A FEARFUL SYMMETRY

THE NEW SOLDIER IN THE AGE OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

RUMU SARKAR

Greenwood PUBLISHING GROUP

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Foreword by Jamie Shea, NATO

Praeger Security International

PRAEGER

AN IMPRINT OF ABC-CLIO, LLC
Santa Barbara, California • Denver, Colorado • Oxford, England

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sarkar, Rumu.
A fearful symmetry : the new soldier in the age of asymmetric conflict / Rumu Sarkar ; Foreword by Jamie Shea.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–313–38232–1 (alk. paper) — 978–0–313–38233–8 (ebook)
1. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. 2. Jihad. 3. Failed states. I. Title.
BL65.T47S27 2010
363.325—dc22 2009052370

ISBN: 978–0–313–38232–1
EISBN: 978–0–313–38233–8

14 13 12 11 10 1 2 3 4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.

Praeger
An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

ABC-CLIO, LLC
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911

This book is printed on acid-free paper 

Manufactured in the United States of America

To my loving parents, who always opened new vistas for me

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Foreword

In an age of publishing abundance, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the interested reader to decide what to put on the "must read" list and what to put aside for a rainy day. Students of international relations and the general reader alike would be well advised to put Rumu Sarkar's *A Fearful Symmetry: The New Soldier in the Age of Asymmetric Conflict* very firmly in the first category for two reasons. First, Dr. Sarkar gives us a gripping and highly relevant analysis of the terrorist threats that still very much confront us today. She analyzes with conviction and authority the cultural context in which these movements operate and makes a highly useful distinction between "secessionist movements" and those pursuing "globalist" approaches. Moreover, this is not a dry, abstract analysis because Dr. Sarkar discusses specific Islamist organizations operating today in areas such as Kashmir, Gaza, or the Philippines.

Dr. Sarkar gives us an in-depth explanation of the ideological foundations of jihadism. At a time when it has become fashionable to explain terrorism mainly by reference to mankind's enduring malevolence or to problems of social integration, she reminds us that there is a link between terrorism and state failure, poverty, and the absence of development. She also gives a firm endorsement to the notion that the promotion of democracy and civil liberties, while not being able to fully eradicate terrorism, can nevertheless greatly reduce its scope and attractiveness. Most usefully, Dr. Sarkar underlines that the struggle against terrorism is political in nature and not religious, not least of all because terrorism has fundamentally political origins, despite its attempt to cloak itself in religious language.

What makes this book so special and so worth reading is that Dr. Sarkar combines a very realistic and frank analysis of the problem of terrorism, with a positive message that we do not need to throw up our hands in despair that we can ever counter this scourge. In the second part of the book,

Dr. Sarkar develops a number of policies. First, she argues that a sustained effort by the international community over a period of time really can make terrorism a less attractive option for alienated individuals. She demonstrates convincingly that as terrorism is basically a form of nihilism that offers no real agenda for social change other than hatred, Western democracies do not need to feel that they are on the defensive. In what is fundamentally a battle of political wills, it will always be essential that the democracies do not show less determination than their adversaries.

Above all, Dr. Sarkar believes that asymmetrical wars can best be tackled on the ground and where they originate in the first place. Her key insight is that of the New Soldier who does not think in a linear way but rather intuitively and with a good grasp of the history and culture of the country in which he or she is operating. The New Soldier shows empathy to the local populations and has the ability to work across old-fashioned military and civilian demarcation lines. At a time when the debate on asymmetrical threats is most often conducted at the strategic level—and in terms of competing values, ideologies, and national policies—Dr. Sarkar reminds us that the key determinant is the individual human being in direct contact with the local population. On the training and cultural preparation that he or she receives lies ultimately our best chance of escaping the ''fearful symmetry'' that all too often places democracies and terrorism on the same level. This book is intelligent and wise, but it is also imaginative and ultimately offers a positive way out from an unnecessary future of cultural conflicts. It deserves a broad readership and, above all, the right attention in governments and policy-making circles to its convincing proposals.

Jamie Shea
Director, Policy Planning,
Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO

Preface

As a preface to this work, perhaps the genesis of how this project got underway may interest the reader. I had been teaching a class session titled "The Fearful Symmetry" for about two years in the LLM seminar that I teach at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. This session addressed the potential linkage between failed or fragile states and harboring illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking, racketeering, smuggling, piracy, and terrorism. Of course, the link to terrorism was not an automatic assumption. For example, Haiti is a collapsed state in the view of most observers, but it does not harbor known terrorists or promote terrorist activities or ideologies. Spain is certainly not a collapsed or compromised state, but the Basque separatists have been launching terrorist attacks there (and perhaps elsewhere) for decades.

In my view, this linkage, however problematic and attenuated, should be addressed by my students in developing a more complete understanding of the importance of the development process. More importantly, it is critical to understand what the failure of development can mean in this context.

It was at this time that a friend of mine sent me the Web link to the writing competition announced by the Fondation Saint-Cyr in Paris, France. I undertook the challenge of writing the essay that addressed the specific question of "Stabilisation et Reconstruction : Une même volonté pour tous les acteurs?" ("Stabilization and Reconstruction: How to Achieve Coherence Among All the Players?"). This, in fact, addressed the same question that I had posed to my class and afforded me the opportunity to write a well-researched, coherent answer. Imagine my surprise when I actually won the competition!

Thus, at the outset, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Fondation Saint-Cyr for selecting my essay titled "A Fearful Symmetry: A New Global

Balance of Power?'' as the winner of the first prize for 2007. This is a special honor because this is the first time that the prize has been created and awarded by the Foundation.

The essay was subsequently translated into French and published in Paris. However, I realized that the confines of the essay were too restricted to answer certain underlying questions that this work now attempts to do. This work offers a more refined and deeper analysis of the underlying questions than the initial essay. Further, I felt a need to ''operationalize'' the concept of the New Soldier, an integral part of the analysis. The New Soldier is, in essence, a soldier endowed with qualities of compassion, empathy, intuition, and wisdom. The relevance of the New Soldier in the terrain of global terrorism will be explored in the text. I have tried to apply the concept of the New Soldier in a concrete context because the concept is designed for immediate use by military forces. Therefore, I have explored the potential use of the New Soldier by multilateral forces such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union Standby Force (ASF). I offer this analysis as part of the continuing dialogue on how to address and conquer global terrorism in all its forms.

Everyone speaks from varied points of view informed by vastly different life experiences, educational backgrounds, and motivations. However, for me, the opportunity to write this work allows me to bring together, in a more holistic way, the three currents of my professional life, namely, development, diplomacy, and defense.

I began my career in international development law as an attorney with the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). I was given a U.S. diplomatic passport and instructed to negotiate many diverse, challenging, and interesting legal agreements, understandings, and accords with more than 40 different countries. This professional experience greatly informed my teaching of the subject of international development law, which is also the subject of a previously published work with the same title.

I subsequently joined the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) as an Assistant General Counsel for Administrative Affairs. OPIC provides U.S. financing for private-sector growth in new and emerging overseas markets. Afterward, I was approached to become the general counsel of two military commissions, the Overseas Basing Commission and, later, the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC). This is where I began to merge development, diplomacy, and defense.

I believe that this merger will provide a new perspective for addressing global terrorism, one of the most important geopolitical challenges of our day. If, by reading this work, you add my voice and perspective to the many others writing on the same subject, I shall be most grateful to you.

A FAILURE OF THE STATE

In sum, the basic theme of the original essay emphasized that a failure of the state in terms of providing support for basic human needs (e.g., physical and social infrastructure) led to a number of Islamic-based separatists' movements. The failure of the state may be seen in terms of a series of systemic failures in the development process.

In contrast, the concomitant failure in ideology created, in part, the complex alchemy giving rise to global jihadists' movements. In terms of addressing the problem of global jihadists, the essay advocated the creation of a New Soldier who exhibits the highly subjective qualities of empathy, compassion, wisdom, and heightened intuitive and perceptive abilities that enable him or her to navigate in unknown cultural, linguistic, and emotional terrains. Creating and cultivating a corps of the New Soldier is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking and one to which most military establishments are unwilling to commit themselves. The following discussion will examine the reasons militating against such a course of action and the reasons why such a course of action actually should be pursued.

Professor Michael J. Mazarr succinctly states many of the objections to adopting a U.S.-based defense policy aimed toward developing counterinsurgency campaigns and approaches and puts them into perspective.[1] He argues that the post-9/11 shift in defense policy that directs military interventions against asymmetric threats and irregular warfare and in support of stabilization operations and nation-building exercises is misguided and, ultimately, quite dangerous. In fact, such attempts may actually destabilize U.S. national security rather than strengthen it.

In my opinion, he correctly points out that

> Although it is always dangerous to generalize, much of the instability described by theories of asymmetric and nontraditional warfare stems first and foremost from causes other than military aggression. Many rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars are the symptoms of political, economic, and psychosocial factors that undermine social stability and popular commitment to public order. Once order has collapsed, leaders and groups arise determined to seize power, and the contest becomes a clash of power-seekers. Yet, the essential problem in many so-called failed states and other contexts that give rise to civil wars, insurgencies and the radicalism at large in the Muslim world is a society or a large group of individuals beset with some combination of economic stagnation, cultural resentment, historical grievance, political or national repression, and other factors. These afflictions—injustices, in the eyes of the aggrieved—are not amenable to military solutions.[2]

In other words, these military engagements are not wars at all but are small, internecine, and often intrastate and inter-ethnic conflicts.

The list of downstream negative consequences from shifting to a counterinsurgency-focused military approach includes, for example,

(1) underfunding the research, development, and procurement of systems for war; (2) inappropriate or inadequate training of military forces for conventional warfare by shifting the focus to dealing with unconventional warfare; (3) underfunding nonmilitary agencies and programs better equipped to deal with the underlying causes giving rise to irregular warfare; and (4) risking the loss of the U.S. strategic and compelling advantage in conventional warfare arenas (especially in dealing with Russia and China's potentially expansionist ambitions).[3]

Moreover, by adopting a strategy of fighting "small wars," the United States, in particular, may be positioning itself to lose. Democracies have a limited capacity to absorb the costs of small wars because of an overall commitment to democratic principles and to the general repugnance to brutal military behavior often found in such conflicts.

Jeffrey Record points out that dictatorships that use violent tactics with their own people and who are not accountable for their actions often have a higher tolerance for small wars than democracies.[4] Thus, the often protracted warfare of irregular wars is generally not winnable by major democracies such as the United States. Arguably, this is the case historically, even with England and France, who were both ultimately defeated by the asymmetric nature of many of the independence struggles that took place in their colonial eras, respectively. (The examples of India and Algeria, respectively, come to mind in this context.)

Moreover, the single-minded focus on winning the kinetic warfare stage tends to make military strategists, policy-makers, and perhaps the public as well feel as though the war has been won and that the world is now a better place. But it overlooks the fact that

> Military victory is a beginning, not an end. . . . Pursuit of military victory for its own sake discourages thinking about and planning for the second and by far the most difficult half of wars for regime change: establishing a viable replacement for the destroyed regime. War's object, after all, is a better peace.[5]

Indeed, in light of the fact that many small wars are intrastate rather than interstate conflicts, regime change is often a significant factor at the conclusion of the actual armed conflict. However, bringing about political transformation is often beyond the ability of a military force. "Military conflict has two dimensions: winning wars and winning the peace."[6] Military forces are designed to do the first and often do it well, but they are not designed to do the latter and often fare poorly. Thus, this is precisely one of the key arguments *against* engaging in irregular warfare in the first instance.

Finally, and most importantly, the use of the military in counterinsurgency operations and related engagements substitutes military operations for diplomatic efforts and development assistance. Arguably, this is a strategic misinterpretation of Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the

continuation of politics by other means."[7] War is not meant to be a substitute for politics.

Professor Mazarr further writes,

> It is thus dangerous to view the military as the lead agency to deal with very diffuse, broad-based asymmetric challenges such as radical Islamism, nation building, stability operations, and even counterinsurgency. Talk of redirecting U.S. military emphasis to asymmetric threats amounts to a form of avoidance, allowing U.S. national security planners to ignore the truly dramatic change underway in the character of the conflict. As smart, adaptable, and courageous as U.S. military officers and men and women clearly are and will be, asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric responses—political, economic, cultural, informational, and psychological tools, tactics and techniques allowed to work organically over time, not retrained military forces whose true purpose is to fight and win wars, which are vastly different enterprises. The strategic trap is obvious: Furnished with a vast, expensive, skillful military tool, policymakers will use it again and again, as they have been doing, without confronting the tougher challenge of shifting resources into nonmilitary tools of statecraft.[8]
>
> By dramatically expanding the budgets for foreign aid, public diplomacy, exchange programs, and related nonmilitary forms of power, the United States can do much more to address sources of instability, stagnation, and grievance that underlie the state failure, radicalists, insurgents, and terrorist groups at large in a globalizing world. Military power is not the way to defeat such threats.[9]

Incidentally, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agrees with this and states that

> We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between. . . . But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's nonmilitary instruments of power. . . . [T]here is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.[10]

Although there seems to be a fairly broad basis of consensus that more resources should be devoted to nonmilitary approaches, agencies, and policies in the context of responding to asymmetric threats, there does not seem to be the requisite political will to implement this need.

Indeed, it seems that the Obama administration "is finding that it must turn to military personnel to fill hundreds of posts in Afghanistan that had been intended for civilian experts."[11] Many of these new positions for agricultural specialists, engineers, lawyers, small business managers, veterinarians, public sanitation workers, and traffic control experts will now be filled by contractors and "reservists, whose civilian jobs give them the

required expertise."[12] In fact, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) requested the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to fill more than 350 new diplomatic positions created in Iraq.

The shortfall in civilian expertise highlights the fact that the U.S. government civilian agencies have not been adequately funded to hire and train personnel eligible to take up reconstruction tasks in post-conflict zones. Moreover, "[u]nlike the armed services, nonmilitary agencies do not have clear rules to compel rank-and-file employees to accept hardship posts."[13] Therefore, there may not be the requisite political will or the individual will to take up these difficult overseas assignments.

The lack of an adequate and available civilian corps to undertake these necessary tasks of rebuilding Afghanistan, in particular, is highly problematic. As General David Petraeus points out, "[p]ower vacuums breed insurgencies."[14] In his view, insurgencies typically emerge from civil wars or from the collapse of states. Generally speaking, insurgencies and global terrorism stem, in large part, from the failure of the state. Indeed, the failure of the development process derives from two related aspects of governance: a failure in governing as well as in being governed.

Second, from the perspective of the wider international community, especially advanced nations actively involved in the overall development process, there has been a failure in statecraft. In other words, there has been a systemic failure to successfully bring about sustainable development (albeit for a complex menu of reasons that lie outside the scope of this limited analysis). Nonmilitary actors on both a bilateral (state-to-state) and multilateral level have not fully succeeded in ensuring concrete development results despite their best efforts to do so.

This leaves the international community with the baleful choice of ignoring these power vacuums leading to potential insurgencies, more instability and endemic corruption, or taking some course of action in response to such conditions. Although it is widely recognized and acknowledged that the preferred course of action with respect to containing forces leading to the potential collapse of the state should be undertaken by nonmilitary actors, it is clear that this has not taken place successfully in many instances. The reasons for this are complex, but the unavoidable conclusion is that neither political transformation nor economic development can take place without security.[15]

Despite (or perhaps in response to) the failure to devote additional U.S. nonmilitary resources to the effort of quelling and preventing asymmetric threats, there has been a shift in the U.S. military paradigm. The DOD issued Directive 3000.05 re: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations on November 28, 2005. This directive firmly establishes the defense policy of supporting stability operations to "help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term

goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions and a robust civil society.''[16]

It is understandable if these tasks do not sound familiar in the context of military operations. In fact, Section 4.3 of DOD Directive 3000.05 provides that

> Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish and maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.[17]

Of course, there has been significant nonmilitary intervention in conflict-ridden areas over the course of the past 60 years. In fact, one commentator notes that ''Africa has been the recipient of several Marshall Plans worth of foreign aid since World War II's end, yet it remains arguably as impoverished today as it was in 1946.''[18] This stems in part from the reluctance of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank to factor security needs into the development equation.[19]

Although it is not certain whether broader nonmilitary interventions in the securitization, stabilization, and reconstruction process are forthcoming, it is clear that military forces (whether unilateral or multilateral) are the first actors in conflict and post-conflict situations. Therefore, I would argue that the need for the New Soldier, whether acting for unilateral or multilateral forces, is a necessary agent of stability and, paradoxically, of change. I would further argue that the New Soldier is needed to implement the current U.S. military SSTR paradigm. However, this discussion has a much broader vision in mind that encompasses not only U.S. military forces but any and all military forces that are faced with asymmetric threats, such as France, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, and many more.

The corps of the New Soldier, in my view, should initially reside in multilateral armed forces and peacekeeping units such as the United Nations (UN), NATO, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). In addition, within the African context, the G-8 Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral program that will create a self-sustaining peacekeeping force of 75,000 (largely African soldiers) by 2010, may also be a logical place to deploy the New Soldier. The concept of the New Soldier may also be relevant to the Africa Counterinsurgency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and many other military and paramilitary programs.

Multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces may be better suited to deploying the New Soldier initially because such forces are predicated on multilateral, multilingual, and multicultural approaches. Indeed, a RAND

study points out that multilateral peacekeeping forces have added credibility, lower operating costs, and more access to seasoned professionals who have experience in handling crises created by collapsed states.[20] Perhaps it is time to examine a new approach by investing in and creating new forms of militarized interventions to be undertaken by the New Soldier.

If this approach is adopted, it will mean that the underlying commitments, missions, and rules of engagement for new military interventions with much broader goals in mind may need to be negotiated. The political implications are quite far reaching, and this needs to be part of the paradigm shift not only for the U.S. military in support of its short-term goals but also for other militaries that are being equally strained by the demands of insurgencies and global terrorism.

The interventions that the New Soldier should initially be focused on are: (1) providing humanitarian relief; (2) securitization and stabilization; and (3) conflict resolution and prevention. Ultimately, the New Soldier should create the backdrop for initiating a diplomatic dialogue to end hostilities and begin the peace and reconciliation process.

Thus, the underlying articles of association of multilateral military forces such as NATO, the UN, and related organizations and units may need to be changed or overhauled to reflect the need and support for the New Soldier. This may mean broader authorities, for example, to intervene internationally by regional military forces where necessary.

There is also a significant concern that changing the focus away from the kinetic aspects of warfare to "softer" skills involved in conflict prevention and reconciliation will conflict with and demoralize existing military structures—after all, established militaries are built on a different set of skills and expectations. Accordingly, the recruitment strategies to attract the New Soldier also may need to be drastically altered. Thus, a new "track" of a military career may need to be formulated and promulgated to attract the officers and other personnel who wish to develop the new skill sets necessary for the New Soldier.

Because the New Soldier has a different and expanded mission from simply engaging in conventional warfare, the underlying core curriculum of military schools may need to be changed significantly. Retired military officers may wish to lead the effort to share their "lessons learned" perspective with new recruits. Their efforts may help shift the military paradigm to include a different kind of soldiering by creating a different kind of soldier. As Secretary of Defense Gates put it, "[N]ew institutions are needed for the 21st century, [and] new organizations with a 21st century mind-set."[21]

This may be the new challenge: to create the New Soldier, not in conflict with the soldier of today but as a new and invaluable partner for the military of tomorrow.

Acknowledgments

I have been very fortunate in having so many patient and supportive friends and colleagues on which to rely for developing my analysis, seeking new research avenues, and reading drafts of earlier versions of this work.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Monsieur Alain Wormser, President, and Monsieur Jean-Claude Hugonnard, Director-General of the Fondation St. Cyr for making the 2007 Grand Prix possible, and for all their contributions to my work, not the least in graciously granting me certain rights conducive to publishing the present work. I would also be remiss if I did not thank my friend, Brian Hannon, for encouraging me to participate in the writing competition sponsored by the Foundation.

I also owe a special thanks to my sincere and loyal friend from law school, Air Force Major (Ret.) Zachary Z. Kinney, who insisted that I read his manual, ''The Commander and the Law,'' and Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, thereby creating the necessary groundwork for embarking on this journey. I also owe special thanks to Professor Eric Patterson, Georgetown University, who provided unwavering support for the work in all of its iterations.

The Foreword was generously provided by Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO. Dr. Shea has been most supportive of my work from the beginning and has encouraged me to develop ways of operationalizing the concept of the New Soldier. His encouragement has been very meaningful to me.

My professional colleagues and well-wishers who added immeasurably to my understanding of the topic include Professor Ali Ibrahim, Professor David Luban, and Professor David Koplow of Georgetown University Law Center; Professor Hew Strachan of All Souls College, Oxford University;

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Vice President for Research of the National Defense University; Major General (Ret.) Robert Scales; Commander Gary Fletcher; Dr. Al Pierce; and Chaplain Eric Wester. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Kim Hudson of the U.S. Air Force War College for her support in seeking ways to operationalize the New Soldier concept.

Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACDS	African Chiefs of Defence and Security
ACOTA	Africa Counterinsurgency Operations Training Assistance
ACT	Advance Civilian Team
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCB	Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Maghreb
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Union Standby Force
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ASI	Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative
AU	African Union
AUSA	Association of the U.S. Army
BRAC	Base Closure and Realignment Commission
C3IS	command, control, communication and information systems
CAT-A	Civil Affairs Team (U.S. Army)
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System

CHLC	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
CSID	Cours Supérieur Inter-Armées de Defense
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DCI	Defense Capability Initiative
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DITF	Deployed Integrated Task Force
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOS	U.S. Department of State
EAC	East African Community
EACDS	Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States Brigade
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEML	École d'État-Major de Libreville
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FM	Field Manual (U.S. Army)
GiRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPOI	G-8 Global Peace Operations Initiative
HSC	Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (U.S. Navy)
HSRT	Humanitarian, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Team
HUMINT	human intelligence
IMS	Interagency Management System
IO	international organization
ISAF	[NATO] International Security Assistance Force
JFC HQ Brunssum	Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum
JRT	Joint Regional Team
LIC	low-intensity conflict

LIW	low-intensity warfare
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSC	Military Staff Committee (Africa)
NARC	North Africa Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
NIF	National Islamic Front (of Sudan)
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCC	Prague Capability Commitment
PCR	post-conflict reconstruction
PLANELM	Planning Element
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Peace and Security Council (of the African Union)
PW	Panel of the Wise
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RtoP	right to protect
SABAC	South Western Afghanistan and Balochistan Association for Coordination
SADC	South African Development Community
SADCBRIG	South African Development Community Standby Brigade
S/CRS	U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SEALS	Sea, Air, and Land Forces (U.S. Navy)
SOE	state-owned enterprise
SOF	special operation forces
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (operations)
SWCC	Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (U.S. Navy)
UN	United Nations

UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OTI	U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

Introduction: Using the Dialectical Method to Analyze Fundamentalist Islamic-Based Terrorism

Rather than plunging into a law-based or political theory-based description of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorist movements, a theoretical analysis in a broader historical context may be a useful starting point. The dialectical method, although now disfavored, offers a highly structured means of analyzing current events and putting them into historical perspective. Certain elements of this method of analysis have been selected for the reasons set forth in the following discussion. This discussion is designed to provide an analytical framework within which to view and draw conclusions about fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism.

A NEW PHILOSOPHIC FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Western political and philosophical thought seems to oscillate between alternate forces of idealism and materialism. Although materialism may be traced back to the thinking of Democritus (fifth century B.C.E.) and the ethics of Aristotle and Epicurus, the European belief in a fundamentally spiritual universe ruled by God almost completely dominated Western philosophy until the seventeenth century.

However, the translations of Greek texts during the Renaissance, the rise of natural sciences, and the application of the scientific method to new

inquiries on the nature of the physical universe and man's relationship to God created a new context for materialist thought. Scientific reasoning was also applied to social sciences by Enlightenment scholars. A new rationalism was particularly evident in the political commentaries of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who was pivotal in formulating man's natural rights to property.

However, the rigid empiricism, materialism, and rationalism of post-Enlightenment scholars such as David Hume were later refuted by Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth century German idealist. His *Critique of Pure Reason*[1] posited that although the world is composed of concrete objects, the perceptions and experiences of the individual actually structure and create order in that objective universe. He thus placed a new importance on the subjectivity of human perception and the human reasoning that orders such perceptions in a cognizable way. Further, he elevated the process of constructing knowledge out of sense impressions and forming universal concepts into a transcendental ideal.

Georg W. F. Hegel moved beyond the empiricists and Kant's transcendental idealism by creating a highly structured philosophical system of dialectical idealism as set forth in his *The Phenomenology of the Mind*.[2] He unites reason with sensory experience by creating a sense-based perception of an object such as a book (thesis) to comparing it with other books and creating a mental concept of a book (antithesis) to creating a fuller, more idealized realization of a book (synthesis).

For Hegel, history was a dialectical process being played out on a global scale. Each stage in the dialectical process is rife with internal contradictions and contains the seed of its own destruction (the ''negation of the negation''). The dialectical process leads to a holistic, final synthesis that inexorably moves toward the attainment of the highest goal of history—to achieve universal freedom.

Frederick Engels (working in collaboration with Karl Marx) took the ''idealism'' out of Hegel's dialectical idealism and replaced it with dialectical materialism. Rather than adopting Hegel's approach of starting with the idea or concept of some concrete object, Engels started with the human events that preceded notions or ideas about such events. Further, the desired (and inevitable) end goal of the progression of human history did not lie in achieving universal freedom but in establishing a communist state.

Needless to say, the dialectical method as a means of analyzing history, and even the dialectical idealism of Hegel, have fallen out of favor. Therefore, it may be surprising to see it revived in this context. Nevertheless, I feel that the analytical approach of the dialectical method has some intellectual merit, and I wish to capture certain intrinsic elements of it. Specifically, I wish to use the dialectical method as a limited diagnostic tool to analyze a broad-based historical problem. It is not my intent to further a discussion of dialectical materialism within its own philosophic or historical context.

The elements of the dialectical method that I find useful are, first, the disaggregation of historical events into a tripartite structure of thesis—antithesis—synthesis. This is a very useful approach to define certain sequential and interdependent stages of historical evolution. Second, the idea that a subsequent historical stage arises from an internal contradiction contained in the previous phase creates a foundation for viewing progressive stages of historical growth as evolutionary in nature and organically connected to each other. This permits the observer to see historical events in a more holistic fashion which, in my opinion, is more useful than sharply and arbitrarily dividing historical events into preset categories. Third, the use of the dialectical method permits the observer to view history not as an uninterrupted continuum but as punctuated with discrete occurrences that eventually become historical events. This helps create a framework of historically significant events rather than a blur of undistinguished occurrences.

Therefore, I request the reader's indulgence in agreeing in advance to divorce the dialectical method from its sociohistorical application in the twentieth century in order to further this analysis. Admittedly, the idea of history moving in a certain predetermined, unilinear way is highly problematic. However, rather than taking an "end of history" approach resulting in universal freedom, the communist state, a clash of civilizations, or liberal democracy, it may be wise to avoid such apocalyptic visions. Perhaps the Hindu world view of history moving in circles is a more value-neutral approach that is better designed to analyze and interpret rather than obfuscate and polarize the issues discussed here. Hopefully, this approach will better incorporate historical, political, and legal dimensions of the analysis, giving the reader a wide-angle view of the problems and proposed solutions.

Thesis. The Cold War era locked the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into a political and military standoff based on the grim possibility of nuclear warfare leading to their mutually assured destruction. The two superpowers were polarized not only in terms of their underlying ideology and means of governance (democracy versus communism) but also in their means of economic production (capitalist-based free market economy versus state-led socialism).

Further, the two superpowers also insisted on polarizing the rest of the world. Similar to the African proverb that says that when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, the policies of containment, proxy wars, and creating spheres of influence took its toll on countries extraneous to the Cold War conflict. Although the political and economic approaches of the former superpowers were strikingly dissimilar, the overarching "symmetry" of these two actors, the two most powerful nation-states at the time, creates the "thesis."

Antithesis. The contradictions contained within socialist regimes eventually led to their collapse, but the peaceful lull that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was shattered on September 11, 2001. We now find ourselves in the second stage of the "antithesis" or the "asymmetry" posed by

global terrorism acting through non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups. In fact, the U.S. military fully recognizes the so-called ''asymmetric threats'' posed by such groups and responded to these threats by establishing the Asymmetric Warfare Group within the U.S. Army in 2005.[3]

Asymmetric warfare is not a new tactic but an ancient one where unconventional tactics are used to counter the overwhelming conventional military superiority of an adversary. The decisive technological and military superiority over the conventional military forces of virtually any conceivable adversary is met not by conventional warfare but by unconventional means that may, in the current context, include terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla warfare, cyberattacks, and information warfare. This ''asymmetry'' of these warfare tactics underscores the relative imbalance in size, tactical approaches, and objectives of the actors. Powerful nation-states (not only the two former superpowers) are now threatened by these nebulous terrorist groups that have no organized center, armies, or formal governance structure.

Synthesis. The next stage or the ''synthesis'' that I propose is the ''Fearful Symmetry.'' The idea of the Fearful Symmetry is based on a poem by the English romantic poet, William Blake, who published *Songs of Experience* in 1789 that included the poem, *The Tyger*.

> Tyger Tyger, burning bright,
> In the forests of the night;
> What immortal hand or eye,
> Could frame thy fearful symmetry?[4]

Not only are we terrorized by the acts of terrorists (an obvious outcome because that is their aim), but I feel that many Islamic-based terrorists are also fearful (if not actually terrorized) by the perceived threat posed by Western ideals and institutions. In other words, the ideas of universal suffrage and representative government, participatory democracy, respecting the rights of women and minorities, and free market economic practices and institutions are deeply problematic for fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorist networks and operatives. Indeed,

> to many of our potential opponents we appear to be as asymmetric as they appear to be to us. To the al-Qaeda fighter, cowering in a cave in a remote part of Afghanistan, fuel air explosives, dropped with deadly precision from aircraft miles away and thousands of feet up, directed by laser designators wielded by highly trained and stealthy special operation forces (SOF), is as asymmetric to him as his tactics are to us.[5]

The transformation from the ''antithesis'' of the asymmetric threats posed by global terrorism to the ''synthesis'' of ''A Fearful Symmetry'' is being

prompted by a fundamental change. There has been a palpable shift from the mere tactical level of posing asymmetric threats perpetrated by global terrorists to an overarching psychological dimension where both sides instill fear in each other. The asymmetric threat of global terrorism is no longer confined to conflict zones with specific military engagements underway; it now affects civilians in every walk of life.

In fact, ordinary life has been transformed to accommodate the impact of the asymmetric threat of global terrorism as illustrated by new protocols with regard to airline travel, heightened security in almost every dimension of everyday life, and a new fearful consciousness of the presence of implicit danger. Moreover, this stage has reached a "steady state" where neither the targets nor the effects of global terrorism are dissipating.

The aforementioned are merely some of the symptoms of asymmetric conflict, but the actual causes lie much deeper. William J. Olson points out, "[t]he United States is engaged in the first post-modern conflict. It is not ready; . . . it is a struggle in which it can win all the battles and still lose the war. . . . We have moved from the era of modern war into the era of post-modern war, into an age of war without a center of gravity."[6] (The concept of a "center of gravity" for war originates with Claus von Clausewitz and is an idea to which we shall return later.) Olson, however, also recognizes that "[m]odern war was not possible without the modern state."[7]

Professor Olson further states, "[p]ost-modern war is not possible without the disintegration of the modern state. If modern war was the product of the emergence of state based on new organizing principles, post-modern war is the product of the collapse of state and the emergence of new organizing principles."[8]

In addition, Professor Olson points out:

> The peace that ended the Thirty Years' War was more than a peace that ended a war. It ended an era and began another one. It, along with the English Civil War, set the major themes shaping the modern world: the end of wars of religion and the beginning of secular wars; the beginning of secular thought leading to the so-called Enlightenment; the consequent explosion of science that helped to fuel intellectual and industrial revolutions; with the further consequence of an emerging doctrine of individual conscience and government based on social contract rather than divine right; the establishment of the idea of the sovereign state within a system of states; the birth of nationalism, of an idea of countries based on common, shared identity rather than as the personal holdings of dynastic families. These themes unleashed powerful forces, creative and destructive, that shaped Europe in the years following, and through that medium the world, America included.[9]

These complex themes characterizing "modernity" have been questioned in fundamental ways by the asymmetric threats posed by Islamic-based global terrorism.

Thus, a discussion of the failings of the Westphalian-based nation-state is integral to an analysis of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism. For modern readers, it is easy to take the structure of the modern nation-state for granted, to assume that it arose *sui generis*. This viewpoint fails to take into account that

> the history of the modern state is a short one—and not a particularly happy one. . . . [I]t was not until 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War, that the modern international system of sovereign state began to develop. Even after this symbolic starting point, it took centuries of conquest and many more years of war before anything truly resembling today's state system took shape . . . [and] even in Europe, the birthplace of the modern state, the history of the state is a history of repression and war.[10]

For the more cynical viewer, the viability of the nation-state structure may be called into question in light of the alarming rise of ungovernable territories, systemic corruption, the inability to govern (or to be governed), the inability to provide public services in support of basic human needs, and the lack of accountability, all of which have led to dismal results. Indeed,

> [o]ne of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter—not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach, not to mention international organized crime and drug traffickers who also exploit the dysfunctional environment. As such failed states can pose a direct threat to the national security of the United States and to the security of entire regions.[11]

In fact, the globalization of organized crime in narcotics, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms dealing (often involving other commodities such as diamonds), cybercrime, piracy, illegal nuclear proliferation, and other illegal activities have often taken advantage of failed states. In seeking a safe harbor from local policing authorities or international law enforcement in general, criminals and criminal syndicates have acted, in some cases, almost like opportunistic viruses using failed or failing states as hosts. Although the relationship of failed states to fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism may not be automatically presumed, the complex dynamic between the two is a critical component of this analysis. Further, the relationship of international crime to global terrorism, and the ways in which both are synergized by each other, is also an important dimension of this discussion.

The following discussion will focus on the implications of global Islamic-based terrorism rather than on the law enforcement aspects of other illegal activities. Nevertheless, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that terrorists are criminals, too. For purposes of this discussion, however, Islamic-based global terrorists offer an ideological spectrum in which to view their

acts—whether this ideology is real or illusory is certainly a fair question that requires a closer examination.

Nonetheless, the suggestion of an ideological conflict offers a different and more complex dimension than simple economic-based crimes that merely seek to accumulate ill-gotten gains. The damage that such economic crimes may inflict on the body polity of the host state may be more in the nature of collateral damage. To date, there is no real evidence to suggest that a stated goal (or actual intention) of crime warlords and syndicates is to destroy the modern nation-state. This provides a sharp contrast to global jihadists, who often argue that the downfall of Western-based democracies is a desired outcome of their actions.

In looking back, one of the central themes of the symmetry of the Cold War was the concurrent policy of ''containment'' practiced by both the United States and the former USSR. Containment permitted both sides to wage war without actually fighting one. However, the end of the Cold War ended the era of the modern war. The era of postmodern warfare has begun, with the attacks of September 11, 2001, acting as the first salvo. Containment is no longer possible. The genie of the Fearful Symmetry is already out of the bottle.

ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

In returning to the issue of fighting asymmetric conflicts, it would be misleading to assert that asymmetric elements of warfare are completely unknown to modern warfare. In fact, there is a fascinating evolution of the U.S. military concepts of irregular warfare, small wars, low-intensity conflicts, military operations other than war (MOOTW), special operations, counterinsurgencies, guerilla warfare, counterterrorism, covert wars, and unconventional warfare, as well as stability operations, peacekeeping operations, and contingency operations.

One commentator remarked:

> In the specialized military literature, the concepts are not always precisely defined. As a result, ''low-intensity warfare'' (LIW) and ''low-intensity conflict'' (LIC) are generally used as synonyms. Related terms like ''foreign internal defense,'' ''counterinsurgency,'' ''counterterrorism,'' ''special warfare,'' ''special operations,'' ''revolutionary/counterrevolutionary warfare,'' ''small wars,'' ''limited wars'' and others are not clearly explained. Sometimes they are employed as synonyms for LIC, sometimes as conceptual antitheses, sometimes as sub-categories. Almost every essay on LIC in a U.S. military journal begins with the result of furthering the terminological confusion.[12]

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) no longer lists low-intensity conflict, military operations other than war, or small wars in its list of official definitions.[13] Nevertheless, the U.S. Marine Corps has an extensive list of

"small wars" dating from the 1800s.[14] Moreover, the needs of irregular or unconventional warfare are tactically supported by U.S. special forces (e.g., the U.S. Army Special Forces [Green Berets], Delta Force, Army Rangers [75th Ranger Regiments], and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment [Night Stalkers]; the U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and Land Forces [SEALS], Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman [SWCC], and the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 84 [HSC-84]; the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command; and the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces). This seems to indicate a somewhat confused picture of overlapping doctrine, strategy, and force projection.

Following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, counterinsurgency doctrine, theory, and practice were left to the special operations military community. A number of humanitarian and peace operations took place throughout the 1990s, including Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; however, there was no major U.S. military thrust to developing counterinsurgency theory and practice.

Thus, when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the existing doctrine on counterinsurgencies was very limited.

> In the fall of 2005, over two and a half years into the struggle to stabilize Iraq and 4 years into the operation in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus partnered with Marine Corps General James Mattis to lead a year-long effort to craft a new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM-3-24). This new doctrine, which was edited by counterinsurgency expert Dr. Conrad Crane, drew heavily on current operational experiences as well as historical case studies and "best practices" of past counterinsurgencies. The final draft of the manual was published in the fall of 2006.[15]

A condensed guide was published by the U.S. State Department in 2009 in an interagency effort titled, "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide." This guide makes it clearer than the original Army field manual that the U.S. role in an insurgency is that of *supporting* the host government in quelling the insurgency. This role is related to the host government's role, but is not the same. Further, the U.S. role changes as the host government defeats the insurgents and builds its capacity to govern again.[16]

The dilemma posed by the Fearful Symmetry is the challenge of fighting a postmodern war under rules of engagement that do not exist for one side and that are unclear for the other. Not only is it not clear who the enemy is from a Western point of view, but the enemy's objectives of fighting this conflict are also unclear. Is the total destruction of all modern nation-states the desired result for fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists? Is a negotiated peace possible? If so, whom do we negotiate peace with? In light of how high the stakes are in terms of assuring the safety and well-being of millions (if not billions) of people, these are very consequential questions. Therefore, establishing a coherent framework of ideas and action with which to

respond to the threat of global terrorism may be the most important geopolitical challenge of the twenty-first century.

Not only are we fighting a postmodern war, but it is a war that is also being fought in what has been termed a ''post-American world.'' Fareed Zakaria points out that America

> remains the most open, flexible society in the world, able to absorb other people, cultures, ideas, goods, and services. The country thrives on the hunger and energy of poor immigrants. Faced with the new technologies of foreign companies, or growing markets overseas, it adapts and adjusts. When you compare this dynamism with the closed and hierarchical nations that were once superpowers, you sense that the United States is different and may not fall into the trap of becoming rich, and fat, and lazy.[17]

Despite his optimism, he also warns:

> Americans—particularly the American government—have not really understood the rise of the rest. This is one of the most thrilling stories in history. Billions of people are escaping from abject poverty. The world will be enriched and ennobled as they become consumers, producers, inventors, thinkers, dreamers, and doers. This is all happening because of American ideas and actions. For 60 years, the United States has pushed countries to open their markets, free up their politics, and embrace trade and technology. American diplomats, businessmen, and intellectuals have urged people in distant lands to be unafraid of change, to join the advanced world, to learn the secrets of our success. Yet just as they are beginning to do so, we are losing faith in such ideas. We have become suspicious of trade, openness, immigration, and investment because now it's not Americans going abroad but foreigners coming to America. Just as the world is opening up, we are closing down.[18]

Fareed Zakaria further explains that

> [b]eing on the top for so long has its downsides. The U.S. market has been so large that Americans have assumed that the rest of the world would take the trouble to understand it and them. They have not had to reciprocate by learning foreign languages, cultures or markets. Now, that could leave the United States at a competitive disadvantage. . . . Learning from the rest is no longer a matter of morality or politics. Interestingly, it is about competitiveness.[19]

In ushering in a post-American world, Zakaria observes that

> [o]n every dimension other than military power—industrial, financial, social, cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance. This does not mean that we are entering an anti-American world. But we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed by many places and many people. . . . The world is changing, but it is going the United States' way. . . . It might be a world in which the United States takes up less space, but it is one in which American ideas and ideals are overwhelmingly dominant. The United States has a window of opportunity to shape and master

> the changing global landscape, but only if it first recognizes that the post-American world is reality—and embraces and celebrates that fact.[20]

In a post-American world, it is important to understand the implications of the changing roles of the nation-state and how nations interact with each other. Indeed, this new world order has been characterized as "nonpolar," where numerous centers wield meaningful power.[21] However,

> nonpolarity complicates diplomacy. A nonpolar world not only involves more actors but also lacks the more predictable fixed structures and relationships that tend to define worlds of unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity. Alliances, in particular, will lose much of their importance, if only because alliances require predictable threats, outlooks, and obligations, all of which are likely to be in short supply in a nonpolar world. Relationships will instead be more selective and situational. . . . The United States will no longer have the luxury of a "You're either with us or against us" foreign policy. Nonpolarity will be difficult and dangerous.[22]

The single biggest complicating factor in confronting global terrorism is that the structure of the nation-state has been badly compromised in some instances, and it is this critical failure that forms the basis of our examination into the rise of fundamentalist Islamic-based extremism.

The challenge now is to understand how to prosecute and win a post-modern war where none of the former rules applies. But more importantly, it is important to understand why this conflict came into being and how it may be successfully concluded, not only for ourselves but also for the enemies that we face. Perhaps it seems counterintuitive that a "win-win" scenario may be contemplated in these circumstances. But as the world is engaged in a conflict of ideas as much as in an armed conflict, the ascendancy of certain ideas may signal the transformation of ideals, governance, and a new view of history for everyone.

PART I

Global Fundamentalist Islamic-Based Terrorism: One Size Does Not Fit All

1

Radical Islamic-Based Separatist Movements

At the outset, it is important to make a very basic distinction between Islamic-based separatist (or secessionist) movements that employ terrorist means and the so-called global fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorist movement. The reason for doing so is that the nature of the Islamic-based terrorism determines, in part, the international response to it.

The primary example of an Islamic-based separatist movement is, of course, Palestine. It has engaged in a decades-long struggle for autonomy, self-determination, and establishing its own statehood, the causes and implications of which will not be addressed here. In light of the fact that Hamas was designated by the U.S. Department of State to be a Foreign Terrorist Organization,[1] Hamas surprised U.S. and other policy-makers by winning the general legislative elections of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in January 2006. Hamas defeated Fatah, the party of the PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, thereby setting the stage for a prolonged power struggle.

Although Hamas uses terrorist tactics of suicide bombings and launching short-range rockets and mortars to achieve its political goals, it also provides basic human services such as educational, sports, health, and religious facilities to its constituents. The fact that Hamas has been responsive to the basic needs of Palestinians, and allegedly has a reputation for honesty in contrast to the corruption of which Fatah officials often stand accused, may explain, in part, its political victory. In essence, Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism.[2]

Another example of an Islamic-based secessionist movement is the Muslim uprising in Mindanao staged by secessionist groups that include the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has known ties to the Al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden.[3] Despite signing a 1996 peace accord with the Philippine government establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) for five provinces, the MNLF staged a revolt in November 2001, thus continuing to destabilize the country.[4] Moreover, the jihadist-based secessionist movements in the Philippines are actively supported by other terrorist groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, and Libya.[5]

Kashmir provides another example of a localized, territory-specific fundamentalist Islamic-based secessionist movement that long predates 9/11. This is a somewhat problematic example because the insurgencies in Kashmir are not truly indigenous but are instigated by outside actors.[6] Similar to the previous example of the Philippines, however, there is credible evidence that Al Qaeda has developed closer ties to Kashmiri terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.[7]

Thus, the Philippine and Kashmiri separatist movements (with Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon)[8] are localized "terror-based" movements that perhaps may be narrowly viewed in the same light as the Basque separatists in Spain, the Irish Republic Army, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or the Chiapas rebels in Mexico, to cite only some examples of "terrorist" groups who also have discrete political objectives and goals.[9] In contrast, other fundamentalist global jihadist movements are more closely aligned in principles and tactics to the Red Brigade in Italy that has a more diffuse political agenda of revolutionary change to be achieved through violent means.

The examples of the Philippines and Kashmir also highlight a disturbing convergence of separatist political objectives with the global intifadah promulgated by Al Qaeda. These recent examples may represent the next evolutionary step beyond the more strictly defined goals related to establishing statehood and political legitimacy that is being pursued by Hamas in Palestine and, to a lesser extent, by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In fact, the clear danger posed by these examples is that they will lose their separatist character altogether and simply merge with the global fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorist network.

Indeed, there is now evidence that Hamas may be shifting its political tactics by abandoning the use of rockets and initiating cultural initiatives and public relations as a means of winning support both at home and abroad.[10] Hamas has duly noted that the international condemnation of Israel over allegations of its use of disproportionate force may have worked in Hamas's favor. Rather than resisting Israeli occupation and military tactics by force, Hamas is initiating a "culture of resistance" that ultimately may lead it to a tactical victory in the end.

Other examples of Islamic-based separatist movements may be cited here, but rather than belaboring the point, it may be useful to consider whether there is a historical relationship (however tenuous) between post-colonial movements that established new nation-states and the previously cited examples. Revolutionary forces in former colonies generally did not have access to organized armies or arms, and they often resorted to using unconventional means to achieve their revolutionary goals. Most notably, Mahatma Gandhi eschewed violence in order to gain India's independence, truly an unconventional war tactic! This approach was later successfully replicated in the civil rights movement of the United States and in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, where Gandhi first began his journey.

Although Palestine is not emerging from a colonial past *per se*, it has not yet managed to successfully achieve its own statehood. The fact that this and other separatist movements are now being energized by the global terrorism espoused by Al Qaeda is a profound departure from the past practice of using international law principles of self-determination to create internationally recognized statehood. In fact, the Israeli-Palestine conflict is no longer catalytic to global terrorism but is being overshadowed and surpassed in importance by the global jihadist terrorist movements in the view of the jihadists themselves.[11]

A significant underlying theme that unites the examples of Islamic-based separatist movements that we have already discussed is the failure of the state as an institution of governance that creates an ordered society. A second failure that can no longer be ignored is the failure to hold state leaders accountable by their own people. Thus, the failure of the state may be viewed as being twofold—both in terms of governing and in being governed.

However, definitions of what constitutes a "failed state" can be highly polemical, political, and problematic. In a collaboration between *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace, the 2009 Failed States Index lists the following nations as the top ten "failed states," namely, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Guinea, and finally (and perhaps most notably) Pakistan.[12]

Yet, the widely touted claim that Pakistan is facing an "existential threat" from violent extremists and that Pakistan is in the process of being "Talibanized" has been met with some stiff resistance in certain quarters. One commentator notes sharply that

> Pakistan is neither Somalia nor Sudan, nor even Iraq or Afghanistan. It is a thoroughly modern state with vast infrastructure, a fiercely critical and diverse media, an active global economy and strong ties with regional powers such as China and Iran. It is not a "failed state." . . . The monotonous drone of "failure" implies that its fragile democracy is not worth preserving. It encourages the marginalization of the civilian government and boosts the claims of both the military and the militants.[13]

However, the actions of the Pakistan government have belied this overly reductionist viewpoint. In fact, Pakistan's political and military leaders have endorsed a peace agreement known as the Malakand Accord, which allows for the imposition of *shari'a*, or Islamic law, in a large portion of the Northwest Frontier Province and ends the military operation of the Pakistan government in Swat. The past peace agreements, which were started under former President Pervez Musharraf's regime in 2004, have served to give the Taliban the time it needed to regroup from fighting with the Pakistani military and reorganize its forces.[14]

In fact, the Malakand Accord has granted the Taliban nearly complete control over a region that encompasses more than one-third of the Northwest Front Province, thereby doubling the Taliban's recruiting base and its taxation base. Moreover, there is evidence that the Taliban is beginning to branch out beyond the Northwest Frontier Province. The Taliban began attacking the Punjab districts of Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali during the spring of 2009, thus forcing the Punjab provincial government to consider closing down its borders with the two provinces.[15]

Fareed Zakaria denounced the Malakand Accord in no uncertain terms: "This was not a peace deal: it was surrender."[16] Examining the deeper implications of this struggle, he notes that

> the real core of this struggle has to be fought by the Pakistani army. They would need to fight a civil war against these militants to protect their own country, something they are loath to do. They have preferred the "phantom" war against India, a simple old-fashioned deployment that they understand. Insurgencies are tough, and they are trying to avoid dealing with it. But they need to understand, this is the existential threat to their country. India is not trying to capture Punjab, the Taliban is.[17]

Of course, the lack of political will to confront and control the Taliban in Pakistan has increased worries in Washington, DC, about controlling Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consisting of about 60–100 nuclear weapons. According to David Sanger,

> [t]he Pakistanis, not surprisingly, dismiss those fears as American and Indian paranoia, intended to dissuade them from nuclear modernization. But the government's credibility is still colored by the fact that it used equal vehemence to denounce as fabrications the reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan, one of the architects of Pakistan's race for the nuclear bomb, had sold nuclear technology on the black market. In the end, those reports turned out to be true.[18]

Moreover, there is an additional concern because there is now tangible evidence reported in June 2009 that Al Qaeda and other militants are leaving Pakistan's tribal areas and moving to Somalia and Yemen.[19] To date, there is no evidence that top Al Qaeda leaders are moving to Somalia, but this may change in the future.

In fact, Somalia is a failed state that bears an eerie resemblance to Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks were launched in 2001. The Somali radical group, Al Shabab (the ''young ones''), and its allies have basically seized control of Mogadishu, the capital, and imposed a tyrannical form of radical Islam on the occupants of the city and elsewhere. The Shabab are using its jihadist ambitions to attract foreign radical militants from around the globe, including Pakistan.[20]

Indeed, there is sobering evidence that a ''boomerang'' effect is now underway, whereby Somalia immigrants to the United States, settling principally in an enclave in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for example, are now being recruited by Al Shabab agents and are returning to Somalia to engage in terrorist activities. As of July 13, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted two Minnesota men in connection with the recruitment of Somali immigrants to fight with Islamic insurgents in their home country. Both were charged with one count each of providing material support to terrorists and conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure people overseas.[21] The recruiting effort took place between September 2007 and December 2008, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been investigating what appears to be a ''massive recruiting effort by the al Qaeda–linked Somali insurgent group Al Shabab in immigrant communities in the United States.''[22]

In terms of what caused more than a dozen young men of Somali descent to disappear from the Minneapolis area in recent months and return to Somalia was, in part, a response to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to push the Islamists out of Mogadishu in December 2006. However, the Ethiopian presence in Somalia was an outrage to most Somalis and became a rallying cry for Al Shabab. Although Ethiopian troops left Somalia in 2009, Somalia's weak transitional government has not been successful in battling the insurgents. In fact, Ethiopia has rejected the request by the Somali transitional government to return to fight the insurgents, stating that such an intervention would need an international mandate. (Somalia has been without an effective government since 1991.)[23]

Some of the Somalian-American recruits came from impoverished circumstances and were struggling in school, but others left the United States not for a lack of opportunity but because they were ''driven by unfulfilled ambition.''[24] This has forced U.S. federal agents and antiterrorism experts to rethink their assumptions concerning the successful assimilation of foreign-born Muslims into the fabric of American life. Losing the struggle again barriers of race, class, religion, and language, such immigrants may be returning to their homeland to become terrorists.

Thus, the franchising effect of radical jihadism is being spurred onward by the availability of safe havens in which to plan and launch their attacks. This effort by Al Qaeda operatives to expand their bases of operation now includes the Sahel, an ungoverned terrain between Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, there is evidence that an Al Qaeda affiliate in North Africa recently has carried out a number of killings, bombings, and other lethal attacks against

Westerners and African security forces. Counterintelligence officials claim that foreign fighters are returning from Iraq and, further, that these recent attacks in North Africa "reflect Al Qaeda's growing tentacles in the northern tier of Africa, outside the group's sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas."[25]

So alarming were the implications of the potential territorial expansion that the U.S. Department of State began its Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002, a counterterrorism program that partnered with local militaries in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania.[26] The program expanded in 2005 in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Pentagon to include Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Succinctly stated, "Al Qaeda established sanctuaries in the Sahel, and in 2006 it acquired a North African franchise."[27]

Returning to Pakistan, the downstream implications of Pakistan as a potentially failing state are dramatic. A failed state lacks the ability to exert full territorial control of the state. Robert Rotberg remarks that

> [i]n contrast to strong states, failed states cannot control their borders. They lose authority over chunks of territory. Often, the expression of official power is limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Indeed, one measure of the extent of a state's failure is how much of the state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls.[28]

If this standard of review is accepted, then Pakistan's course of action in entering the Malakand Accord with the Taliban is chilling, indeed.

A broader examination into what constitutes a failure of the state is warranted here. Although there may not be a universally accepted definition of a failed state, certain underlying themes have emerged. For example, the definition of a failed state used by the British Department for International Development is

> [g]overnments that cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. . . . The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.[29]

More broadly speaking,

> [n]ation-states exist to deliver political goods—security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities—to their citizens. Failed states honor these obligations in the breach. They increasingly forfeit their function as providers of political goods to warlords and other nonstate actors. In other words, a failed state is no longer able or willing to perform the job of a nation-state in the modern world.[30]

However, there is an even more dire possibility. A failed state may simply collapse or implode. According to Robert Rotberg,

> [a] collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state. It has a total vacuum of authority. A collapsed state is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. When a state such as Somalia collapses (or Lebanon and Afghanistan a decade ago and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s), substate actors take over. . . . Yet, within the collapsed state prevail disorder, anomic behavior, and the kinds of anarchic mentality and entrepreneurial pursuits—especially gun and drug running—that are compatible with networks of terror.[31]

Thus, there is a disconcerting spectrum of weak, fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states. What is the internal dynamic that makes a weak state become a fragile one? Why does a failing state actually fail or even collapse? Why, for example, did Somalia collapse?[32] In contrast, why does Indonesia, a weak state, continue to weather tsunamis, secessions, corruption, and ethnic strife? This complex alchemy lies outside the scope of this writing, but it forms the backdrop of what may be creating the maelstrom giving rise to fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism.

In trying to bring some policy cohesion to this complex phenomenon, USAID,[33] for example, refers to ''fragile states'' as a broad range of failed, failing and recovering states. USAID defines ''vulnerable states'' as states that are unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of safety and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. States ''in crisis'' refers to states ''where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where the legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.''[34]

USAID also proposes the ''Fragility Framework'' as the means for analyzing governance in fragile states, reproduced in Table 1.1.

It is worth keeping in mind, however, that

> [n]ot all failed states are created equal. Not all will be equally important to the United States and the international community. Each stable country must gauge its involvement in failed or failing states according to its own resources and interests. Nor can a ''one size fits all'' approach be used to address the broad diversity of cases. Although conceptual threads link these situations, the approach to dealing with failed and dangerously weak states must be tailored to each case.[35]

Eight policy options have been offered by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as a means to deal with failed states, a review of which may be useful in this context. The first option is to do nothing and hope

Table 1.1 Analyzing Governance in Fragile States: The Fragility Framework

	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Security	Military and police services that secure borders and limit crime	Military and police services that are provided reasonably, equitably, and without major violation of human rights
Political	Political institutions and processes that adequately ensure response to citizen needs	Political processes, norms, and leaders that are acceptable to the citizenry
Economic	Economic and financial institutions and infrastructure that support economic growth (including jobs), adapt to economic change, and manage natural resources	Economic institutions, financial services, and income-generating opportunities that are widely accessible and reasonably transparent, particularly related to access to and governance of natural resources
Social	Provision of basic services that generally meet demand, including that of vulnerable and minority groups, is assured	Tolerance of diverse customs, cultures, and beliefs

Source: USAID, "The Fragile States Strategy," (PD-ACA-999) (January 2005) available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.

that the problem resolves itself on its own. This is a tried and true approach of the foreign policy of most governments, but it may have drawbacks, as the example of Afghanistan illustrates. American withdrawal from and inattention to Afghanistan following the cessation of hostilities with the former Soviet Union in 1989 proved to be disastrous in the end. Although a wholehearted intervention following a post-conflict situation may also not be warranted, a clear and objective policy review of what may be at stake certainly is.

A second option is to quarantine a state by monitoring and intercepting potential threats such as in the case of North Korea or Somalia. However, this piecemeal approach may be costly and ineffective over time if an overall strategic approach is not developed and implemented.

A third option is to "disassemble" the state in question and create smaller entities. Again, Somalia affords an example of this, but the long-term viability of Somaliland, Puntland, and other provinces as independent quasi-state entities remains questionable.

A fourth option is to integrate or absorb the failed state into another entity. Although territorial expansion may be an attractive option to resource-starved states, absorbing a failed state is often politically and economically unviable for a host of complex reasons.

A fifth option is to establish a transitional international authority or trust arrangement to permit a transition to actual viable statehood. This was the case in East Timor and Kosovo and requires the active participation of the international community. This may, in fact, be a viable political option in certain instances.

A sixth option is to establish a regional authority as a ''watchdog,'' as with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) acting in Cambodia, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) acting in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. The utility of this type of arrangement remains open to question because the underlying sources of the conflict are not addressed in this situation.

The seventh option is to support one of the sides in the conflict with the hope that it ultimately prevails—a tactic used extensively in the proxy wars of the Cold War which often led to uneven and politically unsustainable results.

A final, eighth option proposed by CSIS is encouraging the international community to develop a post-conflict reconstruction strategy to maintain regional stability, definitively end the conflict, and begin the political and economic reconstruction process.[36] (I realize that the ''Washington consensus'' view presented here perhaps limits the utility of this analysis, but it still has a broad range of reasonable policy options to offer.)

Further, CSIS urges that the term ''post-conflict reconstruction'' be used in lieu of ''nation-building'' for several reasons. First, nation-building was associated with the post–World War II U.S.-led reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany. A salient political aim was to convert the defeated governments into ''friendly'' allies of the U.S. government and its political allies. The historical associations of the term ''nation-building'' imply that an underlying political agenda exists that is not quite as palatable or ''politically correct'' in the current context. Moreover, the international community is providing tactical assistance to encourage the post-conflict reconstruction process. In contrast, the actual task of nation-building falls to the host country and its citizens.

In fact, I would go one step further in urging that the expression ''winning over the hearts and minds'' be eliminated from the military and political lexicon of the United States. ''Winning over'' the hearts and minds of others tends to imply that this is a propaganda-based war effort. Certainly, ideas are at the core of all struggles (whether armed or unarmed). However, convincing others of the soundness of certain ideas of Western liberal democracies (especially through the use of armed force, where necessary) seems to perpetuate the neo-colonial imprint of these ideas. If they are not understood and adopted by Iraqis, Afghans, or others of their own accord, then the persuasive value of such ideas seems highly impeachable when the ideas are being disseminated at the point of a gun.

For example, the world was spellbound, watching the large-scale, dramatic protests in Iran following its presidential election in spring 2009. It is difficult to determine whether true democratic values, a respect for free, fair, and transparent elections, and the peaceful assembly of Iranian citizens are actually their core values. However, these values were compelling to Iranians insofar as the people risked their lives to express them in defiance of their own government.[37] This was particularly significant as the demonstrations, and the underlying values that may have prompted them, were not forced on Iranians by outside powers or influences. Thus, rather than insisting on "winning over the hearts and minds" of captive audiences, it may be preferable to simply let the persuasive power of such ideas play out. There is no real need to refer to a potential clash of values as a "war to be won."

Finally, four pillars of action are proposed by CSIS: (1) security; (2) justice and reconciliation; (3) social and economic well-being; and (4) governance and participation. Adopting a unified international effort using a strategic approach was also strongly recommended by CSIS.[38] These four pillars are reflected, in essence, by the essential tasks outlined in April 2005 by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The S/CRS was created in July 2004 by the U.S. Department of State in response, in part, to several pieces of legislation introduced by the U.S. Congress reflecting the widespread recognition that the U.S. government needed a strategic approach to carrying out post-conflict operations.[39]

The S/CRS document "Essential Tasks" sets forth the "requirements to support countries in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustaining stability."[40] This document builds on the "Joint CSIS/AUSA [Association of the U.S. Army] Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Task Framework" from *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, edited by Robert C. Orr and published by CSIS Press in 2004. It was the baseline S/CRS used at its inception to lead six interagency working groups through a discussion and amplification of the task matrix.

After several months of interagency discussion, the original CSIS/AUSA task framework was divided into five technical sectors: (1) security; (2) governance and participation; (3) humanitarian assistance and social well-being; (4) economic stabilization and infrastructure; and (5) justice and reconciliation. The list was significantly expanded and gives the reader a better, more concrete view of the individual tasks proposed by S/CRS and now underway in the stabilization and reconstruction process in fragile societies. In fact, the U.S. Department of State has described this as a "living document" and encourages individuals to express their suggestions, comments, or proposed editions to the essential task list by contacting scrs @state.gov.

The policy considerations for strengthening weak states and preventing their failure is obvious. As the example of Afghanistan demonstrates, the process of post-conflict reconstruction is a long, time-consuming, expensive, and contentious process.

Robert Rotberg observes that

> Strengthening states prone to failure before they fail is prudent policy and contributes significantly to world order and to minimizing combat, casualties, refugees, and displaced persons. Doing so is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Strengthening weak states also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power vacuums within which terror thrives. . . . Preventing state failure is imperative, difficult, and costly. Yet, doing so is profoundly in the interest not only of the inhabitants of the most deprived and ill-governed states of the world, but also of world peace.[41]

The nation-states in many parts of the developing world (and in some, but not all, conflict areas giving rise to fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism) are fragile, weakened, or collapsed. Although the causes for the ''failure'' of such states differ and the classifications of ''failed states'' change constantly, there is basic agreement on the definition of a failed state: a state that has failed in its basic obligation to provide for the basic human needs of its population.[42]

Other indicia of a failed state are its inability to provide security, its flawed institutions, decaying infrastructure, endemic corruption, ineffective public health and education systems, and economic opportunities reserved for the privileged few.[43] In essence, these states fail to create, implement, and sustain viable infrastructure growth in four discrete respects: (1) physical infrastructure (e.g., transportation, telecommunications, and power); (2) social infrastructure (e.g., institutions supporting education, health and welfare); (3) financial infrastructure (creating viable indigenous capital markets and ensuring access to world capital and trade markets); and (4) legal infrastructure (creating and implementing a Rule of Law framework that adequately supports the internal and external economic and investment needs of the country along with courts, judicial and alternate dispute-resolution processes, and a government-led regulatory framework that is both rational and transparent.)

Sudan, Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are often cited as failed states, while Colombia, Indonesia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are sometimes cited as being at risk for failure.[44] In fact, in the Atlantic Council's Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan, it points out that Afghanistan is now ranked as the fourth most war-torn, fifth most corrupt, seventh most fragile, and second weakest state in the world, as of April 2009.[45] In sum, not only have certain states failed in fulfilling their most basic obligations to their citizenry, the failure of such states has also been one of governance itself.

Aside from the systemic corruption that acts like a sieve in these societies, the commitment to a representative, participatory democracy has often been supplanted by autocratic rule, nepotism, military coups, and nontransparent elections and practices. Attempting to address the causes of the many political failures of states now believed to be harboring or supporting fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists would be an impossible task. Nevertheless, ameliorating and correcting some of these state failures is key to formulating an international response to Islamic-based separatist movements.

On a more optimistic note, if these Islamic-based separatist movements are seeking to establish new political entities (whether as nation-states or some other form of autonomous self-governed unit), then perhaps this is a hopeful sign that they have not abandoned the structure of the state altogether despite its many failings. In other words, if the creation of new political entities is being actively pursued by fundamentalist Islamic-based non-state actors, then perhaps there is still hope of entering into a constructive dialogue with them (as attempted by the government of the Philippines, for example).

The most notable example of creating a new political entity in this context is, of course, Palestine. Unfortunately, because Palestine is such a complicated and thorny political dilemma, it may not be the best model. But it does illustrate the point that there is room for a structured peace process that will hopefully end in a state-led solution.[46] A state-centered approach is far more manageable because it is both geographically contained and fits within the generally accepted and familiar constructs of international political relations and diplomatic dialogue. It is certainly far less threatening than the ''asymmetric threats'' posed by Islamic fundamentalist-based global terrorism.

The specifics of how to structure a multi-tiered, multi-actor approach to a disciplined peace process with substantive benchmarks along the way will be discussed at length later in the text. However, a brief summary of that approach follows:

- Stabilize the conflict area through multilateral and/or regional military intervention (such as UN peacekeeping forces where needed) to end civil war, strife, or unrest
- Structure a coherent and well-developed agenda with well-known, publicized, and accepted benchmarks for an internationally brokered peace process that includes, among other things, a truth and reconciliation process for healing purposes
- Strengthen the infrastructure of the failed or collapsed state as a commitment of the international community acting in partnership with the groups in conflict, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), neighboring countries, regional and multilateral organizations, the media, and other non-state actors.

Of course, this begs the following question: If the infrastructure (physical, social, financial, and legal) of the conflict area has collapsed in part or in whole, despite efforts to the contrary, what will make it work now? This is a complex issue that will be addressed not from the perspective of politics but of economics.

DEVELOPMENT AS A SECURITY CONCEPT

The failure of the state as an economic actor is particularly relevant in this context. In the decades following the independence of most developing world nations, the state was the only institutional actor large enough and sufficiently creditworthy to assume an entrepreneurial function. In other words, the state was the only actor capable of borrowing funds and providing for basic human needs, including power generation, transportation, and telecommunications.

In response to the urgent needs of its population in such sectors, many states created state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which borrowed capital to support the capital infrastructure and other nation-building needs of the state. The SOEs, however, generally engaged in inefficient borrowing practices that burdened numerous developing states with high levels of debt, leading to the debt crisis and the continuing debt overhang of many countries. Over time, the collapse of SOEs, the failure to create adequate private sector growth and private capital markets, the continuing debt burden, and many other complex factors led to stagnant economic growth and, in some cases, to political instability.

The second important inquiry to be made here is whether the voluntary adoption or the military imposition of Western ideals, methods, and institutions helps in this context? The answer, regrettably, is a qualified ''no'' to the voluntary adoption of a Rule of Law agenda that is designed in theory to support the process of development, and an unqualified ''no'' in cases where such a prescription for overarching reform is militarily imposed from without by external forces.

Susan Willett points out:

> The relationship between poverty and conflict is evident in recent figures supplied by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In 1998, of the thirty-four poorest countries in the world, five were engaged in conflict (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Congo Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone, and Somalia), while sixteen (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda and Yemen) are undergoing the fragile process of transition from conflict to peace. [Footnote omitted.]
>
> In the developing world, the root causes of insecurity and conflict are often due to the failure of development to take hold. [Footnote omitted.] Not only does the deficiency of development lead to conflict, but conflict itself results in missed developmental opportunities.[47]

Additionally, Willett points out that most of these conflicts are intrastate (not international) in nature and that the militarization of security problems in developing countries aggravates the problem further. Thus, long-term sustainable development is necessary not only to alleviate poverty but also to create the political and economic stability that is the key to preventing conflict. She clearly states that, "[t]he plight of the poor, the marginalized and the displaced are only taken seriously when they become a *threat* to the perceived global order."[48] (Emphasis in original.)

Willett further indicates that these failures in the development process may be attributed, in part, to the policies of international financial institutions. The emphasis on "[s]tructural adjustment via market reforms and privatization—while important—are not sufficient mechanisms to provide the necessary incentives to prevent conflict, to ensure the demilitarization and rebuild war-torn economies."[49] The reluctance of such multilateral institutions to integrate conflict prevention as part of their development mandate is another shortfall in the overall development process itself.

While supporting a Rule of Law agenda is a laudable political undertaking, it is very difficult (but not impossible) to succeed. The successes of the development agenda in Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, and Africa have led to mixed and uneven results. The reasons for success are few and difficult to emulate, and the reasons for failure are numerous and very complex. Again, the length of this essay would be unduly prolonged and the clarity of it would be diminished if a fuller discussion of this idea were to be set forth here.[50] The idea of more fully and clearly supporting a development agenda by international actors will, however, be revisited later in this discussion.

In fact, it may be argued that by creating sustainable development in fragile or failing states, the perceived need to engage in terrorist acts by separatist Islamic-based "terrorist" movements may be ameliorated and diminish over time. As discussed, these types of movements evolved partly in response to a failure of the state; therefore, creating a more robust state entity that provides for the basic human needs of its population may stem the tide of such terrorism. Taking this approach is quite a challenge and depends largely on external policy changes enacted by international actors working in partnership with developing nations who may need to institute systemic internal policy changes.

Nevertheless, despite the best efforts that may be taken by all concerned to encourage sustainable development in developing countries with separatist fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism, there is no guarantee that these measures will actually prevent such terrorism in the long run.[51] The issues may simply be too complex to be fully resolved by policies that encourage sustainable development. We can only hope that such measures will help ameliorate the terrorist manifesto over time. But regardless of whether sustainable development helps end separatist Islamic-based terrorism, it is a worthwhile goal to pursue in itself, insofar as it ends human suffering and misery caused by poverty, both in body and in spirit.

With respect to militarily imposing Western ideals of democratic governance, market-based economies, and the Rule of Law, the only two successful modern examples of this are post–World War II Germany and Japan. In a seminal two-volume work produced by the RAND Corporation, post–World War II nation-building over the last 60 years was systematically examined.[52] The study points out that with nation-building,[53] peacebuilding, or stabilization operations, the defining term (depending on one's perspective) has been the predominant paradigm for the use of international force in a post–Cold War era. In fact, since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of these operations has steadily increased.

The study concludes that the German and Japanese occupations set a standard for postwar reconstruction that has not been equaled since then. However, the determinants for success do not depend on the level of preexisting Western culture, the relative economic development and prosperity of the country, being surrounded by other Western-styled democracies, or even the cultural homogeneity of the population. The true determinant for success was apparently the level of effort put forth by the international community in the transformation of these post-conflict societies. Moreover, the study points out that democracy can be transplanted in non-democratic societies and that, more importantly, nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction but about political transformation.[54]

Thus, a preliminary conclusion may be offered here. First, the failure of the state has led to several Islamic-based separatist movements that pose grave international security challenges. Second, nation-building is about political rather than economic transformation that *must* be undertaken by the host country in order to be successful. Finally, state failure may or may not attract global jihadists; conversely, the success of an individual state may not necessarily stave off terrorism. There is no formulistic relationship between the two.

Moreover, the success expected of external militarily imposed stabilization and reconstruction operations is limited, even under the best of circumstances, and is certainly not expected to rise to the level of the successes of the German and Japanese examples. But there is another factor that, in my view, will limit the efficacy of such military solutions and ultimately produce substantially reduced positive outcomes.

The "global intifadah" philosophy and tactics of Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups and cells clearly implies that they are not interested in the political or economic stability of their host nation-states. These states (in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, or the territory of Waziristan in Pakistan, for example) are all substantively "ungovernable" at present, for various complex reasons. The essential conflict is not one of stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building, thereby correcting the failures of the collapsed or failing state, but rather one of a conflict in ideology, a theme that will be explored in the next chapter.

2

Global Jihadism and Its Discontents

The discussion in Chapter 1 drew a fundamental distinction between two different types of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism: separatist-based movements versus the so-called "global terrorism" of Al Qaeda and related terrorist cells and networks. The first type is based on a failure of the state, as already described. The second type is based on a failure of ideology.

The failure of ideology in the twentieth century is embodied in the demise of fascism, communism, Stalinism, and Soviet-backed socialism in Africa and Asia. The dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded a new post-Cold War era where old policies of containment, proxy wars, and non-alignment have now become defunct. But if these ideologies have failed, what remains in their place?

The new ascendancy of the Rule of Law on a global scale is certainly worth considering. In the fracas of dying and defunct ideas, a core ideal of Western thought has endured. The eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Adam Smith elevated the drive to acquire material wealth to a classical economic ideal. This, in combination with eighteenth-century philosopher John Locke's demand that the state protect private property and individual liberties, created the platform for liberal political theory. In other words, the pursuit of one's own personal happiness through the material acquisition of personal wealth as well as the state's protection of individual liberties has been elevated to a Western classical ideal. Indeed, the terrifying force of this ideal may be its universality.

Although Western societies developed legal structures over the centuries to protect private property (e.g., contract enforcement, mortgages, secured loans, liens, and bankruptcy proceedings) and to ensure the protection of

individual liberties (e.g., by passing a Bill of Rights and ensuring the due process of law), non-Western societies did not, for the most part, develop similar institutions. What began revolutionizing our world at the end of the last millennium was not the adoption of a Western classical ideal by the non-Western world but the adoption of the Western *methodology* of achieving this ideal through private property, democratic governance, and the Rule of Law. The adoption of this Western-based methodology is what has fueled, in principal part, the legal reform efforts in the developing world for the past 50 years.

However, merely adopting Western-styled institutions and approaches without clearly understanding or fully accepting the underlying philosophical and ideological foundation that supports liberal democracies and market-based economies has proven to be a fallacy. It is deceptively misleading to expect to replicate the same successes in democratic governance and economic growth in Western nations without at least examining the ideological foundation of such systems. In other words, Western-styled approaches and institutions have been adopted by many developing countries in principle but not with respect to the underlying philosophical ideal that forms its foundation.

This has led to somewhat anomalous results insofar as the "illiberal" ideologies and tactics of "terrorist" groups such as Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon have now been legitimized politically. These "terrorist groups" have now formed political parties, and their respective political platforms of using terrorism to achieve their political goals have been legitimized through an electoral process. Both parties are now parliamentary members of their respective countries. These groups (considered to be terrorists in the view of the U.S. government)[1] have used parliamentary elections, for example, as a new and sophisticated means by which to acquire political power. In other words, terrorist means have been used to accomplish political ends.

If the failure of ideology on a worldwide scale in the past century has led to the superficial ascendancy of Western-based institutions, the failure of ideology in the Arab world in the post–World War II pursuit of modernity has been perhaps even more painful and has not led to the same result. Fareed Zakaria writes:

> for the Arab world, modernity has been one failure after another. Each path followed—socialism, secularism, nationalism—has turned into a dead end. . . . If there is one great cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab world.[2]

Modernization is now viewed as Westernization, globalization, or worse, Americanization. However, as Zakaria points out, "[i]mporting the inner stuffings of modern society—a free market, political parties, accountability and the rule of law—is difficult and dangerous."[3] Returning to an earlier

theme, the failure to demand that state leaders take a more informed and critical approach to issues of governance and economic growth by the people that they govern also constitutes part of the failure of the state.

The profound transformation of the frustration, sense of humiliation, and despair in the Arab world into an ideology of hatred involves a very complex alchemy that lies outside the scope of this analysis. On the surface, it appears that Islamic-based separatists have responded to the crisis of the state in a secularized fashion using violence as a means to gain political power.

On the other hand, it appears that in response to the failure of modernity and its accompanying ideological foundation, Al Qaeda has developed a more profoundly religiously influenced "new ideology of hate."[4] This ideology empowers its adherents through hatred and the single-minded pursuit of disruption, terrorism, and the destabilization of Western-styled economies. Its actions are largely of symbolic value that feed off the despair, disempowerment, and disenfranchisement of frenzied young Muslims. Rather than holding Arab leaders accountable for their actions, this distrust has metastasized into an uncompromising hatred of Western ideals, values, institutions, symbols, and peoples.

This new generation of terrorists has no interest in undertaking the hard work of nation-building. In fact, this brand of terrorism is not based on the failure of the state. The state has already imploded as in the failed state of Afghanistan or is in the process of gradual decline and potential collapse in Pakistan unless its political and armed conflict with Taliban forces ends. This type of terrorism is based not only on a failure of Western-based ideology supporting "liberal democracy" but, more disturbingly, on the ascendancy of a new ideology of hatred.

For a more informed view of the ideological motivations of global jihadists, I turn to Ekaterina Stepanova, who writes:

> According to the modern interpretations, holy war [jihad] may take several forms. The principal distinction is between internal (or greater) jihad—religious and spiritual self-perfection and self-purification—and external (or lesser) jihad—armed struggle against aggressors and tyrants. In these interpretations, external jihad is not necessarily the most important, is defensive in nature and is a means of last resort. In contrast, the ideologues of violent Islamism believe armed jihad to be the main weapon in countering the multiple threats and challenges to "the rule of God" on earth. . . . This extremist view is supported by the belief in both historical and more recent injustices, ranging from political suppression and direct occupation of Muslim lands to the socio-economic marginalization of Muslims by the West. The strongest dissatisfaction is expressed with regard to the policies of the USA, the United Kingdom and Israel. Extremists also build on the lack of legitimacy of the ruling elites and governments in their own countries and have a record of undermining secular nationalist regimes (e.g., in many Arab states).[5]

Apart from the internal and external jihad distinction, there are three other subdivisions applicable to external jihadism: liberation, anti-apostate, and global jihad. Liberation jihad is an armed struggle to forcibly remove ''occupiers'' or ''non-believers'' from Muslim territories such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, Mindanao, or Palestine. Liberation jihad defines the separatist movements discussed in Chapter 1 and conforms to the basic contours of nationalist or ethno-separatist insurgency movements. In contrast, the anti-apostate movements target ''impious'' Muslim regimes such as those in Egypt and elsewhere and are not relevant to this particular analysis.

Finally, global jihad is

> a transnational (or more precisely, supranational) movement founded by [Osama] bin laden and al-Qaeda with an ultimate goal of establishing Islamic rule worldwide; . . . the use of terrorist means in global jihad qualifies as super-terrorism. This categorization is dictated by the unlimited, universalist nature of its ultimate goals and agenda. Thus, if the categorization of jihad into liberation, internal and global is to be accepted, global jihad is the most radical and poses the greatest challenge to international security.[6]

In the view of the U.S. government, Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate (a Muslim empire) to wage war with the United States and its allies, beginning with the expulsion of U.S. forces from Iraq.[7] This point of view, also held by academics, military strategists, and others, tends to superimpose order on highly disordered asymmetric threats.[8] While establishing a caliphate may be the declared objective of global jihadists,[9] it is unclear whether they have an actual overall strategic approach in place that will ultimately establish a caliphate.

Indeed, even if Al Qaeda's actions are designed to impose political change from without, as witnessed in the regime change in Spain following the train bombings in Madrid in 2004, the downstream political impact stemming from these bombings seems to be more accidental than deliberately planned by the terrorists.[10] While lacking a discernable overall strategic vision or mission, two themes implicit in jihadism seem to be relatively clear: (1) to free the Muslim world from Western political, economic, and cultural influences, and, to a lesser extent, (2) to impose *shari'a*-based Islamic law, free from the confines of a Western Rule of Law regime.

Perhaps more broadly speaking,

> [t]he Islamic terrorist agenda is more inflexible than most of us imagine, and its ends are defined, not in terms of the transient political parameters of the discourse of international relations, but by a perspective rooted in religious absolutisms that will endure long after the reverberations of the crises in transition in Afghanistan or in Iraq have come to an end.[11]

If, however, Taliban rule in Afghanistan heralds the new form of fundamentalist Islamic-based governance, it still leaves in place two glaring

problems: poverty and political repression. Economic backwardness, political repression, systemic violations of the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities, and the lack of international legitimacy marginalizes such a regime. Although it may follow the strictures of Islamic law (and even that may be open to question),[12] it cannot achieve its own political or economic integrity.

The creators and the adherents of Al Qaeda's new ideology of hatred are educated, wealthy, privileged, and successful by Western standards, as are their new recruits who are Western-educated engineers, physicians, and other affluent professionals. This ideology is not one that advances the economic or political stability of a nation-state in order to create stable, viable state-oriented structures of governance and economic production—this is not at all the goal of global terrorists. In fact, it may be argued that global terrorists emerging from the European context demonstrate that living in stable political economies does not deter them from adopting the ideology of hatred, nor does it deter them from engaging in acts of terrorism. In fact, quite the opposite is true.

One study points out that terrorists have traditionally been well-educated individuals. In fact, well-educated counter-elites have formed the leadership cadre for violent extremist movements throughout time, beginning with the late-nineteenth century Russian anarchists and Marxists.[13] Other studies have revealed that the members and supporters of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine tend to have a higher educational and socioeconomic profile than their fellow citizens.[14]

The genesis of the ascent of radical Islamic-based global jihadist movements began with the formation of Israel in 1948, with the tipping point being the 1967 war. The sociological profile that is emerging from more recent global jihadist movements seems to indicate that the ''old guard'' of the 1980s came from predominantly upper- and middle-class backgrounds. The second wave who joined in the 1990s were predominantly middle class and were less well-educated. The third wave of new jihadists who joined following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 tend to be poor, less educated, and more socially marginalized than their predecessors. Many are only marginally literate and have not finished high school.[15]

It may be unclear as to what these ''waves'' may suggest. Perhaps this latest wave of jihadists reflects both the recruitment practices and the appeal of the jihadist message to individuals with a lower socioeconomic profile and less privileged life experiences. Perhaps their motivations for becoming violent extremists may be based less on ideology and intellectual thought and more on emotional values and responses. The underlying emotional motivations may lie in a deep-rooted desire to be accepted and belong to a larger group or cause. Indeed, there may also be an economic motivation insofar as suicide bombers may regard payoffs to their family as a means of income generation, even if it is earned at the cost of their own lives.

Two aspects of global jihadism are important to highlight in this context. First, the relationship of poverty to global terrorism forms a necessary component of this analysis. Second, the relationship of civil liberties and democratic governance is also a key determinant of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism.

Although definitive statements that ''poverty has little to do with terrorism''[16] have been offered, this conclusion may overlook the context that poverty plays in driving individuals toward violent extremism. Poverty impedes the capacity of a state to stem the flow of corruption, protect its borders effectively, ensure equitable development for all of its citizens, provide physical and social infrastructure to support the basic needs of its population, and provide equitable participation in its governance through free and fair elections. Thus, these factors lead to a downtrodden and depressed state of its citizenry where educational, economic, and entrepreneurial opportunities may be limited to the elite or privileged classes or simply be nonexistent.

In fact, there is evidence that the Taliban in Pakistan has taken advantage of the underlying class rifts coupled with a lack of governance and a failure to provide fair, speedy, and equitable justice. Following its independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained a privileged class of landowning elites, while the workers on their land remained poor, uneducated, and economically downtrodden. The Pakistani government failed to provide even the rudiments of proper health care, educational facilities, and land reform.[17] Landless tenants often were trapped in a corrupt and inordinately time-consuming justice system where their claims were not effectively heard or resolved.

The Taliban exploited this environment of systemic corruption and the lack of effective access to education, health, and justice systems. The Taliban operating in the Swat Valley of Pakistan gradually put pressure on the locals to pay their rent money to the Taliban rather than to absentee landlords. Propertied landlords were persuaded to withdraw their sons from English medium schools and enroll them in *madrasas* (Islamic-based religious schools) and permit one or more of them to train as Taliban fighters.[18] The *shari'a* law and traditional Islamic means of conflict resolution gradually started to replace secular, state-run law courts. Thus, the absence of adequate systems of education, health, land entitlement, and justice were all elements of an impoverished society that provided fertile ground for the Taliban to establish a stronghold.

When former President Musharraf tried to regulate the growing *madrasas* by offering cash to teach more general subjects, the money was accepted, but the educational practices did not change. Even in the view of the Pakistani government, the ''madrasa reform project failed.''[19] Indeed, recent reports also confirm that wealthy landlords are not returning to the Swat Valley. In fact, the ''reluctance of the landlords to return is a significant blow to the Pakistani military's campaign to restore Swat as a stable, prosperous part of

Pakistan, and it presents a continuing opportunity for the Taliban to reshape the valley to their advantage."[20]

The removal of landlords from the Swat region may also have repercussions in the neighboring Punjab province, where the militants are gaining power. This may have the effect of a "property redistribution," where support for the Taliban is tied to the absence of landlords. In fact, the local landlords have fled, in large part, due to the failure of the Pakistani army to protect their families and their lands.

However, the local Pakistani population may be losing its attraction to Taliban-enforced norms. Pakistanis living under Taliban rule are becoming disillusioned because the underlying causes that allowed the Taliban to exert their influence in the first instance—poverty, a non-functioning local government, and the lack of economic opportunity—remain in place. Once the Taliban took power, it only "seemed interested in amassing more."[21] Thus, the cycle may be completing its circle.

The Pakistani government is now scrambling to recruit new judges and has assigned 3,000 new police officers to the Swat region.[22] These government actions may give rise to the hope that a functioning secular modern state will be reimposed in a more effective and sustainable way in this region. However, this story is still unfolding and its conclusion is unclear.

In fact, the Pakistani government may need to take note of the observation by David Kilcullen that

> the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier example shows the classic instance of an accidental guerilla syndrome, with heavy-handed government intervention in a highly traditional and xenophobic society producing a major backlash with extremely far-reaching implications for regional security.[23]

Kilcullen outlines a four-part cycle that forms what he terms the "accidental guerilla syndrome," whereby Al Qaeda (or an affiliate) establishes a presence within a remote, ungoverned, or conflict-affected area during the *infection* stage.[24] During this stage, the terrorist operatives establish cells, logistical support systems, and information-gathering mechanisms.

While this presence initially may be resisted or disapproved by the locals, the next stage is the *contagion* phase, where the extremist group's influence spreads while still operating below the radar screen.[25] The third phase is *intervention*, where external authorities begin to take action against the extremists. This action may be taken by local government authorities, regional powers, or by the international community. In fact, the intervention may be in the form of delivering humanitarian aid, a gesture that it often violently rejected by the extremists.[26]

The final phase is *rejection*, where accidental guerillas are created. In other words, local people become accidental guerillas fighting alongside the terrorist forces, not because they necessarily support their extremist ideology but because they oppose outside interference with their internal

affairs or because they are simply alienated by the heavy-handed actions of the intervening forces.[27] Thus, while the Pakistani government is now trying to assert the trappings of a functioning modern, secular state, it may be "too little, too late" after decades of profoundly neglecting these regions and these peoples. In fact, their intervention may inadvertently spark the accidental guerilla syndrome. Only time will tell.

In fact, this conflict in Pakistan signals a far deeper and more threatening possibility: the looming danger of Pashtun separatism. The conflict has implicit ethnic tensions as well because the Pakistani Army is mainly Punjabi and the Taliban is entirely Pashtun.[28]

Historically, the Pashtuns were politically unified across Afghanistan and Pakistan before the British Raj. (In fact, there is no discernible ethnic difference between Pakistani and Afghani Pashtuns.) The British defeated the Pashtuns in 1847 and later gave the defeated tribes a semi-autonomous status by establishing the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). During the partition of India, the British gave these conquered areas to the newly formed Pakistani government in 1947.[29]

The political domination by Pakistan was never accepted by the Pashtuns, who lobbied for an autonomous state or "Pashtunistan" to be created within Pakistan. The fear of this possibility led Pakistan to support jihadists (*mujahideen*) operating during the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Later, Pakistan was instrumental in supporting the Taliban, which took power in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal.[30] In fact, the

> post-1979 joint struggle that Pakistan waged with the U.S.-led international coalition against Soviet occupation . . . famously relied on Islamic fighters to eject the Russians from Afghanistan. This war of unintended consequences bequeathed to Pakistan a witches' brew of problems that continue to plague the nation today, weakening the traditional fabric of society in its western provinces. The explosive legacy of the Afghan jihad included militancy and violent extremism, millions of Afghan refugees, and the exponential growth of *madrasas*, narcotics, and proliferation of arms. The most dangerous aspect of this legacy was that some 40,000 Islamic radicals were imported from across the Arab world to fight along side the Afghan mujahideen. They later became the core of al Qaeda.[31]

With this as a backdrop, there may be anecdotal evidence that the accidental guerilla syndrome may already be in effect in this area. Using the accidental guerilla analysis, it is clear that the infection and contagion stages have already occurred. Moreover, former U.S. President Bush insisted that former Pakistan President Musharraf send troops into the FATA in 2002, thereby displacing 50,000 people. This, combined with other Pakistani government actions, may be called the intervention stage. "By arousing a Pashtun sense of victimization at the hands of outside forces, the conduct

of the 'war on terror' in FATA, where al-Qaeda is based, has strengthened the jihadist groups that the U.S. seeks to defeat.''[32] This may lead to the rejection phase and the subsequent creation of accidental guerillas.

The Pashtuns now wish to merge the FATA with the Pashtun Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to form a unified ''Pashtunkhwa'' that operates autonomously from Pakistan and its constitution. If there is a merger between the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism, there may be an effective ''Talibanization'' of Pashtunkhwa, which would be disastrous in the view of the Pakistani government. In the words of Pakistan's Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, ''I hope that the Taliban and Paushtun nationalism do not merge. If that happens, we've had it and we're on the verge of that.''[33]

One commentator admonishes, however, that

> [f]or its part, Pakistan has to more purposefully meet the challenge of good governance and manage its economic and security issues with greater energy and competence, while building public consensus and support for its goals of economic and political stability. This requires something from the politicians that they have shown little of in the past year, consumed and distracted as they have been in power plays and political confrontation: leadership.[34]

Although it may be somewhat misleading or confusing to discuss the Taliban in the context of global jihadism, the preceding discussion illustrates that the relationship between separatists' movements and global jihadism is not easily disentangled. The Taliban may be exhibiting ''nationalist'' sentiment in trying to unify territories and change the method of governance from secular, democratic principles to Islamic-based education, conflict resolution, and other matters. This pattern of conduct illustrates that the Taliban is reacting to decades (if not centuries) of poor governance and neglect with an Islamic-influenced and energized agenda to seize and expand their territory of control and political power base.

Indeed, the Afghans have been fighting for their national identity for more than a century—first against the British, then the former Soviet Union, and now the United States, Pakistan, and even against themselves. The withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 was followed by a 23-year civil war in Afghanistan. By late 2001, Afghanistan was a failed state whose ''economy, educational establishment, and governmental institutions had almost ceased to function.''[35]

However, at the outset, it is important to redefine the contours of this conflict. What the international community tends to see as a rugged and unforgiving terrain, the Pashtuns see as their land and their own country, a reflection of themselves. Their love of this land is so profound that it has fueled a struggle that has lasted for more than a century—a struggle that has been fought by throwing stones that only later were replaced with bullets.

Very little has been said in the international press about this conflict being a struggle for self-determination, independence, and the unification of the same (or similar) ethnic peoples in a self-governed autonomous state or territory. ''Self-determination'' formed the rallying cry for independence movements of former colonies during the latter part of the twentieth century and has recognized legitimacy under international law principles. However, the self-determination of the Pashtuns poses a quandary for the international community. The nature of the Pashtuns' desire to form a self-governed unit is highly problematic for two reasons, one internal and the other external.

First, a clear distinction should be drawn with other independence struggles of the twentieth century. Scores of Asian and African nations wished to form a modern nation-state governed (at least in principle) by the accepted principles of modernity: a representative government, the Rule of Law, and a respect for human rights. Whether these ideals have actually been implemented or achieved is, of course, another question.

The Pashtuns under the leadership of the Taliban have displayed no interest in modernity whatsoever, however modernity may be defined. Thus, in terms of what kind of a state they may wish to form, it resembles a pre-feudal, warlord-dominated society that does not conform to the accepted form of modern nation-states.

Moreover, it is clear that a respect for human rights, representative government, or the other trappings of the modern state are not part of the vision for the Pashtun rulership. This is a problem for the international community, which has an obligation to safeguard certain common ideals regarding the sanctity of life and the respect of human rights generally, among other matters. Thus, from within, the type of governance practiced by the Taliban is highly problematic.

Second, supporting a failed state that is an acknowledged supporter, if not an actual state-sponsor, of international terrorism is not an inviting prospect for the international community. The presence and influence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is another serious complicating factor. The Taliban's complex relationship with Al Qaeda also requires an immediate response from the international community because the danger that Al Qaeda and its operatives pose is so real and tangible.

In addition, the fact that the opium trade is so prevalent in Afghanistan, and the fact that the profits generated by this illegal trade are used to financially support terrorist activities, are highly problematic factors.[36] Thus, for both internal reasons related to the style of governance of the Taliban and external reasons related to its implicit support of global terrorism and drug trafficking, it may be very difficult for the international community to support the goal of Taliban-led self-governance or self-determination.

In fact, it appears that the Taliban is engaged in a power struggle where power is best gained and preserved by denying empowerment to others.

Whether this is accomplished by denying education, free elections, or entrepreneurial opportunities to the members of its society, the end goal is political rather than religious—to obtain and retain political power. In other words, religious means are being used to create a political end.

The systemic denial of basic freedoms as the basis for governance has resulted in a form of political oppression rather than a sustainable model for governance in the long run. This, combined with the fact that there is so much violence implicit in the Taliban's governance,[37] tends to make its long-term viability highly fraught with legal and practical problems from an international perspective.

As a rather dismal footnote to this discussion, Pakistan's struggles with nationalist sentiments within its borders may not be confined to the Pashtun any longer. Now, there is evidence that Baluch nationalists are launching an insurgency. Although this one is not on the same scale as the Taliban insurgency in the northwest, it is nevertheless steadily gaining ground. Moreover, the

> Baluch conflict holds the potential to break the country apart—Baluchistan makes up a third of Pakistan's territory—unless the government urgently deals with years of pent up grievances and stays the hand of the military and security services; . . . those abuses have continued under President Asif Ali Zardari, despite promises to heal tensions.[38]

Again, reverting to the failed states analysis, Pakistan's status as a nation-state seems very much weakened, making it a fragile, if not a failing, state.

Although the issues of poverty may be more directly related to separatists' sentiments and political agenda, the separatists are not completely disconnected with global jihadism. The relationship between the two is not direct or necessarily transparent, but very few of the issues discussed herein are. In sum, the synergism between separatist sentiments and global jihadism is a serious and sobering reality.

In addition, the relationship of democratic freedoms as a deterrent to global jihadism is also a critical inquiry to be made in this context. One commentator has concluded that

> there is no relationship between the incidence of terrorism in a given country and the degree of freedom enjoyed by its citizens. [The statistics] certainly do not indicate that democracies are substantially less susceptible to terrorism than are other forms of government. . . . Terrorism stems from sources other than the form of government of a state. There is no reason to believe that a more democratic Arab world will, simply by virtue of being more democratic generate fewer terrorists.[39]

This may not actually be the case. In a masterful study prepared for USAID regarding the drivers of violent Islamic-based extremism, several

layers of analysis revealed interrelated causal and other factors pertinent to this discussion. The study examines the root causes breeding terrorist mind-sets, socioeconomic factors, and political drivers of violent extremism.

The overall conclusion was somewhat surprising:

> Terrorists and other violent extremists do not exhibit common psychological attributes. They do not have a shared psychopathology. Analyses of the personal backgrounds of even those who have engaged in the most gruesome form of terrorism—suicide bombing—typically reveal strikingly normal lives, and no prior evidence of psychological dysfunctions. The readiness to kill for the sake of a particular political and/or agenda—and sometimes sacrifice oneself in the process—cannot be predicted through potential insights into the psychology or personal history of whose who commit these acts.[40]

Thus, creating a terrorist ''profile'' does not seem feasible under these circumstances.

The study did identify, however, eight political drivers of violent extremism. The first is the denial of basic political rights and civil liberties. The second is harsh, brutal, and repressive rule that includes gross violations of human rights. The third factor is systemic corruption and widespread impunity for the elite of the society. The fourth is the existence of ungoverned or poorly governed areas or territories. The fifth is the presence of long, protracted local conflicts, and the sixth is governance by illegitimate, bankrupt, and repressive political regimes. The seventh factor may be specific to Pakistan because it involves the loss of control of insurgents, mercenaries, or other violent political operatives.[41]

In drawing with a very broad brush, conditions of poverty do seem more related to separatist Islamic-based movements. The lack of civil liberties and effective political representation seems more relevant to global jihadist movements. In fact, global terrorists emerging from Europe may illustrate this relationship. David Kilcullen states:

> European governments have typically not engaged in heavy-handed intervention in immigrant [Muslim] communities, but where such intervention has occurred, those communities have tended to close ranks and adopt a siege mentality which created further opportunity for extremist penetration and manipulation. Thus, while not a full-blown accidental guerilla syndrome, the evidence from Europe tends to suggest that the same dynamics that occur in remote traditional societies can also occur within more developed societies, or within certain sections of the populations in those societies.[42]

Thus, it is clear that living a life without the means to acquire educational and economic opportunities, and where certain basic human dignities are not guaranteed, creates a sense of hopelessness and desperation. All these disparate elements form the incendiary caldron that incubates violent extremism.

However, Kilcullen further notes that

> what distinguishes violent extremists from the rest are, to a significant extent at least, the values they embrace, the quest for an intense and exacting form of spirituality that often animates them, as well as the broader worldviews and convictions that they have in common, and which typically portray violence as a logical and acceptable form of retribution for the deprivation they feel they are made to endure.[43]

What then are the "deprivations" that are so deeply felt by extreme global jihadists? According to Kilcullen,

> One manifestation of the role of ideas and beliefs [that have] shaped so profoundly the outlook of extremist movements . . . is the perception of *collective victimization and personal humiliation*. [Emphasis supplied.] Where it can be detected, such a perception typically reflects colonial histories, as well as other forms of repeated foreign interference, manipulation and oppression. . . . The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are viewed as only the most recent manifestations of such longstanding schemes. Many Muslims feel very strongly not only that the West never made serious amends for the past suffering and oppression it inflicted on them, but that it is currently engaged in a renewed effort to victimize and oppress them, as well as to denigrate and demonize their most cherished values and beliefs. Against this background, violence is seen not only as a form of retribution for past wrongs, but as a necessary defense by individuals who feel that they are fighting for the very survival of a culture under siege.[44]

Indeed, as Franz Fanon pointed out in his seminal analysis of the psychological dimensions of those victimized by colonization, violence is often cathartic in this context. "At the level of the individual, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."[45]

Moreover, as a Pakistani friend of mine pointed out, the systematic repression and denial of any positive and constructive avenues of self-expression through music, art, dance, or creativity of any kind leaves only one avenue through which one may express emotion: violence. In fact, he pointed out that there is a general lack of public spaces or entertainment, cafes, restaurants, or means of social interaction in many of the Islamic countries breeding or supporting global jihadists.

Ultimately, the denial of one's individuality, creativity, humanity, and dignity may all lead to a malaise of frustration and resentment. Moreover, witnessing a constant pattern where ethnic or religious minorities are treated unfairly or reduced to a lesser political, socioeconomic, or religious status all help to create an environment that is fraught with implicit tension. This environment may become one, in short order, where fundamental human rights are not acknowledged, at best, or are viciously repressed, at worst.

Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that orthodox or reactionary forms of Islam such as the form practiced by the Taliban tend to encourage violence.

If, in fact, the doctrinaire views of Muslim clergy support violence, whether in the context of global jihad generally or against women specifically, this seems to further block avenues for creative nonviolence. Violence becomes a sanctioned form of activity with which to express a wide range of emotions, all of which seem (from an outsider's point of view, in any case) to be lamentably negative and hostile in nature.

This environment, combined with a narrative of victimization, collective humiliation, and a violation of one's own personal honor and integrity, may give rise, in certain circumstances, to "a pervasive sense of loneliness, isolation, utter despair and hopelessness . . . [promoting a sense] of total rejection, abandonment and betrayal—by the state, by political and economic elites more generally, and even by the rest of society."[46]

The promise of nationhood has already been betrayed to global terrorists somehow, and their alienation is now so complete and so virulent that they have no interest in nation-building on any discernable level. Indeed, the sense of betrayal may lie far deeper than just one emanating from the systemic failures of the state. The true betrayal may not simply lie with Western-based geopolitics and its negative consequences but instead with the betrayal of the promise of hope to themselves. Rather than pursuing an illusion of power through destruction and the wanton disregard for the sanctity of human life (including their own), the adherents of this virulent form of Islamic-based global terrorism should give serious consideration to redeeming this hope. Otherwise, there may not be much to be gained from a discussion of this sort.

Interestingly, one may be tempted

> to assume that an inability to reap the benefits of globalization and modernity represents a primary motivating force behind the resort to terrorism. In reality, however, in the past three decades a disproportionate number of violent extremist organizations have rejected modernity altogether. They have done so explicitly and unconditionally, pointing to, for instance, what they view as modernity's lack of spiritual content and its ethical poverty. The violence in which they have engaged has been intended, in part, to display, in an intentionally spectacular and dramatic fashion, their contempt for, and complete repudiation of post-enlightenment values and secular humanism. They have portrayed these values as an unacceptable quest for a Godless universe. They have also blamed modernity for the ascent of unbridled individualism and hedonism, and for the triumph of materialism and moral relativism.
>
> In those circumstances, [violent extremism] should *not* be viewed as the enraged response of individuals who feel betrayed at having been promised the benefits of modernity—only to be subsequently denied them. [Emphasis supplied.] The resort to violence, instead, should be understood as an effort to roll back modernity by fighting its symbols and manifestations. To many violent extremists, modernity is *not* something to be aspired to; it is a threat around which a wall must be built or a looming danger that must be confronted head-on. [Emphasis supplied.] Religious extremists, in particular, tend

> to view modernity as encroaching on sacred values; they regard it as an all-powerful force that, if left to its own devices, inevitably and irremediably will destroy the integrity of their societies and cultures.[47]

Thus, the power of religion helps to organize and otherwise animate this struggle against modernity, foreign oppression, and a fundamentally unjust and ungodly world order that threatens to destroy the intrinsic values of Islam. Religion not only supplies the necessary intellectual framework (and accompanying moral justification) for violence but provides the means to acquire political power. This is especially evident in Palestine where former and present Hamas ''terrorists'' have assumed parliamentary power and represent actual political constituencies.

What then is the essential nature of this ideological conflict? Is it a global war that is couched in the religious terms of a jihad (struggle) or intifadah (uprising)? Is it a new kind of political coup to gain political power with access to resources and autocratic decision-making through terrorist means? Is it an ideological conflict between postmodern nation-states and a revivalist form of an Islamic-based type of pre-feudalism?

Although there are differing points of view on this matter, it appears as though the conflict is ideological in nature rather than religious.[48] In other words, the conflict does not seem to be an Islamic-based crusade to convert non-believers into believers in Islam. The struggle is political in nature. Although establishing a Muslim caliphate is regarded by some observers as the end goal of global Islamic-based terrorism, this viewpoint—even if taken at face value—establishes a political (not religious) objective. The goal of the ''global intifadah'' appears to be winning political power and using terrorist means to accomplish that goal. Thus, if the essential conflict is viewed as being ideological in nature to achieve political goals, what should be the response of the international community?

First, it does not appear that fundamentalist Islamic-based global terrorism is sustainable in the long run because it contains the seeds of its own destruction. This type of Islamic-based terrorism will, over time, be destroyed from within because it leaves in place and deeply exacerbates existing structural problems of political governance and economic growth.

If permitted to govern (following the Taliban model), the imposition of pre-feudalistic, tribalistic structures does not help alleviate poverty nor does it provide for effective political governance. In fact, this is a recipe for continued marginalization and failure. It is foreseeable that the deepening human misery caused by the failure to address the basic human needs of the population will lead to a further collapse of the societies where fundamentalist Islamic-based global terrorists establish a foothold.

On a deeper level, the ideology of hatred fundamentally misunderstands man's acquisitive nature. From an outsider's point of view, much of the furious hatred of global jihadists seems to be based on their envy and deep

mistrust of Western economic successes, political dominance, and cultural hegemony—its luxury goods, in fact. However, the ultimate luxury good is the freedom of choice. The freedom to choose and to take risks to support those choices is the ultimate freedom.

Deliberately choosing (and imposing on others) the "unfreedom"[49] of having no or few choices that are dictated by religious leaders or tribal warlords does not constitute real empowerment. Indeed, far from disempowering other nation-states, global terrorism acts to disempower its own adherents by cultivating despair and a lack of hope in the future—or simply the belief that tomorrow will be better than today. Although this ideology claims to be faith-based, it mocks faith-based values that are universal in nature.

If, on the other hand, Islamic-based global terrorists have not fundamentally misinterpreted man's nature and are willing to kill for it and, more importantly, to die for this state of "unfreedom," then we are all lost. They have, in effect, created a new kind of human being that is impervious to the values of human civilization, not the least of which is the regard for the sanctity of human life. In fact, the systematic indoctrination of a creed of violence and the uncompromising repression of human creativity affecting all spheres of life may create a new and terrifying sensibility that implicitly encourages a wanton disregard for human life. There truly is no real response to someone who is willing to die, when we clearly are not.

However, waiting for the dialectic method to run its historical course of "negating" Islamic-based fundamentalist terrorism is an unattractive course of non-action. The role that international actors must assume now is a complex matrix of military, political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural initiatives, as discussed in Chapter 4.

3

Resolving the Fearful Symmetry: Creating the New Soldier

Professor Alan Beyerchen,[1] a distinguished historian at Ohio State University, has created a new taxonomy of four world wars based on the seminal work of the nineteenth-century Prussian military historian and theorist Carl von Clausewitz:[2]

- World War I—a chemist's war that effectively used mustard gas, nitrates, and chemical engineering to further war efforts
- World War II—a physicists' war where the atomic bomb led to the decisive victory and where the use of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of radar and wireless communications were keys to winning the war
- World War III (the Cold War)—the information technologists' war where net-centric warfare was key
- World War IV (the Fearful Symmetry)—the social scientists' war.

Further, he theorized that shifts between phases of war are movements in the underlying tectonic plates rather than volcanic eruptions. Although one phase does not completely supplant the preceding one, the "emerging amplifier" is what gains a decisive victory. In other words, chemistry, physics, and information technology are not rendered defunct in the current context, but there is an emerging amplifier that will determine military success in the future.

Moreover, Beyerchen builds on Clausewitz's view of the nonlinearity of war, a theory that, incidentally, has been related to dialectical materialism by both Engels and Lenin.[3] Beyerchen concludes that

> Clausewitz perceives war as a profoundly nonlinear phenomenon . . . that demands that we retrain our intuition. . . . But for those trained in engineering and scientific fields, as are so many military officers and analysts, this retraining is likely to be a more wrenching and unwelcome experience. As the various scientists and mathematicians cited above have suggested, the predominance of a linear intuition is endemic. . . .
>
> Another implication of the nonlinear interpretation of Clausewitz is the need for a deepening of our understanding of his dictum on the relationship of war to politics. That "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" is often taken to mean the primacy of a temporal continuum: first politics sets the goals, then war occurs, and then politics reigns again when the fighting stops. But such a view categorizes politics as extrinsic to war, and is an artifact of a linear sequential model. Politics is about power, and the feedback loops from violence to power and from power to violence are an intrinsic feature of war. . . . War is inherently a subset of politics, and every military act has political consequences, whether or not these are intended or immediately obvious. . . .
>
> Clausewitz understands that war has no distinct boundaries and that its parts are interconnected. What is needed is to comprehend intuitively both that the set of parameters for "the problem" is unstable, and that no arbitrarily selected part can be abstracted adequately from the whole.[4]

Professor Beyerchen first uses Clausewitz's theories to reestablish the interconnectivity of politics with war, but he takes it one step further by relying on Clausewitz's nonlinear view of history to create a new mandate of reasoning: namely, that we move from linear thinking to intuitive thinking. This is the first major step for the New Soldier to take.

Beyerchen's ideas were further expanded by Major General (Ret.) Robert Scales of the U.S. Army. General Scales has theorized that World War IV (the Fearful Symmetry) will replace the political will of governments with the perceptions of the people in a "psycho-cultural war."[5] Thus, building on Clausewitz's basic insight that war is primarily influenced by people rather than technology, Scales argues that the Fearful Symmetry (World War IV) will be won by "winning the hearts and minds" of the people.

In a nutshell, the Fearful Symmetry will cause a shift in the center of gravity (a Clausewitzean concept) from the political will of a government (and its military leadership) to the perception of the people. Thus, wars will be fought on the battlefield of public perception, where empathy demonstrated by soldiers may be more important than their ability to wield arms. Empathy will become an important weapon in this psycho-cultural war.

Moreover, cultural awareness and sensitivity combined with the ability to create trust will be the decisive wining factors or the "emerging amplifiers." General Scales further argues that the soldier (e.g., the Army and Marine Corps in the U.S. military) will win the battle on the ground and should be valued and invested in as a strategic and tactical asset over and above the tactical military technology provided by the Navy and the Air Force.[6]

Therefore, the new elements of victory in this asymmetric war begin with shifting the center of gravity. In other words, shaping perceptions should be elevated to a form of art. Arming and protecting the New Soldier fighting in World War IV (the Fearful Symmetry) means training the soldier, marine, and airman in the new weapons of war: empathy, compassion and cultural understanding. By building tactical intelligence based on the soldier perceiving his surroundings in ways that are intuitive as well as psychological will best protect him. Teaching wisdom and intuitive decision-making in the military leaders of tomorrow will also help them forge new political and military alliances and build indigenous armies from the ground upward.

In sum, General Scales offers the following insight:

> Empathy will become a weapon. Soldiers must gain the ability to move comfortably among alien cultures, to establish trust and cement relationships that can be exploited in battle. . . . Teaching commanders how to think and intuit rather than what to think will allow them to anticipate how the enemy will act. Convincing commanders to leave World War II–era decision-making processes in favor of non-linear intuitive processes will accelerate the pace and tempo of battle. The promise is enormous. But we will only achieve the full potential of this promise if we devote the resources to the research and education necessary to make it happen.[7]

Let us begin by first examining why the asymmetric threats posed by modern forms of insurgency are so prevalent now. Clearly, conventional warfare used against the United States and its allies will not be successful. Therefore, insurgents have no choice but to use unconventional means of conflict. Perhaps as a result of the law of unintended consequences, the United States has moved beyond conventional warfare.

> The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success this type of warfare is difficult to defeat. . . . The message is clear for anyone wishing to shift the political balance of power: only unconventional warfare works against established powers.[8]

Indeed, this approach is correct because insurgencies are the only types of war that the United States has lost, not once but three times, to wit, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This type of asymmetrical warfare also defeated France in Algeria and the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Moreover, the United States is still struggling in Iraq and Afghanistan to resolve both military engagements.[9]

It is worthwhile to keep in mind three distinct aspects of insurgencies. First, they are small wars. In fact, the Spanish term ''guerilla'' means ''little war'' and dates back to Spain's resistance to Napoleon's occupation of Spain from 1809 to 1813.[10]

Second, small wars are long in duration. The Chinese Communists fought for 28 years, the Vietnamese Communists for 30 years, and the Sandinistas for 18 years. The Palestinians have been resisting Israeli occupation since 1948.[11]

Finally, modern insurgencies aim for and achieve major changes in the political, economic, and social structure of the societies in which such wars are prosecuted. Examples include the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, the first intifada, and the Hezbollah campaign in southern Lebanon.[12]

Thus, these small wars may seem like the wars without end, or "ghost wars," where the combatants, purposes, and desired end goals may not be clear. These wars are fought in complex physical, political, and emotional terrains where the none of the strengths and potentially all of the weaknesses of conventional war-fighting states are taken advantage of and manipulated. This requires a change in the paradigm of war for the United States and its allies if the small wars are to end, and to end successfully.

In 1997, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, created the concept of the three-block war to describe the twenty-first century battlefield:

> It will be an *asymmetrical battlefield* [Emphasis supplied]. . . . In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the "three block war." In this environment, conventional doctrine and organizations may mean very little. It is an environment born of change.[13]

In further describing the nature of each of the blocks in the three-block war, the first block is one of conventional kinetic warfare—traditional warfare that is fought by war-fighting forces. However, unlike conventional warfare, the enemy "combatants" may not be governed by the law of war and may deliberately use civilian casualties to further their cause. Thus, the conflict may be asymmetric in nature, insofar as the warring sides may not be using the same rules of engagement.

The second block is peacekeeping and other stabilization activities. Essentially, as General Krulak points out,

> [p]eacekeeping revolves around three inter-related principles: consent to the deployment of peacekeepers by all the parties involved in a conflict; impartiality on the part of the peacekeepers; and, the non-use of force—except in self-defense. The presence of peacekeepers is symbolic rather than coercive, and the success of their mission is highly dependent upon the permission of the belligerents they interpose themselves between. Peace enforcers make no such assumptions; they rely on force of arms in a hostile environment.[14]

Indeed, navigating the gap between peacekeeping and peace enforcement may be one of the gravest challenges of twenty-first century war-fighting. Peace enforcement (using arms) may have disappeared, according to General (Ret.) Barry McCaffrey, after the death of 18 U.S. troops in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.[15] Now, "peacekeeping operations" have replaced "peace enforcement."[16] Even so, according to one estimate, there is fewer than one peacekeeper per 1,000 Afghans, a very discouraging ratio.[17]

The third block is humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Both the second and third blocks require that the military act in concert with the civilian corps, including diplomats, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local and foreign government employees, and civilian employees of military forces. Neither of the blocks should be considered more important than the other, and all may need to be prosecuted simultaneously. The holistic and integrated nature of a three-block war is apparent in the latest insurgencies taking place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and perhaps other venues as well. Indeed, the individual war-fighter may need to conduct operations in all three blocks in a single day, as indicated by General Krulak.

Thus, in fighting the three-block war, the war-fighter must successfully transition "between its three elements as smoothly and seamlessly as possible, highlighting the relationship between peacekeeping and peace enforcement."[18] A full spectrum of operations must be smoothly transitioned to and from on a sliding scale. This is especially true because there are very few times where there is actually a defeat of the "enemy." In Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike Bosnia and Kosovo, there was no decisive defeat of all enemy combatants leading to a discrete post-conflict phase. Therefore, the three-block war should not be viewed as having separate blocks but as a continuum where peaceful blocks may become combat zones and vice versa.[19]

Although the original concept of the three-block war may not have included economic reconstruction, it is a necessary follow-on corollary to humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is a stopgap short-term measure to alleviate human suffering in immediate terms. However, the underlying structural problems of a failure in development must also be addressed if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

As Michael Mazarr aptly points out, the military is not designed to address political grievances or failures in the development process. I agree. However, the problems with economic reconstruction in post-conflict areas does not stem from a lack of political will, particularly among the international donor community or international organizations, or a lack of funds to finance such undertakings. Post-conflict reconstruction is subject to systemic attacks by insurgents. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist operatives "attack aid workers and destroy schools, wells and other economic projects."[20] Thus, the failure to properly securitize so-called post-conflict areas by military forces may be an

easy target of blame; however, as the preceding discussion sets forth, the three-block war is a continuum and is not easily won.

How then do we prepare the New Soldier to fight the insurgencies of the twenty-first century? The same question was posed by General Krulak, who provides the following insight:

> The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguishing combatant from "non-combatant," will blur, and adversaries, confounded by our "conventional" superiority, will resort to asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience. . . .
>
> The inescapable lesson of Somalia and other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or transitional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the *lowest* level. [Emphasis in original.] The [Marine] Corps is, by design, a relatively young force. Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and his ability to make the *right* decision at the *right* time at the point of contact [Emphasis in original]. . . . Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and *independent* decisions under extreme stress—decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion [Emphasis in original]. . . . His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of the article suggests—the *Strategic Corporal*. [Emphasis in original.][21]

Indeed, the "three block war may very well be won or lost in the minds of our 'strategic corporals.' "[22]

Of course, as General Krulak points out, honor, courage, commitment, and character remain bedrock values—this is the foundation upon which the New Soldier is created. Using character as a foundation, military forces must also learn how to cultivate intuitive decision-making, a quality that may become decisive in this context. On the battlefield of the twenty-first century, which consists of asymmetric threats of insurgencies, quick and effective decision-making is critical to success.

General Krulak points out that decision-making is composed of two different models: analytical and intuitive.

> Analytical decisonmaking uses a scientific, quantitative approach, and to be effective, it depends on a relatively high level of situational certainty and accuracy. . . . Unfortunately, the analytical model does not lend itself well to military applications once the enemy is engaged. At that point, military situations most often become very ambiguous, and the leader cannot afford to wait for detailed, quantitative data without risking the initiative.[23]

In contrast,

> recognitional decisionmaking depends on a *qualitative* assessment of the situation based on the decider's judgment and experience. [Emphasis in original.][24]

Rather than looking for an ideal solution, recognitional decision-making seeks a speedy one that will work under the given circumstances.

The key question here is whether the intuitive model of decision-making may be taught, or is it simply intrinsic to the individual? Recently, "practitioners of the military art have come to believe that while heredity and personality may well have an impact on an individual's intuitive skills, these skills can also be cultivated and developed."[25]

During the World War II era, the Japanese instilled a "sixth sense" in their soldiers through months of intensive training in a cohesive unit, thus enabling their soldiers to make rapid, intuitive decisions. The Germans had a similar system of training for their officers whereby they were required to make rapid-fire tactical decisions under highly stressful situations. Of course, both nations lost the war, but there may be something to be learned from the tactics that they employed. General Krulak points out that "Napoleon may be correct if he meant that intuition cannot be *taught* in the traditional sense, but both the Germans and the Japanese were successful in assuming that—through repetition—it could be *learned*. [Emphasis in original.][26]

Learning intuitive decision-making may need to become a core value of organized national standing armies globally. The reason for this is grounded in the fact that asymmetric threats are no longer restricted to certain nations or peoples. Its effects are being felt globally. Further, while it may be a useful starting point to dedicate this type of training for officers rather than non-commissioned officers, "[w]e may need to face the paradox that our least experienced leaders—those with the least skill in decisionmaking—will face the most demanding decisions on the battlefield."[27]

In sum, the three-block war requires not only knowledge of all three components of each block—traditional war-fighting, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction—but also the means of fighting these conflicts by exercising intuitive decision-making capabilities. Moreover, these war-fighting tactics are not limited to the high-ranking officer for well-established militaries but often must be deployed by the lower-ranking soldier with the least training, skills, and personal life experience to aid him or her in meeting this monumental challenge.

Being trained to trust his or her own intuition must be rooted in the solid character of the individual war-fighter. To develop this confidence, the New Soldier must be trained in repetitive decision-making skills under stressful situations so that individual decisions will be second nature and emanate from his or her own sound character. Although there may be a need to emphasize the "growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility and personal accountability,"[28] there also needs to be a moral compass guiding the actions of the New Soldier on the unknown terrains of the twenty-first century battlefield. In other words, a "culture of intuitive decisionmaking"[29] should be inculcated through the training of special operations-related military forces worldwide.

Some may argue that this type of training in situational awareness, including linguistic capabilities, has already been an integral part of military special operations-related preparedness. This is only partially true. Whereas situational awareness and making decisions based on a heightened awareness of the flash points of conflict, danger, and tactical military threats are, no doubt, an integral part of special operations-related training, in my view, they are limited both in its scope and purpose. This type of situational awareness is mainly geared toward making speedy and militarily effective decisions that move the conflict forward in a tactical way. This type of training may not include an intuitive sense of decision-making or the use of ethical principles to guide battlefield conduct to achieve strategic gains.

If, as General Krulak indicates, intuitive decision-making may be learned, the curricula of military training schools and facilities consequently need to be changed to incorporate it as a core discipline. In other words, intuitive decision-making must be taught in order for it to be learned.

This ethic is being absorbed gradually by the U.S. military. For example, the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) states the following:

> There are leadership and ethical imperatives that are prominent and, in some cases, unique to counterinsurgency [COIN]. The dynamic and ambiguous environment of modern counterinsurgency is frequently a small leader's fight however, commanders' actions at brigade and division levels can be even more significant. . . . [Soldiers and marines] must also rapidly adapt cognitively and emotionally to the perplexing challenges of counterinsurgency and master new competencies as well as new contexts. Those in leadership positions must provide the moral compass for their subordinates as they navigate this complex environment. . . .[30]
>
> COIN operations require leaders to exhibit patience, persistence and presence.[31]

Indeed, there may be some anecdotal evidence that the U.S. military is already trying to better understand and utilize the unconscious nature of sensing danger, including its emotional components. U.S. troops are now beginning to explore why and how some people sense danger and act on it long before others do, which, in a life-and-death situation, could spell life over death.

For example, the perception of ''hunches'' or a ''gut feeling'' as well as a cooling of body temperature, superb depth perception, sustaining intense focus for long periods of time, and detecting odd shapes from a complex background are prompts that may be configured into brain activity or in a changed perception in emotions. ''The big question is whether these differences perceiving threat are natural, or due to training.''[32] This question may be answered in due time. In the meantime, however, this type of sensory depth and emotional perceptions may all be added to the training of

the New Soldier and factored into his or her decision-making process on the battlefield of the Fearful Symmetry.

However, I am proposing a further paradigm shift. These battles and, indeed, the war against Islamic-based global terrorism must be fought with compassion, empathy, integrity, courage, and honor. Otherwise, we have already lost the conflict because we would have lost our bearings—a grounding in our own core values. The conflict will be lost without even being fought if we lose ourselves along the way. While integrity, honor, and courage are all familiar within the military context as the backbone of military conduct and training, the qualities of compassion, empathy, and wisdom may be less familiar to the military ethos. Exercising principles of compassion, empathy, and wisdom by the New Soldier go far beyond even intuitively based decision-making.

There is a heightened need for such rare qualities on the battlefield as a result of the nature of the conflict that we now face. It is no longer a question of winning a sharply defined military conquest with politically certain outcomes. Now, the nature of the combat, the nature of the enemy combatants, and the goals and purposes of the conflict may be less clear and compelling from those of the conventional military conflicts in the past. The ''fog of war'' has, indeed, obscured these important markers.

Although the qualities of compassion and empathy may resonate with pacifism, Gandhism, or a moral imperative to simply not engage in armed combat, this resemblance is superficial. I am not proposing that these other types of pacifist approaches to war-fighting (or *not* engaging in armed combat altogether) be adopted. What I am proposing is that certain underlying qualities be incorporated into the war-fighting capability of the U.S. military and its allies and be deployed as strategic weapons of war to overcome and win the conflict.

Why?

The terrains in which the insurgencies of the twenty-first century are being fought are not only physical but also psychological and emotional. It is no longer a simplistic equation of fighting and killing the ''enemy.'' Who is the enemy, and why is the enemy fighting? Where do his loyalties and alliances lie? Is he loyal to an ally of us, and if so, why? What are the desired outcomes of the conflict for him and for us? What are the consequences of the armed conflict, and how do they affect the civilian populations? Where do their allegiances lie? These are all basic questions that have complex and shifting answers that change from day to day, if not moment to moment.

These considerations, and many others, need to be taken into account in prosecuting a ''war without end.'' In order to do so in the most effective way, we must change the paradigm of the conflict. It is not so much about conquest but of persuasion. This is fundamentally a war of ideas and ideologies in ways that are new, unknown, and vastly intimidating. By exercising

the qualities of compassion and empathy, we increase our chances of persuading the people involved (most of them unwittingly) in the conflict in order to end it.

Further, it increases our chances of ending the conflict in a way that supports our goals as well as theirs. If the Afghans, for example, feel conquered or politically dominated, there is vast historical evidence that this conflict will not truly end. It will continue indefinitely and will further destabilize the region. Understanding their political goals and even their emotional needs may help forge a lasting solution and a lasting victory for all sides. *We can win this conflict only if they win as well.*

This may seem to be a very strange suggestion to propose that we win only if our "enemies" win as well. The usual equation is that we win if *we defeat our enemy*. I agree that this formula has its utility, but we have moved away from the Newtonian universe of predeterminant, inexorable laws governing celestial bodies in the universe and toward the Einsteinian universe of probabilities that are unpredictable and uncertain in the world of subatomic particles. We have moved away from the symmetry of the Cold War of two major political actors and systems in conflict with each other to the nano-universe of the Fearful Symmetry, where anyone can become a terrorist in any place at any time. It is not predictable or knowable—it is unstable, unpredictable, and unknowable. That is the source of its power to terrify us.

Richard Haas stated that the "United States will no longer have the luxury of a '[y]ou're either with us or against us' foreign policy."[33] This is true because our alliances will rapidly change over time to accommodate new and shifting political goals and economic needs. The strict and doctrinaire policies (and alliances) of the past will have limited utility in the future.

On a much deeper philosophical level, Martin Buber recognized that human existence may be defined by the way in which we enter into a dialogue with ourselves, with each other, with the world, and with God.[34] According to Buber, we may adopt two types of attitudes in dealing with the world: the *I-Thou* relationship and the *I-It* relationship. In the *I-Thou* relationship, the underlying relationship is one of subject-to-subject. In other words, human beings relate to each other not as objects but as subjects who have a unity of being. Thus, rather than perceiving other human beings as having specific isolated qualities, we engage in a dialogue with each other involving each other's whole being. The *I-Thou* relationship is one of mutuality and reciprocity.[35]

In contrast, the *I-It* relationship consists of a subject-to-object relationship. In other words, human beings perceive of each other as having specific, isolated qualities and view their relationship to the world as a world consisting of things. The *I-It* relationship is one of separateness and detachment.[36] Without venturing too far afield, the relevance of this discussion is to try to persuade decision-makers, especially those in the military who are interested in the intuitive decision-making process, to perceive the conflict in a

radically different way. The conflict with fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism is not only one of ideas but also one involving actual individuals. If these individuals are perceived as subjects (rather than as isolated objects), they may be perceived differently.

If these individuals are perceived as an integral part of a holistic whole that includes us, then we have ''subjectivized'' rather than ''objectivized'' our relationship to them. What is the meaning behind this approach? It is the first step to creating empathy. More importantly, it fosters an understanding of the conflict from the emotional viewpoint of the ''enemy.'' By this, I am not trying to suggest that Osama bin Laden, or the top leadership of Al Qaeda or even of the Taliban, for that matter, should or can be ''subjectivized.'' There are certain ''irreconcilables'' who regrettably may be eliminated only as targets of war or brought to justice for their criminal acts. However, the New Soldier may be better positioned and have more refined decision-making skills in separating the irreconcilables from the reconcilables. This may be a quality worth cultivating.

In fact, there may be some evidence that this paradigm shift is already beginning to occur, not in doctrine but in practice. For example, General Stanley McChrystal completed a ten-day ''listening tour'' of Afghanistan where he visited U.S. and NATO troops, Afghan army and police commanders, and Afghan government officials in 2009. He has ordered new operational standards that require U.S. troops to refrain from firing on structures where insurgents may have taken refuge where civilians may be present, unless Western or allied troops are in imminent danger.[37] This effort is directed toward protecting the lives of civilian Afghans because civilian casualties have been ''one of our greatest strategic vulnerabilities,'' according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.[38]

This new effort will also be directed toward easing the tensions caused by civilian casualties and home searches in U.S.-led or -assisted ground operations. The U.S. military hopes that this resentment by locals will abate and that a ''civilian surge'' to support reconstruction and governance efforts in Afghanistan will take place.[39]

One commentator offers the following prescription for ensuring success of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan:

> Tailoring COIN to Afghanistan is going to require four innovations. First, security, governance, and development must be integrated parts of the overall approach, and the requisite Afghan capacities for each part must be assessed and developed. Second, the fragmentation of governance and the agility of the insurgency require tailoring efforts to provincial and in some cases district conditions. . . . Third, a clear process of reaching out to the irreconcilable and identifying the reconcilable needs to be mapped out and explained to the public. Fourth, the sustainability of COIN depends on whether it is framed within a doctrine of state-building. Whereas the use of force is required in the short-term, the rule of law is required in the medium to long term.[40]

Perhaps this prescription can be integrated into General David Petraeus' "anaconda" strategy for Iraq to create a new approach for Afghanistan. The anaconda strategy against Al Qaeda in Iraq involves six elements of kinetic warfare (i.e., armed combat), politics, intelligence, detainee operations, nonkinetics (e.g., education, job creation), and interagency efforts at stabilization and transformation.[41] War planners should consider transforming this strategy and making it applicable to Afghanistan, if this has not already taken place.

With specific regard to transforming Iraq-based tactics to Afghanistan, a reporter for the *Washington Post* notes the following:

> Helmand, Marines here are fond of noting, is the Afghan equivalent of Anbar, the once-lawless province west of Baghdad that was the focus of Marine operations in Iraq. Both are vast desert regions bisected by a river. The populations are tribal and religiously conservative. Criminal activity—smuggling in Iraq and drug-trafficking in Afghanistan—is rampant. Cross-border infiltration of fighters and munitions from Syria was a massive problem in Anbar; Pakistan plays that role with Helmand. . . .
>
> Although [Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson] is now in a different country, with different traditions and a different insurgency, he nonetheless sees lessons from Anbar that can be applied to Helmand. At the top of his list is the need for more indigenous security forces. . . .
>
> As a Marine patrol walked through the bazaar on a recent morning, its presence prompted a group of men sipping tea in front of a motorcycle repair shop to voice concern—not that the Americans had arrived but that they might depart before the Taliban had been vanquished. . . .
>
> "We cannot trust the government or the Taliban," Zary Sahib, the leader of the town's mosque, told McCollough. "We can only trust you."[42]

Whether this sentiment is echoed by the majority of Afghans is not clear, but there is anecdotal evidence that the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan is changing significantly. It is being patterned after recent successes in Iraq. Further, the nature of the mission has also dramatically shifted from routing out and killing extremists to protecting civilian populations and helping them reconstruct their war-savaged country.

Indeed, recent reporting on the war in Afghanistan makes it clear that the aim of the U.S. military "is to combat the insurgency in a new way: Instead of targeting extremists strongholds, they will aim to protect communities from the Taliban."[43]

In taking advantage of this shift in operational focus and mission, partnering with local inhabitants may be key. For example, the local inhabitants may have an intuitive sense of who may be reconcilable (or not), which is a very useful part of the tactics being employed in Afghanistan now. If local inhabitants and the human intelligence (HUMINT) capability they may offer, harnessed effectively, could be made an integral part of the COIN strategy, locals could become actual stakeholders in this small but long war.

Then, like an actual anaconda, the pressure exerted in an integrated COIN strategy against terrorist or destabilizing elements may become unbearable for such extremists.

As the U.S. Army Field Manual on COIN states, "[t]he insurgents persist by controlling the passive cooperation of the people around them."[44] If this support is undercut, then it may mean a subtle shift in the conflict that may become a game-changer. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the local population in Afghanistan is exhausted and exasperated by this unending conflict.

As in the African proverb, when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. The locals are passively rather than actively engaged in this conflict as they feel threatened, in some measure, by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and foreign military officers. Moreover, they do not know what the final outcome of the conflict will be. They may feel that the foreign forces will ultimately leave but that the Taliban will stay.

British troops operating in Afghanistan have noted that the Taliban is not a "militarily and ideologically coherent force but a 'wide but shallow coalition of convenience' that relies on cooperation between groups that is 'opportunistic rather than strategic.' "[45] Moreover, local Afghans may not give the Taliban and other extremist elements active support but often "acquiesce or turn a blind eye." The British note that "it is only when the cooperation, passive and active, of ordinary Afghans is removed that the insurgency will be fatally undermined. . . . The squeeze on the Taliban must come from within as well as without."[46] Thus, if this sense of disaffection or negative energy expressed by the Afghan locals may be constructively channeled to support the end goals of COIN, then the nature of the conflict may change. In fact, it may change in a way that ultimately defeats the Taliban.

Otherwise, if the U.S. and NATO-led forces continue engaging in sporadic skirmishes and setting up checkpoints that may be averted by the Taliban and jihadists, this war has no foreseeable end because there is no amplifier leading to a victory (or at least to a definitive conclusion). The conflict will continue in *stasis* indefinitely. The COIN manual points out a simple truth, "[s]uccess in COIN depends wholly on the people."[47] This is the time for the New Soldier to capture the emotions and imagination of the people, the key to ending the conflict definitively.

CULTURAL AWARENESS AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON

First and foremost, the nature of the asymmetric war must be redefined. Small wars, or what Rudyard Kipling called the "savage wars of peace,"[48] are ones where our "[f]uture opponents will avoid direct and conventional conflicts with America's overwhelming military power and purposely seek novel and asymmetric combinations of irregular warfare."[49] In fact, where symmetric adversaries are evenly matched and use similar technology,

knowledge of each other's cultures is irrelevant.[50] However, in a small war, culture matters.

So, the U.S. military needs to reexamine the belief, heretofore true, that "success in war is best achieved through an overwhelming technological advantage."[51] The United States has so definitively captured the edge of winning any conflict through conventional and technologically sophisticated means that a defeat of the United States using conventional means is no longer possible. Thus, the U.S. military has become virtually invincible in terms of modern conventional warfare. Although use of an overwhelmingly technological approach will guarantee victory in a conventional sense, it may and has led to defeat in an unconventional war. This was the bitter lesson of Somalia in 1994. Frank Hoffman writes:

> In contrast, what is more important in Small Wars is a very comprehensive examination of the culture of the society or country that is the source of the conflict. Because Small Wars usually are interventions in an internal conflict and require efforts to reconstruct or establish political, social and economic institutions and mechanisms, an acute understanding of the society and its culture is essential. Small Wars are generally culture intensive conflicts, and the battleground, properly understood, includes the political and psychological elements of the populations an culture.[52]

Culture has been defined by Hoffman as the

> combination of national history, myth, geography, beliefs, ethnic backgrounds and region. . . . Culture is the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and thought characteristic of a community or population. Culture is a complex aggregate that includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by a member of society.[53]

Cultural awareness also must be distinguished from situational awareness. Situational awareness is a full understanding of the aerial and ground intelligence technology and the physical surroundings in which the conflict is taking place. However As William Wunderle points out,

> In the military context, cultural awareness can be defined as the "cognizance of cultural terrain for military operations and the connections between cultural and warfighting." Cultural awareness implies an understanding of the need to consider cultural terrain in military operations, a knowledge of which cultural factors are important for a given situation and why, and a specified level of understanding for a target culture.[54]

However, during the culture-centric warfare aspect of asymmetric warfare, General Scales states that an

> intimate knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proved to be far more important for success than

> the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expensive bandwidth. Success in the phase rests with the ability of leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy and of soldiers to thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliar cultural circumstances.[55]

In the words of one young soldier, "I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence . . . wrong enemy."[56]

It is clear that "cultural ignorance has been a challenge in the past for U.S. forces"[57] and that developing greater cultural intelligence is what is needed now. Cultural awareness must augment situational awareness.

One reason cited by Montgomery McFate for the absence of cultural knowledge in the U.S. diplomatic, military, intelligence, or economic communities is "the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment."[58] In echoing a similar sentiment, David Kilcullen notes that

> This is because, through the "military-industrial complex," a substantial portion of the American economy, and numerous jobs in almost every congressional district, are linked to the production of conventional warfighting capacity. It takes factories, jobs, and industrial facilities to build battleships and bombers, but aid workers, linguists, and Special Forces operators are vastly cheaper and do not demand the same industrial base. So, shifting spending priorities onto currently unconventional forms of warfare would cost jobs and votes in the congressional districts of the very people who control that spending. This makes it structurally difficult for the United States fundamentally to reorient its military capabilities away from conventional war-fighting to divert a significant proportion of the defense spending into civilian capacity. Hence, absent a concerted effort by the nation's leadership in both the executive and legislative branches, the pattern of asymmetric warfare, with the United States adopting a basically conventional approach but being opposed by enemies who seek to sidestep American conventional power, is likely to be a long-standing trend.[59]

This is an interesting viewpoint that illuminates one possible economic reason driving U.S. military training and resource deployment toward technology-based fighting systems rather than toward cultural awareness training. There is another reason, and that is simply that the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of the United States following the end of World War II made understanding other nations, cultures, or languages less relevant. It certainly was not a political priority.

Moreover, the United States may have been a victim of its own geography. European nations, for example, live cheek-to-jowl with each other and have vastly different languages, customs, and traditions. Other nations may have many different languages and ethnic identities within them (e.g., India), requiring an enhanced appreciation for cultural differences.

In any case, the lack of cultural awareness is a strategic weakness that fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists are exploiting by simply adapting and adopting "a method of war that seeks to offset U.S. technical superiority with a countervailing method that uses guile, subterfuge, and terror mixed with patience and a willingness to die."[60]

To create this New Soldier to win on a tactical level on the battlefield of the Fearful Symmetry, a new alliance with social scientists (traditionally kept at arms' length by military officers and leaders) may need to be forged. The New Soldier will need to learn new skills from different disciplines in the social sciences to navigate unfamiliar cultures and emotional terrains.

In fact, there is a new recognition that, "[c]ultural awareness has become an increasingly important competency for small-unit leaders. Perceptive junior leaders learn how cultures affect military operations. They study major world cultures and put a priority on learning the details of the new operational environment when deployed."[61]

Aside from using cultural awareness as a tactical weapon in fighting insurgencies and small wars, another dimension has yet to be exercised.

> War is a thinking man's game. A military too acculturated to solving warfighting problems with technology alone should now begin to recognize that wars must be fought with intellect. Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded that great advantage can be achieved by outthinking rather than outequipping the enemy. They are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions—all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.[62]

"Intelligence" within the military community has been restricted to the narrow confines of intelligence-gathering to obtain information about the enemy that may be used in gaining tactical or strategic advantages. This information-gathering effort is designed to support the military end of wining the conflict. However, this definition may need to be expanded to include intelligence gathering from much wider sources and for much wider purposes.

More importantly, the notion of "intelligence" must include the ability to wage the war intelligently by using all the tools and advantages at the warfighter's disposal. Much has been made of the military's use of "hard power," then "soft power," and now "smart power." The transition in the underlying popular lingo must be supported by an actual change in strategy and training. Intelligence should also mean ingenuity, intuition, inventiveness, and "thinking outside the box." Agility on the battlefield of small wars means more than tactical maneuvering with weapons—it requires tactical maneuvering with the mind.

There is also a second missing dimension to fighting small wars—ethics. Ethics reflect a deeper cultural ethos, and, disappointingly, one commentator

concludes that " [t]he bottom line is that significant numbers of U.S. troops think and act in ways that violate their professional ethics and the laws of war."[63] This summary conclusion is particularly alarming in a counterinsurgency context. The U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, represent a profound paradigm shift. The essence of such operations, as pointed out in the earlier example of General McChrystal's operational rules in Afghanistan, is to protect civilians.

However,

> [c]ounterinsurgency ethics are particularly perplexing and complex because the primacy of civilian protection appears at odds with military service values that stress loyalty to fellow Marines and soldiers. It will take time for each service to articulate, inculcate and tend an ethic of counterinsurgency consistent with its culture.[64]

Nevertheless, all soldiers in combat situations have a *jus in bello* obligation to protect the lives of innocent civilians. This duty is an ethical responsibility. *Jus in bello* refers to justice in war or to appropriate conduct in the midst of battle after the hostilities have already been declared.[65] This is a concept that applies to war-fighters. (In contrast, *jus ad bellum* refers to the obligation of a state to enter into a war for a just reason such as self-defense or the defense of another. This obligation falls on heads of state and political leaders.)

Because the contours of counterinsurgencies are so different from those of conventional warfare, there is a transformational dimension of warfare that stems from the ethics of the battlefield. One commentator believes that protecting civilians from injury is the starting point for a "non-violent conflict transformation" for the New Soldier.

"Non-violent conflict transformation" is defined as "an approach to engaging in conflict that is rooted in understanding the complexity of the conflict and in finding creative ways to engage all parties in positive conversation that enables them to come to some level of engagement. It is a collaborative approach that looks to the future, focuses on relationships, and seeks to restructure relationships in order to meet everyone's needs."[66]

This transformation is important within the counterinsurgency context as it provides an avenue other than violence for the war-fighter. This may seem counterintuitive, but it is not designed to render the war-fighter incapable of waging actual combat. Instead, it enlarges the number of options available in waging a counterinsurgency campaign to include nonviolent means as well.

Again, this may sound as though I am reverting to a discussion of pacifism, Gandhism, and other nonviolent means of waging a conflict. I am not. Rather, I am advocating for an enlarged scope of possible options and approaches to winning a conflict. Further, this is applicable only in relation to a war-fighter interacting with civilian populations. This analysis would

not apply to actual enemy combatants in an armed conflict scenario—the war-fighter cannot be incapacitated from his war-fighting capability.

However, in order to effect this transformation, the New Soldier would have to cultivate "creative thinking and deep listening skills."[67] In addition, understanding complexity, demonstrating empathy and respect for others involved in the conflict, and identifying nonviolent means of interacting with the affected civilian populations are all skills that the New Soldier would have to acquire. This goes far beyond distributing candy, soccer balls, or trinkets to local children.

This transformation will allow the New Soldier to move from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. If empathy forms the basis of the relationship with others involved in the conflict, then it evidences "a willingness to understand the situation of the other while not falling into their emotional state."[68] Moreover, empathy is the foundation of the *I-Thou* relationship.

At the outset, this kind of transformation within the rigid command structure of the military may seem to be a hopeless undertaking. However, the qualities of empathy, compassion, creativity, and imagination flow from deep moral courage and help create a new sensibility. This new ethos will permit the New Soldier to engage in more ethical decision-making, pursue nonviolent means of conflict resolution, and more effectively protect the lives and human rights of the civilians that he is there to protect.

In the end, the asymmetric threats posed by terrorists may be ameliorated over time as this new ethic will ultimately change the nature of the conflict. "Violence is known. Peace is the mystery. By its very nature, therefore, peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the imagination of risk."[69]

If a new ethical relationship is forged by the war-fighter with the civilians involved in the conflict, a new heightened discipline of ethics will evolve over time. This new military ethics will be very recognizable because it flows from courage, duty, and honor—the hallmarks of military service and sacrifice.

Indeed, there is reason to feel hopeful that this transformation is already starting to take place within the U.S. military. U.S. Army Field Manual 3–07 states that

> [c]onflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. ***Conflict transformation*** **is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations**. [Emphasis in original.] It aims to set the host nation on a sustainable positive trajectory where transformational processes can directly address the dynamics causing civil strife or violent conflict. It seeks to resolve the root causes of conflict and instability while building the capacity of local institutions to forge and sustain effective governance, economic development, and the rule of law.[70]

Further,

> [c]onflict transformation recognizes that conflict is a normal and continuous social dynamic within human relationships and seeks to provide effective peaceful means of resolution. Conflict transformation is based in cultural astuteness and a broad understanding of the dynamics of conflict. Success depends on building creative solutions that improve relationships; it necessitates an innate understanding of underlying relational, social, and cultural patterns. Success relies heavily on understanding, recognizing that conflict can potentially stimulate growth and to leverage that potential to spur constructive change.[71]

Clearly, there is a recognition that conflict transformation is essential and is based on ''cultural astuteness.'' However, whether this transformation will actually take place through the efforts of military forces, among other actors, will be revealed only over time.

In sum, the New Soldier will need to be trained to move seamlessly from traditional warfare with a conventional enemy to combating irregular threats and providing humanitarian assistance to the innocent. Additional time will be required, not only to effect these profound changes to soldiering, but also to train soldiers in intuitive decision-making and wisdom. (This recommendation, of course, assumes that intuition and wisdom can be both taught and learned.) And, in following the Japanese model previously discussed, the New Soldier may need to be trained and deployed in smaller units in order to be effective.

Assuming the best-case scenario that this intuitive tactical and strategic military approach is fully adopted and implemented by U.S. military forces and its allies, does this mean that these forces will ultimately win the global war on terror (the Fearful Symmetry)? Probably not.

However, this may be the emerging amplifier that is the next dialectical leap in our own evolution. If we can learn to face the most unrelenting, deadly, and uncompromising hatred and commitment to our violent destruction by global terrorists and respond with empathy, compassion, and intuitive decision-making on the battlefield, this may be the greatest lesson that human history may have to offer. In fact, I would argue that this new nonlinear, intuitive soldiering will assimilate the best of Eastern and Western traditions including, arguably, those lessons from Islam that teach empathy and compassion.

No doubt, most will view this argument as hopelessly naïve, and I would agree in large part. Further, as I cannot support this argument with empirical evidence that adopting this approach will, in fact, help resolve or end the Fearful Symmetry, it may lack practical relevance as well.

However, in my view, the only true end to the Fearful Symmetry and the pathway to move into the next historical phase is for the global terrorists to love—not us, but themselves. By disavowing their self-destructive,

self-abnegating, and self-indulgent nihilism and replacing it with a sense of self-respect followed by respect for others, they will decisively end the Fearful Symmetry. This is quite a challenge, and there is no evidence that there is even a remote possibility that this challenge will be met. But by restoring hope, we restore faith in the belief that we can and must live peaceably together and that tomorrow will surely be better than today. At that point, we can move past the Fearful Symmetry and usher in a new era of history that will begin when this one ends.

PART II

The Role of International Actors: A New Integrated Approach

4

"Re-Visioning" Stability and Peace Operations

The asymmetric threats posed by fundamentalist Islamic-based separatist and global terrorism are grave dangers to the international community and the existing world order. Confronting these threats in a systematic way is a difficult, complex, multilateral, and multi-faceted challenge. This challenge has four discrete dimensions: military, diplomatic and political, economic, and cultural. Military strategies apply primarily to global Islamic-based terrorists and secondarily to separatists (but with different objectives and tactics in mind); political and diplomatic actions apply to separatists; economic measures apply to separatists; and cultural efforts to win over the terrorists apply to both, again, with different goals, objectives, and tactics in mind for reasons described more fully in this chapter.

Table 4.1 Four Dimensions of Confronting Asymmetric Threats

	Military	Diplomatic and Political	Economic	Cultural
Separatists	Limited Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes
Global Terrorists	Yes	No	No	Yes

MILITARY ACTION

The preceding discussion set forth in Part I described the relative failures in imposing military solutions by external parties in order to forge a new "peace." (The exception to this generalization may be post–World War II Germany and Japan, according to the RAND study cited earlier. However, there are many dissimilarities between those two countries after their respective defeats following World War II and present-day Iraq and Afghanistan.) Despite important historical lessons to be learned from the post–World War II context, using military solutions with separatist Islamic-based terrorist movements may not be a compelling or particularly effective course of action. Thus, it may be argued that diplomacy, political solutions, and effective economic development strategies (rather than military options) should be pursued in this context.

In fact, this may be an optimal time to consider a change in strategy with respect to an Islamic separatist-based brand of terrorism. With respect to Islamic-based global terrorists, a twofold military strategy seems to be warranted. The first is to vigorously continue and expand law enforcement efforts, described in the following section, and second, to create a New Soldier for the battlefield of the Fearful Symmetry.

National and International Law Enforcement

First and foremost, it is critical to strengthen linkages among all nation-states, intelligence and policing agencies, and international organizations, media, and other non-state actors to contain, if not actually win, the so-called "global war on terror." Stemming the exponential growth of the Hydra-headed monster of global terrorism is a daunting task that requires cohesive, well-coordinated planning, information-sharing, and decisive action among these and other actors. Aside from national and international intelligence operations, containing and preventing the spread of traditional arms and nuclear and chemical weapons, the identification and prohibition of financial flows to terrorists, and criminal prosecutions both nationally (with extradition arrangements in place, as required) and internationally, where appropriate, there are undoubtedly many other aspects of containing terrorism that should be vigorously pursued. Most importantly, creating new methods of detecting terrorist activities, cells, and plots should be highly prioritized and adequately funded by the international players acting in concert with one another.

The nature of this "military action" is primarily one of intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and the administration of justice rather than engaging in formal military operations *per se*. Whether these actions actually stem the flow of terrorist activities is an open-ended question, but it is highly unlikely that this level of "law enforcement" action alone will be sufficient in winning the global war on terror.

Moreover, there is a related dimension of analysis to consider. The missing dimension of analysis goes back to the theory of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military philosopher who was an observer of and a participant in the Napoleonic wars. His seminal work, *On War*, simply states the following dictum:

> War is the continuation of politics by other means.[1]

This simple observation has proven problematic for many U.S. administrations who may have been tempted to not pursue diplomatic channels as vigorously as possible simply because the U.S. military is so powerful and effective with respect to its military operations. Thus, rather than seeking diplomatic and political solutions, military options are pursued instead.

Indeed, one commentator notes that

> [t]oday, war is no longer an instrument of last resort. . . . In other words, today's environment turns the Clausewitzean paradigm upside down, contemporary conflict is no longer an extension of politics, politics is an extension of conflict.[2]

However, despite whatever "sins of omission"[3] in failing to pursue diplomatic solutions that may have been committed by U.S. policymakers and others during the Cold War, this still does not explain the rage of global terrorists. It is very clear that global Islamic-based terrorists are not interested in creating stable nation-states or economies. Therefore, negotiated political solutions or economic incentives to create stronger market-based economies are not persuasive courses of action. With global jihadists, a military solution may be the only option.

The only addition to the preceding description of prescribed military action (e.g., law enforcement activities) that may have some value in this context is to identify new tools with which to win, not the war against global terrorism but the peace. The Iraq example may serve to highlight the problematic nature of peacekeeping and stabilization operations after the kinetic warfare aspect of the military operation has been successfully concluded. This is especially the case where separatists' movements converge with the agenda of global jihadists. While not detracting from the brave and exemplary conduct of all the soldiers, airmen, and Marines in the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, there may be the need to create a new kind of soldier who can win the uneasy "peace" in these highly volatile and unstable environments. Peace, of course, is a highly relative term because terrorist and separatist-based violence is endemic in these and other places.

DEPLOYING THE NEW SOLDIER

The key to winning the Fearful Symmetry is deploying the New Soldier. This concept has been exhaustively described in Chapter 3 and will not be

repeated here except to highlight the following. First, it is important to realize that the counterinsurgency (or whatever term is used in relation to combating global jihadism) has both a law enforcement component as well as a war-fighting component. The law enforcement dimension is limited narrowly in scope to the capture and prosecution of global terrorists. Second, on a more practical level, the war-fighting dimension is more complex and more subtle in certain ways. In the Afghanistan context, it may be more efficient to train and deploy the New Soldier in smaller units. The mission of the New Soldier must also be carefully defined in coordination with NATO's ISAF forces and with the U.S. military. A coordinated and united front is necessary in order to use the New Soldier in ways that help create the long-lasting foundation that can later support the reconciliation and peacebuilding that can bring about sustainable political transformation and economic change.

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ACTION

As already indicated, global terrorists do not have any interest in creating stable political or economic structures. Moreover, negotiating with them can seriously undermine national political processes and the overall global balance of power. Therefore, negotiating with so-called terrorists is not a real option—unless they are elected to parliament!

Diplomacy

However, with respect to fundamentalist Islamic-based separatist movements, there is room for diplomatic efforts and an ongoing political dialogue to resolve underlying issues that may, for example, be related to establishing their sovereignty, land rights, political representation, and the release of political prisoners. Going back to the earlier analysis of recognizing the efficacy of engaging in diplomacy before, during, and after actual war is waged (a Clausewitzean principle), this means that international diplomacy must be fundamentally redefined and restructured.

Diplomacy should be the first and very well-integrated step in a larger political process that addresses underlying issues of political representation, land issues, legal grievances, criminal prosecutions, economic empowerment, education, and health, along with other matters. Diplomatic efforts with Islamic separatist-based terrorist movements could begin with special political envoys or international mediators. The key here is the trust placed in such individuals by the parties in conflict.

The diplomatic effort must, however, have the full commitment of all affected parties, and the roles of each participant should be fully described, designated, and agreed to in advance. A structured process that delineates

well-publicized and agreed-to benchmarks by the key parties in the diplomatic process is critical. Without the requisite political will to commit to a diplomatic resolution, no substantive results will be possible.

In fact, a breakdown in the diplomatic process may lead to a feeling of further betrayal, thus spurring more terrorist-based activities to achieve what are essentially political goals. Therefore, it is critical that a win-win scenario be made possible so that each side (or every side, depending on the complexity of the conflict) may claim victory.

As described earlier, a diplomatic effort that is an integral part of a disciplined peace process is very complex and is a multi-actor, multi-tiered, multi-faceted, and multi-phased process. With the political will necessary to make such a process successful in the short-term and enduring in the long-run, sufficient resources in terms of funds, time, and perhaps even empathy from all the actors must be devoted to this effort.

Finally, in order to fundamentally restructure the diplomatic process on a global basis, the political will of the entire international community must be a key factor. In other words, diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict should not be left to the isolated, unilateral, or sporadic efforts of the United States or other Western powers. Neighboring states to the conflict area and even a broader multilateral effort should be engaged in the diplomatic process.

Perhaps an independent consultative group (e.g., an NGO-based effort) should take the lead with respect to identifying neutral parties that can effectively be trained to lead a negotiated peace process. In other words, neutral South African parties (particularly those well-versed in the truth-and-reconciliation process, for example) may be trained to lead the peace process in the Philippines. The possibilities are enormous but are totally dependent on the will of the international community to commit to the effort of conflict prevention and resolution. The international community must be persuaded that it is in its best self-interest to resolve and prevent conflict, and then it must take active steps to ensure that a brokered peace results from these efforts. If successfully persuaded, these international peace "brokers" can be continually deployed to both resolve and prevent conflict.

Ensuring the success of this type of diplomatic effort is dependent on two factors: (1) trust in the process and in the parties to the process, and (2) meeting the specifically negotiated commitments of the peace process. Trust is essential before the diplomacy is embarked upon, and meeting the commitments of the negotiated outcome is required after the diplomatic process is completed. If the requisite political will exists to commit to these two requirements at the outset of the negotiations, then a positive outcome is almost assured. If not, then the quagmire of conflict, mistrust, continued impoverishment, and missed opportunities for peace will, no doubt, continue into the foreseeable future.

A Political Process

A recapitulation of the essential factors in an overall structured political process follows, with a fuller explanation of its implications.

- *Stabilize the conflict area through multilateral and/or regional military intervention (such as UN peacekeeping forces where needed) to end civil war, strife, or unrest.*
- The first choice to be made is whether the peacekeeping operation and/or a follow-on nation-building exercise should be unilateral or multilateral. A previously cited RAND study concludes that multilateral peacekeeping efforts are more time-consuming and complex than unilateral operations but are less expensive for the participants. Further, multilateral operations tend to produce more thorough political transformations and greater reconciliation among the parties. However, multilateral efforts must have a unity of command to achieve these results.[4]
- The second choice is whether to dismantle existing institutions wholesale or reform them from within. A unilateral U.S. effort to reform post–World War II Japanese institutions from within was very successful, whereas a multilateral effort to dismantle German institutions and recreate them from whole cloth was less successful.[5] If multilateralism is chosen, Afghanistan currently has no existing viable institutions, and everything must be built from the ground upward. In Iraq, a unilateral effort by the United States to recreate dismantled institutions has yielded mixed results, and it may be too early to know if a multilateral approach would have been more effective in this context.
- The RAND study further indicates that while the UN may be a suitable choice for most peacekeeping operations in terms of its multinational character adding to its legitimacy, having lower operating expenses, and using a team of seasoned professionals who understand the challenges of nation-building that have succeeded in the past, there are two other options to consider. The first is more expensive, but it would be a multilateral operation involving the United States, the European Union, and NATO, such as in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia. (The regional character of these institutions may limit its geographic reach, but perhaps this may change in the future.) The second option, which is also multilateral but is less capable in the view of RAND, is using regional organizations such as the African Union and ASEAN for peacekeeping and peace-brokering purposes.[6] Perhaps a useful investment would be to provide training and capacity building for these institutions along the lines suggested in the preceding section on diplomacy.
- *Structure a coherent and well-developed agenda with well-known, publicized, and accepted benchmarks for an internationally brokered peace process that includes, among other things, a truth and reconciliation process for healing purposes.*
- The first important step that must be taken by the parties is to identify the following: (1) the issues creating the conflict; (2) the affected parties; (3) the negotiating parties, and (4) the tools, means, and political processes by which to forge a lasting peace. This is a difficult undertaking because the issues may be

complex and mired in decades-long grievances, attacks, and retribution for past wrongs, whether perceived or real.

- The intervention of an outside neutral party experienced in such peace negotiations may be a helpful starting point. Further, planning a political map for political and economic empowerment so that educational, economic, and political opportunities are restored as quickly as possible may also be a good tactic to consider. However, the complexity of this task is daunting because the answer, for example, may lie in restoring physical infrastructure to the conflict area to permit its integration with the rest of the country. This may be a difficult undertaking for the host government if it is struggling with its budget.
- As already discussed, trust and the political will to commit to the peacemaking process at the outset and in terms of meeting conditions subsequent is critical to the success of the negotiation. In my view, the more well-known the benchmarks of the diplomatic process are, the greater the opportunity to enforce the accountability of the parties by the affected people.
- Second, a continuing process of dialogue and accountability to ensure that benchmarks are being adequately met, or to ensure that such benchmarks are modified in response to changed circumstances or needs, is also an important component in facilitating the success of peacekeeping measures. Rather than signing a peace accord and leaving the negotiation table, it may be a wiser course of action to monitor the progress being made to the commitments of all parties and make adjustments accordingly.
- Adequate enforcement measures of the outputs of the diplomatic negotiation also must be integrated into the original negotiation process. If there is a failure in the outcome of the peace dialogue, then peacekeeping negotiations may need to be resumed. This aspect must be taken into account at the outset and prepared for as an outside contingency.
- Accountability for past injustices is a powerful force in moving the parties toward a final and lasting reconciliation. This is, however, a very difficult, complex, and inherently controversial matter, and it is one that must be carefully considered and committed to, if undertaken by the parties. War crime tribunals, special forums, and truth and reconciliation commissions are powerful tools in airing past grievances, seeking forgiveness, and forging a lasting reconciliation among the parties.[7]
- The RAND report also suggests that making economic reparations immediately after the end of a conflict is counterproductive. It suggests waiting until the economy has stabilized and grown before attempting to make reparations.[8]
- *Strengthen the infrastructure of the failed or collapsed state as a commitment of the international community acting in partnership with the groups in conflict, NGOs, neighboring countries, regional and multilateral organizations, the media, and other non-state actors.*
- Strengthening the infrastructure of the affected conflict area is principally an economic undertaking that will be discussed in the next section. However, the RAND report also makes clear that the participation and commitment of neighboring states is vital to creating an enduring peace process.[9]

The preceding discussion sets forth a complex matrix of interrelated responsibilities of the parties to any peacemaking mission and is a challenge under the best of circumstances. It requires foresight, compassion, trust, creativity, and the requisite political will of all the parties in order to be successful.

ECONOMIC MEASURES

It is clear that political stability or economic growth is not possible without security measures being in place. Once security measures stabilize the conflict area, other issues may be addressed. The previous discussion sets forth a fairly complex and highly interrelated agenda for planning appropriate military, diplomatic, and political actions. These actions must, in large part, precede economic measures being put in place. All these components (including cultural initiatives, to be discussed next) should be part of a coordinated whole.

Bolstering the peace process with supporting economic measures is necessary, but it is certainly no guarantee against future terrorist action. But we ignore global poverty at our peril. Further, there is a linkage between failing states, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption and an increased vulnerability to harboring terrorist networks.

One commentator notes that

> [d]enying terrorists the sanctuary they seek in failed states may become a central feature of the war on terror. . . . Yet, strengthening weak states to the point where their weakness is no longer an "attractive nuisance" for terrorists may require a decades-long commitment of financial and humanitarian aid, technical and military assistance, and institution-building. A massive state-building effort, even with unlimited resources, would likely require years of incremental progress before it produces meaningful results.[10]

In other words, decades of poor governance that profoundly ignores the need to provide for basic human sustenance tends to result in weakened or failing states, increased militancy, and a receptiveness to terrorist operatives and networks. Moreover, general lawlessness supports the growth of crime syndicates, illegal drug and trafficking networks, and other illegal activities that can potentially be used to finance global terrorism.[11]

Rather than embarking on an elaborate agenda of economic measures that should be taken to bolster and strengthen a peacekeeping process, and to do so in a factual vacuum, it may be more useful to put certain considerations into a historical context. Professor Kimberly Marten argues that recent nation-building efforts, or what she calls "complex peace-keeping operations," are both similar to and dissimilar from historical colonial antecedents.[12] In essence, she argues that the emphasis on creating market-based economies and liberal civil societies is not new but an echo from the past.

In other words, former colonial powers acquired territories and possessions with the view toward instilling a certain kind of economic development in these areas for following purposes:

- Accessing raw materials and commodities
- Selling finished or manufactured goods to captive markets
- Expanding trade opportunities for domestic companies of the colonizer
- Creating international investment opportunities
- Creating a foreign tax base to make the colonies self-financing
- Alleviating poverty domestically and in their colonies
- Achieving economic dominance in Europe

Aside from the *mise en valeur* (development) policy of European colonizers, they also wanted to instill Western values (including religious values), languages, and institutions in their colonies. This may be viewed as colonial-based "paternalism," but the humanitarian impulse to indoctrinate or "civilize" foreign subjugated societies in the elements of representational local governance, civic values, and the principles of rationality were all strong motivating factors behind colonization. Thus, the basis for economic development and the propagation of Western-styled institutions, manner of governance, and societal ethical and religious norms laid the foundation for "modernizing" these societies. Professor Marten argues, therefore, that the similarity in instilling a Rule of Law agenda in the context of modern complex peacekeeping operations harkens back to a distant colonial imprint.

Modern peacekeeping operations are dissimilar from their imperialist antecedents as well, according to Professor Marten. Such operations are not designed to capture closed economic markets or to exert colonial-style political governance over them. The recent efforts at peacekeeping are also limited in two important ways: (1) these efforts are limited in terms of how much change may be imposed by external forces, no matter how well-intentioned such efforts are; and (2) perhaps more importantly, these efforts are limited by the political will of the outside peacekeepers or peacebuilders.[13]

Wholesale conquest and the imposition of long-term occupation over conflict areas is simply not on anyone's political agenda at this time. Professor Marten recommends using multilateral forces to legitimate the effort (and remove the post-colonial imprint) and to limit those forces to providing security alone.

She states:

> The colonial operations carried out by liberal states at the turn of the twentieth century and the complex peacekeeping operations of more recent years had one key component in common, despite all their differences. They were characterized by the desire of outsiders to control political events happening on the

> ground abroad. Whether for self-interested security motives or genuine humanitarianism, western liberal democratic states wanted these foreign regions to adopt more of the values and institutions of the western liberal democratic world. In more recent times, this goal was shared by significant portions of the peace-kept populations, but a substantial fraction of the target population has in each case opposed the international presence, which is why the use of robust military force has been necessary. While the balance of reasons for undertaking these operations shifted between the two eras, favoring state self-interest in the former period and humanitarianism in the latter, the desire for foreign control over political and social institutions was a constant.[14]

Professor Marten points out that the lack of political will (in other words, competing political goals and agendas) interferes with and impedes the successful and permanent conclusion of peacekeeping operations. Thus, she argues for a limited goal in peacekeeping in light of the following:

> The history presented here suggests that given the difficulty liberal democracies have in imposing coherent political influence over foreign societies, the limited goal of establishing security over the medium term is more likely to be achievable. In the colonial era, attempts to instill supposedly western values throughout the empire ultimately backfired, as the population recognized the inconsistencies in the policies of the imperialist states. In many cases it appears that it was the brutality of the imperialists, rather than their humanitarianism, that most influenced the later development of politics in postcolonial territories. While complex peacekeeping operations have not been so brutal, the inconsistencies within the liberal democratic values that they have proclaimed, as well as the inevitable lack of cohesive follow-through on planning, have demonstrated that the notion of imposing liberal democracy abroad is a pipedream.[15]

Therefore, she concludes:

> The comparison of recent peacekeeping operations to the era of colonialism as practiced by liberal democratic states has highlighted the fact that imposing control over a foreign society is not possible using liberal democratic means. No matter how noble our intentions, we face limitations in our capabilities and in the effects that our actions can have. . . . In places like Haiti, a large expenditure of resources in the end created no change, and a decade later the international community was called back in again. The people were replaced, but the system was not. Instead of trying to change societies, we should change our expectations. A return to the goal of keeping the peace, rather than imposing change, will lead to more realistic policies that have a better chance of reaching their goals.[16]

This is sound advice, but it is shortsighted because it does not further the means for resolving the conflict giving rise to the need for peacekeeping in the first instance. Simply providing security measures in a traditional peacekeeping operation is only the first step in establishing an umbrella for other

actors (state and non-state) to move in with a highly defined and coordinated agenda for action. While economic growth measures that were designed to stabilize and expand the economies of developing nations may have, in large part, failed, continuing to ignore their implications may simply *not* be an acceptable course of action for the international community.

Thus, based on the foregoing discussion, economic measures are relevant only with respect to Islamic-based separatist movements. Because global jihadists are dedicated to destabilizing (and possibly overthrowing) stable liberal nation-states, the adoption of an economic agenda for change is irrelevant to them. Except for the limited engagement of identifying, terminating, prosecuting, and preventing terror financing (a component of military action that involves law enforcement), economic measures, as previously described, are relevant only with respect to Islamic-based separatists.

Professor Marten also mentions the absence of political will of liberal democracies seeking to enforce the peace with respect to conflict areas. She points out that liberal democratic values and approaches cannot impose change in conflict areas from without. However, a missing dimension of this analysis is the lack of political will of the people in the conflict areas themselves. Again, this is a failure of the state, insofar as the governed are not able (or are not willing) to hold their leaders accountable in the overall development process.

Going back to the foregoing analysis, viewing the concept of security as integral to overall sustainable development would be a welcome departure from current international development policies. Security is often viewed as extraneous or an inconvenient appendage to existing development policies. Changing the current policies of development institutions to include security as a vital aspect of development may effectively redefine and help strengthen the political will of liberal democracies. In other words, if security as a development concept is incorporated into the conceptual thinking and planning of multilateral development institutions along the same lines as "food security" was incorporated into their thinking in the 1970s, this might be a concrete step forward. This step will help commit liberal democracies to revitalizing the development process. By ensuring security, they will ensure a new stable framework in which the development process may unfold.

CULTURAL INITIATIVES

Finally, the last component of this complex matrix is undertaking cultural initiatives that should be directed to separatists as well as global terrorists. In revisiting an earlier discussion, the essay argues that while Western-styled institutions, structures, and approaches may have been adopted by many developing nations (with unequal successes and results), the underlying ideological foundation generally was not. Perhaps a fuller discussion of why this may have occurred would be appropriate in this context.

The principal difference between the developed and the developing worlds is most often cast in economic terms (or the so-called "haves" and "have-nots"). Again, the salient difference between the two groups is viewed in terms of their relative economic power to pursue (i.e., purchase) their individual happiness. However, there is at least another difference which may, ultimately, be more significant. That difference lies in the absolutist objectivity of the developed (so-called Western) world versus the relativist subjectivity of the developing (so-called non-Western) world. In other words, developed societies have the demonstrated capability to create, understand, and rely on a belief system of abstract ideals (e.g., equal justice for all, equal application of the law, due process, democratic representation and governance). (The dictum, "We are a nation of laws, not men," may be appropriate in this context.)

The subjective, personal element where loyalties are given not to abstract concepts but to families, patrons, rulers, and ethnic or religious identities or leaders tends to be much more prevalent in developing societies. Thus, while it is difficult to make overbroad generalizations in such a complex matter, perhaps the underlying ideological foundation in most of the developing world is simply incompatible with the Western-oriented values of strict rationalism, empiricism, and materialism. In essence, therefore, the struggle between the developed and the developing worlds is not only one of economic accumulation but also one of a struggle of ideas around which societies are organized.

For example, the Western view of a nuclear family consisting of parents and their children may be inconsistent with the broader and more inclusive one comprising the more complex family structures found in many places in Latin America, Africa, Eurasia, and Asia. Therefore, familial obligations (whether viewed as being law-based or based on societal obligations) may be much broader as well. Thus, the emotional ties and commitment to a much broader family structure may be very relevant in dictating certain kinds of conduct.

In other words, the *failure* of a corporate insider in Jordan, for example, to release confidential information to his family and friends concerning a stock offering may be seen as a betrayal. It may be the perceived duty of such a corporate insider to provide his family and associates with the information and the means by which to enrich themselves. After all, such gains may fund a son's (or a daughter's) tuition to college.

Thus, adhering to a legal regime where insider trading is a criminal offense may be seen as incomprehensible, alien, bizarre, and in conflict with the mores and expectations of Jordanian society. It may be a pat assumption for Western experts and consultants to feel that such a leap of faith on the part of the Jordanians is logical, necessary, or inevitable. It may be more helpful to establish a dialogue on the rationale for criminalizing insider trading and coming to terms with the underlying cultural mores that are affected

(or offended) by this proposed new legal practice. If Western consultants assume that the criminal nature of insider trading is self-evident, then the interests of their mission to bring legal change, as well as the broader interests of the Jordanians, may not be well-served.

Moreover, it may be wise to keep in mind that many structural changes are taking place in Western societies that are, for example, broadening the concept of the family well past the traditional notion of two parents and their children to include blended and other family structures. In other words, the "Newtonian" legal universe of immutable, predictable laws and relationships has been transformed into an "Einsteinian" universe where the actors, rights, and duties are relative, fluid, unpredictable, and unstructured. Naturally, this is bound to meet with resistance and distrust, primarily from Western observers.

In addition, it may be worth remembering the rationalist ideals of the Enlightenment were later tempered by the ideals of the "romantic rebellion"[17] that followed. Romanticism gave new supremacy to values of subjective experience rather than to unchanging rational ideals.

> Romanticism therefore values the particular insight, the visionary glimpse into imaginative union with the universe, the emotional certainty and joy that arises from a feeling of intimate association in an envisioned patterned order. It distrusts any systematic knowledge, any inherited systems of belief, anything not generated by one's own imagination. It rejects any sense of rational limits to what the human imagination might know. The power of the imagination is potentially infinite: "Less than all cannot satisfy man," cried [William] Blake.[18]

Thus, the ideals of subjectivity, emotionalism, and the elevation of individual emotions to a new poetic and artistic ideal are not foreign to Western cultures after all. Moreover, the idea of intuitively and empathetically understanding differences in thinking and feeling among cultures is an idea that goes back to creating a New Soldier waging a new kind of war in the Fearful Symmetry.

With respect to promulgating Western-influenced cultural values of tolerance, acceptance, and political inclusion to Islamic-based terrorist movements, it is highly unlikely the Western democracies will have much persuasive value in inculcating cultural values that they themselves value. It is important to see this from the perspective of the Islamic-based terrorists. Thus, the most persuasive value of indoctrinating cultural values may originate with the people that they already (hopefully) respect, that is, other Muslims.

For example, the Saudis have recently initiated a terrorist "deprogramming" effort. NBC News was recently given exclusive access to Saudi Arabia's new Al Qaeda rehabilitation center, a minimum-security resort outside Riyadh. Here, clerics try to deprogram militants, teaching them social skills as they swim and play football and video games before being released.

Apparently, the recidivist rate of returning to a life of terrorism is nil at this point.[19]

Another example is that of Singapore. Ambassador Chan Heng Chee states unequivocally that

> Terrorist detainees in Singapore undergo a program incorporating psychological, social and religious rehabilitation. The religious counseling program is driven by volunteers from Singapore's Muslim community. There are no beatings or torture. There have been no deaths. Two-thirds of the terrorists arrested since 2001 have been released and have reintegrated into society. None has strayed back into terrorism so far. Singapore's program is often cited by international experts, including William J. Dobson of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as a model for the detention and rehabilitation of terrorists.[20]

Although these efforts at rehabilitation may be viewed with a certain degree of skepticism, it may be worthwhile to note that the RAND Corporation has proposed concrete steps in creating moderate Muslim networks and disrupting radical networks.[21] These and similar efforts may help win over young Muslim terrorists.

Moreover, another RAND study[22] recommends reintegrating former terrorists and extremists found in renegade state militias, insurgent forces, or armed gangs (including "child soldiers" co-opted into combat at early ages) by providing education, job training, and placement. Of course, this is also a facile solution because it is often the lack of educational and employment opportunities in the first place that may lead to radicalization. However, as a long-term solution, it is certainly a worthwhile pursuit. The study recognizes that the longer such ex-terrorists remain rootless, the more of a problem recidivism and related problems become. In other words, such individuals may drift from one conflict zone to another.

The RAND study also cautions that while the familiarity of ex-terrorists with combat and armed conflict seems to make them viable candidates to join reconstituted state militias, police forces, and other legitimate state security structures, this may not be the wisest option. Security reform is a difficult undertaking, and often the security-related structures are corrupt, ineffective, politicized, and unprofessional. If this is the case, then integrating ex-terrorists or child soldiers into such structures may be adding to the problem rather than solving it.[23]

In essence, the indoctrination of other cultural values such as tolerance, respect, acceptance, and resolving conflict peacefully rather than violently should be directed to all Islamic-based extremists by members of their community as a starting point. A constructive dialogue must be put in place and should be aimed not only at Islamic separatist-based movements but at global jihadists as well. The first question that will need to be answered is, "Why pursue this course of action?" What do terrorists (or would-be terrorists) have to

gain by participating in belief systems and structures that no longer have any validity for them? This loss of faith and the disaffection that they feel is very real and is a crisis of faith that must be addressed now.

Although the most effective course of action seems to be action taken by other Muslims (individually, collectively, and as nation-states), perhaps other means should be pursued as well. For example, NGOs may have a critical role to play here in terms of understanding, empathizing, and legitimating the feelings of distrust, despair, and disaffection that these young Muslims feel. Providing alternate courses of action (particularly through nonviolent means) may be a useful starting point to help them think differently. Merely providing job opportunities certainly will not be enough in light of the fact that the newest recruits are already well-educated and employed individuals.

Providing cultural initiatives to help redeem the promise lost to young Muslims is a challenge for moderate Muslims and the international community. Clear leadership is necessary from both communities and is vital to winning the Fearful Symmetry.

5

Creating a Platform for Reconciliation and Transition

The previous discussions were devoted to an analysis of what gives rise to violent extremism in general and to fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism in particular. Chapter 4 laid out a proposed four-filter analysis of how to direct international efforts to stabilize and reconstruct societies destabilized by such extremism and Islamic-based terrorism. In fact, the relative degree of the terrorist threat may actually affect the continued viability of certain nations such as Afghanistan and perhaps other countries in North Africa as well. Now, it is time to turn to the actual policy matrix and U.S. military and civilian deployments that have taken place over the past several years, which are designed to address these concerns. An examination of this post-9/11 effort is important in this context as it forms the real-life backdrop for this discussion.

At the outset, it is important to examine the definitional challenges of this effort. ''Peacekeeping'' is the term that is most generally associated with operations to contain hostilities once the kinetic stage of warfare has ceased. However, this term is misleading because such peacekeeping operations were generally very dangerous and took place in highly volatile, dangerous environments that were not the least ''peaceful.'' Further, the term was also associated with UN-led efforts beginning in the late 1950s when UN peacekeeping forces were deployed to enforce a cease-fire agreement. Many of these operations were perceived as being less than successful, a factor that stigmatized such operations.[1] In addition, the term ''peacekeeping'' was highly ambiguous as it often referred to several interrelated elements of enforcement, securitization, and stabilization.

In 1992, the UN created the term "peace enforcement" to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force to maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or in response to a threat to the overall safety. "Peacebuilding" was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions (including recreating police or civil defense forces), election monitoring, promotion of political participation, and enforcing human rights. Organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts also can be a part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.[2]

Peacekeeping may also be referred to as peace operations or stability operations,[3] a U.S. Army term that covers a wide range of activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, stability operations may include peace enforcement and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter-drug and other related post-conflict operations. Thus, the foregoing discussion illustrates that there is quite a bit of definitional confusion among the terms "peacekeeping," "peacebuilding," "stability operations," "stabilization and reconstruction," and "nation-building."

THE U.S. IMPRINT ON STABILITY OPERATIONS

Certain doctrinal changes were ultimately made by the U.S. military that led to clearer policy support for stability operations. On November 28, 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) issued its directive on "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations."[4] This new directive (Department of Defense Directive 3000–05) radically redefined the mission of DOD to include the following, in relevant part:

> It is DoD policy that:
>
> 4.1. *Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.* [Emphasis supplied.] They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
> 4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

> 4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. *Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.* [Emphasis supplied.] Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:
>
> 4.3.1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;
>
> 4.3.2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and
>
> 4.3.3. Develop representative governmental institutions.[5]

The breadth and scope of these tasks is overwhelming.

Further, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 was issued on October 6, 2008, updating the version released on February 20, 2003.[6] This manual makes the following clear:

> Stability operations are usually conducted to support a host-nation government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. Generally, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the host nation or other agency cannot fulfill their role, military forces may be called upon to significantly increase its role, including providing the basic civil functions of government.[7]

By nature, stability operations are typically lengthy endeavors. Moreover, FM 3-07 makes an important and clear distinction:

> For many agencies and organizations, stability operations are considered as part of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability following the cessation of open hostilities. For military forces, however, stability tasks are executed continuously throughout all operations. Executed early enough and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability operations provide an effective tool for reducing the risk of politically motivated violence. It does this by addressing the possible drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities. Providing the authority and resources to conduct these stability operations as part of peacetime military engagement may be the most effective and efficient method to mitigate the risk of lengthy post-conflict interventions.[8]

In sum, the doctrinal matrix that governs U.S. security strategy that shapes the conduct of stability operations includes the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and *The National Military Strategy of*

the United States of America (known as the *National Military Strategy*). (Related strategies include the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*.)[9] The *National Security Strategy* addresses stability operations, and the *National Defense Strategy* addresses fragile states and the national security threat they may pose to the United States.

Additionally, in 2005, former President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which outlined his vision for promoting the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization assistance.[10] Moreover, NSPD-44 formally acknowledged that the continued stability of foreign states served the broader national interests of the United States.

President Bush assigned the U.S. Department of State to be the lead agency responsible for these operations and directed former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. government efforts in preparing, planning, and conducting reconstruction and stabilization activities. NSPD-44 also mandated the Secretary of State to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to ensure the integration and synchronization of any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations as needed.[11]

Accordingly, based on an April 2004 decision of the National Security Council principals committee, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell created the U.S. Department of State (DOS), Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. The S/CRS has two institutional capabilities consisting of the Interagency Management System (IMS) for reconstruction and stabilization, and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The IMS is a management structure designed to assist policymakers, chiefs of mission, and military commanders who manage complex reconstruction and stabilization activities. The IMS structure assists them by ensuring coordination among all U.S. government stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.[12] The CRC provides the standing civilian corps to support stability operations in the field.

Also, in support of its mandate to coordinate closely with DOD, S/CRS deploys Humanitarian, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Teams (HSRTs) to the field to participate in post-conflict planning where U.S. military forces will be engaged. Further, S/CRS deploys Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs) with the U.S. military to initiate humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction tasks on the ground. These ACTs may also form the foundation for the civilian component of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or similar interagency field organizations.[13] Better joint civilian-military planning is necessary in order to make such interventions as successful as possible. Civil affairs offices in the U.S. military provide language expertise, regional specialization, and other skills to support stabilization operations.

In addition, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified effort by the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy to plan, direct, and

execute special operations in counterterrorist and related operations worldwide. The USSOCOM consists of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Navy Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, the Joint Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations University. Many worldwide nongovernmental organizations are also active in stabilization and reconstruction activities in post-conflict areas.[14]

Thus, DOD Directive 3000.05, signed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, as previously discussed, in combination with NSPD-44, signed by former President George W. Bush, were both executed in 2005 and created the underlying doctrinal and institutional framework for U.S. military-led stability operations.

Aside from the U.S. Department of State's S/CRS, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives provides flexible short-term foreign assistance to help build peace and democracy and to promote human rights. USAID's former administrator, Andrew Natsios, formulated Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development, which also attempt to further define the policy matrix for the U.S. government in undertaking the stabilization and reconstruction of fragile countries. Natsios built his nine principles based on the Nine Principles of War.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, (1994) outlines objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity as the nine principles of war for the U.S. military.[15] Incidentally, these nine principles are the same as those set forth by von Clausewitz in his treatise, *On War*.[16]

Natsios notes that

> military thinking has evolved and now incorporates the phrase "stability operations" as a term of art to describe post-conflict nation-building efforts. Despite this shift, the military continues to use the Nine Principles of War as an intellectual basis for all military operations, including stability operations. . . . The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development have evolved from a similar institutional experience. They distill fundamental lessons from this experience and bring greater clarity to the operating principles that inform the mission of USAID.[17]

The nine principles that Natsios sets forth are as follows:

- ownership (build on the leadership participation and commitment of a country and its people)
- capacity building (strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies)
- sustainability (design programs to ensure their impact endures)
- selectivity (allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests)

- assessment (conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions)
- results (direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives)
- partnership (collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities)
- flexibility (adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency)
- accountability (design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption)[18]

By attempting to fit the USAID experience into the military paradigm, this is an effort to mesh the two perspectives and organizational cultures into a compatible framework. However, one should remain cognizant of the fact that the values underlying the divergent experiences of the U.S. military and USAID are vastly different. This attempt at synchronizing the two, while laudable, may have limited utility in this context.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

U.S. military participation in international peacekeeping efforts has been uneven and sporadic, ranging from operations in Bosnia (1992–2004), Haiti (1994–1996), and Somalia (1992–1994).[19] Since April 30, 2006, U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations located in the Middle East, Georgia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, and Haiti. Although this history provides a very rich background in terms of understanding policy, strategic, and tactical choices made by the U.S. military in prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,[20] in my view, it would be too wide a diversion and too discursive a discussion to merit treatment here. However, it does form a backdrop to this discussion, and certain elements will be highlighted, as appropriate.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTS)

The following discussion will focus on the creation, organization, and effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The model combines a military-civilian joint field presence and has many interesting implications that are still unfolding. The utility of this model in serving as a

Table 5.1 U.S. Efforts at Nation-Building (1898–2003)

Type	Successes	Failures	Ongoing
Unilateral	Panama (1989)	Cambodia (1970–1973)	
	Grenada (1983)	Vietnam (1964–1973)	
	Japan (1945–1952)	Dominican Republic (1964–1965)	
		Cuba (1917–1922)	
		Dominican Republic (1916–1924)	
		Haiti (1915–1934)	
		Nicaragua (1909–1939)	
		Cuba (1906–1909)	
		Panama (1903–1936)	
		Cuba (1898–1902)	
Multilateral	Germany (1945–1949)	Haiti (1994–1996)	Iraq (2003–present)
			Afghanistan (2001–present)
			Kosovo (1999–present)
			Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995–present)

Source: "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," Table 8 at 117, eds. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (November 12, 2003), available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/S&R_book/S&R.pdf (last visited on July12, 2009).

stability and reconstruction team to initiate key tasks in post-conflict societies will be critically examined.

The downstream effects of Operation Enduring Freedom, a U.S.-led military coalition launched on October 7, 2001, against Afghanistan's Taliban government, toppled that government after only two months of actual combat. The UN Security Council Resolution 1386 established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on December 20, 2001 to help the Afghan Interim Authority maintain security in and around Kabul.[21]

ISAF was formed in January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under British command. It patrols Kabul and the immediate surrounding areas under a UN Chapter VII authorization and has expanded its operations throughout the country. As of April 2006, about 170 U.S. military personnel support the NATO ISAF operating in Afghanistan.[22]

ISAF is unique from a NATO operational perspective because it is the first time that NATO has invoked Article 5 of its articles of association, which requires collective action once one of its members (in this case, the United States) is attacked.[23] Further, this is its first "out-of-area" mission beyond Europe.[24] Although combat-related restrictions have been placed on ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan by their contributing European members, the ISAF intervention in support of stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan has been key.

NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, slightly more than 18 months after ISAF's formation and after the cessation of the initial hostilities. The underlying UN Security Council Resolution 1836 (September 23, 2008) permitting this takeover states that NATO shall provide security and law and order; promote governance and development; help reform the justice system; train a national police force and army; provide security for elections; and assist the local effort to interdict the narcotics industry.[25] ISAF includes troops from all 28 member states of NATO, including from certain nonmember states such as Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Jordan, and Azerbaijan.[26]

U.S. troops do provide some assistance to the ISAF (i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick-reaction force support), but they do not engage in ISAF-directed peacekeeping.[27] NATO's involvement in the Afghanistan conflict permitted it to launch 26 PRTs in the country.

NATO planned the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2001 to evolve in five stages. Stage One (assessment and preparation) took place during 2003–2004, when NATO moved into the northern area of the country, primarily with French and German forces. Stage Two (geographic expansion) began in May 2005, when NATO moved into western Afghanistan with Italian and Spanish forces being in the lead. Both regions remain fairly stable. Stage Three (stabilization) came into operation on July 31, 2006, and was designed to move NATO into the southern part of the country where the



Figure 5.1 Chain of Command for PRTs in Afghanistan

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Provincial Reconstruction Teams," (GAO-09-86R) (Washington, DC, October 1, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0986r.pdf (last visited on July 16, 2009).

Taliban is based. Stage Four (transition) began on October 5, 2006, when the United States transferred 10,000–12,000 of its troops to ISAF to serve under the NATO commander. By 2006, ISAF had covered all of Afghanistan in its operations and is considering beginning Stage Five, or the redeployment stage.[28]

The security environment in Afghanistan continues to be very complex. Indeed, one report highlighted the fact that

> [c]ivilian-military coordination at the strategic level is not just complicated by the presence of two coalitions conducting military operations with different objectives—warfighting and stabilization. The complexity is compounded by the absence of an overall lead agency or lead nation. The [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] UNAMA is in charge of civilian reconstruction and advises the Afghan government on its National Priority Programmes, the U.S. is in charge of rebuilding the Afghan National Army (ANA), Germany is responsible for police training, Italy has taken the lead on judicial reform, the UK is in charge of the counter-narcotics programme, and Japan is in charge of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). This lack of overall coordination was one of the factors that led the U.S. to launch the PRTs.[29]

During the summer of 2002, U.S. military forces developed the idea of PRTs that would spread the effects of the ISAF without expanding the ISAF itself. They were originally designed as ''Joint Regional Teams (JRTs)'' by the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), a U.S. Army combatant command with an area of responsibility that covers Afghanistan. The name of the JRTs was later changed to PRTs at the request of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The PRTs provide support to the central government and not to local warlords.[30] In his opinion, warlords rule regions; governors rule provinces.[31]

Accordingly, PRTs were first introduced in Afghanistan in late 2002 and were intended to have an ''ISAF-like'' effect outside Kabul by creating ''nodes'' of stability while maintaining a ''light footprint'' of the military forces.[32] The PRTs replaced the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams (CAT-As).[33] Originally a U.S.-led effort, PRTs were a new model of military-civilian integration, which permitted civilian personnel to work in highly dangerous environments under the protection of military forces.

As of March 2008, there were 26 PRTs in Afghanistan and 28 PRTs in Iraq. Beginning in October 2006, the PRTs were made part of the NATO-led ISAF mission. Of the 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, 12 PRTs are under U.S. command. The U.S.-led PRTs include those in Asadabad, Gardēz, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Khowst, Mehtar Lam, Farah, Qalat, Sharana, Nuristan, and Panjshir. The ISAF multinational PRTs include those in Baghlan (Hungary), Chaghcharan (Lithuania), Fayzabad (Germany), Herat (Italy), Kunduz

(Germany), Mazari Sharif (Sweden), Maymana (Norway), Qala-e Naw (Spain), Kandahar (Canada), Lashkar Gah (United Kingdom), Tirin Kowt (Netherlands), Wardak (Turkey), Parwan (U.S./South Korea), and Baymian (New Zealand).[34]

Interestingly, the PRTs in Iraq are different in organization and command structure from those in Afghanistan. For the PRTs in Iraq, U.S. Department of Sate personnel lead the teams which consist mainly of civilian and contractor staff. The PRTs in Afghanistan are composed of 50–100 personnel with a U.S. military lead with only about three or four U.S. government civilian or contractor staff.[35]



Figure 5.2 Structure of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), ''Provincial Reconstruction Teams (GAO-09-86R) (Washington, DC, October 1, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0986r.pdf (last visited on July 16, 2009).

CSIS commentators note that

> PRTs gradually evolved a three-fold mandate: providing local security; conducting small-scale reconstruction; and facilitating the expanding presence of the central government. PRTs were sufficiently flexible to be tailored to unique operational environments, permitting commanders to exercise initiative and creativity. Although often characterized as civil-military teams, U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan remain overwhelmingly military in composition, with 80 to 100 soldiers under the command of a field grade military officer, most dedicated to force protection. The sole civilian components are individual representatives from State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture.[36]

The terms of reference for PRTs operating in Afghanistan were issued in 2005.[37] The GAO provides the following description of PRTs:

> In Afghanistan, PRTs perform development, reconstruction, and governance activities, and serve a monitoring and reporting function. Afghanistan has one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates and a life expectancy at birth of about 44 years. To help meet the country's significant needs, PRT projects include schools, health clinics, and roads efforts to build provincial governments' capacity by helping provincial officials develop basic management skills; and facilitating communication between the provincial and central governments. PRT representatives also participated in consultations on the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the Afghan government's 5-year development framework. In addition, according to State and USAID officials, PRTs serve a monitoring and reporting function, as PRT members report to their agencies on local conditions. [Footnote deleted.][38]

Further, a PRT Executive Steering Committee provides guidance and oversight over all PRTs in Afghanistan, as described by Peter Jakobsen:

> The committee, which meets once a month, is made up by the Afghan Minister of the Interior (chair), the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development; the commanders of ISAF and the CFC-A [Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan] (both co-chairs), the Special Representative to the United Nations Secretary General, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), NATO's Senior Civilian Representative, ambassadors of PRT contributing countries and potential contributing nations, and representatives of other nations as they become contributors to PRT operations.[39]

Jakobsen further notes:

> Two working groups report to the Executive Steering Committee and meet on a weekly basis to discuss operational issues. "This working group has the following membership: Ministry of Interior (chair), UNAMA's civil-military coordinator, CFC-A Task Force Victory, ISAF HQ, US Embassy and embassies of PRT-supporting nations or prospective PRT-supporting nations."[40]
>
> The NGO Civil Military Working Group meets once a month to facilitate communication among NGOs, international military forces and the Afghan government on operational issues, and address NGO concerns. It is chaired

> by the UNAMA Civil-Military Coordinator and composed of representatives from NGOs, NGO coordinating bodies (the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief [ACBAR], the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau [ANCB] and the South Western Afghanistan and Balochistan Association for Coordination [SWABAC], ISAF and CFC-A PRTs, other military forces, and representatives from UNAMA and the Afghan government. Its purpose is to share information, prioritize issues of concern for NGOs and the military, resolve and prevent conflicts between military and humanitarian actors, and document and distribute lessons learned on civil-military coordination. [Footnotes deleted.][41]

The foregoing discussion described the structure of PRTs; the following discussion will examine their effectiveness.

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRTS

In assessing the effectiveness of PRTs in bringing about stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, it is clear that PRTs are having a positive impact in Afghanistan. Although PRTs are making a small but positive contribution there are, nevertheless, a number of drawbacks to their current structure, composition, deployment, and relations with the civilian corps that must be critically assessed.

One Danish report concluded that

> the PRTs are successful because they have helped to extend the authority of the Afghan government beyond Kabul, facilitated reconstruction and dampened violence. At the same time, it is clear that they cannot address the underlying causes of insurgency in Afghanistan. The PRTs only make sense as part of an overall strategy in which they serve to buy time while other instruments are employed to tackle the military threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaida [*sic*]; the infighting between the warlords; the increased lawlessness and banditry; and the booming opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade. A comprehensive strategy that couples the deployment of more PRTs by NATO with determined action against these causes of instability is therefore required.[42]

The report also concludes that the UK model PRT that is operational in Mazar, which is focused on securitization rather than reconstruction (a thrust of the U.S.-led PRTs), is more successful, and therefore, preferable.[43] I would argue that although there may be merit in this assessment, there is certainly room for both securitization *and* reconstruction. The manner and strength of the deployments of PRTs with different missions, respectively, is a matter perhaps best left for coordination by the ISAF, working with U.S. military forces.

First, with regard to assessing the utility and success of PRTs, it is becoming increasingly clear that the civilian component, both in terms of personnel and funding, must be strengthened and augmented. Civilian participation,

Table 5.2 Comparison of Three PRT Models (United States, United Kingdom, Germany)

	U.S.-led PRT	UK-led PRT	German-led PRT
Principal Focus	Quick impact reconstruction	Security sector reform, active patrolling	Force protection, enabling civilian reconstruction
Military involvement on reconstruction	Considerable involvement	Limited involvement	Limited involvement
Degree of civil-military integration	Integration, civilian personnel embedded in military teams	Joint leadership, operational autonomy, separate reporting mechanisms	Separate leaderships, weekly coordination meetings
Responsiveness to UN and NGO suggestions	Limited	High	High

Source: Peter Jakobsen, "PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient," Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) (Report 2005:6) (2005), at 28, available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf (last visited on July 13, 2009).

although key, lacks resources and often plays an advisory role rather than a leadership role.[44] PRTs need a broad range of expertise on a variety of development-related areas and establishing the rule of law. Civilians must be able to play a leadership role, not only to stabilize the region but also to begin the process of reconstruction. One report, in fact, advocates that the Afghanistan PRTs be civilian-led, similar to the PRTs in Iraq.[45]

Second, there must be better civilian-military coordination. In the same way that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation[46] mandated "jointness" among individual U.S. military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force), the same kind of jointness between the military and the civilian corps must be strongly advocated and implemented, if not actually legislated into existence. Full integration of civilian efforts into military strategic interventions in Afghanistan is a necessary component of the stability operations and must be addressed on an institutional level among DOD, DOS, and USAID, among others. Taking a "whole-of-government" approach by the DOS has been viewed very favorably by certain commentators who also recommend that a cross-government approach be legislated by U.S. Congressional appropriations for PRTs.[47]

Moreover, certain observers have noted that the merger of military with civilian functions under the same "roof," so to speak, may result in the loss

of so-called ''humanitarian space.''[48] In other words, most NGOs and international organizations (IOs) often prefer not to be associated in funding, leadership, mission, or actual physical location with military operations.

Many NGOs foster the view that military actors are not actually engaged in humanitarian missions. Certain NGOs may argue that by providing humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in post-conflict areas, the military provides force protection, furthers the national foreign policies of the governments that they represent, or meets their international obligations. Thus, humanitarian missions may be viewed as an aspect of military-directed ''psychological operations'' whereby needy populations are furnished with food, water, and other basic human-needs assistance in order to further a political gain or advantage rather than for humanitarian purposes alone. Moreover, certain NGOs argue that military personnel often have no training in promoting sustainable development and lack a long-term development focus.[49]

Such organizations may find that

> [a] clear distinction between civilian and military roles is vital for the preservation of humanitarian space. In a conflict or other nonpermissive environment, if the local population is unable to differentiate between foreign civilian and military actors, all international entities may be perceived as belligerents. If military elements operate in civilian clothes and drive unmarked, nontactical vehicles while engaging in relief and reconstruction activities—as they did in Afghanistan during the summer of 2002—the boundary between civilian and military efforts can become blurred, if not erased altogether.[50]

This argument is often vehemently offered by NGOs and their counterparts in bilateral relief agencies and, in my view, is shortsighted. As the special report by the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) remarks, ''[h]umanitarian space is not an 'all-or-nothing' phenomenon. In many of the countries where the humanitarian community operates, 'humanitarian space' has a fluid quality.''[51]

Further, the USIP report states that

> [a]ssistance agencies make themselves targets simply by providing relief to the population. As the emphasis shifts from [an] emergency response to reconstruction and development, principles of impartiality and independence lose their applicability. . . . Mere association with the central government's objectives and its efforts to provide for its citizens and extend its writ throughout its sovereign territory is often sufficient to invite retaliation. From the perspective of many in the military, this is the primary reason for the loss of ''humanitarian space'' in Afghanistan and Iraq, and not the supposed blurring of civil and military roles caused by military involvement in civil action and reconstruction activities.[52]

Although I do understand the perspective of NGO personnel and others involved in humanitarian missions in post-conflict areas and the passion with which they feel that a clear distinction in both mission and operations should be maintained by the civilians and the military operating in such

arenas, this view neglects an important dimension of the conflict. The harsh reality is that such operations (whether seen as strictly humanitarian, as psychological operations, or as occupying a spectrum between the two) are unfolding in highly dangerous environments. The force protection offered by the military is critical, unless such NGOs are proposing to wait until the full and final cessation of all hostilities before commencing their humanitarian and reconstruction work. This approach, although preferable, is not feasible in the forbidding terrains in Afghanistan and other conflict-ridden areas.

The important humanitarian and related work offered by civilian missions and personnel is indispensable to the efforts at quelling the insurgencies and moving the post-conflict areas on a pathway forward. One commentator points out that "[t]he presence in war zones of military personnel and humanitarian staff is one of the most effective means of guaranteeing not only the delivery of the relief aid but also the protection of civilians from hostilities."[53]

Further, this aspect of the conflict goes back to a Clausewitzean principle that war is part of a continuum and may not have a discrete beginning and end. Thus, humanitarian operations may need to commence before armed hostilities have actually ceased. This may be an inconvenience that we will simply have to accept in prosecuting a long and "small war" that does not seem to have a true ending point.

Moreover, it should be clear that these actions are taking place in highly compromised and dangerous environments. The lack of sustainable or discernible progress should not be surprising in this context; however, the U.S. public in particular, and the international community in general, cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for tangible results. Although the dedicated efforts of the individuals (both civilian and military) operating in PRTs are courageous and necessary, the impact of their actions must have a palpable effect in ending the conflict and in securitizing, stabilizing, and transitioning the post-conflict societies in question. Only when a platform of stability is created can the important tasks of reconstruction begin in earnest.

Third, in assessing the success of PRTs, there seems to be a clear consensus that far more PRTs are needed in the field. As one commentator points out, establishing 22 PRTs in 3-1/2 years after the fall of the Taliban government is proceeding at a "snail's pace when dealing with an insurgency."[54] Also, PRTs should place a greater emphasis on capacity building in Afghanistan that improves local governance and helps link local officials with the central government, thereby enforcing federalism and better central organization of the country.[55] Others point out that "PRTs operate without an overarching concept of operations . . . do not have a unified chain of command, and often do not coordinate or exchange information on best practices."[56]

Thus, with regard to measuring the actual progress in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts (a broader focus than simply measuring the

relative success of the PRT model in the field), a USIP report described a matrix of discrete elements that should be applied in making an assessment. Starting with the premise that establishing an objective process for evaluating the progress of stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the report stated that the "main barriers to progress are political, not conceptual."[57] Often, political pressures are brought to bear on actors in the post-conflict scene to "declare that political objectives have been obtained," before this is really the case.[58]

In other words, "individual agencies are inclined to report their success at implementing programs rather than on their impact on stabilization."[59] This is particularly true because the success of an agency may be measured in terms of the funds it obligates rather than on whether the funds were actually disbursed and, if so, what impact the disbursement of funds had on achieving stabilization goals. The USIP study advocated creating a system of metrics, or measurable indicators of progress, to provide a critical assessment tool to the U.S. government. This tool could then be linked to clear, well-integrated goals and to strategic forward planning.

This study emphasizes measurable progress from the viewpoint of the U.S. government (and perhaps other national actors acting within the PRT framework), but it does not examine the measure of success as seen from the vantage point of the Afghanistan government. Although a consultative process with counterparts in the Afghan government is, no doubt, a daily occurrence in PRTs, it may be wise to also measure progress in terms of meeting the political goals and expectations of the host government. The host government's indicia of success also must be incorporated into the measure of success overall for the international community.

One of the most elusive elements to discuss in this context is the aspect of political will. In other words, what is the Afghan government or, even more broadly, the Afghan people willing to support in terms of their own securitization, stabilization, and transition from a war-torn society to one moving forward? This is the aspect of success that is the most difficult to measure, and frankly, I have not seen it as a measure of success from the point of view of international or bilateral donors during the course of my professional career. Perhaps this is an aspect that must be an integral part of the way in which this conflict is perceived and the way in which this conflict will end.

In conclusion, PRTs are a good example of creating local foreign-based teams of both civilian and military personnel with specialized areas of expertise, but PRTs are a beginning and not an end. Although strengthening existing and establishing new PRTs is a necessary component of the current effort to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan, this measure alone may not be sufficient to end the conflict. Unless a new cultural awareness and sensitivity to the underlying drivers of conflict are brought to bear in Afghanistan and other post-conflict areas, there may not be much tangible success in the end. The underlying factors of conflict will continue to be insufficiently

identified and fail to be dealt with in a consequential manner. We may expect this pattern to continue into the future.

Moreover, the PRT model demonstrates that there is a progressive merger of many different and seemingly incompatible actors and approaches to this conflict. First, there is a subtle merger between civilian and military missions, functions, and roles. Traditional roles of civilian agencies are now being performed or supported by military forces. This has major repercussions in terms of the underlying domestic and international law governing these acts and the politics giving rise to such laws.

Second, the internal cultures of the agencies fulfilling these roles (civilian, military agencies, NGOs, and international organizations) will and are being dramatically affected. The downstream implications of this may not yet be clear, but an important change in organizational cultures is already underway.

More importantly, taking a wide-angle view of the conflict in Afghanistan, there is a very distinct change in the mission focus that began fairly narrowly in 2001 in terms of capturing and/or killing Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants and overthrowing the Taliban leadership. The U.S. military later took on an agenda of securitization, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction in 2005. None of these elements was first thought of as part of the Afghanistan-related war effort when Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001.

Even with respect to securitization, the mission has evolved from "securitizing" Afghanistan from the perspective of defending the national interests of the United States to one that takes into account the "human security" factor of the civilians caught in the conflict. By supporting the individual security interests of innocent civilians as the top priority of the U.S. military operating in Afghanistan, the nature of its mission has shifted substantially but subtly. By adding the larger agenda of initiating reconstruction activities, the scope of the human security element has been enlarged further.

One commentator remarks unequivocally that

> peace and relief operations, therefore, represent a tremendous paradigm shift in military thinking and culture.[60]

This conclusion is based on the following observation:

> There has been a dramatic shift in approach to the protection of human rights to the effect that the military has been called upon to protect civilians in situations of gross human rights violations and grave breaches of [international humanitarian law] IHL by way of "humanitarian interventions" to safeguard innocent civilians. Thus, military forces are declining to be instruments for pursuing power policy, but are increasingly becoming guarantors of foreign policy primarily aimed at stability and peacemaking, which is pursued by States, coalitions such as the African Union (AU) and the UN. Although military personnel have been trained and organised [*sic*] primarily to conduct combat operations, the same expertise has given them a unique capability to undertake

> many of the functions involved in peace and relief operations. Combat troops are trained to close with and destroy an enemy. Yet, in peace and relief operations, they find themselves trying to maintain a peaceful environment without the use of force. Their mission is essentially to keep, enforce, and promote peace and to safeguard the geostrategic changes, hence a transition from an era of confrontation and strategic bipolarity to a more cooperative and multipolar world.[61]

Indeed, the underlying legal doctrine supporting IHL principles stems from the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Article 3 provides in relevant part that

> [p]ersons taking no active part on the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour [*sic*], religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or other similar criteria . . . [and] the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place . . . (a) violence to life and person . . . (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.[62]

By assuming a mission to protect civilians, the U.S. military is moving beyond the negative injunctions set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention and toward a duties-based legal regime. In other words, an argument could be made that the U.S. military has assumed a ''duty'' to protect the Afghan citizen beyond what is required by the Convention. If this argument is accepted, there has been a subtle movement in action (if not in policy or doctrine) toward civilian protection that goes beyond the requirement that civilians during wartime be ''humanely'' treated and not subjected to any violence or outrages to their personal dignity.

Interestingly, this approach mirrors, in principle, the ''Responsibility to Protect'' (RtoP). In 2005, the UN World Summit endorsed this ''groundbreaking'' doctrine, ''that sovereign States have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens but if a State is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizen, the responsibility falls on the international community.''[63] I am not making an argument that the RtoP principle has been adopted de facto (as a matter of fact) or *de jure* (as a matter of law) by the U.S. military, but there is an interesting resonance between the two.

Finally, the decentralized nature of the combat units and their smaller sizes also means that lower-ranking military officers may be taking on leadership roles, and this has ramifications that will be explored later in the text. In fact, there may be evidence that this approach is an effort to provide ''bottom-up'' securitization, reconstruction, and trust-building rather than ''top-down'' nation-building efforts planned centrally from Washington, DC, or from Kabul.

In light of the changed nature of the military mission and the means by which the mission is being implemented, there is ample room and reason to introduce the New Soldier. The New Soldier concept is designed to

address the larger "human security" aspect of the conflict. Deploying the New Soldier as a war-fighter with a heightened cultural awareness and sensitivity may be one means of seeking to end this intractable conflict. Cultural intelligence may be key in winning this conflict and may be the "amplifier" that definitively brings this conflict to a successful conclusion.

Further, in making PRTs more relevant to the SSTR policy platform, it seem clear that securitization and stabilization are among the first priorities for PRTs in terms of initiating a stable cease-fire and ensuring the safety of local nationals. While "reconstruction" has been addressed by U.S.-led PRTs, in particular, in terms of initiating activities that rebuild the destroyed physical infrastructure of Afghanistan (e.g., roads, bridges, airports, schools, hospitals, government buildings), very little attention has been given to the "T" or the *transition* in SSTR.

Defense Directive 3000.05 "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," discussed previously, has the word "transition" in its title, but the DOD policy document does not give any background of what "transition operations" are or how they should be carried out. The S/CRS defines its mission as helping to "stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy,"[65] However, there is no actual definition of "transition."

On its Web site, USAID reports:

> In July 2009, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched a country program in Afghanistan to support the U.S. Government's stabilization and reconstruction initiatives. A new part of this effort is to bring stability to violence-prone areas of the country. The initial objective of the Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI) is to address instability by creating conditions that build confidence and trust between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and local Afghan communities. In close coordination with the International Security Assistance Force, ASI aims to improve the economic and social environment in Afghanistan through small community-enhancement projects. In addition, ASI will support the GIRoA by providing increased public access to information about its social, economic, and political activities and policies.[64]

Although this description is a bit obscure, it seems that the USAID program is focused on "small community projects" (of an indeterminate nature) and the dissemination of public information on political activities and policies.

Because there is no policy directive from DOD, DOS, or USAID that explains or defines "transition," it is not clear whether "transition" is meant to be political, economic, legal, or emotional in nature. This policy vacuum is very telling, and I propose that it be filled with transition activities that should be implemented by the New Soldier. I will argue that the role of the New Soldier in the context of "transitioning" post-conflict societies beyond the stabilization phase may be viewed very broadly. The New Soldier

(acting as an integral part of the PRTs in the field) may, in fact, be deployed to accomplish the following: (1) build trust; (2) build peace; and (3) build reconciliation.

The role of politics and diplomacy in transitioning post-conflict societies has already been addressed in Chapter 4, and only a few points need be highlighted here. Let me make one distinction clear at the outset, however. I am not arguing that the New Soldier be viewed or deployed as a de facto international "diplomat" insofar as soldiers are not legally authorized with appropriate and sufficient delegated authority to engage in this type of diplomacy. However, because the New Soldier is among the first responders to the scene of conflict and/or post-conflict areas, he or she may be in a unique and highly favorable position to initiate a *process* leading to diplomatic negotiation.

Although the actual diplomatic process of ending the conflict officially may be initiated by special political envoys, professional international mediators, or actual diplomats of the international community that have the political will and proper authority to act in this capacity, there is still room for the New Soldier to act in this context. Indeed, the New Soldier may be in a highly favorable position to ascertain the true nature of the underlying conflict by using his or her specialized "active" listening skills, knowledge of local conditions, and familiarity with local actors who carry weight with the community.

The conflict that expresses itself in extremist fundamentalism resulting in terrorist acts may actually be deeply rooted in past grievances, historical inequities, or personally driven agendas. The New Soldier may have unique insight into the "drivers" of the conflict, the players, and how best to seek a reconciliation of opposing interests, factions, tribes, warlords, or other relevant actors. This is not to suggest that all actors and all opposing interests in a conflict of this nature may ultimately be reconciled—that would be an overly optimistic and naïve view—but making the initial determination of who may be an "irreconcilable" is a major starting point. Understanding which person should be subject to an armed confrontation, be subject to capture for prosecution under relevant law enforcement regimes, or be subject to a peace and reconciliation effort is vital knowledge in this context.

Further, understanding the essentials of the conflict, and its underlying causes requires skills that are highly intuitive and emotions-based. I realize that this may be foreign territory for most war-fighters, but it is a skill that I believe may be cultivated. The use of empathy can become a weapon of war if it is used to identify the sources of the conflict and to seek empowering and trust-building ways for resolving the conflict.

In fact, the experienced New Soldier may rely on his or her own life experiences to build a strong bond of communication and empathy with the participants in the conflict. This bond, once forged, may help bring about a stronger, more lasting result if it is based on mutual understanding and

respect. Humor may also be a key to unlocking hidden hostilities by finding a way to humanize rather than dehumanize the actors involved in the conflict. This is the transition where "hard power" becomes "soft power," which then becomes "smart power."

One of the points made earlier in Chapter 4 is the possibility of using independent consultative groups, NGOs, or neutral parties to lead a negotiated peace-finding process. In other words, South Africans and Rwandans, for example, that are well-versed in the truth-and-reconciliation process may be neutral parties to begin the discussion in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines, or other regions of strife. In fact, the truth-and-reconciliation process may be a good starting point to identify grievances and to start the healing process.

Of course, the first element of this undertaking is trust. Trust must be cultivated by the New Soldier, by the independent negotiator (if there is one), and by the locals within the affected conflict-ridden community itself. There must, however, be the requisite political will to achieve trust on all sides. Airing grievances and finding a safe place in which to express deeply felt and hidden emotions in a constructive, nonviolent way builds trust and helps to initiate the healing process. Further, this becomes a building block for peace and, later, for political reconciliation. This is the stage at which the politically driven reconciliation process may begin leading to actual political gains or achieving discrete political goals.

Needless to say, it may also be very easy to become bogged down in the process of "listening," so this process must be initiated consciously with specific targets, goals, and political outcomes in mind. (I am not proposing "therapy for terrorists.") However, a constructive, well-structured dialogue that is linked to specific, objective, well-publicized, and politically accepted goals by all participants may be the beginning of an actual "transition" in SSTR operations.

This "transition" is difficult to bring about because it actually takes place in an emotional terrain where it remains unseen. Unlike seeing a bridge being built over a river, this "bridge" is an emotional one that is far more difficult to build and sustain. Regardless of its ephemeral (or spiritual) nature, it is a critical foundation that will ensure that the same conflict does not erupt again. Dispositively ending the conflict will ensure the success of the final outcome of SSTR operations. Otherwise, we may be left fighting "ghost wars" forever.

Further, in building on the transition initiatives that have already been undertaken by USAID in Afghanistan, there may also be room to build the capacity of local counterparts in Afghanistan by using the PRT structure. One study points out that

> [o]ne of the most important goals of PRT operations is to build the capacity of [the] provincial government. Although programs aimed at teaching governance skills serve a valuable purpose, they are no substitute for directly involving

> local leaders in the process of project development, budgeting and oversight. A process that vests local leaders with a degree of executive authority creates a perception of legitimacy in the community, and local stakeholders who help design and implement projects feel invested in their long term success.[66]

Capacity building may be fraught with all sorts of underlying political land mines, but using the New Soldier to build local capacity in governance and democratization may vest the provincial government with both the skills and the will to politically reconstruct Afghanistan. This may be another very important facet of making a ''transition'' to a stable and viable post-conflict society in a political dimension.

Thus, the New Solder may be a vital instrument in creating a broad-based foundation for dialogue, reconciliation, and transition to a stable, securitized post-conflict society. The New Soldier may be trained and deployed to build trust, peace, and reconciliation. Thus, the current function of ''peace operations'' may also include ''peacebuilding'' activities that can incrementally lead to sustainable peace and help rebuild the post-conflict society.

The use of diplomacy (with a small ''d'') by the New Soldier, along with actively seeking creative, innovative, and nonviolent means of exploring conflict resolution, may help facilitate the creation of a platform—a platform for sustainable political, economic, and legal transformation of a post-conflict or collapsed society. This platform may then be used by actual diplomats, social scientists, civil engineers, architects, designers, air traffic controllers, city planners, and countless others to commence their important work. The New Soldier should be regarded as another means of initiating an important end.

The New Soldier, if deployed, could be instrumental in stabilizing fragile states, reconstructing war-torn and collapsed societies, and, perhaps most importantly, transitioning them to politically and economically viable nation-states. Thus, the next chapter will explore how to operationalize the concept of the New Soldier. In so doing, we now shift from Afghanistan to Africa, another region deeply affected by fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism.

6

Operationalizing the Concept of the New Soldier: A Model Case Study of the NATO Response Force and the African Union Standby Force

This chapter will address how to operationalize the concept of the New Soldier and will discuss the institutional framework in which to do so. The training and deployment of the New Soldier as a new approach will be discussed in relation to the NATO Response Force (NRF), and the African Union Standby Force (ASF). Moreover, the synergies in terms of NATO support for the creation and training of the ASF forces will be explored within the context of controlling and eradicating fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists operating in North Africa (the Sahel) and West Africa.

Chapter 5 examined the NATO-led ISAF within the context of its operations in Afghanistan beginning in 2001. NATO has also ''stood up'' the NRF consisting of about 21,000 troops.[1] The NRF is designed to be a rapid-response expeditionary force that should be viewed as one that is extremely suitable for deploying the New Soldier, as explained in the following discussion.

The idea for a NATO rapidly deployable response force was first suggested by former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during a September 2002 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers.[2] The potential political reasons underlying this suggestion vary greatly—from giving NATO a push toward developing a credible war-fighting capacity in exigent circumstances to better incorporating NATO into ongoing operations in Afghanistan at the time.[3] In any case, the NRF was created in 2002 ''as the vehicle for the 'transformation' of NATO from a large, static force designed to fend off massive Soviet armies into an agile expeditionary outfit.''[4]

One commentator notes that

> [t]o NATO's credit, its 1999 adaptation to the end of the Cold War was fundamental, monumental and appropriate; it finally and formally recognized that its traditional threat was gone; it moved from the static/active defense concepts of the prior decades toward a strategic concept that emphasized security missions outside of traditional NATO areas; and it stressed the importance of developing new capabilities to meet new threats. Furthermore, operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have accelerated thinking that NATO's military relevancy lies, not in the ability to provide heavy land forces or tactical fighter planes in defense of NATO territory, but rather in the ability to act quickly to stabilize distant situations which, left untended, could break out into a larger conflict. Political, social and economic chaos is the new perceived enemy of The Western State. This changed environment requires new tools: better intelligence, quicker force generation, greater power projection, and more precise weaponry.[5]

The NRF also may be viewed within the context of the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) launched in September 1999 during NATO's Washington summit. By the 2002 Prague summit, it was clear that DCI was failing to merge European and U.S. military technology and war-fighting capabilities. At this time, the U.S. proposed creating the NRF, and the DCI was "quietly retired and replaced by the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC)."[6]

Thus, by creating a highly mobile and responsive expeditionary force, the NRF could be very useful in meeting future military challenges by deploying, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile defense, and nuclear-biological-chemical detection and decontamination units.[7] Additionally, the NRF air, land, and maritime components could give greater interoperability as part of a joint or combined force with either the European Union European Rapid Reaction Force or with U.S. forces.

The NRF was designed to include about 25,000 troops at full operational capability, capable of deploying after five days' notice for military operations lasting 30 days or longer, if resupplied.

> At full operational capability, the NRF would consist of a brigade-sized land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force comprised of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of generating 200 sorties a day, and a special forces component.[8]

At its Istanbul summit, NATO delineated the NRF's possible missions as follows:

- a stand-alone force for Article 5 [of the NATO articles of association] collective defense or non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as evacuations, disaster relief and consequence management, humanitarian or counterterrorism operations
- an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-on forces
- deterrence of crises by demonstrating NATO determination and solidarity.[9]

Further, after a six-month training program, the NRF would be put "on call" for six months. After each NRF rotation, these force components would be replaced every six months by a fresh set of units that had completed the six-month training cycle.

Full operating capability was declared for the NRF at NATO's Riga summit in November 2006. The NRF has a total force structure of approximately 25,000 personnel and is under the operational command of the Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum (JFC HQ Brunssum).[10] The NRF may be deployed wherever the North Atlantic Council, the policy and decision-making body of NATO, feels that it should be utilized, and those operations may take place well beyond the borders of actual NATO members.

In fact, two deployments have already been made: first, during the NATO Katrina Support Operation in the United States, and second, in the NATO Disaster Relief Operation in Pakistan (October 2005 through February 2006) after the October 8, 2005, earthquake hit Pakistan.[11] In addition, the NRF was used during the 2004 Olympic Games, the 2004 Iraqi Elections, and for providing humanitarian relief to Afghanistan.[12]

Of course, naysayers believe that the "NRF has failed to fill its roster, and has been informally cut back," and further, that "the NRF is a force that should be on steroids, and instead it's on life support,"[13] but it may be too soon to make such definitive pronouncements. Indeed, the NRF shows great promise to be an effective military tool.

Indeed, General James Jones, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), was quick to point out, "I think that NATO's best days are very possibly in its future. But we must do a better job of understanding what that future is, of explaining it to our nations on both sides of the Atlantic, and understanding that the future of NATO is not to be a reactive, defensive static alliance, but it is to be more flexible, more proactive."[14]

The NRF is designed to be the first permanent NATO expeditionary force to respond quickly to crises (whether military or humanitarian in nature). The NRF provides a

> technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the [Atlantic] Council. The NRF concept was a far cry from the static fight-in-place force that has been the foundation for NATO throughout the Cold War. The expeditionary nature of the unit would give NATO the ability to pursue the full spectrum of options with regards to addressing security issues at the sources.[15]

Indeed, General Jones noted that the creation of the NRF was "an important recognition on the part of the Alliance that the international security environment has changed dramatically."[16]

The NRF troops (and their commanders) must make quick, informed judgments on how to best resolve conflicts and stabilize the situation at

hand. These are precisely the sorts of circumstances that require the exercise of judgment informed by intuition, cultural intelligence, and empathy. For example, of the five past deployments of the NRF, three were relief and humanitarian missions. The other two (namely, the Iraqi elections and the Olympic Games, both of which took place in 2004) involved discrete events that were very short in duration.

Thus, with regard to humanitarian and relief operations of the NRF, using the New Soldier profile could be a very useful starting point. For example, the NRF soldiers could be trained to excise "active" listening skills to ascertain the problems as perceived by the affected civilian populations. Demonstrating "empathy" or an understanding of the losses felt by affected civilians and the ensuing panic they are feeling over losing loved ones, homes, and businesses does not mean the individual soldier is losing himself or herself in the emotions of others. It simply means demonstrating a calm outward demeanor while expressing some human understanding of the difficulties and the painful emotions that the civilians are experiencing. Rather than adding to the tensions implicit in any crisis situation, the emotionally receptive demeanor of the New Soldier may help dampen the underlying sources of conflict and calm the affected civilian populations.

Moreover, being aware of the cultural setting and the context in which a specific crisis is unfolding is also key in terms of understanding and resolving the conflict as expeditiously as possible. Cultural sensitivity and language skills may be very important factors in bringing the crisis to a close.

The reason that the NRF (or NATO in general) may be an optimal choice with respect to the first deployment of the New Soldier is twofold. First, NATO is already a multinational, multilingual, and multicultural military force where the profile of the New Solider is already a natural "fit." Second, by engaging in expeditionary, rapid response, humanitarian, and related missions, NATO troops will need to navigate quickly and assuredly through many difficult and challenging physical, cultural, and emotional terrains.

Indeed, NATO training may already require that different linguistic and cultural (both nationally and in terms of military cultures) be integrated to ensure the smooth operation of its troops in the field. The qualities of the New Soldier could be added to the NATO six-month-long training for its NRF troops, which may help bring a human face to its humanitarian mission. This will mean that the command structure, training, and doctrine may need to be adjusted accordingly. In sum, the mission scope of the NRF lends itself to using the New Soldier profile, especially for the reasons described in the following text.

NATO IN AFRICA

Although there have not been any NRF-specific interventions in Africa to date, NATO has had a substantive presence in Africa from 2005 onward.

Beginning in 2005, NATO began its collaboration with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This was the first Africa-based mission for NATO, and the AU viewed it as a "very positive and promising level of cooperation"[17] between the two institutions.

In providing assistance to AMIS, NATO made its airlift capacity available to more than 37,500 AU peacekeepers in and out of Darfur, Sudan. This support reflects NATO's commitment to strengthen the capability of the AU to expand its presence in Darfur to attempt to contain the growing violence. Apart from providing logistical support in terms of strategic airlift and other operations, NATO transported approximately 3,800 AU troops, including 49 members of the civilian police force.[18]

In addition, NATO provided Staff Capacity Building workshops for the AU officers within the Deployed Integrated Task Force (DITF) headquarters in Ethiopia. For example, one training session was held from August 1–22, 2005, and addressed command and control issues, intelligence collection and analysis, situational awareness, and standard operating procedures development and refinement.[19]

NATO assistance to AMIS terminated on December 31, 2007, after the actual termination of AMIS in December 2007. NATO was then involved in the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a hybrid mission that succeeded AMIS. UNAMID commenced its operations on January 1, 2008.[20] In fact, the AU has already requested further NATO assistance in Darfur.[21]

Further, in June 2007, NATO accepted the request to assist the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and mainly provided airlift support for personnel and supplies contributed by AU member states. The assistance was extended to June 17, 2009, and further extensions are expected.[22]

Additionally, in relation to Somalia, NATO defense ministers responded to a request from the United Nations by authorizing a "fleet of naval vessels to help protect U.N. World Food Program ships carrying relief supplies to Somalia."[23] In 2009 alone, Somali piracy demands for ransom amounted to more than US$30 million. As of spring 2009, NATO replaced the flotilla conducting anti-piracy patrols off Somalia with a new force that will continue the operation "indefinitely."[24]

In May 2009, NATO defense ministers met in Brussels to consider ways to combat piracy in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and ordered the long-term deployment of a naval squadron—known as Standing Naval Maritime Group 2—to the region. The new force will continue to operate in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, where international patrols involving war ships from NATO, the European Union, and other nations have been working to reduce attacks on merchant ships by Somali pirates.[25]

In fact, the AU has actively sought long-term cooperation with NATO in terms of meeting the security needs of Africa. The former African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit, visited NATO's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on March 2, 2007, and met with

former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Ambassador Djinnit addressed the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal decision-making body, and discussed avenues of cooperation between NATO and the AU, particularly in terms of NATO support for AU efforts to bring peace to the strife-torn Darfur region.[26]

On September 5, 2007, the North Atlantic Council agreed to provide assistance to the AU by providing a study on the operational readiness of the ASF brigades. NATO received a Note Verbale from the AU on December 13, 2007, to continue NATO support to the newly formed ASF.[27] The relevance of NATO's support for the ASF will be explored next.

FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC-BASED TERRORISTS IN AFRICA

The relevance of NATO's intervention in Africa and its support for the ASF should be viewed in the broader context of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists in Africa, for purposes of discussion. In attempting to understand the nature of this terrorist threat in Africa, it is important to note that

> there are distinct regional variations to the presence and extent of Islamist terrorist networks across Africa. The threat in Southern and Central Africa is almost non-existent, and for a clear reason: there are relatively few Muslims in Central and Southern Africa. In these areas, Islamists are attempting to convert Christians to Islam, rather than proliferating radical Islamist networks.[28]

Islam is much more prevalent in Northern, Eastern and Western Africa, and accordingly, there are more Islamist groups, both radical and non-radical, in these areas than farther south.[29] It is also important to bear in mind that "Africa has more Muslims than the Middle East or Southeast Asia."[30] Therefore, it is important to begin with certain distinctions in mind, both in terms of geography and religion.

East Africa, of course, has been a long-time concern for the international community because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed, killing a handful of U.S. citizens and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. In fact, terrorists who attacked the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were closely linked to cells in Sudan and Somalia, both of which have served as training grounds and transit routes for Al Qaeda.

Most importantly, East Africa has also been home to both Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. In fact,

> in 1991 the leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF) government, Hassan al Turabi, invited Osama bin Laden to live in Sudan. During this time, bin Laden established multiple businesses in Sudan, many of which he retains, and established al-Qaeda training camps in the more remote areas.[31]

Indeed, the

> Horn of Africa—an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania—has been seen as ripe for terrorist activity, given the region's weak and often corrupt governments, ongoing violent conflicts, porous borders, ungoverned spaces, and grinding poverty. Osama bin Laden based his operations in Khartoum, Sudan from 1991 through early 1996.[32]

However, West Africa and the Sahel (i.e., Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad) are also highly problematic in light of the fact that

> [f]ailed or failing states in central and west Africa have already provided [an] opportunity for al Qaeda and criminal networks possibly affiliated with it for profit from the marketing of diamonds and other precious gems. Wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia opened this door and local warlords like Charles Taylor readily collaborated.[33]

One commentator also notes that

> [w]hile examples of state failure can be found in almost every region of the world, the problem has been especially prevalent in economically depressed and politically unstable areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Within that region, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia provide concrete examples of state failure.[34]

State failure is compounded by

> the weaknesses of many of the regimes in this area, their inability to monitor events in remote regions, and the vulnerability of impoverished populations to proselytizing and recruitment by radical Muslim elements affiliated with or drawing inspiration from Al Qaeda.[35]

More specifically, Marc Sageman sets forth a case study methodology based on terrorism and counterterrorism efforts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia, that differentiates terrorist network components of "hubs" and "nodes." In a 2004 analysis of Al Qaeda, Sageman distinguishes "hubs," which provide "centralized direction and communication linkages" among the nodes, from "nodes" which are decentralized, independent cells.[36]

Although the linkages between hubs and nodes may be weak, they present

> two very different kinds of terrorist threats in a failed state context. Nodes represent the threat of direct terrorist attack, either in the country in which they are operating, or in other countries to which the nodes have access. The threat posed by hubs is different and indirect. It is reflected in the ability of the hub to facilitate the operations of preexisting nodes and to enable attacks by those nodes on whatever targets the nodes determine are appropriate.[37]

Further,

> The case of Somalia suggests that failed states do, in fact, offer an effective venue for operations by evolved terrorist hubs. The environment in such states

> can provide what may be the greatest level of protection available to terrorist organizations from counterterrorism operations by military forces or law enforcement agencies. The case of Somalia also suggests that the violent and chaotic conditions within failed states may reduce dramatically the impact of local attacks by terrorist nodes, but will not preclude terrorist hubs from operating in their new, evolved mode to inspire ideologically or assist financially or materially the operations of geographically distributed nodes.[38]

Thus, the new focus on Africa is being driven by fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorists finding new safe havens in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and now West Africa, where the increased production of oil in Nigeria and Angola and the discovery of oil in Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea are complicating matters.[39] West Africa is continually plagued with instability, corruption, and separatist movements.

Further, the lack of operational maritime fleets and real maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea has led the U.S. Navy to donate patrol boats to Nigeria to help secure its ports and to help Nigeria undertake anti-piracy activities. In addition, the U.S. Navy is trying to shore up maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by launching a 10-year effort to develop and improve maritime security in countries such as Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé et Príncipe, and Togo.[40]

Not only has the U.S. military taken note of Africa's need to strengthen its security architecture in light of multiplying terrorist threats, but so has NATO. As early as 2004, NATO officials were negotiating with Mauritania on ways to secure its borders against infiltration by potential terrorists.[41] However, despite preventive measures to protect against terrorist infiltration, the situation has actually worsened over time.

Al Qaeda's affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), operates in North Africa and has launched a string of deadly attacks against Westerners and African security forces, spurring fears that foreign fighters from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are establishing a base in the area.[42] Retaliation by AQIM for France's policies banning the burqua and directed against the European countries who sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan are very much feared. The unpoliced, vast expanses of space in Mauritania, Niger, Mali, and southern Algeria may have created hospitable grounds to harbor terrorists or an insurgency movement.[43] Thus, NATO members have a vested interest in assisting Africa's efforts to stem the tide of extremist violence and terrorist infiltration in Africa's Muslim-dominated countries.

Indeed, the question has been posed: ''Can Europe build a NATO for Africa?''[44] While it may not be clear whether NATO *should* build a ''NATO for Africa,'' it is clear that NATO is taking a strong interest in assisting Africa to develop a stronger and more robust security architecture. The NRF is described as a ''coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package''

that allows the NRF to power project a 25,000 troop force worldwide. High-tempo combat conditions may be sustained for 30 days and longer if replenished.[45] Thus, one commentator notes that the NRF is one model for the ASF to use in developing an indigenous expeditionary capability to meet exigent security threats in the African continent. The relevance of the NRF to the ASF is important, but let us step back for a moment and trace the institutional development of the ASF.

CREATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION STANDBY FORCE (ASF)

Beginning in the 1990s, African leaders began to discuss the need for a revamped security architecture that would address the needs of the African continent. The deteriorating security framework, the end of the Cold War, and the need for collective action in light of previous failed attempts at changing the security grid led to a seminal conference held in Kampala, Uganda, in 1991.

More than 500 African leaders met at the all-African Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Kampala to discuss security-related problems. The Kampala Document was issued at the end of the conference and later was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Governments.[46] The Kampala Document called for the establishment of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) designed to promote and strengthen the cooperation of all African nations in ensuring the security of Africa as a whole. The thirty-sixth session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, adopted the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration.[47]

Meanwhile, in 1992, the OAU Secretary-General issued a report titled "Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," which advocated for an overall institutionalized rather than an ad hoc approach to security issues in Africa. A year later, in 1993, the OAU members formally established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at a meeting in Cairo, Egypt.[48] In 2002, the OAU was replaced by the AU modeled on the European Union.

In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted a document titled "The Policy Framework Document on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and of the Military Staff Committee (MSC)."[49] Within a few days following the issuance of this document, African ministers of foreign affairs recommended that regular consultations be held to consolidate the proposals contained in the document. The AU Heads of States and Government endorsed this recommendation and adopted an amended framework document in July 2004.[50]

At the first session of the AU, the AU assembly created the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing decision-making organ, to be supported by the ASF, among other supporting architecture.[51] The protocol establishing the PSC and the ASF entered into force in December 2003, a rapid accession that evidenced the seriousness of the AU members in their political commitment to establish the ASF, among other things. The ASF supplanted earlier attempts to create a viable security architecture continent-wide for Africa. The ASF is part of a larger, institutionalized security framework that has several supporting components, including:

> the incorporation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as well as the formulation of a Common African Defense and Security Policy which delineates the member states' collective responses to both internal and external security threats in February 2004 [which] completed this institutional architecture.[52]

Indeed,

> [t]he purpose of the ASF is to provide the African Union with capabilities to respond to conflicts through the deployment of peacekeeping forces and to undertake interventions pursuant to article 4(h) and (i) of the Constitutive Act in terms of which the AU was established. The ASF is intended for rapid deployment for a multiplicity of peace support operations that may include, *inter alia*, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post conflict disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration and humanitarian assistance.[53]

The final concept for the ASF was to create five brigade-level forces, one in each of the five regions of Africa, supported by civilian police forces and other force augmentation. The rollout of the ASF force structure would require an Africa-wide integrated, interoperable command, control, communication, and information systems (C3IS) infrastructure that would link deployed units with ASF headquarters and the regional bases.

The brigade level consists of 5,000 troops per brigade that are ready for rapid deployment. Subregional ASF leadership would exercise command and control over each of the five standby brigades as control of the C3IS infrastructure. The AU Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission will establish command and control over the five brigades (25,000 troops) and the civilian components, including the underlying intelligence and communications operations.[54]

The operationalization of the ASF was painstakingly detailed in the "Roadmap for Operationalization of the African Standby Force," adopted by a group of experts' meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on March 22 and 23, 2005.[55]



Figure 6.1 **The African Peace and Security Architecture**

Adapted from Benedikt Franke, "Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture," *6 Strategic Insights* (January 2007), formerly available at http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/frankeJan07.pdf (last visited on July 16, 2009). See also Benedict Franke, *Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal* (FirstForum Press, 2009).

The ASF structure—with its associated deployment timelines—is informed by six missions and scenarios:

- **Scenario 1**: AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the PSC.
- **Scenario 2**: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.
- **Scenario 3**: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.

- **Scenario 4**: AU/regional peacekeeping force for UN Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.
- **Scenario 5**: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
- **Scenario 6**: AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days.[56]

The ASF was designed to be phased into being in two stages. The first phase (up to June 2005) was designed to establish a strategic management capacity of missions related to Scenarios 1 and 2. In addition, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), discussed later in this chapter, were intended to complement the efforts of the ASF by establishing regionally based standby forces up to a brigade size capable of handling Scenario 4 missions. In other words, the ASF uses the existing military and institutional structures of RECs rather than trying to duplicate them. The second phase of operationalizing the ASF (July 2005 to June 30, 2010) projected that the ASF would be able to handle complex peacekeeping operations that incorporate full missions related to Scenarios 5 and 6.

By 2010, the ASF will be expected to meet the challenges posed by all six scenarios, which include the following:

- Scenario 4: AU peacekeeping and preventive deployment within 30 days of a mandate
- Scenario 5: a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, including the possibility of enforcement, with the military component deploying in 30 days and the entire mission in 90 days
- Scenario 6: deployment of a robust military presence in 14 days to stop a genocide. For AU leadership, the most important (and challenging) scenario is Scenario 6—to be able to stop another genocide similar to the one that occurred in Rwanda in 1994.[57]

Additionally, RECs would be required to continue to develop their capacity to deploy forces capable of handling Scenario 4 cases.

Next, it is important to understand the linkage of the ASF to the RECs. The five regions in Africa to host regional ASF standby forces are Eastern, Western, Southern, Central and Northern.

EAST AFRICA

The Eastern ASF brigade coordinates with the Eastern Africa Community (EAC) to form the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG).

The Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) met in Junja, Uganda, from February 13–14, 2004, and adopted a Policy Framework and a Legal Framework to operationalize EASBRIG. The framework was approved by the meeting of Ministers of Defense held on July 16–17, 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with an approved US$2.5 million budget. EASBRIG now has three components: the brigade headquarters to be located in Addis Ababa, the Planning Element to be based in Nairobi, and the Logistic base to be co-located with the Brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa.[58]

The members of the Eastern ASF now include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Burundi has asked to join Eastern Africa and, therefore, is no longer considered to be a member of Central Africa. Additionally, Tanzania, Madagascar, and Mauritius, who had previously been members, are now active in Southern Africa.[59]

EASBRIG does have its share of difficulties in standing up. However, international donors financially sustain much of EASBRIG and supply it with military advisers and contractors. Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya, EASBRIG's two anchor states, continues to be slow, thus impeding the progress made in establishing the brigade and creating the command and control structures. Also, two of the most conflict-ridden countries in Africa, Sudan and Somalia, are located in Eastern African and pose daunting challenges to the subregion.[60]

WEST AFRICA

The Economic Opportunity of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIG) appears to be the farthest along because it has designated 5,000 troops to be on "standby" status. Further, ECOBRIG has established a command-and-control mechanism with international donor assistance. A high-readiness component, the ESF task force, has also been established, consisting of about 3,000 soldiers that are able to deploy within 30 days under Nigerian leadership. The task force headquarters is located in Abuja, Nigeria, and ECOBRIG has already completed its concept of operations, doctrine, and standard operating procedures.[61]

Training needs have been identified, and several centers for excellence have been established to provide strategic, operational, and tactical levels of education and training. Specifically, there are three centers of training excellence, namely, the National Defence College in Abuja, Nigeria, for the strategic level; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, for the operational level; and the École de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in Bamako, Mali, for the tactical level training.[62] In addition, a logistics center has been established.[63]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The South African Development Community (SADC) chiefs of defense staff and police chiefs approved the formation of a SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) in July 2004, in Maseru, Lesotho. The SADCBRIG was officially launched in August 2007, and has made steady progress with respect to its operationalization but has met only part of its commitment to have 5,000 troops on standby.[64] A Planning Element (PLANELM) and a center of excellence have been established. Further, South Africa and Botswana are able to provide airlift, and South Africa is capable of providing sealift within the region.[65]

Issues still faced by SADCBRIG include funding (now mainly sourced from international donors), logistical support, and deciding where to establish the military depot. Additionally, interoperability, effective communication, and capacity building remain as challenges.[66]

CENTRAL AFRICA

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is composed of 11 member states, namely Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé et Príncipe The ECCAS has now approved a structure for the regional headquarters and the ECCAS PLANELM. By 2008, the regional PLANELM in Libreville, Gabon, had about 20 staff members as well as equipment for the ECCAS standby brigade. The brigade currently has a troop force of about 3,000.[67]

> The proposed centers of excellence for ECCAS are CSID (Cours Supérieur Inter-Armées de Defense, created in 2005 and funded by France) in Youndé, Cameroon, for the strategic level, EEML (École d'État-Major de Libreville, created in 2003 and also funded by France) in Libreville, Gabon, for operational training and EFOFAA in Luanda, Angola, for tactical level training. There are also plans to develop a school in Cameroon into an international police training centre of excellence. In addition, the region has a number of smaller national centres, including one for medical training (Libreville) and one for engineers (Congo), that could play a regional role in due course. The region has also agreed to locate the logistic base for the ECCAS Standby Force in Doula, Cameroon.[68]

French bilateral support for ECCAS is critical, and without its direction, it is unclear whether Central African support for ECCAS would have continued into the future. Underfunding of ECCAS operations nevertheless continues to be a major problem. Moreover, the persisting conflicts in Chad, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain problematic.[69] Other problems include the weak harmonization of ECCAs with the AU decision-making structure, weak managerial capacity, and the inadequate skills of many officers attached to the PLANELM.[70]

NORTH AFRICA

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was originally nominated to be the coordinator for the northern region for the ASF, but as Egypt was not a member of the AMU, this posed certain difficulties. Libya later became the coordinator, and the region established the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC), which includes Egypt. NARC has the mandate to establish the North Africa Standby Force, and accordingly, a memorandum of understanding has been signed at the ministerial level by a number of heads of states and government. The brigade headquarters is located in Libya, and the PLANELM is located in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt has offered to designate the Cairo peacekeeping training school as a regional center of excellence.[71] In addition, the UN has offered the use of its Brindisi logistic facilities in Italy—either as a continental logistic base or for use by the North Africa Standby Force.[72]

In assessing the ASF at this stage, it appears unlikely that the ASF will meet its goal of becoming fully operational by 2010. Although the regionally based brigades should be able to meet the needs of Scenarios 1 through 4, which primarily require observation, meeting the needs of Scenario 5 of multidimensional peacekeeping mission with deployments of 30 days is unlikely.

Indeed, the results of the African-led operations in Darfur (AMIS) and in Somalia (AMISOM) are not encouraging. AMIS was consistently undermanned with a few thousand peacekeepers and lacked sufficient mobility capability or equipment. Although the UN instituted a hybrid mission, thereby expanding the number of troops to 26,000, this was a UN-led rather than an ASF-led measure. AMISOM deployed only 1,500 troops and was generally considered to be a failure. Indeed, right now, the Somali government is fighting against renewed insurgencies with little support, and the Ethiopians have refused its request for military intervention.

With regard to meeting the needs of Scenario 6 (stopping genocide), one commentator discouragingly notes that "there is no way in which the ASF will have the capacity in 2010 or even in 2020."[73] He further notes:

> The will and capabilities to stop genocide will require an outside power, such as the United States, Britain or France and perhaps a regional hegemon, such as Nigeria or South Africa, to decide to intervene and to take on most of the burden. A multinational force will be unable to achieve the unity of effort to deploy and stop genocide. African militaries lack enforcement and counter-insurgency capabilities to stop genocide.[74]

Thus,

> [g]iven the scarcity of resources and dependence on donors and the likelihood of more internal conflict in weak African states, the ASF and the sub-regional commands are not sustainable and will not be for a very considerable period of time to come. Donor fatigue will eventually pose problems for the ASF.[75]

This is certainly a disappointing conclusion but one that indicates that the ASF has nevertheless made uneven, sporadic progress over the past several years. The largest impediment is financial support for "standing up" the ASF standby forces. However, the lack of capacity, staffing, and training has also been problematic, and one commentator notes that this failing ultimately translates into "an absence of leadership.[76]

In light of the fact that there is only a slim likelihood that the UN will stage major interventions or robust peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the future, there is also general agreement that the ASF should deploy in advance of the UN to meet peacekeeping needs in Africa.[77]

Thus, if the ASF deploys first, with the UN following with a multidimensional peace support operation, two problems may arise in this context. First, the deployment of the ASF before the UN effort could lead to a severe and early depletion of ASF forces in its regional capacity. This may mean that a supplementation by Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian troops may be necessary. Second, there is anecdotal evidence that African troops prefer being deployed in a UN mission over an ASF one.[78]

So, rather than relying in principle, in any case, on future supportive UN peacekeeping operations, one approach that may be worthy of future exploration is to partner the ASF with the NRF. Indeed, because most (if not all) of Africa was once a colonial territory of a European country, it would not be a stretch in policy to foresee a strategic European-based interest in intervening militarily to assist Africa in meeting its regional peacekeeping requirements.

Further, the organization and command structure of the NRF may be well-suited in terms of providing backup support for ASF-led missions. Fuller integration and rapid force deployment in coordination between the two rapid-response forces may be an interesting avenue to explore, if it is not being done already. This partnership will help the ASF to meet its Scenario 4 needs of deploying within 30 days to engage in peacekeeping operations and preventive deployments.

An integration between the NRF and the ASF to permit interoperability with respect to advance warning systems, rapid deployments, and joint training may be worthwhile options to explore. In addition, the NRF may be able to provide tactical airlift and sealift to the ASF in some instances. This sentiment is echoed by another commentator who states unequivocally that the "North Atlantic Council should be prepared to deploy the NATO Response Force and other key assets to support AU or UN peace operations, or stand-alone interventions in Africa if necessary."[79] Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the text, the AU has already sent a Note Verbale to NATO, requesting further assistance.

More generally, NATO's involvement in the overall strengthening of Africa's peace and security architecture from the perspective of improved command structure, interoperability, communications and information

sharing, training, logistics, and other related issues may be a very constructive future dialogue. In fact, it is clear that NATO is committing itself more to addressing the terrorist and related threats emanating from Africa and has strategic interests in the continued stability of Africa. Most of its members are separated from Africa only by a body of water, the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, in terms of a sustained military relationship between the NRF and the ASF, there are many avenues worth exploring.

Further, as explored earlier in this chapter, there is a platform for applying the concept of the New Soldier to the NRF. If this approach is accepted, then the same training may be applied to the ASF forces, whether in partnership with the NRF or as a stand-alone training exercise. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there may be a need to train not only the leadership level but also the noncommissioned officer level. The importance of the ''boots on the ground'' aspect of countervailing the Fearful Symmetry should not be underestimated. The ''lessons learned'' from these training exercises for the New Soldier may be especially relevant in quelling insurgencies, interethnic conflict, and other types of intrastate conflict. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has encouraged ''more cooperative military training and exercise participation to promote interoperability among participating countries' armed forces.''[80] Interoperability between the NRF and the ASF would be an excellent goal to pursue.

Epilogue: Resolving the Fearful Symmetry

In conclusion, the preceding discussion gave a detailed analysis using the dialectic method leading to the Fearful Symmetry. Further, a broad distinction has been drawn in terms of distinguishing Islamic-based separatists' movements from global jihadists. In addition, the rationale for using the "failure of the state" as the basis giving rise to Islamic-based separatists' movements was contrasted with the "failure of ideology" giving rise to global jihadists.

With respect to allocating the respective roles of international actors, four filters of analysis were used: military, diplomatic/political, economic, and cultural. These filters were applied to both separatists and jihadists to yield different courses of actions to be pursued by differing parties. With regard to Islamic-based separatists, for example, a cohesive and well-integrated diplomatic front with a detailed, tranched political process must be created and actively pursued.

Additionally, economic measures aimed at empowerment and poverty alleviation must be put in place, with cultural initiatives that are designed to win over young, impressionable, would-be and actual terrorists. With respect to global jihadists, however, economic, diplomatic, and political measures are largely irrelevant. Military action in terms of traditional law enforcement activities and creating a new soldier to fight the Fearful Symmetry must be operationalized. Finally, a cultural war also must be waged, and this poses a grave challenge to the Muslim world and the international community. The promise of a stable and fulfilling future somehow has been betrayed to Islamic-based terrorists and needs desperately to be restored to them.

In conclusion, however, to resolve the Fearful Symmetry, a New Soldier must be created. This soldier must demonstrate the highly subjective qualities of empathy and intuition, with a heightened perception of his or her surroundings, enabling him or her to move fearlessly in different cultural, linguistic, and emotional domains. Such a soldier must be both intuitive and wise. Thus, different cultural values (within the military and more broadly in Western-based societies) will need to be cultivated in order to create this new kind of soldier.

Several chapters provide a detailed examination of the application of the concept of the New Soldier in the context of U.S. military operations unfolding in Afghanistan. The concept is further broadened in terms of its potential application to the multilateral forces of both NATO and the African Union Standby Forces (ASF), both hopefully acting in concert with each other. The usefulness of the concept of the New Soldier depends on its deployment not only among the leadership ranks of various national and multilateral military forces but also among noncommissioned officers, or the so-called "boots on the ground." Thus, the concept requires a 360-degree application in terms of its use in unilateral and multilateral forces (acting with volunteers of national standing armies). In order to be fully successful, the New Soldier concept should be adopted by both high-ranking military leadership and the so-called "strategic corporal." This is, indeed, a wide prescription for change, but I feel that it is a necessary step in order to move forward at this point.

In the final analysis, however, despite any efforts to create and deploy a New Soldier, the Fearful Symmetry will be resolved only when and if the global terrorists themselves learn to love—not us, but themselves. Only by giving up their destructive and self-destructive nihilism and replacing it with a sense of self-respect and respect for others will the Fearful Symmetry truly end. This is the complex challenge that is posed by the Fearful Symmetry, and it is my sincere hope that we may all work together to revive hope and restore the faith in the future. The true leaders in the Fearful Symmetry are those who can inspire hope, faith, trust, and, finally, love. Only when we are able to live peaceably together will the promise of the future be restored to us. At that point, we may move past the Fearful Symmetry and welcome a new era of history that will begin when this one ends.

Notes

PREFACE

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3. Ibid. at 39–41.

4. Jeffrey Record, ''Why the Strong Lose,'' *Parameters* 16 (Winter 2005–06): 20–22.

5. Ibid. at 25.

6. Ibid. at 26.

7. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976) at 87, 89. (First published in 1832.)

8. Mazarr, ''The Folly of 'Asymmetric War','' note 1, *supra*, at 38.

9. Ibid. at 50. Professor Mazarr further argues that ''[t]he United States should powerfully enhance its efforts to reduce instability, conflict and radicalism in key areas of the world and to shore up institutionalization and governance in critical states. It should do so, however, by relying on an expanded and deepened set of non-military tools and do so largely in an anticipatory and collaborative manner rather than an ex post facto and interventionist one.'' Ibid. at 35.

10. Robert Gates, ''Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power,'' Remarks delivered by the Defense Secretary at Manhattan, Kansas (26 November 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (last visited on August 22, 2008).

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12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. ''Counterinsurgency,'' U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) (December 2006) at 1–4. General Petraeus further points that ''[r]ecently, ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity. When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government's ability to defend itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist.'' Ibid.

15. RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (RAND 2003) (James Dobbins et al., eds.) at 69.

16. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (26 November 2005), 4.2, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.

17. Ibid. at 4.3. *See also* Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) (December 2006), a U.S. Army field manual devoted to conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, coauthored by General David Petraeus. The manual states clearly that ''[Counterinsurgency] involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in [Counterinsurgency Operations] alone. Ibid. at 1–1.

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19. Ibid.

20. RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, note 15, *supra*, at xxv, xxxvi, xxxvii–xxxviii.

21. Gates, ''Beyond Guns and Steel,'' note 10, *supra*.

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7. Ibid. at 560.

8. Ibid. at 571.

9. Ibid. at 561.

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11. John Hamre and Gordon Sullivan, ''Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,'' 25 *Wash. Quarterly* 85 (2002): 85, formerly available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.4hamre.html (last visited on July 3, 2009).

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13. *See* DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, available at http://www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ (last visited on July 2, 2009).

14. *See* Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Wargaming Division, Small Wars Center of Excellence, available at http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/ (last visited on July 2, 2009.)

15. Janine Davidson, ''Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate'' (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson.pdf (last visited on July 2, 2009).

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CHAPTER 1

1. *See* U.S. Department Fact Sheet dated Oct. 11, 2005, formerly available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (last visited on July 25, 2007).

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31. Ibid. at 90.

32. *See*, e.g., Hussein Adam, ''Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?'' at 69, 70–76, in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (ed., I. William Zartman) (Lynne Rienner pub., 1995), for a discussion on the collapse of Somalia.

33. In the interest of full disclosure, the author was formerly an attorney with the Office of the General Counsel, USAID, Washington, DC.

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37. Michale Slackman, ''Iran Protesters Take to Street Despite Threats,'' *New York Times* (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/middleeast/10iran.html (last visited on July 10, 2009).

38. Hamre and Sullivan, ''Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,'' note 35, *supra*, at 91–93.

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49. Ibid. at 27.

50. *See*, e.g., Rumu Sarkar, *International Development Law: The Rule of Law, Human Rights and Global Finance* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

51. Gause, ''Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?'' Chapter 1, endnote 9, *supra*.

52. RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, Preface, endnote 15, *supra*. The study examines the last 60 years of postwar stabilization and reconstruction efforts beginning with the military occupations of Germany and Japan, later examining

peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led by the United States. The second volume examines UN-led missions in the former Belgian Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slovenia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.

53. A RAND study defines nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." *See* James Dobbins, "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower," *RAND Review*, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation.html (last visited on August 1, 2007).

54. RAND, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, Preface, endnote 15, *supra*, at xix, 161. Further, a multilateral effort that dismantled institutions wholesale from within as in the case of Germany was less successful in the medium-term than in Japan where a unilateral U.S. effort to reform existing institutions from within was more successful in the short-term.

CHAPTER 2

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4. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Place of Tolerance in Islam," *Boston Review* (December 2001/January 2002), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/elfadl.html (last visited on August 15, 2007). The author, a distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), alleges that the theological premises of global terrorism derived from "the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahabi and Salafi creeds." Salafism was founded in the early twentieth century, and argued, according to the author, that the demands of modernity should be responded to by "a return to the original sources of the Qur'an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet)." While "Wahabism narrowly defined orthodoxy, and was extremely intolerant of any creed that contradicted its own," the author argues that it "does not bear the primary responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in Islam today." He argues that "Wahabism is distinctively inward-looking—although focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims. . . . Militant puritan groups, however, are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt to assert power against Muslims and non-Muslims. As populist movements, they are a reaction to the most Muslims have suffered in the modern age at the hands of harshly despotic governments, and at the hands of interventionist foreign powers. These groups compensate for extreme feelings of disempowerment by extreme and vulgar claims to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan ideological creeds, their symbolic acts of power become uncompromisingly fanatic and violent."

5. Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 85.

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9. "Interestingly, Islamic tradition does not have a notion of holy war. 'Jihad' simply means to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause, and according to the Prophet of Islam, the highest form of jihad is the struggle waged to cleanse oneself from the vices of the heart." *See* Elliot, "A Call to Jihad from Somalia," Chapter 1, endnote 24, *supra*.

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11. Paz, *Between Ideology and Strategy*, Chapter 1, endnote 11, *supra*.

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