyrian-like equivalent, its impact was so overwhelming that the Amerindian civilizations

were destroyed. The same fate befell the Indus River Valley culture during the Aryan invasions (1500 B.C.), and similarly the Hittite Empire as a result of Iron Age migrations, those of the Sea Peoples (1200 B.C.) (McNeill 1963). Cogently, there remains no record of spiritual and intellectual fluorescence in those cultures either.

Following the Axial Age, the era of Classical Empires (550 B.C.–A.D. 565) defined Old World societies. Imperial polities stretched across the whole breadth of Afro-Eurasia, ruling the core territories of European, Middle Eastern, Indian, and Chinese civilizations. The Roman Empire (209 B.C.–A.D. 634), successive Iranian monarchies (Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian), Indian empires (Mauryan, Kushana, and Gupta), and the Chin-Han imperium in China all adopted one of the philosophies or religions of the Axial Age as the guiding ethic of their ruling classes—Greek philosophy in Rome, the Zoroastrian Church in Iran, Buddhism in India, and Confucianism in China (Truxillo 1995). Moreover, universal states brought order and prosperity to their respective worlds, which was much appreciated after the violent upheavals of the Iron Age.

Two imperial societies emerged in the Americas that played the role of Classical Empires. In the central valley of Mexico, the great urban center of Teotihuácan for centuries (A.D. 100–750) exercised influence on all the regional cultures of Meso-America, from Zacatecas in northern Mexico to Honduras in Central America (Adams 1991). It is, strikingly, coincidental that this occurred simultaneously with the emergence of classical imperialism in Eurasia. Andean imperialism, however, emerged a bit later than the hegemonic power of Teotihuacán. In the Andean world, the dual monarchy of Huari-Tiahuanáco established its hegemony from A.D. 500 to 1000, a little after the Classical Empires of the Old World had begun to decline. Both states, that of Teotihuacán and Huari-Tiahuanáco, united their respective cultural realms by way of military force, economic integration, and religious conversion. They replaced earlier regional societies such as those of the Olmecs and Zapotecs in Mexico and the Chavin, Mochica, and Nazca cultures of Peru. Furthermore, Teotihuacán and the Huari-Tiahuanáco epitomized the cultural achievements of Meso-American and Andean civilizations, diffusing their techniques over wide areas and incorporating new regions (Fagan 1991).

Teotihuacán's trade network influenced a vast region, extending from Zacatecas in northern Mexico to Tikal, a Mayan city in the Guatemalan jungle. The Huari-Tiahuanáco Imperium apparently united for the first time the river valleys of Peru's arid coastlands with the Andean highlands. Considering the severe technological restraints on pre-Columbian societies—lack of iron tools, the wheel, and equids—their accomplishments were remarkable. Amerindian societies continued to maintain a cultural profile reminiscent of the Theocratic Civilizations of Old Kingdom Egypt or Akkadian Mesopotamia. Remarkably, the hegemonic systems of Teotihuacán and Huari-Tiahuanáco, like the Classical Empires of Rome and Han China, did establish a legacy of cultural excellence that succeeding societies aspired to emulate (Katz 1972). Furthermore, Teotihuacán at its height was a huge metropolis with a population of five hundred thousand. In the same way that Constantinople dominated the Byzantine world, so Teotihuacán ruled over Meso-America.

In Central America and the Yucatan peninsula, the warring Mayan city-states elaborated their cultural traditions largely in relation to Teotihuacán's rich civilization. Kaminal-Juyu was a colony of Teotihuacán that acted as the great capital's command center in the Mayan world. The last terrible bout of warfare that brought the Mayan Classical Age (A.D. 300–900) to an end may have resulted from the collapse of Teotihuacán's trade network, which was part of the imperial capital's decline (Adams 1991). Teotihuacán entered into a period of economic recession and political militarization around A.D. 500. This situation developed for several reasons: first, rival trading and production centers such as Cholula and Monte Alban emerged; furthermore, Tikal most likely challenged Teotihuacán's economic influence; secondly, militarization was a political response to an economic situation that required greater coercive power (Hassig 1992). Finally, northern tribes from Mexico's Chichimeca frontier were probably tempted to test the weakening defenses of a declining Teotihuacán. Climatic changes in North America, perhaps the first onset of the "little ice age," produced conditions of greater aridity which forced marginal agriculturalists southward toward central Mexico. Various warlike groups of nomadic hunters speaking Nahua languages entered the valley of Mexico at this time.

The succeeding culture of the Toltecs (A.D. 900–1300) descended from that of Teotihuacán. The Toltecs may have been the invaders who overthrew and burned the great city. They could have also been half-barbarian auxiliaries stationed far to the north at "La Quemada," close to the modern city of Zacatecas, that served as border wardens of imperial Teotihuacán. If this was the case, they probably entered the Meso-American heartland as retreating mercenaries, much like the Franks joined in on the dismembering of Roman Gaul after serving as federates of the Roman army on the Rhine (Katz 1972).

Militarized successor states were constructed on the ruins of Teotihuacán's empire: the post-classic Mayans (A.D. 1000–1550) of the Yucatan (centered around the rival cities of Chichen Itza and Mayapan), the Toltecs (A.D. 900–1300) of Tula, the Mixtecs (A.D. 1100–1520) of Oaxaca, and the Assyrian-like Mexica-Aztecs (A.D. 1325–1519) of Tenochtitlán (Carrasco 1992). These bellicose successors remind one of the barbarian kingdoms that replaced the Western Roman and Han Empires. Except for the Mayans, whose complex script and fine arts surpassed those of Teotihuacán, none of the other post-classic cultures equaled those of the Classic Age (100 B.C.–A.D. 900).

The outstanding figure in the rise of the Mexica-Aztec empire was Tlacaelel (1397–1487), who served as cihuacoatl (snake woman) for five successive tlatoani (chief-speakers). During the reign of his uncle, Itzcoatl (1427–1440), Tlacaelel participated in the plot that overthrew the hegemony of the city of Atzoapotzalco in 1428. Afterwards, Tlacaelel helped construct the triple alliance composed of the city-states of Tlacopan, Texcoco, and Tenochtitlan—Tlaltelolco. Tlacaelel organized the Mexica army into totemistic brotherhoods—Jaguar and Eagle warriors. He also established the forms of ceremonial combat (*guerra de flores*) that emphasized capturing prisoners for human sacrifice.

In 1440 Tlacaelel's brother, Motecuhzoma I (regnat 1440–1469) became tlatoani. The cihuacoatl quickly emerged as the prime mover behind the throne, helping to organize the cult of Huitzilopotchli as supreme creator, god, and paladin of Mexica militarism. As Mexica expansion proceded, Tlacaelel manipulated the worship of Huitzilopotchli to justify massive human sacrifice as a means of state terror and imperial control. While Motecuhzoma I was engaged in military campaigns, Tlacaelel initiated a policy of intermarriage with the Cholulan aristocracy in order to give the Mexica pipiltin (nobles) a Toltec lineage.

Tlacaelel's nephew assumed the Mexica throne in 1469; the cihuacoatl continued in his commanding position. During the Mexica civil war (1472–1473), Tlacaelel advocated the brutal annexation of Tlaltelolco, Tenochtitlán's twin island city. Tlaltelolco's own cult of Huitzilopotchli was suppressed in 1473). At this time, Tlacaelel ordered the collection of rival histories in order to eliminate alternate accounts of Mexica origins; the collected codices were burned. When Axayacatl died in 1481, Tlacaelel disapproved of his successor, Tizoc (1481–1486), and successfully plotted his assassination.

Tlacaelel was an avid supporter of Ahuitzotl (1486–1582), who was his great nephew and grandson. Ahuitzotl's reign represented the climax of Mexica imperialism, compensating for defeats inflicted by the Tarascans on Axayacatl and Tizoc by conquering distant provinces in the Mayan lands. To celebrate the apogee of empire, Tlacaelel supervised the greatest reconstruction of the temple of Huitzilopotchli, offering twenty thousand victims in a holocaust of exaltation. Representatives of the empire's conquered and allied peoples witnessed the spectacle, and they were horrified to see their captive kinsmen sacrificed alive.

Tlacaelel died in 1487 after a public career of sixty years; he had contributed to the construction of a splendid imperial edifice. Tlacaelel was seemingly oblivious to the hatred that Mexica imperialism generated among the subject peoples. Moreover, the Toltec heritage so assiduously promoted by Tlacaelel affixed to the Mexica mythology of Quetzalcoatl-Topiltzin (the Toltec prophet), which Hernan Cortez exploited to undermine Mexica self-confidence two generations after Tlacaelel's death (Davies 1987).

When the Castilians invaded Mexico in 1519, the Mexica-Aztec Empire seemed to be at the height of its power, yet the facility with which it was overthrown and the eagerness of its subjects to join Cortez's conquering army indicated grave internal defects (Davies 1992). The empire's main defect was that of political ephemeralness, which afflicted all the successors of Teotihuacán.

The Huari-Tiahuanáco Empire also dissolved into warring successor states. Apparently, its ideological use of a unifying religious cult proved insufficient to hold the diverse ecologies of the Andean realm together. Independent coastal states reappeared after A.D. 1000, the strongest of which, Chimor, united most of them under its rule. From its great capital city, Chan Chan, the Chimor Kingdom maintained and then surpassed the cultural achievements of the earlier Mochica culture (A.D. 100–600), its predecessor (Collier 1992).

At the same time in the terraced highlands of the Peruvian Andes, an empire emerged that directly succeeded to and maintained the traditions of the dual

monarchy of Huari-Tiahuanáco—the Inca Empire (Conrad 1992). From their capital, Cuzco, the Incas (1200–1571) constructed a unitary state with a command economy, highly reminiscent of Old Kingdom Egypt or the Chin Empire in China. The Inca Empire eventually united the Andean highlands with the coastal river valleys of Peru; this unified state expanded greatly in the fifteenth century. When Pizarro conquered the Inca Empire in the 1530s, its northern borderlands extended to Quito, and its southern frontier centered around the Bio Bio River in central Chile.

In retrospect, perhaps the Inca Empire with its imperial dynasty, solar religious ideology, standing army, paved roads, stone fortresses, command economy, and great capital (Cuzco), was a Classical Empire. The Spanish Viceroyalty of New Castile was therefore the Inca Empire's successor state and, conforming to the pattern of Old World history, that successor state imposed a confessional civilization on Peru based upon Roman Catholicism (Truxillo 1995).

Chapter 1

Spain in World History

The ancient Greeks called Spain *Iberia*, and they conceived of that land as the extreme western end of their Mediterranean-based ecumen. And while the Iberian peninsula does exist as an integral part of the Mediterranean, it also partakes of an equally significant Atlantic orientation. However, in antiquity (3500 B.C.–A.D. 565) and throughout the better part of the Middle Ages (A.D. 500–1500), Spain is more properly seen within its Mediterranean context—part of the world of Greece, Carthage, Rome, and North Africa. Later, during the period of the Gunpowder Empires (A.D. 1453–1840), Spain's geographical axis changed towards an Atlantic configuration; this occurred in response to its new role as hegemon of the Indies and defender of the Catholic faith against the depredations of Protestant England, rebellious Holland and, to the Castilians, perfidious France (Vives 1970).

The Iberian peninsula does, in fact, lie on the extreme western end of the Afro-Eurasian world island. It is primarily a semiarid land dominated by a high central plateau. Furthermore, Iberia is divided from France by the Pyrenees Mountains. And it is also internally divided by several mountain ranges. The Levantine or east Mediterranean coastlands of Spain are similar in climate to those of the French Riviera or western Turkey. Around the Bay of Biscay, the Spanish landscape resembles the wet climate of Ireland or Britanny. Meanwhile, along the Atlantic seaboard, Spain and Portugal change from a hilly fertile land in the north to rocky arid lands in the south. Moreover, Andalusia or southern Spain has always seemed more like an extension of North Africa than of western Europe (Braudel 1973). In antiquity and the early Middle Ages, the coastal periphery of Andalusia and the Spanish Levant dominated Iberian history. However, from the high Middle Ages to the middle of the nineteenth century, it was Castile ruling from the high central plateau that exercised dominion over most of the peninsula (Vives 1970).

Even in prehistoric times, Spain was the site of brilliant regional cultures as manifested in the cave paintings of the Paleolithic era. The first homo-sapien

societies in Spain were those of Cro-Magnon man. After the end of the last Ice Age (ca. 15,000 B.C.), when glaciers retreated from northern Europe, the Cro-Magnon hunters of Spain moved north out of the peninsula in pursuit of the game they hunted during the Ice Age. A new people of Mediterranean stock moved into Spain, probably from North Africa; they were later known as Iberians, and they appeared to have introduced Neolithic technology, agriculture, and herding to the region. The Neolithic revolution seems to have been initiated in the Middle East and been diffused from there to other parts of the Old World including Spain (Altamira 1949). From this period on, Iberia would receive stimuli from the eastern Mediterranean; however it did not become the focal point of an original cultural synthesis until the age of the Almohad Caliphate (ca. A.D. 1157–1248).

ANCIENT IBERIA

After Theocratic Civilizations had already arisen in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, around 2500 B.C., the Iberian peninsula participated in the remarkable flowering of an advanced Neolithic culture, that of the Megalith builders. Centered on the island of Malta, the Megalithic culture spread as a religious system around the far western Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar, then along the Atlantic shores of western Europe and North Africa. The Megalithic system, reflecting its possible inspiration from Minoan Crete, appears to have been based on priestly cadres who converted Neolithic farmers to their faith, perhaps promising immortality or some way of guaranteeing the fertility of the soil (McNeill 1963). Furthermore Megalithic priests calculated the movement of the stars, which allowed them to know the temporal cycles of nature.

Some experts believe that the Megalithic elites were representatives of the cult of the great earth goddess—*Mater Magna*. Whatever may be the case, they commanded sufficient obedience to direct thousands of villagers in the construction of great stone tombs and religious (possibly calendrical) monuments, sometimes called dolmans. Stonehenge in England is one of the great masterpieces of this widely diffused culture.

In Spain the rise of Megalithic societies among the Iberians produced a class system that typically passed from a theocratic phase to an era of military chiefdoms based on the use of metals. A similar process transpired throughout the central arc of Afro-Eurasia: from Iberia and North Africa through Europe, the Middle East, northern India, central Asia, and finally to the Far East. The point of origin for the metallurgical revolutions known as the Bronze and Iron Ages (2000–600 B.C.) was also in the Middle East during the time of the chariot-warriors (2000–1500 B.C.) and the Iron Age tribal-infantry invasions (1300–1000 B.C.) (Truxillo 1995).

The appearance of metal tools and weapons in Spain may not have been fortuitous because ancient technicians traveled far and wide in search of the metal ores that were plentiful in Spain. However, it does not appear that the Iberian peninsula was directly affected by the either the Bronze Age chariot-warriors or Iron Age tribal-infantry invasions. Even the use of the warhorse in Spain seems to have resulted from its introduction into North Africa by the Hyksos invaders of Egypt

(1700 B.C.), and the horses' subsequent passage to the peninsula was by way of trade and/or military alliance. Iberian chieftains took advantage of this new technological panoply to establish military aristocracies that waged incessant tribal warfare from their bases on fortified hilltops. Meanwhile, trading in metal ores, slaves, and natural products, Iberian statelets attracted the attention of eastern Mediterranean merchants and colonists—the Phoenicians and the Greeks (Beretta 1952).

The Phoenician colony of Gadis, modern Cadiz, was founded around 1000 B.C. on the southern tip of Spain. The Phoenicians were a trading people who sailed throughout the Mediterranean and even along the Atlantic coasts of Europe, visiting even distant Britain in search of tin. They were masters of shipbuilding and commerce, inventing the alphabetic system used throughout the Western world. After the migrations of the Sea Peoples (ca. 1300 B.C.) overthrew the thalassocracy of the Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, operating from coastal centers along the north Syrian coast, reestablished the trading lifelines of Mediterranean commerce. Their colonies in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Spain resemble those of the later Portuguese in the Indian Ocean region for they were primarily commercial entrepots, similar to Portuguese *feitorias.* And like the later Portuguese, the Phoenicians were not numerous enough to strike outward, fan out into a new land, subdue its inhabitants, and settle the area en masse. Eventually, after long settlement on the seacoasts, Phoenician colonists established a sizeable presence around their major colony in North Africa, Carthage. The parallel with the Portuguese occupation of Brazil is striking (McNeill 1963).

Phoenician contact with southern Spain stimulated the rise of a native Iberian kingdom, that of Tartessos. From 1000 B.C. to around 550 B.C., Tartessos was a major player in the western Mediterranean, ruling a substantial part of southern Spain along the Guadalquevir River. That same area would long remain the center of the peninsula's most sophisticated cultures—those of Roman Baetica, Arab Al-Andalus, and *Siglo de Oro* Seville. A general orientalization of Iberian culture occurred, bringing southern Spain into the matrix of Mediterranean affairs (Altamira 1949).

Hiram of Tyre and Solomon of Israel sought to establish commercial and political linkage with Tartessos. However, the Iberian kingdom's fortunes began to wane when the Carthagenians won a series of naval engagements in the central Mediterranean over the Greeks and Etruscans; these effectively cut Tartessos off from its former trading network and placed the kingdom in the rising orbit of Carthage, a former Phoenician colony. Simultaneously, Tartessos's rule over southern Spain may have been challenged by the appearance of rival states among the Iberians, and by the pressure of Celtic migrations into central Spain from Gaul (Beretta 1952). The invading Celts mixed with the Iberian tribes of central Spain, producing a new Celt-Iberian culture. In northern Spain, Gallicia, and Lusitania (northern and central Portugal), Celtic societies predominated—largely displacing earlier peoples. The advanced Iron Age technology of the Celts along with their aristocratic cavalry (fighting on horseback and in war-chariots with lance and long sword) allowed these Indo-European peoples to hold sway over a large part of Europe, stretching from central Spain and the British Isles in the west through west-central Europe

into northern Italy, eastward to the Balkans and Asia Minor, establishing Galatia in the latter. The Celts began their infiltration into northern Spain across the Pyrenees around 900 B.C. (Harrison 1988).

Another Mediterranean people who settled on the eastern shores of Spain were the Greeks. These Aegean inhabitants had initiated a brilliant urban civilization at the beginning of the ninth century B.C., which later flowered during the Axial Age (800–200 B.C.) in the city-state of Athens. In that great era, the Greeks triumphed over the Persian Empire; the Athenians constructed the Parthenon, and the flowering of Hellenic philosophy, science, arts, and literature became the matrix of a humanistic culture (Hellenism) that is the foundation stone of Western civilization. Yet, Hellenism (in its Latin form) did not directly affect Spain until the time of the Roman conquest, 210–14 B.C. Earlier, in the eighth century B.C., Greek poleis aggressively founded agro-urban colonies to export their surplus populations. During the Greek Colonial era, Sicily, southern Italy, and Marseilles became integral parts of an expansive Hellenic world (Davies 1996).

Hellenism soon began to influence the cultures of the Carthagenians, Etruscans, Gauls, Italians, and Iberians. Vine and olive oil agriculture appeared in Spain as a result of Greek colonization of the Iberian Levant. Coinage and improvements in ceramics can also be attributed to Greek influence. Nevertheless, the Greek presence in Iberia was slight, and the colonies were too far from their bases in Italy and the Aegean; the latter maintaining irregular contact with Spain. When the Carthagenians established naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean after 550 B.C., the Greek settlements in Spain faltered (Harrison 1988).

ROMAN AND VISIGOTHIC HISPANIA

The wars between Rome and Carthage finally integrated Spain into the mainstream of ancient history. After the death of Alexander the Great (323 B.C.), the whole of Afro-Eurasia was convulsed by a series of bloody wars that lasted until the end of the first century B.C.; these involved all the lands from the Mediterranean region through the Middle East, India, Central Asia, and China. The resulting violence and agony was caused by the fall of the Persian Empire to Alexander's conquering Macedonian phalanx, for the Persian Empire under the Achaemenid Dynasty (550–331 B.C.) had acted as an anchor in the center of Eurasia, stabilizing its geopolitical center (Toynbee 1959).

With the collapse of Persia, a series of contenders fought over its former territories. The ensuing struggle between Macedonian generals, Iranian warlords, Indian rajas, and central Asian khans radiated its influence into neighboring lands. Meanwhile, victorious armies and defeated war bands spread a rising arc of warfare across the central portion of the Old World. Eventually, victors emerged from this holocaust; they established new universal states that stabilized their respective cultural realms, bringing law, order, peace, and prosperity. These new regimes are properly called the Classical Empires (550 B.C.–A.D. 565). In the West, the Roman Empire ruled the Mediterranean world for over six centuries. Various Iranian

dynasties restored the Persian Empire in the Middle East while similar imperial governments were established in northern India and China (Truxillo 1995).

The Roman Republic was an aristocratic and agrarian polity, whereas Carthage was a commercial society ruled by a mercantile oligarchy. Moreover, the Romans were an Indo-European people, and the Carthagenians were of Semitic origins. In contrast to the Carthagenians, when the Romans conquered a neighboring society, they settled military colonists in its territory, usually enslaving a portion of the defeated population but eventually incorporating the conquered people into Rome's body social—even extending to them, gradually, the privileges of allies of Rome, then that of Latins and, finally, full citizenship in the republic. No other ancient city-state undertook so far-sighted a policy of political and cultural assimilation. The process often took centuries; eventually, the Romans made Roman their conquered provinces (Roberts 1997).

Rome established its authority over most of the Italian peninsula by 264 B.C. Its invincible legions, composed of citizen-farmers, stood poised to attack Sicily. The desperate Greek city-states on the island first called on the Hellenistic king of Epirus to rescue them; when he failed, the Greeks turned to Carthage. Thus began the first Punic War, and as Carthage was a longstanding maritime power, it was at first victorious against the Romans. The Carthagenians were also a threat to the Greeks of Sicily as that island also possessed ancient Phoenician colonies on its western end. Sicily, the bread basket of the central Mediterranean, was a prize well worth fighting for. Centuries later, the Aragonese kings of Spain would fight long wars in Italy to possess the island's wealth; Spain ruled Sicily for over two hundred years (1479–1714).

The Romans eventually built a fleet and developed the tactics of grappling and boarding; this allowed the Romans to carry their military advantage—land warfare—on to the sea. Rome won the first Punic War and imposed a harsh and humiliating peace on Carthage, which was forced to surrender Sicily and Sardinia, forswear the use of a navy, and pay reparations to Rome. As a result of these punitive terms, the Barca family—for years influential in the affairs of Carthage—prepared for a war of revenge against the Roman Republic. Led by Hamilcar and his son, Hannibal, the Carthagenians succeeded in building a new empire in Spain (Caven 1992).

Beginning in 237 B.C., the Barcas waged a brutal war to subjugate the Celtic and Iberian peoples of central Spain. Furthermore, Hamilcar exploited the old Phoenician colonies in Spain as bases of operation; he dreamed of harnessing Iberian manpower and resources as a counterweight to those of Italy. Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, decided in 218 B.C., to use Spain as a staging point for a land invasion of Italy. His forces moved along the Riviera and over the Alps, catching the Romans unaware in the opening campaign of the second Punic War (218–202 B.C.). After reaching Italy, Hannibal annihilated two Roman armies at the battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae in 217 B.C. and 216 B.C., respectively. The Carthagenian warlord then proceeded to ravage the Italian countryside and even succeeded in detaching many Italian Greek city-states from Rome's alliance; all the while, Hannibal continued to receive reinforcements and supplies from Spain. The Barca

grand strategy appeared to work brilliantly; this was Rome's darkest hour (Caven 1992).

Hannibal was victorious on the battlefield, but his forces were not strong enough to take the city of Rome. Meanwhile, Rome's Italian and Latin allies held fast with the beleaguered republic, which continued to have a huge reserve of military manpower. A war of attrition ensued with Hannibal camped in southern Italy. From there, his forces devastated the regional economy. The Romans recovered from these disasters and took the offensive, striking at the Carthagenian's bases in Spain. In 210 B.C., Scipio Africanus began the Roman conquest of Spain, which deprived Hannibal of reinforcements and supplies. Maintaining their strategic initiative, the Romans attacked Carthage directly in 204 B.C., again under Scipio's brilliant leadership (Caven 1992).

The Carthagenian home government recalled Hannibal. Unfortunately, he was forced to leave his veteran troops behind in Italy. At the battle of Zama in 202 B.C., Scipio decisively defeated the great Carthagenian, who then went into exile, eventually committing suicide in the Hellenistic Orient. Rome once again was severe in its treatment of Carthage, which was stripped of its empire and reduced to a commercial city-state. Finally, in 149 B.C., Rome decided to destroy Carthage because the city's continuing prosperity was considered an affront to the republic.

After a terrible siege (149–146 B.C.) Carthage was razed to the ground, its inhabitants enslaved, and the site salted. With the collapse of Carthagenian hegemony, the Iberian Peninsula was gradually incorporated into the Roman system as an integral domain. The Romans swiftly overran the urbanized Spanish Levant and the wealthy Guadalquevir River valley. However, in northern and western Spain—lands of the Celtiberians and the Lusitanians—the fighting continued for over a century. This conflict culminated in the great siege of Numantia in 139–133 B.C., which became a symbol of Spanish tenacity and patriotic courage—the memory of which was much evoked during Spain's war of independence against Napoleon (1808–1814).

It was the Romans who first called Iberia Hispania. The attempt to conquer Hispania was the ruin of many generals, and the expense and duration of the fighting contributed to the fall of the Roman Republic. However, the lengthy process of incorporation and the numerous personnel expended in the process enhanced the extent and degree of Romanization. Many Roman soldiers were retired in Spain as military colonists, and scores of cities were founded that were centers of Greco-Roman civilization (Civitas). In Spain the Romans followed the same process of gradual assimilation that they had so successfully applied in Italy (Keay 1988).

During the last phase of the Roman Republic, Spain was often the scene of battles and political maneuvers between Roman generals. The peninsula was finally subdued during the reign of Rome's first emperor, Augustus (31 B.C.–A.D. 14). Eventually, the regions of Hispania were so well-pacified that they were governed as senatorial rather than as imperial provinces. Fighting continued in the northern Cantabarian and Pyrenees Mountains, whose mountain tribesmen—especially the *Vascos* (Basques)—were imperfectly incorporated into the Roman order (Collins 1983).

Hispania flourished under Roman rule for over five centuries. The Pax Romana in Hispania was rarely disturbed by invasion or conflict during that time. Furthermore, Roman Spain became as Romanized as Italy, Tunisia, and southern Gaul. All the outer manifestations of Roman rule were displayed in Spain: paved roads, Greco-Roman architecture, municipal government, and the Roman legal system. The Spaniards rapidly adopted Latin as their public language and by every measure were a thoroughly Romanized people. However, it should be remembered that Roman Spain was a colonial civilization, similar to the later Spanish regime in the New World (Altamira 1949).

Hispania sent many luminaries to the Roman metropolis including the philosopher Seneca, and the writers Lucan, Martial, and Quintillian. The emperors Trajan, Hadrian, and Theodosius were also of Spanish origin. The provincial nature of Spanish society at the time is highlighted by the fact that talented native sons had to leave Spain in order to make their fortunes.

The crisis that brought down the Principate (31 B.C.–A.D. 235) did not severely undermine Roman Spain, even though minor barbarian raids did disturb the peace. For a while, Spain was even part of a secessionist Roman regime in the western provinces of the empire. There was some ruralization of the population as cities lost inhabitants; this was part of the worldwide contraction of the political and economic systems of the Classical Empires. Three other imperial regimes collapsed during this period: the Parthian Empire in Iran (A.D. 224), the Kushana Empire in northern India (A.D. 227), and the Han Empire in China (A.D. 220). Epidemic diseases, barbarian invasions, and imperial demoralization all contributed to the process (McNeill 1963).

The Roman world was eventually restored during the Dominate (A.D. 285–395). The emperors Diocletian (A.D. 285–305) and Constantine (A.D. 306–337) rebuilt the empire as a military dictatorship with a command economy, an oriental-style court, and a state church. Similar modifications were occurring throughout the civilized lands of Eurasia and marked the beginning of a new age of world history, the period of Confessional Civilizations (A.D. 312–1517). Rome, having survived the worldwide crisis of the third century, initiated the new age by adopting Catholic Christianity as its imperial religion. In 312 Constantine issued the Edict of Milan, which removed former restrictions on the public practice of Christianity after centuries of sporadic persecution by the Roman government. He did this in gratitude to the Christian god, whom the emperor believed to be responsible for his great victory at the Mulvian bridge.

Eighty years later, Theodosius (A.D. 379–395) completed the process by declaring the Catholic Church to be the official religion of the Roman Empire, proscribing all others. These events would define the mental landscape of European civilization for the next fifteen centuries—until the symbolic disestablishment of the Catholic Church that occurred in France during the French Revolution (1789). In later centuries, Spaniards took particular pride in the fact that a Roman emperor from Spain enthroned the True Faith as the established religion of the Mediterranean world. However, it should be noted that this phenomenon was ecumenical. Across Eurasia, faltering empires tried to buttress their waning fortunes with the

supernatural sanctions of universal churches. Rome turned to Catholic Christianity in the fourth century A.D.; earlier, Iran under the Sassanian Dynasty provided an archetype to Rome by embracing the Zoroastrian church as its state religion. Later, Gupta India (A.D. 325–520) embraced Hinduism, the faith of its people. Similarly, the Wei Dynasty of the Toba Tartars in China (A.D. 389–534) made Mahayana Buddhism its imperial cult (McNeill 1963).

Late Roman Spain accepted Catholic Christianity as the paladin of a new *Romanitas*. Christian Spain was an even more integral part of the new Catholic Roman Empire than it had ever been of the old pagan Principate. Spanish churchmen were prominent in all the affairs of the Patristic Age (A.D. 350–550); Osio, the bishop of Cordoba, directed the Council of Nicea in A.D. 325, while Prudentius and Orosius were outstanding Christian writers. Spaniards were also prominent in the controversies of the age as witnessed in the heretical neo-Manicheanism of the ascetic Priscillian. Christian clergy, monks, and nuns were becoming the arbiters of Spanish society as elsewhere in the western Roman Empire. In effect, the Church was displacing the late Roman government, which was crushing its subjects with taxes and bureaucracy (Collins 1983). At the same time, the empire was forcing its population into hereditary social castes similar to those of Sassanian Iran and Gupta India. In A.D. 395, Theodosius the Great died. This effectively divided the Roman Imperium into two halves. The western empire seemed fragile and poised for disaster. The western senatorial aristocracy was secure in its possession of the best agricultural lands and did not look to the faltering government in Milan or Ravenna for support or patronage—neither did West Roman aristocrats lend their support to the crumbling empire. They preferred to reach an accommodation with Rome's enemies.

The declining Classical Empires were not only threatened by social malaise; they were also invaded by peoples from their cultural periphery whom the imperial elites called barbarians. During the third century crisis, barbarian outsiders probed the defenses of all the Eurasian empires, only China's crumbled before their assaults. Meanwhile, Sassanian Iran (A.D. 224–651) produced a military system capable of resisting barbarian incursions. Militarized land tenure was an ancient means of maintaining a feudal gentry. Moreover, Persian heavy cavalry became the only force capable of successfully thwarting barbarian attacks. However, this system of defense-in-depth by rural barons undermined the tightly controlled administrations of the Classical Empires which had depended on massive infantry armies. Yet, barbarian heavy infantry from northwestern Europe and mobile horse-archers from entral Asia recoiled before the thunderous charge of iron-clad knights or cataphracts (McNeill 1963).

It was the westward migration of Hunnic tribes out of Inner Asia that precipitated the *volkerwanderung* of Germanic nations, which eventually overran the western Roman Empire. In A.D. 375, the Visigoths pressed on the Danubian marches of the Eastern Roman Empire, desperately petitioning the imperial government for permission to settle within its borders as military federates. The Visigoths were anxious to escape the westward expansion of the Huns, who had already subjugated the Alans, an Iranic people, and the Ostrogoths, Germanic kinfolk of the

Visigoths. Recently the Huns had participated in the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire and were simultaneously pressing on the central Asian frontiers of Sassanian Iran. Earlier in the third century, the Goths had moved on to the Ukranian steppes from the Baltic region and, in the process, transformed themselves into a pastoral nomadic people adept in equestrian skills (Davies 1996). The Roman government in Constantinople welcomed the refugee Visigoths into the empire in order to deploy their cavalry against other imperial enemies. Furthermore, the Romans had failed to develop an Iranian-style defense-in-depth because of its expense, feudal tendencies, and the Mediterranean region's chronic shortage of pasture for horses. Very quickly, the Visigoths and their Roman hosts fell out and drifted toward war. The east Roman emperor, Valens, tried to crush the rebellious Visigoths near Adrianople in A.D. 378. Unfortunately, the Roman legions proved no match for Visigothic cavalry. Valens was killed and the east Roman field army was destroyed. The Roman Empire had, in effect, been permanently invaded by a Germanic tribe numbering 250,000 men, women, and children.

The Visigoths devastated the Balkan provinces but were unable to take major Roman cities. After the battle of Adrianople, Theodosius (A.D. 379–395) was elevated to the purple by the western emperor, Gratian; he immediately set about trying to restore the situation in the Balkans. The new emperor was unable to expel the Visigoths from the Danubian provinces but did contain their depredations, and he eventually resettled the Goths as military federates. During these years, the Visigoths were thoroughly Romanized, a process facilitated by their earlier conversion to Arian Christianity, a sect whose trinitarian doctrines were at variance with those of the established Nicean Church of the Roman Empire (Collins 1983).

After Theodosius died in A.D. 395, the Visigoths again became restive, and under the leadership of their new king, Alaric, tried to invade Italy, the core territory of the newly established western Roman Empire, ruled by Theodosius's son, Honorius. Eventually, the Visigoths succeeded in attacking Rome, which they sacked in A.D. 410; this disaster shocked the Roman world. In distant Palestine, St. Jerome expressed his distress at receiving the news. Yet this largely symbolic event only highlighted the self-evident debility of the Western Empire. A few years before the sack of Rome in A.D. 406, other Germanic tribes, taking advantage of Roman weakness, crossed the Rhine into Gaul and later Spain—the Vandals, Suevi, Alemani, Burgundians, and Franks. Roman forces were also withdrawn from Britain, which soon felt the full force of Anglo-Saxon and Jute invaders.

Alaric died shortly after the sack of Rome, and the Visigoths were persuaded to settle in southern Gaul. From there, the Roman government utilized them as federates to defeat the earlier Germanic invaders of Spain. The Visigoths succeeded in pushing the ferocious Vandals out of southern Spain. Unfortunately, the Vandals then proceeded to invade Roman North Africa, where they set up a seaborne empire based in Carthage, which terrorized the western Mediterranean, sacking Rome in A.D. 455. The Vandals' main contribution to Spain was giving southern Spain the name Vandalusia (=Andalusia) (Vives 1961). Meanwhile the Visigoths also helped the Romans contain the Suevi, forcing them into Gallicia, in northwestern Spain.

The Visigoths did not settle throughout Spain at first; they preferred the rich lands of Aquitaine and Provence in Gaul. From those territories, the Goths constantly challenged Rome's crumbling authority in the surrounding areas. Nevertheless, in A.D. 451, at the battle of Chalons, they helped the last Roman field army to defeat their old enemies—the Huns—then under the leadership of Attila. Following this victory, the Visigoths set up an independent kingdom in Gaul and Spain; its capital was Toulouse.

The Visigoths were so Romanized that the ten million subjects they ruled in Gaul and Spain barely acknowledged the demise of the west Roman Empire in A.D. 476; moreover, the Visigothic leadership made arrangements with the Roman senatorial aristocracy to occupy one third of the land to support the Goths as a military caste. The Visigothic rank and file tried to maintain their identity by retaining their Gothic language and their Arian religious allegiance. They also attempted to remain separate from the Roman population by legislating against intermarriage. In Spain, the Visigoths primarily settled on the central plateau around Toledo, which later became their capital (O'Callaghan 1975). In that region of Spain, they were able to maintain the pastoral economy that the Germanic tribes had adopted on the steppes of southern Russia.

The barbarian successor states of the western Roman Empire maintained a sub-Roman civilization, not unlike the cultures of postimperial regimes such as those of the White Huns in eastern Iran and the other Toba Tartars in China. Ironically, barbarian nations attempted to avoid assimilation into the civilizations they had conquered (McNeill 1963). In the end, the older societies absorbed their conquerors. The Visigoths began to feel pressure to adopt the religion of their conquered populations in the sixth century.

In A.D. 507, Clovis, king of the Franks, pushed the Visigoths out of the Aquitaine, killing their king, Alaric II, in the process. Though the Visigoths retained Septima, a strip of land stretching along the Gallic coast to the Rhone River, they were shocked by the willingness of their Gallo-Roman subjects to receive the Franks as liberators. Clovis was a Catholic and Roman loyalism naturally gravitated to the Frankish kingdom as a Catholic state. The Visigoths now reoriented their polity toward Spain, transferring their capital to Toledo. However, even in Spain, the specter of a Catholic reconquest haunted them.

The eastern half of the Roman Empire survived, centered around the city of Constantinople, whose Aegean and Levantine society continued to prosper even as trading links with the western Mediterranean faltered. The east Roman or Byzantine Empire retained control of the wealthy provinces of Anatolia, Syria and Egypt. Only the Balkans were severely ravaged by barbarian migrations.

Protected by the high walls of Constantinople, the Byzantine court was anxious to restore Roman sovereignty in the lost western provinces. At the same time, however, the eastern empire faced the threat of Sassanian Iran on its Syrian frontier. Meanwhile, Syria and Egypt were in the throes of a religious revolution, espousing Monophysite Christianity against the doctrines of the imperial Chalcedonian church. Nevertheless, the Byzantine Empire, with its impregnable capital and rich provinces, presented an outer aspect of strength—the true heir of Hellenistic

civilization and of the Greco-Roman imperial tradition. During the reign of Justinian (527–565), the Roman Imperium reached a second period of magnificence and power (Roberts 1997).

Justinian The Great, dreamed of restoring the former unity of the Roman world. He was also a cultural patron of the new Byzantine-style arts and the builder of Hagia Sophia. The emperor supervised the codification of Roman law; its regalist concepts would underpin the entire absolutist framework of later European monarchies (Madden 1929). Impressed by the brilliance of Justinian's reign, barbarian princes in Italy, Spain, North Africa, and Gaul rushed to receive honors from his court and to emulate its civilization. However, Justinian aspired to more than cultural hegemony; he and his able general Belisarius devised a grand strategy to reconquer the west.

Shortly after A.D. 535, the Vandal kingdom in North Africa fell before Justinian's new army, composed of Iranian-style heavy-horse archers. A few years later, Belisarius invaded Ostrogothic Italy, and fighting on the peninsula continued for over two decades. Nevertheless, the Roman peoples in the reconquered provinces welcomed Byzantine forces as liberators from barbarian rule. They were also eager for the return of a Catholic government as most German barbarian tribes professed Arianism. Only the Franks in Gaul were Catholics, and they were too powerful to be easily reconquered. In 554, east Roman forces landed in southeastern Spain; the Hispano-Roman cities of Baetica welcomed their fellow Catholics and the restoration of imperial rule (Berreta 1952). Upon Justinian's death in A.D. 565, the Mediterranean was once more a Roman lake (Mare Nostrum).

The newly reconquered Roman provinces were quickly disillusioned with an imperial apparatus that overtaxed them and did not properly defend them from renewed barbarian invasion. Moreover, the western Romans had become comfortable with their barbarian overlords' ramshackle forms of government. Justinian's restoration, on the other hand, did reinforce Roman culture in the West and acquainted those lands with the new Byzantine civilization of Constantinople (Brown 1970). However, there is little evidence of renewed commerce or export production in the waning economies of the western Mediterranean.

The Visigothic king, Leovigild (A.D. 568–586), reacted vigorously to the Byzantine threat. He extinguished the Suevi kingdom in Gallicia and forced the warlike Basques to recognize Visigothic suzerainty. Furthermore, Leovigild consciously modeled his court and government on Roman precedents. The Visigothic monarch tried to impose Arianism on the Hispano-Roman population in order to foster unity in the face of Byzantine and Frankish aggression. The plan backfired, and Leovigild's son, Hermingild, led a pro-Catholic rebellion that looked to the Byzantines for support. Finally, Leovigild's successor, Recared (586–601), rejected his father's failed policy and embraced the Catholic faith. The Gothic nobility and clergy followed their sovereign into the Catholic Church. The conversion of the Visigoths accelerated the fusion of the Goths with their Hispano-Roman subjects; this process represented the triumph of Roman Civilization over the Visigoths' Germanic culture (Altamira 1949).

After Ricared's conversion, the Catholic Visigothic kingdom would survive another 120 years as a confessional state. The Byzantine model was paramount in this process, but it should be recalled that other confessional empires were rising at about the same time, including the Islamic Caliphate and the Buddhist empire of the Sui-Tang Dynasty (Truxillo 1995). By the early seventh century, the Visigoths were able to reconquer the Byzantine enclaves in southern Spain; this was another result of their espousal of Catholicism. As a Catholic state, Visigothic Spain was thoroughly Latinized; the Visigoths even abandoned their German language and adopted a Roman law code, the *Liber Judiciorum*. Eventually, Catholic bishops became the chief counselors of the Visigothic kings, whose primary advisoral body was the ecclesiastic council of Toledo attended by prelates and nobles and which convened seventeen times in the seventh century (Reilly 1993). Visigothic kings exercised full patronage over the Catholic Church, appointing bishops and calling church councils; their model was Constantine. The Gothic monarchs, in turn, were exemplars to future Spanish rulers, especially those of the Bourbon Dynasty (1700–1808) (Brading 1991). Unfortunately, the Visigothic kingdom was unable to achieve stability because succession to the throne was elective and often contested by rival lineages. Succession by contest was typical of many nomadic and tribal peoples, including the later Mongols of Chingiz Khan (Hodgson 1974). Perennial instability undermined the economy and squandered royal resources, increasing the power of the nobles. The sacred monarchy that churchmen hoped to create could not long survive in this milieu.

The death of King Witzia in 710 highlighted the systemic weakness of the monarchy. Witzia's son was pushed aside in favor of Roderick, duke of Baetica. The aggrieved faction then called on Tariq ibn Ziyad, Muslim governor of Tangier, who crossed into Spain and defeated Roderick's army at Río Guadalete. The Visigoth king died in battle, and the Muslims proceeded to conquer the country. As a confessional state recently converted to Catholicism, the Visigothic kingdom legislated punitively against the Jews, who were also Spain's chief commercial class. The Jews were often enslaved, persecuted, and forced to convert (Reilly 1993). Their hatred of the Visigothic state may have also contributed to its downfall: later Spanish legend recounts that the Jews opened the gates of Christian cities to the Moors (Alaman 1851).

The Romans and then the Visigoths ruled Spain for over nine hundred years; they set a definitive stamp on Spanish national identity, and, by extension on that of Spanish America. The Romans gave Spain its name (Hispania=España), the Latin language that became modern Spanish, and the country's national religion, Roman Catholicism. Furthermore, Rome incorporated the Iberian peninsula as an integral part of Greco-Roman civilization, bringing to Spain the urban tradition of the polis, the winter wheat, wine, and olive oil economy, Roman law, and the tradition of the paterfamilias. The Visigoths, for the most part, maintained this heritage, building on Rome's political and socioeconomic infrastructure in Spain (Alaman 1851).

The Germanic contribution to Spanish culture was not as great as that of Rome's, but it was significant. The Goths replaced the concept of Roman egalitarian citizenship with the Germanic ideal of the inherent nobility of free men

participating in a ruling culture; this ancient tribal value was not unlike that of the ancient Celts, which was subsequently overlaid by the Greco-Roman concept of political citizenship. The Visigoths elevated their tribal class system into a comprehensive ethic of aristocracy, which would survive in Spain until the end of the nineteenth century (Nutini 1995). They also enshrined the nobiliary ideal in their legal codes, which promoted the idea of ascribed legal rights—incumbent upon one's caste status. In medieval times, these ascribed rights were called *Fueros*; they were informed by the very ancient Indo-European tradition of dividing society into three social castes: ruling-warriors, advisoral priesthoods, and serving-laborers. The Visigothic language also supplied Spanish dialects with many terms for weapons and armor, as was appropriate to a military aristocracy.

The worldwide military revolution initiated in Iran and central Asia from the third century B.C. to the sixth century A.D. made cavalry forces the supreme arbiters of the battlefield. Along with mounted warriors came the feudal tradition of military land tenure, which contributed to the decentralization of postclassical governments (McNeill 1963). The Visigoths had become horsemen on the plains of southern Russia; they maintained their nomadic lifestyle which included cattle-herding when they settled on the central plateau of Spain. In effect, the Goths originated what would later become Spain's chivalric culture. Moreover, Germanic cattle-herding reinforced the pastoral economy of the Iberian peninsula, which was already widespread in ancient times. The Atlantic fringe from the British Isles to Spain and south along Africa's west coast was the refuge of a particular form of pastoralism based on cattle-herding that would eventually be transported to the Americas and become the cowboy cultures of the New World (Jordan 1993).

The most significant Visigothic legacy to Spain's future ideological development was the ideal of a unitary monarchy ruling the entire peninsula (Vives 1970). Until the Visigothic unification of Hispania in the early seventh century, the Iberian peninsula had been little more than a geographical expression akin to Italy or Asia Minor. Various peoples lived in or ruled parts of Iberia for centuries—Iberians, Celts, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthagenians and Romans; however, none of them had conceived of Spain as a sovereign territorial polity. The idea of a national monarchy descends from an Iron Age (B.C. 1200–300) formulation—a homogeneous people acknowledging the rule of a supreme executive. The examples of national kingship provided by ancient Israel and Macedon are of particular relevance to the European political experience (Truxillo 1995).

The Visigoths established the foundations of Spain as a national monarchy, sovereign and separate from the Roman government upon which it was based. A similar process can be seen in the birth of national identities in Frankish Gaul, Lombard Italy, Anglo-Saxon England, and Saxon Germany. Those barbarian regimes were in effect regional versions of the earlier universal Roman Imperium.

Regionalism and local particularism were and are pronounced in Spain, perhaps the result of its diverse geography. Nevertheless, the Visigothic model of a peninsular monarchy or empire has been the goal of subsequent Iberian political agendas. The vision of a lost Visigothic imperium haunted the rulers of medieval Leon; later, the Spanish Habsburgs fleetingly realized this ambition for sixty years

(1580–1640) (Vives 1970). In recent history, the accord reached between the Franco regime in Spain and the Salazar government of Portugal hinted at a modern version of a united Hispania. However, events since the death of "El Caudillo" have highlighted the countervailing strength of Iberian regionalism—as manifested in the emergence of Basque nationalism and the concession of provincial autonomy to Catalonia by the government of King Juan Carlos (b. 1975–).

ISLAMIC SPAIN AND THE *RECONQUISTA*

Military conflict between Christians and Muslims dates back to the rise of Islam as a religious-social system in the early seventh century A.D. The Arabs were primarily a pastoral, nomadic people when they received the teaching of the Arabian prophet, Muhammad (570–632). Inspired by this new faith and led by the worldly townsmen of Mecca and Medina, the Bedouin Arabs swept out of their desert lands, conquering Sassanian Iran, Byzantine Syria, Egypt, and North Africa; further west in 711, Muslim armies entered Spain. The conquest, a testimony to Islamic ardor and Arab military prowess, was accomplished in less than one century—between 632 and 711 (Hodgson 1974). From the fall of the Classical Empires in Eurasia (225–636) until the European discovery of the New World (1492), the rise and expansion of Islam was the most significant event in world history. The struggle against Islam would become the crucible of Christian Spanish character (Lomax 1978).

Christians and Jews were at first tolerated in the new Arab Empire; they were expected to recognize Islam's fulfillment of Judaism and Christianity's religious mission—to bring the whole world to the knowledge of God. When the Ummayad Caliph Abd Al-Malik constructed the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem in 691, many Christians and Jews recognized in this act the restoration of Solomon's temple, prophesized in their own scriptures. Within two centuries of this event, most of the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain had converted to Islam. The spiritual purity of Islam's monotheism seemed liberating to those restive under the regulatory authority of Rabbinical Judaism, the caste consciousness of Zoroastrianism, and the doctrinal exclusivity of hierarchical Catholicism. The scale and speed of Islam's conquests must also have provided a sure incentive (Hodgson 1974).

Christianity receded from those lands that had been civilized the longest. The church-state matrix of Catholic Christianity was confined to western Europe and the beleaguered Byzantine Empire after the eighth century. Meanwhile, the Arab caliphate became the vehicle for a great new social experiment—Islamic civilization—which before modern times, in the millennium between 700 and 1700, was the most widespread society in the world. Islamdom eventually extended to Morocco on the Atlantic and to Mindanao in the Far East and from Moscow in the north to Mombasa in southeastern Africa. At the end of the fifteenth century, non-Muslim civilizations only survived as independent societies in Christian Europe and in the Far East (Hodgson 1974). Before 1500 Muslims had no knowledge of the New

World; therefore the Columbus expedition was fateful, allowing Christian Europeans to break through a centuries-old Islamic barrier.

On two occasions the Christian Europeans attempted to overcome their isolation from the rest of the Old World; the first of these attempts was the Crusades. The second occurred during the great age of oceanic discovery and led to the global hegemony of Europe, which under the current ascendancy of the United States is only now receding as new non-Western powers such as Japan, China, and Iran feel strong enough to challenge American preponderance.

The Crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were a series of military expeditions inspired and directed by the Papacy for the purpose of liberating the Holy Land from non-Christian rule. The Europeans, at first, succeeded in defeating the Seljuk Turks and then in establishing a colonial society in Syria and Palestine. They accomplished this with the assistance of the new Italian maritime powers: Amalfi, Pisa, Venice, and Genoa. The Italians were masters of amphibious warfare, which helped the Crusaders capture coastal cities (Pryor 1992). After liberating Jerusalem (1099) from the forces of the Fatimid Caliphate, the newly created Crusader states prospered for eighty years, being heavily reinforced and supplied by sea. Unfortunately, the Crusaders also dealt a fatal blow to the Byzantine Empire, when the misdirected Fourth Crusade captured Constantinople in 1204 at the instigation of Venice. An unsteady Latin Empire was set up in Byzantium's place for a few decades; this decidedly weakened Christendom's eastern flank against future Turkish aggression.

Muslims eventually rallied under the leadership of Atabeg Zengi of Mosul and later Saladin, sultan of Egypt and Syria. Their forces initially contained Crusader expansion, then pushed the Europeans out of Palestine as a result of Saladin's victory at Hattin Horns in 1187. Crusades continued for another century but failed to recapture a substantial portion of the Holy Land. In desperation, the Pope in Rome sought an alliance with the pagan Mongols, who were marching victoriously through Islamic Iran. And though the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258, killing the Abbasid caliph, they were unable to link up with the Crusaders after the Mamluks (slave-warriors) defeated them in 1260 at Ayn Jalut. Eventually the Mamluk sultan of Egypt turned on the remaining Crusader strongholds, reducing them one after another by 1290 (Bartlett 1993).

Having defeated the Crusades, Muslims under the leadership of the Ottoman Turks launched a countercrusade from the Anatolian marchlands. In 1453 the Ottoman sultan, Muhammed II (1450–1481), captured Constantinople and proclaimed himself Padishah Rumi, emperor of the Romans. Christian Europe was shocked, though the western Europeans had given little aid to what they considered to be a schismatic Greek empire. Using Constantinople as a base of a new Islamic empire, the Ottoman Turks proceeded to conquer Greece, birthplace of Western civilization, then the Balkans and Hungary. Armed with gunpowder weapons, Ottoman armies pressed into central Europe, besieging Vienna twice, in 1529 and 1683. Before modern times, the Christians of Spain were the only Europeans to substantially roll back the frontiers of Islamdom (Roberts 1997).

In 711 forces of the Ummayad caliphate crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from North Africa and began the rapid conquest of Visigothic Spain. The Arabs also moved deep into central France, most of the Spanish cities having fallen without a fight. However, the Muslim armies of camel-bedouins were far away from their North African bases and were operating out of their ecological element, the desert. In 732 Charles Martel, mayor of the palace, led a Frankish heavy cavalry force to victory against the Arabs at Tours. Earlier in 718, Muslim hosts were thrown back from the walls of Constantinople; these victories, in effect, saved Christendom (Davies 1996).

Between 711 and 1212, the Muslims controlled most of the Iberian peninsula. Arab immigrants from the Middle East settled in the fertile river valleys of southern Spain or along the Spanish Levant, mostly in the surviving Hispano-Roman cities. Meanwhile, the Berber allies of the Arabs were assigned less attractive lands in central Spain or along the Duero River. In the richest area of Spain, Al-Andalus, the Muslims created a splendid colonial version of Islamic civilization. For a few centuries, Spain appeared to be an outpost of Middle Eastern culture. Not since the age of the Carthagenian Barcas had Spain been so orientalized (Chejne 1974).

The Ummayad caliphate collapsed in 750 and was replaced by a new Arab dynasty, the Abbasids. The new regime redirected the Caliphal Empire away from a Mediterranean strategy directed from Damascus to an Iraqi and Iranian orientation centered on Baghdad (Hodgson 1974). The Arab Imperium took on the aspect of a neo-Sassanian state instead of a neo-Byzantine polity; the change of tactics marginalized Spain as a far western outpost of Islamdom. Related to these events was the slaughter of the Ummayads by the victorious Abbasids and the subsequent flight of Abd Al-Rahman, a member of the fallen dynasty. He fled to Spain and was eventually acknowledged there by loyal Syrian troops.

Abd Al-Rahman spent the next thirty years (756–788) consolidating his rule over Al-Andalus, while warding off an Abbasid reconquest. At first, the Ummayad emirs did not aspire to the caliphal title of the Abbasids, while the Baghdad government remained strong. Furthermore, Abd Al-Rahman thwarted Charlemagne's campaign against Saragossa in 777–778, though the Franks did found a march in Catalonia, centered around Barcelona. At the same time, the small Christian principality of Asturias managed to maintain itself north of the Duero River (Collins 1983).

For over three centuries, Islamic Spain (711–1031) waxed great in the western Mediterranean; its fleets commanded the avenues of trade with North Africa and the Near East, bringing slaves, gold, ivory, and oriental luxuries to the underdeveloped economies of western Europe. Meanwhile, Cordova, the capital of Al-Andalus, was a brilliant urban center—the greatest city in western Europe, with a population of over 100,000. However, Ummayad Spain never seemed to be able to stabilize its hold over the country. The emirate's Christian population was rebellious and a potential ally of the kingdom of Asturias in the north. The Berber tribes were also prone to move away from their northern marches toward the rich south (Chejne 1974).

In 929 the Ummayad emir Abd Al-Rahman III proclaimed himself caliph. He did this as a counterpoise to the newly created Fatimid caliphate in North Africa and in response to the declining fortunes of the Abbasid government. The caliphate of Cordoba was an exemplar to all of western Europe, whose people sought to trade with the Moors and emulate their brilliant material culture. The Christians even reacquainted themselves with Greco-Roman philosophy and science through the agency of Muslim academies in Spain and Sicily (Altamira 1949). At the zenith of its power, the caliphate of Cordoba fell victim to militarism, court intrigue, and regionalism—the bane of Islamic politics. Meanwhile, the Christian statelets in the north were ready to take advantage of the Ummayads' weakness.

In the aftermath of the initial Arab conquest, surviving elements of the Visigothic aristocracy rallied in the Cantabrian Mountains of northern Spain to resist the Muslim assault. The earliest of the Christian states to emerge was that of Asturias, which later became the empire of Leon when García I (911–914) moved his capital to the old Roman campsite of Legio (Leon). Moreover, the kings of Leon dreamed of restoring the Visigothic monarchy, and their court affected the style, ceremony, and government of the Visigoths (Reilly 1993). The Leonese saw themselves as the leaders of Christian Spain, having captured Oporto in the west and then colonizing the Duero basin. These successes culminated in Ramiro II's defeat of caliphal forces at Simancas in 939.

The other Christian states east of Leon were supported by France (as in the case of Barcelona), or they were created by separatist frontier populations; such were the origins of Castile, Navarre, and Aragón. These Christian statelets were warlike and predatory. In the first instance, Christian principalities prospered in the areas of Spain that the Muslims had either abandoned or had found unconducive to their Mediterranean way of life. Christian Spain also received succor and reinforcements from the rest of Christendom, especially the Popes in Rome and the Clunaic monks of Burgundy. However, Leon, Castile, Navarre, Aragón, and Barcelona remained poor, divided, and culturally unimportant before the eleventh century (Collins 1983).

In the late tenth century, the Ummayad vizir Al-Mansur (the victorious) waged a ferocious thirty-year war to destroy Christian Spain. His armies, mostly composed of Slavic and African Mamluks (slave warriors), ravaged the north, even sacking the great shrine of Santiago de Compostela. Santiago (St. James), the apostle, was promoted by the rulers of Asturias as the paladin of the Christian reconquest of Spain. In spite of these victories, caliphal troops refused to permanently occupy those northern lands; earlier Berber auxiliaries had withdrawn from the northern marches in much the same way. The Christian kinglets rankled at their subordinate status, having been forced to recognize the sovereignty of the caliphate. When the government of Cordoba disintegrated in the early eleventh century, a series of petty successor states known as the "party kings" (*taifas*) emerged. The Christians took advantage of this situation and struck deep into Muslim territory; they fostered civil war, intimidated the weakened *taifas*, and made them pay large tributes for protection. Moreover, the revival of religious activism in Europe inspired crusading sentiments, which motivated foreign knights to come to Spain and

participate in the *Reconquista*. This movement, along with trade and pilgrimages to Compostela, accelerated Christian Spain's integration into European society (O'Callaghan 1975). Alfonso III (866–911), El Magno, dreamed of restoring Spain as an Hispanic Imperium; by the middle of the eleventh century, this goal seemed attainable. The *Reconquista*, in effect, was a Catholic *jihad* (holy war), inspired by the example of Islam's military mission. The *Reconquista* militarized Spanish Christian society, preparing the Spaniards for their warlike role in the New World (Góngora 1975).

All was not conflict, however, between Christians and Moors. Medieval Castilian kings were proud to call themselves "Kings of the Two Religions"—Christianity and Islam. Through Islamic Spain, Christendom benefitted culturally by way of contact with a more civilized society. Islamdom maintained and advanced the Mediterranean civilization of Greece and Rome, and it also drew inspiration from the older heritages of Egypt and Babylonia. Islamic mystics, such as Ibn Al-Arabi (ca. 1200) were masters of Sufi knowledge and, as such, may have founded the Spanish tradition of esoteric gnosis that flowered so brilliantly during the *Siglo de Oro*—the time of St. Theresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross.

Another Spanish Muslim luminary of the late twelfth century was Ibn-Rusd, known in the west as Averroes. He believed that faith and reason were entirely separate paths to knowledge and as such irreconcilable. For Ibn-Rusd, Aristotle, the philosopher, and Muhammad, the prophet, represented contrasting mentalities and archetypes, though reason teaches the philosopher to appreciate the truths imparted to the masses by religion. Averroes' ideas would greatly influence European thought during the high Middle Ages (1100–1300) (Urvoy 1991).

Much later, Ibn-Khaldun (ca. 1400), a philosopher of Spanish descent, taught that religion as manifested in society through history is to be preferred to philosophical and scientific inquiry because the latter are the luxurious products of declining civilizations, whereas religion is natural to people in the first stages of cultural socialization. Ibn-Khaldun developed an entire system of sociology and a historiography to explore this process (Hodgson 1974). Ironically, he did this with the acute eye of a philosophical rationalist. On the Christian side, Raymond Lull (d. 1315) was as great an intellect as any of the aforementioned Muslims; he was also a student of Arabic and a master of Sufic lore. Lull also wrote history, philosophy, and chivalric manuals; in short, this Catalan genius was representative of the diverse and complex culture of medieval Spain (Altamira 1949).

After the Christians conquered Toledo in Spain (1085) and Palermo in Sicily (1081), they set up special schools of translation to impart Muslim learning to Christendom. From alcohol to algebra and chemistry, much terminology and information filtered into Europe by way of Islamic Spain and Sicily. Even the literary conventions of romantic love originated in Hispano-Arabic poetry. The music of Spain and the medieval troubadours of Provence also had their roots in the same Hispano-Moorish tradition. Moreover, the Spanish language is rich in Arabic loan words (Watt 1965). The eastern Mediterranean custom of secluding upper-class women and veiling them in public very much influenced Spanish family relations, especially in Andalusia. In the same region, the code of masculine honor known as

"machismo" evolved, which was predicated on male control of women (Hodgson 1974).

The Arabs brought Near Eastern agricultural techniques to Spain, such as irrigated *hairdos*, windmills, and sugar processing methods. In the arts, the impact of Middle Eastern and North African art and architecture on southern Spanish buildings and decor is obvious. Finally, the equestrian arts and the pastoral-nomadic values of both Arabs and Berbers served as archetypes, reinforcing Spanish herding and ranching traditions. The equipment, livestock, and style of Spanish *vaqueros* and *rancheros* in the Old and New Worlds owe much to the Moors (Jordon 1993).

Spain and Sicily as western outposts of Islamdom participated in the wealthy trade network that connected the Mediterranean region to China. The spillover from this system stimulated the more backward and rural economies of Europe, Africa, the Russian Steppes, and Southeast Asia. For example, gold from West Africa drew Muslim merchants, missionaries, and conquerors southward from the Maghrib. Muslim cadres were soon established in sub-Saharan lands, and they provided western Islamdom and Europe with much needed specie. Later, the *taifas* were reduced to tributary status by the Christian kingdoms; the Portuguese, Leonese, Castilians, Basques, Aragonese, and Catalans were drawn inexorably southward out of poverty, avarice, and religious zeal (Braudel 1973).

In 1085 the frontier city and arsenal of Muslim Spain, Toledo, fell to the forces of Alfonso VI, emperor of Leon. The main burden of the *Reconquista* would fall upon Castile and Leon, because of their long traditions of taking and resettling Moorish lands. These two kingdoms also had long and bitter experience with Muslim retaliation. Exposure to Moorish counterattacks led to the construction of many castles in the country later named "Castilla" or land of castles (Lomax 1978). Aragón eventually united with the county of Barcelona and captured the emirate of Saragossa in 1118. However, the kingdom's ambitions were divided between the conquest of Valencia and dynastic ambitions in southwestern France. Further west, Navarre was landlocked and after the death of Sancho the Great (1035), father of the Castilian and Aragonese royal lines, largely excluded from the great campaigns of the *Reconquista*. On the Atlantic fringe, Portugal, first as a Leonese vassal, then as an independent kingdom, led the west wing of the great offensive against Spanish Islam. The Portuguese *Reconquista* culminated in the capture of Lisbon in 1147. With the tribute and booty extracted from Al-Andalus, the Christian kingdoms began to modestly participate in Europe's medieval fluorescence.

The great weakness of Spanish Islam was that Muslims never sank deep roots into the land. Their orientation was always urban, leaving the countryside to the Mozarabs (Arabized Christians). Furthermore, the atomized nature of Islamic society with its emphasis on the individual rather than particular groups handicapped its ability to undertake prolonged social endeavors of the kind a more corporatist or group-oriented society, such as medieval Europe, regularly sustained. Islamdom's contractualistic social system emphasized achieved status rather than ascribed rank; such characteristics gave medieval Islamic society its strangely modern aspect. Because of this, Islamic societies often produced individual geniuses, but they had difficulty sustaining their accomplishments and giving continuity to

their efforts. This was not the case in a corporatist system, where various intermediary groups (guilds, universities, city councils, feudal lords, and religious orders) help to maintain enterprises requiring long-term investment. On the other hand, contractual social systems are more dynamic and may respond to new situations more quickly than occurs in corporatist societies. They are also more vulnerable and unstable, lacking the conserving and accumulating techniques of their societal rival (Hodgson 1974). In Spain, the difference between these two kinds of social systems is manifested in the meteoric rise and flowering of Islamic culture, followed by its rapid eclipse and conquest—contrasted with the gradual, steady, and later unstoppable advance of Christian Spain at the expense of its brilliant but unstable other, Al-Andalus.

The fall of Toledo called the Muslims of Spain to their senses; they had lost a major city because of their divisiveness. The Moorish ruling class was urbane and prosperous but no longer warlike. Interestingly, Islamic polities were often founded by pastoral nomads (Arabs, Berbers, and Turks for example), who conquered more civilized urban societies. Nomads often lost their martial elan as rulers of conquered cities, setting themselves up for another round of conquest by ruder cousins fresh from the hinterlands. This process was analyzed by Ibn-Khaldun in his introduction to world history, the *Muqqadimah* (Kennedy 1996). The emir of Seville laconically summed up the dilemma of Spanish Muslims, "Better a camel herder in Morocco than a swineherd in Castile." Faced with the prospect of subjugation to intolerant and uncultured infidels, the leaders of Al-Andalus looked to their desert homelands for salvation.

From 1086 to 1110, the forces of the Almoravids repeatedly crossed over from North Africa to help their Spanish brethren. The Almoravids were a reforming party of North African Berbers (Tuaregs to be more precise), who found their vocation waging *Jihad* against the Black African pagans of the Senegal River region. The Almoravids founded their regime on Malikism, a rigid school of Islamic law (*Sharia*); Marrakesh was their capital in Morocco. Almoravid is the transliteration of "Al-Murabitun," which means "men of the *ribats*." The *ribats* were frontier fortresses where bachelor *Ghazis* (holy warriors) waged war on surrounding territories until they had enough captured booty to marry and set up proper households (Watt 1965).

Almoravid armies were equipped with hippopotamus-hide shields, which even crossbow bolts could not penetrate; they also used kettle drums to strike terror among their enemies. Like the early Bedouins, the Almoravids rode camels into battle; they, however, dismounted and fought in ranked infantry formations (Payne 1973). In 1086 at Sagrajas, they routed the armies of Alfonso VI, who barely escaped with his life. Later in 1103 the Almoravids pushed El Cid's forces out of Valencia. Finally in 1108, the Leonese crown prince was killed in battle near Ulces. Southern Spain was swept clear of Christian forces. However, the victorious Almoravids were unable to recapture Toledo or restore the situation on the Ebro where Aragón took Saragossa in 1118. Ironically, the taifa emirs soon regretted their invitation to the Almoravids, who appeared more like an army of occupation than rescuers (Lomax 1978).

Within a generation of restoring Al-Andalus, the martial qualities of the Almoravids waned as they encamped among the gardens and fleshpots of Moorish Spain. The Christians, on the other hand, rallied under the leadership of Alfonso I of Aragón (1104–1134), Alfonso VII of Castile and Leon (1126–1157), and Afonso I of Portugal (1128–1185); they began to push deep into Almoravid territory. The Spanish military orders were formed during this period, partially, modeled on the crusading orders (Templars, Hospitallars, and Teutonic knights) and the Almoravid *ribats*. By the middle of the twelfth century, the Tagus and Ebro River valleys had been secured by the Christians. As mentioned earlier, Lisbon was captured (1147) with the assistance of a Crusader fleet from England and Flanders, later becoming the capital of the separate kingdom of Portugal (Marques 1972). Alfonso VII died in 1157; his great dream of a confederated Spanish Imperium ended when he divided the Leonese empire between his two sons. The *Reconquista* seemed to be faltering. Aragón became more involved in the affairs of southern France, while most Crusaders preferred to see action in the Holy Land instead of Spain. Finally, the Christians needed time to consolidate their gains and repopulate the lands they had reconquered.

The Muslims were in no position to exploit the situation created by their opponents' loss of momentum. A much reduced Al-Andalus degenerated once again into warring emirates as Almoravid power collapsed. Unfortunately, cultural brilliance did not compensate for a society in the throes of political devolution. Islamic Spain, on the defensive, clearly lacked a purpose such as that which sustained the old caliphate of Cordoba in the days when competition with the Fatimids and Charlemagne had defined its orientation. Mere survival in the face of Christian encroachments was only a prelude to increased militarization, economic decline, and religious intolerance. By this time most of the population of Al-Andalus was Muslim, many of the Mozarabs having immigrated to the Christian realms (Payne 1973). Half of Spain was still under Muslim control, but the strongest and most dynamic part was Christian; the outcome of the *Reconquista* was now inevitable.

In 1130 Abd Al-Mumin, leader of yet another confederation of Berber tribes, rose up in the mountains of Morocco against the Almoravids. Abd Al-Mumin proclaimed the formation of a millennialist caliphate under the spiritual guidance of the Mahdi, Ibn Tumart; this new reformist movement was that of the Almohads or Al-Muwalhidun (the monotheists). They were the first in a long line of Sufi-led Berber revolutions that would determine and shape the history of Morocco. Furthermore, the Almohads had every intention of conquering the whole Islamic world; they overthrew Almoravid rule in North Africa in 1150 and then invaded Spain around 1160 (Watts 1965). The armies of the new caliphate swept into Al-Andalus, deposing native Andalusian emirs and Almoravid governors; the Christians soon felt the power of the Almohad advance. However, they (like the Almoravids) failed to dislodge the Christians from any major cities.

On the battlefield Almohad forces were invincible; they excelled at rapid maneuver and feigned withdrawal, whereas the Christians were masters of the arts of siege craft and fortification, which allowed them to hold a conquered territory in depth. The feudal system of military land tenure also contributed to their strength

because the Christians, unlike the Muslims, were willing to settle the countryside and disperse military and political power throughout the land (Lomax 1978). The Christians often expelled the Muslims from a conquered territory, and replaced them with military colonists.

By the time of the Almohad restoration, the area remaining to the Muslims was not sufficient to counterbalance the resources of the Christian portion of Spain. The Muslims desperately tried to circumvent Christian strength by drawing on the manpower and wealth of North Africa. However, the assets of western Islamdom were insufficient when compared to the reinforcements and connections Christian Spain could call upon from western Europe—the latter being densely populated and rich in agrarian production, thus capable of supporting many knights and cities (Bartlett 1986).

At Alarcos in 1195, the Almohads mauled a Castilian army, sending shock waves throughout Europe; the response was quick in coming. With the help of Pope Innocent III, a major Crusade was preached and a pan-Hispanic alliance was formed; forces from the whole of Christendom assembled. Only Leon refused to join because of its disputed frontier with neighboring Castile. The Almohads barely had time to savor their recent victory and enjoy the fruits of Al-Andalus. The caliphs ruled from Seville, which they embellished as the new capital of western Islam. Not long after Alarcos, the Almohads were using Catalan mercenaries to defend their hold over North Africa's coasts. Furthermore, revolts against their rule were already occurring in the Moroccan hinterlands, led, as usual, by reforming tribesmen who decried the corruption and lapse from religion of the prevailing regime. Before the Almohads had even consolidated their empire, they went down in bitter defeat in 1212 at the Battle of Navas de Tolosa before a combined force of Spanish and European crusaders. Within twenty years of this encounter, the Almohad caliphate was disintegrating; its constituent parts reemerged as weakened successor states. After Navas de Tolosa, during the reign of St. Ferdinand (1217–1252), Leon was permanently reunited with Castile. The unified kingdom's joint forces, allied to James I, (the Conqueror) of Aragón (1213–1276), initiated the great campaigns that reconquered most of southern Spain except Granada (O'Callaghan 1975).

After the defeat of the Almohad caliphate, Castile emerged as the strongest power in Spain. At the same time, Portugal reconquered the Algrave in 1250, completing its own *Reconquista*. The Aragonese and Catalans captured Majorca in 1229 and Valencia in 1238. After these victories, the Aragonese-Catalan kingdom turned towards a Mediterranean destiny (Bisson 1991). Before this, however, Catalan connections with Provence had suffered when the Papacy launched the Albigensian Crusades; these were directed against Aragón's vassal, Raymond of Toulouse. Castile and Leon's single-mindedness guaranteed that their united monarchy would obtain the lion's share of the *Reconquista*'s spoils. For example, Leonese forces captured Merida and Badajoz in 1230. Later in 1236, Castile conquered Cordoba, followed in 1243 by the fall of Murcia to a combined force of Castilians and Aragonese. With the capitulation of Seville in 1248, the great phase of the *Reconquista* was over (Lomax 1978).

The remnants of Spanish Islam rallied around the emirate of Granada for a last stand. Interestingly, Granada survived for another two and one half centuries, warding off its inevitable reconquest through a combination of diplomacy, tribute, and military resistance (Harvey 1990). Granada feigned tributary status to Castile but often plotted with Moroccan allies for assistance against the Christians. In 1275 at Ecija, the Castilians were defeated, and their crown prince Ferdinand was killed by an army of Granadines and Moroccan tribesmen. Granada had called on the Marinids to rescue what was left of Al-Andalus. The Marinids were a Berber tribal formation like the Almoravids and the Almohads; however, their victory at Ecija did not lead to the restoration of Spanish Islam. The Castilians were wary after their defeat and did not seek an immediate solution to the problem of Granada. Moreover, the task of integrating Andalusia with Castile consumed much of that kingdom's resources for the better part of two centuries (Reilly 1993).

Alfonso X (1252–1284) was king of Castile when Prince Ferdinand, his eldest son, was killed at Ecija; this monarch's reign was one of the most brilliant and complex in Spanish history. Alfonso was a scholar, and a patron of the arts; furthermore, he maintained a multicultural court reminiscent of Norman Sicily's a century before. Alfonso's father, St. Ferdinand, had conquered Andalusia, leaving him with the daunting task of suppressing rebellious nobles and thwarting Marinid incursions. In 1264 the new Castilian king completed the conquest of Murcia with the assistance of James I (1213–1276) of Aragón. Earlier in 1257, Alfonso X was elected Holy Roman Emperor, but his elevation was opposed by the Pope and Rudolf Von Habsburg (Socarras 1979).

Alfonso X, *El Sabio*, a cultural exemplar, supervised the writing of histories, the *Primera cronica general* and the *Gran e general estoria*. His court used Castilian; he established that language as the realm's official dialect, replacing Gallegan. The king's most impressive accomplishment was the codification of Spanish law—the *Siete Partidas*. The *Siete Partidas* were informed by the spirit of the old Visigothic code, *Liber Judiciorum*, and the newly discovered code of Justinian (Madden 1929). These absolutist or regalian legal systems were modified by Spain's particular circumstances, such as the country's aristocratic or, rather, seigniorial orientation (Payne 1973). Furthermore, the *Siete Partidas* were not well received in Castile, where the nobles resented royal encroachment on their rights of domain. The rebellion of Alfonso's son, Sancho (which brought the king's reign to a bitter conclusion) was partially a reaction to El Sabio's high-handed manner, his cosmopolitan court, excessive taxes, military defeat at Ecija, and regalist attitudes.

The *Seite Partidas* were not accepted as Castile's offical law code until 1348. They are, however, of great significance for the subsequent evolution of the Spanish-speaking world. The *Siete Partidas* embody particular attitudes and concepts that would mold Spanish American society in the Imperial Age (1492–1825). Mario Góngora in *Studies in the Colonial History of Spanish America* (p. 68) has succinctly summarized these traits as being the recognition of the king as a natural lord, the center of a legitimate political and social order; the realm as being in the process of bureaucratization; the subordination of the local church to the state; the trend toward urbanization; the orientation of the social classes toward the ethic of

the *caballero*, an ideal that permeated the entire social structure; the university as the matrix of normative learning; seigniorial patterns dominant in the countryside, along with a patriarchal family milieu, which contributed basic concepts to a patrimonial society; the representative institutions of the kingdom—*cortes* and *cabildo*—being considered anomalous to the monarchy's basic objectives.

Mario Góngora also emphasizes the underlying *Romanitas* of the Spanish Monarchy, linked as it was with the Papacy during the *Reconquista*, and founded upon the principles of Roman law. This conjunction of ideas determined the unique characteristics of the Castilian state—which was at once orthodox and propapal, and regalist in orientation—circumstances typical of a society on the military frontier of Christendom. Such a polity required both the outside assistance raised by the Papacy and a strong military command at the center as manifested in an absolutist monarchy (Fernández-Santamaria 1977).

After the death of Alfonso X in 1284, the politics of Europe loomed larger for Spanish kings than the task of completing the *Reconquista*. Castile became involved in the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), which led to the development of a Spanish fleet in the Bay of Biscay. Castilian naval fortunes rose after a victory over the English in 1372 at La Rochelle; Spanish maritime ascendancy would not be overturned until the Armada Campaign of 1588. In 1369 Castile was defeated in its attempt to annex Portugal after a prolonged war (O'Callaghan 1975).

Castile's aristocracy began a period of feudal turbulence that paralleled developments in England and France. The main difference between Castilian aristocratic factionalism and that of England and France was that Castilian nobles sought to dominate the offices of state, not replace the king's authority with their own local jurisdiction. This stage of "bastard feudalism" was even more pronounced in Aragón and Catalonia, where local corporations circumscribed the power of the crown. And this occurred in spite of the fact that Aragón was engaged in a major phase of expansion in the Mediterranean. Aragonese imperialism was given a major impetus during the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers (1282), when the Papacy called on the king of Aragón to overthrow Angevin rule and re-establish law and order. Meanwhile, Catalan ships challenged Genoa's hegemony in the western Mediterranean (Bisson 1991).

The Castilian economy developed a commercial export sector based on the merino sheep runs of Extremadura. Complementing this pastoral enterprise were northern trading fairs at Burgos and Medina del Campo, also a fledgling textile industry in Andalusia. The *mesta* was organized by Alfonso X to regulate sheep ranching and the great pastoral migrations northward across Extremadura and Leon. Castilian agriculture was relegated to a secondary role in order to foster the livestock industry. A lasting pattern was thus formulated; it would affect Spanish enterprise in the New World, where ranching was always preferred to agriculture, being seen as more manly and noble (Jordan 1993).

Aristocratic landholdings maintained Castilian control over the recently conquered lands of Andalusia, and a vibrant town life sustained local industries and contributed to a high degree of municipal autonomy. Castilian cities generally preferred royal jurisdiction to that of the nobility or the church. They also strove to

acquire representation in the Castilian Cortes (parliament); that body was later reduced to rubber stamping royal decrees and raising taxes. Moreover, the great Spanish military orders lost their verve after the end of the *Reconquista* and became privileged landowning corporations. The knights of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcantara, and Montesa, bereft of their military mission, contributed to the violence of the late medieval period (O'Callaghan 1973). The orders owned the greater part of Extremadura, home of so many later *Conquistadores*. Furthermore, the *rancho*, *encomienda*, mission, *presidio*, and *villa* were Spanish institutions developed during the *Reconquista*, then transferred from Spain's southern frontiers to those in the Caribbean, northern Mexico, Chile, Amazonia, and Río de la Plata (Foster 1960).

The last phase of the *Reconquista* began with yet another Granadine appeal to the Marinids for assistance. The Marinids were then at the height of their imperial career in North Africa. Moroccan forces crossed into Spain and were defeated at the Battle of Río Salado in 1340 by the armies of Alfonso XI (1312–1350). The ring was closing around Granada with no hope of relief from North Africa (Harvey 1990).

In 1415 the Portuguese captured Ceuta, which cut off Granada's maritime contact with Morocco, after which the Marinids could no longer cross the Strait of Gibraltar to support their coreligionists in Spain. With the taking of Ceuta, Portugal launched the great seaborne enterprise that would eventually carry the Portuguese out into the Atlantic, south along the west coast of Africa and, eventually, around the southern Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean. This venture, led by Lusitanian *fidalgos* and pioneered by Portugal's mariners, was characterized by exploration, trade, slavery, and missionary endeavor (Marques 1972). Meanwhile in Castile, the aftermath of Río Salado saw the kingdom descend into internal difficulties. Similar problems also afflicted Aragón, which suffered the decline of its Mediterranean empire.

The closing act of the Spanish Middle Ages was the unification of Spain. In 1469 Isabel of Castile married Ferdinand of Aragón, effectively bringing the Iberian peninsula's two largest kingdoms into a dynastic union; this was effected after years of civil war in both realms. In order to fulfill nearly euphoric expectations attending the union of crowns including messianic hopes that a united Spain would liberate Jerusalem, the Catholic Kings initiated the last campaign against Al-Andalus (Liss 1992). In the midst of a dynastic civil war, Granada fell in 1492 to the forces of Ferdinand and Isabel. The Muslims of southern Spain sent frantic appeals to the Ottoman Empire for relief. After the fall of Granada, religious toleration was withdrawn from the recently conquered Muslims; they were forced to become Catholics around 1500. Most of these converts (the moriscos) remained secretly loyal to Islam and constituted a liability to Spain during the era of Ottoman hegemony in the Mediterranean. In 1568 the moriscos rose in rebellion throughout the mountains of Granada; they even received some arms and troops from the Ottomans. The rising was crushed by Don Juan of Austria. Afterwards, the expulsion of the moriscos was inevitable; it occurred in 1609–1614. Coming more than a century after the earlier expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal (1492–1494), that of the moriscos, in effect, brought to closure the Iberian peninsula's ancient

connection with Semitic cultures—Phoenicians, Carthagenians, Jews, and Arabs (Hess 1978).

The single-mindedness of the *Reconquista* would inspire the Castilians to assume a triple responsibility in the sixteenth century: (1) The Spanish crusade against Islam would continue in North Africa and in the Mediterranean; (2) Protestantism and Ottoman imperialism, together with the Habsburg connection, involved Spain in the affairs of northern and central Europe, especially as the champion of the Counter-Reformation (1542–1648); (3) Finally, the Spanish Monarchy's greatest enterprise was the conquest of the Indies and the subsequent foundation of Spanish America.

As Spain approached the eve of its great age, the *Siglo de Oro*, the Spanish Monarchy presented a picture of military strength and ideological purpose. The Spanish Church was also strong and self-assured, immune to the infection of the Reformation; this was the result of its internal reform under the tutelage of Cardinal Cisneros in the late fifteenth century (Payne 1994). The united monarchy was a confederation in which Castile shouldered the greatest burden of taxation and military obligation. Castile was also the mainstay of the union because of its larger size, resources, and manpower (about 6 million in 1492); it also possessed a stronger royal government than Aragón (Kamen 1991).

The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabel was an early example of a Gunpowder Empire; it used cannon to reduce feudal lords to obedience by destroying their castles. Furthermore, gunpowder weapons facilitated centralization because only a strong state could afford the expense and support the complexity of the new technology (Cippola 1965). Armed with cannons and handguns, Spanish armies overawed Europe for more than a century; great captains such as Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, the duke of Alba, Alexander Parma, and Ambrosio Spinola sustained Spain's military ascendancy and developed new fighting techniques, such as close-order drill infantry regiments *tercios* armed with pikes and muskets, supported by artillery trains and cavalry formations. The *tercio* resembled the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion, upon which it was ultimately modeled (Altamira 1949). Meanwhile, the soldiers of the *tercios* perfected their military skills on the battlefields of Europe when Castile assumed the burden of supporting, then promoting, Aragón's hegemonic ambitions in Italy. After 1492, Spanish mariners, Conquistadores, and missionaries began to traverse the world's oceans, discovering a New World overseas.

Chapter 2

The Habsburg *Welt Reich*

Spain emerged as a great power in Latin Christendom during the reign of the Catholic Kings (1474–1516), Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabel of Castile. The union of these crowns brought together the domains of the Iberian peninsula's largest kingdoms, including Aragón's overseas territories—the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Castile, however, was the greater, possessing the largest territory and population. The kings of Castile were also, in theory, more absolute than those of Aragón, for the eastern kingdom's rulers had to contend with Aragón's particular laws, charters, and privileges—their *fueros*. The Catholic Kings (a title ancient in Spain since Visigothic times) dreamed of completing the unification of Hispania by means of a dynastic union with Portugal. In 1580 this goal was finally achieved when Philip II (1556–1598) annexed Portugal after its young and quixotic king, Sebastian, was killed invading Morocco. The union with Portugal was not permanent, lasting only sixty years (1580–1640). Unfortunately, the cost of defending Portugal's far-flung possessions in Africa, Brazil, and Asia from Castile's Protestant enemies was beyond the Catholic Monarchy's means. The Portuguese looked for the first opportunity to secede, which came in 1640 after the revolt of the Catalans. Those were terrible years of crisis for Castile (Elliot 1986).

Ferdinand and Isabel also sought to complete the *Reconquista* by eliminating the emirate of Granada; they accomplished this in 1492 and, in the process, built a formidable gunpowder army composed of the invincible *Tercios*. The *Tercios* were infantry regiments composed of pikemen and musketeers, fighting together in the new Swiss phalanx-style (Altamira 1949).

The Catholic Kings' state-building took place during the era of Gunpowder Empires (1453–1840). The age of Gunpowder Imperialism is appropriately named because gunpowder technology provided the period's enabling characteristic. States were reinvigorated by the use of gunpowder weaponry; only strong central governments could afford the expense of cannon foundries and attendant industries. With

cannon, royal armies could blast their way through the fortifications of rebellious subjects or those of foreign enemies. Handguns developed later than artillery; they, however, allowed trained infantry to mow down charging cavalry at a distance, similar to the way English longbowmen cut down French chivalry during the Hundred Years' War. Gunpowder Empires, like the Classical Empires, were defended primarily by expensive standing armies of infantry, which replaced feudal cavalry as the main arm of warfare (Truxillo 1995).

Cannon were also placed aboard sailing ships; and in the early fifteenth century, the naval expeditions of the Chinese admiral Cheng Ho were already so equipped. However, it was the Atlantic powers of Europe that used ships as floating gun-platforms the most effectively. First the Portuguese, then the Castilians, English, French, and Dutch sailed the seas searching for plunder, slaves, and gold. They also used seaborne artillery to blast their way into the markets of Asia after 1498 (Scammell 1989). By the eighteenth century, most of the oceangoing commerce of the world was carried on European ships. Ironically, much of the naval technology used by Europe was originally invented by Chinese and Arabian mariners—the compass, sternpost rudder, lanteen sails, astrolabes, and portolan charts. In many ways, gunpowder technology anticipated later elements of modern technicalization (Cipolla 1965). For example, gunpowder weapons became more accurate, lethal, complex, and expensive with each modification, surpassing and making obsolete earlier improvements. The arms race and great power contests that began in that era continue today.

The period of Gunpowder Imperialism is reminiscent of the age of Classical Empires (550 B.C.–A.D. 565). In both eras, great imperial structures dominated the core areas of Eurasian civilizations. However, there were more Gunpowder Empires because of the expansion of Afro-Eurasian societies since the fall of the Classical Empires; Gunpowder Empires were avatars of their former classical predecessors. The Spanish Habsburg Monarchy under Charles V aspired to be and did, in fact, resemble the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne or the late Roman Imperium of Theodosius. The Catholic World Monarchy was, however, larger and more powerful than that of the earlier caesars. Around the eastern Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire, with its capital in Constantinople, very much appeared to be a restored, albeit Islamicized, Byzantine Empire, for the configuration of territories ruled by Suleiman the Magnificent (1521–1566) and Justinian the Great (527–565) was almost identical (McNeill 1963). At the same time, the Safavid Empire (1500–1722) in Iran maintained the Persian imperial tradition of the Achaemenid (550–331 B.C.), Parthians (250 B.C.–A.D. 224), and Sassanians (A.D. 224–651) dynasties of antiquity. In India, the regime of the Timurid Moghuls (1525–1739) reconstructed an imperium along the lines of the earlier Mauryans (320–185 B.C.), Kushanas (100 B.C.–A.D. 225), and Guptas (320–525 A.D.). Meanwhile, Chinese dynasties, the Ming and Manchu, continued to govern in the tradition of China's millennial empire. The traditional (premodern) civilizations of the Old World were at their apogee in this age of restored empires. Simultaneously, religion receded as the predominant institution, and the state with its new weaponry and secularized personnel came to the fore (Truxillo 1995).

In 1492, the same year Granada fell, the Catholic Kings completed the religious unification of their realms by ordering the expulsion of all Jews who would not convert to the Catholic Faith. Many Jews converted (*conversos*), but continued to secretly practice their old religion. These *conversos* came under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, modeled on the Papal tribunals set up to root out the Albigensian sect in Provence during the thirteenth century. In 1481 Ferdinand and Isabel nationalized this institution, using it as a secret police (Kamen 1991).

The idea that enforced orthodoxy strengthened a kingdom by providing it with a common ideology was ancient. And though the expulsion of the Jews (1492) and later that of the moriscos (1609–1614) was detrimental to Spain's economy, these acts were deemed essential to the monarchy's sense of unitary orthodoxy. Furthermore, the expulsions were popular, and the Inquisition was supported by most "Old Christians"; they detested the unconverted Jews and Moors and, generally, suspected well-placed *conversos* of backsliding and insincerity. Later, many exiled Jews and Moors in Holland and the Ottoman Empire (respectively) would plot against Catholic Spain (Braudel 1973).

Abrahamic forms of monotheism (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have always exhibited a propensity for intolerant communalism and religious exclusivity (Hodgson 1974). Therefore the inquisitorial activity of Spain must be seen within the context of other persecuting regimes. For example, Rabbinical Judaism in the Herodian era (65 B.C.–A.D. 69) constructed a persecuting state-church complex centered on the temple of Jerusalem; the late Roman Empire of Constantine and Theodosius (A.D. 312–395) moved toward a totalitarian orthodoxy, proscribing all non-Christian religions. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire rivaled Catholic Castile in building an elaborate religious institution based on Sunni Islam, which persecuted Shii Muslims. The earlier toleration of Jews and Muslims by medieval Spanish kings was the result of their utility. Once Castilians had achieved the same levels of sophistication and expertise as the Jews and Muslims, however, the original conditions of toleration evaporated (Reilly 1993). An exclusive community of those sanctified by means of divine revelation makes claims on the psyche which take precedence over all other considerations.

Columbus was commissioned to find a western route to the riches of Asia across the Atlantic Ocean in 1492. As the epic story of Spanish deeds overseas forms an independent part of this book, I will leave its telling to later, except as events in the New World impinge on those of the Old. That being said, let us recall that from the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (1453) to the time that British warships forced their way into China's coastal economy during the Opium War (1840), ecumenical history became truly global.

Iberians initiated the opening of the world's oceans to long-distance trade and colonization; they also discovered, explored, and conquered the New World. And once the Castilians had conquered the Amerindian civilizations of Mexico and Peru, they set out to create viable successor states to the Aztec confederation and the Inca Empire. From the New World came bullion, especially silver, which revolutionized the world's economy and led to the development of European capitalism (Tilly 1992). In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the flow of silver

through Spain into northwestern Europe resulted in the rapid accumulation of capital, which became self-perpetuating interest based funds unrelated to the fluctuations of agricultural production or surplus distribution. At the same time, New World food crops such as maize, potatoes, and manioc transformed Old World economies from Europe through the Middle East to China. American crops allowed Old World farmers to cultivate marginal lands such as hillsides and, in the case of maize, provided wonderful winter fodder for livestock. These additions to Afro-Eurasia's diet contributed to the rise of Old World populations (only then recovering from the Black Death, 1345–1350) (Braudel 1973).

Tobacco and cocoa from America, along with Arabian coffee and Chinese tea, were also creating another kind of worldwide revolution. Their use as mild stimulants contributed to the growing civility of social occasions, a change known as the "gentling of manners." At the same time, however, New World societies were decimated by Old World diseases brought over by European settlers, black slaves, and Old World livestock. Perhaps 90 percent of Native American peoples died during the sixteenth century as a result of disease, maltreatment, hunger, and depression. Psychologically, the discovery of America also affected Old World mentalities, expanding imaginations and upsetting time-honored worldviews. In effect, American resources allowed Europe to achieve global ascendancy (Crosby 1972).

CHARLES V

Ferdinand's Italian possessions drew Castile into the affairs of Renaissance Italy. The Spaniards at first fought to expel invading French forces from Italy, then established their own hegemony over the peninsula. Spanish involvement in European affairs intensified when the Catholic Kings married their daughter Juana to Philip Habsburg, duke of Burgundy and heir to the Holy Roman Empire. Juana and Philip ruled Castile for a short while after the death of Queen Isabel in 1504; however, Philip I soon died and Juana went insane with grief. She was deposed by her father, King Ferdinand, who then reigned as regent for Juana's son, Charles Habsburg who had remained in the Netherlands to be educated (Liss 1992).

When Ferdinand died in 1516, the Crowns of Castile and Aragón were finally united under one sovereign, the Catholic Kings' grandson, Charles I (1516–1556), who would also later reign as Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire. No king since the time of Charlemagne had ruled so much of Europe—the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, Spain, the Netherlands, Bohemia, France Comte, the Two Sicilies, Sardinia, Milan, and imperial Hungary. Spanish Conquistadores—Cortez and Pizarro—would in turn add American empires to Charles's vast *Welt Reich*. Though the emperor was an international ruler of northern European descent, the heart and soul of his empire was Spain. New World treasure, Spanish arms, and Castilian orthodoxy were the mainstay of his caesarean ambitions. That Charles came to love Spain more than his other realms was testified to by his retirement to a Castilian monastery (Yuste) where he died in 1558 (Bérenger 1994).

Emperor Charles V faced many challenges. At the beginning of his reign (1521), the *Comuneros* of Castile and the *Germanias* of Valencia revolted against his foreign court in the name of municipal liberties. The risings were crushed by royal forces and grandees who feared a popular insurrection against aristocratic jurisdiction. A little after these events, Francis I, king of France (1515–1547), decided to contest with Charles V the rule of Italy. The French king went so far as to ally with the Ottoman Turks and the German Protestants against the emperor. Though Francis was repeatedly defeated by Charles (the emperor even captured him at the Battle of Pavia in 1525), the resources of rich France were sufficient to restore the French king's position many times (Brandi 1963).

The emperor was also confronted with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire under Suleiman the Magnificent (1521–1566); the Turks conquered Hungary in 1525 and besieged Vienna in 1529. Moreover, the Ottoman threatened to control the Mediterranean as Muslim corsairs ravaged the coasts of Italy and Spain. Meanwhile, the Turkish navy often used the ports of southern France for shelter and winter quarters. The emperor mounted valiant efforts to stem the Islamic tide, a cause dear to the heart of Catholic Spain. His forces captured Tunis in 1534 and even besieged Algiers in 1541. (Cortez, the Conqueror of Mexico, was present as an advisor during the siege.) Unfortunately, imperial resources were always overcommitted on several fronts and were never systematically employed for one purpose (Braudel 1973).

It should be recalled that the Islamic world was an expanding force throughout this period. Spanish and Portuguese forces engaged in a worldwide struggle with Islamic societies; the battlefronts in this Ibero-Islamic world war stretched from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, finally involving the islands of Southeast Asia. Eventually this ecumenical conflict ended when new players—the English, Dutch and French—replaced Spain and Portugal as the main agents of European imperialism in the middle seventeenth century (Truxillo 1991).

The Protestant Reformation was the emperor's most intractable problem. As a Catholic Monarch, Charles V could not tolerate heresy no matter how much he agreed with the Protestants that the Church needed to be reformed. Furthermore, Protestantism eroded the very foundations of the imperial ideal of "one faith, one emperor, one sword." Unless the Emperor embraced the new faith, he could find no real basis to accommodate so severe a rift in the body social of Christendom. Charles's frustration with this issue may have hastened his decision to abdicate in 1555 (Brandi 1963).

The failure of Charles V to establish a universal state in Europe is unique in world history. The Emperor had wanted to build a bureaucratic regime that would reverse the political fragmentation of western Europe and restore the unity of Roman times, or at least achieve the partial success of Charlemagne's empire. Moreover, the economic resources of the Habsburg monarchy and advances in military science were such that, in conjunction with Renaissance statecraft and Castilian ideology, a renewed imperium seemed possible (Fernández-Santamaria 1977). Since the economic crisis of late antiquity, which hastened the fall of the western Roman Empire, Europeans had achieved new levels of social and economic

complexity and power. These advances far surpassed those of the ancient Romans and medieval Europeans; they should have facilitated political unification. Furthermore, a common religion, the use of academic Latin, and Italian Renaissance culture contributed to potential unity (Hale 1994).

The age-old norm of world history was for an era of warring states to be followed by the establishment of a universal empire. During the Iron Age (1300–600 B.C.), the world of contending polities in the Middle East gave way to Assyrian and Persian empire building. Later, the bellicose Greek city-states and the Hellenistic kingdoms were pacified by the Roman Empire. In China, the age of warring states gave way to the ruthless imperialism of the Chin Dynasty. Later, when the Han Empire (202 B.C.–A.D. 220) collapsed and barbarian regimes emerged, another epoch of imperial restoration ensued under the Sui-Tang Dynasty (A.D. 589–909). And in Europe, France emerged as a unified kingdom during the high Middle Ages after the incorporation of rival duchies and counties into the royal domain. In light of these precedents, the failure of the Habsburgs seems anomalous (Truxillo 1995).

PHILIP II

Upon his abdication, Charles V divided his patrimony. He gave the imperial title and the ancestral lands of Austria to his brother, Ferdinand I (1556–64). To his son, Philip, the Emperor bequeathed his most powerful and richest domains—Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. Philip II's Catholic Monarchy was the most extensive empire in the world when united with Spanish territories in the New World and Portugal's possessions in 1580. Furthermore, Philip's interests were not as divided as the Emperor's; he primarily pursued Spanish objectives. Meanwhile, the king of Spain became the champion of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, waging war against the True Faith's enemies at home and abroad. An atmosphere of Crusade and *Reconquista* pervaded his court in the palace-monastery of the Escorial (Kamen 1997).

During Philip's reign (1556–1598), the treasures of Mexico's and Peru's mines began to pour into Castile's coffers. With these resources, the king pursued an ambitious foreign policy aimed at establishing a Catholic Universal State (Garay 1944). Moreover, Castile's traditional economy reached the height of its prosperity, and the kingdom's population numbered nearly eight million. However, the burden of empire pressed hard on this one realm; fleets of over three hundred warships were maintained in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and expensive land forces, numbering nearly two hundred thousand men, forced Philip to impose onerous taxes on his Castilian subjects (Lynch 1991).

Philip's reign began gloriously and ended in bankruptcy. In 1557 the king's forces defeated those of France at the battle of San Quentin. By the terms of the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis, Philip established Spain's ascendancy over France (which subsequently fell into a period of religious civil war). The Spanish king next turned his attention to the Mediterranean where, in 1565, the Knights of St. John threw back the Ottoman Empire's attack on Malta, thereby blunting the Turks' Mediterranean ambitions. At Lepanto in 1571, a combined Christian fleet

commanded by Philip's half-brother, Don Juan of Austria, destroyed the Ottoman battle fleet; afterwards, the war in the Mediterranean stalemated. In the Far East, in the same year as Lepanto, Spanish forces captured Manila, which they converted into the base of operations for a Castilian oriental empire (Truxillo 1991).

In 1567 the Dutch revolted against Philip's authority; many urban Dutch converted to Calvinism, which aggravated the conflict with their Catholic sovereign. Meanwhile, the English queen, Elizabeth I (1558–1603), supported the Dutch revolt and directed her mariners to raid Spanish commerce in the Atlantic. The severe measures undertaken by Philip's governors to suppress the Dutch revolt increased popular support for the rebels. Furthermore, the Netherlands were among the richest provinces of Europe; rebellion there compromised Spanish Habsburg finances. As the war intensified and the Dutch provinces were consolidated into a viable polity, the Spanish Monarchy was drained of revenues and troops. Soon English and Dutch seamen were harassing Iberian shipping from the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean. By the early seventeenth century, Holland emerged as a major commercial and maritime power, the birthplace of modern capitalism and of a tolerant bourgeois culture (Boxer 1977).

The Dutch waged a worldwide struggle against Spain and Portugal. For a while, the Dutch army under the stadtholder Maurice of Nassau was the strongest military force in Europe, having perfected the techniques of close-order drill and massed firepower. However, Spain's vast military reserves were sufficient to contain Maurice's counterattacks in the early seventeenth century. The southern Netherlands, modern Belgium, remained firmly under Habsburg rule with the support of the region's conservative Catholic gentry. Overseas, the Dutch captured much of the world's maritime commerce and annexed the bulk of Portugal's seaborne empire, capturing Malacca in 1641 and ruling northeastern Brazil for over twenty years (1630–1654). Holland's financial and naval supremacy was short-lived as the small republic did not have the resources to sustain its great power status (Boxer 1977). Later in the century, naval wars with England and land attacks by Louis XIV's France eroded Dutch strength and prosperity. Ironically, the Dutch revolt had done the same to the Spanish Habsburg monarchy.

Philip II decided to deploy the full naval power of his empire against Queen Elizabeth; in 1588 he launched a combined Iberian armada. The king planned to have his armada sweep the British fleet from the English Channel; having accomplished this, the armada would pick up Alexander Parma's army in Flanders. Parma's forces would then land in England, defeat the English army, depose Elizabeth, and link up with English Catholics who wanted to restore a Catholic monarchy. Tragically, the Spanish Armada was defeated as much by inclement weather as by the English navy. Later, Philip launched other armadas unsuccessfully against England. Meanwhile, English sea raiders intensified their attacks on Spanish ports and shipping. Philip, however, avenged his defeat by supporting Irish revolts that drained the resources of the queen's realm and tarnished the luster of Gloriana's reign (Pierson 1975).

Toward the end of his rule, Philip faced the monarchy's most ominous challenge—the reemergence of French power under the Bourbon Dynasty. At the end

of the French wars of religion, Henry of Navarre abandoned the Protestant faith and became Henry IV of France (1589–1610); France quickly revived under his firm leadership. Philip opposed Henry's candidacy and even dispatched Alexander Parma with Spanish troops to support hardcore Catholic elements in France. But the French were weary of civil war and accepted Henry as king when he espoused the Catholic faith. Moreover, the Catholic party had done much damage to its cause by accepting Spanish assistance (Bonney 1991).

In 1598 Philip II died, leaving his world monarchy to a weak son, Philip III (1598–1621). The Spanish Habsburg realm was drained by decades of war and heavy taxation. Even the silver receipts from the New World were insufficient to defray the costs of the many campaigns and enterprises of Philip's reign. The prudent king's character and temperament recall the style and personality of the brilliant but reclusive Justinian. And like the restored Roman Empire, Philip's Catholic monarchy was poised at the precipice between decline and recovery. Spain's population was falling and her economy was faltering, but revenues from the New World were still high enough to sustain Spanish power a while longer. They might have been employed in peace to restore Spain's economy and commerce (Lynch 1992). Unfortunately, the Spanish Habsburgs' Austrian cousins were preparing for war.

EL SIGLO DE ORO

In spite of the impending crisis, Castile entered a season of cultural fluorescence, rare in any traditional society. The Castilian Renaissance was an aspect of the Baroque civilization of the Counter-Reformation, the world of Theresa of Avila, Ignatius Loyola, Cervantes, and Velasquez. The Spanish Baroque flourished in multiple centers—patronized primarily through the agency of religious orders, medieval universities, and the court (Maravall 1986). The basis of this culture was not the Erasmian humanism of Charles V's Burgundian court, but rather the Tridentine restoration of Catholic fortunes exemplified in the new style of Philip's Escorial, a palace-monastery. Castilian sailors, saints, and soldiers were among the first truly planetary men. The Baroque civilization of Catholic Europe flourished in Austria, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and southern Germany; its influence extended from Poland to Peru and from Mexico to the Philippines (Braudel 1973). Moreover, Castilian viceroys and proconsuls regulated the affairs of native empires in Mexico and Peru, kept the peace between Italian city-states, and dictated policy in Vienna, Munich, and Antwerp.

The achievements of the Castilian Renaissance, though brilliant, were of a kind not dissimilar to other cultural flowerings: fifth century (B.C.) Athens, Justinian's Constantinople, the Arab Caliphate, Tang and Sung China, or Castile's contemporary, Safavid Iran. Later, Castile's accomplishments would be cast in the pale by the next stage of social evolution as new factors associated with modernity would forever outmode and outclass an Agrarian Age (3500 B.C.–A.D. 1700) society, no matter how brilliant (Truxillo 1995).

By stages, military defeats broke the spirit of a martial nation, beginning with the Dutch revolt in 1567 and the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Inflation caused by the massive influx of American silver wrecked the Castilian economy and led to a price revolution throughout the Old World. Meanwhile, the military resources of the empire were overcommitted, and the morale of the bureaucracy was undermined by corruption and the sale of offices; landed aristocrats expanded their holdings, disregarding royal authority and oppressing the peasantry. Many of the formerly royal towns of Spain lost their chartered liberties and came under noble jurisdiction (Ortiz 1971). The Church also lost its elan in the seventeenth century as the flames of Counter-Reformation ardor waned. Moreover, Castile was cursed with low nuptiality and low natality because marriage had become too expensive; meanwhile, the religious orders gathered ever higher membership (Payne 1973).

During the reign of Philip IV (1621–1665), the fortunes of the monarchy reached a crisis. The impending disaster also had its roots in the intrusive rise of the North Atlantic societies—Holland and England—but the internal dialectic of the Iberian peninsula explains much of what happened to Spain. Moreover, these developments were paralleled throughout the Mediterranean, in Spanish-controlled Italy and the Ottoman Empire (Braudel 1973).

THE LATER HABSBURGS

The Austrian Habsburgs depended heavily on their Spanish relations for financial and military support, for the Danubian lands were hardpressed by the Turks and fragmented socially by the unresolved issues of the Protestant Reformation. The Austrian branch of the Habsburg Dynasty was initially more latitudinarian on religious questions, and hoped to reconcile with the German Protestants of the Holy Roman Empire. However by the end of the sixteenth century, a reformed and militant religiosity was reawakening, in the Catholic parts of central Europe, the hope of restoring by military force the lost unity of medieval Christendom (Evans 1979).

During the Counter-Reformation, the clergy was reformed along the lines recommended by the Council of Trent (1542–1563), and a spiritual quickening was at work throughout the Catholic world (Wright 1982). Meanwhile, the Jesuits became active agents of Catholic restoration, educating a new, dedicated Catholic elite. Many princes sought their services and admired the Jesuits' ability to produce loyal and able servants of the crown. The Society of Jesus also promoted the international agenda of the Papacy, which had undergone a remarkable transformation as a result of the Counter-Reformation (1542–1648) (Bangert 1986). The Popes were once again worthy of their great religious office though they now had to deal with powerful Catholic princes like Philip II, who often felt that their own religious pedigree was superior to that of the Roman Pontiffs. Ferdinand, the archduke of Styria, became Holy Roman Emperor in 1619 and was an enthusiastic supporter of the Counter-Reformation (Hsia 1998). Maximilian I of Bavaria (1598–1651) was

another German ruler who vigorously promoted the militant agenda of reformed Catholicism (Wright 1982).

Ferdinand II (1619–1637) decided to pursue with military force the restoration of the Catholic religion in the Holy Roman Empire. In 1618 the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) began when the leaders of Bohemia rejected Habsburg rule and elected a Protestant prince as their king. Habsburg forces overran the Czech kingdom and a general conflict ensued as regional rulers mobilized against the reimposition of imperial authority in Germany. Until 1630 the war went well for the imperial cause. And for a moment, it seemed as though the Holy Roman Empire of the medieval Salian Dynasty was about to be restored (Bérenger 1994).

The Spanish Habsburgs were so encouraged by the favorable progress of Ferdinand's armies that they joined the war effort in 1621. The Spanish crown signed a truce with the Dutch in 1609 and had barely begun to recover from Philip II's many wars when new fighting broke out. The young Spanish king, Philip IV (1621–1665), was anxious to restore the glory of the Catholic Monarchy; he was encouraged in that ambition by his dynamic and able first minister, the conde-duque Olivares (Elliott 1986). Spain, therefore, supported Ferdinand's war effort with money and troops. At first, Spanish armies led by the Genoese field marshal Ambrosio Spinola won many victories against the Dutch, even recapturing the great fortress-city of Breda.

Louis XIII (1610–1643) became fearful of a renewed Habsburg alliance once again surrounding France as in the times of Charles V (1516–1556). The French Monarchy was barely recovering from the turmoil of the religious civil wars. Louis XIII, under the influence of Cardinal Richelieu, supported for German Protestant princes while pursuing a punitive regimen against Protestant Huguenots in France. Initially, Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu were unable to openly enter the war against the Habsburgs because French public opinion at that time favored the international agenda of the Counter-Reformation. In 1630 with French encouragement and subsidies, the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus (1611–1632), joined the war to support fellow Lutheran princes. Under the Vasa Dynasty, Sweden was temporarily raised to the status of a major power though, like Holland, it did not have the population or resources to support its aspirations to greatness (Bonney 1991).

Swedish forces, using their king's new combined-arms tactics (field artillery and heavy shock-cavalry), were able to clear northern Germany of imperial forces. Everywhere the Swedes carried the day, advancing toward the Catholic lands of central and southern Germany. In 1632 Imperial forces were decisively defeated by Gustavus Adolphus at the Battle of Lützen. Unfortunately for the Swedes, their victorious king—the Lion of the North—was killed in the same battle. The Swedes, however, remained undefeated and continued campaigning in Catholic territory; they ravaged Bavaria. Somehow, the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs found the resolve to raise more troops and continue the fight (Ingrao 1994).

In Spain, the dynamic energy of Olivares was desperately trying to mobilize the military potential of the giant Spanish Monarchy. Olivares's plan, the Union of Arms, attempted to distribute the crushing tax burden of empire more equitably, thereby relieving Castile, the monarchy's overburdened center. At first, the reforms

of Olivares seemed to breathe new life into the Catholic Monarchy; Spain entered the Thirty Years' War vigorously. Moreover, Spanish forces made early progress against the Dutch, taking many fortress-cities. In 1625 a naval expedition under Fradrique de Toledo drove the Dutch from Bahia in Brazil, honoring the Habsburgs' commitment to defend Portugal's seaborne empire. Fradrique's forces campaigned in the Caribbean, clearing out the pirate bases located on islands such as St. Kitts (Lynch 1992). In the Far East, Spanish governors in the Philippines repeatedly launched expeditions from Manila to assist Portuguese garrisons defending Malacca, Macao, and the Moluccas. But in 1629, disaster struck at the confidence of the Castilian-Portuguese condominium when the Spanish treasure fleet was captured off Mantanzas Bay by Dutch admiral Peter Heyn. With the plunder taken from the Spaniards, the Dutch financed further assaults on Portugal's overseas possessions, including their eventual occupation of northeastern Brazil (Boxer 1977).

Olivares's program, the Union of Arms, was unable to salvage the fortunes of Castile or reverse its decline. Meanwhile, Castilian *arbitristas* and Ottoman memorialists suggested reforming their respective empires along traditional lines, that is, returning to the ideals of Philip II's reign or to the Age of Suleiman the Magnificent. Rampant inflation, *latifundismo*, overextension of resources, military defeats, and the sagging morale of ruling institutions undermined both empires. The decline of the Spanish and Ottoman empires occurred within the context of their internal developments which were exacerbated by the intrusion of the new Dutch and English economic systems. In Habsburg Spain and Italy, as well as in the Ottoman Empire, the commercial and mercantile classes preferred to use their wealth not to promote reinvestment in commerce and manufacturing; instead, after the sixteenth century, they sought security in land holdings and the purchase of nobiliary status (Braudel 1993).

Enriched by the Indies and in charge of substantial military forces, the Castilians were, at first, unable to recognize the transmutation of northwestern Europe, for they were not, immediately, disadvantaged in competition with this new type of society. However, the acquisition of self-perpetuating capital in Holland and the subsequent revolution in the level of social power, exemplified by escaping the agricultural cycle, led to sustained and accelerated technicalization of military, industrial, and commercial sectors. In the early seventeenth century, the Dutch controlled much of the world's economy. At the same time, Holland supported fleets of several thousand merchantmen and warships whereas Spain's reliance on Genoese expertise was no longer a sign of modernity (Truxillo 1991).

As Gustavus Adolphus's army bore down on the crumbling imperial forces, Olivares pressed the limits of the Union of Arms. With great effort, another army was raised from the empire's strained reserves. Fortunately, Philip IV's martial brother, the cardinal-infante, commanded Spain's troops and was joined by the emperor's equally able son, Archduke Ferdinand. Their combined forces represented the harmonious integration of both branches of the Habsburg Dynasty. The Catholic army met the Swedes at Nordlingen in 1634 and was victorious over the Protestants. This was Habsburg Spain's last great victory; after Nordlingen,

imperial fortunes temporarily improved. However, France felt even more threatened by the victorious Habsburgs and entered the war in 1635 on the side of the Protestants (Bonney 1991).

The strain on Spain was intolerable, though her forces at first pushed into French territory. Fortunately for the Habsburgs, England was unable to support the Protestant cause because civil war had broken out in the island kingdom where Puritans and Parliament waged war against the Stuart Dynasty and its supporters. These events, however, offered scant relief to the Habsburgs as the cost of continuous war mounted. In 1640, with French assistance, Catalonia revolted against Habsburg rule; Portugal took advantage of Castile's preoccupation with Catalonia to secede that same year. As a result of these disasters, the conde-duque Olivares fell from power, and Philip IV assumed direct rule over his faltering monarchy (Elliot 1986).

Worse was yet to come as defeat followed defeat. In 1639 the Spanish fleet was again vanquished, this time at the Battle of the Downs by the Dutch. Then, in 1643 at Rocroi, the French crushed Spain's vaunted *tercios*, ending a century and a half of Spanish military preponderance. Later, southern Italy revolted against Spanish rule in 1647. Finally, in 1648, the Thirty Years' War ended in an exhausted stalemate. Spain was forced to recognize the independence of Holland, and the Austrian Habsburgs lost all hope of restoring imperial authority and Catholicism throughout the Holy Roman Empire. The dream of a Universal Catholic Imperium was now dead; the age of the territorial state had arrived (Garay 1944).

Halfway through the seventeenth century, Castilian hegemony was faltering politically and collapsing economically. In the end, the state constructed by the Catholic Kings could not escape the limitations of Agrarian Age (3000 B.C.–A.D. 1700) political systems. The Spanish monarchy's financial and military commitments eventually outstripped the resources of a traditional society, even one much enlarged in area and wealth. Furthermore, factors introduced at the end of the sixteenth century served to undermine the whole historical complex of the globe, including Spain's empire. The radical growth of a new kind of commercial and technicalistic society in northwestern Europe introduced a period of calculated and accelerated economic growth. Moreover, the sustained and expanded economic and social resources of Holland and then England forever disadvantaged societies operating within the norms of the Agrarian Age, which had remained basically unchanged since urban societies emerged in Sumer five thousand years earlier (Hodgson 1974).

The decline of the Ottoman Empire and Ming China occurred at the same time as the fall of the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy. The Ottoman Empire had also undergone a mid-seventeenth century restoration during the administrations of the Koprulu *wazirs*. For a time, Ottoman forces again besieged Vienna in 1683. However, defeat was followed by a long recession, in which Ottomans lost their status as a first-rate power. The Ottoman Empire and the Spanish Monarchy faltered at the time when modernity was emerging in northwestern Europe; yet the pace of change was still recognizable within the context of the Agrarian Age, comparable

to the earlier decline of the western Roman Empire or the Carolingian Empire (Truxillo 1995).

The Spanish Habsburg Monarchy and its eastern Mediterranean neighbor, the Ottoman Empire, both survived the crisis of the seventeenth century. Castile emerged from the trauma of the Spanish War of Succession (1700–1713)—shorn of its Belgian and Italian provinces—but with its American empire intact (including the Philippines). Afterwards, a French dynasty, the Bourbons, tightened the rein of control in Spain using the French model of centralization. Moreover, revenues increased and military effectiveness was raised, but the Spanish Monarchy never recovered its former status in Europe (Lynch 1989).

The genius of the Hispanic world passed to the Americas. Spanish American colonial elites, however, rankled under the heavy hand of Bourbon intendants and military governor; perhaps they were nostalgic for the Habsburg style of confederated monarchy. These developments prepared the ground for Latin American independence (Lynch 1992). By contrast, the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century moved toward decentralization and the diffusion of authority to provincial elites who, in turn, were further committed to the waning prestige of the central government. In the nineteenth century, the pursuit of independence in the Balkans was prolonged and violent in contrast to Latin American independence; in addition, the Ottoman ruling classes most often decamped their former possessions. Throughout the nineteenth century, both Spain and Turkey thrashed about fitfully, attempting to modernize their traditional societies and losing their empires in the process (Truxillo 1991).

FRANCE: ARCHETYPE OF THE IMPERIAL NATIONAL MONARCHY

France's war with Spain was part of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and continued until 1659. Louis XIV (1643–1715) emerged victorious from this conflict—though Spain recovered Catalonia, and the French king barely survived the disorders of the Fronde rebellions. Meanwhile, Spain was sinking into poverty and impotence under the rule of the decrepit Charles II (1665–1700). Louis XIV, on the other hand, restored France to the position of hegemony it had enjoyed in the high Middle Ages. Furthermore, Louis was called the Sun King because of the brilliance of his reign; the cultural splendor of his court radiated throughout Europe. From the great palace of Versailles, the French king was the master of a new-style polity—an imperial national monarchy—modeled on the traditions of ancient Rome (Bluche 1990).

One must develop a basic understanding of the Sun King's reign in order to comprehend the Hispanic world's subsequent evolution in the eighteenth century. During the reign of Louis XIV, France's government was centralized, its overlapping jurisdictions brought under the supervision of royal intendants. A new service nobility, recruited from middle-class lawyers arose, this nobility of the robe was educated at Jesuit colleges in the authoritarian traditions of Roman law. As royal servants, these men helped the monarchy overcome the feudal pretensions of the ancient nobles of the sword. Ministers such as Colbert and Louvois regularized

French finances, which paid for the rapid expansion of France's armed forces. Furthermore, Colbert advocated the economic philosophy of mercantilism, encouraging the king to develop France's domestic industries, acquire colonies, and build a strong navy (Bluche 1990).

France's rich agricultural lands and large population (25 million) provided the means to support Louis XIV's great power ambitions. And it should not be forgotten that the classical age of French civilization enhanced the prestige of the monarchy. Under Louis XIV, French culture replaced the earlier influence of Spain's Golden Age (*Siglo de Oro*) in western European societies; the Enlightenment originated in France (Davies 1996). However, the version of that cultural movement which ultimately took root in Spain is known as the Catholic Enlightenment; the latter rejected the overt secularism and neopaganism of the original Enlightenment. The Catholic Enlightenment also favored the modernizing and scientific rationalism of the eighteenth century, yet maintained, as had the earlier humanism of Erasmus, that the Christian faith perfected or even enhanced the Enlightenment's basic principles (Góngora 1980).

Louis XIV's compact, populated, and rich kingdom—centrally located like a fortified hexagon in the middle of western Europe (a position not unlike that of Iran's in central Eurasia)—was a perfect base from which to establish hegemony over western Europe. Louis XIV's imperial kingdom eventually raised an army of four-hundred thousand men and maintained a navy of one-hundred fifty warships, forces much larger than those of the Spanish Habsburgs at the height of their power. However, France's colonial possessions in Canada, the Caribbean, and India did not remit to France the kind of revenues Spain received from the New World. Moreover, the king's ambitions imposed an enormous strain on France's domestic economy. Yet it is remarkable that one European state alone could support such massive military forces while singlehandedly engaging various alliances of rival European powers; coalitions against the French were usually formed by Holland, Britain, and Austria (Roberts 1997).

Louis XIV was a ruler comparable in power with his two contemporaries the Moghul padishah, Aurangzeb (1659–1707), and the Manchu emperor, K'ang-hsi (1662–1722)—both of whom ruled empires with over 150 million subjects. Moreover, European civilization achieved a level of sophistication and refinement during the great king's reign equivalent to that of the older civilizations of Asia. Yet the comparison is deceptive insofar as France did not succeed in ruling as large a portion of Western civilization as did the Moghuls and Manchus of India and China. A cumulative level of social and technical power had been achieved by a single European country equivalent to an entire Asiatic empire. The transmutation toward Modernity was already operating in seventeenth-century Europe; it would forever change human societies (Hodgson 1974).

Louis XIV's first wars, directed against Holland, succeeded in weakening the Dutch, who were also heavily engaged against the English at sea. French aggression then turned on Spain's possessions; Franche Comte was annexed in 1671, and sections of the Spanish Netherlands were incorporated into France. In the later seventeenth century, a coalition of European powers, including Britain under

William and Mary (1689–1702), contained French expansion, acting in concert to preserve the balance of power (Davies 1996).

In 1700 the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, died. He had been under intense pressure from both his Austrian cousins and Louis XIV to leave the Spanish throne to one of them. The Austrians had the best claim on Charles's patrimony as Habsburgs. However, many of the king's advisors believed that the Austrian house was too heavily engaged in the reconquest of Hungary from the Ottomans to be able to secure Spain's Italian and Atlantic possessions. After all, even Charles V had been forced to divide his imperium at his abdication. Moreover, the French king was a Habsburg through his mother, and he had married a Spanish Habsburg infanta; thus Louis XIV's heir was three-quarters Habsburg. Irrespective of Louis' hereditary claim to the Spanish throne, Charles II's court recognized in France the only power that could hold together the Spanish Empire. The dying Spanish Habsburg, therefore, recognized Louis XIV's grandson, Philip of Anjou, as his heir in 1700 (Lynch 1989).

The Spanish War of Succession (1701–1713) was a world war in scale; fighting between France and the alliance of Holland, Britain, and Austria raged across Europe, the Americas, and in the waters of the Indian Ocean. Most Spaniards supported their new Bourbon king, Philip V (1700–1746); however, the Catalans and part of the Castilian nobility supported the Habsburg candidate, Archduke Charles, in order to preserve their *fueros* from the centralizing agenda of a French dynasty. At first Louis and his Spanish allies held their own; then British naval control of the seas and the land campaigns of Prince Eugene of Savoy turned the tide of war against France (Davies 1996).

Had Louis XIV succeeded in his original goal, a single Bourbon prince would have eventually ruled France, Spain, and their respective colonial empires. The French king would then have formed an imperial configuration greater than the empires of Constantine, Justinian, Charlemagne, and Charles V. Such a monarchy could have aspired to rule Europe and dominate the world. Moreover, a conservative universal state of this kind might have placed a brake on technological change and used its power to reimpose Catholicism on northern Europe. It should also be remembered that as Louis XIV grew older, his Spanish-style religiosity became more pronounced. He revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, thereby ending toleration of France's Protestant minority. However, the treaties ending the Spanish War of Succession forced an aged and defeated Louis to guarantee separate succession to the French and Spanish thrones; Spanish Italy and the southern Netherlands were ceded to the Austrian Habsburgs (Bluche 1990).

For a few decades at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, the Austrian Habsburg Empire—under Leopold I, Joseph I, and Charles VI (1657–1740)—appeared about to restore the multinational imperium of Charles V. The Ottomans had been thrown back from the gates of Vienna in 1683, and Hungary was reconquered by the Austrian army under Prince Eugene of Savoy around 1700. Subsequently, more lands were won from the Ottomans in the Balkans and from the Spanish in Italy and Belgium in the early eighteenth century (Ingrao 1994). The Danubian Monarchy was the center of a brilliant Baroque

civilization; at one time its art, architecture, and music, along with a complex intellectual system, stretched from Poland to Peru. Later the Baroque was concentrated primarily in the realms of the Austrian Habsburgs (Evans 1979). At the end of Charles VI's reign (1740), the Austrian Monarchy fell into a dynastic crisis. Charles VI died without a male heir, which endangered the Habsburgs' hereditary claim to the imperial title of Holy Roman Emperor. Meanwhile, the Ottomans recovered from their earlier defeats sufficiently to drive the Austrians out of Belgrade in the war of 1736–1739. Though the Austrian Habsburgs remained a major power in Europe, their opportunity to succeed Louis XIV's France as Western civilization's premier monarchy had passed. Later, Prussia under Frederick the Great (1740–1786) and Russia, newly reconfigured as a Westernized state, challenged Austria's ascendancy in central and eastern Europe (Roberts 1997).

From the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, France barely managed to remain Europe's greatest power. At the same time, Great Britain under the Hanoverians was rapidly rising as a commercial and maritime force. Spain, meanwhile, recovered slowly under the Bourbons from its low ebb during the later Habsburg regime. Early in the eighteenth century, Sweden lost its Baltic supremacy when its warrior-king, Charles XII, was defeated by Peter the Great's Westernized Russian army. Holland, Portugal, and the Italian states receded to the role of secondary powers.

Prussia under the Hohenzollerans unexpectedly emerged in this period as a powerful and militarized kingdom. Led by Frederick the Great, the Prussians succeeded in holding onto Silesia and other territories conquered by their king. All of this was preparation for Prussia's later role in the unification of Germany (1871) after which, the Second Reich (1871–1918) and the Third Reich (1933–1945) struggled to establish Germany's rank as a great world power (Roberts 1997).

The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) was another world war with extensive fighting between British and French forces in North America and India. Spain and France joined forces during the conflict in an alliance known as "the family compact." Unfortunately, the coalition of Bourbon kingdoms was much less coordinated in its foreign policy objectives than the earlier dynastic alliance of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs. The former entente was more solid because it was based on the shared ideology of militant Catholicism and the common civilization of the Baroque. On the other hand, the Bourbon family compact was only a political and military alliance; each royal court pursued national objectives irrespective of other's interests. Spanish and French forces continued to clash with each other in North America and the Caribbean during the early eighteenth century, regardless of their dynastic alliance (Savelle 1974). The two Bourbon houses went down in bitter defeat during the Seven Years' War, sometimes referred to as the French and Indian War in American history. Furthermore, the British Empire's superior naval and economic resources allowed it to sustain long and extensive fighting by land and sea in North America, the Caribbean and India, capturing Quebec in 1759, Montreal in 1760, and Habana and Manila in 1762 (McFarlane 1994).

The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1763, represented a major shift in world power. Britain and Prussia arrived on the international scene while France and Spain

receded as powers. The first two were Protestant countries and the latter ancient champions of Catholicism. However, in the secularized atmosphere of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, the religious issue was muted. By terms of the treaty, Britain gained French Canada, Spanish Florida, and access to India unencumbered by French competition. At the same time, British manufacturing was on the verge of an industrial revolution that was in turn built on the agrarian resources of England's seventeenth century agricultural revolution (Roberts 1992).

Britain's government, in contrast to continental ones, was parliamentary, and the English social ethic of individual rights was based on English Common Law, the ideals of individual prosperity, self-reliance, and personal happiness. These Anglo-Saxon aspirations are so well-entrenched in the modern world that it seems strange to emphasize their novelty and to contrast them to the prevailing sentiments of premodern Europe. It should be recalled, however, that European society before the French and Industrial Revolutions was more collectivist and communalistic, characterized by corporatist ideals and religious sectarianism (Tilly 1992).

The Bourbons did achieve a vengeance of sorts against Britain by way of the American Revolution (1775–1783). In 1779 French, Spanish, and Dutch forces joined with the American rebels; together they temporarily outfought the British. The Thirteen Colonies achieved independence, becoming the United States. During the Revolutionary War, Bourbon Spain reconquered Florida, whereas France and Holland achieved less tangible objectives; both achieved some respite, however, from Britain's relentless economic and maritime pressure. Unfortunately for France, the cost of another war with England pushed the Bourbon kingdom further into the financial abyss. The social and economic strains of great power status, coupled with the ideological critique of France's ancien regime by the Philosophes, prepared the way for the French Revolution (1789–1799) (McNeill 1963). Furthermore, the obvious decline of France's ruling classes and that of the Bourbon kings' individual caliber contributed to the crisis. If one aspect of the transition to modernity was Britain's economic, industrial, and social transformation, the other was most certainly the revolution that brought down Bourbon France. All these developments were viewed with great interest by Spain's colonial elite (Lynch 1973).

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Chapter 3

The Age of Discovery, Exploration, and Conquest, 1492–1556

SETTING THE STAGE

At the end of the fifteenth century, European peoples living along the Atlantic coast began their great era of seaborne imperialism. The Age of Discovery and Exploration occurred at the same time as the Italian Renaissance. And though the two movements were not related, the intellectual expansiveness of the Renaissance made it easier for Europeans to assimilate aspects of the New World. By exploring and conquering the Americas, western Europeans were also able to increase the relative weight of their civilization in world affairs. Eventually the resources provided by the New World tipped the age-old balance of Eurasian civilizations in favor of Europe. In this sense, the age of exploration was a turning point in world history (McNeill 1963). Since the retreat of Hellenism in the seventh century (A.D.) and the failure of the Crusades in the thirteenth century, Europeans had been confined to the western end of the Afro-Eurasian world island. When Columbus and Vasco de Gama sailed on their epic voyages at the end of the fifteenth century, it still seemed likely that the Ottoman Turks would overrun the whole of Christendom. A century later, the entire planet was beginning to feel the impact of the Europeans and their sailing gun ships, for the Atlantic maritime tradition facilitated European nations sailing with impunity throughout the world's oceans. Heavy-ship construction, necessary in the stormy waters of the North Atlantic, was combined, in the fifteenth century, with elements of Mediterranean naval technology, such as the lanteen sail, the compass, and portolan charts (Scammell 1989).

The Portuguese were pioneers in the synthesis of maritime traditions. The vessels they built sailed throughout the world's oceans; moreover, they proved nearly invincible when armed with cannon. Caravels, carracks, and galleons were Portuguese ship types whose main energy source was the inexhaustible winds of the earth's oceans. The Portuguese prince Henry the Navigator was a maritime pioneer; he established a school of navigation and a naval base in southern Portugal to

launch overseas expeditions. Prince Henry's first goal was to gain access to the rich gold, slave, and ivory trade of West Africa that was carried by caravan across the Sahara to North African ports. The opening salvo of Portugal's seaborne enterprise was the conquest of the Moroccan port city of Ceuta in 1415. The capture of Ceuta denied to the Muslims of North Africa one of their best bases for launching attacks across the Strait of Gibraltar into Spain (Russel-Wood 1992).

Other Atlantic Europeans based their enterprises, not only on Mediterranean naval technology, but also on Italian colonial traditions. The whole range of colonial practices—double-entry accounting, plantation economies, fortified outposts, overseas administration, and missionary enterprise—has precedents in the medieval empires of Genoa and Venice. Yet neither of those city-states had the population or resources of a territorial kingdom, even a small one such as Portugal (whose inhabitants numbered around 1,500,000 in 1500). However, without Italian expertise, investments, and participation, European colonization of the New World would have been inconceivable (Scammell 1989).

By the late fifteenth century, the Ottoman Turks were restoring Islamic military power at sea. During the next two centuries, the Genoese and the Venetians were slowly driven from their colonial outposts in the eastern Mediterranean. The Crimea, Chios, Rhodes, Athens, Cyprus, and Crete were outposts from which the Italian republics were expelled by the Turkish maritime resurgence. Nevertheless, most of the region's seaborne trade remained in Christian hands, the Ottoman fleet being primarily used for military purposes. Venice gradually declined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as much of its traffic in spices and oriental luxuries was diverted to Atlantic ports via the southern route around Africa. The Venetians staged a minor recovery in the later sixteenth century because Asian merchants were able to circumvent Portuguese blockades and patrols and once again make use of the Middle East as a transit zone. The decline of Venetian commerce was not complete until the English and Dutch replaced the less commercial-minded Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the seventeenth century (Braudel 1973).

The Genoese, on the other hand, maintained the fortunes of their city by allying themselves with the Iberians; neither should one forget that Columbus was Genoese. The Iberian alliance was sealed in the 1530s, when Andrea Doria, grand admiral of Genoa, changed his allegiance from Francis I to Charles V. Andrea Doria had been shocked by the French king's overtures to the Ottomans, having even allowed the Turkish fleet to winter in Toulon. After that time, a thriving partnership ensued for over a century; Genoese generals and admirals were prominent in the service of the Spanish Habsburgs. Moreover, the rich economic system centered on Seville, based on the shipment of silver from Mexico and Peru to Spain, was under the financial management of Genoese bankers and financial experts. In this capacity, the Genoese expanded their role in the international financial affairs of Europe, even while losing their overseas colonies to the Turks (Bethell 1984).

The facility of the Genoese, Venetians, Florentines, and Catalans with marketing and money matters gives the lie to the Weberian maxim of Protestantism's especial affinity to capitalism. Instead of there being a vague psychological propensity among Calvinists for redemption through worldly gain (a symbol of election),

one should instead postulate a different premise. The reason why Protestant countries such as England and Holland prospered in the seventeenth century while Catholic countries declined is related to the contraction of the Mediterranean economy in that century and the cumulative crisis in southern Europe caused by ecological blighting. Mediterranean lands were especially denuded of woods for fuel and shipbuilding. Similar difficulties had already occurred in the Islamic Levant and North Africa, both of which had prospered as commercial and maritime centers before Europe had experienced similar growth (Prior 1992).

As a result of diminishing resources, prosperous families reoriented their investments away from commerce into landed estates and the quest for noble status. Therein lies the reason why the northwest Europeans took the lead in modern capitalist development and not the peoples of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Dutch and English later used their superior naval resources to gain access to North American furs, Scandinavian iron, Russian timber, and Baltic game and fish; all this occurred at a time when British and Dutch shipping was diverting most international trade away from the Middle East and the Mediterranean (Braudel 1973).

THE PORTUGUESE SEABORNE EMPIRE

Portugal's seaborne empire was comparable with and similar to the Castilian world monarchy that preceded it. Moreover, Portugal's possessions prospered in Africa and Asia at the same time as Cortez and Pizarro were conquering Mexico and Peru. The inclusion of a brief survey of Portugal's colonial venture will provide the reader with a comparative view of another Iberian response to the problems and opportunities of Gunpowder Imperialism in the Age of Discovery, Exploration, and Conquest. After the time of Prince Henry the Navigator, the Portuguese continued to push south along the west coast of Africa. They established fortified trading posts (*feitorias*) on the coast and were soon diverting much local trade away from the Saharan routes. The profits from such enterprises financed further exploration southward until, in 1488, the southern tip of Africa was rounded (Boxer 1975).

The Portuguese also discovered and settled Atlantic island groups (the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde islands), where they planted sugar and imported black slaves to do the work. This early experiment with a plantation economy would be transferred, in the later sixteenth century, to Brazil (Russel-Wood 1992).

Portuguese *fidalgos* (noblemen, who captained their country's overseas adventures) shared the antimerchant prejudices of all landed aristocrats; they were instead eager for booty, plunder, and quick profits. The *fidalgos* enjoyed the status and wealth afforded by plantation life. As adventurers, maritime conquistadores, and expedition caudillos, the Portuguese, like the Castilians, were outstanding, drawing on their long experience during the *Reconquista*. Their imaginations remained filled with such late medieval aspirations as Crusading, liberating Jerusalem, finding a Christian king in Asia (Prester John), or living like lords in conquered lands (Boxer 1975).

Portuguese warships and Iron Age weaponry were superior to the military technology of most black Africans and Native Americans; Lusitanian conquista-

dores, therefore, found ample opportunity to realize their dreams. Of course, tropical diseases, hardship, and disappointment took their toll on all European adventurers. The rate of death among the Portuguese expeditionary force to Asia could be as high as 70 percent (Scammell 1989).

The Portuguese reacted swiftly to the news of Columbus's voyage across the Atlantic for he had earlier offered his service to Portugal. The prospect of the powerful Castilian Monarchy reaching Asia first was a spur to action; a large expedition was outfitted under the command of Vasco de Gama. In 1498 he entered the Indian Ocean and landed on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent. Muslim merchants and seamen were shocked by Vasco da Gama's appearance at Calicut. The Portuguese, he said, came seeking "Christians and spices." And since they had relatively little that the sophisticated markets of Asia valued, the Portuguese used their cannon to gain access to Asia's seaborne commerce (Subrahmanyam 1993).

In the first three decades of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese established the Estado da India. In 1509 Portugal's viceroy in the east, Almeida, defeated a large Muslim fleet that had been reinforced by the Mamluks of Egypt; this engagement occurred off the Indian coast near Diu. Lusitanian vessels were capable of delivering cannon broadside that clearly demonstrated their superiority over the lightly armed and constructed ships of the Indian Ocean. Viceroy Almeida was replaced that same year by Alfonso de Albuquerque (1509); his administration in the Portuguese Far East was outstanding. Albuquerque was the actual founder of the Estado da India, though he never received the rank of viceroy (Truxillo 1991).

Albuquerque decided on a new strategic policy in the East. He realized that Portugal had neither the resources nor the population to sustain a territorial empire of the kind the Spaniards would later build in Mexico and Peru. The admiral also believed that Almeida's plan to avoid all territorial commitments and concentrate on naval supremacy was impractical because of Portugal's lack of sailors, ships, and timber. Without bases in the area, the Portuguese would be operating long distance from their West African outposts. Furthermore, local supplies and allies would be undependable as long as there was no permanent locus of Portuguese authority (Livermore 1953).

Alfonso de Albuquerque conceived of a grand strategy that would reconcile the two imperial models and take into account Portugal's slender resources. First he set out to capture the key sites from which small amphibious forces might control the trade of Asia. Moreover, the Portuguese were already unassailable in their home bases as no Asiatic fleet could strike at them there. Ironically, the Chinese maritime expeditions of Cheng Ho (1400–1433) might have anticipated Portugal's hegemony in the Indian Ocean region by a century had the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) sustained China's seaborne venture (McNeill 1963).

The main bottlenecks controlling the commerce of the Southern Seas were the straits of Madagascar, the Gulf of Aden, the entrance to the Persian Gulf (the Straits of Hormuz), the Malabar coast of India, the Straits of Malacca, and the southern coast of China. By the time Albuquerque assumed command of Portuguese forces in the area, his countrymen had already captured many of the Swahili port-cities along the east coast of Africa. Most of those cities remained under Portuguese

control until the very end of the seventeenth century. In 1699 Omani Arabs led a Muslim reaction that expelled the Portuguese from Mombasa and other ports in East Africa (Truxillo 1991).

Albuquerque's fleet consisted of thirty or more warships and around one-thousand five-hundred men; this was about half the amount Albuquerque claimed he needed to maintain Portuguese supremacy. In 1510 Goa on the west coast of India fell; later, it became the capital of the Estado da India. Malacca was captured in 1511; that city was the richest prize to be gained, hegemon of Malaysia and Indonesia. Finally, the island of Hormuz was taken in 1515. When Alfonso de Albuquerque died in 1515, his plan was near completion. After 1553 the Portuguese gained access to China's trade by way of Macao. Only Aden, south of the Red Sea, continued to elude Portuguese control (Boxer 1975).

The Estado da India prospered throughout the sixteenth century. For a while, the Portuguese managed to redirect a substantial portion of the Indian Ocean's commerce into the orbit of Portugal's eastern outposts and also around the southern cape of Africa. Middle Eastern caravan routes that were the land portages for Asia's seaborne traffic were initially devastated. But by the middle of the sixteenth century, much of the Middle East's trade network via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf was restored. Meanwhile, Venice was also hard hit when Lisbon became the main entrepot for oriental spices and luxuries, but its fortunes also recovered in the later sixteenth century. The restoration of Asia's native commerce was brought about by the gradual assimilation of Western shipbuilding techniques by local shipwrights. For example, merchant fleets of the Indian state of Gujarat and the Sumatran sultanate of Achin were well armed and began to evade and outfight Portuguese patrols. As the Portuguese became overcommitted in Africa, Brazil, and Asia, their policy changed from carrying the region's commerce to accepting protection money from regional merchants. The Lusitanians, in turn, refrained from plundering regional markets (Subrahmanyam 1993).

The Ottomans offered three serious challenges to Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean. The Turkish offensives were part of the larger Ibero-Islamic world war, which raged intermittently from the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean for almost two centuries (1492–1667). In 1538 the Turks, together with the Muslim ruler of Gujarat, laid siege to Diu. The assault failed, even though it occurred the same year the Ottomans defeated a Hispano-Venetian fleet at Preveza in the Adriatic. Later (1550s) the Portuguese turned back another Turkish attempt to break out of the Persian Gulf through the Portuguese-held Straits of Hormuz (Truxillo 1995).

A regionwide alliance of Muslim rulers, fostered by Ottoman diplomacy, attempted to expel the Portuguese from their positions on the coast of India and Malacca. The Ottomans promised to assist this alliance with a substantial force of Janissaries (elite slave-troops). The attacks took place in 1568–1571; both Goa and Malacca were hard pressed to throw back the besiegers. Even though Ottoman cannoneers were present during the campaign, the main Ottoman force so critical to the plan was tied down invading Cyprus and putting down a rebellion in Aden. At the same time, the Ottomans were involved with the construction of a Don-Volga

canal in the Ukraine. The Turks wanted to invade Safavid Iran by way of the Caspian Sea using the canal; this plan also failed. In 1571 the Holy Alliance (Spain, Venice, Genoa, the Knights of Malta, and the Papacy) defeated the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto; that same year the Castilians occupied Manila in the Far East. The strategic initiative in the Ibero-Islamic world war was clearly passing to the Iberians (Truxillo 1991).

The Portuguese survived the crisis of 1568–1571, but the cost to their empire was high. In the 1570s, the Muslim sultan of the Moluccas led a native reaction that drove the Portuguese from the Spice Islands. Then, in 1578, the Portuguese king, Sebastian, was killed while trying to conquer Morocco. After that disaster, Portuguese bases on the Moroccan coast fell one after another to the victorious sultan, Al-Mansur. The direct male line of the house of Avis came to an end when Sebastian's elderly uncle died in 1580. Philip II of Spain took the opportunity to unite the whole Iberian peninsula by annexing Portugal. Prudently, the Castilian king promised to respect and maintain the full autonomy of Portugal (Hess 1978).

In the East, Portugal's fortunes began to recede. Around 1585, the Portuguese in East Africa witnessed a temporary retreat of their hegemony when an Ottoman admiral rallied local Swahili resistance against Lisbon's rule. Fortunately, the beleaguered Portuguese received reinforcements from Goa. The Ottoman attack had been launched from Red Sea ports held by the Turks. Earlier in the 1540s, the Portuguese had fought against the Ottomans for control of Christian Ethiopia. Portugal supported Negus's forces in their war against Ahmad Gran (warlord of Harrar); tragically, Vasco Da Gama's son was killed in that campaign. Afterwards, the Turks established a series of bases along the Red Sea. However, the Portuguese were not exhausted; they undertook the conquest of Ceylon in the 1590s. These events transpired as the Dutch and English harassed Portugal's seaborne traffic (Diffie 1977).

The union of crowns with Castile was both beneficial and detrimental to Portugal; initially, Castile helped protect Portugal's farflung empire. In the Far East, the Spanish governors of Manila often forestalled Achinese and Dutch attacks on Macao and Malacca. Eventually, the Portuguese suffered the disadvantages of having acquired Castile's enemies—England, Holland, and France. Portuguese merchants, many of them *conversos* (converted Jews), on the other hand, swarmed over Spanish America during the period of the union (1580–1640), making the Castilians wary of their Portuguese allies. On the other hand, the Portuguese aristocracy became more Castilianized culturally throughout this period (Marques 1972).

In the early seventeenth century, the crisis grew as the defense of a worldwide monarchy appeared to be beyond even Castile's great means. First came the Dutch who they colonized Indonesia, building a colonial capital, Batavia, on the island of Java. Meanwhile, the Portuguese suffered one loss after another. In 1622 Hormuz fell before an Anglo-Persian alliance, which diminished the Middle East's role in the commerce of the Indian Ocean. Afterwards, the Dutch and English definitively captured the region's carrying trade. Later in 1629, the Dutch occupied northeastern Brazil (Boxer 1977).

The Spanish Habsburg Monarchy was hard pressed to meet all its commitments while the Thirty Years' War was raging in Europe. Spanish forces, based in Manila, valiantly fought to ward off Dutch attacks on Macao, Malacca, and even on their own rich port-city. In 1641 Malacca fell to the Dutch; a little later, the Portuguese lost their bases in Ceylon. These same years witnessed the expulsion of Portuguese Jesuits from Ethiopia and Japan though the society's missions continued to operate in the courts of Moghul India and Manchu China. Ironically, many of the worst setbacks occurred after the Portuguese had broken away from Habsburg Spain in 1640 (Livermore 1953). The Portuguese tenaciously held on through all these disasters and fought back vigorously. Nevertheless, the Dutch continued their advance, founding Cape Colony in South Africa in the 1630s. The Portuguese retained most of the East African coast until the end of the seventeenth century (Russel-Wood 1992). In the southern Atlantic region, Salvador da Sa managed to retain Angola, the source of many Brazilian slaves. At the same time, Creole planters formed (with their slaves) a resistance movement that dislodged the Dutch from northeast Brazil in the 1650s. The rich sugar and timber resources of Brazil were replacing Asia's prestigious trade in monetary significance. An expansive Luso-American civilization was being created in Brazil because of its greater proximity to Portugal (Boxer 1975).

In Brazil, Portugal formed a colonial society similar to Spanish America. The African component was, however, more significant in Brazil than in the largely Indian societies of Mexico and Peru. The situation in the Spanish Caribbean was, of course, more comparable to the social milieu in Brazil. Another significant difference between the two societies was the relative strength of their respective social institutions. The monarchy and the church were more powerful and influential in the Castilian Empire. For example, the Spanish crown had almost immediately revoked the seignorial privileges of the Columbus family, whereas the Portuguese monarchy actually attempted to settle the Brazilian coast by granting tracts of land to feudal *Donatarios*. The system failed for the most part, and the Portuguese government gradually reassumed control of the grants. Finally, it should be noted, that the Portuguese Church was significantly less active in Brazil than that of Spain in Mexico or Peru even conceding the smaller population and resources of Portugal. Interestingly, Portuguese churchmen such as the Jesuit Antonio Vieira (1608–1697) thought of Portugal as a messianic kingdom, destined to spread the Catholic Faith throughout the world (Choquette 1992).

As Brazil's fortunes rose, the Portuguese crown began to neglect its Indian Ocean empire. At the close of the seventeenth century, Portugal's first possessions in the East, the Swahili, cities fell to an Omani attack, including Fort Jesus in Mombasa (1699), key to the whole coastline. Only remnants of the once mighty Estado da India remained—Mozambique, Diu, Goa, Timor, and Macao (Boxer 1975).

Gold and diamonds were discovered in central Brazil at the end of the seventeenth century; Portugal, therefore, reoriented its colonial objectives to exploit the new continent and its riches. Brazil's enormous wealth, largely carried on English ships, sustained the waning prestige of the Portuguese Monarchy. In the end, like Spanish-America, Brazil became greater than its parent society. Sustaining Brazil's

incredible growth in the eighteenth century was the dynamic energy of the *bandeirantes*—Brazil's homegrown explorers-conquistadors-slavers. *Bandeiras* were large companies of mixed-race adventurers who operated out of Sao Paulo. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the *Bandeirantes* pushed Brazil's frontier steadily westward, searching for gold, slaves, and food (Livermore 1953).

Eventually, the Luso-American viceroyalty became an independent South American empire—Brazil. Napoleon's invasion of Portugal in 1807 was the catalyst to Brazil's independence. The Braganca Dynasty fled before the French invasion disembarking on British ships for Brazil where a court in exile was set up, events that made the Brazilians very aware of Portugal's inadequacy as a metropolis and fostered a growing sense of autonomy. Independence was proclaimed in 1822 after King John VI returned to Portugal and his son Don Pedro was proclaimed emperor of Brazil (Zavala 1990).

The Atlantic empires of Holland, England, and France seemed insignificant in comparison with those of the Iberians. In the case of Holland and France, overseas ventures did bring high profits, and they conquered substantial territories, but in neither case did their colonies compare with the Spanish kingdoms of Mexico and Peru, treasure houses of the world. It was not until the late nineteenth century did France and Holland, along with other European nations, build extensive colonial empires in Africa and Southeast Asia (Savelle 1974).

England was different because that island kingdom did establish thirteen territorial colonies on the eastern seaboard of North America (1607–1776). Many of the Thirteen Colonies' institutional foundations were developed during the English conquest of Ireland; these included the homestead and plantation. Furthermore, the English Civil War, the closing of the Commons, and the flight of sectarians all served to populate the Thirteen Colonies with a large number of white European settlers (unlike Ibero-America, where native and mixed-race peoples predominated). The English successfully planted a vigorous graft of their own culture in North America—based on English Common Law, personal liberty, the nuclear family, market economics, and representative government. All of these traditions bore fruit during the American Revolution, when Anglo-American colonists cast off royal rule and constructed an independent and expansionary republic—the United States of America (McFarlane 1994).

Yet it would be wrong to anticipate the future greatness of the United States and give too much significance to the 169-year history of the Thirteen Colonies. In their time, they were marginal possessions of the British metropolis, similar in significance to Canada in the external affairs of France. It can also be argued that except as a dumping ground for dissenters, exiles, debtors, and adventurers, the English colonies were less valuable to England than the fur trade of Canada was to France. In fact, both France and England found their sugar-producing islands in the Caribbean more profitable than either Canada or the Thirteen Colonies. During the French and Indian War (1756–1763) and the American Revolution (1775–1781), France and England decided to surrender their mainland territories rather than risk the loss of their Caribbean plantations (Savelle 1974). Spain also held onto Cuba

and Puerto Rico for almost a century (1821–1898) after mainland Spanish America became independent for much the same reason.

THE WORLD OF THE CONQUISTADORES

The greatest and most extensive of the seaborne empires was created by the Catholic Monarchy of Spain. The kingdom of Castile built the first America as an extension of Spain's overseas empire, and the Indies remained under Spanish rule for over three hundred years (1492–1824). In no part of the New World does the significance of the imperial era so outweigh the period of independence (Zavala 1990). During most of the Age of Gunpowder Empires (1453–1840), the world monarchy of Catholic Spain was the most extensive state on the planet. At the end of the eighteenth century, it stretched from San Francisco in the north to Patagonia in the south; east to west the empire extended from Barcelona to Manila. The Spanish World Monarchy was even larger than the Russian Empire of Catherine the Great and the Manchu Empire of China, which were its contemporaries (Truxillo 1995). In effect the Hispano-American Imperium became a New World Christendom as a result of Castile's tutelage.

Iberian Christians constructed a militarized society as a result of the *Reconquista*, a conflict that lasted over four centuries (1085–1492) and ended with Christian Spain conquering Muslim Al-Andalus. The reconquest was largely completed by 1250, when the major Moorish cities were in Christian hands—Toledo, Saragossa, Valencia, Lisbon, Cordoba, Seville, and Murcia. Most of the conquered territories fell under Castilian jurisdiction. And it took Castile over two centuries to absorb those lands. In the process, the Castilians learned how to administer and develop an empire (Lomax 1978).

The Iberians that undertook the *Reconquista* saw themselves as a heroic race of crusaders, so privileged by their great feats as to be exempt from manual labor. And, as many of the Moors fled before the Christian advance, large tracts of southern (Andalusia) and western (Extremadura) Spain were turned into grazing lands. Herding sheep and cattle was viewed by many Spaniards as more manly and noble than farming. Fortunately, Europe's medieval economy was receptive to wool exports from Spain. These, in turn, produced a vital commercial and textile sector in Spain's northern cities. Castile's pastoral economy was always less developed and sophisticated than the Agrarian economy of fallen Al-Andalus (Vives 1970).

During the *Reconquista*, Castilians developed the critical institutions of empire that would help them rule the Americas. Like all premodern elites, the Castilian aristocracy depended on landed estates along with subordinates, forced labor, and tribute for status; these aristocratic patterns of exploitation were exported to the New World. In the political realm, the Castilian monarchy's near absolutism was unique among the Iberian kingdoms. Even though aristocratic faction was rife in the late Middle Ages (1350–1474), Castilian kings were not hampered by constitutional restraints such as those that bound the rulers of Aragón (Madden 1929).

When the New World was opened up, the Castilian crown was determined to assert full royal prerogatives over the new lands. The Church was controlled by the

Patronato Real, established during the pontificate of the Spanish Pope Alexander VI (1492–1503). Furthermore, the Conquistadores were not allowed to turn their *encomiendas* into feudal domains, and the cities of the Americas were forbidden to convoke or gather in a cortes (parliament) (Góngora 1975). No other European prince had so wide a latitude to evolve authoritarian models—"carte blanche"—except the czar of Russia.

The most significant portion of Castile's preparation for overseas empire was its ideological mentality. Pervading most sectors of Castile's population was the quest for noble status and the ideal of crusade. The motto "*Armas y letras dan nobleza*" epitomizes the Castilian search for status, wealth, and honor. Moreover, the union of church and state was very strong in all the Iberian kingdoms; Catholic Christianity was the paladin of Iberian identities. During the centuries of war with the Moors, the Islamic concept of *jihad* (holy war) also influenced Iberian ideology. For example, the great military orders, which prospered as great landowners in southern Spain, were partially based on the *ribats* or monastic fortresses established by Muslim holy warriors (*ghazis*) in North Africa (Castro 1971).

The hidalgo class—the mainstay of Spanish expansion—was inspired by a military mission whose origins extended back to the time of Charlemagne (Góngora 1975). The Frankish emperor conquered Saxony in the late eighth century and forced the pagan Saxons to accept Catholic Christianity; he then garrisoned Saxony with Frankish nobles and their knights (Riché 1983). Another precedent for the military mission was the establishment of the Teutonic military order in Prussia and along the Baltic. Non-Christian populations in those areas were also forced to convert to Catholicism, and German warrior-monks became their territorial lords (Christiansen 1980).

The Castilian Church guarded against laxity in the face of large Jewish and Muslim minorities; their implicit criticism kept Spanish Christianity vigilant and immune to the later currents of the Reformation. Cardinal Ximenez Cisneros reformed the Spanish Church in the late fifteenth century; he was also the restorer of the Franciscan order in Spain. Eventually, Cardinal Cisneros was appointed regent and elevated to the primatial see of Spain, archbishop of Toledo. The Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella (1471–1516), were patrons of the great cardinal in his many endeavors. The Spanish Monarchs established the Inquisition in their realms, promoted the reformation of religious orders, patronized the new humanistic learning of the Renaissance, and completed the *Reconquista* by taking Granada (1492). Later, that same year, the Catholic Kings pushed forward with the religious unification of Spain by expelling all Jews who would not covert to Christianity (Payne 1994).

The political ideal of the Catholic Kings was unique: a territorial state transforming itself into a confessional empire. Unified, vigorous, militant, and prosperous, Spain was ready for its American venture. The Catholic Monarchy's preparation for empire was facilitated by its religious policies and by the emergence of Castilian as an official language—given form by the grammars of Nebrija and Vives—becoming, as it were, the lingua franca of a New Rome in the Western

Hemisphere (Green 1968). In 1492, Spain's *anno mirabilis*, Columbus discovered the Americas, which he claimed for Castile and Leon.

Many have written of the discovery of America as if it was the opening act of the Modern age. And it is true that the Europeans were able to assert their global primacy largely because New World resources so heavily tipped the global balance in their favor. However, it should be recalled that these changes occurred gradually and were not really complete until the early nineteenth century (at the end of the Gunpowder Imperial Era). It was the combined effect of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution that precipitated modernity even though the earlier evolution of commercial capitalism, rationalism, technicalization, and experimental science all prepared the way (Truxillo 1995). Earlier localized fluorescences duplicated aspects of each of modernity's characteristics. For example, rational thought had been an early trait of Greek philosophy during the Axial Age (800–200 B.C.). The Arab caliphate patronized a highly advanced form of science during the Confessional Age (A.D. 300–1500). Similarily, Sung China's level of technical and industrial development was extraordinary and unsurpassed by Europe until the nineteenth century. In addition, commercial capitalism was already well-advanced in the trading societies of the medieval Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, what appears to be amazing is the extraordinary coalescence of these manifestations in Europe during the age of the Gunpowder Empires (Truxillo 1995). Ironically, the most successful European empire of pre-modern times was that of Catholic Spain, a throughly traditional society.

Castile on the other high arid plateau of Iberia was the heart of Spain though earlier, southern Spain (Al-Andalus) under the Moors and eastern Spain—the kingdom of Aragón-Catalonia—had appeared more cosmopolitan and prosperous (Vives 1970). Interestingly, Castilian pre-eminence in world affairs, lasting 150 years (1492–1643), was sustained by a country with an underdeveloped commercial sector and a backward pastoral economy. The Castilians were pious, warlike, and poor; their kingdom, at most, had a population of eight million (ca. 1560), which barely compared to France's twenty-five million or Germany's thirty million (Bonney 1991).

This unmodern society rejected the Reformation and championed the Counter-Reformation. Yet Spain would build a confessional civilization in the New World, which endured for over three centuries—a life span as long as that of the Roman Empire in western Europe. The imperial history of Spanish America can be divided into four parts: the Age of Discovery and Conquest (1492–1556), the Era of Imperial Zenith (1556–1640), the Baroque Age (1640–1760), and the Bourbon Reforms and Independence (1760–1825).

The reigns of the Catholic Kings and the Emperor Charles V coincide with the Age of Discovery, Exploration, and Conquest—the period inaugurated by Columbus's discovery of the New World and which ends with the abdication of Charles V. From 1492 until 1519, the Spaniards concentrated on the main Caribbean islands—Hispañola, Cuba, and Puerto Rico; they also reconnoitered the mainland coasts of Venezuela, Central America, and Florida. During the Caribbean phase of their American enterprise, the Spanish ruthlessly exploited the natives,

forcing them to work in gold mines and on agricultural estates. The island populations were hardly prepared for the cultural shock of encountering Iron Age invaders with horses and gunpowder weapons (Bethell 1984).

Institutions such as *encomienda* and the *repartimiento* were established to provide the Spanish colonies with forced labor and tribute. *Encomiendas* descended from *Reconquista* practices and were first assigned by Columbus and Nicolás de Ovando on Hispañola being assignments of native labor from specific villages to individual colonists (*vecinos*) (Simpson 1966). The Spaniards used *Encomienda* labor to construct fortified towns for protection. The cities built in the Indies were unlike those of medieval Spain in so far as they were open to the surrounding countryside, similar to the secured towns of the Roman Empire. Later, of course, coastal settlements were fortified to guard against foreign attackers. In the first Spanish settlements, the lifestyle of the *ecomenderos* was strikingly medieval in character, a direct continuation of the military frontier in Spain. Likewise, the *encomenderos* were part of a tradition of knightly warfare and military land tenure that stretched back to the archetypal example of this way of life in Sassanian Iran (224–641) (McNeill 1963).

Luis Weckmann has brilliantly discussed the survival and renewed vitality of the conquistadores' chivalric ethic in *The Medieval Heritage of Mexico*. During the reigns of New Spain's first two viceroys, Antonio de Mendoza (1535–1550) and Luis de Velasco (1550–1564), the culture of the conquerors exhibited the characteristics of Charles V's Burgundian court. Banquets, tournaments, and hunts established a round of social events that highlighted the knightly ethic of early New Spain. The dwellings of the conquistadores in Mexico City initially took on the appearance of urban castles adorned with heraldic devices and noble banners. Especially noteworthy for his aristocratic lineage was Antonio de Mendoza, whose father had been the viceroy of Granada under the Catholic Kings. Raised in the Arabic court of the Alhambra, Mendoza was exposed to the elegant and expansive civilization of Andalusia (Aiton 1972); this prepared him for his role as viceroy in the exotic and brilliant world of Anahuac (Mexico).

The *repartimiento* was another kind of tribute collected from the natives in the form of labor. *Repartimientos* were used by the Spanish community at large for public works, mining, harvesting, or even transport and manufacturing. Spanish officials appointed by the crown (*corregidores*) oversaw the assignment of *repartimientos*; they were supposed to guard against any abuse of native labor. Unfortunately, royal officials often participated in the exploitation. On the other hand, most premodern governments tolerated a certain amount of corruption as unavoidable, given the circumstances of transportation, communication, and distance. However, this toleration was contingent on an overall assumption of loyalty to the crown (Zavala 1990).

Columbus was initially granted the title of hereditary admiral of the ocean seas and made viceroy of the newly discovered islands for life; he was also entitled to one-tenth of any profits derived from the New World. Later, the Castilian crown removed the Columbus family from effective control of the islands because of their

mismanagement and pretensions; royal governors were sent in their place (Haring 1947).

Spain's New World possessions came solely under the jurisdiction of the crown of Castile as integral provinces of that kingdom. The traditions and customs of Castile, especially those of Andalusia and Extremadura (where most sixteenth-century settlers came from) were those that most shaped Spanish America. In terms of legal jurisdiction, the Indies were part and parcel of Castile with the same laws and *fueros* pertaining to either realm. The subjects of the separate kingdom of Aragón-Catalonia were initially forbidden to immigrate to the Americas (Muldoon 1994).

In the New World, Castilian kings had a free hand constructing a model society according to royalist principles. Moreover, they had no intention of allowing any other corporation—church, nobility, cities, or guilds—to interfere with the monarchy's absolutist objectives. Very early on, the crown withdrew the privileges of the Columbus dynasty, a sign of its absolutism. It also sought to regulate church affairs by acquiring the right of royal patronage from the Papacy. In a Spanish-dominated Italy, the Popes were forced to be unusually accommodating (Shiels 1961). The Castilian crown also frustrated attempts by the conquistadores to turn their *encomiendas* into feudal domains. Meanwhile, Castilian tradition allowed for royal supervision of trade, town government, and native affairs. The earlier conquest and settlement of the Canaries established precedents for the monarchy to follow in the organization of the Americas (McAlister 1984).

Most of the Spanish conquests were undertaken by private companies or war bands led by a captain or caudillo under contract to the Crown. Later, the *bandeiras* of Brazil were organized in a similar fashion, though largely through local initiative. The conquistadores' arrangements with the king were called *capitulaciones* and were considered by the earliest settlers to be a kind of Magna Carta binding a sovereign to his warriors (Mingo 1986). However, royal agents were always present during campaigns to collect the "royal fifth" as part of whatever spoils the conquerors acquired. Conquistador companies (*universitas*) were reminiscent of those led by El Cid (1041–1099) during the *Reconquista*. It should also be recalled that El Cid led his forces into Moorish territory to conquer an independent kingdom for himself and his *banda*, that was loosely under the jurisdiction of his overlord Alfonso VI, emperor of Leon and Castile (Góngora 1975). In the early fourteenth century (1303–1311), the Catalan Grand Company, led by Roger de Flor, went to the rescue of the faltering Byzantine Empire. The Catalan *Almogavares*, or mercenaries inflicted many defeats on the Ottoman Turks, but they soon grew dissatisfied with their Byzantine employers and revolted. Their caudillos set themselves up as caesars of the Grand Duchy of Athens (1311–1388) under the distant jurisdiction of the crown of Aragón (Moncada 1975). With these examples in mind, it is little wonder that Spain's rulers did not trust ambitious conquistadores thousands of miles away from royal supervision. Their martial qualities made the Spaniards the terror of Europe, enhancing the reputation of the invincible *tercios*, and serving them well in the conquest of the New World. In the Indies, the conquistadores

endured innumerable hardships and struggled against great odds, inspired by their unbounded ambition, unquenchable greed, and fanatical zeal.

The crown rightly feared the independence and turbulence of its distant and bellicose agents (Kirkpatrick 1971). The royal government had no desire to see the feudal anarchy of fifteenth-century Europe repeated in the New World. After the conquest of Peru in the 1540s, such a challenge to royal authority did occur. It was led by the Pizarro family, who had initially organized the conquest of the Inca empire. Moreover, the crown was hard-pressed to put down the rebellion; Viceroy Blasco Nuñez de Vela was killed by Pizarro's adherents. The king eventually conceded the issue of hereditary succession to *encomiendas* distributed by Francisco Pizarro to the original conquerors. Similar disturbances greeted the institution of the New Laws (1542) elsewhere. The New Laws sought to abolish the *encomiendas* after one lifetime; their failure convinced the monarchy of the necessity of suppressing all forms of feudal jurisdiction and municipal self-government. In New Spain, the viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, wisely delayed the enforcements of the ordinances because of settler opposition. The Dominican activist Bartolome de las Casas was the main force behind the effort to deny the conquerors the fruits of their conquest (Parry 1974).

The crown of Castile soon established the Council of the Indies to oversee the operations of its American empire. This council was one of several regulating the affairs of the monarchy; it was staffed almost exclusively by lawyers (*letrados*) educated at the universities of Salamanca and Henares de Acala or later at the imperial colleges in Madrid. Trade with the Americas was centralized and regulated by the Casa de Contractacíon which was located in Seville. Eventually, ships sailing to and from the Indies did so in convoy to protect themselves against foreign corsairs and pirates (Haring 1947).

In time, the royal government devised a bureaucratic hierarchy to govern the Indies, a centralized executive branch consisting of viceroys, captain-generals, and governors to administer the various territories of the Americas. During the Age of the Conquests, special frontier governors or march wardens were appointed, called *adelantados*; the latter was an ancient title, descending from the Leonese Empire (939–1157). Royal courts, called *audencias*, provided justice and checked the executive power of the viceroys or governors in their courts' jurisdiction. Other overlapping agencies provided for local government (*cabildos*), tax collection (*hacienda real*), and market regulation (*consulados*). No government in Europe until the eighteenth century was so systematically organized as that of Spain's American empire. The Catholic Monarchy, like the Ottoman system it resembled, endured for over three centuries with only minor adjustments (Vives 1961).

The dreadful collapse of Native American populations in the Caribbean weighed heavily on the conscience of the Emperor Charles V. Churchmen and missionaries such as the Dominican Las Casas, wrote shocking reports cataloging native mistreatment by the Spaniards. These allegations were also significant because Spain's enemies used these stories to misrepresent Spanish rule, calling it a tyranny to justify their own predations on Spanish commerce and to establish their own colonies in the New World. During the reign of the Catholic Kings, Pope

Alexander VI (1492–1503) granted Spain and Portugal the exclusive right to evangelize and settle non-Christian lands. This division, as it seemed, of the world was confirmed by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Under the terms of that agreement, Spain exercised dominion west of an imaginary line running north-south along the Atlantic. Portugal, after some minor adjustments to the boundary, claimed jurisdiction over the regions east of the line of demarcation, including coastal Brazil (MacLachlan 1988).

Royal jurists contested or downplayed Papal power in favor of a regalian interpretation of Spain's rights to the New World based on Roman and natural law with their provisions for the rights of discovery and conquest. Yet, the Papal donations of Alexander VI and Julius II remained the basis of the Spanish monarchy's universalist claims to the New World. The Papal bulls "Inter Coetera" (1493) and "Universalis Ecclesiae" (1508) were in continuous use as a theocratic justification for Spanish sovereignty until the Catholic Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century (Muldoon 1994). As late as 1648, the great jurist Solórzano Pereira in his work *Politica Indiana* still referred to the Papal donations as the surest foundation of a Catholic Monarchy, and this at a time when the principle of the laws of nations—already evident in the writings of Saavedra Fajardo—was overturning that of Christendom and its ideal of Papacy and Empire (Góngora 1975).

The Spanish Kings always tried to ameliorate the condition of their Indian subjects. They enacted humane legislation to protect their New World charges; the Laws of Burgos (1512) and the New Laws (1542) were examples of their concern. The Laws of Burgos were inspired by the ideals of Palacios Rubios, who instituted the famous *Requerimiento*, a document to be read to the Indians before their conquest that called upon them to accept Papal jurisdiction and royal authority or suffer the consequences of just war. Yet, the monarchy's critical financial situation ultimately undermined the crown's good intentions. As royal revenues from the New World increased, especially after the discovery of silver in Peru (1545) and Mexico (1547), every means, no matter how ruthless, were used to guarantee that their mines were provided with extensive native labor and local food production. The harsh conditions of this process coupled with the impact of Old World diseases (from which Native Americans had no immunity) led to the devastating collapse of Indian populations; Mexico's may have fallen from 30 million in 1519 to 1.5 million in 1650; Peru's population decreased from around 10 million in 1500 to only 1 million in 1640 (McAlister 1984).

The Spanish conquerors of Mexico (1521) and Peru (1532) initially lived in small cities, governing millions of native subjects, more like the new ruling elites of ongoing native empires than as representatives of Hispanic culture. The *ciudades y villas* of the conquistadores were self-governing, agro-urban complexes, akin to the Islamic cities of Al-Andalus or the Macedonian colonial encampments of Hellenistic times. In fact, the urban orientation of the conquistadores directly descended from Mediterranean precedents, especially those developed during the *Reconquista*. The situation in Meso-America and the Andes would change after 1560, when native populations declined so drastically. The resulting demographic catastrophe undermined native elites, eroded Indian cultural continuity and precluded the

possibility of the Spanish viceroyalties becoming successor states of the fallen Mexica-Aztec confederacy and the Inca Empire (Bakewell 1997).

Catholic missionaries, especially those of the mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians), preached against the cruelty of the conquerors. They tried to protect native converts, isolating them in their own communities, such as La Republica de los Indios. At first, especially in Mexico among the Franciscans, the hope was entertained that a new Christendom was being constructed in the New World. The mendicants dreamed of an apostolic church emerging among the millions of enthusiastic Indian neophytes that would be as pure as that of the New Testament. The American Church would redeem that of the Old World by its faith and moral excellence (Ricard). As the Protestant Reformation swept through northern Europe, stealing many souls from the True Faith, in the New World countless millions were replacing those losses with better Christians. Some of the missionaries wrote in an apocalyptic vein, believing that the conversion of the Indians was a stage in the fulfillment of human history. Many friars believed that the last times were at hand, to be initiated by the worldwide preaching of the gospel (Brading 1991). Some of the first Franciscan missionaries in Mexico were adherents of the Spiritual Franciscan movement of the high Middle Ages. Martin Valencia, Pedro de Gante, Motolinia, and Mendieta were certainly inspired by the teachings of the twelfth-century abbot Joachim de Fiore, who wrote about a third age of the Church that would be initiated by the teachings of the Holy Ghost (Phelan 1970). Furthermore, many Franciscans believed St. Francis was the new spiritual man alluded to by Joachim de Fiore (Reeves 1977). Interestingly, St. Thomas More's *Utopia* served as a model to Vasco de Quiroga, judge (*oidor*) and later bishop of Michoacán, when he established his famous *hospitales* among the Indians of his diocese. In these communities he attempted to preserve their communal way of life with its round of sanctified labor (Weckmann 1992).

By the later sixteenth century, the mendicants' apostolic zeal was waning. The missionaries were demoralized; their flocks had been devastated by diseases or were being dragooned into labor service by the *repartimiento*. Nevertheless, the heady days of the first Catholic mission in the New World remained a legacy, contributing to the positive self-image of Spanish American Christians. As long as the Catholic Monarchy maintained its credentials as patron of the True Church and its works in the Americas, none dared to question its right to govern or the legitimacy of its sovereignty (Brading 1991).

The conquerors of Mexico and Peru established in those lands the centers of Spanish rule in North America and South America respectively. Cortez was a heroic figure who brilliantly overthrew the Mexica-Aztec Empire in 1519–1521. In many ways, the conqueror of Mexico resembled Machiavelli's Prince, while the boldness of his enterprise recalled the campaigns of Alexander and Julius Caesar. Later historians of the conquest—Gómara, Bernal Díaz, and Antonio de Herrera—all confirm this image. Cortez conquered Mexico with only a thousand Spaniards by assuming the leadership of an anti-Mexica native alliance. The epic events of the conquest (a word that in the original Latin means to seek adventure and fame) are too great to do justice in a work such as this; therefore let me once again refer the

reader to the works of the three authors mentioned above: Francisco López de Gómara's *Historia de la Conquista de México*, Bernal Díaz del Castillo's *Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España*, and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas's *Historia General de los Hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas i Tierra Firme de Mar Oceáno*.

After the fall of the Mexica capital, Cortez founded a new metropolis, Mexico City, on the site; from there, he launched expeditions that subdued most of Meso-America in a few years. Moreover, the great conqueror was a builder and a charismatic leader, who proved his sagacity when he founded the city of Vera Cruz and had himself elected captain-general in order to break with his superior, the governor of Cuba. After initial reluctance, Cortez distributed *encomiendas* to his men in order to bind the restless conquistadores to the land. The conqueror of Mexico was also a patron of the first Franciscan mission led by Martin Valencia. Cortez received the friars on the causeway leading into Mexico City with great solemnity and humility so as to impress the Indians with the importance of the Catholic religion. Later, he asked the emperor to establish a missionary church in Mexico to keep the secular clergy from corrupting the faith of the Indians (Wagner 1944). Cortez was determined that the rapine and lawlessness of the Caribbean enterprise would not be repeated on the mainland, and he tried to set the new Spanish kingdom on a sound economic footing. The conqueror had been a participant in the terrible slave raids and *calalgadas* that devastated the islands. He was also aware of the ruthless campaigns of his contemporary Pedrarias Davila, the royal governor in Central America—conqueror of Panama, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica—events as terrible as the bloody wars of the Assyrians in the ancient Middle East. Cortez imported the livestock that soon overran central Mexico. Ironically, the grazing animals damaged native crops but also enriched local diets. He also built sugar mills and started a silk industry on his estates in Cuernavaca, the *marquesado*. From bases in southeastern Mexico, Cortez launched expeditions across the Pacific, searching for new lands to conquer and for the fabled straits of Anian. In effect, the great conqueror was the founder of modern Mexico (Liss 1975).

Unfortunately, Charles V feared Cortez's towering ambition; he, therefore, circumscribed the conqueror's authority by appointing royal agents to oversee his activities. After a disastrous campaign to Honduras (1524–1526), Cortez was forced from office; he eventually went to Spain to redress his grievances. In Castile, Hernan Cortez was honored and raised to the rank of marquis but replaced as royal governor by a viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza. Later, the conqueror participated in the Emperor's disastrous attack on Algiers (1541) after which, Cortez's residence in Seville became a noble court, replete with resident humanists and intellectual luminaries (Elliot 1989). The conqueror of Mexico died in 1547, never returning to the country he had founded; neither is he honored in the Spanish metropolis he constructed on the ruins of Tenochtitlan—"Sic transit gloria mundi."

The conquest of Peru was undertaken by a disreputable band of adventurers led by Francisco Pizarro, an impression further enhanced by that conquest's failure to find a worthy chronicle such as Gómara or Bernal Diaz. Ironically, the Inca empire fell as quickly as that of the Aztecs, though it appeared to have been more

soundly constructed. The Indian empires were, in effect, theocratic civilizations—like those of Old Kingdom Egypt and Hummarabi's Babylon—incapable of resisting a gunpowder monarchy. Pizarro's forces were much smaller than Cortez's (consisting of only two hundred men and twenty-seven horses) while the difficulties of traversing and campaigning in the Andean highlands were enormous. It is a testimony to the almost demonic energy of sixteenth century Iberians that they were capable of marching and fighting in environments as diverse as the high and cold Andes, the tropical jungles of Central America, or the burning deserts of northern Mexico (Kirkpatrick 1971).

Pizarro, imitating Cortez, captured the ruler of the Inca empire. Having accomplished this, he forced a ransom from the Inca's subjects, then promptly murdered the captive prince. This act of ruthlessness paralyzed Inca resistance, temporarily allowing the Spaniards time to occupy the main Inca centers, including the capital, Cuzco. Pizarro's men later withstood repeated attempts by the Incas to dislodge them from their captured strongholds. Eventually, an Inca court-in-exile was established in the jungles at Vilcabamba by Manco Inca; it long remained the focus of native resistance to Spanish rule. In 1571 the neo-Inca statelet was finally conquered by the viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo (Zimmerman 1968).

The conquerors of Peru were factious, and civil war ensued. Amalgro, who was Pizarro's partner along with the priest Lucque, felt cheated of his fair share of the spoils from the conquest of Peru. Amalgro and his followers saw Pizarro award the best *encomiendas* to his brothers and retainers. Thereafter, Amalgro left Peru for Chile, hoping to recoup his losses. The "men of Chile" returned exhausted and disappointed, ready to challenge Pizarro's faction for the corpse of the Inca Empire. Civil war ensued, and Amalgro was subsequently killed; this, in turn, impelled his followers to assassinate Francisco Pizarro in 1541. During the civil wars, large native contingents fought on either side. The party led by Pizarro's brothers was defiant and determined to enjoy its spoils, defending their conquests against all challengers, including the king's officials (Lockhart 1974).

Spanish Peru was built on less secure foundations than New Spain (Mexico) partially because of its great distance from Castilian bases in Central America. Furthermore, Lima, its capital, was a coastal city—situated far away from the country's Andean heartlands. This isolation produced a schism in Peru's social ecology that has never been healed—that between the residual continuity of the Inca highlands and the domination exerted by the Spanish regime on the coastal plain (Bakewell 1997).

By the time the emperor, Charles V (1558) died, Spanish rule in the Americas was set on a firm foundation. Distinct societies were already emerging under Castilian domination. For example, the future outlines of an Afro-Hispanic Caribbean were already evident on the islands of Hispañola, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, and along the lands of the Spanish Main—Venezuela, Cartagena, Panama, and Vera Cruz. In New Spain, Catholic Mexico was born of the union of Castile and Anahuac. South of New Spain, the kingdom of Guatemala was the nucleus of Central American identities. In South America, rich Peru was hegemon of the developing countries of Rio de la Plata (Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina) and the Andes (the future

Ecuador, Bolivia and Chile). New Granada, centered around Bógota, would later become Colombia (Donghi 1993).

The Spaniards had conquered or at least reconnoitered the lands from the western deserts of North America to the pampas of South America, by the middle of the sixteenth century. Between 1539 and 1542, Francisco de Coronado and Hernando de Soto explored the entire region of the southwestern and southeastern regions of upper North America. At the same time, Gonzalo Pizarro and Orellana were opening up the Amazon basin. Further south, Pedro de Mendoza moved into Paraguay, and Valdivia began the conquest of Chile; these expeditions defined the peripheries of the Spanish Empire (Parry 1974).

The conquistadores preferred to settle in those lands where Indian settlement was dense or where black slaves could be imported as a substitute work force. Moreover, the conquerors were few in number, perhaps only twenty thousand total in 1560; Africans were as numerous and prone to rebellion, especially in Mexico. At first, Spanish women were rare; this led to an explosion of mixed races—mestizos (half Indian), mulattos (half black), and zambos (a black and Indian mixture). Native Americans, however, remained the overwhelming majority of the population (Mórner 1967).

Spanish towns were islands of Hispanic civilization in the midst of predominantly Indian societies. Universities in Santo Domingo, Mexico City, and Lima were established in the mid-sixteenth century as signs of royal favor, introducing the New World to the benefits of a learned society. The humanist Francisco Cervantes de Salazar (1514–1575) was an early luminary of the Indies' precocious academic culture (Lanning 1940).

The Spanish Monarchy successfully transferred its institutional model to the New World, including the union of throne and altar which was the mainstay of Spanish Imperialism. The Castilian king was the patron of the Church and champion of the worldwide Catholic Counter-Reformation, a new Constantine. As a result of the Patronato Real, the king of Spain nominated all positions in the American Church; he also collected the tithes, using them to support the clergy and to construct and maintain cathedrals, parishes, schools, missions, hospitals, and religious houses. In Spain, the king exercised a similar jurisdiction in Granada, though the privilege of universal patronage (throughout the country) would only be assumed by the Bourbon Dynasty in 1753 after its concordant with the Papacy. Spanish missionaries successfully propagated the Catholic religion among the Indians, and church revenues helped support the monarchy's enterprises at home and abroad. For the first time since the end of the Roman Empire or the fall of the Sassanian Dynasty, a truly confessional state reigned in which the ruler was as committed to religion as was the priesthood (Brading 1991).

The religious orders were not only upholders of Indian rights and agents of evangelization, they were also chroniclers of Indian cultures and preservers of native civilization. Of course, incidents occurred such as the time that in Bishop Landa in the Yucatan, destroyed Mayan books and artifacts. In fact, most of the early evangelizers did consider the Indian religions to be inspired by Satan; they rejected overt similarities between native cults and Christianity, denouncing them

as further proof of demonic influence. Missionary writers Bernardino de Sahagún, Jerónimo de Mendieta, and later Juan de Torquemada in Mexico, and secular writers such as Cieza de Leon and Garcilaso de la Vega in Peru—recorded myths, histories, and literature in a genuine attempt to understand the Indians. They also wanted to Christianize the Amerindian cultures. Moreover, the mendicants believed that native society, the Republica de los Indios, required segregation from the corrupting influence of the Republica de los Españoles, though no one really questioned the inequity of the former laboring to support the latter (Cuevas 1946).

Spanish authorities in New Spain, Peru, and Nueva Granada eventually tried to segregate those natives that survived the great epidemics of the middle sixteenth century. The viceroys Luis de Velasco in New Spain (1550–1564) and Francisco de Toledo in Peru (1569–1581) forced the Indians into Spanish-style towns or *congregaciones* where they could be more closely supervised by religious authorities and exploited (the *Repartimiento* in New Spain and the mita in Peru) by the secular ones (Céspedes 1974). Even Las Casas accepted the legitimacy of native princes living off the labor of their subjects. It is to the credit of the great Dominican, however, that he was willing to attribute a higher purpose even to those Indian religious practices, such as human sacrifice, that the Spaniards found base. Furthermore, Las Casas defended the right of the Indians to be treated as free subjects of the crown at the Junta of Valladolid in 1550, countering the arguments of the humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. The latter maintained, according to Aristotelean principles, that the Indians were slaves by nature, more like children than rational beings, and this in spite of Pope Paul III's bull "Sublimus Deus" (1537), which asserted the complete humanity of the Indians (Hanke 1949).

Bartolomé de las Casas was only one of many outstanding jurists, scholastics, and theologians whose speculations concerning native rights, the "Jus Gentuim" (the law of nations), and the morality and justice of imperialism were the glory of sixteenth century Spanish thought. This roll call of honor includes Francisco de Vitoria (1480–1546), Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), Melchor Cano (1509–1560), Domingo Bañez (1528–1604), all Dominicans, and the Jesuits Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Luis de Molina (1535–1600), and Juan de Mariana (1535–1624). However, none of them could yet imagine a society that escaped the inherent injustice of agrarianate civilizations (Gracia 1993).

Along with the Church, the Spanish Empire in the Americas was institutionally represented by two great viceroyalties. The wealth and population of these New World kingdoms under Charles V would have made them worthy seats of any Old World empire. For example, Hernan Cortez wrote to the Emperor, saying that in Mexico the ruler had acquired another empire as great as the one he already ruled in Germany. As the twin mountains of silver (*los cerros ricos*)—Potosí and Zacatecas—became fully productive, the Indies became essential to the finances of the Catholic Monarchy. Interestingly, revenues from the New World, even at their height, barely exceeded those the Church paid to the crown in Castile. Extra money from the Americas (about 20 percent of the royal revenues) was nevertheless essential to Spain's ambitious foreign policy in Europe and later Asia (the Philippines) (Lovett 1986). As of 1560, Spain had no serious rivals in the New World, though

French corsairs were already preying on Spanish shipping. And the French king, Francis I, demanded to see the clause in Adam's will that gave the New World to Spain. Meanwhile, the economy of Castile, especially that of Andalusia, was booming; Spanish settlers in the New World mostly originated in southern Spain during the sixteenth century. They demanded products from their homeland because there was a lag of at least twenty years before the local economy of a conquered province could feed and supply its new ruling class with products similar or equivalent to those of Spain (Davis 1973).

Outgoing convoys of ships bound for the Indies often anchored for a while in the Canary Islands. The earlier conquest of these islands served as a laboratory for the Spanish in their New World venture. From the Canaries, Spanish ships sailed across the Atlantic in about four weeks. After arriving in the Caribbean, the great *flota* separated, usually near Puerto Rico or at Hispañola; then the two parts of the convoy made their way to Panama or Vera Cruz. After unloading passengers and supplies, the ships were loaded with treasure, New World exports, and returning passengers. The two fleets reconverged in Cuba and then sailed along the Gulf Stream to Spain. Ultimately Seville and Cadiz became major emporia of a new Atlantic economic system; the Seville world system became the vehicle of early modern commercial capitalism. Spain's wealth led to planetary inflation, the Price Revolution. Ironically, the first global economy left the Catholic Monarchy bankrupt (Haring 1947).

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Chapter 4

The *Pax Hispanica*, 1556–1825

IMPERIAL ZENITH (1556–1640)

The second period of Spanish American imperial history began with the ascension of Philip II (1556–1598) to the throne of the Catholic Monarchy and ended around 1640, when military disasters in Europe caused the Spanish Empire to falter; this era represents the apogee of Spanish imperial civilization. The New World possessions of Castile were colonies in the Roman sense of the word, which is to say that they became overseas manifestations of their metropolis, new Spains across the Atlantic. By 1600 after Native populations had been decimated, the Hispanized sector comprised of *peninsulares, criollos* (American-born Spaniards), and mestizos grew in their place, along with Africans and mulattos (Esteva-Fabregat 1995).

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the various countries of Spanish America were largely Hispanic in culture and fully integrated into the Baroque civilization of Catholic Christendom. By that time, Meso-American and Andean ruling classes had been reduced to commoner status, divested of rank and privilege. The Inca aristocracy fared a little better than the Aztec elite because Cuzco, the Inca capital, was not the main center of Spanish domination in Peru. The writings of Guaman Poma de Ayala (ca. 1614) and Alva Ixtilxochitl (1578–1650) reflect the anguish of royal mestizos witnessing the disintegration of their respective Indian civilizations (Brading 1991).

Under Philip II (1556–1598), the Spanish World Monarchy reoriented itself away from the Mediterranean, toward the Atlantic (Braudel, 1973). In the Mediterranean, the struggle between Spain and the Ottoman Empire stalemated after the battle of Lepanto in 1571. And though that engagement was a Christian victory, the Ottomans quickly rebuilt their fleet and renewed their offensive, capturing Tunis in 1574. The port city of Tunis was critical to the Spaniards as a forward base that allowed them to carry their offensive into the eastern

Mediterranean. Around 1580, the two superpowers disengaged in order to deal with other adversaries. As a result of this conflict, Spain secured the defense of Italy, and the Ottoman Empire was secure in the possession of the Balkans. At the same time, the Turks faced the renewed threat of Safavid Iran under Shah Abbas (1587–1629). Philip had to deal with the rebellion of the Netherlands, English predation on Spanish shipping, and civil war in France. Each of these crises was in some way tied to the conflicting goals of international Protestantism and Catholic Spain's universalist ambitions (Alvarez 1966).

Philip's temperament established the cultural milieu of Spanish America for nearly two hundred years (1570–1762). In character and style, Philip II (1556–1598) was like Justinian the Great (527–565); both were extremely sedentary, intellectual, and legalistic. Moreover the Catholic religion was at the center of their ideology. Justinian was a great patron of a new Byzantine style of art, the builder of Hagia Sophia; Philip's great monument was the Escorial. The Spanish king was a Maecenas of late Renaissance culture. In their architectural accomplishments, the two Catholic sovereigns aspired to surpass Solomon's temple in Jerusalem (Brown 1970).

Great generals served Justinian and Philip; Belisarius and Narses were the swords of Justinian's reconquest of the West whereas Philip was ably served by the Duke of Alba and Alexander of Parma. The latter was a master of siegecraft and an early pioneer of close-order drill tactics. Furthermore, the Byzantine emperor and Spanish king both ruled in a bureaucratic fashion from palace headquarters, which made them suspicious of and ungrateful to the great captains that did their bidding on the battlefield. And just as Justinian's reign was the apogee of the later Roman Empire (284–634)—leaving a legacy of greatness to be emulated by later medieval rulers—so Philip II left his mark on the Counter-Reformation in Europe and molded the subsequent destiny of Spanish America (Lynch 1991).

When Philip II died in 1598, the Spanish World Monarchy in America was at the height of its power and significance in world history. At that time, Spanish America had a population of around 160,000 Spaniards, mostly concentrated in Mexico and Peru; they primarily lived in the few great cities such as Mexico or Lima or near the great mining centers, notably Potosí or Zacatecas. Many Spanish towns and cities had either replaced or were built on the sites of former Indian centers. Great stone edifices—cathedrals, palaces, fortresses, schools, and convents—rose in the new cities. Towns were laid out in a grid-iron pattern reminiscent of classical city design and the plan of the great camp of Santa Fé built by the Catholic Kings during the final siege of Granada (Bethell 1984). While Indian labor was plentiful (in the sixteenth century), the Spaniards massively restructured America's urban landscapes, a feat comparable to the architectural boom initiated by the Greeks in Asia after the conquests of Alexander (336–323 B.C.).

The development of Spanish American architecture mirrored the various phases and styles current in Europe—passing through late Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, and Classical incarnations. Naturally, the skills and cultural traditions

of Indian and African builders and artisans modified all the products of Spanish American culture, informing them with elements that were clearly non-European. In effect, a New World synthesis was emerging, not only in the arts but in all spheres of Ibero-American society (Liss 1975). The process continues even today and is slowly leading to the emergence of a new civilization distinct from that of Europe, Africa, Asia, or Amerindia. The Mexican thinker José Vasconcelos called this New World synthesis the Raza Cosmica.

The Spanish ruled a stratified society ranked in a pigmentocracy, descending from an Iberian-born elite (mostly administrators, higher clergy, and entrepreneurs) to Creole Spaniards (whose highest ranks included *hacendados*, lower clergy, and mine owners) through a numerous mixed-race population—mestizos and mulattos (mostly urban). At the bottom of the social hierarchy were the several million surviving Indians and tens of thousands of black African slaves. Moreover, Indians and blacks supported the whole system with their tribute and servile labor (Mórner 1967). The lower classes maintained the output of the silver mines that sustained Castile's great power status and was also a stimulus to increasingly autonomous local economies and intercolonial trade (Bakewell 1993). During Philip's reign, Spanish America took on an increasingly metropolitan aspect. For the great viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico) and New Castile (Peru) ceased to be mere successor states of the Aztec and Inca empires; they had become instead full-fledged Hispanic kingdoms overseas. In time, the *encomendero* class was broken of its feudal ambitions; the central government grew stronger and local town governments were stripped of their authority. The bureaucratization of the Indies' accelerated, after the disturbances attending the New Laws in Peru and the *encomendero* conspiracy discovered around the person of Cortez's son in Mexico (1562). The viceregal capitals were transformed into cultured centers of Spain's hierarchical civilization, replete with a bureaucratic government, a Creole aristocracy, a state-church, and a stratified social system (Haring 1947). Meanwhile, the crown squeezed the colonies as much as possible because it needed revenues to promote the Counter-Reformation throughout the world.

The Missionary Church was demoralized as the Indians died off, and the millenialist dreams of the mendicants faded. Moreover, as Creoles became the majority in most religious houses, a perceptible waning of enthusiasm for the rural mission could be detected. The new focus of this largely Creole church was the urban environment of Spanish America. Later, when Propaganda Fide colleges were founded (between 1683 and 1795), the Creole clergy rediscovered a spiritual zeal for evangelization. In New Spain, the Franciscan colleges of Querétaro and Zacatecas provided the personnel for expansion into Texas and California (Brading 1991).

The growing tension throughout Spanish American society, between peninsular Spaniards and Creoles, manifested in the religious orders over the election of superiors and provincials. The issue was resolved by the unsatisfactory system of the *alternativa*, whereby peninsulars and Creoles alternated in the leadership of religious houses and consideration for episcopal rank. Around

1621, a few mestizos and Indians were ordained priests because of the shortage of clergy fluent in native languages. Meanwhile, a new diocesan church was rising, as mandated by the Council of Trent, centered in the cities around cathedral chapters, urban convents, Jesuit colleges, and lay confraternities (Dussel 1983).

The decade between 1565 and 1575 was critical to the formation of Spain's grand strategy to integrate the Americas into the Catholic World Monarchy. In the early 1560s, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was commissioned to secure the defense of the Caribbean and Florida from foreign interlopers. He discharged these duties brilliantly, exterminating the French Huguenot colony in Florida and replacing it with the fortified settlement of St. Augustine in 1565. Later the Italian military engineer, Antonelli helped plan the great fortifications that ringed the Spanish Caribbean—San Juan, Cartagena, Porto Bello, Vera Cruz, and Habana (Hoffman 1980).

In 1568 the viceroy of New Spain, Martín Enríquez (1568–1580), surprised and captured John Hawkin's English expedition in the port of Vera Cruz. Afterwards, English pirates regularly raided Spanish commerce and attacked coastal settlements. Meanwhile, Sir Francis Drake terrorized the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Spanish America, sacking Santo Domingo and attacking silver-laden mule-trains crossing Panama. However, Spanish ships sailing in convoy could usually ward off these attacks. Even after the disastrous Armada Campaign of 1588, the Spaniards were able to successfully maintain their New World lifeline by systematizing the *flotas* (Carrera de las Indias) (Lynch 1991).

In four critical years 1568–1571, Philip's new measures remade the Indies. During this time, Juan de Ovando served as *visitador-general* and president of the Council of the Indies; he was also a member of the Junta Magna of 1568, when the reforms of Philip II were instituted. Under Ovando's supervision, a great inquiry was conducted concerning the resources, cities, population, and history of the Indies; new laws forbidding future conquests (1573) and further defining the Patronato Real were instituted (1574). The decrees of the Council of Trent were also enforced (Poole 1987).

Two new viceroys assumed control of Mexico and Peru; they were instructed by the Junta Magna (1568) to carry out its reforms. Martín Enríquez (1568–1580) refurbished royal authority in New Spain and Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581) restored order in Peru. Both men were perfect embodiments of Philip's sober and dedicated system of government; they were ordered to increase royal revenues by regularizing Indian labor supplied for the mines. The viceroys accomplished the task by congregating the surviving Indians into pueblos, where they might be better protected, Christianized, supervised, and exploited. The king's agents had no problem disentangling the contradictions of this agenda (García-Abásolo 1983).

Enríquez and Toledo initiated elaborate plans to defend their highland kingdoms' coastal regions. They also carried on frontier wars against the Chichimecas of northern Mexico and the Chiriguanos of upper Peru in order to secure mining operations that were located on the frontiers of their viceroyalties. Under

Enríquez and Toledo, the viceregal courts became colonial extensions of the Escorial. The aristocratic style, knightly ethic, and informal government of earlier viceroys, such as Antonio de Mendoza (1535–1550) and Luis de Velasco (1550–1564) in New Spain, no longer seemed appropriate to a world-class empire. Meanwhile, Castilians were engaged on a global scale attempting to form a universal Catholic Monarchy. In the eyes of contemporary observers, the Spanish Empire was even thought to be the fifth monarchy of prophecy preparing the way for Christ's second coming and the millennium (Pagden 1990).

In 1570 Pedro Contreras y Moya arrived in Mexico to establish the first American office of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the same Inquisition that helped to maintain religious orthodoxy in Spain and Italy. The Holy Office guaranteed that those two bastions of Roman Catholicism were untouched by Protestanism and that Spain's Jewish and Moorish *conversos* would be supervised. In the New World, the Inquisition had less work to do than in Europe. Indians were usually exempt from Inquisitorial supervision because of their status as catechumens and wards of the state. Furthermore, Spanish immigration laws forbade overseas passage to *conversos*, although a few celebrated cases of crypto-Judaism were prosecuted. On the whole, the Inquisition mostly concerned itself with the censorship of books and the moral regulation of society, especially lax clergy. Sex crimes such as homosexuality and clerical seduction of penitents were severely punished. Interestingly, the great *autos de fe* held in Mexico City, Lima, and Cartagena were popular events that reinforced those communities' sense of belonging to a religiously committed Catholic Monarchy (Choquette 1992).

The Spaniards inherited from medieval Christendom a monumental hostility to homosexuality. This hatred was exacerbated during the *Reconquista* by the flourishing pederastic subculture encountered by the Christians in the Moorish cities of Al-Andalus. And in the New World, the Spaniards often accused Indians of unnatural vice in order to dispossess and enslave them. Ironically, the Iberians—members of the larger Mediterranean world—were exponents of the exaggerated code of masculine honor as well as proponents of the seclusion of upper-class women. These ideals are usually conducive to the appearance of a strong homosocial ethic which did, in fact, pervade most aspects of Mediterranean and Ibero-American public life, but did not shade off into homosexuality because of medieval prejudice and the availability of native and slave women for casual sex (Truxillo 1995).

Pedro Moya y Contreras, who later became Archbishop of Mexico City, viceroy of New Spain, president of the Council of the Indies, and patriarch of the Indies—was the perfect embodiment of a Tridentine prelate; his career embodied the ideal of political and religious harmony. The archbishop called the third General Council of the Church in Mexico, which instituted the reforms of the Council of Trent (1542–1564). Moya's council set the Mexican Church on a course that was only altered in the 1960s after Vatican II (Poole 1987). In Peru, the great archbishop of Lima, St. Toribio de Mogrovejo (1538–1606), performed a similar role; he also convoked a definitive provincial council that regularized

the affairs of the Peruvian Church. Moya and Mogrovejo were dedicated to raising the standards of their diocesan clergy; they also wanted to enforce episcopal jurisdiction over the *doctrinas* of the religious orders (Choquette 1992).

Much of the history of colonial times is taken up with ecclesiastical affairs and church politics. The most celebrated case of this type was that of Bishop Palafox of Puebla (ca. 1640), who was driven from his see because he attempted to impose episcopal authority over the Jesuits in his diocese. Furthermore, the affair was a terrible affront to the aegis of the monarchy, representing a potential threat emerging from the alliance of local interests and clerical privilege. The Jesuits, in particular, were singled out as having discredited Palafox, the crown's loyal servant in Puebla. The higher clergy saw themselves as the active agents of the Catholic Monarchy; they were the religious representatives who complemented the secular administrations of Enríquez and Toledo (Israel 1975). The Peruvian Church, however, lacked the idealistic roots of Mexico's first missionaries. The Incas never completely accepted Catholicism, which resulted in Lima appearing to be a giant Catholic monastery on the coast away from Peru's Inca heartlands. Clerical exponents of Peru's Creole patriotism were therefore reluctant to embrace the Andean past in the manner of New Spain's chroniclers. The Augustinian friar Antonio de la Calancha, in his *Crónica moralizada del orden de San Agustín en el Peru* (1638–1653) devalues the Inca past and instead identifies his Peruvian homeland with Ophir, fabled land of King Solomon's mines. Potosí with its Cerro Rico was another Ophir supplying Spain's sacred monarchy with the means to promote the True Faith and fight heresy (MacCormack 1991).

The year 1571 was almost as important to the Spanish Empire as 1492. In that year, the Holy Alliance of Spain, Venice, Genoa, and the Papacy destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto. And in the Far East, the Spaniards captured Manila from its sultan; its great harbor would later become the center of Spain's oriental empire, which for seventy years (1571–1641) dominated the trade of the Far East. The Manila galleons carried silver to the Philippines across the Pacific from Mexico in exchange for Chinese silks and luxuries. Oriental commodities, in turn, supported a thriving intercolonial trade between Mexico and Peru; the crown tried to suppress this commerce as ruinous to Spain's industries and mercantile interests. Moreover, the Spaniards dreamed of launching expeditions to missionize Japan, conquer China, and defeat Malaysian Islam. From the beginning, the Philippines enterprise was largely a Mexican affair, supported with personnel and revenues from New Spain (Truxillo 1991).

In Peru, Viceroy Toledo finally eliminated the Inca court in the jungle fastness of Vilcabamba. The last reigning Inca, Tupac Amaru, was executed in Cuzco, symbolically ending Inca rule in 1571 (Zimmerman 1968). Fifteen seventy-one was also the year the first Jesuits arrived in Mexico. St. Ignatuis Loyola (1491–1556), a Navarrese hidalgo and soldier, founded the premier religious order of the Catholic restoration; his Society of Jesus was a religious international organization operating on a global scale. In the early seventeenth century, the Jesuits were active in the Catholic countries of Europe, Spanish

America, Brazil, and the Philippines; they were also represented in Ethiopia, India, China, and Japan (Hsia 1998). Interestingly, the Jesuits combined the militancy of Spanish Catholicism with the new individualism and learning of the Renaissance (Wright 1982). Furthermore, they were devoted to the Papacy and upheld strict Catholic orthodoxy. In the New World, the Jesuits were active in higher education and in the missions of northern Mexico, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Their reductions in Paraguay were renown as utopian and self-supporting communities. Moreover, local landowners usually envied the prosperity of Jesuit estates and longed to gain access to their mission Indians. In Paraguay the Jesuits were forced to arm their charges after Brazilian slavers, the famed *bandeirantes*, continued to harass and attack the missions. During the Comunero Revolt of 1725–1731, the Jesuit militia consistently supported royal authority against the Cabildo of Asuncíon (Bangert 1986).

The Jesuits' greatest impact on Spanish America (as in Catholic Europe) was as educators; their seminaries and colleges trained Creole elites for professional careers in the service of the Catholic Monarchy. The Jesuits soon became champions of Creole rights, supporting their charges' petitions to be considered for positions in the church and government of their own countries. However, the Society of Jesus never failed to instill in its students and parishioners a deep sense of loyalty to Catholic princes (Jacobsen 1938). Jesuit affinity for royal authority was partially a reflection of the centralized government of their own order centered as it was on a commanding general in Rome (often referred to by Jesuit critics as the Black Pope).

After Philip died, the caliber of Spanish government declined. Centuries before, the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (ca. 1400) had come to the conclusion that empires usually pass through a three-generational sequence, lasting approximately 120 years. The first generation establishes the empire; the second prospers at the height of imperial glory; the third lives in a time of declining fortunes (Hodgson 1974). After the latter, imperial structures may linger for centuries, staging abortive recoveries without ever restoring their original elan. The Spanish Monarchy passed through these same stages in the years between Union of Crowns and the heyday of Philip IV's reign (1479–1625). Moreover, the Hispanic Imperium underwent its abortive recovery during the reign of Charles III (1759–1788), confirming Ibn Khaldun's thesis.

The effort required to maintain the global interests of the Spanish Monarchy was exhausting and, the resources necessary to defend and promote the Catholic faith were greater than those available to Spain. Furthermore, Castile was overtaxed—its industries were declining and its population was falling. Meanwhile, France reemerged under the early Bourbons as a threat to Spanish hegemony and the Dutch were going from strength to strength in their quest for naval supremacy and economic ascendancy. Castile, on the other hand, desperately required the termination of its military commitments in Europe and at sea. Relief seemed to be at hand when Queen Elizabeth died (1603), and her successor, James Stuart, sought a truce with Spain. In 1609 the Spanish patched together a cease-fire with Holland; Spain needed peace in order to recover.

However, the Dutch continued their predations against Portuguese Asia and Iberian naval forces proved insufficient to contain the threat (Lynch 1992).

In the Americas and the Philippines, the Spanish Empire remained relatively secure and prosperous; silver shipments to Spain remained high up to the 1620s. At the same time, the Manila galleon trade in the Pacific rivaled the economy of the Atlantic, centered on Seville so much so that Spain tried to forbid intercolonial commerce in an effort to maintain Seville's monopoly. Spain built fortifications in the Caribbean and along the Pacific to defend the routes to its vast overseas holdings. Small naval contingents, called the "Armanda de Barlovento," were permanently stationed in the New World, however, budgetary constraints and commitments elsewhere, plus a critical shortage of naval personnel, kept the armada understrength. Moreover, the expense of supporting military forces in the New World and the Philippines was consuming local revenues that Spain desperately needed in Europe. Yet expenditures of public funds were a stimulus to local economies, which were already engaged in extensive contraband trade with Spain's English and Dutch enemies, further undermining the metropolitan economy (Haring 1918).

Not only were naval forces engaged in the defense of the empire, but by the end of the sixteenth century, substantial numbers of troops were stationed there. In the early seventeenth century, it was discovered that the *encomenderos* were no longer fit for service as a regional militia. Ideally, the *encomenderos* were a semifeudal cavalry maintaining armed retainers while living in fortified urban households, supported by the labor and tribute of their assigned Indians (Góngora 1975).

Earlier during the Mixton War (1540–1542), it had become clear that the *encomendero* class was living in luxury and had lost its martial spirit. The Mixton War and the revolt of Manco Inca (1536–1537) were the last serious challenges to Spanish rule in the lands of the former Indian empires. Ironically, the *encomenderos* and their retainers when called to service were not as effective as armed Indian auxiliaries. During the Mixton War, Antonio de Mendoza responded to the incompetence of the *encomenderos* by arming Mexica warriors and allowing Indian nobles the privilege of forming cavalry detachments (Aiton 1927).

As a form of military land tenure, the *encomienda* system resembled the *timars* of the Ottoman Empire (1288–1925) and the *itqas* of the earlier Seljuk Empire (1055–1324). The Turkish land assignments were also made in lieu of regular payment to defray the cost of a territorial army. And, like the *encomiendas*, the *itqas* and *timars* did not allow feudal jurisdiction to their holders that privilege always being a prerogative of the state (Hodgson 1974).

In the secure and prosperous internal provinces of the empire, there was little occasion for the ruling classes to resort to arms except in duels or to suppress civil disturbances. However, on the northern frontier of New Spain and in Chile (against the Araucanians), regular troops were maintained at great cost. Approximately one thousand five hundred soldiers garrisoned the presidios of northern Mexico during the Chichimeca wars (1545–1595). The Chilean frontier

(sometimes referred to as an American Flanders) was defended by two thousand regulars, who were maintained from the revenues of Peru after 1600 (Hennessy 1978). The costly defense of northern New Spain made sense because of the proximity of the area's rich silver mines. On the other hand, the Chilean front was maintained because of clerical pressure not to abandon a Christian missionary zone. Similar arguments were later used by Franciscan friars, pressuring the monarchy to sustain its commitment to Hispanic settlements in New Mexico and Texas. New Spain's distant outposts would have been impossible to maintain without first having won the Chichimeca wars (Powell 1975). Other troops, such as those forming companies of viceregal guards, were used for ceremonial duties. During Mexico City's civil disturbances in 1624 and 1692, viceregal troops proved inadequate to ensure the safety of royal officials. Noble horsemen from the rural haciendas, led by Creole aristocrats, crushed the urban mobs during the grain riots of 1692 (Brading 1991).

Great estates appeared throughout Spanish America in the seventeenth century; they were part of the general ruralization of Spanish America's economy. The metropolis failed to maintain sufficient economic stimulus for its colonial markets. The hacienda system throughout the Iberian world reinforced the patrimonial aspects of colonial society. Even though the great estates (*latifundias*) did not have feudal jurisdiction, their owners maintained a nobiliary lifestyle with wide-ranging patronage over bonded peasants. The monarchy tried to protect the corporate privileges of Indian communities; however, throughout the seventeenth century, tribal and communal landholdings gave way to widespread peonage (*yanaconas* in Peru and *inquilinos* in Chile) (Góngora 1975). Nevertheless, independent Indian societies continued to exist on the margins of the colonial world. In the late nineteenth century, the liberal regimes of independent Spanish America tragically abolished most communal holdings which, in turn, further accelerated the growth of *latifundias* and haciendas. In the new secular order of the independent republics, there was no longer a Church or king to protect Indian rights (Williamson 1992).

On the haciendas, armed retainers were employed to keep laborers in order and to ward off Indian raids (at least in those estates near unsubdued frontiers). Among the various cowboy cultures of Spanish America, a martial quality had always existed. The equestrian and ranching traditions of Spain had evolved during the long wars of the *Reconquista*; these were then transferred to the cattle-raising frontiers of the New World. Eventually, separate equestrian societies emerged—the gauchos of the Rio de la Plata regions, the *llaneros* of Nueva Granada, and the *charros-vaqueros* of northern New Spain (Hennessy 1978).

Around the Caribbean in the great stone fortresses that guarded the ports and received convoys from Seville, garrisons were stationed, consisting of regular troops and local militia. The militias were often captained by Creoles but were primarily recruited from the mixed races (mostly mulattos) of the port cities (Hoffman 1980). A similar system prevailed in the Philippines, where Manila's Spanish community provided the core troops of expeditionary forces made up of thousands of Christian Filipino auxiliaries. Hispano-Philippine

forces engaged in various military operations, such as defending the islands from Moro raids or thwarting Dutch attacks on Manila. Sizable expeditions were launched to enforce Spanish claims to Mindanao, the Moluccas, or Brunei. Moreover, Spanish governor-generals acting almost as independent rulers in the far east often committed men and ships to help the hard-pressed Portuguese in Malacca and Macao. The Spanish also built forts on Formosa before withdrawing from their farflung Asian outposts. Spain's first withdrawls in the Far East occurred when the Portuguese withdrew from the Union of Crowns (1640); the retreat continued after the Chinese warlord Koxinga occupied Formosa and threatened to attack Manila (1664) (Truxillo 1991).

Under the ministry of Conde-Duque of Olivares (1621–1641), the Catholic Monarchy exhibited renewed vigor in the conduct of foreign affairs. Olivares aspired to restore the monarchy to the level of greatness it had achieved under Philip II (Elliot 1986). Spain therefore entered the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) on the side of the Austrian Habsburgs; at first, the war went well for the Catholic allies. Bohemia was recovered and the Dutch lost many key fortresses, but the strain on Castile's faltering economy was intolerable. Furthermore, prices continued to rise, caused by the rapid influx of American silver. Later, the import of bullion declined because more cash was needed to sustain local economies in the New World. The sale of offices was rampant as Spain desperately attempted to raise more revenue. Titles of nobility were even sold to American Creoles; this eventually led to the creation of a substantial Creole aristocracy in the late colonial period—though divested of feudal jurisdiction. Interestingly, Cortez's *marquesado* was the only feudal jurisdiction in the Indies (Nutini 1995).

The conde-duque wanted to alleviate Castile's distress by distributing the burden of empire more evenly among the monarchy's component realms; Aragón and Portugal in particular enjoyed wide degrees of autonomy. The Union of Arms was the name Olivares gave to this program of imperial reorganization. According to the plan, the taxes and military contingents of all Spanish kingdoms were to be increased; meanwhile, Castile's obligations were not diminished. The result was a growing animosity even in the Americas to increased exactions. Moreover, the Portuguese were appalled at the sight of their empire falling prey to the Dutch. Furthermore, Castile was unable to fulfill its defense commitments under the terms of the original Union of Crowns. Portugal, Aragón, and Italy were seething with rebellion; revolts broke out in the 1640s, leading to the permanent secession of Portugal, the temporary secession of Catalonia, and rebellions in Sicily, Naples, and Andalusia (Kamen 1991).

The Spanish Habsburgs made a last supreme effort to live up to their vaunted reputation in 1621–1626. On the American front, Fradrique de Toledo, commanding a large expedition, cleared the Dutch out of Bahia in Brazil and temporarily suppressed piracy in the Caribbean. Afterwards, the sense of exaltation was so great that Olivares proclaimed his sovereign, Philip IV (1621–1665), The Planet King. To celebrate the victories a new palace, the Buen Retiro, was constructed in Madrid; Velasquez celebrated Castile's good fortune on the

battlefields of two hemispheres with some spectacular canvases, the "surrender of Breda" and the "liberation of Bahia." Unfortunately, the effort could not be sustained (Elliot 1986). Moreover, imperial forces nearing victory in Germany were frustrated by the intervention of Lutheran Sweden on the side of the Protestant princes. A fatal blow fell in 1629, when Dutch admiral Peter Heyn captured the silver fleet off the coast of Cuba in Matanzas Bay. The stolen treasure was then used to finance Dutch campaigns in the Orient and against Brazil (Boxer 1977).

More disasters were to come, even though the Spanish and the Austrians defeated the Swedes at Nordlingen in 1634. As a result of that victory, France entered the war on the side of the Protestants, eventually turning the tide of battle against the Habsburgs. In 1639, at the Battle of the Downs, the Dutch destroyed Spain's last effective fleet, which was attempting to carry supplies to the Spanish Netherlands. At Rocroi, in 1643, the French annihilated the main Spanish field army stationed in Belgium. Before this final blow, the Portuguese and Catalans (1640) seceded from the monarchy; the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies revolted in 1647 (Stradling 1981).

Olivares, crushed by misfortune, resigned from office in 1641. The Catholic Monarchy seemed to be on the verge of disintegration. At the same time in the Indies, the enemies of Spain relentlessly assailed the islands and port cities of the Caribbean region. In 1655 English forces of the Puritan dictator Cromwell annexed the island of Jamaica, and in 1671 the pirate Henry Morgan, sacked and destroyed Panama City. Meanwhile, Spain's European rivals were planting their own colonies in Canada, New England, and the Caribbean—irrespective of Spanish claims and Papal donation (McAlister 1984).

THE BAROQUE AGE (1640–1760)

The third phase of Spanish American imperial history begins in 1640 with the Catholic Monarchy's fortunes at low ebb and ends around 1760 when the new Bourbon Dynasty is about to implement its revolutionary reforms. This period is also known as the Baroque Age, par excellence. By this time, Spanish American societies had achieved a certain psychological distance from their Castilian metropolis. One of the most exuberant manifestations of Creole patriotism was the erection of great ecclesiastical edifices. The cities and towns of Spanish America were graced with Baroque churches, cathedrals, convents, seminaries, palaces, and colleges. Moreover, the New World took on the appearance of a thriving extension of Mediterranean civilization, replete with gilded altars, fine oil paintings, elaborate religious processions, and grand public ceremonies. The urban centers of the Spanish Empire became vast stages upon which the dramas and comedies of Hispanic colonial society were played out (Brading 1991).

The Baroque culture of Spanish America was an integral part of the international civilization of Catholic Christendom, a world that stretched from the plains of Poland to the highlands of Peru; it also extended from Milan—center

of St. Charles Borremeo's Counter-Reformation court—to Manila, capital of Spain's oriental empire. Art, literature, religion, and a learned society were avidly shared among countries participating in Baroque civilization. However, the overarching institutions of this world remained—the church, the state, and the aristocratic family. Great estates sprawled over the countryside of Catholic kingdoms, their agrarian economies maintaining a patrimonial aspect until recent times. In Spanish America, as in Catholic Europe, the goal of successful social aspirants was the achievement of noble status and a rapid escape from manual labor or commerce (Braudel 1973).

The Spanish Monarchy in the seventeenth century was the main patron and protector of Baroque civilization. The situation changed in the later seventeenth century and during the eighteenth when the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy became the premier representative of Baroque sentiments and attitudes; this patronage was, however, conducted on a reduced scale and mainly confined to central Europe (Ingrao 1994). Meanwhile, Spanish America slowly moved out of the orbit of the Baroque and fell steadily under the influence of French Classicism. The Hispanic world, nevertheless, remained a cultural realm psychologically surrounded by the warm and civilizing waters of the Mediterranean. José Antonio Maravall, in his book *Culture of the Baroque* (1986), writes that the Baroque is characterized by four traits: (1) a guided culture, (2) a mass culture, (3) an urban culture, and (4) a conservative culture. Each of these categories can be applied to Spanish America in the period between 1640 and 1760.

The society and culture of the Indies was guided by the twin institutions of church and state in effect, a civilization molded by the alliance of throne and altar. In the seventeenth century, particularly in Catholic Christendom, a new mass culture was emerging that united the ruling elites with the masses by way of religious propaganda and the ritual practices of the Counter-Reformation (Wright 1982). By contrast, the elite culture of medieval scholasticism and Renaissance humanism stood head and shoulders above the common milieu of their respective societies. Baroque civilization, on the other hand, anticipated aspects of modern ideological state systems in its ability to unite all levels of society through its public art, religious spectacles, and civic display; Roman-inspired uniformity informed every aspect of government, religion, economic regulation, and even family life. The latter, was being evinced by more careful scrutiny of marriage requirements, inheritance laws, and social proprieties in Hispanic societies (Maravall 1986).

The urban orientation of the Baroque is especially evident in Spanish America. To inspire protection the conquistadores preferred to live together in towns; their early concepts of urbanism were entirely drawn from the ancient Mediterranean ideal of a self-sufficient agro-urban society. Moreover, this model of citied life continuously renewed itself in the Mediterranean region from the time of the Greek poleis through that of the medieval communes and Islamic Suuq/Alcazars to the city-states of Renaissance Italy (Bethell 1984). In the Americas, some Spanish towns were built on the sites of Indian towns. During the Baroque period, Spanish urbanization largely replaced Meso-American

and Andean cities. Villas and *ciudades* reproduced significant characteristics of Amerindian town life, their ritualistic and ceremonial milieu for example. Some of this ritual was a self-conscious attempt by Catholic missionaries to maintain the calendrical round of sanctified labor the Spanish priesthood and *encomendero* class merely replacing native rulers and hierophants. Richard Morse observes (in volume 2 of the *Cambridge History of Latin America*, p. 89) that from 1570 to 1760, the cities of Spanish America manifested an "aulic" quality—teeming on feast days with awestruck crowds of celebrants and spectators—participants, as it were, in the great public occasions of Baroque urban society. By the later eighteenth century, the nature of city life in Spanish America would change to a market orientation with its class-consciousness and antagonistic social alienation. The conservative nature of Baroque culture grew out of its first trait, that of being a guided culture. The ideology of the Counter-Reformation as manifested in the decrees of the Council of Trent and the social objectives of the Society of Jesus and the cultural orientation of the Catholic courts of Philip II (1556–1598), Ferdinand II (1619–1637), and Maximilian of Bavaria (1598–1651) aspired to create a modern version of the organicist corporatist and integralist social milieu of medieval Christendom (Bireley 1990). However, in the Baroque form of this confessional civilization, the king rather than the pope was its highest authority, whereas the royal court replaced the religious orders as its integrating agent. The Neoplatonic concept of divine emanations was used as an archetype to explain the mechanism by which power and legitimacy descended through God to the king, who then diffused this divine inspiration by way of royal justice and patronage throughout society (Evans 1979). The theory of the divine right of kings was present in the writings of Pedro de Ribadeneyea (1526–1611), Juan Eusebio Nieremberg (1595–1658), Juan de Solórzano Pereira (1595–1655), and the warrior-bishop Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606–1682) (Arancon 1987). The concept of sacred monarchy was pushed in the direction of a French-style absolutism in the eighteenth century by Spanish Bourbon theorists (Stoetzer 1979).

The cultural continuum between the Old World Baroque and that of the Indies was manifest in the reflection by Spanish American authors of continental trends (Quesada 1917). For example, the epic tradition of late Renaissance Italian literature (Ariosto and Tasso) was brilliantly represented in the work of Alonso Ercilla (1533–1594), *La Araucana*. In New Spain, Bernardo de Balbuena (1568–1627) also employed verse to celebrate the glories of his American *patria* in *La Grandeza Mexicana* (Brading 1991). Balbuena's poem was an early Baroque manifestation of Creole patriotism in which Mexico City emerges as the new Rome of the Indies. The Baroque penchant for systems was also evident in the universal genius of two Creole luminaries, Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora (1645–1700) and Pedro de Peralta y Barnuevo (1663–1743); their work bears comparison to that of the polyhistorian, Athanasuis Kircher, S.J. (1601–1680) (Leonard 1929). Furthermore, two Mexican Creoles stand out in the fields of poetry and theater, Juan Ruiz de Alarcon (1580–1639) and Sor Juana de la Cruz (1651–1695) (Blanco 1989). Alarcon in Spain and Sor Juana in New Spain

were considered muses of the first rank in the seamless fabric of Spain's *Siglo de Oro*. The mentality and cultural horizons of each of these representative figures remained thoroughly immersed in the conservative objectives of Baroque learning: to preserve and pass on the intellectual corpus of a normative system of education (Evans 1979). They believed, as did most premodern intellectuals, that each generation was in danger of diminishing a received tradition unless they remained true to its founding principles.

The autonomy of Spanish America was not only the result of the growing weakness of Castile, but it also reflected the increased strength of colonial societies. Economically, the Spanish colonies were outgrowing the Seville monopoly. As Spain became less able to supply them with sophisticated manufactured goods, contraband trade with Holland, England, and France increased; this, in turn, drained away revenues Spain needed to sustain its own economic viability (Lynch 1992). Shipments of silver from Mexico and Peru, their chief export, fell throughout the seventeenth entury (Bakewell 1971). Meanwhile, the cost of defense rose as the European rivals of Spain planted their own colonies in the Caribbean and on the North American mainland. Therefore, part of the burden of defense was transferred to the Indies. New Spain undertook the maintenance of a Caribbean flotilla, raised militia forces to repel coastal attacks by the Dutch, and sent expeditions to defend Jamaica and Hispañola from English and French incursions. In the Pacific, New Spain defrayed the cost of government in the Philippines. The viceroyalty of Peru performed the same function in South America, especially in the war-torn province of Chile (McAlister 1984).

Handling their own defense increased the corporate sense of autonomy in Spain's New World kingdoms. The various regions of Spanish America preferred to view themselves as separate realms under the jurisdiction of the Castilian Monarchy. Because of this outlook, resentment grew against the management of the local government, church, and economy by the Iberian-born Spaniards. Moreover, the privileged classes of the Indies believed that according to natural law—a principle of late scholastic learning in Spain—native sons should be given preference in appointments to the offices of church and state in their own homelands. During the late Habsburg and early Bourbon periods, Creole elites did, in fact, purchase or force their way into a goodly portion of all but the highest positions of the state and ecclesiastical establishments (MacLachlan 1988).

Creole patriotism began to grow in the process, embellished by a century or more of residence in the New World; patriotic sentiments were increasingly evident in the reclamation of the Indian past by Creole writers. They sought to throw off the stigma of New World inferiority leveled at them by peninsular Spaniards, such as Jorge Juan de Santacilla and Antonio de Ulloa, and the Enlightenment thinkers—Buffon (1707–1788) de Pauw (1739–1799), Robertson (1721–1791), and Raynal (1713–1796) (Gerbi 1973). As early as the publication of *Royal Commentaries* of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1539–1615), authors in the New World had sought to restore the native past, giving their American homelands a classical antiquity equivalent to the Greco-Roman heritage of

western Europe. Creole writers often sought to rehabilitate the much maligned history of the Aztecs and Incas, defending native reputations from charges of idolatry, Satanism, and unnatural vice (Brading 1991). They cultivated the idea that St. Thomas, the Apostle, might have preached in the New World (Lafaye 1974); that Indians were descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel; or that Quetzacoatl, the Toltec prophet, was possibly an early Christian missionary. (A modern version of this kind of speculation claims a Far East origin for Quetzacoatl, making him a Buddhist monk or a Taoist sage.)

The anthropological investigations of early clerical authors—the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún and the great Jesuit José de Acosta (1540–1600)—led to the theory of the evolutionary stages of culture (Acosta 1970), which prepared the way for the Baroque speculations of Carlos Sigüenza y Góngora and Agustin de Betancur about the origins of Meso-American cultures. The greatest of the Creole defenders of the Indian heritage of Mexico was the exiled Jesuit, Francisco Javier Clavijero (1731–1787), a figure of the Catholic Enlightenment. His work *Historia Antigua de Mexico* continued to influence Mexican patriots in the nineteenth century and was a foundation of the *Indigenismo* ideology of twentieth-century Mexico (Ronan 1977).

Regional devotions such as those of the Virgin of Guadalupe and Santa Rosa de Lima also became foci of provincial identities. The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe was the greatest manifestation of Creole patriotism in its prepolitical colonial form. That this occurred in New Spain is already proof of Mexico's growing significance in the Catholic Monarchy. According to legend, the Virgin Mary had appeared to an Indian, Juan Diego, on the hill of Tepeyac in 1531. The Virgin asked Juan Diego to have a shrine built for her on the site; his initial approaches to the bishop of Mexico were rebuffed. Finally, the Virgin made roses bloom as a sign of her apparition, which Juan Diego gathered in his cloak. He appeared for a second time before Bishop Zumárraga. This time, opening his cloak to release the fresh roses, he revealed the imprinted image of the Virgin. Afterwards, a small chapel was erected on Tepeyac, and devotion to the image slowly grew; eventually the miraculous figure was identified with the woman of the Book of Revelation and the Extremaduran cult of Guadalupe, so popular with the early conquistadores. Initially, the legend of Guadalupe was opposed by the mendicants, who felt that the image offered the natives an opportunity to blend legitimate Christian devotion with the Aztec cult of Teotenanzin, also worshiped on the same hill of Tepeyac (Lafaye 1974).

Slowly, however, the cult of Guadalupe grew until devotion to the image on Tepeyac became the paladin of Mexican national identity. In 1648 the Creole priest Miguel Sanchez published a work titled *Imagen de la Virgen Maria, Madre de Dios de Guadalupe, milagrosamente aparecida en la Cuidad de México*; this book instantly became the clarion of a whole genre of religious literature written to celebrate New Spain's election as a sacred realm, chosen to provide a miraculous vessel for the unfolding plan of revelation. All the luminaries of New Spain's Creole intelligentsia participated in this flowering of patriotic fervor. Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora wrote *Primavera Indiana*;

Francisco de Florencia (1620–1695) was the author of *La Estrella del Norte*. Throughout the next century, Mexican writers became more exuberant in their praise for and evocation of Guadalupe; one Creole priest even imagined the Papal See being transferred to Tepeyac during the last times. In the early nineteenth century, patriotic ideologues Fray Servando Teresa de Mier (1763–1827) and Carlos Maria de Bustamante (1774–1848) continued to employ the Guadalupe cult as the instrument of an anti-Spanish confessional nationalism. Nor should one forget that the armies of revolutionary priest Hidalgo and Morelos fought under the protection of the Virgin during the wars of independence as did those of Zapata and the Cristeros during the Revolution (1910–1929). Non fecit talitier omnia nationi, "other nations are not so blessed," is the motto of Guadalupe (Brading 1991).

The weakened Spanish Monarchy had neither the resources nor the inclination to suppress these manifestations of colonial patriotism so long as outward deference to the monarchy was maintained. Castile could not defend the New World effectively after 1660; increasingly, it was the balance of power system fostered in Europe by Britain that kept the other countries from dismembering the Spanish Empire. A similar situation prevailed in the nineteenth century when European powers refrained from carving up the Ottoman Empire in order to maintain the same balance of power principle. However, the American portion of the Catholic Monarchy proved more than capable of fending for itself; it almost appeared as though the healthiest part of the Hispanic world was the Indies. Slowly, a period of benign neglect descended on the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru (Lockhart 1984).

The very nature of Spanish America's colonial status fostered conditions of potential autonomy, if not outright independence. For the Indies were colonies in the Roman sense that is, extensions of the culture and civilization of their metropolis. The American colonies, in effect, were Spanish kingdoms overseas, insofar as they were ruled by a Spanish king and were inhabited by the descendants of Spanish hidalgos and the subjugated natives. Castile's American domain embodied the Catholic religious ideal of an extended Christendom. Even the patriachical values and corporatist social ethic of Iberia was transferred to America, including seclusion of upper-class women and the chivalric code of male honor, deuling, and the quest for caballero or nobiliary status (Góngora 1975).

The Spanish family was particularly important to the process of social integration; not only did the extended family reinforce the patrimonial nature of Hispanic societies, it also provided those societies with a matrix of interconnecting social relations. For example, immigrants from Spain were often pioneering agents of larger families; they built a web of business connections across the Atlantic Ocean and transferred cultural values to their new homelands (Lockhart 1984). The Indies were not colonies in the mercantilist sense of economic assets to the metropolitan economy, though in the heyday of the Seville world system they did indeed play such a role along with their other as Roman-like colonies. At the end of the seventeenth century, signs of economic and political recovery

were already evident in Spain and the Indies. Indian populations in the New World were slowly recovering after the demographic collapse of the late sixteenth century; the total population of Spanish America in 1650 was around ten million doubling in the period before independence (ca. 1800). Local economies, which had fallen back into a self-sufficient rural-urban symbiosis, were again expanding and reconnecting to wider avenues of commerce. Even some areas of Spain long in recession such as Catalonia, were producing textiles at an increasing rate (Lynch 1992).

Colonial government was also showing signs of renewed vigor. In 1692 New Mexico was reconquered from rebellious Pueblo Indians. The Pueblo Revolt (1680–1692) had been part of a general weakening of Spanish authority along New Spain's northern frontier. At low ebb New Mexico was lost, the Texas missions were withdrawn, and parts of Sonora and Arizona were abandoned. Much of this disaster was due to the increased use of the horse among the region's Indian tribes and their mastery of Spanish military technology, which they acquired through trading with or raiding Spanish settlements (Weber 1992). A similar evolution occurred among the hostile tribes of the Argentine Pampas and the Araucanians of southern Chile (Hennessy 1978). However, by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the tide had turned in favor of a Spanish reconquest of the North. Not only was New Mexico regained (1692), but Texas was also reoccupied (1718) in order to contain French expansion out of Louisiana. Furthermore, in 1711–1722, Nayarit was finally conquered. Later, Nuevo Santander was colonized (1749) and, in 1769, responding to a Russian threat in northern California, the Spanish undertook the conquest and settlement of alta California. These *entradas* or *reconquistas* were largely undertaken by the Mexicano inhabitants of New Spain (Jones 1979), who were mostly creolized mestizos (albeit under royal supervision).

New Mexico was established as a northern extension of New Spain in 1598 by Don Juan de Oñate. That distant colony was a microcosm of life on a Spanish frontier; one in which the institutions of the *Reconquista*—mission, presidio, villa, and *rancho*—continued to inform the lifestyles of a vigorous and hardy race of creolized mestizos and *genizaros* (captive Indians raised in Hispanic households, who later served as military colonists). Moreover, New Mexico's history passed through multiple stages that epitomized the evolution of colonial Spanish America: Cabeza de Vaca's discovery (ca. 1530), Coronado's exploration (ca. 1541), Oñate's conquest and settlement (ca. 1598), Franciscan evangelization and acculturation (ca. 1630), Pope's rebellion (ca. 1680), Don Diego de Vargas's reconquest (ca. 1692), the Pueblo warrior alliance (ca. 1720), the Comanche threat (ca. 1730), French incursions (ca. 1780), *genizaro* colonization (ca. 1790), Mexican independence (ca. 1821), and Anglo-American infiltration and conquest (ca. 1846) (Weber 1992).

Interestingly, New Mexico was on the verge of establishing a full-fledged, albeit small-scale, version of New Spain's civilization when the United States, tragically, cut short its development into an independent Hispanic society. Nuevo Mexico, the faithful and martial kingdom of St. Francis, lacked the two

institutions that would have allowed it to produce a self-perpetuating intelligentsia and governing class such as Quebec possessed when it was conquered by England in 1760 and which allowed French Canada to survive as a separate nation. New Mexico lacked a bishopric to ordain native priests and a college to train secular professionals; and when it did acquire a Catholic bishop and a university, they came about through the agency of New Mexico's Anglo-Saxon conquerors (López-Gaston 1985).

On the marches of northern Mexico a new and dynamic people were emerging—the *Norteños*; they were a vigorous mixed race of Spanish, Indian and African ancestry, who had come into existence during the fifty years of the Chichimeca Wars (1544–1594) (Powell 1975). *Norteños* eventually settled a wide arc of territories, fanning out like an inverted pyramid from Zacatecas northward, including the lands of Nueva Vizcaya, Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Mexico, Texas, Nueva Santander, Coahuila, and California. The inhabitants of this region were primarily military colonists, ranchers, and miners (Jones 1979). In many ways, their lifestyle reproduced the milieu of the Iberian *Reconquista.* While the *Norteños* were obviously of mixed race, they culturally tended to identify more with their Hispanic than their Indian heritage. They believed that their simplified Castilian culture was an improvement over the barbarous environment of their Indian ancestors (Leon-Portillo 1990). Partially, this was a manifestation of domination and acculturation, but the process involved was also a conscious choice by a mestizo people, choosing the societal matrix most likely to bring success. In the frontier areas of Spanish North America and South America, a new regional economy was developing based on stock raising and large estates, which had medieval antecedents in Castile's ranching economy (Jordan 1993).

The change of dynasty in 1700 did not immediately affect Spanish America. The Bourbon Dynasty spent the first half of the eighteenth century attempting to restore royal authority in Spain. The navy was carefully rebuilt during the ministries of Jose de Patiño (1727–1736) and the marquis de la Enseñada (1743–1754), improving contact with the Indies (Brading 1991). Bourbon reformers acted under the direct influence of Jerónimo de Ustariz's tract, *Theórica y Práctica de Comercio y de Marina* (1724). Initially, Louis XIV (1660–1715) dreamed of restoring the universal empire of Charlemagne and Charles V. He hoped to eventually create a united monarchy consisting of France and the huge Spanish Empire by placing his grandson, Philip of Anjou, on the throne of Castile. Such a combination, under French tutelage, would have had little difficulty achieving global hegemony. However, the other great powers led by Britain and the Austrian Habsburgs waged war on a planetary scale to prevent this Bourbon ascendancy (Bluche 1990).

After the Spanish War of Succession (1700–1713), the Bourbons surrendered Spain's European empire, and the French and Spanish Bourbons were forced to accept separate dynastic succession. Although the two Bourbon houses periodically formed a family compact, they were also competitors for empire in the Americas (Savelle 1974). Eventually, the Spanish Bourbons began to identify their family interests with those of Spain and less with those of their French

cousins. The French connection reinvigorated the Spanish Monarchy, which was forced to associate itself more closely with its surviving empire in the New World. French advisors, technicians, and various experts began to modernize Spain along French lines. The liberties of the separate Aragonese realms were suppressed; government, finance, and legal procedures were centralized. Furthermore, the imposition of French style intendant reasserted royal power in the provinces while government expenditures on the army and navy helped to restimulate economic development. At best, Bourbon Spain only regained the rank of a second-class European power, but the improvement was considerable over late Habsburg times. The situation was so markedly improved that Philip V (1700–1746) restored Spanish rule over the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by the end of his reign (Lynch 1989).

In the Americas, the first half of the eighteenth century was characterized by a higher caliber of royal government, better contact with Spain through the restoration of the convoy system, and a renewed military effort to protect the empire. However, the humiliating Asiento system imposed by England after the Spanish War of Succession clearly demonstrated Spain's continuing weakness vis-à-vis a first-rate European power. Otherwise, colonial autonomy, including Creole access to *audiencia* and episcopal appointments, continued to flourish (Burkholder 1977). In their third century, colonial societies were maturing as independent countries although they still identified their collective aspirations with those of a universal Catholic Monarchy (Góngora 1975). Better government and more careful attention to the economy, plus modest improvement of technology, fostered steady growth and prosperity in Spanish America (Bakewell 1997).

Subtly, the ideology of the state was changing from Catholic universalism to a more narrow focus on Spanish national interests. And though the Bourbons hoped to include the Spanish Americans in their vision of a greater Hispanic nation, the truth of the matter was that the Creoles already thought of their New World homelands as separate nations or countries. Whereas the Habsburgs viewed the Spanish Empire as a confederated monarchy composed of many kingdoms, the Bourbons, as heirs of French centralism and Colbert's mercantilism, defined the monarchy more narrowly as an extension of the national patrimony. The Indies required Spain's support and protection in the first century of their colonial experience. By the eighteenth century, the situation had changed; Spain depended on the Americas to maintain its own great power status (Lynch 1989).

The eighteenth century after the death of Louis XIV (1715) was the Age of the Enlightenment in Europe, a universal manifestation of European civilization. As an intellectual movement, rationalism and secularism were among the Enlightenment's most salient traits—the world of the salons, academic journals, encyclopedists, royal societies, and the Philosophes. Voltaire and Rousseau were luminaries in this milieu; they exalted the rational and romanticized the spirit of humanity, freed of Christian tradition. The secularism of the Renaissance was largely humanistic; that of the Enlightenment was stridently based on a world

view that was profoundly scientific, rationalistic, and anti-Christian. Eventually, these ideas undermined the authority of monarchies predicated on the Christian concept of sacred kingship (Brading 1991).

There was another Enlightenment, however, that was avowedly Catholic; it sought to use humanism to update Christian learning and culture. Erasmus and his circle followed a similar vein before the Reformation (Bataillon 1982). Throughout the twentieth century, Christian modernists remained advocates of a reapproachment between the Enlightenment's scientific world view and Christianity's religious perspectives (Góngora 1980).

The Catholic Enlightenment was particularly strong in the Spanish Monarchy's realm, the Habsburg Empire, and Italy. The tradition was represented by diverse figures such as the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II (1765–1790), and the exiled Creole Jesuits Francisco Javier Clavijero (1731–1787), Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzman (1748–1798), and Juan Ignacio Molina (1740–1829) (Góngora 1975). As a movement, the Catholic Enlightenment was characterized by admiration for the French Catholicism of Louis XIV's reign, with its emphasis on royal supervision of the Church. The Gallicanism of Bishop Bousset was especially admired for its regalist orientation and profound religious orthodoxy. Furthermore, clerical and lay exponents of French culture began to view the achievements of the Baroque Age with contempt; they utilized French Classicism as a model to denigrate the learning, arts, and mentalities of the previous century (*Coleccíon Ensayo* 1988).

The Catholic Enlightenment also espoused patristic and biblical theology and advocated a return to national church traditions, opposing the Papacy's universal claims and the Popes' chief agents, the Jesuits. Visigothic precedents were considered precious examples of the religious policy of a confessional monarchy (Brading 1991). Ironically, many of the secular clergy viewed this Spanish Gallicanism as the fulfillment of the reformist objectives of the Council of Trent. In Spain and the Indies, the Catholic Enlightenment developed on a parallel track with the more secular tradition represented by encyclopedists, free masons, and political economists. The Spanish Benedictine Feijoo and later the royal ministers Campomanes (1723–1803) and Jovellanos (1743–1811) were some of the finest representatives of this tradition (Simo 1953). In the Americas, the Catholic Enlightenment was primarily introduced by Iberian-born prelates—such as Abad y Queipo and Archbishop Alonso de Haro y Peralta—and progressive Jesuit faculty (Fisher 1955).

The rabidly anticlerical and secular features of the European Enlightenment were almost entirely absent or muted in the New World. No one could imagine a society divested of the overarching tutelage of Catholicism. Even those who wished to curb the Church's power by pruning away the wealth and influence of the religious orders—or who advocated the secularization of clerical property—were firmly committed to the Catholic culture of the Spanish Monarchy. Radical social secularization was not even on the agenda of the Jesuits' enemies (Rosales 1988).

Secular humanism would not become widespread until the middle of the nineteenth century and, even then, it barely touched the masses. At the end of the colonial age, secularization contributed to a schism in the collective psyche of Hispanic societies what is referred to in Iberian history as the emergence of the "two Spains." In Spanish America, the separation between a popular culture that remained essentially traditional, Catholic, and Baroque, and the dominant civilization—inspired by the secular trends of liberalism and positivism—has not been reconciled (Burns 1980). The way to an integral synthesis cannot be sought among the imported fineries of Europe and North America; a future renaissance of the *Hispanidad* must emerge from a revival of seminal traits—those of Spain in the *Siglo de Oro* and of America during the Baroque Age.

Advocates of the Spanish Enlightenment wanted a subordinated church, whose wealth was completely at the disposal of the state. Significantly, during the independence movements of the early nineteenth century, Mexican priests were in the forefront of popular revolutions. Hidalgo and Morelos did not see any contradiction between the ideals of the Enlightenment, particularly the Rights of Man, and their goal of founding a confessional republic to rule an independent Mexico (Brading 1991).

THE BOURBON REFORMS AND INDEPENDENCE (1760–1825)

The last period of imperial rule in Spanish America was initiated by the Bourbon reforms and terminated with the achievement of independence on the mainland (1760–1825). This era of Spanish colonial history was of extraordinary significance in determining the future course of Latin America. For in those sixty-five years, Spain squandered its political capital and lost the esteem of its American subjects, while forfeiting its role as defender of the Catholic Faith (Lynch 1973). At the beginning of the Bourbon reforms, the monarchy vigorously reasserted royal prerogatives in the Americas as part of an administrative reconquest. The Spanish Empire under Charles III (1759–1788) was restored to great power status, and the entire Hispanic world entered into a period of high prosperity. The revived imperial domains reached their greatest extent around 1790, stretching from Nookta Island in the Pacific Northwest to Tierra del Fuego in the Antarctic zone. After the outbreak of the French Revolution (1789), the Catholic Monarchy collapsed (Herr 1958).

The successors of Charles III did not fulfill the promise of a restored *Hispanidad.* The Spanish Bourbons become desperate in their attempts to ward off French revolutionary aggression and even tried to nationalize Church property; this alienated the dynasty's most important ally. Finally, Napoleon invaded Spain (1808) and deposed the Bourbon family; the New World drifted, in turn, towards independence. The Hispanic world was eventually engulfed in an ideological civil war as the restored Bourbon regime was unwilling to make concessions. Moreover, Ferdinand VII wanted to restore full absolutism after his return from exile in 1814. The result was chronic unrest in the metropolis and an unruly independence for Spanish America (Lynch 1973).

The Bourbon Reforms occurred as a result of the crisis engendered by Spain's defeat in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763); Spain was shocked by Britain's easy occupation of Habana and Manila in 1762. Furthermore, it was clear that Spain's ally, France, was no longer the strongest European power; Britain reigned supreme at sea, depriving France of her possessions in Canada and India. Spain was forced to cede Florida to Britain and conceded England's permanent occupation of Gibraltar. At the war's end, Prussia, under Frederick the Great, and the Russian empire emerged as first-rate powers with Austria losing a little ground to both; Portugal was able to retain the territorial gains it had made in Brazil by terms of the Treaty of Madrid (1750). As a consolation prize, Spain gained the western bank of French Louisiana, whose defense further strained its military resources. The Spanish Bourbons were faced with the real prospect that a greatly strengthened Britain might attack and conquer the Indies. At the same time, the Portuguese were increasingly aggressive along the Plate River, and North American Indian tribes, now masters of the horse, were ravaging the interior provinces of northern Mexico (Zavala 1990).

José de Galvez was dispatched by Charles III to New Spain as *visitador-general* in 1765; he made recommendations for reforming the government and economy of the viceroyalty. Many of the Bourbon Reforms were first advocated in two works from the early eighteenth century—Jerónimo de Ustariz's *Theórica y Práctica de Comercio y de Marina* (1724) and José del Campillo y Cosios's *Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la America*—both of which emphasized Spain's need to recapture the economy of the Indies. Most of the suggestions contained in these tracts were eventually instituted by José de Galvez (1720–1787) in New Spain and his protégé, the *visitador-general* Juan Antonio de Areche, in Peru (Priestley 1916).

Among the tasks Galvez supervised was the establishment of a colonial army, which was executed by Lt. General Juan de Villalba. Some regular regiments were eventually stationed in the Indies, but most of the new troops were militia, locally recruited. The overall implementation of the military reform was under the direction of Alejandro O'Reilly, inspector-general of the army in the Indies. Creoles were usually the officers of predominantly mixed-blood troops; their drill, instruction, equipment, and pay was much improved over earlier times. The new colonial army was also given corporate status, its own courts—the *fuero militar*. New Spain, as the richest of the Bourbon viceroyalties, fielded a military force of at least thirty thousand regulars and militia. Most of the regular troops were concentrated around the Caribbean, where the threat of English aggression was the greatest. Massive fortifications were also constructed in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and at Cartagena and Vera Cruz (Archer 1977).

The colonial army improved defenses, and it managed to contain Indian attacks to a certain degree. Moreover, colonial forces campaigned successfully against the English during the American Revolution (1775–1781), regaining Florida. The primary function of the colonial military, though, was to maintain internal security and suppress popular discontent. Significantly, two great disturbances in the eighteenth century—the Comunero War (1781) in New Granada,

and the Túpac Amaru Revolt (1780–1783) in Peru—occurred in regions where the new army was undermanned (Domínguez 1980).

The Bourbon Reforms not only established an effective military in Spanish America, they also affected the economy, government organization, and the Catholic Church, for economists of the late colonial period were believers in the efficacy of free trade. This ideal is epitomized in the writings of Adam Smith and represented a change from the monopolistic restrictions and mercantilism of the previous two centuries. The Bourbon regime gradually allowed unrestricted trade between the ports of Spain and those of the New World. The convoy system was eliminated ships being allowed to sail individually. Even though much of the contraband trade was suppressed, Spanish industries could not supply the Indies with the finished products they demanded. In effect, Spanish merchant houses often acted as agents or factors for foreign enterprises, especially French manufacturers (Walker 1979).

Bourbon reformers encouraged the formation of monopolistic trading companies—such as the Caracas Company (1742–1781); they achieved some success in marketing colonial products—cacao, sugar, cochineal, and tobacco. Moreover, renewed initiative resulted in the accelerated expansion of the colonial economy, which rebounded for the monarchy by way of increased revenues. Unfortunately, Spain's domestic economy did not recover because it remained state driven—dependent on army contracts, naval construction, royal factories, and monopolies. New technologies were introduced that improved mining and agriculture in Mexico and the Carribbean; a school of mining was established in Mexico City. By the end of the eighteenth century, the effect of these changes were unprecedented prosperity, especially in Mexico, Cuba, and the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina). Peru never recovered its former rank as the empire's premier colony; production of its silver mines declined permanently in the seventeenth century because of mismanagement and labor shortages (Lockhart 1984).

Populations increased rapidly as the colonial economy grew. The cities of Spanish America assumed a splendid and confident aspect; they were adorned with many new edifices, some in the new classical style. At the same time, other projects were completed, such as Mexico City's cathedral; a new academy of fine arts, San Carlos, was also founded. Several new royal universities were established, in which modern and scientific curricula were followed; the late scholastic world view of the Siglo de Oro was crumbling (Bethell 1984).

One of the lights of the period was Manuel Tolsá (1757–1816), architect and sculptor; although he was born in Spain, his main work was accomplished in Mexico. Tolsá was a figure comparable to Sinan (1489–1588), the Ottoman architect, who put his imprint on the structural landscape of the Ottoman Empire. In 1791 Manuel Tolsá came to New Spain and became director of the Academy of San Carlos, where he influenced generations of Mexican artists. His greatest projects were the completion of the cathedrals of Mexico City and Aguascalientes, the construction of the school of mining and the waterworks of Mexico City, the erection of many monuments, roads, and public works in the

Valley of Mexico, and casting of bronze sculptures such as the equestrian statue of Charles IV and the funerary bust of Cortez. In effect, Manuel Tolsá and his disciples remade the face of central Mexico. Ironically, the prosperity and splendor of late colonial times heightened the grievance of Spanish Americans who saw the fruits of their economy siphoned off to a metropolis that seemed unworthy of their loyalty and did not reward America's sons with offices and rank (Cuevas 1946).

Throughout the eighteenth century, immigration from Spain was high, perhaps as many as four thousand individuals per year. Unlike the immigrants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, those of the eighteenth came primarily from northern Spain. And, like many newcomers, their industriousness, thriftiness, and opportunism were resented by the longtime inhabitants of the New World. Even though peninsular Spaniards often dominated commercial and industrial enterprises, rich Creoles were rentiers, *hacendados*, and mine owners. In any case, intermarriage between the two groups was high, and one should not exaggerate the antagonism of what was, after all, two similarly Hispanic populations. It should also be recalled that the mercantile sectors in New World societies were less bourgeois in their inclinations and more prone to acquire nobiliary status with their profits (Góngora 1975).

The reorganization of the colonial government not only involved a reassertion of royal authority and the imposition of the intendant system; it also meant that the access Creoles had gained to positions in their home countries' governments was now rescinded. For, Galvez and other Bourbon reformers had a profound distrust of Creole patriotism; they no longer accepted the older concept of the Habsburgs—that the New World kingdoms were separate realms united under the jurisdiction of Castile. To the Bourbon regime, the Indies were exploitable colonies of the new economic type. To be sure, the crown had responsibilities toward them, but they were in no sense autonomous. The Bourbons had suppressed the liberties of Aragón in Spain at the beginning of their rule and were in no mood to tolerate colonial autonomy. Because of this, the Creoles increasingly felt subjugated to a distant and exploitative metropolis. Some attempts were made to ameliorate Creole resentment by offering them rank in the peninsular army, church ,and bureaucracy; few Americans, however, wished to leave the intimate circle of friends and family to serve in what now amounted to a foreign country—Spain (Brading 1991).

The Indies were reorganized into four viceroyalties—New Spain, 1535; New Castile, 1542; New Granada, 1734; and Rio de la Plata, 1776. Before the Bourbon reforms, Habsburg Peru (1532–1700) had administered all of Spanish South America as the viceroyalty of New Castile. Furthermore, the governments of the new viceroyalties were not accessible to Creoles because they were dominated as usual by peninsular Spaniards.

The new intendants and their subdelegates did not entirely suppress the worst abuses of their predecessors (the *alcaldes mayores* and *corregidores*) such as the *Repartimiento de Comercios* or forced labor in the *obrajes* (Haring 1947). The intendant system fostered a new kind of regionalism, founded on the

autonomy of larger jurisdictions. Intendants answered directly to Madrid, further circumscribing the already reduced power of the viceroys; Bourbon viceroys no longer headed the *audencias* in capital cities and were not chief executives of the Hacienda Real. The self-sufficiency of Bourbon intendencies carried over into the independence period, becoming the great problem of provincial and state regionalism for the new republics. Interestingly, the area of northern Mexico was given a strong administrative identity under a commandant-general whose jurisdiction, the interior provinces, acted as a proto-viceroyalty (Bethell 1984).

When José de Galvez came to Mexico in 1765, he was also commissioned with the task of suppressing the Society of Jesus and expelling its members (1767); the royal order was enforced throughout Spain and Spanish America. Portugal had moved against the Jesuits earlier, and later so did France and Austria; eventually, even the Pope was forced by erstwhile Catholic princes to suppress the Society of Jesus worldwide. The Papacy's most faithful servants fell by this blow, their global ministry dismantled. The Jesuits had always been in the forefront of defending the Catholic tradition against its critics, even the secular thinkers of the Enlightenment. Their removal from the scene weakened Catholicism at the very time when the great explosion of the French Revolution was about to occur. In Spanish America, the expulsion of the Jesuits would eventually prove fatal to the Monarchy (Cuevas 1946).

The Jesuits were known for their learning and wealth throughout the Americas; their estates were particularly well managed and prosperous. Moreover, Jesuit missions in Paraguay and Sonora were models of good management and evangelization in which the earlier ideals of Franciscan utopianism were maintained. Spanish Americans, trained in the society's colleges and seminaries, were prepared for the highest offices of church and state; ironically, the Bourbon reformers had every intention of excluding the Creoles from those positions. The Jesuits were also suspected of fostering Creole patriotism among the Creoles; they promoted the idea of creating a Creole empire in North America, an empire within an empire (Liss 1970).

Further, the other religious orders envied the society, and the government coveted its wealth and resented its influence. Many of the bishops also remembered the arrogance that the Jesuits in Mexico displayed when they drove Bishop Juan de Palafox y Mendoza (1600–1659) from his see in Puebla. In any case, the Society of Jesus was suppressed in order to make manifest the supremacy of the state over the Church. At least two thousand Spanish American Jesuits went into exile. And there were riots in parts of Mexico which were brutally suppressed by José de Galvez. Finally, colonial education was stricken, and the Creoles added another grievance against the Bourbon regime (Bangert 1986).

The Bourbons relied on the military as the chief support of the monarchy; their representatives and officials were primarily soldiers rather than lawyers and clerics as under the Habsburgs (Góngora 1975). Most of the Bourbon appointments were new men—*Manteistas*—recruited from schools other than

the old imperial colleges in Salamanca, Valladolid, and Alcalá (Brading 1991). This change represented a further secularization of royal power, a process already well advanced among other European monarchies. Throughout the later eighteenth century, the kings of Europe favored soldiers in official appointments and in general affected a military style, even wearing uniforms. The disadvantages of emphasizing the king's role as commander-in-chief became evident when military defeat lowered the prestige of monarchy. Secularization of kingship was carried to extremes by Fredrick the Great of Prussia, who saw himself as the state's first bureaucrat and general. Some of these developments were influenced by the naturalism of the Enlightenment; others grew out of an intense admiration for China's secular and rationally recruited mandarinate (McNeill 1963).

Under the Habsburgs, the Spanish Monarchy was ideologically defined by the Baroque tradition of Neoplatonic kingship. Theorists of magical science invested rulers with almost cosmic properties; the king upheld the universe in his own realm, the physical embodiment of maintained order (Arancon 1987). Using the analogy of the body to represent the social order, the king was its head, while the Church was its heart and soul (Sturzo 1939). Moreover the late Roman doctrine of the "two swords" invested the prince's authority with an almost priestly quality (Kelly 1993). The Spanish Habsburgs aspired to universal monarchy and as such saw themselves as sacred rulers, upholding Catholic orthodoxy, spreading the True Faith, and regulating the affairs of nations; their very motto, *Plus Ultra* ("more and beyond"), epitomized these aspirations. In this world view, the Church was the surest guarantee of order and ideological support for the crown; its spiritual authority and hierarchy were a perfect complement to the temporal power of the king and his government (Hamilton 1963).

The Catholic concept of statecraft was ancient, descending from the sacred monarchies of the ancient Middle East—Ur, Akkad, Babylon, Assyria, and Persia (McNeill 1963). Their legacy was, in turn, transferred to the West—*Translatio Imperio*—by the agency of Alexander the Great and Imperial Rome (Evans 1979). This ideal reflected the most antique traditions of the Indo-Europeans (Aryans), that of a three-class society composed of rulers, priests, and laborers. As late as the eighteenth century, the Spanish Empire still embodied that ideology (MacLachlan 1988). However, as the Bourbons distanced themselves from their role of priest-kings—regardless of how devout individual rulers were, or how much Bourbon prelates maintained the Gallican ideology of the divine right of kings—they proportionately cut themselves off from the very root of their authority. For the Bourbon Dynasty's greatest claim to legitimately rule Spanish America was a universal Catholic Monarchy, not as secular despots, commanding armies that held exploited colonies for the advantage of Spain, now a second-class European power (Brading 1991).

The very prosperity of the late Bourbon regime highlighted the Creoles' resentment that lands as rich as Mexico, Cuba, Guatemala, Nueva Granada, Quito, Peru, or La Plata should be governed for the benefit of a distant mother country. In the early nineteenth century, the Prussian scientist Alexander Von

Humboldt extolled the wealth and magnificence of Spanish America; this coupled with the recent independence of the Thirteen Colonies from England fueled Creole dissatisfaction (Humboldt 1988). The revolutionary ideals of the Enlightenment concerning the rights of man and economic liberty only added to a corpus of ideas that rested squarely on Thomistic or scholastic traditions of natural law. These taught that the governance and economic fruits of a country should be the proper domain of that land's native sons; the foundations of Creole patriotism throughout Spanish America were thoroughly medieval (Stoetzer 1979).

As a native New Mexican of Hispanic descent, the author finds these same sentiments the key to his own people's dissatisfaction with the United States' government of occupation in the Southwest. Like their sixteenth century ancestors in New Spain, the *Hispanos* of New Mexico remain disinherited in lands their ancestors conquered and settled. Furthermore, their *bienmeritos* in the service of the American republic have been disregarded; their lands, government, towns, church, economy, and colleges remain under the control of an imported Anglo-American establishment. This in contravention of the *Jus Gentium* and natural law which uphold the rights of *hijos de provincia* to *mercedes* (land grants) in lands their fathers peopled—"*A su costa y minción.*"

The catalyst that finally toppled the Bourbon regime in the Hispanic world was Napoleon's invasion of Spain (1808–1814). The Spanish Bourbons had been forced to ally themselves to the revolutionary regime that executed the Bourbon king of France; they entered into this unholy alliance in order to avoid the same fate. When Napoleon became dictator, then emperor, of the French (1799–1815), Spain was incorporated into his continental system. This gave the English free rein to prey on Spanish commerce which, in turn, began to erode the prosperity of Spanish America. Moreover, Napoleon forced Spain to cede the Louisiana territories to France in 1801 and then sold those lands to the United States two years later, after the troops he dispatched to settle North America perished suppressing the slave revolution in Haiti (Zavala 1988).

Charles IV (1788–1808) was an incompetent ruler and was unduly influenced by pro-French ministers who convinced him of the necessity of the French alliance. A crippling blow was delivered to Spain's navy, in 1805, at the Battle of Trafalgar, where Lord Nelson annihilated the Franco-Spanish fleet. The defeat compromised Spain's ability to maintain regular contact with America. Three years later, Napoleon invaded Spain, deposing the Bourbon dynasty. Unlike the Portuguese Braganzas, the Spanish royal family failed to make provisions for a quick flight to its American territories. The Spanish people, however, rose up against Napoleon's occupation; and so many French troops were tied up in the Peninsular War that the conflict contributed significantly to Napoleon's ultimate defeat (Payne 1973).

In Spanish America, Napoleon's usurpation was universally rejected; there was no apparent support for Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain. At the same time, Spanish peninsulars residing in the Indies attempted to maintain royal authority in the name of the deposed dynasty. In Mexico, peninsular elements

overthrew the viceroy because he made moves to acknowledge the legitimacy of a junta set up by Mexican Creoles. Everywhere, regional juntas composed of local Creoles declared their loyalty to the crown and tried to gain control of provincial governments. Civil wars ensued, led by regional leaders such as Bolivar, San Martin, Hidalgo, and Morelos. Many Creoles feared the outbreak of social upheavals such as those in Haiti (where a slave revolt had exterminated the planter class) and zealously supported the royalist cause (Domínguez 1980).

The restored Bourbon regime in Spain refused to make any concessions to colonial aspirations. Even the liberal Cortes of Cadiz, which formulated the constitution of 1812, refused to cede parity to the Indies in the matter of parliamentary representation. Ferocious repressions led by Spanish officers, such as Felix Calleja (1759–1828), alienated many sectors of colonial society from their traditional loyalty to the crown. The executions of insurgent leaders such as Hidalgo (1811) and Morelos (1815) in Mexico were particularly shocking (Miller 1985).

By 1820 the royalist cause was faltering because of the intransigence of Ferdinand VII (1814–1833). Moreover, the British were willing to help the rebels in order to capture the carrying trade of Spanish America and to forestall the reemergence of Bourbon power in Europe and the New World. At the same time, Britain's former colony, the United States, was also determined to frustrate the reestablishment of Spanish power south of its borders. Through its annexation of Florida (1819) and the settlement of Texas (1821) by Anglo-Americans, the United States made its expansionary intentions toward Spanish America clear. The Monroe Doctrine (1823–1824) later confirmed the United States' commitment to excluding non-Anglo-Saxon powers from the Americas. In such matters, at least, Britain and the United States acted in unison; this Anglo-American condominium has survived many crises, reemerging with full force during the Falklands War in 1982 (Williamson 1992).

The revolt of Colonel Riego (1820) in Spain temporarily overthrew Ferdinand VII's absolutist restoration in favor of the liberal constitution of 1812. By this time, however, most of South America was unwilling to accept the half measures offered by the newly empowered liberal regime in Spain. Because Spanish troops were occupied with domestic matters, the rebels no longer feared that Spain would dispatch substantial reinforcements to the Americas. Simon Bolivar from Nueva Granada and San Martín out of Argentina and Chile closed in on the remaining royalist bastion in Peru. Isolated from Spain, the royalist cause collapsed in Peru after the Battle of Ayacucho (1824). However, Peru's Spanish ruling class was afraid of another Inca revolt, similar to that of Tupac Amaru II (1781), sweeping over the country if authoritarian government was shaken by a change of regimes. In any event, the Creole landed-class retained control of the political process throughout the nineteenth century (Lynch 1992).

In Mexico, independence came about largely in response to the radical provisions of the constitution of 1812, which Mexican elites feared would compromise their corporate privileges. The Hidalgo and Morelos revolts (1810–1815) had terrified the propertied class with the prospect of a social revolution; they,

therefore, remained basically loyal to the crown. However, in 1821, responding to the crisis engendered by the Riego revolt, a coalition of Creole officers, clerics, and surviving rebel leaders, under the leadership of Agustín de Iturbide (1783–1824) overthrew the viceregal government; the Army of the Three Guarantees was in favor of making Mexico an independent kingdom. Unfortunately, no Bourbon prince agreed to assume the throne of an independent Mexico and the new country subsequently devolved into a state of military anarchy (Miller 1985).

Mexican Creoles, like their South American contemporaries, seemed incapable of forming stable governments. Interestingly, the idea of placing a European prince on an American throne worked well enough in Brazil some years later. In, 1822 the Braganca crown prince proclaimed Brazil an independent empire. The stability provided by a monarchical regime helped the Brazilians eventually develop a strong sense of social coherence and national identity (Veliz 1980). The independence of Latin America brought the last Gunpowder Empire of European descent in the New World to an end; its authority, however, lingered a while longer in the Caribbean and the Philippines (to 1898).

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Conclusion

SPANISH AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

With their economy in shambles after nearly two decades of civil war, the inhabitants of Spanish America found the aftermath of independence distressing. The Creole warlords who assumed control of the governments of Spanish America's sixteen states (ca. 1835) were unable to establish the legitimacy of their rule. Ironically, the leaders of the new republics were often former officers in the Bourbon army. Once the King's authority was overthrown, there were few traditions of self-government that Spanish Americans could rely on. During the colonial regime, only the administration of city councils (*cabildos*) had remained in Creole hands. Moreover, provincial cities—often the former seats of Bourbon intendants and foci of local patriotism after independence—were vehicles of rampant regionalism. Within twenty years of independence, Central America, formerly the kingdom of Guatemala, broke apart into five successor states. The Central American republics, however, were weak and hardly self-sufficient. They were entirely incapable of warding off neocolonial domination by Great Britain and the United States (Burns 1980).

History clearly shows that countries must be of a certain size and population in order to become viable polities. The author estimates that in the late twentieth century a viable state should have an area of at least two-hundred thousand square miles, and a population of about sixty million. In contemporary Latin America, only Brazil and Mexico meet those requirements, although Argentina, Colombia, and Peru come close.

The viceroyalties of Nueva Granada and Rio de la Plata also devolved into constituent countries—Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, in the case of Nueva Granada, and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia in that of Rio de la Plata. The British, meanwhile, attempted to dominate the region's economy, flooding local markets with cheap manufactures that crippled regional industries. This

process exaggerated the export sector of Latin American economies, making them more dependent on British shipping and overseas demand for their raw materials. Moreover, Britain was in the first stages of the Industrial Revolution—the production of its economy was prodigious—facilitating the establishment of economic hegemony. Without proper financing, the fledgling republics of Spanish America could not reform their socioeconomic structures (Williamson 1992). The United States expanded throughout the nineteenth century at the expense of the Hispanic world, annexing Florida in 1819, conquering Mexico's northern territories in 1846, and occupying Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898. When one considers the meteoric rise and expansion of the United States after independence, it is easy to criticize Spanish Americans for not having established a similar political and socioeconomic system. Ironically, the leaders of independent Latin America did try to imitate the North American republic's constitution; they, however, showed no aptitude for this style of government (Lynch 1992).

The disparity between the two Americas is a systematic one, originating in the period of each society's foundation. When Spanish America was founded in the sixteenth century, modernity had not yet occurred. The Spaniards, therefore, established a colonial variant of western Christian civilization overseas. The Catholic Monarchy reproduced in the New World a thoroughly traditional agrarianate civilization, the kind the Sumerians had built in ancient Iraq, albeit one much more powerful and complex. The English, on the other hand, founded the Thirteen Colonies at the beginning of the modern age, in the seventeenth century. Anglo-America, from the beginning, was part and parcel of the new changes in technology and world view attendant on modernity. It would seem that the very excellence with which Spain imbued the Indies—including the brilliance of its conservative Baroque culture—inhibited Spanish America's ability to respond creatively to the world of the Industrial Revolution. A similar paralysis overwhelmed China and the Islamic world in the nineteenth century (Hartz 1964).

The Reformation also distinguished Anglo-America from Spanish America, where the Counter-Reformation triumphed instead. Protestantism flourished primarily in northern Europe whereas Catholicism held sway in the southern and central parts of the continent. In effect, the Reformation carried the day in countries outside the borders of the former Roman Empire. The Catholic religion, on the other hand, retained the loyalty of the western Roman provinces (except Britain). Furthermore, *Romanitas* (Romanism) permeated the Latin culture of the Hispanic world, just as a Germanic quality pervaded Anglo-Saxon societies. The Wars of Religion were also transported to the New World the United States remaining the champion of Protestantism as surely as Ibero-America continues to be a bulwark of Roman Catholicism (Dealy 1992).

Caudillos (strongmen) dominated Latin American politics for fifty years (1821–1871); they were finally replaced by oligarchic regimes in the later nineteenth century. The role of the caudillos in Spanish American history is often misunderstood; these new conquistadores (for they, in effect, conquered Spanish America from the royal government) were the necessary state builders. They protected their fragile countries from foreign aggression, Spanish reconquest, and

internal disintegration. Even the worst of them, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (1795–1876), can be viewed as a complicated opportunist, desperately parrying the ravenous hunger of the United States for the territory of Mexico then, ironically, selling more of the national territory in 1853 (the Gadsen Purchase).

The strength and stability of nineteenth-century Latin American oligarchies rested on their ability to successfully supply industrial economies in Europe and the United States with much-needed raw materials while maintaining order in their respective countries. The ideological basis of the liberal oligarchies was a secular philosophy oriented toward development and progress—positivism. The government of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico (1876–1910) epitomized this type of system as did the Brazilian Empire of Pedro II (1831–1889). The age of liberal governments was a third era of prosperity for Spanish America; the first being that of the imperial zenith, 1560–1620, and the second the regime of the later Bourbons, 1765–1805. Latin America, especially its cities, acquired a modern air; it was a period of "haute bourgeois" confidence, epitomized by Brazil's national motto—"order and progress" (Donghi 1993). The Church was challenged by most liberal regimes and subordinated to the state, often losing its privileges, wealth, land, and social influence. Liberal anticlericalism, in effect, completed the secularization initiated by the Bourbons. Nineteenth century conservatives—such as Lucas Alamán (1792–1853), Gabriel Garcia Moreno (1821–1875), and Miguel Antonio Caro (1843–1909)—saw the Church as the only institution capable of uniting all sectors of comparatively heterogeneous societies in a common faith for which the liberal had no credible substitute (Davis 1973).

The landed elites, however, remained unchanged in their patriachical social milieu; they were the element that most clearly maintained the Iberian heritage of Latin American societies, especially after the royal government, the imperial Church, and the Bourbon army had fallen. After independence, the royal government perished, though there was some continuity in the administration of the new republics. The imperial Church, however, put up a more tenacious fight to preserve its colonial privileges. In the battle against the secularism of liberal governments, the ultramontane ideology of Popes Gregory XVI (1831–1846) and Pius IX (1846–1898) inspired Latin American churchmen to greater efforts. Anticlerical movements, like the *Reforma* (1855–1878) in Mexico, occurred throughout Spanish America; they succeeded in diminishing the Church's influence by the late nineteenth century. The Church, however, staged a comeback at that time, using the social teachings of Leo XIII's (1878–1903) *Rerum Novarum* (1891) to create Catholic parties and labor movements; this phase of Church history in Latin America is often referred to as the "Second Christendom" (ca. 1878–1965) (Meyer 1989).

For the most part, the Bourbon army was defeated and disappeared during the wars of independence in South America. Of course, many of the insurgents had been trained in the colonial military. In Mexico, however, it was the Bourbon army, led by Creole officers, that proclaimed independence in 1821. Mexican generals Iturbide, Santa Anna, and Bustamante had all seen service in the wars against Hidalgo and Morelos. After the failure of the Mexican Empire of Iturbide (1821–

1823), the former Bourbon officer class ruled Mexico as a praetorian guard. The army maintained order in the cities of central Mexico—a triangle whose three points were Zacatecas in the north, Vera Cruz in the east, and Acapulco in the west—leaving the rest of the country to rural caudillos, secessionistic governors, and unsubdued Indian tribes. Tragically, Mexico's military anarchy and economic devolution tempted foreign powers to attack; Spanish and French incursions were repelled by Santa Anna, but American pressure was more overwhelming (Depalo 1997).

The war of North American intervention (1846–1848) destroyed the reputation of the Creole army. Santa Anna, however, tried to rebuild the old army along modern lines during his last presidency (1851–1855) with funds he received from the Gadsen Purchase (1853). Interestingly, the officers trained during the last administration of Santa Anna became the crusading champions of the conservative party during the War of the Reform (1857–1860). The pantheon of Catholic heroes included generals Leonardo Marquez, Tomás Mejia, and the brilliant but mercurial Miguel de Miramon—the latter two dying with Emperor Maximilian in 1867. It was, however, too late to salvage the situation for the old order, which went down in a bitter defeat during the War of the Reform (1857–1860). A new liberal army emerged from the catharsis of that war and the subsequent invasion of Napoleon III (1861–1867). Moreover, the defeat of the French and Maximilian's stillborn empire (1864–1867) sealed the fate of Mexican conservatism (Sánchez-Navarro 1949).

The Liberal government of Benito Juarez was maintained in power by the bayonets of a victorious new Liberal army. Later, Porfirio Diaz, a general during the *Reforma*, constructed a prosperous and stable oligarchic government supported by the liberal army of the *Reforma*; the Diaz regime (1876–1910) fell from power as a result of a popular uprising that became the Mexican revolution (1910–1929). Yet a third army rose out of that conflict, which remains today the chief prop of the present government in Mexico (Donghi 1993).

By the 1920s, the liberal governments of Latin America were everywhere challenged by social movements aiming to establish greater political participation; the worldwide depression of 1929, moreover, exacerbated social tension. Mexico provided a good example of the process; its revolution (1910–1929) placed a progressive and technocratic "petite bourgeoisie" in power. Economically, the new populist governments promoted industrial development and import substitution; they had some success, but the resulting social dislocation often gave more latitude to radical elements; dislocation then provoked harsh reactionary measures by endangered oligarchic interests (Williamson 1992). In Spain, similar developments led to the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the subsequent triumph of General Franco (1939–1975) (Payne 1973). Surprisingly, the later character of the Franco regime resembled the aging revolutionary government of contemporary Mexico insofar as they both emphasized economic development instead of ideology. Meanwhile, communist and fascist ideologies in Europe, between the wars, provided the vocabulary for Latin American political factions (Rock 1993).

During World War II, Latin America was actively recruited into the United States' antiFascist alliance and some regional development took place as a result of

American aid. Afterwards, however, the Cold War between the Western alliance and the Soviet bloc forced the United States to support reactionary elements in Latin America to prevent communist or socialist elements from assuming power. Cuba, under Castro (1959–) was seen as a particular threat to American interests. In the 1970s authoritarian regimes that had modern police-state profiles emerged, no longer assuming the aspect of patrimonial despotisms. *Corporatism* and *bureaucratic authoritarianism* were the terms used to explain Latin America's refusal to adopt Anglo-Saxon representative democracy. Moreover, an increasingly modern social milieu defied any easy explanation of Latin America's recalcitrant politics. Nevertheless, an acute observer would immediately recognize a universal phenomenon linking Latin America to other underdeveloped or rather non-modern societies (Wiarda 1990).

Recent pressures in favor of democratization are most likely only temporary manifestations of popular will encouraged by neoliberal economics, liberation theology, protestant fundamentalism, and the worldwide success of the Anglo-American archetype of consumerism and personal liberty. Once economic conditions decline, radicalization will undoubtably provoke the repressive measures favored by vested interests. In the long run, the temporary upsurge of late capitalist economies will wane, leaving neocolonial dependencies in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia more desperate than before. Furthermore, regional associations such as NAFTA may prove to be springboards for renewed American intervention (Dealy 1992).

Authoritarian regimes will eventually be restored throughout Ibero-America—based on those perennial Hispanic institutions: army, oligarchy, church, and family. The army represents the age-old Hispanic quest for order in a world of anarchic individualism, whereas oligarchy embodies the Iberian desire for nobiliary status; the Church, on the other hand, remains the guardian of morality and provides a supernatural sanction for society. Finally, the family has always been the matrix of culture, work, intimacy, and basic socialization; it is where Latin Americans learn to be Latin (stemming from their Hispano-Roman origins) and American (of the New World). In this characterization, one encounters the founding paradigm of Indo-European cultures—a society of warrior-rulers (the army and oligarchy), priests (the Church and the intelligentsia), and commoners (workers and the family). The Crown of Castile no longer rules in the Indies; but the Sword and the Cross remain (Garay 1944).

Latin America, meanwhile, is that part of Western civilization in which pre-Enlightenment values remain the strongest, a continuous source of inspiration for Catholic nationalists and *Hispanidad* idealists. The postmodern world, however, abjures and mocks their values. At the same time, postmodernist thinkers say that the scientific world view of the Enlightenment is a semiotic mirage. Meanwhile, the contemporary atmosphere of nihilism, pessimism, and anomie continues to erode the inherited values and traditions of the West. Sprawling cities spread their poverty and ugly development everywhere. Environmentalists tell us the earth is dying, a death accelerated by the demise of the Amazonian rain forest. In addition, the modern state, in its various guises, grows like an all-consuming leviathan, devouring

political rights and personal liberties. Families and friendships dissolve in a slash and burn pop culture. Even the mighty Catholic Church toters on the precipice of oblivion, undermined by modernism and a prevalent mood of skepticism. Technologies that once promised freedom from routine now enslave us in a world of information. More frustrating on a personal level is the general unsettling of gender roles. Recently, scientists have warned us about new, more virulent bacteria and viruses that may threaten the human race with extinction. Finally, the prophets of hate proliferate in a milieu of neotribalism, nationalism, and fundamentalism. In light of these considerations, the author longs for the vanished world of his ancestors—a garden from the Mediterranean world enclosed by the high walls of faith—its harmony maintained by the light of a civilization whose brilliance illuminates the outer darkness—*Hispania Victrix*.

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