

A black and white profile portrait of Joseph Stalin, facing right. He has dark hair, a high forehead, and a prominent mustache. He is wearing a dark jacket or coat. The background is dark and out of focus.

DAVID R. EGAN AND MELINDA A. EGAN

JOSEPH

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH-
LANGUAGE PERIODICAL LITERATURE TO 2005

STALIN

Joseph Stalin

An Annotated Bibliography of English-Language Periodical Literature to 2005

David R. Egan
Melinda A. Egan



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For

Michael Evanick,

father, altruistic soul, mariner, and adventurer

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Introduction

Purpose

The central aim of *Stalin: A Bibliography (SB)* is to present a comprehensive list of English-language periodical literature on Joseph Stalin spanning the period from the earliest writings about him up to the year 2005 and including articles from popular magazines as well as scholarly publications. Ranging from editorials and news reports to academic articles, the more than 1,700 sources cited in *SB* collectively cover the full range of his life, the various aspects of his leadership of the Soviet Union, and virtually all facets of the system and practices traditionally associated with his name. This large body of material has been gathered here in annotated form primarily for the benefit of the nonspecialist engaged in research of one sort or another about the man who is widely considered to be among the most influential historical figures of the twentieth century. Inasmuch as *SB* provides a record of scholarly opinion on Stalin and sheds light on the evolution and current state of Stalinology, the book, hopefully, may be of some interest to academicians as well.

Scope

The coverage boundary of *SB* extends beyond the person of Stalin to include the subjects of Stalinism, the Stalinist system, and the Stalin phenomenon, and those policies and practices of the Communist Party and Soviet state most often associated with Stalin's name. An effort has been made to list only those articles in which Stalin figures prominently, but, in some instances, articles have been included which do not center on Stalin but are worthy of listing for one reason or another. Such a coverage policy obviously has a significant element of subjectivity built into it, making it vulnerable to criticism, but, all things considered, the use of a flexible standard in selecting the articles to populate *SB* seems to be warranted in order to maximize the potential value of the book for students of Stalin.

Having opted for a relatively broad definition of Stalin as a subject, *SB* follows a similarly liberal policy in selecting the types of articles to be listed. First off, the user will notice that along with the scholarly writings one would expect to find in a Stalin bibliography are articles from the popular and semipopular press, most of which were written during Stalin's lifetime. These nonacademic sources have been included for the benefit of individuals interested in reading about how Stalin was viewed and treated in those publications intended for a broad audience and which, by virtue of their mass circulation, helped to shape attitudes in the West toward Stalin and the Soviet Union during the years of his rule. *SB* also reaches beyond the realm of nonfiction to provide a selection of articles dealing with artistic portrayals of Stalin, meaning with representations of Stalin in novels, short stories, poetry, drama, film, and art. These sources have been included primarily because portrayals of Stalin by Soviet writers, filmmakers, and artists in the years since his

death have helped to shape the study of the Stalin question. Also included are a number of book review essays, particularly those which develop a position or offer a perspective on the subject of Stalin rather than limit themselves to a straightforward analysis of a single book or group of books.

SB is intended to be the first volume in a two-volume set, with the second covering English-language books, essays, conference papers, and doctoral dissertations.

Format

User convenience is the main concern governing the structure of *SB*. To this end, the book is divided into fourteen main sections: General Studies and Overviews; Biographical Information and Psychological Assessments; The Revolutionary Movement, October Revolution and Civil War Years; Rise to Power; Politics; Economics; Society and Social Policy; Nationalism and Nationality Policy; Culture; Religion; Philosophy and Theory; Foreign Relations and International Communism; Military Affairs; and De-Stalinization. While grouping entries in this way allows users to scan large blocks of articles on a single aspect of Stalin as a topic for study, the book's subject index, as one would expect, provides the most complete list of entries dealing with a given topic. With more than 300 main headings and nearly twice that number of subheadings, the subject index is designed to assist users in locating articles addressing highly specific aspects of Stalin and Stalinism as historical subjects. The index also includes a large number of cross-references and alternative headings—employing, respectively, the terms “see also” and “see”—as well as multiple citations of individual articles to direct the user to every article dealing with a given subject.

Annotations

Annotations accompany the vast majority of the articles cited in *SB*, the exception being those articles which, for one reason or another, could not be located. Designed for the nonspecialist, the annotations are descriptive, rather than critical, and aim to provide just enough information for users to make reasonably informed choices in determining which studies they might find particularly interesting or valuable for their purposes. Annotations have been limited to 150 words or so, making oversimplification difficult to avoid, and, regrettably, encouraging a somewhat “list-like” style of writing. Hopefully, the main thrust of most of the articles which appear in *SB* has been captured along with a fair representation of the principal evidence or supporting information they present.

Spelling

The spelling of surnames has been standardized in the annotations as well as in the author and subject indexes. In bibliographic citations, however, author names have been spelled in accord with how they appear on title pages, leading to alternate spellings for some names. A few liberties have been taken with transliteration in order to render Russian names more palatable for the non-specialist, most notably with respect to the spelling of some first names (“Joseph” rather than “Tosif,” for instance) and last names (“sky” rather than “skii,” for example).

1

General Studies and Overviews

- 1 Abel, Lionel. "On the Crimes of Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler." *Partisan Review* 58, no. 1 (1991): 78-87.

Abel reverses the position he took in Dwight Macdonald's *Politics* against the claim made by James Burnham, in the January 1945 issue of the *Partisan Review*, that Stalin was the logical and appropriate successor to Lenin, and he explores the question, "If Stalin for all his criminality was the rightful heir to Lenin, then can Lenin have been innocent of crime?" According to Abel, since the revolutionary theory espoused by Lenin, sanctioned by Stalin, and used to justify the harsh policies of the Bolsheviks proved to be invalid, both men must be considered to be guilty of committing criminal acts even though their crimes may be, to some extent, forgivable in view of "the positive developments throughout the world that occurred as a result of their actions." Abel also addresses the moral distinction between Stalin and Hitler, maintaining that Stalin at least wanted to justify the October Revolution as well as the Bolshevik crimes that followed from its failure; whereas the crimes of Hitler were merely committed in order "to prove himself inexorable."

- 2 Acton, Edward. "Understanding Stalin's Catastrophe." *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 3 (2001): 531-40.

Acton reviews seven books dealing with Stalin: Gabriel Gorodetsky's *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (1999); Stephen Lee's *Stalin and the Soviet Union* (1999); Evan Mawdsley's *The Stalin Years: The Soviet Union, 1929-1953* (1998); Richard Sakwa's *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (1999); Lennart Samuelson's *Plans for Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1924-1941* (2000); Mark Sandle's *A Short History of Soviet Socialism* (1999); and Chris Ward's *Stalin's Russia* (1999). Acton mainly discusses Gorodetsky's analysis of how and why Stalin allowed himself to be caught off guard by the German invasion of 22 June 1941—according to which the Soviet dictator's disastrous military mistake was primarily conditioned by the mind-set which governed his attitude toward the Western powers and colored his reading of the diplomatic signals and intelligence reports pointing toward an imminent German attack—and how the findings in *Grand Delusion* contradict or refine the interpretations advanced in the other books under review here.

- 3 Adler, Les K. and Thomas G. Paterson. "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s." *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970): 1046-64.

Adler and Paterson provide an account of how American commentators on the Soviet Union, in developing an image of Soviet communism as "Red Fascism," tended to focus on the seemingly similar methods employed by the Hitler and Stalin regimes and to ignore the differing origins, ideologies, goals, and practices of the German and Soviet totalitarian states. This image, in the authors' view, contributed to popular fear and hostility in America toward the USSR and encouraged the adoption of a policy of containment to halt Soviet aggression and reduce the chances of

another world war. Adler and Paterson critique some thirty years of American writings which deal with the analogies between the fascist and communist totalitarian states, explaining why they believe that the Hitler-Stalin comparison is both a superficial and misleading one. They also discuss how the friendly "Uncle Joe" of American wartime propaganda became the paranoid Soviet tyrant of the Cold War, an imitator of Hitler, and the successor of the Nazi leader as the greatest menace to world peace.

- 4 Akhminov, H. "Stalin: Monster or Functionary?" *Bulletin of the Institute of the Study for the History and Culture of the USSR* 17, no. 2 (1970): 7-20.

Akhminov takes issue with the view that ascribes the negative features of the Stalin era to the personality traits of the deceased dictator, arguing instead that a close look at Stalin's career reveals that his strategic moves corresponded with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and that the use of force, terror included, was necessary to implement his strategic decisions during the period 1927-53. Examining four decisive turning points in Stalin's life—his appointment as Secretary General of the Communist Party's Central Committee on 3 April 1923; the adoption of the program of "building socialism in one country" at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925; the carrying through of the "second Bolshevik revolution" with the collectivization of agriculture and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class; and the Great Purge, officially ushered in by Stalin in a speech before a plenary meeting of the Central Committee on 3 March 1937 and targeting the contributions to the creation of the "negative cult of personality" by Robert Payne, in his book *The Rise and Fall of Stalin* (1965), and Nikita Khrushchev, in his denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Akhminov describes how Stalin's principal actions in consolidating his authority, forcibly collectivizing agriculture, and dealing with the very real and widespread opposition to his policies and authority within the party during the "second Bolshevik revolution" not only corresponded to Marxist-Leninist principles and strategy but to the logic of events at that time as well. "One may argue as to whether the measures Stalin took to keep the population under control had to be so drastic, but they were, from his point of view, completely rational, being based on a realization of the fact that it was *after* the initial difficulties had been overcome that popular dissatisfaction would really come to the surface," Akhminov concludes.

- 5 Alker, Hayward R., Jr. "On Critical Compassion in the Historical Judgment of Stalin." *Soviet Union* 8, no. 1 (1981): 25-28.

Alker comments on Theodore Von Laue's essay, in this same issue of *Soviet Union*, dealing with the question of judging Stalin. He sees considerable merit in Von Laue's argument for the need for compassionate understanding of the moral and political dilemmas and the challenging situational imperatives that Stalin faced, but he maintains that the special features of Stalin's historical context, as described by Von Laue, were not unique and therefore do not void the entire force of criticism of the brutality which characterized his rule of the USSR. He contends that political leadership, in any context, should be faulted when it does not morally uplift or transform the people it serves, particularly when considering the question of political greatness, as Von Laue does.

- 6 Anderson, Perry. "Trotsky's Interpretation of Stalinism." *New Left Review* 139 (1983): 49-58. Anderson traces the evolution of Leon Trotsky's thinking on Stalinism and examines the fundamental theses that the Bolshevik revolutionary and political leader put forth in *The Class Nature of the Soviet State* (1933), a work which served as the foundation of his definitive study of Soviet society under Stalin—the book entitled *Where Is Russia Going?* (1937) and "misleadingly translated" as *The Revolution Betrayed*. Reassessing Trotsky's account of Stalinism from the perspective of the early 1980s, Anderson argues for the merits of Trotsky's internal balance sheet of Stalinism—particularly the sociological richness and penetration of his survey of the USSR under Stalin, and the sobriety of his estimate of the contradictory nature and the dynamics of the Stalinist

bureaucratic regime—and for Trotsky's underestimation of the ability of the Stalinist model of transition beyond capitalism to propagate itself successfully on the international plane.

- 7 Angotti, Thomas. "The Stalin Period: Opening Up History." *Science and Society* 52, no. 1 (1988): 5-34.

Angotti looks at the general historical direction of the Soviet Union in the Stalin era and Stalin's role in setting and implementing the policies of the Communist Party and Soviet state as part of an examination of the premises on which the demonology of Stalin is based. He calls for an alternative approach to the prevailing Stalin-bashing, one that takes into account, on the one hand, the "incredible qualitative advances" which occurred during the Stalin period—including the tremendous expansion of the Soviet economy, the forging of a Soviet working class out of a backward peasant nation, a cultural revolution which brought literacy and basic education to the Soviet masses, and the USSR's decisive role in the defeat of fascism—and, on the other, how the cult of personality which developed around Stalin hobbled socialism, and how the ideological and institutional rigidity that characterized the Soviet system under his rule retarded the further transformation of Soviet society.

- 8 Anismov, Evgenii V. "Progress through Violence from Peter the Great to Lenin and Stalin." Translated by Steven Richmond. *Russian History* 17, no. 4 (winter 1990): 409-18.

Stalin by name does not figure prominently in this account of how the use of violence to advance progress has become "the grim historical tradition of Russia," but, as a study which shows how the idea of progress through violence evolved from the time of Peter the Great through the Stalin era, it sheds light on the historical roots of some of the basic components of Stalinist ideology, most notably the idea that society can be transformed in accord with the leadership's preferences through the instrument of the totalitarian state, and the belief that the leader of this transformation represents the father of the nation and a man above criticism by virtue of the fusion of the idea of nationality sovereignty with his own personality.

- 9 Arnold, G. L. "Stalinism." *Political Quarterly* 21 (October 1950): 338-55.

Arnold considers the ways in which Stalinism emanated from the political beliefs and practices of Lenin, particularly with respect to how the Leninist party of professional revolutionaries acting in the name of the proletariat subverted socialist democracy and paved the way for the Stalinist bureaucracy. In describing the principal components of Stalinism, Arnold emphasizes Stalin's liberal use of force to impose the "second revolution" on the masses; his expansion of the socialist state's power, which should have started to wither away according to classical Marxism; and his manufacture of a rationale which attempted not only to justify the intensification of the state's power but to legitimize the new Stalinist hierarchical society in the eyes of the party and the Soviet people. Arnold also discusses how the party of Stalin rests upon a combination of revolutionary despotism, exaltation of the workers in abstract, and callous contempt for the individual toiler in actuality, and how even the slightest breath of political freedom is viewed as a lethal threat to the Stalinist party's effort to remold society.

- 10 Aron, Leon. "The New Stalinology." *Commentary* 91, no. 4 (April 1991): 60-64.

Aron reviews *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (1991), by Walter Laqueur, and *Stalin's War against the Jews: The Doctors' Plot and the Soviet Solution* (1990), by Louis Rapoport. Focusing on what "the new Stalinology" has to say about the roots of Stalinism, Stalin's personal involvement in the terror and purges, Ivan the Terrible as a source of inspiration for Stalin, and the sources and manifestations of Stalin's anti-Semitism. Aron maintains that the initial findings of Soviet Stalinology, while being rich in detail and of immense significance in the USSR, have yielded few true surprises for the serious student of the Soviet Union and have served to confirm

the main findings and theories of veteran scholars of Stalinism such as Robert Conquest, Richard Pipes, and Adam Ulam.

- 11** Aronson, Ronald. "Sartre on Stalin: A Discussion of *Critique de la Raison Dialectique, II*." *Studies in Soviet Thought* 33, no. 2 (1987): 131-43.

Aronson looks at the central section of the unfinished second volume of Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique*, summarizing the main elements of the French writer's analysis of the fate of the Bolshevik Revolution and offering an assessment of the merits of his exploration of the question, "Why Stalin?" He sees considerable value in Sartre's picture of Bolshevism, Leninism, and Stalinism as "a single praxis" deviating in accord with the new vicissitudes its agents had to confront; his assessment of why the revolution had to turn to a single individual to unify it; his thinking on whether Stalin, with all his personal peculiarities, was called for in the circumstances the Soviet Union found itself in the aftermath of the October Revolution and Russian Civil War; and his portrayal of Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" as a monstrous deviation from Marxism. The key limitations of Sartre's analysis, in Aronson's opinion, are his underappreciation of the drastic changes the party went through as Stalin gathered the strands of power into his hands, and his attributing to Stalin alone the disasters that befell the USSR under his rule—including the human cost of collectivization, the physical destruction of the party, and the horrors of the gulag—rather than locating them in the demands imposed by the difficult situation in which the Soviet Union found itself at that time.

- 12** Balabkins, Nicholas. "A Recent Plea of a Soviet Humanist." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 4, no. 1 (1973): 36-46.

This examination of Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* (1971) centers on the book's analysis of Stalin's practice of terror as a functional and purposeful tool used repeatedly and with cold calculation by the Soviet dictator to advance and secure his unlimited power. Medvedev's description of Stalin's functional terror, explanation of how Stalin was able to do what he did, and argument that the best way to block re-Stalinization in the USSR is to build safeguards into the Soviet legal system and the structure of the Communist Party all receive consideration in Balabkins's review, as do the place of Medvedev's overriding concern with the evils of tyranny and with advancing basic civil liberties in the Soviet Union in his decision to undertake the task of writing *Let History Judge*.

- 13** Barghoorn, Frederick C. "Understanding Stalin, or Critically Judging Him?" *Soviet Union* 8, no. 1 (1981): 29-33.

Barghoorn examines the case made for compassionate understanding, fairness, and moral responsibility in judging Stalin by Theodore Von Laue in his essay which appears in this same issue of *Soviet Union*. According to Barghoorn, Von Laue, in considering all of Stalin's major policies as a necessary and justified response to Russian underdevelopment and to Russia's disadvantages in competing with the West, oversimplifies and distorts Stalin's record, coming "perilously close to equating explanation with justification," and doing a disservice to the victims of the dictator and to the opponents and critics of Stalin as well. Barghoorn also questions Von Laue's interpretation of Stalin's development policy, his reference to Stalin and other Bolsheviks as "patriotic Russians," and thesis that "an 'understanding' attitude toward Stalinism is a prerequisite for good relations with the Soviet Union."

- 14** _____. "What It Takes to Be a Stalin." *New York Times Magazine* (15 March 1953): 7+.

In answering the question, "What qualities must a man have to succeed Stalin?" this article suggests that the dictator's heir, like the former master himself, must be ruthless, deceptive, and able to play many roles; profess absolute adherence to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of communism but be willing to twist doctrine to the uses of political and economic power; be able to infuse into his

whole program a patriotic quality as well as serve as a supreme unifying symbol; and know how to command the loyalty of the party, state bureaucracy, and the military. Barghoorn also discusses the possibility that Georgi Malenkov might become another Stalin, noting that, while the fifty-one-year-old heir apparent to the Soviet dictator has several factors working in his favor, he lacks the enormous prestige of Stalin among the communist functionaries and leaders at home and abroad, has alienated some members of the Communist Party by his imperious behavior, and does not have the flexibility and experience to fashion Soviet foreign policy in the way like Stalin was able to do.

15 Bertonneau, Thomas F. "Satanic Arrogance." *Modern Age* 46 (winter/spring 2004): 167-71. Bertonneau comments on how *Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million* (2002), by Martin Amis, contributes to an understanding of the brutality of the Stalin regime and "the spell that Marxism-Leninism was able to exert over Western intellectuals." Among the subjects Bertonneau discusses are the myth of Lenin as the good man betrayed by Stalin; the litany of horrors perpetrated by the Stalin regime, including de-kulakization, the forced collectivization of agriculture, and the purges; and the reasons for the failure of the outside world, particularly Western intellectuals, to react to what was actually happening in Russia under Stalin's rule.

16 Bienstock, Gregory. "Stalin." *Nineteenth Century* 127 (January 1940): 32-40. Abridged version, "New Messiah." *Living Age* 358 (April 1940): 128-32.

Bienstock offers a highly critical review of Stalin's rise to power, the brutal practices and policies he has followed as ruler of the USSR, and the legend that has grown up around the Soviet leader, thanks to the official propagation of the cult of personality. He describes how the "legend of Bolshevism," with its self-glorification of its mission, founder, and accomplishments, was transformed into the Stalin legend, and he constructs a portrait of Stalin as the perfect "apparatchik," a mediocrity who weaseled his way into a position of authority, and a leader whose politics have led to the transformation of Russia into a slave state, the robbery of the land and lives of millions of the nation's peasants, and the trashing of the ideas of personal freedom and human dignity.

17 Bittelman, Alexander. "Stalin: On His 70th Birthday." *Political Affairs* (December 1949): 1-13.

18 "Brass v. Steel." *Time* 27 (16 March 1936): 26-27.

Time gives an account of the March 1936 interview with Stalin conducted by Roy Wilson Howard, the chairman of the board of Scripps-Howard newspapers, presenting some of the provocative questions the "brassy" Howard asked and the responses to them by the unflappable "man of steel." The failure to achieve communism in Russia, the sacrifice of personal liberty for the good of the state, and the conditions most responsible for the threat of war in Europe are among the main subjects Howard raised with the Soviet leader.

19 Brent, Jonathan. "Gucci Shoes and Khachapuri: Power and Belief in Russia Today." *Chronicle of Higher Education* 50, no. 7 (12 March 2004): 10-13.

The editorial director of Yale University Press presents an account of his conversation with Alexander Yakolev, the architect of perestroika during the Gorbachev years, whose International Democracy Foundation plans to copublish with Yale a number of documents from what is termed Stalin's Personal Archive. Brent primarily relates Yakolev's concerns about the current political situation and future of democracy in Russia, including his comments on his nation's lack of knowledge of the history of the Stalinist past and the need for the publication of documents from the Stalin Archive in order to prepare the way for writing an honest textbook about Soviet history. Brent also cites Yakolev's statement that Russia still has a long way to go in coming to terms with Stalin's legacy, largely because "people are still too afraid of the consequences of telling the truth"

about the Stalin era—a state of affairs attested to, in Yakolev’s opinion, by a recent survey which found that “more than half of the Russian population still thinks favorably of Stalin.”

- 20** Brodsky, Joseph. “Twenty Years after Death: The Immortal Tyrant.” *New York Times Magazine* (4 March 1973): 10-11+. Reply by L. Tillet, *New York Times Magazine* (8 April 1973): 13+.

The moral effect of Stalinism, both during the dictator’s rule and since his death, is the main subject of this article written by a prominent Russian poet exiled from the Soviet Union in 1972. According to Brodsky, Stalinism, with its mixture of murderous repression and monumental material accomplishments, ultimately made it difficult for the Soviet people to comprehend “who was murdering and who was building . . . who was doing evil and who good,” leading to a mind-set marked by “the loss of not only an absolute but even a relative moral criterion.” Describing how the advent of a “double mentality” blossomed under Stalin, Brodsky discusses how a moral nonexistence along with the idea of the arbitrariness of existence took root in Soviet society and adversely affected Soviet spiritual life.

- 21** Buchanan, Meriel. “Man of Steel.” *Saturday Review* 160 (14 September 1935): 168-69. Buchanan paints a picture of Stalin as the most ruthless and unscrupulous Bolshevik revolutionary; a man who conceived the idea of the Cheka and played a leading part in the decision to execute the members of the Imperial family in Ekaterinburg in July 1918; a schemer who has managed to assume absolute power in the Soviet Union; and a tyrant who may come to pose a grave threat to European security.

- 22** Buck, P. S. “Joseph Stalin Revealed.” *Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 40 (May 1940): 278-79.

- 23** Bullock, Alan. “Have the Roles of Hitler and Stalin Been Exaggerated?” *Government and Opposition* 32, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65-83.

This assessment of the degree of responsibility shared by Hitler and Stalin for the main steps taken by their respective regimes revolves around the contention that, while neither man created the circumstances which gave him his opportunity to rule nor could have achieved success without an extensive supporting cast, each was able to exert a powerful, even decisive, influence on the way events developed and on the policies implemented under their rule. In advancing the argument that circumstances, particularly the disruption of normality and continuity by violent upheavals in both German and Russian society, placed the two men in a position which allowed their personalities, individual talents, and political views to assume inordinate importance, Bullock discusses the ability of the two leaders to establish a system of governance in which power remained inherent in the man, not the office; points out some of the key initiatives taken by the two men while in power; and suggests that no other party leaders on the historical scene in their countries at that time would have acted as each of them did in setting and implementing the kinds of policies that became the hallmarks of their respective regimes.

- 24** Burbank, Jane. “Controversies over Stalinism: Search for a Soviet Society.” *Politics and Society* 19, no. 3 (1991): 325-40.

Burbank examines the writings on Stalinism by various Western revisionists who, in rejecting the “totalitarian” paradigm as an approach to understanding the nature of the Stalin regime, have formulated a social theory of Stalinism which privileges the role played by forces from below in shaping the policies followed in Stalin’s Russia. She first considers the writings of revisionist pioneers Sheila Fitzpatrick and Moshe Lewin and then turns to the work of J. Arch Getty, Robert Thurston, and Lynne Viola, who, as leading representatives of the “young revisionists,” have sought to flesh out the concept of Stalinism as a “revolution from below.” Throughout her analysis

of revisionism, Burbank maintains a critical posture, particularly with respect to the “young revisionists” who she feels have succeeded, through the boldness of their claims and the overtness of their attacks on earlier scholarship, in generating considerable controversy in the field of Soviet studies, but who have yet to provide a convincing social explanation of Stalinism. Among the shortcomings Burbank sees in the revisionists’ work are their tendency to overstate the case for Stalinism as a social process rooted in class struggles and lower politics; their unwarranted assumptions about the cause-effect relationship between “forces from below” and Stalinism; and their unwillingness to consider the insights into Stalinism provided by the voices of Soviet dissidents.

25 Burnham, James. “Lenin’s Heir.” *Partisan Review* 12 (winter 1945): 61-72.

Burnham takes aim at Leon Trotsky’s critical portrait of Stalin as a man and a leader, arguing that Stalin, far from being the unimaginative, plodding, and intellectually handicapped individual who appears in Trotsky’s writings, has repeatedly demonstrated, in his political techniques, military leadership, geopolitical vision, and conduct of diplomacy a boldness and creative imagination incompatible with the defining characteristics of a mediocre man. He also takes issue with Trotsky’s general analysis of the sorry fate of the revolution under Stalin’s rule, as expressed in his classic work, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937), arguing for the unpleasant truth of the consistency of Stalin’s basic policies and actions with those of Lenin, for the fulfillment of the communist revolution under Stalin, and for Stalin as the legitimate heir of the founder of Bolshevism.

26 Cap, Jean-Pierre. “Contributions from Soviet Archives to Lenin’s and Stalin’s Image and Legacy. Part II: Stalin.” *Ukrainian Quarterly* 59, nos. 1-2 (2003): 91-122.

Cap reviews Jean-Jacques Marie’s *Staline* (2001), a book which draws upon newly available Russian archival material and is considered to be the most comprehensive French-language work on Stalin. Cautioning the book’s readers to keep in mind that Marie is a Trotskyist-Lambertist whose ideological perspective skews his interpretation of the Soviet Union under Stalin, and noting that the study presents “a rather negative picture of Stalin as a man and makes an almost systematically negative assessment of his leadership,” Cap offers a chronologically arranged commentary on Marie’s portrait of Stalin, focusing on selected issues which the writer “either examines in the light of new information, which he neglects to discuss, or to which he applies his ideological bias.” Chief among the shortcomings of Marie’s book, according to Cap, are its failure to deal adequately with the tragedy of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, particularly the extent of Stalin’s genocidal assault on the Ukrainian peasantry.

27 Carr, E. H. “Stalin.” *Soviet Union* 5, no. 1 (July 1953): 1-7.

Carr considers the question of “How far has there been a specifically Stalinist epoch of Soviet history and a specifically Stalinist contribution to Soviet development?” He maintains that while Stalin shared Lenin’s voluntarism and carried on the revolution as Lenin conceived it, he stands apart from Lenin and may be considered to have been an innovator by virtue of his development of the concept of “socialism in one country,” revival of Russian nationalism, and creation of a new privileged class in the form of a Soviet bureaucracy which replaced the Western-oriented, Leninist party of intellectuals with an organization staffed by men more practically minded. Carr also contends that Stalin, in contradiction to Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, “typified the ‘eastern element’ in Russian policy and outlook,” substituting for the Western background of Marxism “a native anti-western tradition running from Russian Orthodoxy through the Slavophiles to Herzen and the narodniks.” Any assessment of Stalin’s place in Soviet history, Carr concludes, must take into account his use of Russian traditions to make the Soviet Union one of the great world powers during the years of his reign.

- 28** Chamberlin, William Henry. "Asia Invades Europe." *Nineteenth Century* 127 (May 1940): 549-60.

This article holds that the essential traits of "classical Asiatic despotism" can be seen in the basic characteristics of Stalin's dictatorship, including the unlimited power of the Stalin regime, its contemptuousness for human life, its secretiveness and practice of "devious and treacherous" statecraft, and its use of brutal force to secure impressive quantitative, but never qualitative, achievements. Chamberlin, who sees Stalin as having a consuming hatred of everything characteristically European, presents a number of examples of "the absolute Asian ruthlessness of Stalin"—most notably his murderous behavior in dealing with his political rivals—along with an account of Stalin's "phenomenal guile" in promoting a war between the democratic and fascist powers from which the Soviet Union could remain aloof and he could profit by extending his Asiatic realm westward.

- 29** ———. "Stalin Is Russia's Worst Czar." *American Mercury* 45 (September 1938): 1-10.

Chamberlin compares the practices of the tsarist state to those of the Stalin regime with respect to political repression, freedom of elections and the press, censorship of arts and letters, and the administration of justice, maintaining that the government of Stalin has proved to be far more restrictive and abusive than its tsarist predecessor. He does not deny that the tsarist method of rule was arbitrary and played a role in shaping the nature of the Soviet state, but he contends that the shortcomings of tsarism have been exaggerated as much as its constructive achievements have been underestimated by American apologists for Stalinism who, on the whole, contend that "every bad thing in the Soviet Union is a carry over, in milder form, from the horrific practices of tsarist times."

- 30** ———. "Stalin: Portrait of a Degenerate." *American Mercury* 43 (February 1938): 206-18.

The nature and scope of the Great Purges, according to Chamberlin, attest to the deterioration of Stalin's capacity for leadership. Describing how Stalin's style of rule and purposeful use of terror during the period 1929-33 contrasts with the irrationality of the Great Purges, and how the Soviet dictator's lapses into wild and senseless terrorism have created an atmosphere of panic among his own followers, Chamberlin contends that Stalin has managed to place in jeopardy not only the very system he created but his own future as the party's leader as well. He also discusses how the "roughness and disloyalty" in which Lenin saw the key to Stalin's character figured into the dictator's rise to power, and how these qualities, which once served Stalin well, have contributed to the terror of his "brutalitarian state."

- 31** ———. "The Three Eras of Soviet Communism." *Russian Review* 24, no. 1 (1965): 3-12.

Chamberlin looks back on nearly a half-century of Soviet communist rule, outlining the basic features of the regimes of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev. In dealing with Stalin, Chamberlin describes the terror and darkness of the Stalin era while noting the constructive developments that took place during his rule, including significant advancements in industry, science, and education, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as the strongest continental power. He also comments on the political and economic constraints that have marked Soviet rule, and on the possibility that Khrushchev's successors may bring change to the Soviet system.

- 32** Cheong, Seong-Chang. "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of Ideology and Power." *Asian Perspective* 24, no. 1 (2000): 133-61.

Cheong examines the unfolding of the ideology of Kim Il Sung from the 1930s to the time of Stalin's death in 1953; the influence of Mao Tse-tung on the Korean communist leader's thought during the mid-1950s; and the ties between Stalinism, Maoism, and *juche* ideology. In assessing Stalin's influence on the ideology of Kim Il Sung, Cheong identifies key elements of the so-called North Korean phenomenon as being distinctly Stalinist, including the establishment of a mono-

lithic ideology, the restoration of nationalism, the development of a leader-centered party, the use of an extreme form of the cult of personality, and the emergence of a political culture of terror.

- 33** Clarke, George. "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future." *Fourth International* 14 (January 1953): 5-13.

The death of Stalin, according to Clarke, will not presage the doom of socialism, as some Western commentators have forecast, but rather the beginning of the end of Stalinism and the emergence of socialism from the limitations and burdens under which it has suffered during the years of his rule. Describing Stalin as "a usurper, a hangman, hated and despised," Clarke maintains that the Soviet dictator, in betraying the promise on which he rose to power, used barbaric methods "for privilege-seeking, power-seeking purposes" in support of a philosophy of conservatism and to the detriment of both the Soviet working class and the world proletariat. Regardless of the rigors of the Stalinist dictatorship and the exploitation exercised by the bureaucracy under Stalin's rule, the Soviet regime, in view of the strength of the socialistic economic system and the workers' commitment to the cause of socialism, will not only outlive Stalin but will be freed from the constraints of Stalinism and undergo a renaissance which will witness a vindication of the ideas on socialist development advanced by Leon Trotsky, according to Clarke.

- 34** Cohen, Mitchell. "Theories of Stalinism: Revisiting a Historical Problem." *Dissent* 39, no. 2 (1992): 176-91.

This paper reconsiders some of the major interpretations of Stalinism, including the theories advanced by Leon Trotsky, Nicholas Berdyaev, Hannah Arendt, Robert Tucker, Stephen Cohen, Richard Pipes, and Moshe Lewin. Focusing on the question of Stalinism's possible ties to Leninism, totalitarianism, and Russian political traditions, Cohen suggests that, while Stalinism was not the inevitable consequence of Leninism, Lenin certainly helped prepare the ground for Stalinism, primarily through his conception of the party; that "totalitarianism" describes Stalinism to a certain degree but is "inadequate to understand it, and can obscure it by eclipsing its socioeconomic and Russian historical dimensions;" and that Stalinism, while rooted in Russian political culture, was not the inevitable result of Russian history. Rather than being the necessary ideological, historical, or structural continuation of other phenomena, Stalinism, in Cohen's view, was, "like all historical forces, the culmination of a constellation of circumstances and a melding of factors."

- 35** Cohen, Stephen F. "Bolshevism and Stalinism: New Reflections on an Old Problem." *Dissent* 24 (spring 1977): 190-205.

Cohen suggests that the consensus view among scholars that Stalinism was the logical and even inevitable continuation or outcome of Bolshevism rests upon a "series of dubious formulations, concepts, and interpretations" which tend to obscure more than they illuminate about the phenomenon of Stalinism. In addition to pointing out the problems and shortcomings of the conceptual explanations of the direct connection between Bolshevism and Stalinism, Cohen explains why he feels that the main scholarly disservice of the continuity thesis has been to discourage close examination of Stalinism as a specific system with its own history. In Cohen's opinion, Stalinism is best considered as a multistaged phenomenon, and as a "system" that was less a product of Bolshevik programs or planning than of a desperate attempt to cope with the chaos and crisis created by the Stalinist leadership itself during the social upheaval of 1929-33. He also sees a need for further consideration of a number of questions in the study of Stalinism, including the nature and depth of popular support for Stalinism both inside and beyond officialdom, and the extent to which the Stalin cult was an authentic phenomenon.

- 36** Crankshaw, Edward. "Is the Man in the Kremlin Another Hitler?" *New York Times Magazine* (4 July 1948): 3+.

Crankshaw lists the apparent similarities between the regimes and practices of Stalin and Hitler and then goes on to explain why he believes that the oft-stated parallels between the two dictators are, in fact, not only wide of the mark but also dangerously misleading. For Crankshaw, Stalin is not a would-be world conqueror and megalomaniac like Hitler but rather “the senior representative of a force which he believes will sweep the world” and a leader supported by countless individuals worldwide who fervently support the communist cause. Specious comparisons between the two dictators will not help the noncommunist world to recognize the true nature of the threat posed by the Stalin regime, a threat best countered by a concerted policy which aims to discredit Stalin, the Soviet regime, and Marxism itself as worthy sources of inspiration for reformers in other lands, according to Crankshaw.

- 37** ———. “A Long Look at Stalin, Ten Years After.” *New York Times Magazine* (7 April 1963): 30+.

Crankshaw speculates on how Stalin is likely to appear to Russians in the future, suggesting that even with Khrushchev’s exposure of some of the dead tyrant’s crimes, and even though the Soviet Union has reached a stage in which his ways no longer apply, Stalin will one day again be venerated as “a man who did dreadful things and at times ran amok, but who, nevertheless, dragged a humiliated and backward land into the 20th century,” and who was a driving force not for revolution but for patriotic endeavor and the building of Soviet power.

- 38** ———. “The Man Who Holds the Key to War or Peace.” *New York Times Magazine* (3 October 1948): 7+.

The leading quality of Stalin’s political character, according to Crankshaw, is a “quiet patience” which has allowed him to wait for the ideal moment to strike against his chosen enemies while, at the same time, hastening that moment by gradually exploiting their weaknesses and by slowly consolidating his own strength to ensure victory when the opportunity to strike presents itself. This quality, Crankshaw writes, is not only displayed clearly in Stalin’s rise to power, in his domestic policies, and in his dealings with the West and Hitler in the 1930s, but also in the years following World War II, particularly with respect to the process of establishing Soviet control over Eastern Europe and to his willingness to wait for the capitalist systems of Europe to collapse under the strain of their own inner contradictions rather than risk war to accomplish “the inevitable.”

- 39** “Credulous West Helped Stalin to Build an Empire.” *Saturday Evening Post* 225 (4 April 1953): 10.

This article lambastes the intelligentsia of the West for its eagerness to excuse the abuses of the Stalin regime and to propagate the myth that Stalin was a great progressive leader and humanitarian at heart. The Western elite’s misjudgments of Stalin, along with the errors made by naïve Western diplomats in their dealings with him, contributed significantly to the successes he enjoyed in building an empire as one of the world’s greatest tyrants, according to the article.

- 40** Cullen, Robert B. “Life after Stalin.” *Newsweek* 105 (25 March 1985): 51.

Cullen comments on the economic policies implemented by Stalin along with remnants of the repression that characterized his regime that are still evident in Soviet society on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II. He also comments on the favorable mention of Stalin’s wartime leadership in a film about Marshal Georgi Zhukov then showing in Soviet theaters, the lingering power of the dictator’s legacy, and traces of the cult of personality, particularly in Stalin’s homeland of Georgia.

- 41** D., J. “Comments: Stalin’s Early Writings.” *Twentieth Century* 150 (August 1951): 104-9.

This article cites a number of omissions or alterations in the early writings of Stalin as they appear in the official collection of his works, thirteen volumes of which had been published as of 1951.

The author suggests that the textual changes in Stalin's writings are aimed at softening or eliminating statements he made that are "inappropriate" or inconsistent with later statements made by him, and that the changes may be an attempt to supplement Stalin's public image by adding a new dimension to his infallibility—"the gift of prophecy." The dilemmas faced by Soviet scholars who deal with Stalin's writings, and the disappearance of any frontier between scholarship and propaganda in the Soviet Union also receive attention in the article.

42 D'Agostino, Anthony. "Stalin Old and New." *Russian Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 447-51.

D'Agostino outlines the main trends in scholarly opinion on Stalin and Stalinism and comments on three books written about the dead dictator in the early 1990s—*Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, by Dmitri Volkogonov; *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*, by Robert Conquest; and *The Stalin Phenomenon, a Symposium*, a collection of essays by prominent revisionist historians and edited by Alec Nove. He describes Volkogonov's book as "a brief for the glasnost line of the 'Bukharin alternative' to the ultra-left deviationism of Stalin"; a work laced with "confused and windy asides about character and morality"; and a study which, despite the author's access to a wealth of Soviet archival materials, fails to go beyond what can already be found in Western works on the political history of the Soviet Union. Conquest's portrait of Stalin, especially his commentary on the nature of the power which Stalin wielded and the manner in which he exercised it, is well received by D'Agostino, as are the essays in *The Stalin Phenomenon* and the commentary provided by Nove, particularly with respect to what they have to say about the career of revisionism and the reliability of Soviet archives and other official documents.

43 Dallin, David J. "The Consistency of Stalin." *American Mercury* 62 (January 1946): 7-15. Reply by O. Dittman. *American Mercury* 62 (April 1946): 508.

Dallin considers the consistency of Stalin's political behavior, arguing that, while the Soviet leader's political career "has been checkered and changeful on its outside," his belief in the viability of "socialism in one country" and in the ability of Russia to become the controlling center of a vast empire of communist states has remained constant. Questioning those who suggest that Stalin, following the Soviet victory against Germany, may favor the establishment of democracy in Russia and a policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, Dallin argues for the need to view Stalin's "surface adjustments and tactical retreats" within the framework of his commitment to a world revolutionary tradition centered in the USSR. He also discusses Stalin's efforts to strike a balance between the official world revolutionary tradition and the new nationalism that emerged in Russia during the years of World War II.

44 Daniels, Robert V. "Does the Present Change the Past?" *Journal of Modern History* 70 (June 1998): 431-35.

Daniels critiques Stephen Kotkin's assessment of the impact of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Communist regime on the writing and understanding of the history of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet era up to the end of World War II. He contends that Kotkin, in surveying recent literature on the Soviet period, adopts an overly negative tone in treating the work of his colleagues; misconstrues the contest between historical traditionalists and social historians as "'intentionalism' versus 'functionalism'"; mistakenly suggests that the upheaval of 1991, with its liquidation of the last vestiges of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, somehow both alters "the historical fact of totalitarian rule under Stalin and the neo-Stalinists" and calls into question the views recently put forth by social historians about the limits of totalitarianism; and fails to address the most critical turning point in the ideological redefinition of the Soviet experience—the second stage of Stalin's revolution from above, with its shift to social and cultural conservatism. Daniels also criticizes Kotkin for failing to address directly the question of why recent events and newly available Soviet archival materials, which largely "underscore or flesh out what was already known or conjectured

by historians of the Soviet period,” require historians to make changes in their conceptions of the Soviet past.

- 45 ———. “Stalin: Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary?” *Problems of Communism* 38, no. 5 (September-October 1989): 81-86.

Daniels comments on Roy Medvedev’s *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (1986); Robert H. McNeal’s *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (1986); Robert Conquest’s *Stalin and the Kirov Murder* (1989); Hiroaki Kuromiya’s *Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932* (1988); Francesco Benvenuti’s *Fuoco sui sabotatori! Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934-1938* (1988); Hans-Henning Schröder’s *Industrialisierung und Parteibürokratie in der Sowjetunion: Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Versuch über die Anfangsphase des Stalinismus (1929-1934)* (1998); and Pavel Campeanu’s *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order* (1988). His analysis of these seven studies revolves around what the books have to say about the limitations on Stalin’s personal power; the lack of a master plan behind his major policies; the economic irrationality, immense waste, and inefficiency that marked the early five-year plans; and the counterrevolutionary nature of Stalin’s “revolution from above.”

- 46 ———. “Was Stalin Really a Communist?” *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 20, nos. 2-3 (1993): 169-75.

Daniels addresses the question of whether the evil of Stalin and Stalinism flowed inexorably out of the Bolshevik movement or whether Stalin “usurped the movement and turned it in an essentially different direction, albeit still dressed out in the language of its original nature.” Arguing that a realistic assessment of Stalin and his place in history demands a combination of the interpretations that Stalinism was a betrayal/logical product of the Bolshevik Revolution and Marxist ideals, Daniels sees Lenin, along with the conditions in Russia in the years immediately following the Bolshevik seizure of power, as having set the stage for the emergence of a postrevolutionary dictator such as Stalin who would work out “some sort of synthesis of revolutionary spirit and appearances with a revival of old-fashioned political methods and structures of rule.” He believes that the nature of the synthesis Stalin arrived at was primarily shaped by his personality, particularly his “machievellian drive to amass power,” his need of “a sense of unconditional ideological legitimacy,” and his paranoiac destruction of the party’s leadership. As Stalin moved forward with his “revolution from above,” his link to the Bolshevik heritage weakened and the Russian element became more prominent in his synthesis, particularly with respect his embracement of “Russian nationalism, nationalistic history, and Russification of the Soviet minorities,” according to Daniels.

- 47 De la Bedoyere, Michael. “From My Window in Fleet Street: The Nature of Stalin’s Policy.” *Catholic World* 177 (May 1953): 137-41.

De la Bedoyere takes the occasion of Stalin’s death to comment on how the Soviet dictator, in achieving mastery of the Soviet Union by creating a personal dictatorship through ruthless suppression of “enemies of the people” and in expanding Russian national power and territorial control, managed to discredit, in the eyes of the world, the revolutionary movement for which he stood. He also remarks on the situation which confronts Stalin’s successors in the Kremlin, and on the direction they are likely to head in trying to maintain the empire Stalin built.

- 48 Demaitre, Edmund. “Stalin and the Era of Rational Irrationality.” *Problems of Communism* 16, no. 6 (November 1967): 76-85.

Demaitre examines the concepts of the Soviet Union as “the leading nation” in the world and the CPSU as the prime mover in the international communist movement as examples of the seemingly irrational manifestations of Stalinism, arguing that the concepts were, in fact, “the byproducts of more complex processes or cleverly designed ideological means of attaining practical objectives.”

According to Demaitre, the attempt of the Stalin regime to demonstrate Soviet superiority in all spheres of human activity—including such campaigns as the promotion of the myth of Soviet man's physical, moral, and intellectual superiority; the seemingly endless series of "Russia was first" legends; and the image of Stalin as a "universal genius" who possessed transcendental, even miraculous powers—is a prime example of how Stalin resorted to irrational methods to serve rational ends. This same "rational irrationality," Demaitre continues, can be seen in the Stalin regime's efforts to deflect possible doubts about Bolshevik predictions regarding the evolution of Soviet society; to denigrate the accomplishments of noncommunist countries; and, ultimately, to justify a Stalinist messianism which "assigned to the Soviet Union the role of leader and benefactor of mankind." Demaitre also discusses the effect of Stalinist myth-making on Western Marxism and on the development of Soviet policies and institutions in the post-Stalin era.

49 Djilas, Milovan. "Stalin's Legacy." *Encounter* 50, no. 6 (1978): 47-49.

Writing on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Stalin's death, the author, the former vice president of Yugoslavia and a close associate of Marshall Tito, briefly describes the legacy of Stalin, highlighting the Soviet dictator's role in the transformation of the Communist Party into a privileged level of society; his imposition of ideological uniformity within the party; his establishment of a brutal police state; and his fostering of intellectual stagnation and economic inefficiency within the Soviet Union. Djilas also comments on how Stalin bequeathed a foreign policy characterized, in part, by the transformation of the early Soviet version of internationalism into Soviet imperialism laced with Russian chauvinism.

50 ———. "Theses about Stalin." *Freedom at Issue*, no. 55 (March-April 1980): 27.

Djilas sets forth ten theses about Stalin, including the propositions that Stalin was the continuer of what Lenin started; Stalinism—a system of total terror—must be considered to be the most tyrannical order in all of history; a personality cult such as Stalin's is inherent in totalitarian movements; Stalin continued in the tradition of tsarist despotism; Stalin and Stalinism remain alive and well in the Soviet Union after de-Stalinization; no communist party is completely free of Stalinism; and Stalin's shadow is still spreading over the entire world and will continue to grow until Soviet expansionism is finally contained.

51 Dukes, Paul. "Makers of the 20th Century: Joseph Stalin." *History Today* 30, no. 9 (1980): 14-18.

This overview of Stalin's life and legacy centers on the image of "the Leader" instilled in the Soviet populace during his rule; the official Soviet position on Stalin's legacy as reflected by a *Pravda* article of 21 December 1979 occasioned by the one-hundredth anniversary of his birth; and the conventional Western point of view on Stalin's reign and accomplishments. Dukes addresses such questions as the extent to which the dictator's successes have been ignored; the role played by Soviet insecurity in an unstable world in shaping Stalin's policies and tactics; the circumstances that led him to conclude the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939; and the quality of his leadership during the war against Hitler's Germany.

52 Duranty, Walter. "The Two Men." *New York Times Magazine* (29 June 1941): 3+.

Duranty argues for a number of similarities in the lives, careers, and regimes of Stalin and Hitler, and he challenges the common view of Hitler as a gambler who staked everything on each throw of the dice and of Stalin as a cunning plotter who never took any major step without exact and detailed preparation.

53 Eastman, Max. "The End of Socialism in Russia." *Harper's* 174 (February 1937): 302-14.

Eastman sees the policies pursued by Stalin in the mid-1930s in the spheres of education, women's freedom, the family, and international affairs as being counterrevolutionary and signal-

ing the end of the socialist experiment in Russia. He also discusses the Stalin Constitution of 1936 as representing the “assassination of the phantoms of proletarian democracy by the caricature of representative government”; Stalin’s economic policies as the source of the emergence of a new privileged caste in Russia; and the 1936 show trials of veteran Bolshevik leaders as the “bloody punctuation of a twelve-year period of counterrevolution.”

54 Elliot, Walter. “Stalin.” *Spectator* 174 (27 April 1945): 378.

Stalin’s simplicity, practicality, and “firm grasp of the obvious” are described as his leading attributes in this brief sketch of his political character. Elliot also comments on how these attributes may lead Stalin, whose prime concern has always been national security, to realize that the Soviet Union has much more to fear from isolation than from Western “imperialist hostility” in the post-war world.

55 Emmons, Terence. “The Abusable Past.” *New Republic* 206 (9 March 1992): 33-36, 40-41. Emmons discusses the rejuvenation of the “totalitarian thesis”—the concept of a total state ruling over an atomized society in the Soviet Union—with the advent of glasnost and the final collapse of Soviet communism, and then goes on to review Robert Tucker’s *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (1991); Dmitri Volkogonov’s *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* (1991); Walter Laqueur’s *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (1990); and Robert Conquest’s *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (1991). He points out the merits of the Tucker and Volkogonov books as political biographies, and notes the effort of Conquest and Laqueur to take the measure of the new material that has become available on Stalin, but he questions whether the new material and writings have yielded truly significant facts about Stalin and Stalinism or have advance scholarly understanding of the Stalin phenomenon. He suggests that, given the likelihood that Stalin “carefully avoided leaving a paper trail,” few, if any, great revelations will emerge about Stalin with further archival exposure of the Soviet past.

56 Erickson, John. “Stalin Revisited.” *RUSI Journal* 136, no. 1 (1991): 69-72.

Erickson reviews Walter Laqueur’s *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (1990), an analysis of the wave of new material and writings on Stalin published in the Soviet Union under glasnost. He comments favorably on Laqueur’s coverage and treatment of the debate between Soviet anti-Stalinists and protagonists of Stalin and Stalinism, and on his account of the fortunes of *Pamyat* (Remembrance), the association which arose from the initiative to establish a monument to the victims of Stalin’s gulag, and whose activities triggered a virulent response on the part of Soviet neo-Stalinists. He also comments on the question of why Stalin, despite his crimes and abuses, managed to rule for decades and gain popular support, and on the challenges facing the Soviet people in their effort to come to grips with the Stalin phenomenon and the extent of the nation’s own moral responsibility for it.

57 Ezergailis, Andrew. “Stalin Reconsidered.” *Canadian Slavic Studies* 1, no. 2 (1967): 284-90.

This review of Francis Randall’s *Stalin’s Russia: An Historical Reconsideration* (1965) revolves around the question of whether Randall, in arguing for the greatness and stature of Stalin and in presenting him as an omnipotent ruler, free from the bonds of historical necessity, “has exercised proper historical skepticism and objectivity in arriving at his interpretation, or has manipulated the evidence.” According to Ezergailis, Randall has failed to be objective in four principal ways: by accepting Stalin’s own evaluation of his role and accomplishments; by the frequent expression of value judgments; by tending “to create a false legitimacy” in his efforts to show that Stalin ruled with the “grudging assent” of the Soviet people; and by a “constant unwarranted search for the silver lining behind even the bleakest aspects of Stalin’s tyranny.” Ezergailis also criticizes Randall for brushing off theories and explanations which contradict the book’s thesis.

58 Fischer, Louis. "Joseph Stalin." *Reader's Digest* 53 (July 1948): 151-50.

Fischer offers an overview of Stalin's career as a revolutionary, rise to power as the heir of Lenin, and main policies and practices as dictator of the Soviet Union from 1928-48. Receiving most attention in Fischer's political sketch are the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky; the personal attributes and tactics which worked to Stalin's advantage in his campaign to succeed Lenin; Stalin's habitual reliance on the purge to eliminate opposition and protect himself from blame for policy failures; his consolidation of his authority over both the Soviet government and Communist Party; and the controls he established over Russian social, professional, and cultural organizations. While Fisher credits Stalin for his leading role in modernizing the Soviet Union and in guiding the nation to victory over Germany in the Second World War, he faults him for not being satisfied with simply receiving credit for these achievements but rather requiring glorification, fawning adulation, and "saccharine flattery which would have turned the stomach of any normal person." He also comments on the persistent official attempt to identify Stalin with Lenin, and on how "the nearer official fiction brings Stalin to Lenin, the further Stalin departs from Lenin's policies."

59 ———. "Mahatma Gandhi and Generalissimo Stalin." *Modern Review* 1 (March 1947): 15-21.

Fischer contrasts the beliefs, attitudes toward men, and position on the end justifying the means espoused by Mahatma Gandhi with those of Stalin. He describes how Gandhi's egalitarian socialism, disdain for powerful government, commitment to nonviolence, and belief in improving "the system" by empowering man constitutes the antithesis of what the Soviet dictator stands for and what Soviet socialism has come to embrace.

60 ———. "Russia, Twenty-two Years After." *Nation* 150 (10 February 1940): 182-84+.

Twenty-two years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Louis Fischer assesses the direction taken by the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership, describing, among other things, the ways in which Soviet citizens have been changed by the Stalin regime's policies; the nature of the dictatorship established by Lenin under Stalin's rule; and how Stalin has squandered the sympathy expressed by Western progressives in the early years of the Soviet revolution by turning his back on the internationalism written on the Soviet banner, by failing to move the Soviet Union in the direction of democracy—despite the promises offered by the Soviet Constitution of 1936—and by failing to align the Soviet Union with the Western democracies in the struggle against fascism. Fischer also discusses the ways in which the thinking, behavior, and policies of Stalin represent a turn away from those of Lenin, much to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the cause of socialism.

61 ———. "Trotsky, Stalin, and Deutscher." *Virginia Quarterly Review* 40, no. 2 (spring 1964): 307-13.

This critique of Isaac Deutscher's *The Prophet Outcast* (1963), the third volume of his Trotsky trilogy, mainly deals with how the book portrays Stalin and Stalinism. According to Fischer, Deutscher, in effect, apologizes for Stalinism by presenting it as the product of the barbarity of Russia and justifies Stalin's murder of government and party officials by describing the purges as actions designed to prevent the managerial class from becoming "the new bourgeoisie." Also coming under fire in the review are Deutscher's understanding of the place of the working class in Stalin's Russia, particularly his vision of the Soviet Union as a "workers' state"; his version of the circumstances surrounding the 1932 death of Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva; and his attempt, and Trotsky's too, to condemn many of Stalin's actions while still justifying the system that made those acts possible.

62 Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Politics as Practice: Thoughts on a New Soviet Political History." *Kritika* 5, no. 1 (winter 2004): 27-54.

Fitzpatrick opens with a brief historiographical survey of Soviet political history and a discussion of the merits of an orientation toward practice in scholarly investigation of the politics of the Stalin period. She then goes on to suggest a number of possible lines of investigation for historians seeking to analyze Stalin's political practice, focusing here on the rules of the game in party discussion of the 1920s and their revision under Stalin in the 1930s. Reflecting on "transition politics" in Soviet history, Fitzpatrick discusses how the political rules were largely rewritten first in an atmosphere of crisis during the 1917 October Revolution, then between 1927 and 1930, when the rules of the Stalin dictatorship were set in place, and, lastly, between 1953 and 1956, when Stalin's successors attempted to devise new rules for the functioning of the Stalinist system. She also offers a brief list of Stalin's innovations in high political science, including the abolition of factions; the use of the secret police against party opponents; the use of show trials as a way of disciplining politicians as well as signaling policy; and the application of "conspiratorial" rules restricting the circulation of certain party discussions and protocols.

- 63** Gleason, Abbott. "The October Revolution: Invention and Reinvention, Ad Infinitum." *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 2 (June 1998): 426-30.

This commentary on Stephen Kotkin's survey, in the June issue of the *Journal of Modern History*, of the new literature on the Russian Revolution that has emerged since the events of 1991 centers on Kotkin's criticism of the older generation of political historians, specifically the two main proponents of the totalitarian point of view, Richard Pipes and Martin Malia. Gleason maintains that Kotkin's attack on Pipes is too indiscriminate; questions Kotkin's suggestion that the hard line position of Pipes on the Cold War discredits the point of view advanced by Pipes; and maintains that Kotkin seems to criticize the case which Pipes makes for the existence of a basic continuity between Russia's autocratic traditions and the despotism of the Bolsheviks while subscribing to this same position himself in a limited way elsewhere and while criticizing Malia for not doing so.

- 64** ———. "Totalitarianism in 1984." *Russian Review* 43, no. 2 (1984): 145-59.

Gleason discusses totalitarianism as a phenomenon, a generational perspective, and a syndrome or pattern of interrelated traits common to the Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin dictatorships. He traces the history of the academic debate surrounding the viability of the "totalitarian model," devoting special attention to the argument spearheaded by Sheila Fitzpatrick that Stalin, rather than imposing his will on a passive society, as the totalitarian model would have it, had popular support for his policies. In Gleason's opinion, while the totalitarian model has lost much of its power to provide an intellectual framework for understanding the Soviet Union, "scholars should not lose sight of what it was about the USSR which made its depiction as a 'totalitarian' polity convincing to people for thirty years."

- 65** Golubović, Zagora. "Stalinism and Socialism." *Praxis International* 1, no. 2 (1981): 126-36. Golubović examines the question of the historical genesis of Stalinism with the aim of determining whether Stalinism represents a continuation of tendencies started during the October Revolution or whether it constitutes a break with the initial revolutionary forces. She maintains that the period of Stalinist consolidation at the end of the 1920s stands in opposition to "the most significant achievements of the previous revolutionary period while establishing an order which represents its opposite," and that those who equate Stalinism with socialism, or believe that Stalinism was the inevitable consequence of Marxism, are, therefore, in error.

- 66** Gouldner, Alvin W. "Stalinism: A Study in Internal Colonialism." *Telos* 10, no. 34 (winter 1977): 5-48.

Gouldner describes the various tendencies of Stalinist historiography, and then puts forth a definition of Stalinism as "a regime of terror in furtherance of a property transfer, entailing a personal dictatorship and bureaucracy." Expanding on this definition, Gouldner describes how Stalinism—

as a process of state-building grounded in a set of class relations in which the classes are not deemed to be part of a single moral community, and which thus empowered the agents of the more powerful class, the proletariat, to treat the weaker class, the peasants, as an object of exploitation and subject it to the most brutal violence—developed as a form of internal colonialism with bureaucracy and terror serving as the means of imposing subservience upon the subordinate sectors of society and extracting compliance from them. He contends that the party's policy commitments and ideology along with the resistance of the peasants to the demands made upon them limited the Stalin regime's capacity to generate alternatives to the use of terror in dealing with the countryside, and that peasant opposition encouraged the bureaucracy to support unconditionally "the continuing growth of its master's powers, contributing to the concentration of powers, to a possible cult of personality."

67 Graziosi, Andrea. "The New Soviet Archival Sources: Hypothesis for a Critical Assessment." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 40, nos. 1-2 (1999): 13-64.

Graziosi considers some of the problems raised by the opening of former Soviet archives, including lacunae ("white spots"), biases, and the margin for error in various types of the new archival data. Analyzing these problems from the angles of documentation generated by the group ruling the Soviet Union and records left by people inhabiting the country, and limiting her time frame largely to the years between 1917 and 1941, Graziosi points out the difficulties researchers must cope with in their efforts to reconstruct the Soviet past from the archival records generated in a Stalinist system in which key decisions were made by a small group operating informally behind closed doors and producing few, if any, minutes of its deliberations. With respect to Stalin himself, Graziosi notes that, in addition to records the dictator may have intentionally destroyed or altered out of precaution or fear, there is the problem of documents that "never existed at all" due to Stalin's preference for an informal style of ruling which included private evening meetings and early morning phone calls during which the main issues of the 1930s and 1940s were discussed and resolved. She believes that because the more troublesome episodes of Stalin's rule are precisely the ones most likely to have passed without a trace in the archives, historians should attach little meaning to the absence of archival evidence on such matters. In suggesting some possible remedies for dealing with the limitations of Soviet archival records, Graziosi argues for the need for an evaluation of the reliability of each kind of document and for determining "which are the questions that can be legitimately posed to these documents, and which are those that it would naïve to believe they could answer."

68 Gunther, John. "Stalin." *Harper's* 172 (December 1935): 19-32.

Gunther offers an inventory of the sources of Stalin's power, emphasizing such attributes as the Soviet leader's durability and physique, patience and tenacity, shrewdness and cunning, mastery of detail, ability to handle men, practical intelligence, and extravagant ruthlessness. He describes how these and other personal characteristics figured into Stalin's career as a revolutionary, rise within the ranks of the Bolshevik Party's leadership, and triumph over Trotsky and other rivals in the struggle for power within the party following Lenin's death. He also comments on Stalin's style of life, work habits, and overall demeanor, and provides an account of Stalin's then recent statements denouncing "heartless bureaucrats" and pointing out the need to value every worker capable of benefiting the cause of building socialism.

69 Gurian, Waldemar. "Stalin: Death of a Myth." *Commonweal* 57 (27 March 1953): 622-24.

Gurian counters the official hagiography devoted to the recently deceased Stalin with a description of him as a man of limited intellect who managed to turn revolutionary ideas into forces for gaining unlimited power for himself and his henchmen. Operating on the basis of a mindset which considered the dictatorship of the proletariat, the totalitarian state, and the use of violence as ends in themselves rather than as the means to create a socialist utopia, Gurian writes, Stalin managed

to impose and maintain “a new closed reality” upon Soviet society, buttressing the policies he pursued with doctrinal claims linking the rise of Soviet power to the advancement of universal socialism and communism. Gurian suggests that Stalin’s political methods, particularly his habit of claiming that any and all actions which served his own personal power were expressions of necessary laws embodying socialist justice, will continue to be practiced by the new Kremlin leadership, but he questions whether Stalin’s successors will have “sufficient authority and coolness” to avoid an adventurous foreign policy in the manner that the ever cautious Stalin did.

70 ———. “Stalin on His 70th Birthday.” *Commonweal* 51 (23 December 1949): 310-12.

Gurian attempts to isolate the defining characteristics of Stalin’s political character and career. He sees Stalin’s ruthlessness, ability to determine when the moment is ripe to advance or to retreat, and absolute certainty that he is always right as being critical to the success he has enjoyed throughout his political life. He suggests that Stalin’s success in destroying all resistance to his will by employing trial and error methods, by relying on his opponents’ underestimation of his abilities, and by using “patient enveloping tactics” in achieving his goals may well encourage him to use this same methodology in world affairs as a means of extending his power beyond the Soviet Union.

71 Halfin, Igal and Jochen Hellbeck. “Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin’s ‘Magnetic Mountain’ and the State of Soviet Historical Studies.” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996): 456-63.

The authors discuss Stephen Kotkin’s *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (1995) as a groundbreaking contribution to the historiography of Stalinism, one which, in synthesizing elements from both the totalitarian and revisionist schools of thought, offers a fundamentally new understanding of power in the Stalinist system by emphasizing the productive, rather than the repressive, features of Bolshevik rule and by explaining how Stalinism, as revealed by a case study of life in the industrial city of Magnitogorsk, functioned as an elaborate social system, a “civilization” in its own right. While noting the value of *Magnetic Mountain* as a study of Stalinism in practice, Halfin and Hellbeck question certain aspects of Kotkin’s methodology, point out some of the limitations of his conceptualization and understanding of the Stalinist subject, and identify a series of shortcomings in his explanation of the ideological underpinnings, internal contradictions, and popular impact of the Great Terror as it unfolded in Magnitogorsk.

72 Hall, Gus. “Interview with J. V. Stalin.” *Political Affairs* (April 1951): 10-24.

73 Hartfree, Simon. “Leninism versus Stalinism: Was Stalin the Executor of Lenin’s Will or Just His Comrade?” *Modern History Review* 8, no. 2 (November 1996): 6-9.

74 Hayhurst, Stephen. “Russell’s Anticommunist Rhetoric before and after Stalin’s Death.” *Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Archives* 11, no. 1 (summer 1991): 67-82.

Hayhurst describes how English mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell’s vehement hatred of the Stalin regime underwent small yet significant revisions after the Soviet leader’s death in March 1953. He points out how, upon the conclusion of World War II, Russell publicly called for a defensive policy against Stalinism, urging Western leaders to launch a preventive war to wipe out the Stalin regime before Moscow made a move to conquer Western Europe. Russell’s Russophobia, his repeated warnings about the danger posed by Stalin’s tyranny, and his belief that Stalin was “the reincarnation of Ivan the Terrible: insane and totally evil,” Hayhurst writes, gave way with Stalin’s death to a far more balanced and positive view of Russia and its leaders, with Russell speaking out against Cold War fanaticism in the West, revising his criticisms of the Soviet regime as retrospective condemnations of Stalinism, and attributing more of the danger of nuclear

war to the West and less to a Russia rid of the man—Stalin—whom he believed was “the root evil of most of the misery and terror in, and threatened by, Russia.”

75 Heilbrunn, Jacob E. “The Unanswered Question.” *Global Affairs* 7, no. 2 (1992): 186-92. Heilbrunn reviews *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (1991), by Robert Conquest; *Stalin’s Prosecutor: The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky* (1991), by Arkady Vaksberg; and *The Fifth Corner of the Room*, a novella by Israel Metter first published in its entirety in the former Soviet Union in 1992. He treats Conquest’s work rather harshly, maintaining that, other than the book’s focus on the abyss dividing Lenin from Stalin, it lacks themes and it tends to bewilder its readers by assigning equal importance to all events in Stalin’s career. He also questions Conquest’s dismissal of the belief that Stalinism enjoyed a measure of popular support, contending that, at a minimum, it is unreasonable to disagree with the likelihood that the Stalinist state enjoyed the complicity, if not the enthusiastic support, of many of its citizens. For Heilbrunn, the Soviet people’s role in fashioning Stalinism and the extent of their complicity in their own victimization is the great “unanswered question” regarding the Stalin era and is the focus of his commentary on Metter’s novella, a work which, through a series of vignettes in which the protagonist relives the different stages of his life, addresses the question of why the Soviet people succumbed to Stalinism and acquiesced to the horrors of the Stalinist regime.

76 Hellbeck, Jochen. “Speaking Out: Languages of Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia.” *Kritika* 1, no. 1 (winter 2000): 71-96.

Hellbeck points out some of the shortcomings of the current emphasis on popular nonconformity, resistance, and protest in studies dealing with individual and collective attitudes toward the Soviet state during the Stalin era. Drawing upon Soviet autobiographical sources, Hellbeck argues that, in view of the enormous power of “the revolutionary master narrative,” a lasting revolt against the prevailing revolutionary current “appeared utterly undesirable to the dissenting subject because of its combined threat of self-marginalization and atomization.” Furthermore, in sensory terms, “the experience of dissent went along with the notion of utter loneliness and forceful expulsion from the nurturing collective. If the crippling and anesthetizing effects on individuals when they were expelled from the collective” are taken into full account, dissenting Stalinist subjects, Hellbeck concludes, “more often appear as selves in crisis, longing to overcome their painful separation from the collective body of the Soviet people,” rather than as “heroic liberal or preliberal autonomous agents,” as portrayed in some studies of dissent in the Stalin period.

77 Heller, Michael. “Mr. Stalin, I Presume?” *Survey* 30, no. 4 (1989): 155-63.

Heller criticizes the first volume of Dmitri Volkogonov’s *Triumph and Tragedy: A Political Portrait of J. V. Stalin*, the first Soviet political biography of Stalin. Stating that the most remarkable feature of Volkogonov’s work, given his opportunity to work in Stalin’s archives, is “the complete absence of anything new about the Soviet past or about Stalin,” and maintaining that the nature of the “triumph” referred to in the book’s title remains unclear throughout the study, Heller describes *Triumph and Tragedy* as being long on images of Stalin borrowed from Trotsky’s *The Revolution Betrayed* and short on analysis of the possible sources of both Stalin’s success and his triumph. Heller finds no merit in the politico-philosophical explanation for Stalin put forth by Volkogonov, one that likens the cult of one-man leadership to a twentieth-century version of Caesarism, and he points out the flaws in the logic that attends Volkogonov’s approach to distinguishing Stalin from Lenin and the weakness of his defense of Lenin, a defense which Heller sees as the underlying aim of *Triumph and Tragedy*.

78 ———. “Portrait of a Tyrant.” *Midstream* 29 (June/July 1983): 49-52.

Heller reviews *Portrait of a Tyrant* (1980), a book written by Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko—the son of Bolshevik Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, who perished in the purges of the 1930s—and

based on a mix of historical research and reminiscences of old revolutionaries and camp prisoners. Antonov-Ovseyenko, who was a prisoner in Stalin's gulag for over a decade, adds detail to the history of the terror in painting living portraits of Stalin's victims and executioners, but his portrait of the Soviet dictator, including his assessment of Stalin as a man, explanation of why he became the party's leader, and account of his connection with Lenin, suffers from oversimplifications and disregard of established facts, largely as a consequence of his desire to prove Stalin's criminality at all costs, according to Heller. Particularly troublesome, in Heller's view, is Antonov-Ovseyenko's attempt to portray the Old Bolsheviks and Lenin "as having been 'betrayed' by the infamous thug, Stalin," a portrayal which, in failing to answer the question, "How did the brilliant, clever Old Bolsheviks . . . allow the Revolution to be 'stolen' from them?" ignores the connection between the system Lenin began building and the system firmly established under Stalin.

- 79** Hitchens, Christopher. "Lightness at Midnight: Stalin without Irony." *Atlantic Monthly* 290, no. 2 (2002): 144-53.

This review of *Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million* (2002), by Martin Amis, mainly deals with what is seen as the book's tendency to deny that a general recognition of the toll of Stalin's crimes and abuses has already taken place and to lapse into one-dimensional thinking when dealing with complex historical issues and questions such as the moral equivalence between Stalin and Hitler, the cruelties that have attended the impulse to create the "perfect society," and the inevitability of Stalinism, given the historical circumstances in postrevolutionary Russia.

- 80** Hollander, Paul. "The Founding Fathers of Communism Re-Examined." *Orbis* 41, no. 3 (1997): 479-88.

The books under review in this essay are *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archives* (1996), edited by Richard Pipes; *Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary* (1996), by Dmitri Volkogonov; and *Stalin* (1996), by Edvard Rodzinsky. The main themes followed by Hollander in examining the three books are the discrepancy between the Marxist view of the role of the individual in the historical process and the determining role played by Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin in the development of Soviet communism; the similarity in the approach to politics taken by the three leaders; and their sharing in common a sense of mission and a belief in their entitlement to determine the fate of millions of people. Hollander also discusses what Rodzinsky's book shows about Stalin's ruthlessness, practice of deception, and calculated use of violence, and he weighs the merits of Rodzinsky's proposition that "the strongest glue that gave the Soviet system coherence and momentum was the fear Stalin's policies instilled in the population." The review closes with a brief commentary on the fatal flaws in the Soviet system in light of the revelations provided by the three books about the beliefs and practices of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.

- 81** Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Fidel's Stalinism." *Freedom at Issue* nos. 92-93 (November-December 1986): 11-12.

Horowitz identifies six characteristics of Stalinism that are evident in Fidel Castro's Cuba: the subordination of civil society to the party state; the domination of the party by a single leader and a small coterie of his associates; the practice of arbitrary purges and leadership rotation; the primacy of concern for economic development over political democracy; the institutionalization of control and terror, leading to a stifling of alternative economic strategies and policies; and an emphasis on national control rather than foreign adventures. He also discusses Stalinism in terms of its ability "to fine-tune the screws of oppression at will" and to "choke the creative energies of the people, making the system surly, if not vulnerable."

- 82** Karaivanov, Ivan. "Stalin Is a Failure!" *UN World* 6 (December 1952): 12-15.

Grievous miscalculations by Stalin and popular discontent within the USSR are the sources of a major doctrinal retreat by the Kremlin at the Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow in October

1952, according to this critique of Soviet communism written by a Bulgarian communist who was one of the guiding spirits of the Comintern, and who broke with Moscow over the Cominform resolution condemning the Tito regime. Karaivanov maintains that the proceedings at the congress reveal the negative features of Soviet reality; Stalin's misjudgment in predicting a capitalist collapse in the postwar period and in formulating Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe; and the Kremlin's need to retreat from the ideological position which held that the USSR had entered the stage of building communism. The measures announced at the Moscow meeting to strengthen bureaucratic controls and tighten party discipline—steps which reflect the Soviet leadership's recognition of "the mistrust which their own people feel for them"—constitute the final confirmation of Stalin's failure as the leader of Soviet communism, according to Karaivanov.

83 Kendall, Walter. "Stalinist Socialism: Myth of the XXth Century." *Review* 4, no. 2/3 (1962): 69-81.

84 Kennan, George F. "The Legacy of Stalinism." *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings* 79 (1967): 123-34.

The political physiology of Stalin and his influence on Russia, China, and the United States during and after his lifetime are the focal points of this address delivered by American historian and diplomat George F. Kennan at one of a series of special gatherings of the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1966-67 dealing with then recent American foreign policy. Kennan sees Stalin's political success as deriving from his mastery of political tactics and intrigue, his cynical yet effective realism, his shrewdness as a statesman, and his blend of tactical flexibility and persistence in pursuit of his goals. He identifies Stalin's greatest weaknesses as being his violently jealous nature, the ease with which his suspicions were aroused, and his complete lack of patience with normal human weaknesses. Kennan credits Stalin with expanding the power, prestige, and territorial control of the USSR but describes Stalin's Russia as a "sad place," with the intelligentsia intimidated and frightened, the peasantry in a wretched condition, and Bolshevik ideology discredited by its association with the brutality and suffering that so characterized Stalin's rule. In discussing Stalin's impact on China, the pernicious influence of his example on the Chinese Communist Party and its practices receives most attention. The deep-seated fear, suspicion, and resentment that Stalin's postwar behavior and policies instilled in the American people and their leaders, and the failure of Americans to recognize the significant modifications in Soviet Stalinism since the dictator's death occupy Kennan's attention in the closing section of his address.

85 Kershaw, Ian. "Totalitarianism Revisited: Nazism and Stalinism in Comparative Perspective." *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 23 (1994): 23-40.

Kershaw reassesses the relative merits of the concept of totalitarianism as applied to the Hitler and Stalin regimes, particularly the extent to which National Socialism and Stalinism can be seen as a similar genus of state, distinct from others, and he considers how a comparison of Nazism and Stalinism affects notions of the singularity of National Socialism. He argues for the value of the totalitarianism concept in highlighting two important similarities between the Nazi and Stalinist dictatorships—the total claim of each regime on its subjects, and the deformation of existing structures of rule—but he maintains that the concept of totalitarianism is of greatest value in illustrating the differences between the two systems, most notably with respect to the singularity of each system and the character of the leadership of the two regimes, as shaped by the personality of the two dictators and the nature and function of their leadership positions. Whereas the singularity of Stalinism can be located within the continuities of a system which preceded and succeeded Stalin himself, National Socialism, Kershaw concludes, was truly unique, as Hitler was not only indispensable to Nazism, but the self-destructive nature of the aims and essence of his regime suggest that Nazism could never have transformed itself into a more stable form of authoritarianism, as happened with the reordering of the Soviet system after Stalin's death.

- 86** Khlevniuk, Oleg. "Socialism and the Stalin Period after the 'Archival Revolution.'" *Kritika* 2, no. 2 (spring 2001): 319-27.

Khlevniuk points out the central place of Soviet archives in research priorities for today's scholars, describing how archival materials, even though they do not hold the answers to many of the questions about Stalinism and the Stalin era, have substantially enriched previous research and have made possible research on subjects that were previously difficult to study due to lack of reliable sources. He surveys contemporary developments in the historiography of the Stalin era, including the latest research in social history, on the history of Great Terror and the gulag, and on the functioning of the Stalinist system and the extent to which the system both shaped and adapted to objective realities. He also comments on the prospects and trends for future archival research on Stalinism, particularly the likelihood that there will be a more uniform distribution of research interests between traditional and newer topics in the Stalin period; a further intensification in the shift in historical attention toward postwar Stalinism; and an expansion of the level of collaboration between Western and Russian scholars as Russian historians come to terms with the new political and ideological realities in their nation and adjust to the conflict between the old and new historiography in Russia.

- 87** Khrushchev, Nikita S. "Khrushchev Remembers." Edited and translated by Strobe Talbott and prepared for *Life* by Gene Farmer and Jerrold Schecter. *Life* 69 (27 November 1970): 30+; 69 (4 December 1970): 48+; and 69 (11 December 1970): 54+.

These excerpts from the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev largely deal with the former Soviet leader's observations and comments on Stalin's leadership, practice of politics, personality, and behavior. Among the subjects Khrushchev addresses are the horrors that attended Stalin's policy of forced collectivization of agriculture; the circumstances surrounding and impact of the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov; the chaos and frenzy of the Stalin purges of 1936-38; Stalin's logic in concluding the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact; the leadership of and mistakes committed by Stalin during the Great Patriotic War; Stalin's increasingly temperamental, brutish, and paranoid behavior during the last years of his life and its paralyzing effect on the Soviet government; and the illness and death of the Soviet dictator in March 1953, including the behavior of the Kremlin's leaders during Stalin's last days, and their efforts to provide, in the wake of Stalin's demise, for a stable political succession in the face of "the menace" posed by the power-hungry Lavrenti Beria.

- 88** King, Beatrice. "[Appreciation]." *Anglo-Soviet Journal* (October 1941): 286-94.

- 89** Koeves, Tibor. "The Legacy of the Man of Steel." *United Nations World* 7 (April 1953): 12-15+.

This sketch of Stalin's character privileges the role played by the Soviet leader's "obstinate drive and punctilious efficiency" in his achievement of what are seen as the five principal goals of his career—the establishment of a strong central government with himself as the undisputed leader, the creation of an industrial empire, the modernization of agriculture, the construction of a powerful army, and the expansion of Russia's strategic frontiers. Koeves also comments on Stalin's legacy, maintaining that the most important parts of his "political testament" demand that his successors maintain a monopoly of power for the party's top leaders, build Soviet power relentlessly, avoid risky adventures that might jeopardize that power, and weaken the capitalist states by denying them the markets and raw materials of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.

- 90** Kotkin, Stephen. "1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks." *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 2 (June 1998): 384-425.

In this assessment of the impact of the collapse of the Soviet communist regime and the opening of Soviet era archives on historians of Russia and the USSR, the author reviews a wide range of declassified sources and recent scholarly works, largely within the context of the Russian Revolution's relation to the old regime and of Stalin's revolution from above, with topical asides on the nationality question and Stalinist culture, and with a closing section on the career of the totalitarian model. Reviewing more than thirty books and commenting on dozens of others, Kotkin not only considers an array of issues related to the principal categories he has chosen to address—including such Stalin-centered questions as the correlation between Leninism and the system built under Stalin, Stalin's role in the Great Terror, the degree of his authority over the Politburo, and the nature of the Stalin cult and the Stalin phenomenon as a whole—but also comments on how 1991 has impacted the main historiographical trends in the study of post-1917 Russia, all with the aim of suggesting a possible new framework for interpretation and future inquiry. He argues for the value of an analytical framework that would transcend the conceptual categories and narratives of past decades which have served as the basis of scholarly analysis, one that would center on the interconnectedness of the USSR with the rest of the world and treat Soviet socialism as an “alternately undeveloped, exaggerated, and familiar form” of global modernity. For comments on Kotkin's essay, see Abbott Gleason's “The October Revolution: Invention and Reinvention, Ad Infinitum.” *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 2 (June 1998): 426-30, and Robert V. Daniels's “Does the Present Change the Past?” *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 2 (June 1998): 431-35.

- 91 ———. “The State—Is It Us? Memoirs, Archives and Kremlinologists.” *Russian Review* 61, no. 1 (2002): 35-52.

Stalin is not the focus of this essay but it does address the question of the significance of recently declassified documents and new memoir literature for the study of Soviet history, the Stalin era in particular. On the whole, Kotkin maintains that access to the new material has not revolutionized understanding of the Soviet Union but rather “the writing of Soviet history continues to be more deeply conditioned . . . by researchers' world views and agendas, and the times they live in. . . .”

- 92 Labeledz, Leopold. “Deutscher As Historian and Prophet.” *Survey* no. 41 (April 1962): 120-44. For a reprint of this article, see “Isaac Deutscher's Stalin.” *Encounter* 52, no. 1 (January 1979): 65-82.

This critical commentary on the views put forth by the prominent Polish-born British journalist and Marxist historian Isaac Deutscher (1907-1967) in his two decades of writings on Stalin and Soviet communism includes, as part of its attack on Deutscher for his handling of historical evidence and ignorance of the matters about which he writes, a number of examples of how, in the author's view, Deutscher failed to comprehend and badly misrepresented the policies and practices of the Stalin regime. For Labeledz, Deutscher's image of Stalin, interpretation of Stalinist Russia, and prophecies on the course to be taken by Soviet communism not only reflect the workings of a mind clouded by ideological prejudice and wishful thinking but also point toward Deutscher's “addiction to myth-making,” a habit which renders him incapable of making a sober analysis of Soviet affairs.

- 93 ———. “Deutscher As Historian and Prophet, II.” *Survey* 23, no. 3 (summer 1977-78): 146-64.

Published here for the first time, this essay was written in 1962 as the second part of a critical appraisal of Polish-born Marxist journalist, historian, and political activist Isaac Deutscher's approach to and assessment of Stalin, Stalinism, and the development of the Soviet Union. Taking aim on a new (1967) edition of Deutscher's 1960 work *Stalin: A Political Biography*, Labeledz criticizes Deutscher for his selective and unbalanced use of available sources and accuses him of blurring the lines between fact and fiction. The liberties taken by Deutscher in dealing with historical facts are compounded by a significant number of inaccuracies in the book, which are par-

ticularly evident in his treatment of the Kirov assassination and the Tukhachevsky affair, according to Labeledz. Deutscher's "infantile fixation" on the prophecy that the "progressive" work done by the "Dark Knight" Stalin will "usher in an epoch when the pure faith in its 'pristine' form will be restored and implemented" is, in Labeledz's view, the prime source of the deficiencies evident in *Stalin: A Political Biography*.

- 94 ———. "Stalin and History: Perspectives in Retrospect." *Survey* 23, no. 3 (summer 1977-78): 134-46.

Labeledz takes the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Stalin's death to comment on the historiographical reappraisals of the Soviet dictator in the West and in the USSR since 1953; the changing image of Stalin under the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes; and the attitude toward truth and facts that characterizes Soviet historiography. In addition to describing the vicissitudes of communist historiography, Labeledz introduces his accompanying essay, "Deutscher as Historian and Prophet, II," in which he questions the interpretation of Stalin and Stalinism put forth by Isaac Deutscher in his book, *Stalin: A Political Biography*.

- 95 Lang, Sean. "Stalin." *Modern History Review* 16, no. 1 (September 2004): 34-35.

Lang gives a brief description of some of the best websites available for the study of Stalin, including sites that provide selections from Stalin's own writings; the text of some of his interviews with foreign journalists; an overview of his life and accomplishments; new revelations about the Stalin era from Soviet archives; and a survey of his network of labor camps. Lang also notes the existence of a website that takes its visitors to a Stalin theme park in Lithuania which purportedly "combines the charms of Disneyland with the worst of the Soviet gulag prison camp."

- 96 Laqueur, Walter. "Remembering Stalin." *Encounter* 20, no. 3 (March 1963): 19-27.

On the tenth anniversary of Stalin's death, Laqueur constructs a balance sheet of the former Soviet dictator's policies and accomplishments. Laqueur's Stalin is a man of limited intellect prone to view complex issues in black-and-white terms and prepared to take any and all actions to achieve the ends that he, as dictator of the Soviet Union, deemed to be desirable. The most pointed example of this mindset in action and the most lasting of Stalin's achievements is, in Laqueur's view, the industrialization of Russia, which, while achieved at great costs for the Soviet people, laid the foundation for Russia's military success in World War II and emergence as the strongest industrial and political power in Europe. The cruelties and sufferings that attended rapid industrialization, forced collectivization, and other key programs of the Stalin regime, Laqueur adds, while worthy of condemnation, were largely rationalized by the regime as necessary measures for the promotion of a higher good. In presenting this retrospective portrait of Stalin, Laqueur compares the Soviet dictator's style of rule, policies, and accomplishments with those of Hitler, usually to the advantage of Stalin. He also comments on the various stages of the process of de-Stalinization and the emergence in the late 1970s of a Soviet interpretation of Stalinism which held that Stalinism was neither inherent in Leninism nor its logical successor but merely an aberration, a form of degeneration, and a phenomenon that could not possibly redevelop in a Soviet society that has now reached a higher stage of development.

- 97 ———. "Russia through Western Eyes: Vision and Reality." *Survey* 41 (April 1962): 3-13.

This commentary on some of the landmarks in Western writing about Russia from the October Revolution until Stalin's death includes a critique of the views set forth in the 1930s by Western intellectuals who were fascinated by Stalin and the Russia under his rule, and who, in the name of progress, declared their support for the Soviet leader, even in the face of the despotism and terror that he practiced. Laqueur not only indicts leftist intellectuals such as Lion Feuchtwanger, Harold Laski, and Beatrice and Sidney Webb in his critique but also Walter Duranty—the Moscow correspondent for the *New York Times*—Joseph E. Davies, America's Ambassador in Moscow in the

1930s, and the prominent British historian of Russia, Bernard Pares. He also comments on how the general level of understanding of the Soviet Union has improved since the 1930s, due largely to increasing evidence of Stalin's abusive rule and to the publication of more factual material about the day-to-day operation of the Soviet system.

98 ———. "Why Stalin? A National Debate." *Society* 27, no. 3 (March/April 1990): 26-42.

Laqueur reviews the various interpretations of Stalinism advanced in the West from the 1930s through the 1980s and then focuses on the debate on Stalinism that engulfed the Soviet Union under glasnost. He comments on Soviet writings dealing with such subjects as Stalinism's psychological profile and effect on the Soviet people; the connection between Stalinism and the extremism of the Russian revolutionary movement; the impact of the doctrine of the Bolshevik Party's infallibility on the origins and shape of Stalinism; and popular support for Stalinism in a Soviet nation seeking a sense of security in troubling times and accepting the need for both a strong government to cope with the danger posed by "capitalist encirclement" and for rapid industrialization for the sake of national security. Laqueur also discusses the theories of Stalinism advanced by Stalin's defenders, including those which point to the Stalin era as "a time of great enthusiasm, of national unity and pride, of belief in the leadership and a historical mission."

99 Laski, Harold J. "My Impressions of Stalin." *New Republic* 115 (14 October 1946): 478-79.

English political scientist Harold Laski, who met Stalin while heading a British Labor Party goodwill mission to Russia in October 1946, offers a list of the Soviet leader's principal characteristics, beliefs, and concerns. In Laski's estimate, Stalin is a leader who is direct and simple in manner; more interested in domestic than foreign affairs; suspicious of those who at any time have shown antagonism toward the socialist revolution; anxious to avoid war and eager to find common ground with the West; deeply respectful of power and strength; elastic in his approach to building socialism; and convinced of its ability to transform the world for the better. Laski denies that Stalin is a dictator but rather sees him as a powerful political figure who is the leader of a team, the Politburo, which at times disagrees with him and needs to be convinced of the appropriateness of some of his proposals.

100 Lewin, Moshe. "Stalin and the Fall of Bolshevism." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 7, no. 1 (summer 1976): 105-17.

The main theme of this critique of Adam Ulam's *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (1973) is that the book, in disregarding the problems and dilemmas that confronted Bolshevik leaders, the debates on strategies and aims in which they engaged, and the difficult choices they had to make, presents an "almost farcical picture" of the history of Bolshevism and an implausible case for the proposition that Stalin was a product of his party and the Soviet system. Lewin also questions the book's assessment of Stalin's personality, maintaining that Ulam discounts the behaviors and actions of Stalin which point toward his psychological instability in favor of the view that the madness some scholars attribute to Stalin stemmed from the Soviet system itself, and that "Stalin's atrocities and vulgarities were results of corruption by power, not insanity."

101 ———. "Stalinism—Appraisal and Reappraisal." *History* 40 (February 1975): 71-77.

Lewin reviews Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, I-II* (1974); Adam Ulam's *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (1973); Robert Tucker's *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (1973); Stephen Cohen's *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (1974); and Roger Pethybridge's *The Social Prelude to Stalinism* (1974). He describes the focus of each of the five books, establishes their perspectives, and comments on the ways in which they add to scholarly understanding of Stalinization as "a process in which the traits of the original Bolshevik organization were obliterated and a new one, though using many of the same trademarks, was created."

He also comments on *Makers of the Russian Revolution*—a collection edited by Georg Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie—which provides biographies and autobiographies of individuals who were prominent in the party's early stages, and who were largely deleted from history by Stalinist falsification.

- 102** Lynch, Michael. "The Roles of Lenin and Stalin in the Russian Revolution." *History Review* 34 (March 2000): 29-33.

Lynch provides an outline of the key considerations and historical interpretations students should take into account when addressing the question, "Did Stalin fulfill or betray the revolution that Lenin began in 1917?" Among the issues he addresses are the personal ambitions of Lenin and Stalin; the characteristics of the Bolshevik Party during the years of its development under Lenin; and the place of the Russian Revolution in the authoritarian tradition of the nation. Lynch concludes with a comparative list of considerations with regard to how Lenin consolidated Bolshevik power in the period 1917-24, and how Stalin enforced his authority once he assumed leadership of the USSR.

- 103** Lyons, Eugene. "Stalin, Autocrat of All the Russias." *American Mercury* 48 (October 1939): 238-43.

This favorable review of Boris Souvarine's *Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (1939) centers on the book's account of Stalin's patience and calculation in intriguing his way to power and of Stalin as the supreme personification of a Bolshevism that appropriated the forms of Marxist thought while disregarding its ethical and humanist substance and twisting the original idea of socialism into its very opposite. Lyons also comments on the propagation of the cult of Stalin and on how Souvarine's book dismantles the legend of Stalin fashioned in Russia and garnished by the "deluded followers" of Soviet "socialism" abroad.

- 104** Magil, A. B. "This Is Stalin: Facts and Myths Regarding the Soviet Leader." *New Masses* (28 December 1943): 20-22.

On the occasion of Stalin's sixty-fourth birthday, this article, in attempting to separate the "facts" from "myths" about the Soviet leader's political character and leadership, presents an image of Stalin as a great and selfless leader, decisive yet fair-minded, committed to liberating Soviet territory from German control, and dedicated to promoting the development of free, independent nations, working-class internationalism, and progress toward socialism. Taking aim on *Stalin: Czar of All the Russias* (1940), by Eugene Lyons, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (1939), by Boris Souvarine, and the views expressed on Stalin by Edwin L. James, the managing editor of the *Times*, and commenting on "the stubborn refusal of most political commentators to learn anything about Stalin beyond the impressions they have gathered since the Nazi invasion," Magil draws upon Stalin's own writings and speeches to "set the record straight" regarding such questions as the relationship between nationalism and internationalism in Stalin's thinking, the nature of the political authority which he wields, the sources of his success in leading the USSR in peace and war, and the effect that World War II has had upon the stability of the Soviet regime.

- 105** Malia, Martin. "The Archives of Evil." *New Republic* 231, nos. 22/23 (11 November 2004): 34-41.

Malia considers a selection of books by younger scholars in order to gauge how the reevaluation of the Soviet experiment is proceeding since access to "the archives of evil" has become more readily available. Focusing on Igal Halfin's *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (2000) and *Terror in My Soul* (2003), Terry Martin's *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (2001), and Amir Weiner's *Making Sense of War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (2001), Malia points out how the four books add to the body of information dealing with the Stalin era, and he

comments on how the work of the three authors provides a sense of the directions of change in Soviet studies, particularly with respect to “the pre-1991 methodological issue of the relative weight to be assigned to politics and ideology on the one hand, and to socioeconomic forces on the other.” He suggests that, while historians such as the three whose work is under review here have managed to tap Soviet era archives to offer new information on various aspects of the Soviet adventure, the recent flood of documentation that has come with “the archival revolution” has largely outdistanced scholarly analysis of its meaning. It is not an injection of new facts into the study of Soviet history that will bring this field of scholarship up to the level of achievement that can be seen in the most creative areas of contemporary historical writing—the study of Nazi Germany and the French Revolution—but rather a methodological adjustment in the direction of ideology and cultural history and away from social history which has dominated the study of “the Soviet adventure” in recent years, according to Malia.

106 “Man of the Year.” *Time* 35 (1 January 1940): 14-17.

This article describes Stalin’s enormous effect on world affairs during 1939—most notably his dramatic alteration of the power balance in Europe and advancement of the likelihood of a European war by orchestrating a nonaggression treaty with Hitler’s Germany—as the rationale for his selection as *Time*’s “Man of the Year.” The article also provides a critical review of Stalin’s years as a revolutionary, rise to power as Lenin’s successor, and major policies as leader of the Soviet Union, citing “numerous examples of his cynical opportunism and unprincipled grabbing of power.”

107 Mark, Eduard. “October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1929-1947.” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (1989): 937-63.

Mark draws upon a wide range of books, newspapers, and periodicals published in America as well as records of the executive branch of the United States government to examine American views on the “Soviet experiment,” Stalinism, and Soviet foreign policy for the period 1927-47. He isolates four distinctly different schools of thought on the subjects at hand, explaining how these interpretations, whose paradigms he labels as the “National Bolshevik,” “Thermidorean,” “Evolutionary,” and “Totalitarian,” reflect the divergent ideological preconceptions and political interests that Americans brought to their attempts to explain the discrepancies between Soviet practices under Stalin and the traditional values of socialism. He traces the process by which these interpretations of Stalinism were first postulated and then later weighed against events and developments in the Soviet Union during the years under review, describing how the National Bolshevik and Totalitarian paradigms proved to be most enduring of the four models, with each in its own way managing to reconcile “the surviving manifestations of Stalinist ‘conservatism’ with renewed ideological militancy at home and abroad.” While the National Bolshevik paradigm served a purpose of the Right—antiradicalism—and the Thermidorean a purpose of the Left—the redemption of collectivism—in concert they “facilitated the formation of a national consensus in support of containment,” Mark concludes.

108 McClarnand, Elaine. “The Debate Continues: Views on Stalinism from the Former Soviet Union.” *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 20, no. 1 (1993): 11-33.

McClarnand summarizes the views of Stalinism expressed by various scholars, nineteen in all, from the former Soviet Union whom she interviewed in Moscow and St. Petersburg between 15 June 1991 and 13 April 1992 on three aspects of the Stalin question: the meaning or definition of Stalinism; the origins of Stalinism; and the relationship between Stalinism, Leninism, and Marxism. The interviews, McClarnand writes, illustrate clearly the complex and highly charged nature of the Stalin debate in the former Soviet Union, with such questions as was Stalinism specifically Russian in origin, was it a form of twentieth-century totalitarianism, and did it stem from the the-

ory and practice of Bolshevism leading the way among the points of disagreement in the debate, and with the main points of convergence in this discussion being that Stalinism represented a particular method of modernization, was a multidimensional phenomenon arising from a complex of factors, and must be considered in conjunction with the social base upon which it rested and from which it drew support. McClarnand also discusses what the interviews reveal about historiographical trends in Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship on Stalinism, particularly with respect to the similarities and differences between Soviet and Western interpretive approaches to and treatment of the Stalin phenomenon.

109 McDermott, Kevin. "Archives, Power and the 'Cultural Turn': Reflections on Stalin and Stalinism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 1 (2004): 5-24.

McDermott discusses four interrelated issues that he believes must be considered in any contemporary study of Stalin: the impact of the "archival explosion" since 1991; the need to reconceptualize Stalin's political authority; the challenge of integrating new sociocultural perspectives into the traditional genre of political biography; and the task of delineating the contradictions and limitations of Stalin's power. He maintains that the newly available archival material largely confirms what is already known about Stalin and his regime, but, by providing an unprecedented wealth of information on the inner workings of the regime and details on the changing nature of Stalin's relationship with his Kremlin colleagues, has "permitted a more nuanced, sophisticated interpretation of the Stalinist system as a whole." He suggests that a "war-revolution model"—one which takes into account the brutalizing effects of World War I and the Russian Civil War on Stalin's political character; the fierce ideological battles within the Soviet Communist Party; the ever-present threat posed by "capitalist encirclement" and internal enemies; and Stalin's commitment to Marxism and to the rapid socialist transformation of Soviet society—might help to promote understanding of Stalin's political mentality and many of his actions. He sees the recent sociocultural research as having provided valuable insights into both the question of the political, social, and cultural legitimacy of the Stalin regime and the contentious issue of popular conformity to Stalinist norms, but he believes there is a need for further consideration of how the new "cultural turn" helps the political historian grapple with the question of Stalin's personal power, particularly with respect to the intersection of that power with the authority of the Soviet state. He also identifies what he sees as the primary constraints on the Soviet dictator's power, namely, a vast bureaucracy often staffed with incapable and potentially insubordinate provincial "cliques" which proved difficult to control from the center; various forms of popular resistance stemming from the "limited appeal of Marxism-Leninism; the ambivalent reception of the Stalin cult; the existence of alternative nonconformist views among a fairly wide strata of the Soviet population"; and Stalin's own habit of distrusting even his closest associates and of seeing "enemies" everywhere—all of which may have combined to make him feel "powerless to enforce his will, or even totally unable to discern the causes of the regime's malfunctions."

110 McNeal, Robert H. "Trotsky's Interpretation of Stalin." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 5 (1961): 87-97.

McNeal identifies what he sees as a series of shortcomings in the interpretation of Stalin advanced in the writings of Leon Trotsky. In McNeal's estimate, the mannerisms and style of the provincial and nonintellectual Stalin encouraged Trotsky, the cosmopolitan intellectual, to adopt a low opinion of Stalin's intelligence which, in turn, skewed his assessment of Stalin's character and prevented him from recognizing his talents and achievements. Believing that Stalin was a mediocrity, Trotsky came to see Stalin's rise to power, Stalinism, and the postrevolutionary development of Soviet Russia as being products of greater forces—akin to those which produced the counterrevolutionary rule of both the Thermidoreans and the Bonapartists in French revolutionary history—that had little to do with the ability of Stalin himself. The fact that Stalin conducted a radical and progressive economic policy which Trotsky himself had called for, in McNeal's view, seems to

run counter to Trotsky's contention that the program of the early five-year plans was forced upon the nonrevolutionary Stalin by a stalemate between agriculture and industry which reached a high point in 1928. Trotsky's accusation that Stalin betrayed the revolution is also found wanting by McNeal as is his argument that neither Stalin nor his works would survive if the Soviet Union were to go to war against Germany.

- 111** Menken, Jules. "Stalin and His Russia." *Nineteenth Century* 146 (December 1949): 395-404; 147 (January 1950): 17-34.

The first installment of this two-part article describes the most important features of what is termed as "the Soviet political legend," compares the leading elements of this myth with Soviet reality, and discusses how the Soviet legend has served the Stalin regime as an instrument of power. The second examines Stalin's political personality and character, and the pattern of his behavior as a young revolutionary, as a contestant in the intraparty struggle for power following Lenin's death, and as absolute ruler of the Soviet Union. Here, the emphasis is on Stalin's instinctive drive toward power; his patience and dissimulation while amassing the strength to deal with those deemed to be his enemies; and his utter ruthlessness in attacking, overwhelming, and destroying his opponents once he came to believe his position was unassailable. In illustrating the interaction of policy and power under Stalin, and in exemplifying the influence of his political character and will to dominate, Menken discusses the growth in size and power of the state police; the use of hierarchical planning as an instrument for achieving total control over all economic activity; and the collectivization of agriculture as a means of solving "the peasant problem" and further enhancing the power of the Stalinist state. Menken also considers how Soviet foreign policy under Stalin's personal direction reflects a desire for expansion for power's sake and the same patience, tactical flexibility, and concern for developing the instruments of power before moving toward an objective which also characterizes Stalin's domestic policy.

- 112** Merridale, Catherine. "Glasnost and Stalin: New Material, Old Questions." *Historical Journal* 36, no. 1 (1993): 233-43.

Merridale reviews *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (1991), by James Hughes; *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (1991), by Walter Laqueur; *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (1989), by Roy Medvedev; *The Doctors' Plot: Stalin's Last Crime* (1991), by Yakov Rapoport; *Stalin in Power, 1928-1941* (1991), by Robert Tucker; and *Stalin and Stalinism* (1991), by Alan Wood. Focusing on Tucker, Medvedev, and Laqueur, Merridale mainly considers how the three books, in drawing upon material made available under Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, deal with such questions as the nature of Stalin's personality, its role in shaping the Soviet system, the origins of Stalinism, and Stalin's place in the purges of the 1930s. She also points out the need for historians to take advantage of the new material to begin asking questions about Soviet society under Stalinism which were impossible to answer in the days of limited archive access; to add substance to the various theories of Stalinism and the Soviet system; and to further scholarly understanding of the Stalinist state by moving beyond "the tired old totalitarian model of the Stalinist polity."

- 113** Methvin, Eugene H. "Hitler and Stalin: 20th Century Superkillers." *National Review* 37, no. 10 (31 May 1985): 22-29.

In this comparative look at Hitler and Stalin as dictators responsible for the nonwar deaths of tens of millions of people, Methvin argues that Hitler, despite being far less deadly than Stalin, has dominated the historical scene largely because of the intensity of his historical strut, the overtness of his evil, and the historical documentation of his atrocities. Moreover, where in Hitler "we see a perfectly alien, disgusting, wholly denounceable devil," Stalin's psychopathic criminality was cloaked in the verbiage of Marx, making it ideologically and psychologically painful for Western, liberal-minded writers to study his life and policies, according to Methvin.

114 Meyer, Alfred G. "On Greatness." *Soviet Union* 8, no. 1 (1981): 18-24.

Meyer comments on Theodore Von Laue's essay "Stalin among the Moral and Political Imperatives, or How to Judge Stalin?" published in this same issue of *Soviet Union*. He commends Von Laue for mustering the courage not only to recognize Stalin's achievements but also to place his crimes and abuses within a context which explains and, possibly, excuses them. Lending his support to Von Laue's basic perspective, Meyer asserts that it is healthy for Western analysts "to be told that they should get off their moralistic high horses" when attempting to judge political systems other than their own.

115 ———. "The Origins of Stalinism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (January 1989): 162-67.

Meyer offers a favorable review of Pavel Campeanu's *The Origins of Stalinism: from Leninist Revolution to Stalinist Society* (1986), a book which links the origins of Stalinism to the premature seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and to the consequent substitution of the party for class structure as the driving force of history in Russian society. Quoting at length from *The Origins of Stalinism*, Meyer establishes the conceptual framework within which Campeanu develops his argument; explains how the book ties the need for a single infallible leader to the substitution of the party leadership for the rank-and-file membership; and argues for the merits of Campeanu's model as a powerful analytical tool for investigating the emergence of Stalinism, the limits of the use of force as the principal means to shape social structures, and the party's inability to develop a viable strategy for creating a socialist system.

116 Miliband, Ralph. "Stalin and After: Some Comments on Two Books by Roy Medvedev." *Socialist Register* (1973): 377-95.

This review of Soviet historian Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (1971) and *De la Démocratie Socialiste* (1972) revolves around what the two studies have to say about four main questions: what happened under Stalin; why did it happen; what has happened since Stalin; and what is to happen next? In discussing how the two books address these questions, Miliband primarily describes Medvedev's account of the record of Stalinist repression, particularly with regard to the scale of the repression, its targeting of innocent victims, and its devastation of officialdom in every sphere of Soviet life; his argument against the notion that Stalinism, given the circumstances which existed in postrevolutionary Russia and the nature of the political system established under Lenin, was inevitable; and his case for the democratization of Soviet political and civic life by way of reform within the existing system as the most likely direction that the Soviet Union will head during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

117 Molotov, Vyacheslav. "Stalin As Leader of the USSR." *Labour Monthly* 23 (November 1941): 460-62.

Stalin receives praise for his leading role in the October Revolution and Russian Civil War, in resolving the national question and forming the USSR, in drafting the 1936 Soviet Constitution, in building the Soviet socialist society, and in purging the state apparatus from "inimical, spying and wrecking elements" in this excerpt from a 1939 speech delivered by Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov.

118 Morris, Stephen. "Medvedev on Stalinism." *Politics* 7, no. 2 (1972): 197-202.

Morris reviews *Let History Judge*, written by Soviet historian Roy Medvedev and published in the West in 1971. He commends Medvedev for the extensive empirical research which has gone into the production of the book, and for providing, as its publishers claim, "the first serious account of Stalin and Stalinism to come from the Soviet Union"—one which repudiates the then current official Soviet version of the Stalin era and "the more widely respected apologetic histories of people

like Isaac Deutscher” as well. However, in describing the book as a work pervaded by Medvedev’s struggle to fit the history of Stalinism within Marxist-Leninist categories and to show a basic conflict between the moral purities of Leninist socialism and the criminal aberrations of Stalin, Morris contends that Medvedev has presented an idealized and distorted picture of Lenin in an effort to respond to the gap between ethically based Marxist-Leninist theory and morally abominable Stalinist political practices, and has made a sharp break with the materialist and deterministic theory of history in his effort to explain the Stalin era as a period in the nation’s history where the direction of sociopolitical development was determined fundamentally by the will of one man, Stalin, rather than by an impersonal economic substructure.

119 Navrozov, Lev. “Stalin under Western Eyes.” *Commentary* 57, no. 4 (1974): 66-70.

Navrozov critiques Adam Ulam’s *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (1973), taking issue with Ulam’s description of prerevolutionary Russia as “a country characterized by unchanging and hopelessly benighted tyranny”; his portrayal of Lenin as “a man of ‘humane instincts,’ not at all like Stalin”; and his interpretation of Stalin’s collectivization of agriculture as a step that would have established a reputation for Stalin as “the benefactor of the Russian peasant,” had he eschewed forcible methods in implementing the collectivization program. Ulam’s treatment of the question of whether Stalin, during the last stage of his rule, aspired to world domination also comes under fire in Navrozov’s review.

120 Neville, Peter. “Joseph Stalin: Man and Legacy.” *Modern History Review* 6, no. 1 (1994): 22-25.

Appraising Stalin’s place in the history of the Soviet Union, Neville comments on the steps taken by the Soviet leader in eliminating political rivals in his rise to power; the competing views of his role in the purges of the 1930s; his initial blunders and ultimate success as a wartime leader, and the question of whether Stalinism was a product of Stalin’s own doing or was part of a broader political and social process at work in the years following Lenin’s death. Neville also considers Stalin’s legacy of extraordinarily high levels of military spending and distrust of Western nations as well as the critical portrayals of his legacy by Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev.

121 Nevins, Allan. “Two ‘Greats’ Two Dictators Worship.” *New York Times Magazine* (4 February 1940): 10+.

Nevins examines Stalin’s admiration of Peter the Great and Hitler’s for Frederick the Great. He links the two dictators’ appeals to the names and precedents of these epic national figures to the need to justify their own authority and territorial expansion; discusses how Stalin and Hitler distorted the image of their respective heroes by magnifying those qualities of the two great historical figures that served their own selfish political interests; and explains why he believes that both Peter and Frederick the Great, if they could return from their tombs, would be horrified by the regimes and policies of the two dictators.

122 Nickson, Richard. “The Lure of Stalinism: Bernard Shaw and Company.” *Midwest Quarterly* 25 (summer 1984): 416-33.

Nickson chronicles the favorable views of Stalin and the Soviet experiment expressed by various representatives of the Western intelligentsia during the 1930s and 1940s, speculating on the sources of allegiance shown by Western intellectuals to communism during this time. Focusing on the impressions of Stalin and Soviet socialism conveyed by George Bernard Shaw, a lifelong passionate advocate of socialism, Nickson maintains that the British playwright’s nondoctrinal espousal of the Soviet cause was a tactic in an artistic campaign to expose the evils of capitalism in British society, and that Shaw was ignorant about the real nature of conditions in Soviet society. He also criticizes Shaw for refusing to come to terms with the manifold evils of Stalin and Stalinism.

123 Nove, Alec. "Was Stalin Really Necessary?" *Encounter* 18, no. 4 (1962): 86-92.

This paper deals with the questions of whether Stalinism was "an integral, unavoidable, 'necessary'" part of the achievements of the early Soviet period, and whether the extent to which the evil associated with the Stalin system is attributable to Stalin himself rather than to the policies adopted by a minority party eager to maintain its rule and to impose rapid industrialization on a peasant country. Explaining that "necessity" is used in the paper neither to justify the need for Stalin and his system nor to suggest their inevitability but rather with reference to the practical alternatives which Stalin and his colleagues had before them in the late 1920s—given their ideology, their minority status, and their perception that urgent and rapid industrialization was a matter of survival for their regime and the revolution they championed—Nove develops the argument that many of the elements of what may be called Stalinism flowed from the coercive process set in motion by the decision to industrialize quickly and to do so at the expense of the peasant majority of the Soviet population. He further argues that, while the possibility of a Stalin was a necessary consequence of the effort of a minority group to keep power and to execute a vast socioeconomic revolution in a very short time, the needless cruelty of collectivization and the madly excessive pace of industrialization attributable to Stalin, along with the more personal and arbitrary measures he took as his reign progressed, were not necessary, meaning that "the whole hog Stalin" was not a Bolshevik necessity.

124 O'Brien, John Conway. "The Eternal Path of Communism: From Marx via Lenin and Stalin to Solzhenitsyn and Gorbachev." *International Journal of Social Economics* 18, nos. 5-6-7 (1991): 5-31.

An essay in a special issue of the *International Journal of Social Economics* devoted to the theme of the reforms of Gorbachev in the light of Marxist-Leninist ideology, this paper outlines the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and the various steps taken by the Soviet leadership along what is termed as "the never-ending road to Communism." In the brief section on Stalin, O'Brien describes the dictator's rise to power, the degree to which his policies were consistent with Marxism, and his replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat with a personal dictatorship, glorified by the cult of the leader.

125 Orlovsky, Daniel T. "The New Soviet History." *Journal of Modern History* 62, no. 4 (1990): 831-50.

This commentary on recent scholarship on the revolutionary era of Russian history and the post-1917 history of the Soviet Union includes a review of two books that deal directly with Stalin and Stalinism—*The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution"* (1987), by Michal Reiman; and *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (1988), by Robert McNeal—and three that seek to explain Stalinism as a cultural system and manner of governance by exploring specific areas of Soviet social, economic, and cultural life—*Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (1989), by Richard Stites; *Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia* (1988), by Douglas Weiner; and *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity* (1988), by Lewis Sigelbaum. Among the Stalin-related subjects that Orlovsky deals with in his remarks on these studies are the connection between Lenin and Stalin, specifically with regard to the authoritarian institutions spawned by Bolshevik ideology; the roots of the "Stalin leap forward" at the end of the 1920s; the nature of Stalin's revolutionary utopia and his personal role in its propagation; the emergence, essence, and promotion of Stalinist science; and the inner workings of the Stalin regime as revealed by the unfolding of the Stakhanovite movement and by its relationship to the industrialization drive of the 1930s. Orlovsky also discusses how the works under review suggest, collectively, that Stalin, or his governing bloc, had a large responsibility for the most extreme policies of the 1930s, and that Stalin himself, in both blatant and subtle ways, "set the tone, fixed and set signals . . . which in the political culture of the

period were readily picked up by thousands of smaller and would-be Stalins in the party and state apparatus.”

126 Pares, Bernard. “On the Fear of Russia.” *New Republic* 108 (19 April 1943): 498-502.

Pares counters the suggestion made by some in the West that Stalin intends to push the cause of world revolution if he wins the war against Hitler, arguing that such speculation is based upon out-of-date ideas about the nature of what has happened in the Soviet Union under communist rule and on a misunderstanding of Stalin’s priorities. For Pares, the Kremlin, under Stalin’s leadership, has consistently advanced a progressive socialist program in the USSR; abandoned the early Soviet domestic experiments and support for world revolution championed by radical Bolsheviks; and pursued a foreign policy aimed at preserving peace so that the party’s leaders might focus their attention and resources on building socialism in the Soviet Union. While many innocent people perished in Russia during Stalin’s ruthless repression of all opposition, the principal victims of his purges were the revolutionists who hoped to derail his domestic program and rekindle Moscow’s support for world revolution, according to Pares. With Germany’s defeat, Stalin, Pares predicts, will no doubt “return to the vast program of home construction . . . which has been the great task of his life” and will continue to work for the cause of peace and a stable Europe so that he can advance the interests of his own country, as he has done in the past.

127 Pike, David. “Stalin and the Intellectuals.” *Internationales Archiv für Socialgeschichte der Deutschen Literatur* 10 (1985): 225-44.

This review of the essays in the 1983 book *Stalin und die Intellektuellen* (*Stalin and the Intellectuals*) centers on the methodological limitations, conceptual oversights, and issues shortchanged in the essays in their attempt to come to grips with the question of why, in the 1920s and 1930s, many prominent German intellectuals “became transfixed by the Soviet Union and ended up speaking out in favor of Stalin’s policies and practices with an ardor equal to their opposition to Hitler.”

128 Pipa, Arshi. “Stalin and Hoxha: The Master and Apprentice.” *Telos* no. 74 (winter 1987): 109-15.

Pipa critiques the political behavior and practices of Enver Hoxha, describing how the Albanian communist leader has emulated Stalin in constructing a personality cult through consecutive party purges; by posing as an all-knowing genius in an effort to cover an inferiority complex; and by practicing an unprincipled Byzantine-style Machiavellianism in both domestic politics and diplomacy. Pipa also discusses how Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, including his campaign to reexamine the Stalin myth and the violations of law that occurred during the Stalin era, will affect Albania, where Stalinism in its Hoxhian variant was then still very much alive.

129 Plamenatz, John. “Deviations from Marxism.” *Political Quarterly* 21 (January 1950): 40-55.

This examination of deviations from Marxism by Russian Marxists focuses on Leon Trotsky’s explanation of the triumph of Stalin and denunciation of Stalin as a traitor to the Marxist faith and a betrayer of the October Revolution. According to Plamenatz, since Trotsky himself maintained that a socialist revolution in Russia could not succeed unless there were revolutions in more advanced countries, Stalin cannot be condemned for betraying the revolution but rather Stalinism itself must be viewed as the inevitable outcome of a premature revolution of which Lenin and Trotsky were the architects. Furthermore, Trotsky’s justification of his own position and condemnation of Stalin needs to be questioned in view of the facts that the Bolshevik Party had ceased to be democratic long before Stalin became master of Russia and that what little freedom the Russian people had died during the Russian Civil War under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky.

- 130** Potapenko, Vladimir. "From the Time of Troubles to the Present Day." *Russian Politics and Law* 38, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 84-96.

This critical commentary on Soviet political and economic development under Stalin and his successors opens with a brief appraisal of Stalin's accomplishments in terms of the price the Soviet people paid to become a great power. Among the policies of the Stalin regime that Potapenko considers in this regard are Stalin's proclamation of the 1936 Soviet Constitution guaranteeing unprecedented rights and freedom, which in practice were completely ignored; his monumental construction projects made possible by gulag labor; and his programs of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization, which cost millions of lives and "opened a direct path to the empty shop shelves and queues" that became commonplace in Soviet life. While Potapenko roundly condemns Stalin for his disregard for the needs and welfare of the Soviet people, he salutes his countrymen for their ability to endure and survive under the oppressive policies and practices of the Stalin regime.

- 131** "Power Corrupts." *Christian Century* 70 (18 March 1953): 311-13.

Christian Century describes Stalin's political career as "a tragic and foreboding proof" of British historian Lord Acton's insight that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The article not only maintains that power corrupted Stalin personally but also that the ruthless struggle for power, from which he emerged triumphant, thoroughly corrupted the revolution which he professed to serve. While the tomb of Lenin and Stalin in Moscow's Red Square attracts pilgrims by the tens of thousands, this phenomenon, the article predicts, will come to an end when the Soviet people finally realize that the original purposes of the Russian Revolution were corrupted not just by Stalin but by Lenin as well.

- 132** Ravindranathan, T. R. "The Legacy of Stalin and Stalinism: A Historiographical Survey of the Literature, 1930-1990." *Canadian Journal of History* 29, no. 1 (1994): 113-46.

Ravindranathan provides a topically arranged survey of historical writings on Stalin and Stalinism, including the literature on Stalin's formative years; activities in the Bolshevik revolutionary movement; and victory in the intraparty struggle following Lenin's death; the formation of the Stalinist state; the Stalin regime's collectivization and industrialization programs of the 1920s and 1930s; the purges and terror of the 1930s; Stalinist foreign policy; the treatment of the national minorities under Stalin; and, lastly, on the general theme of Stalin and Stalinism. He also comments on a number of prominent biographies of Stalin, devoting most attention to the works of Isaac Deutscher, Roy Medvedev, Robert Tucker, Adam Ulam, Robert McNeal, and Dmitri Volkogonov. Overall, Ravindranathan notes the preeminence of Western scholarship on the Stalin era—due primarily to the limitations imposed on Soviet historians under Stalin and his immediate successors—and he forecasts a wave of valuable contributions to the study of the Stalin period by Russian historians as the nation revives its "great pre-Stalinist historical tradition."

- 133** ———. "The Stalinist Enigma: A Review Article." *Canadian Journal of History* 28 no. 3 (1993): 545-59.

This review article on Dmitri Volkogonov's *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* (1991), Robert Tucker's *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (1991), and Robert Conquest's two studies, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (1991) and *The Great Terror: A Reappraisal* (1990) centers on the three authors' treatment of the terror and the most famous of the show trials of the 1930s. Ravindranathan also considers what the four books reveal about Stalin's early life, role in the October Revolution and Russian Civil War, victory over his rivals in the intraparty struggle for leadership following Lenin's death, wartime leadership, and erratic behavior toward the end of his life. While noting a few shortcomings in the books under review, particularly in Volkogonov's biography, Ravindranathan concludes that on balance, all four studies contribute significantly to scholarly understanding of the Stalin era.

134 Read, Christopher. "Stalin's Russia." *History Today* 33 (April 1983): 41-43.

Read provides an overview of the leading books written on Stalin's Russia from the 1950s through the early 1980s. His survey includes sections on general studies, biographies, specialized monographs, the Communist Party, foreign policy, and cultural and educational policy; a brief commentary on the disadvantages with which historians of the Stalin era must cope; the themes most typically addressed by historians; and the aspects of Stalin's Russia that have been relatively neglected.

135 Reichman, Henry. "Reconsidering Stalinism." *Theory and Society* 17, no. 1 (1988): 57-89.

Reichman offers a reappraisal of "Stalinism" as a historical category by examining a number of Western interpretations developed amidst the assault on the totalitarian model, and by looking at definitions proposed by Leon Trotsky and those who followed his lead, in light of their ability to encompass and explain some of the latest findings of historical research on Stalinism. In Reichman's view, attempts to present Stalinism as a specific period in Soviet history or to interpret it as a coherent political, economic, or social system tend to obscure significant discontinuities and conflicts within the Stalin era, overlook the chaotic and contradictory nature of a number of developments during this period, and "underestimate key links joining Stalin to his predecessors." For Reichman, Stalinism as an explanatory concept "lacks historical and conceptual power, covering more than it uncovers about the multidimensional reality of Soviet history—and, ironically, about Stalin's own role in that history."

136 Rittersporn, Gábor Tamás. "Rethinking Stalinism." *Russian History* 11, no. 4 (1984): 343-61.

Rittersporn contends that the organization and functioning of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus in the 1930s are far removed from the highly centralized and efficient mechanism of political action traditionally associated with Stalinism, and that the policies, actions, and maneuvers of the epoch which were legitimized by Stalin's name do not constitute a single coherent "Stalinist" line. He also questions the central importance of Stalin in shaping some of the key events and decisions of the 1930s and the extent to which Stalin's will prevailed during this era. He suggests that the accepted image of Stalinism may well be a "prisoner of the Soviet establishment's official self-image," which, by efficiently masking social and political realities, propagated the popular tendency "to attribute everything that happened in the USSR during a whole historical period to Stalin's will and to equate the outcome of complicated socio-political process with his supposed intentions."

137 Roberts, Geoffrey. "Josef Stalin." *History Review* 47 (December 2003): 47-50.

This overview of the changing nature of Stalin's reputation during the half century following his death primarily deals with the assault launched by Nikita Khrushchev on Stalin's leadership and criminal actions; the sources of the continuing popular appeal of Stalin in Russia; and the need for balance in assessing Stalin's contradictory legacy. Roberts also comments on the aspects of Stalin's personality that contributed to his success in rising to power and that helped shape the character of his policies in dealing with the task of rebuilding Russia after the upheavals of revolution and civil war and in transforming a backward nation into an industrialized socialist society.

138 Roodkowsky, Nikita D. "Stalin and Malenkov." *Catholic World* 177 (May 1953): 56-92.

Roodkowsky locates the inhumanity which characterized Stalin's political life in the teachings and the patterns of strategy and tactics of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. He describes how Stalin was able to rationalize his policy of oppression and violence, including such actions as the forced collectivization of agriculture, the purges, and the use of terror, by drawing upon the writings of the three men. Roodkowsky supplements his commentary on Stalin's rule and its ties to communist

ideology by explaining why he believes that the future policies of the dictator's then current successor, Georgi Malenkov, are likely to mirror those of his predecessor.

- 139** Rosenfeldt, Niels E. "Stalin Recalled." *Problems of Communism* 32 (July/August 1983): 62-66.

Rosenfeldt reviews Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko's *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of Tyranny* (1981), Nikolai Tolstoy's *Stalin's Secret War* (1981), and Werner G. Hahn's *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53* (1982). In considering *Time of Stalin* and *Stalin's Secret War*, Rosenfeldt focuses on the methodological shortcomings of the two books; their reliance on evidence that cannot be fully verified; and their overall lack of scholarly analysis of Stalin's exercise of power. Hahn's book—which contends that Andrei Zhdanov, who led the ideological campaign of the 1940s on the Soviet cultural front, was not the hardliner he is often portrayed as, and that his fall signaled Stalin's turn toward a new kind of ideological extremism—is viewed by Rosenfeldt as a thorough investigation of the ideological arguments and accusations which marked the debates of late Stalinism on philosophy, science, and economics, and as an example of sophisticated Kremlinology applied to the Stalin era. The research and methodological strengths of *Postwar Soviet Politics* aside, Rosenfeldt questions whether the book's thesis about Zhdanov is tenable, particularly with respect to Hahn's use of the terms "moderation" and "extremism" to periodize the late Stalin era.

- 140** Sandler, Åke. "Stalin and Hitler: A Lesson in Comparison." *Pacific Spectator* 7, no. 2 (1953): 152-66.

Soviet communism has no resemblance to or connections with communism, socialism, or any other form of Marxism but rather is a political and economic system based on the concept of one, all-powerful, infallible personality, as in the case of German fascism, according to this article written shortly after the death of Stalin. In comparing the Stalin regime to that of Hitler, Sandler cites the slavish display of devotion to the two leaders; the concentration of absolute power in their hands; and the lack of moral distinction between the killing of Jews and the slaughter of kulaks, between Hitler's purges of 1934 and Stalin's purges of 1936, and between the two men's use of the secret police and systematic terror to sustain their rule.

- 141** Schapiro, Leonard. "Lenin and the Russian Revolution." *History Today* 20 (May 1970): 324-30.

Schapiro looks at the question of whether Lenin, had he lived longer, would have opted to put the machinery of control he had developed to the same uses as Stalin. In Schapiro's estimate, when one considers that Lenin's last reflections are characterized by a deep concern over the bureaucratization of the party leadership and the often arbitrary behavior of communists in high positions, it is unlikely that a longer-lived Lenin, in view of his moral authority within the party, would have used the party machinery in the manner that Stalin did, or, given Lenin's character and intellectual makeup, would have succumbed to the temptations of absolute power as did Stalin. Lenin's vision of a long period of peace between classes under the New Economic Policy, during which the conditions for a socialist transformation of the country could be cultivated, is wholly at odds with the pattern of development imposed on the nation by Stalin and further suggests that under Lenin's guidance the Russian Revolution may have yielded different results than it did under Stalin, according to Schapiro.

- 142** ———. "The Triumph of Lenin and Stalin: On the Origins of Totalitarianism." *Encounter* 62, no. 3 (1984): 63-70.

This commentary on the origins of Soviet totalitarianism revolves around the totalitarian implications of Lenin's concept of the Bolshevik monopoly of power and his use of the party as the vital device for maintaining it. Describing the Bolsheviks as a small minority which came to power

determined to rule alone, Schapiro discusses how the Bolshevik leaders, in the face of opposition from both the Right and the Left, developed instruments of arbitrary repression and manipulated a façade of ostensibly freely functioning and popularly elected institutions as a means of securing their monopoly of political power. Concurrent with these developments, Schapiro explains, two key processes were under way: first, a series of departments of the Central Committee were set up under the direction of the General Secretary, Stalin, which eventually came “to dominate the whole life of the country”; and, second, the organizational and control mechanisms within the party were further refined to establish firmly the system of party domination which was to remain unchanged under Stalin and his successors. While Lenin, in his last years, became increasingly concerned over the arbitrary behavior of communist officials and over the need to eschew ideological dogmatism in favor of pragmatic policies conducive to the development of the social conditions needed to ensure real progress toward socialism, the seeds of Soviet totalitarianism had already been sown by the time of Lenin’s 1924 death.

- 143** Schwartz, Harry. “Stalin and Stalinism Five Years After.” *New York Times Magazine* (2 March 1958): 31+.

Schwartz identifies what he sees as being the main traits of Stalin’s personality, describes their influence on the Soviet leader’s practice of politics and the doctrine he preached, and speculates on the reasons why Stalinism proved able to blanket the Soviet Union for so many years. He also considers the extent to which the five years since Stalin’s death have witnessed the demolition of Stalinism, emphasizing that, while the Stalin myth has largely been destroyed, the heart of the phenomenon of Stalinism—dictatorial rule by a small clique—remains alive and well in the form of the Khrushchev regime.

- 144** ———. “Stalin’s Career: Storm and Steel.” *New York Times Magazine* (5 October 1952): 10-11.

On the opening day of the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in October 1952, Schwartz provides a series of ten pictures which collectively portray Stalin’s climb to absolute power and some of the landmarks in his reign. He suggests that the photos form a suitable background for examining the clues which the proceedings of the congress may supply regarding future events in Russia.

- 145** Sharp, Samuel L. “Stalin’s Place in History.” *New Republic* 128 (16 March 1953): 8-10.

Sharp offers an evaluation of Stalin’s personality, a description of his practice of the art of politics, and a definition of the essence of Stalinism. He describes Stalin as an individual given to doubt and suspicion, qualities which inclined him to engage in intrigue, and to see intrigue everywhere, and which shaped his domestic politics as well as his attitude toward the outside world. Referring to Stalin’s efforts in the field of philosophy as being directed at subverting Marxist theory, Sharp sees what Stalin called “living Marxism” as being reducible to “the art of fitting all changes dictated by practical necessity into a framework of a seemingly rigid doctrine.” Stalinism, at its core, is, in Sharp’s view, “an ‘un-theory’ in the service of administrators, a code of political behavior completely sterilized of anything except what is necessary to hold power, a pursuit complete in itself without reference to any discernable aims of human welfare.”

- 146** Slusser, Robert M. “A Soviet Historian Evaluates Stalin’s Role in History.” *American Historical Review* 77, no. 5 (1972): 1389-98.

Slusser reviews *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (1971), by Roy Medvedev. He considers the sources on which the book is based; the contribution it makes to historical knowledge; certain weaknesses in Medvedev’s analysis of Stalinism due to his ignorance or neglect of non-Soviet studies; and the relationship between the original text and the edited translation of the book. He also describes the prepublication history of *Let History Judge* and briefly dis-

cusses the critical response to the book by a number of Western reviewers, particularly with respect to its underlying theme that Stalinism was not the inevitable outcome of the political system established in Russia under Lenin but a monstrous distortion and perversion stemming primarily from fatal defects in Stalin's character.

147 Smith, Jessica. "Stalin and His Heritage." *New World Review* 21 (April 1953): 3-10.

"Stalin and His Heritage" is the keynote article in a collection of hagiographic writings on the Soviet leader published in the April 1953 issue of the *New World Review*. In setting the tone for the tributes which follow, Smith, the editor of the *New World Review*, commends Stalin for "building a new society on the scientific foundations laid by Marx, Engels and Lenin"; for his leadership in combating the forces of fascism; for his tireless efforts to establish peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union; and for giving hope to hundreds of millions of people around the world that the "equal brotherhood of peoples will one day be a reality everywhere." The articles which follow Smith's tribute are Paul Robeson's "To You Beloved Comrade," 11-14; Howard Selsam's "Joseph Stalin: Philosopher-Statesman," 15-23; Ralph Parker's "How the Soviet People Grieved," 24-28; and Frederick V. Field's "Soviet-Chinese Friendship," 29-32. Also included are a selection of tributes to Stalin from around the world, Georgi Malenkov's funeral oration, and a brief biographical sketch of Stalin.

148 Snow, C. P. "On Stalin's Triumph, on Stalin's Madness." *Esquire* 67 (May 1967): 114-18+. Snow begins by outlining Stalin's early years as a Bolshevik revolutionary, role in the October Revolution, and relationship with Lenin. He then describes how Stalin managed to emerge triumphant in the intraparty struggle for leadership following Lenin's death, emphasizing here the role played by Stalin's mastery of "political chess," administrative talent, influence within the party apparatus, and adoption of the theory of "socialism in one country." He goes on to discuss how Stalin, after having gained full control over the party and state, launched "the greatest industrial of all revolutions" and, in an effort to pull abreast of the capitalist powers economically and militarily, refused to slacken the pace of industrialization and collectivization, leading not only to "horrifying human losses" but to Stalin's degeneration into madness as his brutal reign progressed in time.

149 Staerck, Gillian. "Joseph Stalin and Life in the Soviet Union 1924-53." *Modern History Review* 13, no. 3 (February 2002): 1.

Staerck offers a brief outline of Stalin's political beliefs, rise to power, and launching of the "revolution from above"; an overview of life in Stalinist society of the 1930s; and an account of the development and nature of the cult of personality. While describing Stalin as a "ruthless, predatory, and controlling" individual who was "paranoid about the security of his power," Staerck concludes that "without Stalin's cruel enforcement of modernization the Soviet Union would not have withstood the German invasion and emerged as a superpower."

150 "The Stalin Dictatorship." *Nineteenth Century* (May 1928): 590-602.

The first half of this article outlines the reasons why Stalin bested Trotsky and other veteran Bolshevik leaders in the struggle for power following Lenin's 1924 death. The remainder ascribes to Stalin's policies and manner of rule the responsibility for the loss of enthusiasm for the communist cause evident among romantically minded intellectuals from the Bolshevik ranks and among European intellectuals and idealists as well. The article also discusses the sources of the "false image" of Stalin evident in the American press in 1928, countering the portrayal of the Soviet leader as "a great-hearted and moderate man, struggling with immoderate colleagues" to bring progress and justice to a backward land with a description of him as "a venomous Bolshevik" who is committed to the establishment of communism in the USSR and to the advancement of the cause of world revolution at the expense of the capitalist West.

151 Stassen, Harold E. "Schweitzer vs. Stalin." *Ladies' Home Journal* 68 (July 1951): 36-37+. American political leader Harold Stassen draws upon his meetings with Stalin and French philosopher and missionary physician Albert Schweitzer to contrast the values and beliefs of the two men. He identifies the prime tenet of Stalin's philosophy as "disdain for life" and that of Schweitzer as "reverence for life"; contrasts Stalin's advocacy of godlessness with Schweitzer's devout worship of God; and locates Stalin's ruthlessness in his failure to adopt an ethic which carries with it respect for the welfare and dignity of others and recognition of the need for personal moral restraint. He predicts that the life-affirming philosophy championed by Schweitzer will, by the twentieth century's end, triumph over the morally and ethically bankrupt creed espoused by Stalin.

152 Stolberg, Benjamin. "October into Thermidor." *Nation* 144 (10 April 1937): 401-04. Stolberg reviews Leon Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937). He commends the exiled Bolshevik leader with having penned one of the best polemics in the history of literature in indicting the Thermidorean evolution of the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule, and concedes that many of the reasons Trotsky gives for the Thermidorean turn in Russia may be true, but he faults the book for its failure to move beyond orthodox Marxism to explain why the October Revolution gave way to a Thermidorean reaction and for its lack of an answer to the question, "How can revolution avoid a Thermidorean end?"

153 Swain, Geoffrey. "Lenin, Tyrant or Saviour? Trotsky, Bukharin or Stalin: Who Could Best Claim to be Heir to All that Lenin Stood for, Good or Bad?" *Modern History Review* 16, no. 1 (September 2004): 2-6.

Swain considers the cases advanced by historians who argue that Lenin, in his last struggle, sought a reliable heir—Trotsky or Bukharin—through whom "to save the Soviet regime and return it to the humanity of its original struggle," and he discusses how the opening of Soviet archives in recent years has led to a series of revelations which have made it much easier for historians to portray Stalin rather than Trotsky or Bukharin as Lenin's true heir, particularly with respect to what can be seen as the Leninist antecedents to Stalin's subordination of the cause of world revolution to Soviet security interests; to the promotion of economic growth through industrial planning and collectivized farming; and to the use of terror as an essential tool of security policy. Despite these various connections between the two leaders, Swain continues, Lenin and Stalin clearly differed in their stature as politicians, with Lenin knowing when a particular policy had served its purposes, and with Stalin lacking the temperament and political skills to make this same kind of judgment in a timely fashion. In the final analysis, however, "Trotsky, Bukharin, and Stalin were all heirs to different aspects of Lenin's personality and political legacy, but none of them combined those political skills which made Lenin both the tyrant and saviour of revolutionary Russia," according to Swain.

154 "Ten Years after Stalin." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (March/April 1963): 1-99. This issue of the journal *Problems of Communism* is devoted to an examination of events and developments in the Soviet Union and the communist world during the decade since Stalin's death and to an analysis of the meaning of Stalin and Stalinism. Among the subjects addressed by those articles that focus on Stalin are the dictator's influence on Soviet culture, his policy toward China, and the place of the "cult of personality" in Marxist theory regarding the role of the individual in history.

155 Thatcher, Ian D. "Nazism and Stalinism." *History Review* 45 (March 2003): 8-13. It is the contention of this essay that, while the regimes of Hitler and Stalin were alike in a number of respects, there were more dissimilarities than similarities between the two. In developing this point of view, Thatcher presents a comparative analysis of Nazism and Stalinism based on six

subjects—politics, war and terror, economy, popular participation and society, art and culture, and the regimes in retrospect.

- 156** ———. “Stalin and Stalinism: A Review Article.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, no. 6 (September 2004): 907-32.

Thatcher reviews Erik Van Ree’s *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin. A Study in Twentieth-century Revolutionary Patriotism* (2002); David Hoffman’s *Stalinist Values. The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941* (2003); *Stalinism* (2003), edited by David Hoffman; *Stalin’s Terror. High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union* (2003), edited by Barry McLaughlin and Kevin McDermott; *The Stalin Years. A Reader* (2003), edited by Christopher Reed; and *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936* (2003), edited by R. W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, and E. A. Rees. In commenting on how the books under review add to scholarly understanding of Stalin and Stalinism, Thatcher considers such subjects as the place of Stalin’s thought within the broader tradition of Bolshevik thinking; the relationship between old-fashioned Russian patriotism and new style internationalism in Stalin’s ideology; the Stalinist leadership’s recruitment of traditional symbols and institutions to further the goals of creating the “new Soviet man” and achieving communism; the futility of state violence and force as a means of fashioning Soviet society; and a host of questions dealing with the Stalin terror, including why the terror occurred, Stalin’s role in it, and the aspects of the terror beyond his controlling hand.

- 157** Tsipko, A. “Legitimacy and Authority: Sources of Stalinism Reevaluated.” *World Affairs* 152, no. 2 (fall 1989): 87-97.

Tsipko takes aim at the argument that Stalin was a traitor to the revolution. He contends that Stalinism, rather than being a counterrevolutionary break with Bolshevik thinking and practice, was the natural consequence of a left-wing extremist philosophy which, in placing the success of the revolution above everything else, looked upon terror as a legitimate tool to advance its version of socialism. Tsipko neither frees Stalin of responsibility for the excesses and violence that epitomized his rule nor denies that he abused his power for egotistical purposes but rather contends that Stalinism did not emanate from the sinister figure of Stalin alone but rather grew out of ideas about socialism and about its immediate tasks common to Marxists of his era; was consistent with the “leftist impatience” and “blind veneration of dogma” that characterized the Bolshevik old guard; and was made possible by the intelligentsia and party activists, who, in accord with their conviction that the interests of creating a classless society and fashioning the new Soviet man took precedence over all other concerns, were more than willing to endorse Stalin’s “economic adventurism.”

- 158** Tucker, Robert C. “Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin’s Legacy to Brezhnev’s Russia.” *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 2 (1981-82): 424-35.

Tucker maintains that the emergence of a rigid, centralized, and highly stratified sociopolitical structure in the Soviet Union was the result of historical decisions that largely reflected the unique political personality and outlook of Stalin. He discusses how the basic elements of the Bolshevik program were transformed by Stalin’s “Russian national Bolshevism”—at the center of which was a platform calling for forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, and the development of military-industrial power—and how Stalin’s Bolshevism, with its imposition of a “revolution from above,” renewed and amplified both the developmental mode and state-building process begun in tsarist times, leading to the exploitation and impoverishment of the Soviet people, the implementation of totalitarian controls over the entire populace, and the bequeathal of a swollen state and a spent society to Stalin’s heirs. Tucker also comments on the politics of change practiced by Stalin’s successors, stressing the enormity of the problems in post-Stalin society, the inability of Stalin’s protégés to deal with these problems effectively, and the prospects for fundamental political and economic reform in the Soviet Union of the future.

- 159** Urban, George R. "Conversation with Milovan Djilas," *Encounter* 53 (December 1979): 10-42.

This far-ranging interview with Milovan Djilas, who was, until his fall from power in 1954, vice president of Yugoslavia and a member of the Politburo and Central Committee, includes numerous questions about the former Yugoslav leader's impression of Stalin and Stalinism. In responding to the questions put to him by Urban, Djilas describes Stalinism as a perversion of Marxism and as "Leninism pushed to the limit of its awesome rationale"; maintains that while Lenin may have seen Stalin "as a crude and difficult man," in all political respects he "looked upon Stalin as unexceptional and the rightful heir to his heritage"; and objects to associating the evils of Stalinism with the shortcomings of Stalin's character rather than locating them in the ties that bind him with Lenin. He also comments on his own early favorable impression of Stalin and attachment to Stalinism; the break between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties due to Stalin's "ambitious nationalism expressed in a form of imperialism under the guise of Communism"; and Stalin's repeated emphasis on Soviet power as the "only reliable or even desirable means" to spread communism.

- 160** ———. "History in the Raw, and Stalin." *Freedom at Issue* 72 (May/June 1983): 27-28.

Urban shares some of the lessons he has learned from the personal interviews he has conducted with people having special knowledge of Stalinism. Writing some thirty years after Stalin's death, Urban mainly comments on the partiality and myopic historical vision of the men "who were there"; the enduring "efficiency of the Iron Curtain"; and the conspiracy of public silence which surrounds Stalin's crimes. He also notes how the question/answer method employed in the interview genre underscores the truth that "'history in the raw' is stubborn and chaotic," neither carrying a "natural theme" nor imparting any "message."

- 161** Utley, Freda. "Stalinism and Hitlerism." *Contemporary Review* 174 (January 1940): 40-48.

Utley discusses the common ground shared by the regimes of Stalin and Hitler with respect to the status of labor, state control of land and capital, the stifling of open dissent by terror and the secret police, the use of widespread propaganda to urge the people to put the interests of "the cause" ahead of their own personal concerns, and a thirst for territorial aggrandizement. She also criticizes the Left in Britain for its persistent failure to recognize both the true nature of the Stalin regime and the full extent of the alliance between Russia and Germany ushered in by the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939.

- 162** Van Ree, Erik. "The Russian Tsars through Stalin's Eyes." *Theoretische Geschiedenis* 26, no. 4 (1999): 501-19.

Van Ree examines the views expressed by Stalin on Russian tsars and the tsarist era from his youth through the final years of his rule, arguing that, while at first sight the Soviet dictator's positive views on some aspects of the tsarist past suggest that he indeed identified with it, close inspection of this identification reveals that he "never abandoned the perspective of the pre-revolutionarily Russian state as representative of the interests of the feudal and bourgeois classes"; felt a genuine hostility toward the old privileged strata; and condemned the tsarist system and most of the individual tsars and emperors throughout his entire rule. Only two elements in Stalin's thinking, Van Ree contends, prevented him from condemning all Russian rulers equally: his admiration of the early tsars and military leaders—most notably Ivan IV—who consolidated the Russian state in the face of opposition from the nobility and enemies abroad; and his favorable view of tsarist colonial expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia, which he perceived as a process which "furthered the break up of the local 'feudal' systems, and contributed to modern state building and capitalist development."

- 163** Vinograd, Ann C. "Will Stalin Become a Non-Person?" *Index on Censorship* 14, no. 6 (1985): 15-17.

Vinograd summarizes the Stalin entries from three editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*—the first published in 1947 during the era of Stalin glorification, the second in 1957 during the period following the Twentieth Party Congress decrees on de-Stalinization, and the third in 1976 near the end of the Brezhnev era—pointing out the changes in the texts, and how they reflect shifts in the party line. She discusses these changes under the headings of Stalin's greatness; his relationship with Lenin; the errors he committed as absolute ruler of the Soviet Union; and the nature of his personality, showing how the trend that emerges from the three editions examined is toward a progressively diminished, though not always more negative, picture of Stalin, with coverage shrinking from fifty-eight to five to two pages, reflecting, in part, a reduction in the amount of space devoted to his errors.

- 164** Von Hagen, Mark. "The Stalin Debate and the Reformulation of the Soviet Past." *Harriman Institute Forum* 5, no. 7 (1993): 1-12.

Von Hagen examines the debate among historians about the Soviet past which came with the major reform movement that began in the Soviet Union in 1985. He describes how the Stalin question dominated all discussion in the early years of the debate, and how the search for the roots of the Stalin phenomenon shifted away from "intentionalist" explanatory schemas, which focus on the conscious intentions of the Stalinist leadership toward "structuralist" arguments, which look for the sources of Stalinism in the structure of decision-making processes, the political economy, or the political culture in seeking to define the limits of Stalin's power and to determine why large segments of the Soviet population were actively involved in the dictator's campaigns. The critical reevaluation of prewar Soviet foreign policy, especially the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, and the cost of the Soviet victory in World War II, are singled out by Von Hagen for close examination as "hot spots" in the debate on Stalin's legacy.

- 165** Von Laue, Theodore. "A Perspective on History: The Soviet System Reconsidered." *Historian* 61, no. 2 (1999): 383-91.

In this reassessment of the Soviet system and the vast changes the country experienced during the eighty years since the 1917 Revolution, the main contention is that if the Soviet experiment is placed within the broad context of the unprecedented bloodshed witnessed by the twentieth century, one can see that Lenin and Stalin, "far from being the monsters they are often portrayed as," followed the only practical course of action that would ensure the survival of their country. Pointing to Stalin's 1931 statement that the immense gap between the Soviet Union and the advanced capitalist countries must be eliminated within ten years or else the nation would be crushed, Von Laue describes Stalin's all-out effort, during the critical years of the late 1920s and the 1930s, to transform the Soviet Union materially and culturally. While noting the brutal cost of the Stalin revolution, Von Laue credits the Soviet dictator with instilling confidence and patriotic pride in the Soviet people and making the once vulnerable Soviet Union respected around the world.

- 166** ———. "Reply." *Soviet Union* 8, no. 1 (1981): 34-37.

Von Laue replies to the trio of scholars—Alfred Meyer, Hayward Allen Jr., and Frederick C. Barghoorn—who commented on his essay "Stalin among the Moral and Political Imperatives, or How to Judge Stalin?" He outlines the perspective guiding his views; restates his case that a fair and responsible appraisal of Stalin must begin with an understanding of both the Russian dread of suffering a military defeat like the one experienced in 1917-18 and the belief of the Bolsheviks in "the need for mobilizing the country's resources in the shortest time possible and at whatever price"; and develops further his argument for a realistic cultural relativism as a moral imperative in a world in which "the unjustifiable has become commonplace."

- 167** ———. “Stalin among the Moral and Political Imperatives, or How to Judge Stalin?” *Soviet Union* 8, no. 1 (1981): 1-17.

Von Laue attempts to place Stalin's deeds within a framework of historical conditions and ethical norms that explains the Soviet dictator's behavior while avoiding the moral judgments so often made by Western analysts of his rule. He argues for the importance of placing the harshness and brutality that so characterized Stalin's rule within the context of such factors as the callousness inherited from Russia's tsarist past and escalated by World War I and politicized by revolution and civil war; the elemental relapse into backwardness and chaos that came with the violence and destruction of 1914-21; the threat to the young Soviet regime posed by the Western capitalist powers; and the staggering demands of transforming a huge backward agrarian country into an industrial power capable of defending itself in a hostile international environment. Presenting Stalin as the Soviet leader who possessed the self-confidence and psychological strength to assume the power needed to mold the available resources of state and society to meet the most basic goals of the Bolsheviks, Von Laue discusses how Stalin, operating under the assumption that he had no time to waste in transforming the Soviet Union into an industrial giant capable of withstanding another world war, felt entitled to put aside all considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, and to use all means at his disposal in waging war on Russian backwardness and the Russian national character. Praising Stalin as “a tragic giant set into the darkest part of the twentieth century,” and calling for compassion for the frailties which he shared with ordinary mortals, Von Laue questions the right of American scholars to pass moral judgment on a Stalin who was shaped by realities and confronted with challenges completely alien to American historical experience. For commentaries on Von Laue's assessment of Stalin, see the essays in this same issue of *Soviet Union* by Alfred G. Meyer, Hayward Allen Jr., and Frederick C. Barghoorn, which are followed by a “Reply” by Von Laue.

- 168** ———. “Stalin in Focus.” *Slavic Review* 42, no. 3 (1983): 373-89.

Von Laue analyzes the causes of Stalin and Stalinism from an enlarged historical-philosophical perspective, arguing that the phenomenon of Stalin is best understood when placed “in the full context of global power politics.” Pointing to “the monstrous political ambitions released in Western Europe at the end of the nineteenth century,” Von Laue locates Stalin in “an age of final solutions conceived before 1914 as grandiose and legitimate human ventures” and put into practice during and after World War I. Within this political atmosphere, Von Laue contends, we find a postrevolution Russia which felt threatened by a superior capitalist West and lacked the institutions to curb the political power of the Bolshevik ruling elite who believed the nation's survival required a drastic, even brutal, reordering of state, economy, and society. These circumstances favored the emergence of a leader such as Stalin, one “close to the masses by temperament and style, exceptionally energetic and driven by an ambition as great as the chaos in the country and the scope of *Weltpolitik*,” according to Von Laue.

- 169** ———. “Stalin Reviewed.” *Soviet Union* 11, no. 1 (1984): 71-92.

Von Laue critiques the negative assessments of Stalin offered by Boris Bazhanov, in an interview with George Urban in the summer of 1980 issue of *Survey*, and Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, in his 1981 book *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny*. Any balanced assessment of Stalin and his role in history, Von Laue contends, must take into account two fundamental considerations: first, the anarchism and brutality which characterized Russian popular culture and made government by consensus impossible; and second, the backwardness of Russia, which demanded the imposition of institutions and cultural skills upon an unprepared people if the nation were to survive amidst a threatening international situation. Neither Bazhanov nor Antonov-Ovseyenko's assessment of Stalin's ability to rise to power and the methods he used to establish his leadership, in Von Laue's opinion, do justice to the political, social, and economic realities Stalin faced or to his ability to advance the revolutionary mission to create a socialist Russia. Von Laue also takes issue with An-

tonov-Ovseyenko's treatment of the "Great Leap Forward," the terror of the 1930s, and his overall interpretation of Stalin as a purely criminal character responsible for every act of horror perpetrated during his rule, none of which, Von Laue maintains, takes into account the factors conditioning Stalin and his policies. In addition, Soviet historian Roy Medvedev's *Political Diary* (1981) attracts Von Laue's fire for ignoring popular, cultural, and historical realities in its analysis of the limits of de-Stalinization and of the pro-Stalin defensiveness which surfaced during the early years of the Brezhnev regime.

- 170** Ward, Chris. "What Is History? The Case of Late Stalinism." *Rethinking History* 8, no. 3 (2004): 439-58.

In this discussion of late Stalinism as a case study of some of the problems surrounding the question, "What is history?" the author examines the construction of the history of the high politics of Stalinism by reviewing five episodes in the 1946-53 period—Marshal Georgi Zhukov's demotion, the activities of the Special Council on Kolkhoz Affairs, the *Zhdanovshchina*, the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, and the Leningrad affair. He argues that these episodes, which are usually narrated as examples of either "monolithic orthodoxy," which holds that the postwar years marked the apotheosis of Stalin and Stalinism in the USSR, or "new pluralism," which insists that it was not just, or even primarily, Stalin who made the history of late Stalinism, are best understood in terms of a third narrative structure, "pressured elites," which considers the social and political forces disrupting the regime and troubling the leadership, and which offers a plausible explanation of the five episodes distinct from but overlapping with those seeking to explain the episodes in terms of Stalin's authority or infighting among powerful Stalinists. Ward also analyzes these three narratives as cultural artifacts, maintaining that "they depend for their effect on a variety of rhetorical and literary devices which tell us as much, if not more, about the construction of history as they do about the past."

- 171** Wheeler, Harvey. "Problems of Stalinism." *Western Political Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1957): 634-74.

Wheeler identifies what he considers to be the main components of Stalinism, the reasons for the breakdown of the Stalinist system, and the problems Stalin's successors have had to deal with in their attempt to cope with the collapse of the Soviet dictator's "terroristic industrial program." While Wheeler mainly deals with the rival approaches taken by the Khrushchev and Malenkov factions in dealing with the crisis of Stalinism, his analysis includes a discussion of Stalinism as a mechanism for applying dictatorial political techniques to industrialize an underdeveloped country; Stalin's reversal of Marxist theory by elevating political power to a determining role in promoting fundamental economic change; his manipulation of the theory of democratic centralism and systematic use of terror to achieve his goals; and the efforts of Stalin's successors to pare away most of the glaring evils of Stalinism without basically altering the Stalinist system to which they, as neo-Stalinists, remain firmly attached.

- 172** Wiles, Peter. "The Importance of Being Djughashvili." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (March/April 1963): 77-83.

Wiles recreates the criticisms raised by an unnamed visitor to the "annual self-criticism meeting in the Explanations Division" of the Institute for the Advanced Contemplation of Human Affairs, held on 6 March 1963 in Fordograd, and the response to them by the Fellows of the Institute. Arranged as a discussion between the Fellows, labeled collectively as "historical determinist," and the visitor, tagged a "vulgar factologist" by the Fellows, Wiles's "recreation" covers a wide range of Stalin-related subjects, including Stalin's programs of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture, his campaign against the so-called kulaks, and his dealings with Hitler, Mao, and Tito.

173 Z. "To the Stalin Mausoleum" *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (winter 1990): 295-344.

This paper examines the Soviet experiment from 1917 through the Gorbachev years, arguing that the historical record of "Sovietism" and the nature of the system bequeathed by Stalin to his successors permit only great skepticism about the future of glasnost and perestroika. The author contends that Stalin inherited the fundamentals of the model that became the main line of Soviet development, namely, "a monopolistic, monolithic Party . . . operating on the principle of 'democratic centralism' . . . and on the myth of the historical inevitability of socialism," and that the basic approach Stalin took in his efforts to build "socialism in one country" was conditioned more by this fundamental political heritage than it was by his warped personality and lust for power. The Soviet edifice completed by Stalin by 1939, the argument continues, with all its impressive gains in heavy industry and military capability, was one laden with internal contradictions not only counterproductive to further Soviet development but also responsible for the economic, administrative, and political ossification of the Soviet system to which the programs of perestroika and glasnost are a meager response—one which aims to preserve the party's "leading role" while attempting to resurrect, in another reform, a failed utopia.

174 Ziolo, Paul. "The Hidden City of Kitiezh: Trauma and Psychogenic Arrest in Russia." *Journal of Psychohistory* 27, no. 3 (2000): 208-30.

Ziolo describes the Stalin regime as the culmination of a number of convergent psychohistorical processes the roots of which reach back into Russia's sociocultural origins. He contends that elements of Byzantine culture interacted with certain impulses from Russia's "dark pagan past," reinforced by the impact of the Tatar invasion and subsequent historical experiences, to generate "a tense dynamic and Russian psychology" from which emerged three hybrid factors: the development of universal apocalyptic fantasies (experienced as "a need for birth reenactment on a macro-cosmic scale"); the primacy of expiatory suffering; and the deification of the sovereign as "an all-powerful saving father . . . to whom one must submit and with whom one must merge in order to be reborn." Ziolo considers this adaptation of the Byzantine vision within the context of the Kitiezh legend, describing how the legend evolved from its earliest days through the 1917 Revolution, and how Russia's population was, in effect, "psychologically prepared for the Stalinist era." In addition to relating the "problems of psychogenic arrest" in Russia to the Stalin phenomenon, Ziolo compares the ways in which Stalin and Tatar ruler Genghis Khan rose to power and maintained their respective positions, concentrating here on the two leaders' practice of genocide as an instrument of psychological terror.

Biographical Information and Psychological Assessments

- 175** “Assembly Messages of Condolences over Death of Premier Stalin.” *United Nations Bulletin* 14 (15 March 1953): 220.

This report cites the condolences over the death of Stalin expressed at the United Nations by Brazilian Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly João Carlos Muniz; the message sent to Soviet Ambassador Andrei Vishinsky by the U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie; and Vishinsky’s response to the condolences offered by First Committee, in which he spoke of what Stalin has meant for the Soviet people and of how deeply they mourn his loss.

- 176** Berger, Oscar. “Stalin: 70.” *New York Times Magazine* (18 December 1949): 14.

On the occasion of Stalin’s upcoming seventieth birthday, the *New York Times Magazine* printed this sequence of nine cartoons by Oscar Berger picturing “things that years have brought” to the Soviet leader. Among the episodes in Stalin’s life that are depicted in the cartoons are his stay in prison in 1902; landing of “a big job in the Kremlin” in 1924; launching the First Five-Year Plan; and success in making the Soviet Union an atomic power.

- 177** Bey, Essad. “Red Czar.” *Collier’s Weekly* 88 (12 December 1931): 7-8+; (19 December 1931): 10-11+; (26 December 1931): 14-15+; 89 (2 January 1932): 22-23+; (January 1932): 14-15+; (16 January 1932): 20-21+; (23 January 1932): 18-19+.

This seven-part, undocumented early biography of Stalin covers the highlights of his political career up to 1932, including his early work in the Bolshevik Party; rise to a position of influence as Lenin’s “trusted friend and staunchest disciple”; role in the 1917 Revolution and Russian Civil War; triumph over Trotsky in the intraparty struggle for power following Lenin’s death; and launching of the “revolution from above” in 1928. The Stalin who emerges from this story-like biographical sketch is fanatical in his devotion to the cause of socialism; ruthless in his pursuit of power and in dealing with his enemies; a workaholic who is rarely seen in public; and a leader who has managed to “direct the imagination and will of a vast nation towards one common goal”—the building of the world’s first socialist society.

- 178** ———. “Stalin at Home.” *Living Age* 341 (September 1931): 47-49.

Bey offers some undocumented glimpses into Stalin’s private life and personal habits, providing descriptions of the Soviet leader’s relationship with his second wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, behavior as a father and a son, tastes in reading and music, and the pleasure he takes from knowing that he has his party comrades “in the hollow of his hand” by virtue of the secret files he has amassed containing information about their sins and shortcomings.

- 179** “Birthday in Moscow.” *Life* 28 (16 January 1950): 32-33.

Six photographs of the festivities in Moscow marking Stalin’s seventy-first birthday accompany this account of the celebrations of this occasion across the USSR and the gifts the Soviet leader

received from well-wishers abroad, including seventy carloads of presents from East Germany alone, an Alfa Romeo sports car from admirers in Italy, and a racing bicycle from his devotees in France.

- 180** Blakeley, Thomas J. "Comments on R. Aronson's "Sartre on Stalin." *Studies in Soviet Thought* 33, no. 2 (1987): 145-46.

In this brief commentary on Ronald Aronson's assessment of Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, the author commends Aronson for his analysis of Sartre's portrayal of Stalin as a "necessary idiosyncrasy" of the October Revolution and of "socialism in one country" as a monstrous deviation from Marxism; for demonstrating the continuity between the first and second volumes of Sartre's *Critique* by showing how the basic notions developed in the first are applied in the second to history and to an analysis of Stalinism; and for pointing out that Sartre's almost sterile discussion of the brutality of the Stalin regime borders on "justifying terror through explanation."

- 181** Bronska-Pampuch, Wanda. "Stalin's Daughter—A Stormy Rejection." *Atlas* 13 (May 1967): 32-36.

Bronska-Pampuch draws upon the memoirs of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, to comment on Stalin's home life; his daughter's reaction to his rise to power, repressive politics, and wartime leadership; and his state of mind at the time of his death. In describing how Svetlana gradually became estranged from her father, Bronska-Pampuch depicts Stalin as a brutal and deeply suspicious individual obsessed with the belief that there was an abundance of "enemies of the people" who had to be dealt with mercilessly, and as a leader whose sycophantic followers drove him to megalomania, and who was on the brink of insanity at the time of his death.

- 182** Bullock, Alan. "Personality in History: Hitler and Stalin." *Modern History Review* 5, no. 2 (1993): 2-6.

This brief examination of some of the reasons why Stalin and Hitler were able to assume absolute power centers on the role played by their personalities, rather than historical circumstances, in aiding their rise to power and in influencing the harshness of their rule. The psychological need of the two dictators to dominate, their personal brutality, and the manner in which they exercised power each receive consideration in Bullock's discussion of how the personalities of the two men relate to some of the more horrific aspects of their respective regimes.

- 183** Carmichael, Joel. "Stalin Tackled Again." *Midstream* 24, no. 4 (1978): 64-72.

Carmichael presents a harsh critique of Adam Ulam's *Stalin, the Man and His Era* (1973) and Robert Tucker's *Stalin As Revolutionary, 1879-1929* (1973), challenging, among other points, the books' views on Stalin's rise to power in the 1920s and on the bloodbaths that came with collectivization, the purges, and the Great Terror, and the psychological approach the two authors have taken in their efforts to provide insights into Stalin's character and political behavior.

- 184** Cavendish, Richard. "Death of Joseph Stalin: March 5th, 1953." *History Today* 53, no. 3 (2003): 55-56.

Cavendish presents a brief summary of the circumstances of Stalin's last days and the immediate reaction to his death by Nikita Khrushchev, Georgi Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Lavrenti Beria.

- 185** Clark, Charles E. "The Stalin Doodles." *Manuscripts* 35, no. 2 (1983): 101-12.

Clark repeats some of the comments made by various individuals who observed Stalin's habit of doodling while they visited him or when he was engaged in official meetings of one sort or another. He comments on the kinds of figures that the Soviet leader drew and on the range of theo-

ries regarding the meaning of his scribbles and what they might reveal about his personality and character. Clark devotes special attention to the doodle drawn by Stalin during the Yalta Conference, which H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs, managed to acquire as a member of the American delegation at the meeting of the Big Three. Clark cites the opinion of American psychoanalyst Emmanuel Hammer regarding what the Yalta doodle suggests about Stalin and his frame of mind at the time of the drawing. He also considers the likelihood that Stalin allowed himself to doodle as part of a conscious effort to deflect the efforts of others to maintain eye contact with him or to penetrate his thoughts and as a means of instilling a sense of discomfort and fear in his visitors as well.

186 Clyman, Rhea G. "Stalin Outwits Shaw." *American Mercury* 60 (February 1945): 220. Reply by Francis Lismore, *American Mercury* 60 (May 1945): 633.

George Bernard Shaw's visit to a Russian church, during his junket to Russia in the summer of 1947, where, in the dim light of the church, he sat on a kneeling Russian whom he reportedly mistook as a pew is the subject of this brief note. According to Clyman, when Shaw complained to Stalin that Russian church pews were "too short for comfort," Stalin made it clear that Shaw had not sat on a pew but rather a kneeling Russian and said to him, "Don't make this mistake again. I don't like my people sat on, not by a foreigner at any rate."

187 "The Complete Stalin." *Newsweek* (23 July 1945): 73.

This brief note identifies the military decorations on Stalin's uniform as painted by Russian artist Ivan Savelyeff in his portrait of Stalin that appeared on the cover of the 23 July 1945 issue of *Newsweek*.

188 Crankshaw, Edward. "False God Dies, Crisis Is Born." *Life* 34 (16 March 1953): 20-29.

The likelihood of a long fight for power among Stalin's successors is the focus of this heavily illustrated article written the week following the Soviet dictator's death. Crankshaw also discusses the nature of the relationship with Stalin enjoyed by each of his principal heirs, and how Stalin himself, by virtue of the atmosphere of violence, conspiracy, and fear that he bred, bears blame for the vitality of the rumor then circulating in Russia that he fell victim to an assassination plot hatched by his associates.

189 Crim, Elias. "A Little Visit to the Stalin Museum." *American Scholar* 54, no. 1 (1985): 106-10.

In this description of the Stalin Museum in Gori, Georgia, the author comments on the contents of the three rooms devoted to Stalin's life, the first dealing with his youth and early manhood; the second with his leadership of the Soviet Union; and the third containing memorabilia attesting to "the love of the Soviet people for their leader." Crim notes that the second room contains nothing even remotely linked to the brutal policies followed by Stalin, but rather focuses on his leadership in World War II, conveying the message that the Soviet Union's very existence in the war years hung on his political and military genius. He also comments on what the Stalin Museum shares in common with other museums in the USSR, particularly with respect to the Soviet government's habit of using its museums for propagandistic purposes.

190 "Death of Premier Stalin; Text of Official Announcement." *Current History* 24 (April 1953): 247-48.

Provided here is the text of the official announcement of Stalin's 5 March 1953 death—issued jointly by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council—which praises Stalin for his accomplishments, reaffirms the correctness of the policies followed by the party under his leadership, and urges the Soviet people to

mobilize all their creative energy to continue the cause of building communism that he so vigorously promoted.

191 "Deathwatch." *Newsweek* 141 (16 March 1953): 68+.

Newsweek describes the media frenzy unleashed in the West following the statement issued by Radio Moscow that Stalin was near death. The article notes the kinds of stories carried in the press during his last days and the headline treatment accorded to his death.

192 Dubinsky, Rostislav. "The Night Stalin Died." *New York Times Magazine* (5 March 1989): 42-43+.

Soviet violinist Rostislav Dubinsky describes how he was summoned to the Kremlin on 6 March 1953 where, for three days and nights without food and with only fitful sleep, his ensemble continuously played Tchaikovsky's *Second Quartet* as mourners filed by the open coffin of Stalin in the Kremlin's Hall of Columns. Dubinsky also comments on the incredible atmosphere in the hall at that time and on the throngs of mourners who passed by the coffin, looking at the dead Soviet leader "with the same expression of grief and humility."

193 Erofeyev, Victor. "The Good Stalin." Translated by Peter Carson. *New Yorker* 74, no. 40 (28 December 1998-4 January 1999): 44-47.

The son of one of Stalin's translators and interpreters relates some of the stories about Stalin told to him by his father, most of which portray "the good Stalin" who was the savior of Russia, the father of a great nation, and a man who impressed all who came into contact with him. Erofeyev, a writer who, in 1979, launched the underground literary magazine *Metropole* which published Russian dissident writers, also describes how, in the early 1950s, his father, for petty reasons, became the subject of increased KGB surveillance and may have been headed for the gulag had not Stalin died when he did.

194 "The Evil That Men Do." *Time* 61 (16 March 1953): 29-31.

Time provides an account of the official bulletins released by the Kremlin during Stalin's last days, the scene in Red Square during his funeral, and the eulogy of Stalin given by new Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov. The article includes an inset, titled "The Man that Stalin Built," describing Malenkov's rise to power within the Stalin regime, his relationship with Stalin, and his rivalry with Andrei Zhdanov.

195 "A Family Affair." *Newsweek* 47 (9 April 1956): 48-53.

This brief article opens by citing the reports circulating in Russia as part of the de-Stalinization campaign that Stalin murdered his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, and then moves on to list a series of biographical tidbits regarding Stalin's family life.

196 Fell, Ian. "Reconstructing Stalin." *The Historian* 32 (fall 1991): 14-15.

This description of the four-part "History Inset" series completed by Yorkshire Television and first shown in the fall of 1991 includes a brief account of how an image of Stalin and two farm girls from Soviet Asia is one of many used in the television series to discuss pictures as a form of historical evidence and to evoke the scope of history. The original photo of Stalin and his adoring peasant comrades, Fell explains, included Mikhail Chernov, the People's Commissar for Agriculture, and was published by the *Daily Herald* on 11 December 1935. When the *Daily Herald* carried the photo again on 23 February 1939, the layout man had "purged" Chernov from the picture, prompting Fell to question whether this picture of Stalin can be used to address the attainment targets prescribed in the new National Curriculum regarding the use of historical sources.

- 197** Fiddick, Thomas C. "Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives." *Psychohistory Review* 25, no. 2 (1997): 177-86.

Fiddick reviews Alan Bullock's *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (1991), noting the overall value of the study for what it reveals about the similarities between the two men and their policies, but focusing on the book's shortcomings, most notably what is seen as Bullock's tendency to make highly debatable assertions; his failure to integrate into the book's narrative the psychological insights he provides; and his omission of a number of aspects of the personalities of the two dictators which might have been explored with profit. With respect to this last shortcoming, Fiddick believes Bullock should have considered such facets of the behavior of the two leaders as "their perpetual posing as 'steel-like' and hard, which probably masked a fear of impotence"; their display of defense mechanism common to paranoid personalities; their relationships with their mothers and attitudes toward women in general; the psychological basis of their anti-Semitism; their belief in and use of the idea of vast international conspiracies which allegedly threatened national security; and their relationships with father figures, meaning with Lenin in Stalin's case, and Hindenburg in the case of Hitler.

- 198** "For Stalin's Scrapbook." *Time* 57 (21 May 1951): 30-31.

Time briefly describes three new pictures of Stalin: a painting of "Stalin the statesman" engaged in a discussion with Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese leader's 1950 visit to Moscow; a photograph of "the genial, human Stalin" in a chat with an eight-year-old student at Moscow's School No. 131; and a photo of Commander-in-Chief Stalin atop Lenin's tomb in Red Square reviewing Soviet army troops during the May Day parade in 1951.

- 199** "Freeman's Diagnosis." *Newsweek* 42 (30 November 1953): 60.

This brief note cites an article in the conservative magazine *The Freeman* suggesting that Stalin was clinically insane before he died. The magazine's report was based on a claim made by two former Soviet officials that Kremlin doctors had diagnosed Stalin as a paranoiac as early as 1938, a diagnosis to which his fear of "capitalist encirclement" and of a "doctors' plot" to kill him further attest, according to *Newsweek*.

- 200** "From the Other World." *Time* 46 (5 November 1945): 36.

Time cites a number of late October 1945 rumors circulating in the Western press that Stalin was ailing, dying, or dead. The rumors, the article notes, have been put to rest by American Ambassador Averell Harriman who, upon his return to Moscow from a meeting with Stalin at the dictator's Black Sea retreat, reported that the Soviet leader was healthy and was amused by the reports of his own demise.

- 201** Frost, Bob. "The Killer in the Kremlin." *Biography* 1, no. 2 (1997): 78-84.

Frost presents a brief overview of Stalin's rule, describing the Soviet dictator's brutal policies as the consequence of the investment of absolute power in a distorted mind committed to social engineering in the name of a utopian ideology.

- 202** "Funeral of Marshal Stalin." *Illustrated London News* 222 (21 March 1953): 435.

This article includes captioned photos of Soviet leaders alongside Stalin's body at the outset of his funeral procession; the dense crowd in Red Square during the funeral ceremonies; and the gun carriage bearing Stalin's body accompanied by a throng of official mourners.

- 203** Gray, Malcom. "Stalin's Chilling Legacy." *MacLean's* 104 (20 May 1991): 31.

The Kremlin's closing of the memorial site consisting of the simple two-room cottage in Gori, Georgia, where Stalin was born serves as a prompt for this brief account of the Soviet dictator's

crimes and accomplishments and of the ambivalent feelings of many Soviet citizens about his role in their nation's history.

204 "Grief Heard 'Round the World of the Party Faithful." *Life* 34 (23 March 1953): 32-33.

This article includes photographs of Stalin's funeral and of memorial services around the USSR along with a brief description of the "massive pageantry" of his funeral procession and an account of the expressions of grief in and beyond the Soviet Union following his death.

205 "Growth of a Despot." *Life* 31 (29 October 1951): 109-17.

Nearly fifty captioned photographs and drawings dealing with the era of the Russian Revolution and the early years of the Soviet Union taken from the book *Since Stalin: A Photo History of Our Time* (1951), by Boris Shub and Bernard Quint, comprise this illustrated historical outline of Stalin's career from his years as a young revolutionary to his rise to total power as leader of the Communist Party and ruler of the Soviet Union.

206 Hachinski, Vladimir. "Stalin's Last Years: Delusions or Dementia?" *European Journal of Neurology* 6, no. 2 (March 1999): 129-32.

Stalin's personal behavior throughout his years as leader of the USSR, according to Hachinski, fits many of the diagnostic criteria for paranoid personality disorder, as stated in the World Health Organization's *Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders* (1992) and the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders* (1992). With this assertion in mind, Hachinski considers Stalin's late-in-life bizarre behavior, suggesting that the Soviet dictator's natural suspiciousness and morbid fears reached the level of extreme paranoia as a consequence of his suffering a series of lacunar strokes which typically "disconnect the circuits that underpin cognition and behavior." Stalin's personal habits, particularly his heavy smoking and frequent consumption of alcohol, Hachinski adds, no doubt contributed to the deterioration of his health as did his distrust of doctors toward the end of his life and his self-treatment of his long-standing hypertension with a glass of boiled water laced with iodine which he consumed daily before dinner.

207 Hill, Edwin C. "Man of Steel." *Scribner's Magazine* 100 (October 1936): 87.

The 1936 purging of veteran Bolshevik leaders prompted this brief account of Stalin's personality, character, and political career. Obsession with power, mastery of political infighting, ruthless treatment of political rivals, and suspicion bordering on paranoia are, for Hill, the leading characteristics of the Soviet dictator—a man who doubtlessly will be responsible for the flowing of "rivers of blood" and the redrawing of the map of the Eastern world before his career runs its course.

208 Himmer, Robert. "On the Origin and Significance of the Name 'Stalin.'" *Russian Review* 45, no. 3 (1986): 269-86.

Himmer argues that while the young Dzhugashvili was thinking of Lenin when he took the name "Stalin" in December 1912, he did not choose the name to indicate his identification with the founder and leader of Bolshevism, but rather, by assuming a name based on the Russian word for "steel," he was proclaiming himself the new champion of the "hard" revolutionary creed from which Lenin had retreated after the failure of the 1905 Revolution. In support of this interpretation, Himmer traces Stalin's growing disillusionment with Lenin's leadership of the Bolsheviks after 1905, including Lenin's favoring of participation in the Duma, which Stalin believed represented a compromise with the class enemy that could only weaken the proletariat; the ebbing of Lenin's once firm and determined voice in favor of the irresolution Dzhugashvili thought typical of intellectuals; and Lenin's retreat from the concept of a conspiratorial party by sanctioning party admission for anyone who called himself a socialist.

- 209** Hoekstra, Steven J. "Docudrama as Psychobiography: A Case Study of HBO's 'Stalin.'" *Psychohistory Review* 26, no. 3 (spring 1998): 253-64

Hoekstra isolates the major historical events and facts that psychobiographers have recognized in their efforts to fathom Stalin's psychological motivations and processes and then examines the images of Stalin conveyed in HBO's 1992 film "Stalin." Focusing on the degree to which HBO's portrayal of the Soviet dictator was able to, or chose to, include information relevant to the psychobiographical theories on Stalin's thinking and behavior, Hoekstra argues that, while the film covered virtually all of the significant events in Stalin's life from 1917 onward and various aspects of his family life, personal behavior, and emotional condition, it ignored his formative years, shed little light on the psychological underpinnings of his behavior, and provided the viewer with few, if any, clues as to why he acted the way that he did.

- 210** Hook, Sidney. "Stalin—Mystery and Legacy." *New Republic* 171 (20 July 1974): 21-24.
Hook reviews *Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend* (1974), by Ronald Hingley; *Stalin As Revolutionary, 1879-1929* (1973), by Robert Tucker; and *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (1973), by Adam Ulam. He establishes what he sees as the distinctive qualities of the three biographies; describes how each weaves what is already known about Stalin into different patterns of interpretation; and comments on what the books have to say about Stalin's talents as a politician and about the widely debated question of whether he was Lenin's heir or betrayer. He considers in some detail the kinship between the historical voluntarism of Lenin and Stalin—a link which he believes provides Stalin with a basis for a legitimate claim as Lenin's successor and which he feels is insufficiently developed in each of the three biographies under review. He also discusses how the voluntarism of Stalin runs counter to the cardinal principle of historical materialism and thus renders implausible the suggestion in Hingley's book that Stalinism is a natural outgrowth of Marxism.

- 211** "How Stalin Got That Way." *Collier's Weekly* 124 (8 October 1949): 74.
This article draws upon the nonpolitical pages of Isaac Deutscher's *Stalin: A Political Biography* (1949) to provide a character sketch of the young Stalin. The article privileges the role played by the abuse Stalin experienced at the hands of his father, the poverty he suffered under, and the restrictions he experienced during his seminary days in spawning within him the frustrations, resentments, and hatreds which gave shape to his oppressive rule.

- 212** J., W. "Stalin at Work." *Living Age* 345 (December 1933): 326-28.
This translation of a 1933 report from a Zurich German-language daily cites an article from the *Sozialistische Boten*, a publication issued by socialist émigrés, that provides an inside look at the unusual life Stalin leads in the headquarters of the Communist Party, describing his work habits, relationship with his staff, and the special significance he attaches to the archives in his office which contain secret information about important party members, particularly their misdeeds and offenses. Stalin's concentration on foreign policy during the period 1930-33, especially his efforts to create a favorable attitude toward Russia in Europe in order to be able to meet the danger of Japanese provocation in Asia with as little risk as possible, also receives attention in the report.

- 213** Jastrow, Joseph. "The Dictatorial Complex: A Noted Psychologist Analyzes the Mental Patterns of Europe's Strongest Strong Men." *Current History* 49 (December 1938): 40-41.
The mental patterns of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, as revealed by the public statements and political actions of the three dictators, are the subject of this brief article. Jastrow sees Hitler as the most abnormal of the three leaders because he displays all three factors of the paranoid complex—hypertrophy of the ego, a deep-seated feeling of being wronged, and a scheme of revenge against those deemed to be "enemies"—Mussolini as "a normal enough human being," except for his megalomania, and Stalin, despite his willingness to use drastic, inhuman methods to further his goals, as "the most normal" of the three dictators.

- 214** Jaworski, Marian. "Stalin's Son in a War Prison." *Journal of Soviet Military Studies* 5, no. 2 (1992): 242-66.

The vast majority of this memoir deals with the behavior, experiences, and treatment of Stalin's son, Jacob, while an inmate in a German prison camp in Lübeck, Poland, during the second half of 1942. Jaworski, who was a prisoner in the Lübeck camp, recollects his conversations with Jacob on a wide range of subjects, most of which concern the war, camp life, and various plans to escape from the prison. He comments only briefly on Jacob's few statements about Stalin, noting that Jacob's relations with his father seemed to be more official than sincere, that he appeared to fear Stalin more than he loved him, felt uncomfortable in his presence, and was careful not to incur his displeasure. Jacob also stated that while his father had a strong constitution and hard character, his health was failing and his days were probably numbered.

- 215** "Joe Stalin, Dieter." *Newsweek* 39 (13 August 1951): 33-34.

Newsweek notes Stalin's eating habits, as observed by Churchill during a wartime dinner at the Kremlin with the Soviet dictator, and his statement, in a Kremlin meeting with a group of Estonian doctors, that his health had improved remarkably due to a new diet he was following.

- 216** King, David. "Retouching History." *Life* 22, no. 10 (September 1999): 96-102.

Photographic historian David King presents here a series of photographs as examples of how Soviet retouchers under Stalin used airbrush and scalpel to alter reality in such ways as removing the images of once prominent communist personalities; doctoring photos of Stalin to smooth his imperfect complexion and make his hair and mustache as neat as a matinee idol's; and adding thousands of listeners to the original picture of the crowd that had gathered to hear Lenin's speech in Dvortsovaya Square in Petrograd on 19 July 1920.

- 217** Konigsberg, Eric and Gary J. Bass. "Uncle Larry: Joseph Stalin on Larry King." *New Republic* 208 (1 March 1993): 11-12.

The authors present a humorous version of what it would be like if "Supreme Soviet Joe Stalin" were to have done a television interview on the show "Larry King Live" and responded to such questions as why he chose politics as a career, and how long he intended "to go on killing people," as well as to calls from viewers, such as "Leon Trotsky," whose opening remark was, "Joseph Stalin, you counterrevolutionary. Lenin always said you were a weasel."

- 218** "'Khrush' and 'Bulge' Got the Affability Act from 'Old Joe.'" *Saturday Evening Post* 229 (25 April 1956): 10.

Stalin's ability to be affable and charming, as reported by American Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, is noted in this article and is discussed as an attribute which his successors, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, have attempted to imitate.

- 219** Khrushchev, Nikita. "A Sudden Death." *Time* 136 (1 October 1990): 72.

In this brief excerpt from the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, the former Soviet leader suggests that Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, committed suicide upon learning of an affair her husband was having with the wife of a military officer named Gusev. Khrushchev also describes Stalin's mournful behavior at Nadezhda Alliluyeva's funeral and finds no grounds to accept the truth of the rumor that the Soviet dictator had murdered her.

- 220** "Killer of the Masses." *Time* 61 (16 March 1953): 35-36+.

Time outlines the landmarks in Stalin's life as a revolutionary, critiques his twenty-five-year reign as the ruler of the Soviet Union, and provides a summary of some of the official responses to his death by leaders in Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Communist China, India, and Iran.

221 “Kremlin Case History.” *Time* 61 (16 March 1953): 60-62

This report draws upon the detailed case history provided by Stalin’s doctors to describe the efforts undertaken to save his life following the stroke he suffered during the morning of 1 March 1953. The report also summarizes the results of the autopsy performed on him by physicians anxious for confirmation of their diagnosis and for validation of the treatments they administered to the dying Stalin.

222 “Last of the Three.” *Time* 46 (1 October 1945): 29.

Stalin may soon be forced to delegate his manifold functions, due to a liver disease that has sapped his strength, according to this brief report.

223 Leonhard, Wolfgang. “The Day Stalin Died.” *Problems of Communism* 16, no. 4 (July 1967): 76-82.

Leonhard presents a series of excerpts from personal recollections of Stalin’s 5 March 1953 death by a number of individuals who experienced and observed the impact of this event, including men in such diverse settings as Moscow, the Vorkuta labor camp, Budapest, East Berlin, Beijing, and the jungle headquarters of the Viet Minh, who were then battling the French for control of Vietnam. He also discusses briefly the range of reactions that Stalin’s death prompted, and how these responses correlate more closely with the function of the particular individual—his duties, political career, political philosophy, and degree of loyalty toward communist ideology—than with the individual’s nationality.

224 Liebling, A. J. “Death on the One Hand.” *New Yorker* 29 (28 March 1953): 105-12+.

Liebling notes the headlines and reports that appeared in the Western press during the days of Stalin’s critical illness, and he shows how the rumors that were circulating and the “informed” opinions given by unnamed officials at that time dealt primarily with whether Stalin’s impending death would serve to promote prospects for world peace or further global instability, and whether the selection of a successor for him would proceed smoothly or by way of a bitter and bloody intraparty struggle that would destabilize the Soviet political system.

225 Lipson, Leon S. “Stalin’s Style.” *Yale Review* 70, no. 4 (1981): 500-505.

Lipson attempts to illustrate how Stalin wrote in a “curiously formal, intricately patterned way” by looking into the ninth and last chapter of his *Foundations of Leninism*, a section titled “Style in Work” which comprises only eleven paragraphs totaling twenty-eight sentences. He sees an almost perfect structural parallelism between the sections on each of the two qualities—“Russian Revolutionary Sweep” and “American Efficiency”—that comprise Stalin’s version of the Leninist style of work. This rigid structural pattern, Lipson suggests, may owe something to Stalin’s training as a seminarian and to his posing as a champion of order and firmness over “the massive disorder and vacillation around him and in him.”

226 Lismore, Francis. “Stalin Outwits Shaw.” *American Mercury* 60 (May 1945): 633.

Lismore points out several inaccuracies in the article entitled “Shaw Outwits Stalin,” which appeared in the February 1945 issue of *American Mercury* and which dealt with the British playwright’s 1931 visit with Stalin. He also elaborates on Shaw’s interpretation of why Stalin, in replying to Shaw’s question whether Winston Churchill would be well received in Russia as a private tourist, said that Churchill could count on a warm welcome because the Soviet government was grateful to him for providing the Red Army with a vast supply of military material as a consequence of the victory of the Bolsheviks over the British-equipped counterrevolutionary forces in Russia’s civil war.

227 Lockett, Edward B. "Stalin at 72: Prisoner of Himself." *Coronet* 32 (May 1952): 86-91. Lockett describes Stalin as "a captive of the fear and terror system he has created," a leader who, living in isolation, is completely out of touch with the Soviet people he rules. He also presents an account of the main features of Stalin's private life, personal tastes, work habits, and style of living, and he offers a character sketch of Stalin which draws upon anecdotes about the Soviet leader provided by various diplomats.

228 Lorince, Gabriel. "How Stalin Died." *New Statesman* 74 (11 August 1967): 171. Lorince describes Stalin's last hours, the behavior of the Kremlin's top leaders who gathered around the dying dictator's bed, and the actions of Lavrenti Beria upon Stalin's death indicating that he was intent on assuming the dictator's power—all as reported by Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, in her book *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967).

229 Lourie, Richard. "Saint Joe." *New Republic* 198 (20 June 1988): 10-11. Lourie describes his journey to Gori, Georgia, to visit Stalin's birthplace, the appearance and contents of the Stalin Museum, and the experience he had as a brief "guest" of the KGB chief in Gori, who detained him for traveling from Tbilisi to Gori without official permission. The KGB officer asked Lourie how Americans in general viewed Stalin, to which he responded by stating that "Americans saw Stalin as a great historical leader who had industrialized Russia and led the country to victory in the Second World War but also as a man who had done great evil," a reply for which the chief, who apparently revered Stalin, seemed willing to settle.

230 Luck, David. "A Psycholinguistic Approach to Leader Personality: Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Liu Shao-Ch'i." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 7, no. 4 (1974): 426-53. Luck argues for the value of examining patterns in the use of simile and metaphor in the recorded articulations of leaders as an approach to understanding leader personality and predicting political behavior. Sorting the available historical data on Stalin and Hitler into categories labeled "goals," "mobilization style," and "personal patterns," Luck constructs indices of the imagery patterns of the recorded writings, speeches, and interviews of the two leaders which indicate that violent anal imagery prevails in the articulations of Stalin, and violent oral imagery in those of Hitler. He suggests that these imagery patterns correlate to important aspects of the two leaders' personalities, including aggression levels expressed in terms of destructive or violent body activities projected onto politics. Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao Ch'i figure into Luck's analysis as other kinds of leaders along a continuum running between Stalin and Hitler, leaders who integrate and balance "oral-incorporative and anal-rejective trends into a more 'embracive,' less destructive attitude toward others."

231 ———. "A Psycholinguistic Approach to Leader Personality: Imagery of Aggression, Sex and Death in Lenin and Stalin." *Soviet Studies* 30, no. 4 (1978): 491-515. This article opens by developing a rationale for a form of personality analysis based on the use of imagery by leaders in their writings, speeches, and interviews, and then moves on to study how imagery of aggression, sex, and death in Lenin and Stalin correlates with their political and personal behavior patterns. Luck's indices of the use of similes, metaphors, and related devices by the two leaders show that Stalin employed aggressive oral, anal, and sex imageries more often than Lenin, and that death imagery, in particular, was far more frequent in Stalin than in Lenin. Since this imagery pattern reflects important aspects of the personality and behavior of the two leaders and was available "for psychological comprehension and deathly-aggression prediction" well before their attainment and exercise of power, political analysts would do well to consider the merits of a psycholinguistic approach to leader personality in weighing the character and projecting the political behavior of today's world leaders, Luck suggests.

- 232** Lyons, Eugene. "Dzhugashvili: Russia's Man of Steel." *World's Work* 60 (June 1931): 77-80. Also in *World Today* 58 (August 1931): 210-16.

The Stalin depicted in this 1931 favorable biographical sketch is a man whose personal life is "abstemious, conventional, almost ascetic"; a politician who is notoriously inaccessible to foreign journalists and diplomats but makes time to meet with the rank and file of the party's personnel; and a selfless leader who is a devout disciple of Lenin and has "disciplined himself to the point where he is an almost perfect instrument of his chosen cause." Lyons, who at that time was the Russian correspondent of the United Press and who based his profile on Stalin on a two-hour interview he managed to obtain with the Soviet leader, also reports that Stalin responded to his question, "Are you a dictator?" with an amused expression and an explanation of why dictatorship by any individual is impossible under the Soviet system—a response Lyons believes to be a genuine one by a man who looks upon himself only "as an instrument being wielded by his party and his class."

- 233** Mackintosh, Malcolm. "The Technique of Tyranny." *RUSI Journal* 119, no. 4 (1974): 78-79.

This review of *Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend* (1974), by Ronald Hingley, deals mainly with the book's analysis of Stalin's personality, the development of the Bolshevik Party which he came to dominate, and the techniques he employed to intrigue himself into power and secure his rule for more than a quarter-century. Hingley's assessment of Stalin's leadership during World War II and account of the dictator's last years also receive consideration as does the book's attempt to answer the question, "Was Stalin really necessary—either to Russia or the Communist cause?"

- 234** "Marrying Djugashvili?" *Time* 35 (1 April 1940): 23-24.

This brief note cites Stalin's relationship with Soviet aviatrix Marina Raskova, reporting that she has often been seen riding in his official car to the Kremlin and to his country villa, and that she has been accepted by everyone around Stalin as his new wife.

- 235** "Marshal Stalin at 65." *New York Times Magazine* (17 December 1944): 11.

The milestones in Stalin's career marked by this collage of eight photographs include his initial meeting with Lenin; return to Petrograd from Siberian exile in 1917; formation of a triumvirate with Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev to take the place of Lenin; meeting with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at the signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in Moscow in August 1939; and wartime meeting with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Tehran Conference in November-December 1943.

- 236** Mayer, John D. "The Emotional Madness of the Dangerous Leader." *Journal of Psychohistory* 20, no. 3 (1993): 331-48.

Mayer argues for the existence of a symptom pattern that uniquely identifies one type of intentionally violent and dangerous leader who is capable of influencing the dangerousness of a country. Drawing upon the more recent editions of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, Mayer creates an "emotional-aberration model of dangerous leaders," with a symptom list arranged into three broad classes of political behavior reflecting indifference toward people's suffering, intolerance of criticism, and a grandiose sense of national entitlement characterized by the desire to unite by force people who show little or no interest in being united. He applies the component parts of each of these three classifications of the "dangerous leader disorder" to Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein, and to these three leaders' opponents, Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, and George H. W. Bush, showing how the dangerous leader criteria he has developed fits the behavior of the three dictators, while that of their adversaries fits relatively few of these criteria. Mayer closes with a discussion of cross-cultural issues that may affect the applicability of the diagnostic category he proposes, and of the relative merits of developing an

international organization of mental health professionals to monitor and publish status reports on the mental condition of national leaders.

- 237** McNeal, Robert H. "Stalin's Family: A Commentary on Svetlana Alliluyeva's Memoirs." *Russian Review* 27 (January 1968): 78-86.

This commentary on Svetlana Alliluyeva's *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967) deals mainly with what the book reveals about Stalin's attitude toward and treatment of his immediate kin, particularly his failure to spare his own family from the terror of the 1930s, and what his destruction of his family suggests about his psychological makeup and mental state at that time. Stalin's attitude toward his mother, his anti-Semitism, reaction to the suicide of his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, and feelings of remorse about the collapse of his family are also considered by McNeal in view of the revelations provided by *Twenty Letters to a Friend*.

- 238** Medvedev, Roy. "Mother of the Tsar." *Russian Life* 41, no. 3 (1998): 18-23.

Medvedev describes the lifestyle of Stalin's mother, Ekaterina Dzhugashvili, during the years of his rule, her relationship with her son during his years as a revolutionary, and the correspondence Stalin carried on with her, eighteen notes in all, between the years 1922-27. He also comments on Stalin's failure to return to Georgia upon his mother's 4 June 1937 death, and on his suppression of reports of her death in the Russian press, maintaining that he was probably too involved with the purges at that time to respond to his mother's passing yet wanted to keep the news of her death out of the papers "in order to avoid harmful gossip."

- 239** Medvedev, Zhores A. "The Puzzle of Stalin's Death." *Russian Social Science Review* 45, no. 1 (2004): 83-97. Also in *Russian Studies in History* 42, no. 3 (2003-2004): 77-91.

Medvedev examines the circumstances surrounding the death of Stalin, debunking the theory that the Soviet leader fell victim to a plot and slow-acting poison, and exposing the shortcomings of the standard view of Stalin's last days. According to Medvedev, there was indeed a plot but it was not directed against Stalin himself but rather was improvised after he had already suffered a stroke on the morning of 1 March 1953; was aimed at the new leadership of the Communist Party and Soviet government that Stalin had put in place in October 1952, after the Nineteenth Party Congress; and was devised by Lavrenti Beria, Georgi Malenkov, and Nikita Khrushchev "with an eye to rolling back Stalin's expansion of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and to forming a triumvirate to run the country" following Stalin's death. For Medvedev, the improbability of the only two versions of Stalin's death—one provided by Khrushchev's memoirs, the other based on the narratives of several of Stalin's bodyguards interviewed by various authors who have published biographies of Stalin in recent years—and the peculiar behavior of Stalin's closest colleagues during the days he lay dying suggest that Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Beria may have schemed to cloak the news of Stalin's mortal illness until they could settle the question of succession in their favor by restoring the Politburo that had existed prior to the Nineteenth Party Congress and setting up a new managerial body of party leadership, with themselves at the helm.

- 240** "Messages Relating to the Illness and Death of Joseph Stalin." *United States Department of State Bulletin* 28 (16 March 1953): 400.

This article consists of the White House press release of President Harry Truman's message to the Russian people on the eve of Stalin's death, assuring them of America's desire for peace, and the press release of 5 March 1953 of the American government's offer of condolences to the government of the USSR on the death of the Soviet leader.

- 241** Messerer, Azary. "Orwell and the Soviet Union." *Et Cetera* 14, no. 2 (1984): 130-34.

This account of English writer George Orwell's vision of how new technologies might be exploited by a totalitarian regime to eliminate privacy and control society includes a brief discussion

of the ritual that accompanied the radio broadcasts of Stalin's decrees and speeches in the 1940s and the impact such broadcasts had upon the Soviet people.

242 Miasnikov, A. L. "The End." *Soviet Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1991): 84-92.

The *Soviet Review* publishes here a fragment from an unpublished manuscript written by A. L. Miasnikov, a prominent Soviet physician and therapist who was a member of the team of doctors who attended to Stalin during the last three days of his life. The excerpt includes an account of the diagnosis the team's members agreed upon, their efforts to counter the deterioration of Stalin's condition, and their care in compiling bulletins for the Soviet public about the state of his health. Miasnikov also comments on Stalin's autopsy, which revealed extensive sclerosis of cerebral arteries—a condition which most likely developed over the last years of his life and which causes functional disorders of the nervous system. In Miasnikov's estimate, this condition may have manifested in Stalin's behavior "as a loss of orientation concerning what was good and what was bad, what was permitted and what was not, who was a friend and who was an enemy." He also states that cerebral arteriosclerosis leads to an accentuation of character traits—"the angry man becomes an enraged and evil one, the somewhat suspicious becomes the pathologically suspicious, the person begins to experience the mania of persecution," all of which can be seen in Stalin's behavior in the last years of his life.

243 Michel, Peter J. "'Mission to Moscow': William McChesney Martin, Jr.'s World War II Trip to the Soviet Union." *Gateway Heritage* 14, no. 1 (1993): 46-55.

This account of the observations made by William McChesney Martin Jr., an influential economic analyst for the War Department, during his April-May 1943 visit to the USSR as a member of an American military delegation charged with assessing Russia's economic situation and the impact of American aid delivered under the Lend-Lease Agreement includes a brief section on Martin's description of Stalin's appearance and apparent disinterested behavior during a 23 May dinner held at the Kremlin for the visiting Americans.

244 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. "History and Biography." *History Today* 54, no. 3 (2004): 30-31. Montefiore discusses the challenges that confront those who write historical biographies, the sources of the fascination with the study of tyrants, and the insights into Stalin and Stalinist Russia that he gained both from his interviews in Russia with individuals who witnessed Stalin and from his work in newly opened Soviet archives while researching his book *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (2003). He also comments on the personal nature of Stalin's power, particularly the place of loyalties and patronage of clans and entourages in his regime, and on the dictator's keen appreciation of history. A case for the need for historians to expose the full extent of the horrors perpetrated by tyrants such as Stalin closes out the article.

245 Moore, Nigel. "The Myth of Stalin: The Psychodynamics of Its Utopian Ideals." *Russian History* 11, nos. 2-3 (1984): 283-97.

Moore considers the utopian aspects of the myth of Stalin within a psychoanalytic framework. Defining utopia as "a myth of perfection, a wish-fulfillment of narcissistic boundlessness, denying hostility and helplessness," Moore discusses Stalin's idealization of Lenin and use of solar symbolism in terms of how they relate to the Soviet dictator's own narcissistic strivings and reflect his homosexual desires toward the cult figure of Lenin. While Stalin's omnipotence, latent destructiveness, and homosexual urges were each represented in the myth, ultimately the myth "created a corrupt conscience, or super-ego, and a totalitarian sense of perfection and justice, that was able to legitimize almost any action carried out in its name," according to Moore.

246 Moraitis, George. "The Ghost in the Biographer's Machine." *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 31 (2003): 97-106.

This exploration of how biographies come into being is based upon the author's collaboration with several scholarly biographers, one of whom is Robert Tucker, a prominent biographer of Stalin. Moraitis, a psychoanalyst, discusses how Tucker came to write a biography of Stalin in which emphasis would be placed on the central role of the dictator's psychodynamics in shaping his behavior and actions during his rise to power and years as ruler of the Soviet Union. He also comments on the limitations of Tucker's reliance upon the work of Karen Horney for the psychoanalytic model he uses in his approach to Stalin's psychopathology.

- 247** Moroz, Oleg. "The Last Diagnosis: A Plausible Account That Needs Further Verification." *Soviet Review* 30, no. 6 (1989): 82-102.

Moroz reviews the circumstantial evidence indicating that Vladimir Bekhterev's 24 December 1927 death was an unnatural one that resulted from his diagnosis of Stalin as a paranoiac after the prominent psychiatrist and neuropathologist's 22 December Kremlin meeting with Stalin for the purpose of offering advice regarding the Soviet leader's withering arm. He lends his support to the view that the impulsive Bekhterev most likely made an offhanded comment about having examined "a paranoiac with a withered arm," was poisoned for making such a statement, and that the deed was covered up by Stalin's henchmen. Moroz also comments on how Bekhterev's diagnosis of Stalin as a paranoiac accords well with much of what is known about the Soviet dictator's political behavior, and on the likelihood that Stalin's mental condition played a substantial role in shaping the brutal and aberrant actions that so characterized his rule.

- 248** Murphy, Mike. "Stalin Lives." *Weekly Standard* 8, no. 34 (12 May 2003): 16-17.

Murphy gives an account of his recent tour of the Stalin Museum, which rests behind the small wooden cabin in which the young Dzhugashvili grew up as a boy in Gori, Georgia. Noting first that the impressive dimensions of the museum gives one "a powerful urge to crush some Kulaks and conquer Finland," Murphy goes on to relate the high points of the monologue on Stalin's life and accomplishments provided by robot-like guides reading from a scripture, the contents of which suggest that no one in Gori "ever got the memo from Moscow about the fall of the Soviet Union." Murphy also notes some of the peculiar aspects of the Stalin collection, including the "very creepy room that features a desk mask of Stalin made shortly after he died," a private cabin where one "can take a picture of his toilet," and a "menacing and ferocious" 150-pound table lamp of "jagged steel crudely hammered into the shape of a Soviet tank crashing into battle."

- 249** "News in Pictures: Stalin's Funeral." *Time* 61 (23 March 1953): 28-29.

Time provides a series of captioned photographs of Stalin's funeral, including photos of the Soviet leadership in the funeral procession, Stalin's coffin, and the crowd of mourners in Red Square.

- 250** Nexö, M. A. "Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Sketch." *Soviet Russia Today* (January 1940): 9+.

This biographical sketch draws upon material published in the Soviet press, Henri Barbusse's *Stalin*, the official *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, and the writings of various Soviet leaders to present a flattering description of Stalin's student days, years as a revolutionary, relationship with Lenin, and role in the October Revolution and Russian Civil War. The closing section of the article, entitled "Stalin, Continuer of Lenin's Work," describes the advances made in the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership, including the industrialization of the nation, the collectivization of agriculture, and the establishment of the Stalin Constitution—"the most advanced charter of human rights to be announced by any society."

- 251** "Old Bolsheviks and Big-Shots." *Time* 30 (4 October 1937): 22.

This report on the failure of the Stalin Plant to produce enough luxury cars for Soviet "big-shots" includes an account of how Stalin travels back and forth to the Kremlin from his home in the

Galitsin Palace in a speeding motorcade consisting of three twelve-cylinder French Hispano-Suizas and of the security measures taken to provide for his safety.

252 “Once Again, How Is Stalin?” *Newsweek* 28 (4 November 1946): 43.

Newsweek describes the rumors circulating in 1945-46 that Stalin’s health was failing and speculates on which of his colleagues might be the next leader of the Kremlin in case of his death. The article notes that most experts pick Andrei Zhdanov or Vyacheslav Molotov, rather than Georgi Malenkov, to be Stalin’s successor.

253 “Pallbearer Stalin.” *Life* 25 (4 October 1948): 55.

Photographs of Stalin in attendance at the funerals of various Soviet leaders, among them Vladimir Lenin, Sergei Kirov, Mikhail Kalinin, and Andrei Zhdanov, appear next to this brief commentary on how Stalin, in serving as a pallbearer for “national heroes,” has buried more of his colleagues than has any other modern dictator.

254 Parker, Ralph. “Four Strong Men, East and West, Who Lead the United Nations.” *New York Times Magazine* (4 July 1943): 15+.

The “four strong men” characterized in this brief sketch are Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Joseph Stalin. Parker primarily notes Stalin’s simple dress and tastes, rigorous work schedule, attention to detail, and willingness to take into account the views of others before making major decisions.

255 Parry, Albert. “The Land Whence Stalin Came.” *Travel* 83 (October 1944): 4-9+.

Parry comments on the geography, culture, and people of Georgia and the history of the region of Transcaucasia from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. He also offers a brief review of Stalin’s early life in Georgia and his revolutionary activities there from the late 1890s until the outbreak of World War I.

256 Phayre, I. “The Georgian Cobbler’s Son.” *Windsor Magazine* 86 (October 1937): 585-601.

257 Pomper, Philip. “Nečae, Lenin and Stalin: The Psychology of Leadership.” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 26, no. 1 (1978): 11-30.

Pomper opens with an account of the efforts of various historians to connect Lenin with the nineteenth-century Russian nihilist Sergei Nechaev by pointing to the affinities between the values and identities of Russian nihilism and Bolshevism. Advancing the argument that a comparative analysis of the identifications and ego-defense strategies of Nechaev and Stalin suggests that Nechaev resembles the Soviet dictator far more than he does Lenin, Pomper attempts to show that both men had powerful hero identifications (Mikhail Bakunin for Nechaev and Lenin for Stalin), that “they both employed identification as an ego defense in combination with the ego defense of projection—the strategy designated ‘identification with the aggressor’ by Anna Freud—and that the paranoid character of Nečae’s conspiratorial activity and Stalin’s rule are closely connected with their ‘identification with the aggressor.’” He also contends that Stalin exhibited a pattern of behavior similar to Nechaev’s, with Stalin’s leadership capacities being “placed in the service of a paranoid character disorder.”

258 Post, Jerrold M. “The Seasons of a Leader’s Life: Influences of the Life Cycle in Political Behavior.” *Political Psychology* 2, (fall/winter 1980): 35-49.

This attempt to relate psychological phenomena occurring during the three major transitions of adulthood—the early adult, the mid-life, and the late adult—to the political behavior of leaders makes several references to Stalin, most notably with respect to how his identity as a rebel was forged during the years he spent as a youth in the Tiflis Theological Seminary—a repressive and

authoritarian institution—and how his attachment to Lenin, whom he idealized as a hero, reflects the tendency of the rebel against authority to seek a new authority.

- 259** Prince, Charles. "A Psychological Study of Stalin." *Journal of Social Psychology* 22 (November 1945): 119-40.

Prince offers a psychological analysis of Stalin's personality growth and principal modes of action. In attempting to locate the developmental experiences that were of primary importance in shaping Stalin's political behavior, Prince considers Stalin as a Georgian, as a man in private life, and as a revolutionary, and he provides an assessment of how Stalin's early in life experiences impacted his political behavior and activity as the leader of the Communist Party and dictator of the USSR. Among the conclusions Prince draws are: Stalin owed his "ambitions and repressions" to his mother; the seed of his desire for power was germinated by his seminary experiences as a youth; his struggle for dominance was his chief source of gratification; his tenacity of purpose and perseverance were his most outstanding personal qualities; and his vicious and cruel behavior as the ruler of the Soviet Union stemmed primarily from a deep-seated sense of suspicion and "an irrevocable disgust in his fellow-men."

- 260** Prud'homme, Alex and Liz Corcoran. "Bearing Her Burden." *People Weekly* 38 (12 October 1992): 83-84.

The authors present a brief overview of the life of Stalin's only daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, noting her relationship with her father, her 1967 defection to the United States, her criticism of her father's reign of terror, and her efforts to distance herself from her father's memory.

- 261** Radzikhovsky, L. A. "The Great Psychologist." *Soviet Journal of Psychology* 10, no. 5 (1989): 87-102.

Radzikhovsky examines the psychology of Stalin, the psychological traits of Stalinism, and the Stalinist style of thinking and its social determination. Arguing that Stalin "can rightly be called a great psychologist for his ability to manipulate masses and individuals, to direct their emotions, thoughts, and actions, to make them play a game and believe in it," Radzikhovsky portrays the Soviet dictator as the master of the "total and cynical lie" whose practice of wearing "several masks at once" in weaving his web of deception in his rise to power, and whose talent for brainwashing the Communist Party and Soviet people into accepting the myths he created constitute "the psychological core" of his personality. Radzikhovsky identifies three different stages in Stalin's concerted effort to break down the common sense and inner psychological resistance of the Soviet people to the "total lie" which he propagated: "division," meaning the binary separation of people into opposing groups constituting "the good guys" and "the bad guys"; "provocation," meaning the enlargement of some aspect of the initial division into a specific threat leading to the creation of a phobia toward internal and external enemies of the "good" Soviet people; and "destruction," meaning the physical elimination of the targeted category of enemies so that the Soviet "monolith becomes a monolith again for a while—until Stalin announced the next 'crack.'" The myths and total falsehoods upon which the Stalinist system rested, Radzikhovsky contends, not only deformed the consciousness of the Soviet people but affected even "the master of the myth" himself, leading to the disintegration of Stalin's personality and the development of a kind of "social autism."

- 262** Randall, Francis. "Books on Stalin." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (1963): 94-97.

Randall provides a retrospective examination of some of the early books on Stalin and Stalin's Russia, critiquing Sergei Dmitrievsky's Russian language biography *Stalin* (1931), Essad Bey's *Stalin, The Career of a Fanatic* (1932), Isaac Don Levine's *Stalin* (1931), Henri Barbusse's *Stalin, A New World Seen through One Man* (1935), Boris Souvarine's *Stalin, a Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (1935), and Leon Trotsky's *Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* (1941). He

gives high marks to the studies of Souvarine and Trotsky, a middling review of Levine's biography, and sees little to recommend in the other three books.

263 Rappaport, Helen. "Stalin and the Photographer." *History Today* 51, no. 6 (2001): 12-20. Rappaport presents an account of American photojournalist James Abbe's 1932 visit to the Soviet Union, during which he managed to arrange a photo session with Stalin. She describes the photo shoot scene, Abbe's impression of Stalin, and how Abbe, during his seven-month stay in the Soviet Union, became "a master of the illicit photograph," taking pictures of bread lines, hungry peasants, the destruction of Russian Orthodox Churches, and a host of other taboo topics, all of which appeared in his 1934 book *I Photograph Russia*. Appended are a dozen or so of Abbe's photographs of Stalin's Russia.

264 Raymond, Ellsworth. "Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Stalin?" *American Magazine* 151 (February 1951): 34-35+.

Ellsworth, a former American government political and economic analyst on Russia who served for six years as chief translator for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, describes the sweeping extent of the measures adopted to safeguard Stalin's life, including the steps taken to secure the Kremlin's gates and walls; the painstaking precautions to keep the road clear between the Kremlin and Stalin's country estate; and the various countermeasures taken to prevent a would-be assassin from having an opportunity to kill Stalin during one of the many parades he reviewed in Red Square. Raymond also discusses how such steps as the careful screening of candidates for Stalin's personal staff, the isolation of the Soviet Union from contacts with the outside world, and the rotation of Kremlin sentries from one post to another at odd intervals have further added to the unlikelihood of Stalin being the victim of an assassin, despite the countless number of Russians with ample motives to kill him.

265 "Red Stars." *New Yorker* 68 (2 November 1992): 38-40.

This article describes the impression of Stalin formed by Sergei Plekhanov, the Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and the man given the task of writing the Russian subtitles for the three-hour HBO film "Stalin," which premiered in Moscow on 7 November 1992; Plekhanov's role in the making of the movie about Stalin; and the friendship he formed with actor Robert Duvall, who played the role of the Soviet dictator. The article also notes that the last day of the filming occurred on Stalin's birthday, December 21st, at Stalin's dacha, and that just as the death scene was being staged, an excited Plekhanov rushed in to announce a news flash: the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.

266 Rees, Simon. "Historians Are Still Trying to Sort Out the Dark Private Life and Strange Death of Josef Stalin." *Military History* 20, no. 4 (2003): 18+.

This profile of Stalin centers on how the Soviet dictator was possessed by deeply rooted persecution and paranoia manias which encouraged him to imagine that the nation was awash with spies, saboteurs, and plots against him, contributed to the wholesale purges against the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the Red Army, and led him to take extraordinary precautions in his personal life to confuse and thwart would-be assassins. Among the precautions taken, Rees writes, were the testing of his food for poison; his travel in a huge motorcade of identical limousines; his refusal to sleep in the same room twice in a row; and the clearing of all people from the motorway on which he traveled so as to protect him from the snipers he feared could be lurking along his customary route.

267 Rhodes, Erik. "Origins of Tragedy: Joseph Stalin's Cycle of Abuse." *Journal of Psychohistory* 24, no. 4 (1977): 377-89.

Stalin's immediate family experiences and the culture into which he was born combined to produce in him certain psychological disturbances that resulted in the widespread terror and suffering he caused during his years of power in the Soviet Union, according to this psychological assessment of the roots of Stalin's abusive behavior. Rhodes examines the dynamics of Stalin's emotional disturbances and their manifestation in his paranoia, in his inability to tolerate feeling personally challenged by others, and in his abuse of his own children. Linking the behavior of the adult Stalin to a cycle of abuse where the abused becomes the abuser, Rhodes argues that Stalin's unresolved memories of childhood violation led him to reinflct "the pain and suffering of his childhood on the millions who became subordinate to him throughout his lifetime."

268 Rieber, Alfred J. "Stalin, Man of the Borderlands." *American Historical Review* 106, no. 5 (December 2001): 1651-91.

This essay, in explaining "how the politics of personal identity became the foundations of a Stalinist ideology and a homologue for the Soviet-system," draws upon the literature of identity formation in order to explore "the relationship between Stalin's struggle to transform and present his self and his solution to the central problem of the Bolshevik Revolution: how to construct a centralized polyethnic state on a proletarian basis." Using the unifying theme of "a man of the borderlands," Rieber examines Stalin's representation of self through the entire process of his identity formation; explores the ways the social and cultural matrix of the Caucasus may have shaped Stalin's beliefs, attitudes, and policies in his formative years; and reconsiders Stalin's political writings as a function of the transformation of his persona within the revolutionary movement. In explaining how Stalin constructed a social identity that would serve his political aims, Rieber organizes Stalin's life experiences into three interpretive frames—cultural (traditional Georgian), social (proletarian), and political (hegemonic Russian)—describing not only how Stalin's success in the struggle for power can be linked to his fashioning of a multiple identity for himself that was appealing to all sections of the party, but also how the future socialist state was an extension of Stalin himself on three interlocking frames: "the proletariat as the dominant class, the ethno-cultural region as the territorial unit, and Great Russia as the political center of the state."

269 "Russia's Man of Steel." *Literary Digest* 139 (21 December 1935): 13.

Literary Digest takes the occasion of Stalin's fifty-sixth birthday to outline his early years as a revolutionary, rise to a leading position within the Bolshevik Party, and assumption of absolute power as ruler of the Soviet Union. The article also comments on Stalin's mannerisms, habits, tastes, and political personality.

270 Sabotkin, S. M. "Laboratory of the 30 Stalins." *Science Digest* 33 (April 1953): 11-15.

Sabotkin provides an account of the work done between 1939 and 1953 at clinics in Kiev and Kislovodsk devoted to the conduct of medical experiments on human guinea pigs for the purpose of testing new drugs, serums, and elixirs that might extend the life span of Stalin. The human subjects, Sabotkin explains, were selected from a pool of Georgian men of Stalin's age who had physiques and constitutions similar to his, and who were then made to live their lives in the clinic in slavish imitation of the work habits and personal tastes of the Soviet leader, all while being subjected to various experimental drugs and procedures. Sabotkin also notes Stalin's use of a specially prepared "anti-reticular cytotoxic" serum developed at the "lab of the thirty Stalins" and purported to be a remedy against aging; the creation of a special "life-support machine" for the Soviet dictator; and the efforts of Kremlin doctors, Alexander Frankel in particular, to make Stalin conscious of the need to conserve his strength.

271 Salisbury, Harrison E. "The Days of Stalin's Death." *New York Times Magazine* (17 April 1983): 38+.

Salisbury provides an account of how Moscow reacted to the news of Stalin's grave illness, describes the scene in Red Square in preparation for and during Stalin's funeral, and notes the obstacles foreign correspondents had to deal with in covering "the days of Stalin's death." He also speculates on why the official report that Stalin had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage was held up for more than forty-eight hours and on the possibility that Stalin's death was hastened by the key members of his inner circle—Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev—who had reason to believe that they were about to become victims of a fresh purge to be launched by their master.

272 ———. "Why Stalin Had to Die." *Look* 20 (21 August 1956): 61-62+.

There is sufficient circumstantial evidence in the case of Stalin's death, Salisbury contends, to support the conclusion that the top members of the Politburo may have arranged for Stalin to be murdered. At the forefront of this evidence, Salisbury writes, was the growing sense among the party's senior leadership in the early months of 1953 that Stalin was planning a purge that would threaten their very existence, a fear confirmed by Khrushchev in his indictment of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress. Salisbury also points to the fact that Khrushchev and his Politburo colleagues had, along with the motive and justification to kill Stalin, the ability and opportunity to carry out the murder and to cover it up as well.

273 Satterfield, Jason M. "Cognitive-Affective States Predict Military and Political Aggression and Risk Taking: A Content Analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 6 (1998): 667-90.

This study draws upon theories of personality, cognition, and information processing to find reliable predictors of military aggression and risk taking in the behavior of Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt. In discussing the case of Stalin, Satterfield analyzes the dictator's behavior on scales of aggression/passivity and risk/caution in association with such events as the reconquest of Georgia, the party purges of the 1930s, the Soviet military offensive in Ukraine during World War II, and the wartime meetings of the Big Three in Tehran and Yalta.

274 ———. "The Real Stalin." *Survey* 23, no. 3 (1977-1978): 131-33.

Satterfield takes the occasion of a new edition of Boris Souvarine's biography of Stalin, published originally in French in 1935, to review briefly the reasons why the book, which managed to demythologize Stalin when his cult was being produced during the early period of his rule, did not, at the time of its publication, receive the acclaim it deserved and why it later came to be widely accepted as the best early account of the life of Stalin.

275 "Second Thoughts from Svetlana." *Time* 91 (26 September 1969): 37-38.

This article deals with the ways in which the image of Stalin conveyed by his daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, in her new book, *Only One Year* (1969) differs markedly from that in her first book, *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967), most notably with respect to her father's responsibility for a terror that destroyed millions of people in the USSR. The article also relates some revealing new vignettes the book provides about Stalin, including examples of his love of practical jokes, and notes Svetlana's account of her father's distrust of his secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria.

276 "Seventy." *Time* 54 (26 December 1949): 13.

Time describes the celebration of Stalin's birthday in Russia and other communist nations. The article also notes that Stalin himself has much to celebrate, given his success in wielding absolute power in the Soviet Union and in building a vast empire.

277 "A Short History of Joseph Stalin." *New York Times Magazine* (13 December 1942): 16-17.

As Stalin neared his sixty-third birthday, the *New York Times Magazine* ran this series of drawings by Oscar Berger marking landmarks in the Soviet leader's life, including his expulsion from the

Tiflis Theological Seminary, arrest and exile as a young revolutionary, leading part in the Russian Civil War, appointment to the position of General Secretary, and assumption of the role of supreme leader of Soviet forces in World War II.

278 "The Six Mysteries of Josef Stalin." *United Nations World* 7 (April 1953): 8-9.

The "six major mysteries" in Stalin's life outlined in this brief article are: what became of the postscript to Lenin's will in which he criticized Stalin; how did Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, die; what role did he play, early in his career, in organizing the Bolshevik Party in the Caucasus; what was his role in the famous 26 June 1907 Tiflis raid; was he responsible for the deaths of two of his intimate friends, Politburo members Mikhail Frunze and Grigori Ordzhonikidze; and did he leave behind a testament, an autobiography, or diaries?

279 Smith, Beverly. "Mr. Steel—a Man You Ought to Know." *American Mercury* 138 (July 1944): 20-21+.

Smith draws upon twenty years of American commentary on Stalin to describe the Soviet leader's character, aims, and motives in the hope of shedding light on how America might best deal with the Soviet Union in the postwar world. The Stalin who emerges from Smith's commentary is a hardheaded realist driven by a fanatical desire to make Russia powerful and prosperous and sparing nothing and no one in his relentless quest to achieve his goals. Smith does not totally discount the opinion that Stalin will take advantage of postwar chaos to use the Red Army to expand communist power in both Europe and Asia, but she believes he is more likely to press for guarantees of the security of Russia's western border and to concentrate on rebuilding his war-torn nation, a task which will be easier for him to address in a stable and peaceful world.

280 Snow, Edgar. "Stalin Faces Truman." *Saturday Evening Post* 217 (30 July 1945): 20-21+.

Snow gives a close-up view of the personality, character, and political behavior of Stalin in an effort to shed light on the nature of the man whom the newly installed President Truman must understand if the bridge established between America and the Soviet Union by Franklin Roosevelt is to be maintained. He describes what he sees as signs of genuine respect and admiration for Stalin by the vast majority of the Soviet people; Stalin's shrewdness as negotiator at the wartime conferences of the Big Three; his impressive command of information on a wide variety of subjects; and his manner of speech—both privately and when giving formal addresses—work habits, and personal tastes.

281 Solovyov, Vladimir. "Stalin's Death." Translated by David Gurevich. *Partisan Review* 58, no. 3 (1991): 471-77.

The collective memoirs of Stalin's guards, published thirty-five years after the dictator's death, serve as the main source of this account of the response of those who first discovered that the Soviet leader was seriously ill and needed emergency medical care; the reasons for the delay in arranging for such care; and the cynical reactions to Stalin's desperate plight by those within his inner circle—Lavrenti Beria, Georgi Malenkov, and Nikita Khrushchev. Receiving most attention in the article is the crass behavior of Beria at Stalin's deathbed, and the fact that Stalin's medical care during his last hours may have suffered because the Kremlin's physicians and many other prominent medical specialists were in jail at the time in association with the so-called doctors' plot. Solovyov also describes how the members of Stalin's inner circle, as victims of "the Kremlin's virus of paranoia," quickly replaced their fear of Stalin with fear of each other as they formed coalitions and drafted strategies to advance their own relative positions in the hope of becoming the dictator's successor.

282 Sonne, John C. "On Tyrants as Abortion Survivors." *Journal of Prenatal and Perinatal Psychology and Health* 19, no. 2 (winter 2004): 149-67.

Sonne draws upon a combination of psychoanalysis and communication systems theory, enriched by research in the field of prenatal psychology that has demonstrated that the unborn are sentient beings possessing a vulnerability to psychic trauma, to advance the thesis that “murderous sibling rivalry, one of the psychological and social consequences of the threat of being aborted,” is a major dynamic operative in the destructive behavior of such tyrants as Hitler, Franco, Mussolini, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein. Describing the theme of tyrannical siblings as one characterized by feelings of rejection, envy, and revenge against those perceived to have what the abortion survivor was wrongly deprived of, Sonne relates the behavioral profile of abortion survivors seen in clinical practice to that of the tyrants under study, suggesting, in the absence of direct evidence from their prenatal history, that these individuals experienced the threat of being aborted. Among the abortion survivor characteristics attributed to Stalin and the other tyrants being considered are murderous hostility toward any person who did not agree with them completely; the demand of absolute loyalty from those around them; the lack of loyalty to others; a projection of false selves to the world, including the ability to present themselves to their subjects and others as saviors; and the possession of self-destructive tendencies, especially a penchant for “sabotaging themselves when near the point of success or fulfillment.”

283 Staerck, Gillian. “The Death of Stalin, 9 [sic] March 1953.” *Modern History Review* 12, no. 4 (April 2001): 34-35.

Staerck presents a brief account of the immediate impact of Stalin’s death on Soviet policy, including the relaxation of the Soviet regime’s use of terror, a return to the collective leadership Stalin had overturned in 1928, and a turn toward a more conciliatory foreign policy and an effort to reduce international tension.

284 “Stalin: A 67-Year Plan.” *New York Times Magazine* (15 December 1946): 17.

On the eve of the Soviet leader’s sixty-seventh birthday, cartoonist Oscar Berger offers a series of drawings which highlight Stalin’s career from his 21 December 1879 birth in Tiflis, Georgia, up to the time of his assumption of the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party on 3 April 1922.

285 “Stalin as a Young Man Was Observatory Assistant.” *Science News Letter* 42 (11 July 1942): 25.

Science News Letter reports that Stalin served as a meteorologist and magnetic assistant at the Tiflis Observatory, in his native Georgia, during the years 1898-1901. The report notes how this almost forgotten chapter in the Soviet leader’s history came to light, and that the notebooks made by the young observer Dzhugashvili are still in existence and are carefully treasured as prime exhibits for a museum of the history of science in the USSR.

286 “Stalin Be Praised: Fiftieth Birthday Greetings.” *Living Age* 337 (1 February 1930): 673-75. A translation from the *Rote Fahne*, a German communist daily, this brief article heaps praise on Stalin on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, describing him as “the most perfection incarnation” of the communist cause, the true disciple of Lenin, a master of welding together theory and practical organization in the proletarian movement, and an indefatigable fighter against the enemies of the proletariat—the bourgeoisie, fascists, the traitorous followers of Trotsky, and “left-wing chat-boxes” in the ranks of the communist leadership.

287 “Stalin, by Churchill.” *Newsweek* 20 (21 September 1942): 27.

Newsweek cites Winston Churchill’s appraisal of Stalin, given on 8 September 1942 to the House of Commons, in which he spoke of the Soviet leader’s courage, candor, wisdom, and sense of humor.

288 "Stalin Has Intimations of Mortality." *Christian Century* 67 (8 March 1950): 293.

This brief note cites a news item distributed by Worldover Press reporting that Soviet scientists have developed a serum to be given to Stalin for the purpose of extending his life. The note also questions the wisdom behind the assumption made by some that the extension of the lifespan of rulers would result in wiser rule.

289 "Stalin on Review." *New York Times Magazine* (19 June 1949): 7.

This page contains a dozen pictures of Stalin at the 1949 May Day celebration in Red Square along with a brief statement noting his robust appearance.

290 "Stalin Rumors Kindled by Failure to Show Up for Red Celebration." *Newsweek* 26 (19 November 1945): 44.

The meaning of Stalin's absence from the celebrations held in Moscow on the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the recurrent rumors that he is seriously ill are the subject of this report. Pointing to the contradictory information on Stalin's health, the report suggests that Stalin may appear to be doing fairly well when observed vacationing in Sochi but may not be healthy enough to return to his heavy duties in Moscow. The possibility that Andrei Zhdanov might be Stalin's successor also receives consideration in the report.

291 "Stalin's Birthplace in Gori." *Life* 13 (24 August 1942): 72+.

Photographs of the peasant home of Stalin's birthplace in Gori, Georgia, accompany this note on Soviet military efforts to safeguard the site—then a monument to the nation's leader—from the advancing German army.

292 "Stalin's Mother: Soso Was Always a Good Boy." *Literary Digest* 107 (20 December 1930): 25-26.

This article consists of highlights from the 1930 interview with Ekatrina Dzhugashvili, Stalin's mother, at her residence in Tiflis, conducted by H. R. Knickerbocker of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Most noteworthy are her comments on her son's good behavior as a youth, and her insistence that he was not expelled from the Tiflis Theological Seminary, as the official record states, but rather was removed from the seminary by her personally because his health had deteriorated from studying too hard. The article also cites some of the impressions of Stalin recorded by Eugene Lyons, of the United Press, following his two-hour Kremlin interview with him.

293 "Stalin's Photos: the Mystery Deepens." *Newsweek* 35 (3 April 1950): 32.

The possibility that two photos of Stalin that had recently appeared in the Soviet press may have been altered to make him appear younger is noted in this brief report. The report also cites a 20 March statement made by a Russian colonel named Navivayko, during a speech at the House of Soviet Culture, that Stalin's strength was failing and that Molotov, who had been released from his position as foreign minister, was assuming Stalin's duties.

294 "Stalin's School Days." *Living Age* 342 (March 1932): 82.

This report sheds light on Stalin's behavior and performance during his days as a student at the Tiflis Theological Seminary by citing anecdotes offered by Father Bogayavlensky, who formerly taught at the seminary, depicting the young Dzhugashvili as a ruffian, who once beat a classmate senseless for speaking sacrilegiously, and as a poor student, who was confounded by mathematics and had a highly limited understanding of religious scriptures.

295 Strong, Anna Louise. "I Met Stalin." *New Masses* (29 December 1942): 20-22.

This article consists of an excerpt from the chapter on Stalin in the book *The Soviets Expected It* (1941) in which the author, a prominent American leftist and journalist, describes the impression

Stalin made upon her during her Kremlin meeting with him and gives a favorable review of his leadership style. For Strong, Stalin is an astute listener; a superlatively good committee man blessed with a talent for cooperation and for “getting swift decisions out of the brains of many people”; a man whose objectivity in handling complex questions and whose knowledge of world politics has impressed all who have met him; and a leader who is deeply committed to upholding the democratic rights of the Soviet people and to ridding the world of the scourge of fascism.

296 ———. “Stalin: Some Notes on His Method.” *Soviet Russia Today* (December 1939): 9-10+.

The author links Stalin’s success as a ruler to his talent for close, attentive listening; his habit of drawing upon a wide range of sources before making any major decision; and his willingness to cooperate with his colleagues in determining the best course of action to take in dealing with any problem. In Strong’s opinion, Stalin is the perfect committee man, meaning a leader endowed with the ability to combine the concerns, preferences, and leanings of those with whom he confers to arrive at the proper course of action and to explain clearly, with out any “oratorical tricks” or concern for arousing his audience, why a particular decision has been taken and the benefits it is expected to yield.

297 Sulzberger, C. L. “Stalin: Still the Man of Mystery.” *New York Times Magazine* (19 August 1945): 9+.

This biographical sketch describes Stalin’s systematic behavior, tenacity in seeking power, and success in making the Bolshevik Revolution “work” and in steeling it against its internal and external enemies. Sulzberger also points out the similarities between Stalin’s policies and those of Peter the Great; his achievement of “the national aspirations of Russia’s long line of Czars”; and his emergence as a dominant world figure whose touch will affect the helm of international affairs.

298 Suny, Ronald Grigor. “After the Fall: Stalin and His Biographers.” *Radical History Review* 54 (fall 1992): 187-96.

Suny reviews S. J. Taylor’s *Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times’s Man in Moscow* (1990); Robert C. Tucker’s *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (1990); Dmitri Volkogonov’s *Stalin, Triumph and Tragedy* (1991); and a pair of books by Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (1990), and *Stalin, Breaker of Nations* (1991). He outlines the thesis and some of the key points advanced in each of the five works, and he describes how the “lives of Stalin” produced by the dictator’s biographers from the 1930s through the 1980s have reflected the shifting political contexts at the time of their writing. In commenting on the biographies of Conquest, Tucker, and Volkogonov, Suny discusses the books’ portrayal of Stalin as being much more purposeful and radical in his aims and methods than the opportunist and centrist sketched by Trotsky and others; their inclusion of a mass of new detail on the arbitrary cruelty and pointless brutality of the Stalin regime; and how the books place responsibility for the Soviet system, with all its excesses, squarely on the shoulders of Stalin himself.

299 ———. “Beyond Psychotherapy: The Young Stalin in Georgia.” *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 48-58.

Suny opens with a brief commentary on the limitations of psychohistorical studies of Stalin that draw upon universalistic psychological theories, and on the merits of approaching Stalin’s psychological and personal motivations in terms of the values of the society in which he grew to manhood. He offers a sketch of turn-of-the century Georgian society and culture to suggest how placing Stalin’s early life within its social and cultural matrix sheds light on the young Georgian’s psychological development in his formative years. Suny’s analysis yields the conclusions that as a child Stalin seems “more typical of, than different from, the class and cohort of which he was a member,” and that when he entered the revolutionary movement as a young man “he was hardly a

fully formed figure capable of carrying out the Great Terror, however terrible may have been the deprivations of poverty, the abuses of his father, or the psychosocial effects of Russifying teachers." Suny concedes that the young Stalin may have acquired "deep social hostilities to the repression that hindered his advance, a determination to resist what he perceived as injustice, and the ability to create a tight, loyal following around him," but he believes that it was other contexts and experiences that would intervene "to shape and reshape the young Georgian rebel into the Russified author of Stalinism."

- 300** ———. "Making Sense of Stalin: Some Recent and Not-So-Recent Biographies." *Russian History* 16, nos. 2-4 (1989): 435-48.

Suny examines the checkered reception of psychohistory within the discipline of history and offers a historiographical survey of psychohistorical assessments of the life of the young Joseph Stalin, including the works of Boris Souvarine, Leon Trotsky, Isaac Deutscher, Gustav Bychowski, Robert Tucker, Adam Ulam, Robert McNeal, Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, and Robert Slusser. Noting both psychohistory's potential for explanation and the limitations of the studies produced by practicing psychohistorians of Stalin, Suny encourages future biographers of Stalin to consider meshing social history with a multifaceted psychological probing of the behavior of both the young Dzhugashvili and the mature Soviet dictator to bring their readers closer to the complex subject of Stalin.

- 301** Svanidze, Budu. "Stalin and His Three Wives." *McCall's* 80 (February 1953): 30-31+; (March 1953): 44-45+.

In these excerpts from the 1953 book, *My Uncle Joseph Stalin*, the nephew of Stalin, in describing his numerous meetings with his uncle over a span of more than twenty years, comments on Stalin's attitude toward and dealings with a host of party and military leaders during this time; his marriage to and life with each of his three wives—Keke Svanidze, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, and Rosa Kaganovich; and various incidents and developments in his political life, including his reaction upon receiving news of the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941; the toll that the war took on his well-being; and his plan to reconstitute the Politburo's membership once the war was over by eliminating "anyone who might become dangerous to the country in case of his death."

- 302** "Svetlana's 'Letters': Another View of Stalin." *Newsweek* 70 (14 August 1967): 42-43.

This commentary on *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967), the memoirs of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, describes the book's account of how the suicide of Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, devastated him and created a barrier between himself and his children. The article also notes what the book has to say about Lavrenti Beria's relationship with and influence on Stalin, and the response to Stalin's death by the leading members of his entourage as well as by his servants and personal guards.

- 303** Thomas, B. "The Famous and the Infamous as a Child Might See Them." *New York Times Magazine* (22 August 1943): 11-12.

The "child's view" of Stalin presented in this series of sketches on prominent world figures of the mid-1940s has it that "Mr. Stalin is called comrade and sometimes Uncle Joe. He lives in Moscow and he would not let the Germans have it. This made them cross and they tried to have Stalingrad because it was called after him but they had a terrible defeat by the Russian soldiers and Goebbels said it was General Winter that was the cause of the defeat."

- 304** Tucker, Robert C. "A Case of Mistaken Identity: Djugashvili-Stalin." *Biography* 5, no. 1 (1982): 17-24.

Tucker traces the development of the theory of self-identity from Freud's initial concept of identification through the work of Erik Erickson, Daniel Levinson, and Karen Horney, showing how each added to self-identification theory and how aspects of their thinking on this subject can be applied with profit by biographers of Stalin. The psychological-political profile of Stalin that Tucker constructs within the context of this theory revolves around how Stalin's identification with Lenin became the permanent keystone of his identity—most notably with respect to how his inability to be a revolutionary and leader of Lenin's stature relates to Horney's notion of psychological mistaken identity, particularly her thinking on the system of unconscious defenses developed by the individual in response to the inevitable disparity between the idealized and empirical selves. In Tucker's view, Stalin sought to resolve a life-long identity crisis by inflicting it upon Soviet society through his conversion of the inner psychological defenses that he had developed to cope with whatever was discordant with his idealized self, and, in so doing, gave shape to the outer political realities of the Stalinist totalitarian state and system of repression.

305 ———. "Several Stalins." *Survey* 17, no. 4 (1971): 165-78.

Tucker critiques the biographical portraits of Stalin offered by Leon Trotsky, E. H. Carr, and Isaac Deutscher, and comments on some of the new information that has surfaced about the Soviet dictator during the fifteen years since his death by way of such avenues as public speeches by party leaders, scholarly writings by Soviet historians, previously unpublished writings of Lenin, manuscripts circulating in Soviet underground culture, Nikita Khrushchev's remembrances of Stalin, and portrayals of the dictator in Soviet fiction. In discussing this body of writings, Tucker identifies a number of attributes and characteristics of Stalin which he believes now need to be considered in order for biographers to construct an accurate picture of the Soviet leader. Most notably, he maintains that a viable portrait of Stalin should take into account his success in fashioning himself into a force for shaping the historical process within the USSR, and should recognize the possibility that he may have been afflicted with a paranoid disorder which colored his political behavior, affected his policy choices, and influenced the dynamics of Soviet totalitarianism.

306 ———. "Svetlana Alliluyeva as Witness of Stalin." *Slavic Review* 27, no. 2 (1968): 296-312.

This review of Svetlana Alliluyeva's *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (1967), a chronicle by Stalin's daughter which seeks to tell the story of her family as she witnessed it, deals mainly with what the book reveals about Stalin and how these revelations supplement, reinforce, modify, or negate what was previously known or believed about him. Among the subjects Tucker considers in this regard are Stalin's family background and upbringing, and such personal behaviors and characteristics as his irritability, national self-identification, anti-Zionist obsessions, and profound sense of distrust along with the psychological mechanisms which serviced it. Tucker also discusses Lavrenti Beria's place within Stalin's inner circle, and the influence Beria had upon Stalin, particularly with respect to the 1934 Kirov affair and the "doctors' plot" of 1952-53.

307 Ullstein, Elizabeth M. "Revealed by Their Handwriting?" *New York Times Magazine* (13 June 1943): 13.

Ullstein analyzes Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin from the viewpoint of a graphologist, describing how the style and mechanics of their handwriting sheds light on the traits, temperaments, talents, and personal limitations of the three leaders. Stalin's handwriting, in Ullstein's opinion, is that of a powerful personality, an individual with "a strong critical faculty, aggressive in the extreme," a coolly calculating character which explodes into action only after careful reflection, and a person willing to pursue his aims regardless of costs or barriers.

308 "Unretouched Photo of an Aging Man Shows *Pravda* Keeps Stalin Young." *Life* 30 (11 June 1951): 29.

An unretouched photo of a tired looking and gray-haired Stalin in attendance at a Bolshoi Theater event held on 21 January 1951 to commemorate the twenty-seventh anniversary of Lenin's death is placed in this note along side the doctored front-page photo that appeared in *Pravda* the following day showing a rejuvenated Stalin with an unlined face and thick black hair.

309 Van Ree, Erik. "Stalin as Writer and Thinker." *Kritika* 3, no. 4 (2002): 699-714.

Van Ree reviews three Russian-language books on Stalin. The first, Mikhail Vaiskopf's *Stalin the Writer* (2002), deals with Stalin's style of writing and the structural characteristics of his thought. The other two, Valeri Torchinov and Alexei Leontiuk's *Stalin: A Historical-Biographical Handbook* (2000) and Konstantin Zalessky's *The Empire of Stalin: A Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary*, are works which, collectively, contain over 1,700 entries on Stalinist functionaries, prominent figures in Stalinist society, and individuals important in Stalin's own life.

310 "We Wept: The Last Helpless Hours of Mighty Stalin." *Newsweek* 54 (13 July 1959): 34.

Newsweek repeats the account of Stalin's last days told by Nikita Khrushchev to Averell Harriman and notes Khrushchev's statement that Stalin, like Peter the Great, "fought barbarians with barbarism" and was "a great man."

311 Werth, Alexander. "Man and Symbol." *Nation* 176 (14 March 1953): 222.

In this commentary on the attitude of the Russian people toward Stalin, the author links the origins of the dictator's popularity to the public's perception that he had proved himself able to lead the nation through good times and bad, and that he generally succeeded in what he set out to accomplish. Despite the huge growth in his prestige during World War II, fed by his enormous self-confidence, courage, and success in countering the German invasion, it is not true, according to Werth, that Stalin personally became a demigod to his people but rather that he became the symbol of the Soviet state, and it was in this capacity that the adulation heaped upon him served a useful purpose by establishing him as a father figure who "created a feeling of security and self-confidence among his people."

312 "What Stalin Really Did." *US News and World Report* 63 (23 August 1967): 38-43.

This article draws upon the revelations about Stalin and his policies provided by the memoirs of his daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, and by Nikita Khrushchev, in his speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, to present an overview of Stalin's rise to power and quarter-century rule of the Soviet Union. Featured most prominently is Stalin's growing paranoia during his last years, particularly his obsession with fears of a "plot" to remove him from power.

313 "What Stalin Was Like—As Yugoslavia's Djilas Knew Him." *US News and World Report* 52 (23 April 1962): 20.

This brief note repeats a few of the observations about Stalin provided by ex-communist Milovan Djilas, who was at one time second in command in Tito's Yugoslavia. Djilas recalls Stalin as "a brutal, cynical, hard-drinking despot" who distrusted his allies and predicted, amidst World War II, that Europe would have another major war within fifteen or twenty years.

314 White, M. B. "How I Photographed Stalin and Hopkins inside the Kremlin." *Life* 11 (8 September 1941): 25-27.

White presents a brief account of the impression Stalin made on him during a July 1941 Kremlin photo shoot of Stalin and the American envoy from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Lloyd Hopkins. He notes the Soviet leader's imposing physical appearance, magnetic personality, and stone-like pose during the photo session.

315 Wingrove, Paul. "The Mystery of Stalin." *History Today* 53, no. 3 (2003): 18-20.

Upon the fiftieth anniversary of Stalin's death, Wingrove discusses some of the new details about Stalin that have come to light since the opening of Soviet-era archives and examines some of the conflicting historical interpretations of the dictator and the system he established. Focusing on the terrible suffering of the Stalin years and the degree of Stalin's responsibility for it, Wingrove devotes most of his attention to the views put forth by J. Arch Getty in *Origins of the Great Purges* (1985); Robert Thurston in *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (1996); and Martin Amis in *Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million* (2002).

316 "Without Stalin, What Next?" *Business Week* (7 March 1953): 27-28.

This commentary on the likely impact of Stalin's death on Soviet domestic and foreign policies includes a brief discussion of the uniqueness of Stalin's authority in the modern world and of how his personification of the Soviet Union, from both a political and psychological perspective, has compounded the difficulties facing the Soviet leadership in trying to settle on his successor.

317 Wolfe, Bertram D. "The Case of the Litvinov Diary: A True Literary Detective Story." *Encounter* 6, no. 1 (January 1956): 339-47.

Wolfe contends that Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov's *Notes for a Journal* (1955) is not the work of Litvinov but rather the shoddy product of a profit-driven forgery mill headquartered in France and with branches in Britain, Germany, and America. Pointing to a host of factual errors and contradictions in the book, and commenting on how many of the statements, beliefs, and behaviors attributed to Litvinov are inconsistent with the real Litvinov's character, Wolfe outlines the case for the spurious nature of *Notes for a Journal* and for Gregory Bessedovsky as its real author. He characterizes *Notes* as a "collection of trivia, absurdities, and salacious backstairs scandals" which reflect poorly on the quality of Soviet leadership, and he describes how the book attributes the cruelties of the Stalin era to Stalin's subordinates while portraying Stalin himself as a tower of strength, a man of great foresight, and a leader who possessed qualities which tended to normalize and humanize Soviet rule. Wolfe also criticizes British historian E. H. Carr for his role in the publication of the apocryphal *Notes*.

Revolutionary Movement, October Revolution, and Civil War Years

318 Adams, Arthur E. "The Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Front in 1918-1919." *Slavonic and East European Review* 36, no. 87 (1958): 396-417.

This commentary on the origin, nature, and significance of the conflict among Bolshevik leaders regarding how best to set up the bureaucratic mechanism for the state and army needed to win control of Ukraine and what the military objectives in the region should be includes a discussion of Stalin's point of view on these two issues; the aid he gave—as a key member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Military Committee—to the commander of the Soviet Ukrainian forces, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko; and how Stalin's position and actions in Ukraine during the critical months of November-December 1918—particularly his sympathy with the demands of Ukrainian Bolsheviks for local command of the struggle to win control in the region—figure into his private feud with Leon Trotsky, the champion of centralism.

319 Brown, Stephen. "Lenin, Stalin and the Failure of the Red Army in the Soviet-Polish War of 1920." *War and Society* 14, no. 2 (1996): 34-47.

Brown examines the circumstances surrounding the decisions which led to the Red Army's defeat in the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920, focusing on the reasons why Stalin chose to disobey the 11 August order of Sergei Kamenev, the Red Army's Commander-in-Chief, to send the elite cavalry unit known as the *Konarmiya* northwards toward Warsaw for the purpose of protecting the Red Army's weak southwestern flank. According to Brown, Stalin's act of insubordination stemmed from a note he received from Lenin informing him that the Poles had been advised by Britain to accept the Soviet terms for peace and urging him to turn his attention to the defeat of the forces of Baron Wrangel's White Army stationed in the Crimea. Not only was the information conveyed to Stalin factually incorrect, Brown explains, but it led to the splitting of the Soviet forces between two military fronts—a strategy responsible for the disastrous performance of the Red Army in the Battle of Warsaw. The interference of Lenin and insubordination of Stalin in mid-August 1920, Brown concludes, can only be explained once it is realized that Soviet political and military leaders alike believed that it was strategically sound and militarily necessary to achieve a simultaneous victory over Poland and Wrangel—a hope that proved to be founded on an overly optimistic assessment of the resources of the Red Army and the management abilities of the Red command.

320 C., L. "Stalin Arrives." *New Statesman* 36 (25 October 1930): 80-81.

The author recollects his experiences traveling by rail from Vladivostok to St. Petersburg in February 1917 as news of the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the establishment of the Provisional Government swept the train. He notes that on the fourth day of his journey, the train stopped at "a tiny, insignificant station" in the wilderness of Siberia to pick up three political exiles and bring them back in honor to the new Russia, one of whom was "a tall dark Caucasian, with a bluish-

black moustache, and sly, penetrating eyes” whose name—Stalin—conveyed nothing at all to the train’s other passengers.

- 321** Fiddick, Thomas. “The ‘Miracle of the Vistula’: Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy.” *Journal of Modern History* 45, no. 4 (1973): 626-643.

Fiddick contends that the sudden and mysterious retreat of the Red Army, under General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, from the Battle of Warsaw in 1920 was not prompted by any indiscipline by General Semen Budenny, who commanded the First Cavalry Army, or by the refusal of Stalin to obey orders from the high command which would have moved the armies of the southwestern front toward Warsaw to protect Tukhachevsky’s exposed left flank, as some analysts have maintained, but rather was the result of Lenin’s telegrams to Stalin misinforming him about the Central Committee’s decision to unite the two fronts under Tukhachevsky. According to Fiddick, it was, in fact, Tukhachevsky who first disobeyed orders by moving his troops deep into Polish territory on his own initiative, and it was his bolting from party control, along with the dangers posed by the dubious advantages of taking Warsaw, which prompted Lenin to intervene via Stalin to block Tukhachevsky’s last-minute attempts to use Budenny’s forces to protect his own exposed left flank, thereby forcing Tukhachevsky to retreat and giving the Polish forces of General Joseph Piłsudsky a “miraculous victory.”

- 322** Himmer, Robert. “First Impressions Matter: Stalin’s Initial Encounter with Lenin, Tammefors 1905.” *Revolutionary Russia* 14, no. 2 (2001): 73-84.

A close reading of the two accounts given by Stalin in the early 1920s regarding his initial encounter with Lenin, his inspiring mentor, at the December 1905 party conference in Tammefors, Finland, indicates that the young Dzhugashvili’s idealized view of Lenin, instead of being confirmed, turned sour as a consequence of Lenin’s personal behavior at the meeting and his position on Bolshevik participation in the forthcoming elections to the new tsarist assembly, the State Duma, according to this paper. In supporting his argument that Dzhugashvili’s view of Lenin and attitude toward Lenin’s leadership of the party changed after the Tammefors conference, Himmer points to the absence of citations from Lenin’s works and of praise of Lenin personally in Dzhugashvili’s writings from 1906 to early 1913, when arrest and Siberian exile brought Dzhugashvili’s political activity to a temporary halt. His discovery that Lenin was not a hero of working class background, nor proletarian in character, and the failure of Lenin to offer him any “words of approval, appreciation and acceptance” at Tammefors may have also figured in his disappointment with Lenin and consequent disaffection for him as the party’s leader, Himmer suggests.

- 323** Kennan, George F. “The Historiography of the Early Political Career of Stalin.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115, no. 3 (1971): 165-69.

The ban imposed by Stalin’s successors on all scholarly inquiry into his life as a revolutionist in Transcaucasia, and their 1961 order of the removal of his body from its position of honor alongside that of Lenin in the Red Square mausoleum, lend credence to the argument that during his early political career Stalin had been “an informer, if not an agent, of the tsarist secret police,” according to this address delivered at a November 1970 meeting of the American Philosophical Society by the prominent American historian and diplomat George F. Kennan. Pointing to evidence that Stalin had been arrested in Tiflis, Georgia, in April 1906 by the tsarist police and opted to strike a deal in order to purchase his release and gain travel privileges, Kennan suggests that Stalin—amidst the bitter competition between the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of the Russian Social Democratic Party, and in a political atmosphere in which Bolshevik leaders “played with the police in a complicated game of penetration and counter-penetration”—was motivated to work clandestinely with the tsarist police by his hatred of the local Mensheviks and willingness to inform on them not only for the sake of personal revenge and ridding himself of troublesome opponents but for advancing his own fortunes competitively within the party as well. Kennan also sug-

gests that “much of Stalin’s behavior during the purges may have been influenced by his desire to rid himself of people who had memories or suspicions of the real nature of his early Party activity.”

324 Knight, Amy. “Beria and the Cult of Stalin: Rewriting Transcaucasian Party History.” *Soviet Studies* 43, no. 4 (1991): 749-63.

Knight discusses the circumstances and events surrounding the appearance of Lavrenti Beria’s 1935 book, *On the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, a work which substantially altered historical facts in order to portray Stalin as a leader in the Transcaucasian Social Democratic movement while at the same time discrediting his former revolutionary comrades. She examines the genesis of the book, describes its favorable impact on Beria’s career, and discusses its damaging effect on the development of Soviet historiography in the Stalin era, and how it contributed to the cult of Stalin by portraying him as the first Bolshevik in Transcaucasia, the leader of the struggle against “legal Marxism,” and a powerful force in practical revolutionary work in the region. The book, Knight writes, also attempted to justify Stalin’s factional activities against the Mensheviks and to refute the fact that “Bolshevism in Transcaucasia was an insignificant movement that developed under the shadow of Menshevism, which had the overwhelming support of the masses.”

325 Lee, Eric. “The Eremin Letter: Documentary Proof That Stalin Was an Okhrana Spy?” *Revolutionary Russia* 6, no. 1 (1993): 55-96.

Lee examines the debate over whether the letter purportedly written by Colonel Eremin—a high-ranking official of the *Okhrana* (the tsarist secret police)—describing Stalin’s activities as an *Okhrana* agent during the years 1906-12 is authentic or a forgery. He believes that, in view of the model of typewriter used to produce the letter, the nature of the letterhead, the dating of the letter, stylistic problems with the letter’s terminology and text, and the long delay in its publication—first by Russian émigrés and later by Isaac Don Levine, a Russian-born journalist who published a photo of the document in the 23 April 1956 issue of *Life* magazine—the case against the authenticity of the Eremin letter is a weighty one indeed. While the Eremin letter itself may not be genuine, the large number of accusations that Stalin was a tsarist spy, the preponderance of circumstantial evidence that he was in the employ of the *Okhrana*, and the fact that the details revealed in the letter indicate that its author was highly knowledgeable about both the Russian revolutionary movement and the activities of the *Okhrana* lend credence to the interpretation that “the story it tells is basically true,” according to Lee. All things considered, the mystery of the Eremin letter and the broader question of Stalin’s relationship with the *Okhrana* cannot be fully resolved at this time, Lee concludes.

326 Levine, Isaac D. “A Document on Stalin As Czarist Spy.” *Life* 40 (23 April 1956): 17-48+. Levine argues for the authenticity of a 12 July 1913 letter signed “Eremin” and sent from tsarist police (*Okhrana*) headquarters in St. Petersburg to the chief of the *Okhrana* for the Yeniseisk Province in Siberia describing Stalin’s service as an *Okhrana* spy and noting his severance of his connection with the *Okhrana* and subsequent arrest and exile to a region in Siberia in Yeniseisk Province. In making his case for the letter’s authenticity, Levine traces the history of the document’s travels; establishes that the letter’s paper might well be pre-World War I Russian stock and that the machine used to type was a model used by the *Okhrana* during that time period; identifies Eremin as the prewar chief of the Kiev special section of the *Okhrana*; and shows how the arrest of Stalin, in Tiflis in 1906—an event unmentioned by the dictator’s official biographers—might have led to his recruitment as an *Okhrana* agent within the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. For comments on Levine’s case for Stalin as a tsarist spy, see “Letters to the Editors” *Life* 40 (14 May 1956): 21+.

327 ———. "Was Stalin a Spy?" *Saturday Review* 39 (22 September 1956): 19.

Levine responds to Michael Florinsky's critical review of *Stalin's Great Secret*, a book in which Levine advances the argument that Stalin had once been a spy in the service of the *Okhrana*. Levine charges Florinsky with having based his rejection of the thesis of *Stalin's Great Secret* on questionable criticism of only one component of the book's evidence—the *Okhrana* report referring to Stalin's service as a spy—and with having ignored such evidence as the suppressed historical fact of Stalin's arrest and immediate release by the *Okhrana* in April 1906 in Tiflis; the seemingly inexplicable behavior of Stalin in launching his wholesale purges of the 1930s; and the timing and substance of the 1956 effort of the Kremlin's leaders to distance themselves from the crimes and abuses of their former boss.

328 Orlov, Alexander. "The Sensational Secret behind Damnation of Stalin." *Life* 49 (23 April 1956): 34-38+.

Orlov, a former NKVD general and intelligence officer, presents evidence suggesting that Stalin once acted as a spy for the secret police of Tsar Nicholas II. Orlov first explains how, in 1937, he learned of the existence of a file kept by the *Okhrana* consisting of handwritten espionage reports from Stalin; records of Stalin's efforts to advance himself in the tsarist secret service; and a note indicating he was to be exiled to Siberia, apparently because of his jealousy-inspired machinations to secure the ouster of fellow spy Roman Malinovsky and to have himself designated as the main police agent within the Bolshevik ranks. He describes how the file ended up in the hands of a group of high-ranking communist officials and eventually came to serve as the impetus for a plot headed by General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, supreme commander of the Red Army, to remove Stalin from power and have him shot as a traitor—a plot which not only failed but ended with the June 1937 court-martial and execution of Tukhachevsky and seven of his colleagues along with the summary liquidation of everyone who had seen the *Okhrana* file or heard about its existence. Orlov states that for years he did not dare disclose Stalin's "most guilty secret" out of fear for his own life and for the safety of his relatives in Russia as well, but once the Khrushchev regime denounced Stalin, he felt it was safe to make public the former dictator's darkest secret. He also suggests that the 1956 official denunciation of Stalin was prompted by the party leaders having learned that their former boss had been a police agent, and by their consequent belief that they had best downgrade and distance themselves from him before the secret became known to the public. For comments on Orlov's evidence that Stalin was a tsarist spy, see "Letters to the Editors" *Life* 40 (11 May 1956): 21+.

329 Schlesinger, Rudolf. "Lenin As a Member of the International Socialist Bureau." *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 4 (1965): 448-58.

Schlesinger examines Stalin's critical response, in a 1931 article entitled "On Some Questions of the History of Bolshevism" published in the Soviet historical journal *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya*, to an article in the summer 1930 issue of that same journal by one Slutsky who suggested that Lenin, in prewar days, had underestimated the danger of "centrism" in the international labor movement and had erred by not promoting a breakaway of the left-wing groups in the Western parties of the Second International from their local "centrist" leadership. Stalin, Schlesinger writes, attacked the editors of the journal for encouraging the discussion of issues affecting the very essence of Bolshevism and for publishing an article laced with "hidden Trotskyism," and, by so doing, he established, in effect, "the task of party history as searching not for the truth but for constructs fitting the needs of the party leadership." Schlesinger draws upon the pre-1914 correspondence between Lenin, who was then Russian representative in the International Socialist Bureau, and Camille Huysmans, then Secretary of the Second International, to point out the shortcomings of Slutsky's analysis of Lenin's behavior and the mistakes made by Stalin, in his attack on Slutsky, regarding both Lenin's attitude to his own duties as a member of the International Socialist Bureau and the extent of his involvement in the work of that agency.

330 Slusser, Robert M. "On the Question of Stalin's Role in the Bolshevik Revolution." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 19, no. 4 (December 1977): 405-16.

Slusser discusses the various historical interpretations of Stalin's puzzling behavior during the final days and hours when the key decisions were made and steps taken which led to the Bolshevik victory in the October Revolution. He points out the limitations of each school of thought on why Stalin seems to have done nothing significant during this crucial time, and develops his own argument that the answer to Stalin's puzzling behavior may be found in the official Bolshevik record of the Central Committee session of 20 October 1917, at which Stalin was subjected to repeated rebuffs. According to Slusser, Stalin, who, as Trotsky once remarked, was "inclined to sulk in hiding and dream of revenge" when his feelings were hurt, and who typically became irritated when he could not carry his point, suffered humiliation at the 20 October session with Trotsky's exposure of him as a "covert supporter of the 'strike-breaker'" Grigori Zinoviev, who, along with Lev Kamenev, had openly opposed a Bolshevik insurrection at this point in time and whose ouster from the party had been demanded by Lenin. Humiliated and angry, Stalin, Slusser writes, failed to report for orders to Trotsky, the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, at the Central Committee session of 24 October, resulting in both his failure to be given a responsible assignment in the Bolshevik Revolution and in his insignificant role in that historical event.

331 "Stalin's Mystery." *Newsweek* 40 (25 August 1952): 88.

This brief commentary on Louis Fischer's biography of Stalin revolves around the question of whether Stalin was a tsarist agent. The article cites only circumstantial evidence in exploring this possibility, emphasizing the gentle treatment Stalin received from tsarist police when he was arrested and in exile in Siberia, and Stalin's rewriting of the history of the Russian revolutionary movement and his own biography as though he were obsessed by the desire to "expunge something indelibly recorded there."

332 Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Journeyman for the Revolution: Stalin and the Labour Movement in Baku, June 1907-May 1908." *Soviet Studies* 23 (January 1972): 373-94.

Suny examines a little-known period in Stalin's career, the time between June 1907 and May 1908 when he was in Baku, Azerbaijan, describing how the young revolutionary came to the city as a man of the underground, a *Komitetchik* of considerable experience, and quickly plunged into party politics, securing Bolshevik control over the local Social Democratic organization. As the open labor movement marched from success to success in its dealing with industrialists, Stalin, Suny writes, was drawn into trade union activities, though "at no time did he either abandon the party underground or deny its primacy." Stalin's writings and activities during this time suggest that "his years in Baku were among the few in his life in which he involved himself in the day-to-day struggle of the working class." At the end of this period, he returned to the revolutionary underground, but while in Baku "the young Koba already prefigured the later Stalin, both as the organization man and the pragmatist."

333 Trotsky, Leon. "Joseph Stalin." *Life* 7, no. 14 (2 October 1939): 66-73.

The Stalin who emerges from this biographical sketch written in exile by the former Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky is a man whose ambitions far outdistance his resources of intellect and talent; a Bolshevik party figure who played only a minor role in the revolutionary movement and the events of October 1917 due to his lack of theoretical imagination and historical vision; an individual prone to brooding when he suffered a rebuff at the hands of the more gifted members of the party's leadership; and a political schemer driven by his desire for revenge against those within the party who, for good reason, showed little regard for his abilities and who stood in the way of his drive for power. In addition to citing various incidents in Stalin's life during his years as a revolutionary through the end of the Russian Civil War which illustrate these prominent character traits,

Trotsky comments on Stalin's motivation for aligning himself with Nazi Germany in the August 1939 Nonaggression Pact, explaining why he feels the alliance flowed inevitably from Stalin's fear that involvement in a European war could lead to the debilitation and popular rejection of the Kremlin oligarchy which he heads and is committed to preserving at all costs.

- 334** Van Ree, Erik. "Stalin's Bolshevism: The First Decade." *International Review of Social History* 39, no. 3 (1994): 361-81.

Van Ree considers the position of the young Dzhughashvili in the 1904-1906 conflict within the Bolshevik Party between the followers of Lenin and the leftist tendency headed by Alexander Bogdanov. In examining Stalin's Bolshevism during the Tiflis and Baku periods of his career as a revolutionary during the first decade of the century, Van Ree describes how Stalin's tactical and organizational views during this time moved from kinship with those of Bogdanov to a position near, but somewhat left, that of Lenin. The concept of the "*praktik*," a term for someone who worked for the party in Russia and carried out what the émigré revolutionaries thought up from afar, is, for Van Ree, the key to understanding Stalin's position in the factional conflict at hand. As hard-working practical revolutionaries who prized the unity of the Bolshevik faction, the Baku *praktiki*, Stalin included, were less moderate than Lenin and tended to believe that differences over philosophy or principle that were not directly relevant to the running of the party should not be allowed to tear it apart. Thus, while Stalin sympathized with the leftists' position, he was not a Left Bolshevik and did not wish to see factional disputes compromise the party unity he cherished at this point in his life as a Bolshevik, according to Van Ree.

- 335** ———. "Stalin's Bolshevism: The Year of the Revolution." *Revolutionary Russia* 13, no. 1 (2000): 29-54.

Van Ree challenges the thesis which maintains that prior to Lenin's return to Russia in April 1917 Stalin, as a typical "old Bolshevik," believed that the country was only ripe for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and that the party therefore had little choice but to critically accept the new Provisional Government. He develops the argument that it was not Lenin's "April Theses" which persuaded Stalin to accept the view that the time for the second stage of the revolution had arrived, but rather he, like most of his old Bolshevik comrades, had already concluded that the Provisional Government should be overthrown and replaced by a radical, Soviet government and only questioned Lenin's assertion that a new Soviet democratic republic could quickly begin the transition to socialism. Van Ree also rejects the interpretation that a reluctant Stalin, in essence, "missed the October Revolution," maintaining that Stalin did not need to be convinced of the timeliness of a move he had stood for all along; was fully aware of what was going on during the time leading up to the revolution; and acted in accordance with the line adopted by Trotsky and the Central Committee in bringing a Bolshevik government to power.

Rise to Power

336 Aldanov, M. A. "Stalin." *Contemporary Review* 133 (May 1928): 605-12.

Aldanov describes the qualities displayed by Stalin during his years of work in the revolutionary movement, in the 1917 Revolution, and during the Lenin era of Soviet history, and comments on why Stalin was able to triumph over Leon Trotsky in the struggle for leadership within the party after Lenin's death. In commenting on the contest for power in Russia in the mid-1920s, Aldanov discusses the struggle as a "personal one" in which the contestants raged against one another and subscribed to and abandoned positions on key issues in accord with the political needs of the moment. In such a contest, Aldanov writes, Stalin, "a cunning and adroit man, who never sticks at anything," proved to be a master of political in-fighting and a far more talented politician than the flamboyant ideologue Trotsky and for these reasons managed to triumph over his more talented rival in the struggle for Lenin's mantle.

337 Bazhanov, Boris. "I Was Stalin's Secretary." Translated by Edward Van Der Rhoer. *Kontinent* 9/10 (1976/1977): 451-479.

In this excerpt from the book *I Was Stalin's Secretary*, the author, who served as the corresponding secretary of the Politburo and to the Secretary General of the Communist Party until his flight from the Soviet Union in 1928, writes about Stalin's tactics and maneuverings in the intraparty struggles of the mid-1920s. He emphasizes the importance of Stalin's mastery of "underhanded work" in securing his victory over the opposition, and he constructs a case for anti-Semitism as having been an important motivating factor for Stalin in the struggle for party leadership. Bazhanov also discusses how own his disagreement with Genrikh Yagoda, head of the GPU (the security police) led the GPU collegium to write a letter denouncing him to Stalin as a counterrevolutionary, and how Stalin was pleased by the opportunity to profit from the conflict between the Politburo's secretary and the GPU by having both sides report to him about the transgressions of the other.

338 Blank, Stephen. "Stalin's First Victim: The Trial of Sultangaliev." *Russian History* 17, no. 2 (1990): 155-78.

Blank examines the 9-12 June 1923 Moscow trial of Volga Tatar communist leader and Stalin client Mirsaid Sultangaliev, describing how the case and the subsequent purge of national "deviationists" in 1923-24 connect to the Stalin succession and shed light on the nature of the show trial phenomenon as well as on GPU involvement in party affairs during the New Economic Policy era. Placing Stalin's motives in arranging for the arrest and trial of Sultangaliev within the context the then current crisis in nationality relations, the spread of dissent within the party and among workers in 1923, and the succession struggle for leadership of the party, Blank explains how the trial, for Stalin, served the politically useful purposes of reconfirming his preeminent role in determining nationality policy, displaying his power to arrest even his own deputy, and—in the face of the "insipid performances" of Leon Trotsky and Grigori Zinoviev during the Sultangaliev affair—

putting the national minorities and potential dissidents of all stripes on notice that he and not his rivals within the party's leadership could be the arbiter of their fate. Blank also discusses how the instruments of show trial, recantation, and purge were linked together into a single formidable weapon at this time and were viewed as a legitimate tool of political struggle, not just by Stalin, but by all those involved with the trial. He describes how the concept of the purge as a licensed political witch hunt, while blossoming later under Stalinism, has its roots in the "virtually hysterical fear" of opposition within the party which was characteristic of the Bolshevik leadership in the early 1920s.

- 339** Bociurkiw, Bohdan R. "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev." *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 26, no. 4 (November 1960): 575-91.

This examination of the technique of succession in the Soviet system, while centering on the factors that shaped the nature and course of the post-Stalin power struggle and the steps taken by Khrushchev in gaining victory over his rivals for leadership of the party, includes a discussion of both the tactics employed by Stalin in his successful struggle for the party's leadership following Lenin's death, and the striking analogies between the techniques used by Stalin in the 1920s and those used by Khrushchev. Most notable among the similarities cited by Bociurkiw are how the two leaders, having established themselves as the party's General Secretary, used the broad powers of this office to pack the local and territorial secretariats and bureaus with their own supporters as a means of gaining control of the party's congresses and Central Committee; capitalized on the party prerogatives of patronage to place their adherents in charge of the governmental and police organs, the army, and the media; and played off their principal rivals against one another "by manipulating the issues calculated to incite animosities among them" and by the shrewd use of concessions, threats, and political blackmail "to split and demoralize the opposition."

- 340** "The Bolshevik Clerk Who May Succeed Lenin." *Literary Digest* 77 (14 April 1923): 64-67.

Literary Digest cites the writings of an unnamed Moscow correspondent for the *New York Times* regarding which one of the Communist Party's leaders would be most likely to succeed the then seriously ill Lenin. According to the article, Stalin is the man most likely to become the Soviet Union's next leader because he is Lenin's "most trusted and closest associate," a veteran Bolshevik, a skilled administrator, secretary of "the powerful machine of revolution," and a master of political intrigue and manipulation.

- 341** Borgese, G. A. "Six Kings." *Atlantic Monthly* 164 (September 1939): 327-39.

This discussion of the foundations, strengths, and defects of the principal "kingships" in the 1939 world includes a brief section on Stalin's years in the Russian revolutionary movement and rise to power in the Soviet kingdom as "the legitimate heir . . . to the Byzantine and Czarist conquests."

- 342** Bunce, Robin. "Lenin's Successor." *Modern History Review* 16, no. 1 (September 2004): 7-9.

Part of the *Modern History Review's* "Aiming High" series, this article offers guidance on how to write an essay on the question, "Why did Stalin emerge as Lenin's successor rather than Trotsky?" Bunce outlines the strengths and liabilities that each of the two men brought to the intraparty struggle for leadership, and presents excerpts from and a commentary on four sources upon which students might draw in writing the essay at hand: Preface to the *Works of J. V. Stalin* Vol. 6 (1924); *My Life*, by Leon Trotsky; Lenin's "Testament," from *Collected Works*, (1966), Vol. 36; and Dmitri Volkogonov's *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* (1991). He also provides a series of ques-

tions to test the reader's understanding of key terms and to encourage the reader to consider the context, utility, and reliability of the excerpts presented.

- 343** Carmichael, Joel. "Stalin: Two or Three Echoes." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (July 1954): 341-48.

Carmichael provides an account of the lowly estimate of Stalin's abilities set forth by economist and socialist theoretician Nikolai Sukhanov in *Notes on the Revolution*—published in Russia a few years after the revolution and considered to be an authoritative commentary on the revolutionary period—and of how Stalin's fellow Bolsheviks at that time shared Sukhanov's unflattering opinion of Stalin. Stalin, Carmichael writes, took advantage of the general conviction among the party's leaders that he was a "mediocrity" to strike down in turn each of the contending cliques that tried to use him as a pawn in the struggle for power following Lenin's death. Appearing to be the voice of moderation and conciliation in the intraparty struggle for power, Stalin, through a series of deft and ingenious moves, slowly outmaneuvered each of his rivals by using of the power he acquired through his control of the party apparatus to secure majority support in the Central Committee; by playing upon the Bolshevik Old Guard's treatment of the party as sacrosanct and on their acceptance of the need to confine all factional disputes within the party; and by placing his opponents in the unenviable position where they would have had to step outside the party in order to carry on a successful struggle against him—a move psychologically unacceptable to the Old Guard and tantamount to political suicide, according to Carmichael.

- 344** Chamberlin, W. H. "Stalin: Heir of Lenin." *Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 26 (July 1926): 618-23.

Chamberlin describes the steps taken by Stalin, who before 1922 "was scarcely counted among the likely candidates for the Leninite succession," in using to his full advantage the strategic possibilities of the office of the General Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee to outmaneuver the more recognized leaders of the party—Leon Trotsky, Alexei Rykov, Grigori Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev—in the intraparty struggle for leadership following Lenin's 1924 death. He stresses the role played by Stalin's ability to win the backing of the Central Committee and the party congresses by stocking these organs with men loyal to him and to place his more talented rivals in a position in which they had to submit to the decisions of the Stalin-dominated organs or else violate party discipline, an action which would place themselves "utterly in the wrong from the point of view of party ethics." Functioning within the context of "Communist constitutionalism," Stalin has emerged as the leader of the Communist Party "without any dramatic role of drums and blowing of trumpets," thanks to his mastery of the game of political politics, Chamberlin writes.

- 345** "Czar of the Bolsheviks." *Review of Reviews* 81 (19 June 1930): 80+.

This early biographical sketch of Stalin centers on his years as a revolutionary, rise to a position of prominence in the Bolshevik Party, and the means by which he managed to become absolute ruler of the Soviet Union despite his personal limitations and the call for his removal from the position of the General Secretary of the party by the dying Lenin. The article also comments on the shroud of mystery surrounding Stalin's personal life.

- 346** Daniels, Robert V. "The Left Opposition As an Alternative to Stalinism." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 2 (1991): 277-85.

Daniels outlines the leading components of the Left Opposition's ideology and program of action, describing how the Trotsky-led group differed from the Stalin camp with respect to the pace of industrialization; the role to be played by the peasantry in the development of socialism; Soviet Russia's relation to the international revolution; the possibility of building "socialism in one country"; and the bureaucratization of the party apparatus at the expense of intraparty democracy. Dan-

iels also discusses why the Left Opposition failed so completely in its struggle with the Stalin-Bukharin group, and why the Left's critique of party leadership during the 1920s—particularly its recognition of Stalin as an unprincipled power grabber and its anticipation of the most serious evils of the Stalin era—deserves study and credit as a major benchmark in understanding Stalinism.

- 347** ———. “The Secretariat and the Local Organizations in the Russian Communist Party, 1921-1923.” *American Slavic and East European Review* 16, no. 1 (1957): 32-49.

This paper aims to elucidate some of the processes whereby the paramount influence of the Party Secretariat under the supreme command of Stalin came to be established. Tracing the history of the secretariat in the years 1921-23, Daniels focuses on the details that attended the decisive step in this process—“the establishment of control of the central Secretariat over the local Party organizations, which gave Stalin the foundation for controlling the Party congresses and through them, in time, dominating the entire policy-making summit of the Party and the state.” Describing how Stalin—through what appeared to be an effort to bring young talent into the upper echelons of the party by way of a rational program for examining, recommending, and promoting workers at all levels of the party organization—managed to stock the party apparatus with officials who, by owing their political fortunes to the secretariat, “could hardly be anything but its willing creatures,” Daniels explains how Stalin, by way of this “packing operation,” was able to rise to supreme power as “the unimposing representative, unfeared until too late, of the Party's secretarial hierarchy.”

- 348** ———. “The Soviet Succession: Lenin and Stalin.” *Russian Review* 12, no. 2 (July 1953): 153-72.

Daniels offers a comparative analysis of the problem of Soviet succession upon the deaths of Lenin and Stalin. Emphasizing the disparities between the Lenin and Stalin successions, Daniels discusses how the Soviet regime, at the time of Lenin's death, was in a state of transformation and was beset by a number of burning issues, and how a relatively free atmosphere could be found in party politics, whereas upon Stalin's death, institutional and ideological stability prevailed and party debate was highly circumscribed. Chief among the parallels that Daniels sees between the two successions are the psychological impact of the death of the paternal leader, and the problem of reviving the personal authority enjoyed by leaders of the stature of Lenin and Stalin. Daniels also discusses of the possibility of a struggle between the collective and individual systems of leadership among Stalin's heirs.

- 349** Darling, Arthur B. “Crisis in the Struggle between Trotsky and Stalin.” *Current History* 27 (December 1927): 443-46.

Darling presents an account of the criticism voiced by Trotsky and his allies in the summer of 1927 against the behavior, practices, and policies followed by the Soviet Communist Party under the leadership of the group headed by Stalin; the Stalin administration's angry response to the Trotsky group's criticisms; and the consequent reprimand of Trotsky and Zinoviev, on 10 August 1927, by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) for their “factionalist” activity. He discusses how the desire of Trotsky and Zinoviev to find a sympathetic audience for their arguments in advance of the December meeting of the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU—at which the question of the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the CEC was slated to be considered by delegates who, by and large, were loyal to Stalin—led them to distribute their printed speeches and propaganda throughout the country and resulted in the charge that their open opposition to the policies of the Soviet government was encouraging and aiding indirectly the enemies of the USSR, leading to their expulsion from the CEC on 24 October 1927 for “factional activity and indiscipline.”

350 David-Fox, Michael. "Memory, Archives, Politics: The Rise of Stalin in Avtorkhanov's *Technology of Power*." *Slavic Review* 54, no. 4 (winter 1995): 988-1003.

This essay makes use of Soviet archival materials to offer a fresh perspective on ex-communist émigré Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov's self-representation in his 1959 book *Technology of Power*—one of the most influential sources on Stalin's rise to power—and to raise questions about the innerparty events of 1928-29 as described in Avtorkhanov's memoir. Pointing to a series of contradictions among Avtorkhanov's 1959 account, his lesser-known 1983 autobiography, and his newly available personal file from the archive of the Institute of Red Professors (IKP), David-Fox calls into question the version of Avtorkhanov's experiences at the IKP in the late 1920s provided by *Technology of Power*—particularly with respect to his misportrayal of himself as a well-connected IKP eyewitness at the heart of the Bukharinist-Stalinist struggles—and discusses how Avtorkhanov's approach to Stalinism, portrayal of the Bukharin-Stalin conflict, depiction of the IKP as a bastion of Bukharinism, and version of Stalin's role in the March 1928 Shakhty affair are tied up with his own reconstructed past and combine the perspectives of a young memoirist and a mature Sovietologist. David-Fox also considers how the book, despite early warnings about its reliability by several prominent Western scholars, managed to be transformed into a historiographical classic in the West and in post-Soviet Russia as well.

351 Davis, Jerome. "Joseph Stalin, Russia's Ruler Today." *Current History* 29 (March 1929): 961-68.

Davis presents a favorable version of Stalin's activities as a young revolutionary; his role in the Russian Revolution and Civil War, and rise to a dominant position within the Communist Party. In discussing Stalin's emergence as the most important man in 1929 Russia, Davis primarily deals with the Soviet leader's mastery of party politics, close contact with the rank and file of the party, and attention to the changing moods of the common people of Russia. While Stalin may rule Russia with a firm hand, he is "a dictator only of the American variety, a political boss who rules because he knows how to work with others," and who could be displaced at a moment's notice by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, if it chose to do so, according to Davis.

352 Deutscher, Isaac. "The Stalin Pattern for Power." *New Republic* 128 (16 March 1953): 10-14.

This excerpt from the author's 1949 study *Stalin: A Political Biography* traces the steps taken by Stalin in his ascendancy to power within the Communist Party following Lenin's 21 January 1924 death. Deutscher describes how Stalin's obscurity and lack of charisma worked to his advantage in his march to power as did his ability to exploit, to the disadvantage of his rivals, his position as the party's General Secretary and the Leninist mystique as well. Deutscher also discusses how those who opposed Stalin were victimized by their acceptance of the axiom that only a single party could exist in the Soviet state and by the logic of a situation which drove them into the role of a separate party.

353 "Djugashvili, Alias Stalin, New Ruler of Russia." *Literary Digest* 90 (7 August 1926): 42-44.

This early sketch of Stalin as the new ruler of Russia draws primarily on the observations of William Henry Chamberlin as set forth in his capacity as a commentator for the journal *Asia*. Among the points noted about Russia's "man of mystery" are his reputation as "a strong, silent man"; his tireless efforts as "a practical revolutionary" during the years 1906-17; use of his position as General Secretary to move to the top of the party organization; adoption of a conciliatory policy toward the nation's peasant class; and belief that the new Soviet state should not hitch its wagon to the cause of world revolution but should rather focus its efforts on developing socialism within the Soviet Union.

354 Erwarton, G. "Stalin, the Man of Mystery." *Fortnightly Review* 131 (March 1929): 395-401. Erwarton describes Stalin as a man of limited intellect and theoretical talent, a cunning, brooding, and suspicious individual, who, by virtue of having been appointed to a position—General Secretary of the Communist Party—which allowed him to make strategic appointments throughout the party organization and to "sow his obedient dullards" in each and every level of the apparatus, has managed to outmaneuver the cream of the crop of the Bolshevik leadership and establish himself as the absolute ruler of Russia. In his effort to cling to the control lever of the Communist Party machine, and to use the machine for his own selfish and ambitious ends, Stalin "has forgotten that in Russia the party still occupies a position almost analogous to that of an invading force occupying conquered territory," and has failed to blend the party with the masses, as prescribed by Lenin, opening the door for his own and the party's demise, according to Erwarton.

355 Etty, John. "Lenin's Wonderful Georgian." *History Review* 49 (September 2004): 36-41. Etty examines the complex relationship between Lenin and Stalin, focusing on how Lenin's admiration of Stalin's practical political abilities gave way to the belief that Stalin's increasing power as the Communist Party's General Secretary, combined with his personal imperfections, demonstrated that he would be unsuitable as the party's next leader. Etty emphasizes that the key to the change in the relationship between the two men was Lenin's illness—a development which saw Stalin increasingly try to engineer his own success, and which led Lenin to realize that Stalin's crudeness made him unworthy as a successor, that he had lost control of Stalin, and that the time had come to destroy him politically.

356 Felshtinsky, Yuri. "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and the Left Opposition in the USSR, 1918-1928." *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 31, no. 4 (1990): 569-78.

Felshtinsky makes use of materials from the Trotsky Archives housed at Harvard University to analyze the sources of the Left Opposition in the Bolshevik Party, the reasons for its defeat, and the roles played by Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin in the ideological struggle within the CPSU during the early years of Soviet power. He comments on the opposition of the Leftists to the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but his focus is on the position of the Leftists in the 1920s, most notably regarding the New Economic Policy, Soviet industrialization, and the party's policy toward the Chinese revolutionary movement. In describing the intraparty struggle which revolved around these issues, Felshtinsky presents Trotsky as a brilliant revolutionary consistently encamped on the left wing of the revolutionary spectrum and far more interested in the revolution itself than in promoting his claim to party leadership, and Stalin as a crafty tactician who managed to outmaneuver first the Left Opposition and then his own previous allies on the Right, and who incorporated elements of the program of his capitulating opponents into his own arsenal and carried them to extreme lengths.

357 ———. "The Mystery of Lenin's Death." *Russian Social Science Review* 45, no. 4 (2002): 37-87. Translation of an article from *Voprosy istorii* 1 (1999): 34-63.

Felshtinsky draws upon new material and research regarding Lenin's last years to argue that the Soviet leader was removed from the chairmanship of the *Sovnarkom* as early as mid-1922; that this event was tantamount to a coup d'état; and that the conspiracy to isolate Lenin right up to the time of his death was far-reaching and probably led by the head of the secret police, Felix Dzerzhinsky, acting in accord with Stalin. In positioning his argument within the context of the anti-Lenin dissent which, for various reasons, had been brewing in the Bolshevik leadership since late 1917, Felshtinsky outlines the steps taken to isolate and, if possible, eliminate Lenin entirely from the Soviet political scene, including Stalin's fabrication of documents indicating that Lenin intended to take poison to spare himself a slow death at the hands of stroke-induced paralysis. He suggests that, given the probability that Stalin murdered Lenin by poisoning him, historians should consider pushing back the date of the Stalinist terror to the time of Lenin's death and rethinking

previous assessments of those Soviet leaders who, in the midst of the intraparty power struggle triggered by Lenin's failing health, "saw personal advantage in coming to an understanding with Stalin while he himself was pursuing the goal of removing the Party's leader."

358 Fischer, Louis. "Trotsky and Stalin." *Nation* 151 (7 September 1940): 191-92.

Fischer describes the personality differences and clash of ideas that fueled the feud between Stalin and Trotsky, maintaining that the oft-cited theoretical chasm that yawned between Stalin's position and Trotsky's on such issues as support for world revolution and the direction to be taken by Soviet economic policies was based more on questions of speed and timing than on any fundamental differences in ideology, and that the violent personal dislike the two leaders had for one another was pivotal in shaping their historic duel. Fischer also comments on the form assumed by the struggle between the two men after Trotsky had been removed from power and had left the Soviet Union, and how the war between the two men figures into the purges of the 1930s, the turns taken by Soviet domestic and foreign policies, and the weakening of the worldwide labor movement.

359 Fischer, Ruth. "Stalin's Rise to Power." *Twentieth Century* 150 (September 1951): 231-46.

This paper consists of a digest of a chapter from the projected second volume of the author's study of Stalinism, the first volume of which appeared in 1948 under the title of *Stalin and German Communism*. Fischer, who was a leading member of the Comintern and the German Communist Party until 1926, mainly discusses the nature and extent of the opposition to Stalin within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the goals that the anti-Stalinist alliance of opposition groups hoped to achieve; the obstacles which stood in the way of any attempt to remove Stalin from power; and the maneuvers executed by Stalin in keeping tabs on those who opposed him and in ensuring the failure of any rebellion against his authority. She also comments on the high regard that most of the oppositionists had for the exiled Leon Trotsky; their desire to draw upon his prestige and moral authority to remove the Stalinist stratum from the party; and the reasons why they nonetheless shied away from involving Trotsky's organization in their plans against Stalin.

360 Glassman, Leo N. "Stalin's Rise to Power." *Current History* 34 (April 1931): 73-77.

Glassman describes the "peculiar mental and physical qualities" that enabled Stalin to become the unchallenged leader of the Soviet Union, most notably his singleness of purpose, ruthless pragmatism, and complete lack of ethics in his relations with people. He outlines how Stalin, once he gained control of the party apparatus, "played his cards with the skill of a master politician," outmaneuvering first the leaders of the Left and then the Right, despite the fact that his rivals were superior to him intellectually and had more revolutionary experience as well.

361 Gordon, Roderick. "Stalin vs. Trotsky: Leadership 1923-27." *Modern History Review* 5, no. 4 (1994): 10-12.

This brief account of Stalin's triumph over Trotsky in the intraparty struggle for leadership following Lenin's death emphasizes the role played in Stalin's victory by Lenin's early support for him and failure to identify a successor prior to his own death. Gordon also discusses the tactics used by Stalin in defeating Trotsky, and how Trotsky's own political ineptitude and failure to develop a power base contributed to his defeat and 1929 exile at the hands of Stalin.

362 Jenkins, David. "The Power Struggle after the Tenth Party Congress." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 9, no. 1 (1969): 96-104.

Jenkins examines the power struggle that took place within the Soviet Communist Party from the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 until Lenin's death on 21 January 1924. He emphasizes how Lenin's ban, at the Tenth Congress, on factional activity within the party and revival of the Central Control Commission as an organ to supervise the actions of party members proved to be a turning

point in the history of the Communist Party, replacing the myth of democratic centralism with a party dictatorship and providing Stalin with the means he would eventually use to gain control of the party and to stifle his opponents. Jenkins describes the ways in which Stalin, in his capacity as General Secretary and with his power over the Central Control Commission, used the organizational machinery at his disposal to gain control over the Central Committee, dominate the Politburo, and outmaneuver his main competitor, Leon Trotsky, in the struggle for party leadership. Jenkins also notes how Trotsky failed to take effective action against the Stalin-led triumvirate at the most crucial moments of the struggle for power during the 1921-24 period, and how the absence of an orderly means of succession to Lenin's "throne" proved to be a vital factor allowing a man such as Stalin to assume control of the Communist Party.

363 Korey, William. "Zinov'ev's Critique of Stalin's Theory of Socialism in One Country, December 1925-December 1926." *American Slavic Review* 9 (December 1950): 255-67.

This discussion of the arguments advanced by Grigori Zinoviev, a senior Politburo member, head of the Communist International, and longtime friend of Lenin, in his case against Stalin's theory of socialism in one country revolves around Zinoviev's three main objectives in his attack on Stalin's position: to show that the theory of socialism in one country was revisionist and impossible to realize; that it was based upon the false premise of the relative stabilization of capitalism; and that Stalin's tactics, which flowed logically from his theory, threatened to undermine the Bolshevik program of world revolution. Korey also discusses how Zinoviev—in rooting his argument in an analysis of contemporary events and of the disintegrating economic forces at work in the capitalist world, and in stressing the inevitability of a military attack by hostile capitalist states long before socialism could be established in Russia—attempted to give credence to his contention that capitalism, far from entering a period of relative stabilization, was moving in the direction of imminent collapse, and what was necessary, therefore, was not the reformism of Stalin's misguided theory, which Zinoviev believed represented a betrayal of the world revolution and Bolshevik ideals, but rather to the empowerment of the world proletariat so it could "seize the revolutionary moment" when it arrived.

364 Lauzanne, Stéphane. "Stalin, the Bear." *Living Age* 339 (January 1931): 488-90.

This brief commentary on Stalin's political behavior and the caliber of his associates is based upon a *Revue de France* article written by Boris Bazhanov, who served briefly as an adjutant of Stalin and who was secretary of the Politburo from 1923 to 1928 before fleeing to the West in 1928. According to this sketch, the atmosphere surrounding Stalin and the other leaders of the party is one of hatred and fear; the masters of the Kremlin are a mediocre and ridiculous lot; and Stalin himself rarely plays a role in the discussions of the Politburo but rather gives his opinion on the issues at hand only after all debate has ended, usually in the form of a sanction of the solution on which the majority of his assistants had already agreed but expressed as if the solution were his own idea. Lauzanne also comments on Stalin's cleverness in eliminating, little by little, the Bolshevik leaders who might oppose him in his quest for absolute power.

365 McCullagh, Francis. "Stalin's Dictatorship." *Nineteenth Century* 103 (May 1928): 590-602. McCullagh comments on the foreign and internal policy of the Soviet government in 1928 and the split which took place the previous year in the ranks of the Communist Party. Describing the victory of Stalin over his more talented and flamboyant rivals within the party as marking the end of the glamour era in the party's history and the rise of a Soviet political mechanism akin to the Tammany Hall machine in New York, McCullagh paints a dismal picture of Bolshevism and Soviet life under Stalin. "Arid and inhuman," devoid of idealism and enthusiasm, and unpopular with the Soviet people, the Stalin dictatorship, McCullagh writes, has undermined its own stability by swelling the ranks of the unemployed through unsound economic policies, disillusioning the industrial workers, and alienating communist idealists in all countries. McCullagh also paints an

equally critical portrait of Stalin himself, describing him as a dull and plodding individual; a man devoid of imagination though gifted in practical management and intrigue; and a leader skilled in the art of deceit, who, contrary to the image he has tried to establish for himself in his dealings with the capitalist West, is wholly committed to the radical socialist transformation of the Soviet Union and to the ultimate victory of communism throughout the world.

366 McNeal, Robert H. "Lenin's Attack on Stalin: Review and Reappraisal." *American Slavic Review* 18, no. 3 (October 1959): 295-314.

McNeal draws upon Nikita Khrushchev's revelations of 1956 and evidence hitherto unpublished from the Trotsky archives at Harvard University's Houghton Library to review and reassess Lenin's attack on Stalin in the last months of 1922 and early 1923. His analysis yields the conclusion that Lenin's attack on Stalin came to naught in part because his own attitude toward the General Secretary was sufficiently ambivalent to prevent him from simply calling for the vote that was necessary to relieve Stalin of his chief offices and responsibilities. Instead, he chose to threaten Stalin with a breach in their relations and to allow him to escape with an easy apology for his transgressions when he found it necessary to press the matter. Furthermore, he asked Trotsky—"a frail reed on which to rely" and a man who wholly underestimated Stalin—to carry on for him, a mistake compounded by his failure "to make his wishes so explicit that Trotsky could not have evaded them." In addition to being reluctant "to exert himself against a man whom he considered a mediocrity," Trotsky was not in agreement with Lenin on the critical Georgian issue upon which the attack on Stalin was focused, and therefore had little enthusiasm for any attack on Stalin for his treatment of the uncooperative Georgian communists. McNeal also considers the role of Stalin's political acumen in frustrating Lenin's campaign against him, noting Stalin's use of "obstructionism and dissimulation" to avoid a direct, decisive clash with the Bolshevik leader, and his success in manipulating people and documents to outmaneuver Trotsky during the critical days when Lenin's wishes might have been acted upon.

367 ———. "A Letter from Trotsky to Krupskaya, 17 May 1927." *International Review of Social History* 18, no. 1 (1973): 111-19.

This article consists of a translation of a 17 May 1927 letter from Leon Trotsky to Lenin's widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, in which he attempts to persuade her to speak out in favor of the opposition to Stalin, particularly with respect to Stalin's positions on the general strike in England, the Chinese revolutionary movement, and the course to be followed by the Comintern. The letter, which appears here in the original Russian as well as in an English translation, is introduced by its translator, Robert H. McNeal, who describes Trotsky's relationship with Krupskaya and motives for writing the letter, and notes that the letter's accusatory tone and tactlessness doomed to failure its author's effort to persuade Krupskaya to lend her support to the Stalin opposition.

368 Meyer, Alfred G. "The War Scare of 1927." Abridged and edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick. *Soviet Union* 5, no. 1 (1978): 1-25.

The stated aim of this paper is "to demonstrate the central role of the 1927 war scare in developing and finally resolving the last stages of the long battle between Stalin and Trotsky." Meyer explains that the war scare originated in a genuine concern by Nikolai Bukharin—an ally of Stalin at that time—over the nation's security in reaction to a series of shocks and setbacks for the Soviets in the international realm but went on to become an "essentially phony issue" and an object of outright political manipulation in the intraparty struggle for leadership. The opposition to Stalin, led by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, used the opportunity of the war scare to revive its criticism of the party's foreign policy and leadership of the international revolutionary movement, and to highlight "the 'degeneracy' of the party regime" in hope of regaining their power and influence in the party and to overthrow Stalin and his supporters. Stalin responded in kind to this maneuver by using the war scare to discredit Trotsky and the opposition, equating their criticisms with faction-

alism and defeatism and claiming it was tantamount to treason. While the opposition remained within the party's ranks throughout the duration of the war scare, it had been thoroughly discredited, and the groundwork for its subsequent destruction in November 1927 firmly laid, Meyer concludes.

- 369** Neumann, Sigmund. "Leadership, Institutional and Personal." *Journal of Politics* 3 (May 1941): 133-53.

Neumann contrasts the institutional leadership characteristic of democratic political systems with the personal leadership that is the preeminent element in dictatorship. In dealing with the leadership qualities of dictators, Neumann briefly discusses Stalin's triumph over Trotsky in the struggle for party leadership following Lenin's death, arguing that a strong organization and "quasi-institutional set-up" upon which modern dictatorship is based figured prominently in Stalin's rise to power. Neumann contrasts Stalin, as an ardent party worker, a "creature of committees," and a supreme organizer, with Trotsky, a "violent individualist," a great theorist, and "the glamour boy of the revolution," describing how circumstances in Russia in the mid-1920s favored the emergence of a leader "who commanded a big and all-inclusive machine."

- 370** Pereira, Norman. "Stalin and the Communist Party in the 1920s." *History Today* 42 (August 1992): 16-22.

This overview of Stalin's rise to power in the 1920s opens with an account of the political and personal assets which favored Stalin in his contest with Trotsky for leadership of the party, including his appeal and closeness to the unlettered masses; his shrewd judgment, common sense, and uncanny sense of timing; and the acceptance of him as a mediator among the titans in the party and as "the man of the golden mean." Pereira then traces the steps Stalin took and the mistakes Trotsky made during the years of their struggle for Lenin's mantle, emphasizing here Stalin's ability to capitalize on the influence at his disposal as the party's General Secretary. Pereira closes with an account of how Stalin usurped the position of the Left after having disposed of its chief advocates, and used the Left platform as a weapon to outmaneuver and discredit his former allies on the Right. Overall, Pereira presents an image of Stalin as an extraordinarily popular figure within the ranks of the party in the 1920s, and as a man whose genuine talents must be taken into account when gauging the sources of his political success.

- 371** "Persons and Personages: Stalin." *Living Age* 335 (February 1929): 420-22.

Living Age outlines the career of Stalin up to his assumption of power as Russia's leader and "hazards a few guesses" concerning his character and political behavior. Among the attributes the article assigns to Stalin are "a shrewd cunning and disregard for human feeling"; an unwillingness to assume responsibility for any policy he initiates until that policy proves successful; an inability to express himself in a cogent and reflectful manner; and, above all else, a thirst for power and a willingness to sacrifice scruples, consistency, and principles to secure it.

- 372** Rigby, T. H. "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin." *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 1 (1981): 3-28.

Rigby investigates the roots of political clientelism in the Soviet Union in an effort to determine whether the clientist practice owes its origins to Stalin's habit of filling top provincial posts with his protégés and to these "little Stalins" proceeding to do the same in their own domains of influence, or whether this phenomenon was already in place in the early Soviet period, with Stalin merely exploiting it to his political advantage. Rigby's analysis of the operation of early Soviet provincial officialdom yields the conclusion that political clientelism developed slowly and was well advanced by the time Stalin gained control of the Central Committee apparatus. Stalin did, however, act in accord with his recognition of the "advantage of progressively converting the corps of the provincial party secretaries into a personal following and encouraging the latter to do

the same with local officials coming under their authority.” Since political clientelism “did not spring ‘fully armed’ from the head of Stalin, but instead developed over a considerable period ‘within the womb’ of early Soviet society,” Stalin’s role in the birth of this practice was “more that of midwife than of parent,” Rigby concludes.

373 Roderick, Gordon. “Stalin vs. Trotsky, 1923-27.” *Modern History Review* 5, no. 4 (April 1994): 10-12.

Roderick provides an overview of Stalin’s rise to power at the expense of his most prominent rival, Leon Trotsky. Stalin’s ability to portray himself as Lenin’s confidante, his subtlety and ruthlessness as a political tactician, and his highly developed bureaucratic skills, Roderick explains, allowed him to emerge as the prime candidate to deal with the Soviet Union’s needs in the mid-1920s, while Trotsky, in underestimating the challenge posed by Stalin, showed little interest in the mundane world of political bureaucracy and remained politically immobile, giving the more politically determined Stalin the opportunity to emerge as the party’s undisputed leader by the end of the 1920s.

374 Rush, Myron. “The Rise of a Secretary.” *Problems of Communism* 6, no. 5 (1957): 50-51.

This discussion of Nikita Khrushchev’s ambition to assume the title of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU includes a brief commentary on Stalin’s use of his position as General Secretary to undermine collective leadership and acquire dictatorial power in the years following Lenin’s death. In discussing how the party’s ruling oligarchy, following Stalin’s death, sought to forestall the possibility that one of them, by virtue of being accorded Stalin’s title, could claim to be his legitimate successor, and then use this powerful position to subvert the oligarchy and establish personal dictatorship in the manner of Stalin, Rush explains why he believes Khrushchev might be on the verge of converting that possibility into a Kremlin reality.

375 “Russia’s Man of Steel.” *Literary Digest* 96 (14 January 1928): 19.

This report centers on the views expressed by F. A. MacKenzie, author of *Russia before Dawn*, in the London *Sunday Times* regarding Stalin’s assumption of Lenin’s mantle. MacKenzie briefly outlines how the politically sagacious Stalin, relying on “the strength of his organization,” managed “to discard one after another of the veteran communist leaders of yesterday, stripping them of power, prestige, and almost character.”

376 Sarel, Benno. “Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin (The Background of Russian Politics).” Translated by Connie Buttinger. *Dissent* 4, no. 1 (1957): 76-87.

Sarel discusses Lenin’s decisive role in shaping the Bolshevik Party into an organization of tightly disciplined professional revolutionaries separate from but acting in the name of the working class, and functioning internally with little regard for democratic principles, and why, despite his immense will to help the working class of his country through the Bolshevik Party, the party Lenin created, operating in an environment not yet ripe for socialism, was transformed into an enemy of the Russian workers. In describing how the degeneration of the grandiose revolutionary experiment Lenin launched “was facilitated precisely by those elements of rigid discipline, cohesiveness, and heroism with which he had invested Bolshevism,” Sarel keys on the gradual bureaucratization of the Bolshevik Party under the influence of the “committee-men” who managed the party’s daily affairs and were indispensable to its effective operation. He describes how Trotsky stood in opposition to and became a victim of the bureaucratization of the party, and how Stalin, with Lenin’s active support, rose through the ranks of the committee-men, assuming a position of power at the very time when the interests of the governing apparatus of the party and those of the masses which it represented came into conflict. With the ebbing of the prospects for world revolution, and with the committee-men fully in charge of both the party and the Soviet state, Trotsky, Sarel writes,

found himself “stranded in a world absolutely foreign to him” and handicapped in his ability to shape the direction taken by the party of Lenin under the rule of the committee-men led by Stalin.

377 Scheffer, Paul. “Stalin’s Power.” *Foreign Affairs* 8 (July 1930): 549-69.

Scheffer offers a character sketch of Stalin and an account of the strategies and tactics Stalin employed in his wielding of power within the Communist Party. Attributing an inferiority complex to Stalin founded upon his unattractive physical appearance, inability to express himself eloquently, and disrespect shown toward him by the party’s Europeanized intellectuals during the early years of the Bolshevik revolutionary movement, Scheffer describes how a revengeful Stalin used his colleagues’ low opinion of his abilities to his own advantage. As the party’s “brilliant elite” delegated duties to the “plodding” Stalin, Scheffer explains, he forged a network of ties with the members of the middle and lower ranks of the party and used the enormous influence he had acquired as the party’s General Secretary to fill key positions with appointees indebted to him for their political fortunes. As he consolidated the network of party officials he quietly established, Scheffer continues, Stalin launched an artful and highly effective war on party democracy, outmaneuvering his opponents on the Left, and then turning against his former allies on the Right, and came to preside over a progressively restricted and firmly loyal circle of followers who participated in power at the tip of the party structure. In illustrating how Stalin orchestrated his rise to power and gained revenge against the intellectuals in the party who had once looked down upon him, Scheffer traces the steps taken by Stalin in removing Trotsky and other “Old Bolsheviks” from the Soviet political equation in the years following Lenin’s death.

378 Sforza, Carlo. “Trotsky and Stalin.” *Commonweal* 11 (5 February 1930): 387-88.

This commentary deals primarily with the factors, both personal and situational, that contributed to the victory of Stalin, “the ignorant and silent Asiatic,” over Trotsky, who is described as a gifted socialist, with intellectual, literary, and oratorical abilities far outdistancing those of his Georgian rival. Crediting Stalin with a talent for “silent oriental intrigue,” and faulting Trotsky for failing to recognize the maneuvering skill his rival possessed, Sforza describes not only how Stalin managed to gain absolute control over the Communist Party, but also the challenges he faces in maintaining the power he has won, particularly in view of signs of a growing assertiveness by Russian workers and their rediscovery that “the only safe basis for any progress is simply liberty.”

379 Souvarine, Boris. “Did Stalin Kill Lenin? An Interview with Boris Souvarine.” Translated by Edward Van Der Rhoer. *Kontinent* 1 (1980): 481-88.

In this interview, Boris Souvarine, a French Marxist, historian, and author of the first biography of Stalin, responds to questions about his acquaintance with Stalin; how Stalin managed to triumph over his opponents in the intraparty struggle for power following Lenin’s death; and whether Stalin should be regarded as Lenin’s “illegitimate” or “legitimate” son. Souvarine also comments briefly on Trotsky’s suspicion that Stalin hastened Lenin’s end, speculating that if Stalin did away with Lenin, he did so at the request of Lenin, who had lost the will to live because of his incapacitating illness.

380 ———. “Stalin: How and Why.” *Survey* 23, no. 3 (1977-1978): 120-31.

Souvarine describes the methods by which Stalin rose to power, emphasizing how he used the strength of the multiple offices which he held, particularly his position as the party’s General Secretary, to realize a single unique design—to transform a Leninist oligarchy into one comprised of individuals personally indebted to him for their positions and dependent on him for their advancement within the hierarchy of the new social elite. Souvarine, one of the founders of the French Communist Party and a pioneer of Stalinography, also comments on the assistance Stalin received from others in his rise to power, not only from his immediate supporters but from Lenin and even Trotsky, who, “perched upon the summit of the Soviet bureaucratic pyramid, failed to

see what was developing at the lower levels, displaying a lack of awareness which eventually presented Stalin with all the controls on his plate.”

381 “Stalin Explained.” *Living Age* 334 (1 April 1928): 585-88.

Stalin’s rise to power, this article holds, stems from the appeal he has for the majority of the Communist Party’s members as a man without ego willing to develop collective power and yet able to provide firm leadership in the service of the party’s pressing economic and security concerns. Given that Russians “now look with terror upon any new political thought,” and that the party seems wary of flamboyant politicians “who go in for ‘permanent changeability,’” Stalin’s sober personality and lack of creative political faculties are not viewed by the party’s majority as liabilities but rather as necessary qualities of leadership at this moment in the nation’s historical development, according to “Stalin Explained.”

382 Swain, Geoffrey. “Stalin’s Rise to Power.” *Modern History Review* 14, no. 3 (2003): 3-7.

Presented as an introductory guide for the nonspecialist, this article lists the key points dealing with Stalin’s rise to power; describes how he was courted by the leading contenders for Lenin’s mantle because of the enormous power he wielded as the party’s General Secretary; and notes the steps taken by Stalin to establish himself as the party’s leader and launch his radical economic program once he believed his political position was secure. Swain also discusses the criticism directed against Stalin within the party over the harshness and ill-effects of his policies of collectivization and rapid industrialization; the brief period of rather half-hearted reconciliation between Stalin and his former enemies that was ushered in as a consequence of the setbacks his economic program experienced; and his turn against his critics and reassertion of his authority with the December 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov, which he billed as the work of the regime’s opponents. A glossary of key terms and a basic chronology of events for the 1927-34 period are appended to the article.

383 “Trotsky and Stalin.” *World Tomorrow* 12 (April 1929): 148-49.

This article draws upon a series of reports in the *New York Times* citing Trotsky’s grievances against Stalin to point out the contradictions in Trotsky’s thinking, particularly his castigation of Stalin for his moral turpitude, lack of imagination, and lust for power, on the one hand, and his deterministic view that the whole situation in Russia is simply the inevitable fruit of the present economic situation, on the other. By such inconsistency, the article states, Trotsky actually arrives at something quite near the truth, for the Russian situation is partly determined by the position of the peasant in the Russian economic scheme of things, and partly by Stalin’s personal ambitions and itch for power, which “is truly Napoleonic in proportion.”

384 Tucker, Robert C. “Between Lenin and Stalin: A Cultural Analysis.” *Praxis International* 6 (January 1987): 462-76.

Tucker examines various developments in Bolshevik politics and political culture in the interim between Lenin’s death in 1924 and before Stalin achieved uncontested primacy in the Bolshevik regime as a means of casting fresh light on the Stalin phenomenon in its birth-time. First elaborating on the Bolshevism of Lenin as a composite revolutionary culture consisting of “disparate and even conflicting elements developed over a quarter of a century,” and then considering the clashing tendencies—Left, Center, and Right—in the party’s leadership as divergent offshoots of Lenin’s Bolshevism as a culture, Tucker proceeds to describe Stalin’s peculiar brand of Bolshevism; how it differed from that of the Left and the Right; and, wayward as it was from Lenin’s point of view, how it can be considered as one form which Bolshevism took in the post-Lenin period. Inasmuch as Lenin’s Bolshevism came to include revolution from above as an integral pattern and sanctioned the wielding of state power as a “cudgel” against the revolution’s various enemies, Stalin’s policy position, as it emerged in his mind in the 1920s and in the context of Bol-

shevik political culture, rather than being set apart under the heading of "Stalinism," is best viewed as "a nationalistically and imperialistically wayward form of Bolshevism, a Bolshevism of the radical Right," which drew inspiration from the example of Peter the Great's attempt to modernize Russia in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, according to Tucker's analysis.

- 385** Urban, George R. "Stalin Closely Observed: A Conversation with Boris Bazhanov." *Survey* 25 (summer 1980): 86-109.

This interview with Boris Bazhanov, Stalin's secretary in 1923-26, who defected from the USSR in 1928 because of his disillusionment with what he witnessed in the Kremlin, deals primarily with Stalin's contributions as a partner with Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev in holding at bay Lenin's most likely successor—Leon Trotsky; his role in the deaths of military hero and Commissar for War Mikhail Frunze and Ephraim Sklyansky, Trotsky's deputy as member of the Supreme War Council; the background of Lenin's "Testament" denouncing Stalin and the drama which surrounded the reading of the document at a session of the Central Committee in May 1924; and the various manifestations of Stalin's crude and continuous anti-Semitism. The Stalin who emerges from the Bazhanov interview is a man of limited education and intellectual ability in comparison to the senior Bolsheviks of the Lenin era; a leader whose wisdom was a myth manufactured for propaganda purposes; a shrewd tactician whose sole concern in the 1923-26 period was "how to outwit his colleagues and lay his hands on the reins of unrestricted power"; a person ruthless enough to orchestrate the murders of Frunze and Sklyansky, Bolsheviks toward whom he had developed a great aversion; and a ruler who rose to power "entirely through the medium of intrigue and infighting" rather than because of any innate leadership qualities.

- 386** Van Ree, Erik. "Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment." *Studies in East European Thought* 50, no. 2 (1998): 77-117.

Van Ree examines the debate which took place within the party on the viability of the idea of "socialism in one country," establishing the positions on this question by the party's leadership—Bukharin, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky—and how their views relate to the teachings of Marx and Engels and to the thinking of Lenin on this subject during the years 1917 to 1923. Describing how Lenin's stance on this matter underwent a complete reversal in the years following the October Revolution—moving from a belief that an isolated revolutionary Russia would have no chance of survival, then to the conclusion that socialism could be built, but only in an incomplete form, in an isolated Russia, and finally, in 1923, to the position that Russia could, indeed, build a socialist society in the absence of world revolution—Van Ree categorizes the positions advanced by each of the major participants in the "socialism in one country" debate, developing the argument that, while each of the contenders in the debate misrepresented Lenin's views by presenting them as monolithic and unalterable and by denying the intense development they had undergone in the 1917-23 period, Stalin and Bukharin—in developing the theory that a complete socialist society in one country was a viable project—most clearly acted in accord with Lenin's evolving position on this subject, formalizing his views into a fixed formula. Trotsky was the only one of the major participants in the debate who really opposed "socialism in one country," the only one faithful to Marx and Engels—all the others, to varying degrees, followed the lead of Lenin, Van Ree concludes.

- 387** White, William C. "Heir of Lenin." *Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 30 (April 1930): 256-59+.

White describes the conflict that developed between Stalin and the "Right tendency" led by Nikolai Bukharin over the goals, pace, and means of implementation of the Five-Year Plan launched in 1928, and how Stalin orchestrated a drive to discredit the Bukharin group by tying it to the disgraced "Left Opposition" of Leon Trotsky, by claiming that it aimed to undermine the party program and bring eventual defeat to the proletariat, and by mounting a vigorous press campaign to

increase enthusiasm for the economic program he espoused. Depicting Stalin as the antithesis to the charming and brilliant Bukharin, who was widely regarded as the ideological heir to Lenin, White suggests that Stalin's personal distaste for the qualities evinced by the Europeanized intelligentsia—the core of the Bolshevik old guard—may have given added impetus to his campaign to discredit Bukharin and his closest allies, Alexei Rykov and Mikhail Tomsky, and to have them removed from their positions of power within the party leadership.

388 Wolfe, Bertram D. "Tito and Stalin: Window into the Cominform." *Vital Speeches of the Day* 19 (1 December 1952): 114-21.

In this June 1952 speech delivered before "an interested group of specialists" in Washington, D.C., Bertram Wolfe, who was then Chief of the Ideological Advisory Section of the Voice of America, opens with a look at the ambiguities of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist attitude toward the national question, and then proceeds to examine the differences which led to the break between Stalin and Yugoslav communist leader Marshal Tito, including the historical, nationalistic, and ideological sources of the dispute as well as the role played by Balkan political tradition and the personal conflict between the two leaders. Wolfe also comments on the factors which made Titoism possible, the various sources of appeal of Titoism, and the notion of Soviet imperialism which Tito's break made so clear.

389 Wood, Junius B. "Stalin and the New Russia." *Independent* 117 (2 October 1926): 391-92.

Wood outlines Stalin's rise to power in the Bolshevik Party and the means by which he achieved his ends, emphasizing the role played by his mastery of grassroots politics and direction of a vast bureaucracy in his emergence as Lenin's successor. He discusses Stalin's triumph over the opposition led by Lev Kamenev and Grigori Zinoviev; his turn away from support for world revolution and the Communist International; his call for the promotion of political stability and economic prosperity in the Soviet Union; and his support for the improvement of economic relations with the leading capitalist nations as the best means of promoting communism in the long run.

Politics

General

390 Abel, Lionel. "Metaphysical Stalinism: A Study of Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*." *Dissent* 8, no. 2 (1961): 137-52.

This discussion of Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as a failed attempt to synthesize Existentialism and Marxism includes an analysis of the French philosopher, dramatist, and novelist's proposition that the "fighting political group" must, by means of intragroup terror, "transform those individuals who join it into beings other than they are." Abel, in questioning the applicability of Sartre's postulate to the Bolshevik Party under Lenin, maintains that only under Stalin did the party, through the threat of terror, transform its members, substituting party personae for their real selves.

391 "After Stalin." *Spectator* 190 (6 March 1953): 268-69.

Reports of Stalin's critical illness prompted this brief assessment of the sources of the dictator's power and of the impact that his death might have on Russia and on the world at large. The article also comments on the likelihood that Stalin has drawn up a political testament in which his successor is named, and on the probability that the next Soviet leader will be too preoccupied with internal concerns and with maintaining the empire Stalin built to pursue a provocative or aggressive international policy.

392 Ashmead-Bartlett, E. "Revolt against Stalin." *Current History* 30 (April 1929): 50-54.

The author describes 1929 Russia as a land in revolt against Stalin and his colleagues because of their inability to put forth a policy to lift the nation out of economic ruin and the state of despair into which it was sinking at that time. Not only the peasants, who are angered over the Stalin regime's agrarian policy, and the bourgeoisie, whose relative economic freedom under the New Economic Policy has fallen victim to Stalin's program of economic transformation, are in revolt against Stalin but also many of the young members of the Communist Party, who have become disillusioned with the results of the October Revolution and feel that "the old doctrinaire revolutionary leaders have outstayed their period of utility and that the board should be swept clear for men with more flexible views," according to Ashmead-Bartlett. Also discussed in the article is the intraparty struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, and the absence of any significant differences between what Ashmead-Bartlett sees as the thoroughly bankrupt policies espoused by the two men.

393 Bahne, Siegfried. "Trotsky on Stalin's Russia." *Survey* 41 (April 1962): 27-42.

Bahne describes the intraparty struggle between Trotsky and the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate, and he reviews the analysis offered by the exiled Trotsky regarding both the rightist course steered by Stalin and the Stalinist leftward swing of the late 1920s. Bahne also discusses the principles upon which Trotsky's criticism of Stalin's postrevolutionary Russia are based, and how the

great wave of purges in the mid-1930s was, for Trotsky, a confirmation of his analysis of the Stalinist “Thermidor” and the Soviet process of “degeneration.”

- 394** Baker, Russell and Charles Peters. “The Prince and His Courtiers at the White House, the Kremlin and the Reichschancellery.” *Washington Quarterly* 21 (February 1989): 38-42.

The authors draw a number of analogies between the White House “court” of Lyndon Johnson and court life under both Adolph Hitler, as depicted in the memoirs of Albert Speer, and Joseph Stalin as portrayed in the remembrances of Nikita Khrushchev. They describe how the three leaders were treated with a deference approaching reverence by their courtiers; how the courtiers sought to insulate their respective “princes” from uncomfortable truths delivered at the palace door; and how the courtiers, out of fear of being the bearers of bad news, elected to withhold information essential to realistic policy decisions, often leading to “disastrous consequences for the people on the other end of royal decisions.”

- 395** Barnes, Steven. “The Stalin Constitution.” *E. C. Barksdale Student Lectures* 12 (1991-1992): 267-96.

Barnes examines the text of the Stalin Constitution of 1936 and the standard interpretation of the document as a propaganda move aimed at differentiating the Soviet Union from the fascist states in order to facilitate the creation of an antifascist alliance with the Western democracies. He maintains that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the constitution is best understood as an expression of Stalin’s decision to solidify the changes brought about through his “revolution from above” by removing emphasis on revolution, rehabilitating the concept of the state, and securing his own position as leader of the party. Painting himself as a hero who had advanced the cause of socialism in the face of villainy and treason, Stalin, Barnes writes, viewed the constitution as a means of adding a new dimension to his propagandistic image as a popular leader trying to ensure the welfare of his people, this time by promising them all the rights enumerated in a document he referred to as “the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world.”

- 396** Bauman, Zygmunt. “Stalin.” *Cultural Studies/Critical Methodologies* 4, no. 1 (2004): 3-11.

The focus of this philosophical exploration of the mystery of earthly power is on how “cosmic fear”—the human emotion aroused by the unearthly magnificence of the universe and horror of the unknown and uncertainty—has been transformed in the modern state into a contrived official fear which allows the wielders of power to secure a grip on their subjects and which, by its randomness, encourages a sense of gratitude on the part of those subjects fortunate enough to be exempt, inexplicably, from its reach. Stalin enters into Bauman’s analysis as “the master supreme of the mass production of vulnerability and insecurity,” a leader who managed to generate official fear through purges and other forms of repression and by highlighting the dangers posed by hostile capitalist powers. Such measures, Bauman writes, generated an intense level of uncertainty among Stalin’s subjects, encouraging subservience to the authority of his regime in exchange for the regime’s promise to mitigate the extent of their already existing vulnerability and insecurity. The current administration of American President George W. Bush also figures prominently in Bauman’s argument as a regime which has sought to revitalize the state’s “monopoly of redemption” by dramatizing official fear, warning Americans of imminent (terrorist) attempts on their safety, putting them in a state of alert, building up tension which is then relieved when the attempts fail to materialize, and encouraging the public to ascribe to the organs of law and order credit for being delivered from the threats to their personal safety and welfare.

- 397** “Behind the Scenes in Moscow.” *Literary Digest* 108 (24 January 1931): 13.

This brief report centers on the efforts of Sergei Syrtsov to form a secret organization to overthrow Stalin, the failure of the “Syrtsov revolt,” and the continued threat posed to Stalin’s leadership by

the widespread discontent among Soviet peasants and the peasant soldiery of the Red Army over the Kremlin's agrarian policies.

398 Blit, Lucjan. "The Party of Lenin and Stalin." *Socialist Commentary* 16 (October 1952): 233-35+.

Blit describes the party founded by Lenin and ruled by Stalin for a quarter-century as one born from an authoritarian philosophy, an organization which suppresses all opposition, demands absolute discipline from its members, and has led to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship. Looking at the "Amended Rules" to be proclaimed at the then upcoming Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, Blit maintains that the changes to be announced at the congress merely serve to enhance the omnipotence of a party that has become an end in itself.

399 Bliven, Bruce. "A Letter to Stalin." *New Republic* 94 (30 March 1938): 216-17.

Bliven describes the negative international repercussions of the Moscow trials and calls upon Stalin to normalize proceedings in any future treason trials in accord with Western legal tradition; publish all evidence relevant to such trials; abolish the death sentence for all crimes; and offer amnesty to all opponents who have not yet been found guilty of any crime in return for a pledge of future good behavior on their part. He suggests that Stalin should allow his opponents to organize themselves into a legal opposition that would be encouraged to participate openly in the Soviet political process, and that he withdraw from public life for a year or so to show that he and the Soviet government are not one and the same and to prove wrong those foreign critics "who lump together Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini."

400 Bordyugov, Gennadii. "The Policy and Regime of Extraordinary Measures in Russia under Lenin and Stalin." Translated by John Morison. *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 4 (1995): 615-33.

Bordyugov looks at two cases in Russian history of rule by a regime of extraordinary measures and their growth into *chrezvychaishchina*, meaning an institutionalized and systematized state of emergency, the first being under Lenin beginning in May of 1918, and the second taking place under Stalin in 1928-29, and both being prompted initially by a food-supply crisis. He describes how the system of extraordinary organs set up in 1918 under Lenin—namely, the institution of extraordinary commissars; the establishment of "grain troikas" endowed with full powers in a specific region; the granting of unlimited rights to grain requisitioning organs of the Commissariat of Trade; the extensive use of the GPU for the confiscation of grain and arrest of "hoarders" and "enemies of the people"; and the supplementing of extraordinary organs with groups of local activists so that the grain requisitioning campaign would not seem like an external police action—was revived under Stalin in the name of state security, and how the extraordinary measures and accompanying *chrezvychaishchina* instituted by Stalin failed to strengthen state security in any meaningful way, as was the case under Lenin.

401 "The Boss Gets Promoted." *Time* 37 (18 May 1941): 24-25.

Stalin's promotion of himself to the position of Soviet Premier, to go along with his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, is noted in this brief report.

402 Boterbloem, C. N. "The Death of Andrei Zhdanov." *Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no. 2 (2002): 267-87.

In this study of the circumstances and consequences of the 1 September 1948 death of Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, the author deflates both the theory that Zhdanov was murdered by doctors acting on Stalin's orders, and the interpretation that his death was part of some master plot for a new wave of political persecutions. According to Boterbloem, Zhdanov's death was due to a heart attack, most likely caused by this lifestyle and the

pressures that affected him and others working in positions of power under Stalin. His withdrawal from the Kremlin scene in the summer of 1948 and replacement by Georgi Malenkov as Central Committee Secretary, according to Boterbloem, should not be viewed within the context of such later developments as the lethal purge of his closest associates in 1949-50 or the accusation made in January 1953 that his death was the result of a medical murder linked to the "doctors' plot" but rather should be considered within the framework of his failing health and loss of official favor as a consequence of the rash action of his son Yuri in supporting the anti-Lysenko side in the genetics debate in 1948.

- 403** Brandenberger, D. L. and A. M. Dubrovsky. "'The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism As Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941." *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 5 (1998): 873-92.

The authors examine the development of a state-oriented patriotic ideology reminiscent of tsarist great power and Russocentric traditions and its emergence as a component of official Soviet ideology between 1931 and 1941. They describe how Stalin and other party leaders during the 1930s pushed for an approach to the writing and teaching of history that would privilege the Russian ethos and allow for the co-opting of imperial Russian charisma and the use of tsarist symbols, myths, and heroes as a way of mobilizing patriotic sentiments and loyalty in service of state-building priorities. While the ideology of national Bolshevism is most commonly associated with the Kremlin's other wartime concessions, such as its alliance with the capitalist powers, rehabilitation of the Russian Orthodox Church, and dissolution of the Comintern, Brandenberger and Dubrovsky contend that this feature of Stalinist ideology began as "a prewar phenomenon reflecting the party hierarchy's preoccupation with state building and legitimacy."

- 404** Brooks, Jeffrey. "Stalin's Politics of Obligation." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 47-68.

Brooks describes how the promotion of Stalin as the source of the Soviet nation's accomplishments and as the paternal benefactor of society fostered the development of a complex set of interrelationships based on the politics of obligation which served to legitimize the Stalin regime, reinforce the aspiration to totalitarian control, and undercut the moral standing of the opponents of the Stalinists. In providing examples of how the politics of obligation functioned in practice, Brooks locates Stalin in the center of the leadership's efforts to instill in the population a sense of obligation by portraying "the Leader" as the chief architect of the Soviet system and the prime source of its benefits and by representing the citizenry as deserving recipients. Brooks also discusses the kinship between the rituals of public thinking regarding Stalin and the exchanges of obligations in everyday life by way of *blat*—networks of influence and acquaintances used by ordinary people to circumvent the system in gaining access to scarce goods, opportunities, and services—as well as patronage, through which favors were traded among equals and between superiors and inferiors.

- 405** Buchanan, Meriel. "Stalin Plans World Domination." *Saturday Review* 162 (5 September 1936): 300-301.

Buchanan portrays the 1936 Soviet Constitution as "a piece of bluff" by Stalin to cloak his efforts to solidify his position as supreme dictator and to redouble revolutionary propaganda around the world. Pointing to Stalin's efforts to use the secret police to crush the supporters and sympathizers of the Trotsky group as well as "all those who have ever dared murmur against his government," Buchanan suggests that the Soviet dictator's ultimate goal is not just supreme power in Russia but world domination as well.

- 406** "Building a Soviet Superstate." *Business Week* (25 October 1952): 156-58.

This article deals with the administrative reform launched by Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party in October 1952 aimed at abolishing the division between the party and the

state bureaucracy. The article describes the reorganization plan as a step toward creating a unified power apparatus and a "totalitarian superstate" and notes the rich dividends that would accrue in both the administrative and economic fields if Stalin is able to unify and rationalize the governmental setup in the Soviet Union.

407 Carr, E. H. "Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin." *Spectator* 161 (18 November 1938): 852-53.

In this brief commentary on Stalin's political character and manner, the author describes Stalin as a master organizer and the "perfect bureaucrat," a man who judges every situation "on its merits" rather than in accord with fixed principles, and a leader who lives in an atmosphere of mystery and seclusion. Carr also raises the question of whether Stalin runs the machine of government or the machine runs him, suggesting that by shielding himself from direct contact with the world beyond the Kremlin, Stalin has become abnormally dependent on those around him and therefore subject to manipulation by "an entourage whose composition cannot even be guessed." For a reply to Carr's remarks, see the brief note by G. H. Livesey in *Spectator* 161 (25 November 1938): 906.

408 Cassidy, Henry C. "Clock Runs Out on Stalin." *Saturday Evening Post* 217 (18 November 1944): 14-15+.

Cassidy, the chief of the Associated Press bureau in Moscow, offers a political portrait of Stalin and speculates that as the Soviet dictator nears his sixty-fifth birthday he has had to come to grips with the fact that he cannot complete the work he has cut out for himself and, therefore, will probably eschew "fresh adventures" in favor of a conservative middle course that would allow him to consolidate "what he has already gained, and do what little more he can before he dies."

409 Chamberlin, William Henry. "Joseph Stalin and His Aides." *American Mercury* 32 (July 1934): 315-22.

Chamberlin comments on Stalin's political character, the qualities and tactics that enabled him to rise through the ranks of the Bolshevik Party to a position of supreme dominance, and the leading men of influence in Stalin's regime, how they came to hold such positions of power, and the nature of their ties with "the Leader." Receiving most attention among Stalin's lieutenants are Lazar Kaganovich, Kliment Voroshilov, Mikhail Kalinin, and Vyacheslav Molotov. Chamberlin also contrasts the methods used by Lenin and Stalin in selecting collaborators, noting how Lenin proved able to work with men of differing views, while Stalin tolerates only men whom he regards as fully devoted to and politically dependent upon him.

410 Chamberlin, William Henry and Arthur Upham Pope. "Can Stalin's Russia Go Democratic?" *American Mercury* 58, no. 242 (February 1944): 135-48.

This article contains two sharply contrasting responses to the question, "Can Stalin's Russia turn democratic?" One, by Arthur Upham Pope, maintains that the democratic features of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, along with the Stalin regime's success in bringing economic, social, and legal democracy to Russia, point to the conclusion that, once the restrictions required by the war effort are no longer necessary, political democracy will no doubt be established in the USSR. The other, by William Henry Chamberlin, holds that, in view of the fact that Stalin has devoted his political career to "stamping out with meticulous care those limited elements of democracy and individual freedom of expression that existed in the Communist Party in the first years of the Soviet regime" and has gone to great lengths to establish his totalitarian grip on the Soviet Union, it is ludicrous to believe that he might preside over the liquidation of his own authoritarian regime and become a pioneer of democracy in postwar Russia.

411 Chancellor, Richard. "Interregnum in Russia." *Spectator* 11 (15 November 1946): 506.

Chancellor suggests that Stalin's absence from Moscow during the November 1946 celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, along with some statements made by Vyacheslav

Molotov in New York that were at odds with official Kremlin diplomatic positions, indicate that the Soviet dictator's grip on the Politburo is relaxing and that "a new order is shaping itself within the Soviet hierarchy." Chancellor also comments on the balance of power within the Politburo under Stalin and on the likelihood of either Lavrenti Beria or Georgi Malenkov becoming Stalin's successor.

412 ———. "Stalin's Return." *Spectator* 178 (10 January 1947): 38-39.

Chancellor describes a number of actions taken upon Stalin's January 1947 return to Moscow, following a prolonged recuperative stay in the south of Russia, affecting the power positions of some of the leading members of the Politburo. He suggests that the moves enabled Stalin to continue to maintain "the delicate balance of contending forces within the upper hierarchy of Russian rulers," but that, with the question of political succession looming on the horizon, the dictator's ability to assert his power over both the Communist Party and the Soviet government may soon come to an end.

413 Chernobaev, Anatoli. "The Shliapnikov-Stalin Duel: From the History of the Intra-Party Struggle in the VKP (b.) in the 1920s." Translated by John Slatter. *Revolutionary Russia* 12, no. 1 (1999): 103-14.

Chernobaev outlines the role played by Alexander Shliapnikov in the revolutionary movement and in the history of social democracy, and then discusses Shliapnikov's efforts—in a January 1924 *Pravda* article, "Our Disagreements," and a September 1926 article in the journal *Bolshevik*—to speak out against the "unworthy methods of political struggle" being used by the party's leadership in their actions against those who did not share the party's line. Chernobaev describes how the reprisals against Shliapnikov, who served as the first Commissar for Labor in the Soviet government and who led the Workers' Opposition group of the early 1920s, for criticizing the undemocratic practices of the party apparatus increased as Stalin's power grew, leading to a denunciation of Shliapnikov and his followers as members of an "anti-Party bloc" which included the Trotskyists. This campaign culminated in the early 1930s with an attack on Shliapnikov's scholarly historical works, which were inconsistent with the exaltation of Stalin's role in the history of the party and the revolutionary movement—an attack which fabricated a basis for the slanderous charge that he was a proponent of "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism," and which paved the way for his July 1933 expulsion from the party, arrest in January of 1935, and execution on 3 September 1937.

414 Chubariyan, Alexander and Vladimir O. Pechatnov. "Molotov 'the Liberal': Stalin's 1945 Criticism of His Deputy." *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 129-41.

This collection of eight telegrams exchanged between Stalin and top Politburo members Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, and Anastas Mikoyan during the Soviet leader's postwar stay in Sochi in November-December 1945 includes a brief introduction in which the editors, Chubariyan and Pechatnov, discuss the significance of the documents in terms of the light they shed on Stalin's methods of controlling his closest colleagues, Molotov in particular, and how they hint at Stalin's future public campaign against Western influences and "cosmopolitanism."

415 "A Close-up of Russia's Big Boss." *Literary Digest* 103 (7 December 1929): 17.

This brief note cites some of the revelations about Stalin provided by G. Bessyodovsky, the former Soviet Ambassador to France who fled from his office in Paris and took refuge in a French police station on 9 November 1929. Bessyodovsky states that the leading figures in the Communist Party "are in reality Stalin's submissive servants" who dare not initiate anything or even speak their minds for fear of displeasing their ever-suspicious boss. He also states that Stalin is "the only one of the leading communists who still believes in world revolution," a belief encouraged by the

Kremlin's ambassadors, envoys, and agents in foreign countries who, out of fear for their jobs and even their lives, flood his desk with false reports that the revolutionary process is "developing relentlessly" in these nations.

416 "A Conversation between Stalin and Wells." *New Statesman and Nation* 8 (27 October 1934): 601-6.

This article contains the verbatim record of the conversation between Stalin and H. G. Wells that took place during the British novelist and historian's visit to Moscow in October 1934. Among the subjects the two men discussed are the nature of President Franklin Roosevelt's economic reforms; the possibility that capitalist societies will evolve peacefully in the direction of socialism through reforms necessitated by the breakdown of the capitalist system; and the need for revolution as an agent of change and for a revolutionary party to lead the workers in their rise to power and creation of a socialist society. The Stalin-Wells conversation generated comments by a number of prominent figures in British intellectual society, including George Bernard Shaw and John Maynard Keynes. For these commentaries and the responses of Wells, see *New Statesman and Nation* 8 (10 November-8 December 1934): 613-14, 653-55, 709-10, 713-15, 750, 786-87, 822-23, 967.

417 Davies, R. W. "The Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair." *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 1987): 29-50.

Davies presents an account of the views and activities of the "'Left'-Right Bloc" formed by Sergei Syrtsov and Vissarion Lominadze in 1930 in opposition to key aspects of the economic policies pursued under Stalin's leadership during the First Five-Year Plan. Syrtsov and Lominadze, Davies explains, had been on opposite ends of the spectrum of views within the Stalin camp but found common ground in their objection to such policies as the pace of industrialization, which they believed was not supportable by existing physical resources; the collectivization campaign, which they maintained had turned overly abusive and needed to be relaxed; and the centralization of economic decision making, which they felt had become excessive and inflexible and was stifling initiative. While the opposition to Stalin's policies was not organized into an actual "bloc" around the two men, and their resistance was weak, supported by only a small number of people, and was easily overcome, the Syrtsov-Lominadze affair was nonetheless a significant incident, Davies contends, for it suggested that, beneath the apparent official unanimity in support of the party's economic program, there existed a stratum of party members in the administration and in industrial management which believed there was "a substantial element of adventurism and bureaucratic excess in Stalin's policies," indicating that the defeat of the "Right Opposition" in 1929 and the triumph of Stalin had not brought an end to dissension within the party.

418 Deutscher, Isaac. "Great Dilemmas for Stalin and His Heir." *New York Times Magazine* (13 March 1949): 7+.

Deutscher comments on some of the key questions facing the Soviet leadership in 1949, most notably how to strike a balance between promoting socialism in the USSR and fostering world revolution, and how to contend with popular revulsion against the Soviet police state. He maintains that "the lack of strong and original personalities" in the Politburo and the inability of its members to command even a small part of Stalin's moral authority could make it difficult for the Kremlin to deal effectively with these major issues in the event of Stalin's death, and that Russia could find itself virtually leaderless if his successor is confronted with a critical international or domestic situation before establishing his authority. Deutscher also explains why he believes that Stalin is likely to appoint his own successor, and why the most likely candidate as the party's next leader is either Vyacheslav Molotov or Georgi Malenkov.

- 419** Fainsod, Merle. "The Communist Party Since Stalin." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 303 (January 1956): 23-36.

This commentary on the changes that have taken place within the Communist Party during the first three years following Stalin's death opens with a description of how the Bolshevik Party was transformed with Stalin's rise to power, including how the party underwent an enormous expansion of its ranks, incorporated the new managerial and technical intelligentsia into leading party posts, and was converted into "a disciplined body of functionaries swearing unswerving allegiance to Stalin." Fainsod also discusses how the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party became the primary instrument of rule, serving as the agency through which Stalin managed to control all important appointments within the party, the police, the armed forces, and the administration, and how Stalin devised a system of safeguards to ensure that no organization or institution could challenge his authority.

- 420** Feuchtwanger, Lion. "Stalin Speaks." *Literary Digest* 124 (21 August 1937): 25.

In this brief excerpt from the book *Moscow, 1937*, the author comments on his Kremlin meeting with Stalin, noting the dictator's mannerisms and style of speech and his agitated state when talking about the "Trotskyist trials" and about the charges against Karl Radek in particular.

- 421** Fischer, Louis. "Stalin Gets a New Job." *Nation* 152 (17 May 1941): 573-74.

Stalin's May 1941 replacement of Vyacheslav Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, according to this article, stems from the dictator's long-standing desire to hold Lenin's title of Soviet Premier; his belief that, since the Communist Party has been merged with and submerged by the Soviet government, he must become the head of the government in order to sustain his absolute authority; and his fear that, with signs growing that Hitler intends to attack the USSR, or at the very least try to exact more economic aid and military collaboration, he must concentrate all power in his own hands at this crucial moment in the Soviet regime's life. Fischer also considers the possibility that Molotov has lately become too prominent among the Kremlin's leaders and has even evinced coldness for further Soviet sacrifices to sustain the "friendship" with Germany, and that Stalin, who "does not like to have around him even vaguely potential rivals," might have assumed Molotov's position for these reasons.

- 422** ———. "Trotsky's World Revolution." *Current History* 36 (September 1932): 673-78.

Fischer outlines the conflicting stances of Trotsky and Stalin on the question of whether a socialist state can be erected in one country alone. He lends his support to the view that the moves toward socialism made under Stalin during the First Five-Year Plan, the regime's plans for the continued rapid spread and intensification of the socialist characteristics of the Soviet economy, and the armed truce declared between the USSR and the leading capitalist nations all point toward the validation of Stalin's "socialism in one country" position. He further maintains that Stalin's concentration on the revolution at home, especially when socialist revolutions in Europe were not in the offing, was not, contrary to Trotsky's accusation, a counterrevolutionary move, and that Stalin, far from being opposed to world revolution, would no doubt be willing to aid a foreign communist revolution if he felt that Soviet support would be decisive and that the international complications of intervention would not threaten Soviet security.

- 423** Foster, W. Z. "Lenin and Stalin As Mass Leaders." *Communist* 18 (December 1939): 120-29.

- 424** Frédérrix, Pierre. "Joseph Djughashvili: Alias Stalin." *Living Age* 349 (September 1935): 48-52.

Frédérrix outlines the highlights of Stalin's political career, including his role in building the party apparatus on the ruins of the old Russian administration, and how he came to control the appara-

tus, outmaneuver Trotsky in the succession struggle that followed Lenin's death, and transform himself into "a sort of consul for life" primarily by using the power and influence he amassed as the party's General Secretary. For Fr  d  rix, Stalin is a realist in the mold of Lenin and a man far more deserving to be Lenin's heir than the idealist Trotsky.

- 425** F  rst, Juliane. "Prisoners of the Soviet Self?—Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 3 (2002): 353-75.

This paper looks at anti-Stalinist youth organizations of the postwar period, examining how and why a young person of the Stalinist period formed convictions which dissented from the official party line, and considering the framework within which such opposition was presented. Political youth organizations, F  rst writes, had a number of affinities with Stalinist society, and their very acceptance of the values and norms propagated officially by the Soviet regime seeded their rejection of Stalin and Stalinism. These "children of the revolution" turned away from the Stalin regime as they came to believe that it was founded on policies contrary to the teachings of Lenin; that the deification of Stalin was contrary to Lenin's championing of democratic centralism and revolutionary simplicity; and that the Stalinist system represented a betrayal of socialism in favor of a form of state capitalism. For a critical commentary on F  rst's interpretation of her documentary and oral sources, see Hiroaki Kuromiya's "'Political Opposition in Late Stalinism': Evidence and Conjecture." *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 4 (2002): 631-38. For F  rst's reply to Kuromiya's criticisms, see 55, no. 5 (2003): 789-802, and see 56, no. 2 (2004): 309-14) for Kuromiya's rejoinder.

- 426** Getty, J. Arch. "State and Society under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 18-35.

Getty makes use of newly available Soviet archival documents to study the drafting of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, the "all-union discussion" of the document, and the Supreme Soviet electoral campaign of 1937. According to Getty, the Stalinist leadership took the constitution very seriously—with Stalin himself serving as the chairman of the Constitutional Commission and devoting much time to the document—and was even prepared, for a while, to conduct contested elections for the Supreme Soviet. However, in view of the criticisms that surfaced in the officially sanctioned national discussion of the constitution—many of which concerned the proposed voting rights—and in response to reports from conservative local officials who, out of fear of the consequences of any move toward a democratic process, warned Moscow about the possibility that "alien elements" might be elected, the Central Committee suddenly and secretly revised the electoral system, banning contested elections in the upcoming voting and billing the decision for single candidates as "a victorious sign of the 'close connection' between the party and the masses." Overall, Getty sees the "democratic" project of the 1936 Constitution as a "trial balloon"—one deflated by social reality—floated by a Stalin regime "governed by opportunism, improvisation, and reaction to changing events rather than by adherence to a long-term plan."

- 427** Gorlizki, Yoram. "Ordinary Socialism: The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Patrimonial State, 1946-1953." *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 4 (2002): 699-736.

This study of the Soviet political system from 1946 to 1953 draws upon the concept of the neopatrimonial state to examine the role of the Council of Ministers in the postwar years, illustrating how Stalin's patrimonial leadership was "married to technocratic forms of organization to produce a strange hybrid mode of administration." In Gorlizki's view, while the Council of Ministers appeared to be "a well-functioning bureaucratic system . . . based on regular well-informed committees," it became home to "perverse and bizarre practices," largely as a consequence of Stalin's resistance to attempts "to delimit his own authority by means of rules. . . ."

- 428** ———. “Stalin’s Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 2 (2001): 291-312.

Gorlizki considers the question of why Stalin did not dispense with the Politburo altogether and resort to a purely dictatorial system of executive rule. He analyzes the internal dynamics of the Politburo, pointing out the existence of three distinct Politburos in the late Stalin period—the de jure Politburo, the closed meetings of Stalin’s inner circle, and the “Politburo without Stalin,” meaning the cabinet of leaders (usually Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Beria) which convened in the leader’s absence and reached decisions without him—and showing how each was deployed by Stalin to lock his colleagues into a system of collective responsibility by which he could bind his peers. In discussing the Politburo’s external relations, Gorlizki describes how, despite its internal fluidity and pliability, externally the Politburo “projected an image of stability and order” in accord with the needs of the hierarchic Stalinist system. He also comments on how the Politburo, under the impact of Stalin’s attempt at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 to “democratize” the party, was substantially reformed and assumed “a specific party leadership role,” with the newly formed “Presidium Buro” functioning in the role of the aforementioned “Politburo without Stalin,” resuscitating “collective decision making” within the party, and serving as the forerunner of the cabinet that took over when the dictator died.

- 429** Gross, John. “Marxism and Stalin.” *New Society* 66, no. 1092 (20 October 1983): 116-17.

In this assessment of Marxism as “a recipe for state totalitarianism” and communism as a system that is “tyrannical by its very nature,” the author briefly discusses Stalin as the logical outcome of the system Lenin constructed, arguing that Lenin, in establishing a one-party state, setting up a secret police apparatus, and stamping out liberal and social democratic elements in Russian political life, fashioned the instruments of tyranny that lie at the core of the Stalinist dictatorship.

- 430** “Hark from the Tomb.” *Time* 47 (29 April 1946): 100+.

Time comments on the main points of Trotsky’s political biography of Stalin in which the Soviet dictator appears as a man of inspired mediocrity, perfidy, and political depravity and a traitor to the revolution and communism. The article considers the differences in personality and politics between the two leaders; their struggle against each other in the intraparty conflict that followed Lenin’s death; and the circumstances surrounding both the assassination of Trotsky and the posthumous publication of his portrayal of Stalin.

- 431** Harriman, W. Averell. “After Stalin, What?” *Newsweek* 41 (16 March 1953): 28+.

In this article, American statesman W. Averell Harriman shares his impressions of the Stalin he knew and states his views regarding the new situation with which the West must deal as a consequence of Stalin’s death. Harriman notes Stalin’s demeanor, disinclination to contemplate his own death, and failure to take the necessary steps to secure an orderly succession to his leadership. He also discusses why he feels the death of Stalin and the beginning of a new regime in the Kremlin could lead to cracks in the Soviet empire and confusion within the Soviet Union, but, at the same time, could also pose a dangerous threat to world peace as the new Soviet leaders may prove to be more reckless than Stalin and more willing to take greater risks in setting and pursuing Soviet foreign policy.

- 432** Harris, James. “Was Stalin a Weak Dictator?” *Journal of Modern History* 75, no. 2 (June 2003): 375-86.

Harris explores the nature of the Stalinist political system and the paradoxes of Stalin’s power as revealed by four recently published works: *Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936* (1995), edited by Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk (1995); *Stalinskoe politbiuro v 30-e gody, Sbornik dokumentov* (1995), edited by A. V. Kvashonkin, A. V. Livshin, and O. V. Khlevniuk; *Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, Perepiska, 1928-1941* (1999), edited by A. V. Kvashonkin, A. V.

Livshin, and O. V. Khelvniuk; and *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (1999), edited by J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov. He suggests that, while Stalin's power was without limits and he was at the center of all key party decisions, the Soviet dictator was constantly frustrated by the subversion of his directives by the party and state bureaucracies responded to the impossible demands from the center with foot-dragging and deception, and that he was "haunted by the fear of hostility to his rule." In answering the question, "Was Stalin a weak dictator?" Harris suggests that Stalin's "weakness" derives from some of the consequences of the colossal changes he initiated, particularly with respect to the dislocation, social tensions, anger, and opposition that these changes generated and that "made the Soviet Union extremely difficult to govern."

433 Hayes, Nichols. "Kazem-Bek and the Young Russians' Revolution." *Slavic Review* 39, no. 2 (June 1980): 266-68.

This account of the career of Alexander Kazem-Bek, the self-styled neomonarchist and leader of the "Young Russians" émigré party centered in Paris, includes a discussion of how the self-proclaimed *Führer* of the Young Russians hailed Stalin's usurpation of power as a step toward a neomonarchist restoration; argued that the Stalinists share "the émigré radical Right's biases toward Russian nationalism, anti-Semitism, anti-intellectualism, militarism, and *vozhdizm*"; and looked toward "the new ranks of the Stalinist leadership for the advent of a young Bonaparte, . . . who would depose Stalin and execute the Brumaire of the Russian national revolution." Hayes also discusses how Kazem-Bek interpreted Stalin's 1937 arrest and execution of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and purge of the Red Army's leadership as an effort to thwart a Russian Brumaire, and how this action, along with Stalin's conclusion of the 1939 nonaggression pact with Hitler, led Kazem-Bek to condemn the Soviet leader as an enemy of the Russian nation.

434 Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Winner and Losers: The Limits of Pragmatism and Moralism in Politics." *New Literary Review* 13, no. 3 (1982): 515-32.

Horowitz analyzes the association between politics and morality by looking at the careers of two pairs of figures—a "pragmatist" pair, Joseph Stalin and Tammany Hall politician George Washington Plunkitt, and a "moralist" pair, Leon Trotsky and American merchant and last royal governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson—in an effort to illustrate "the conduct of the political process at its polarized extremes and in so doing to demonstrate how politics determines the fate of moral credos. . . ." In dealing with Stalin, Horowitz discusses how the question of "winning" was for him, as with Plunkitt, "the primary, dedicated requirement of political life," and how, for Stalin, opposition and treason were one and the same, the admission of error or defeat was impossible, and no authority existed—political, philosophical, moral, or otherwise—beyond his own judgment.

435 Hough, Jerry F. "The Stalin-Trotsky Split: A Lesson for Kremlinologists." *Reporter* 29 (5 December 1963): 37-39.

According to Hough, the ideological differences between Trotsky and Stalin with respect to world revolution were far less extreme than they seemed and were, for the most part, lost on a sizable segment of the educated public in the West which, in witnessing the debate between the two men in the mid-1920s, concluded that Stalin had abandoned revolutionary Marxism in favor of Russian national interests, a judgment reinforced by such events of the 1930s as his Popular Front strategy against Hitler, subordination of Marxism-Leninism to Russian nationalism during World War II, and dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. Hough writes that Stalin, while countering Trotsky's push for world revolution with an argument for building socialism in Russia, continued to insist that world revolution was indispensable for the final victory of socialism and maintained that the establishment of socialism in Russia was but a means for the later development of revolution in all countries. Concern for Soviet security may have occupied pride of place in his foreign policy,

Hough continues, but that did not rule out the option of pursuing other goals, including the advancement of the cause of world communism, whenever or wherever possible, as his actions in the last decade of his life clearly illustrate.

436 "How Premier Stalin Rules." *US News and World Report* 25 (8 October 1948): 11-13.

This article, in discussing the question of whether Stalin, the Politburo, or the Russian military really runs the Soviet Union, states that the Soviet leader might listen to members of the Politburo and the military high command, but his decisions, once made, are the final word on all policy matters. The article also outlines how the Politburo functions, describes the views and roles of its top members, and speculates on the line of succession once Stalin dies.

437 Hughes, James R. "The Irkutsk Affair: Stalin, Siberian Politics and the End." *Soviet Studies* 41, no. 2 (1989): 228-53.

Hughes examines the political crisis known as the "Irkutsk affair" which enveloped the Siberian party organization during the grain crisis of 1927-28. He describes how power relationships, especially those between Stalin and his clients in the party, operated in the Soviet state at that time, and the ways in which Siberian regional factors influenced these relationships and distorted the practical implementation of policy directives from the central authorities. Hughes also discusses the impact of Stalin's January 1928 tour of Siberia on the Soviet dictator's reappraisal of the New Economic Policy and turn to the left, and how the image of "a 'degenerate,' politically suspect local party, tainted by its ties with kulaks and resistance to the application of emergency measures" during the grain crisis, failed to result in the purging of Sergei Syrtsov, the regional party boss and a political moderate, because of the patron-client relationship established between Stalin and Syrtsov.

438 ———. "Patrimonialism and the Stalinist System: The Case of S. I. Syrtsov." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 4 (1996): 551-68.

Hughes points to Stalin's relationship with Sergei Syrtsov as an example of patron-client ties that formed the core of the Soviet leader's governing network. He traces the rise and fall of Syrtsov's career as a member of Stalin's inner circle, showing how Syrtsov's independent thinking and criticism of Stalinist policies, including his attacks on collectivization and dekulakization as well as on the overall economics of the First Five-Year Plan, were tolerated by Stalin until Syrtsov, disillusioned by Stalin's dictatorship over the party, initiated a conspiracy in the summer of 1930 to remove Stalin from his position as General Secretary. When Stalin learned of Syrtsov's plans, Hughes explains, he had him dismissed from the Sovnarkom and the Politburo without any pretense to adhering to party rules, demonstrating not only the consequences of breaking "the unwritten code between patron and client" but also the extent to which his personal power had grown.

439 "Is Stalin Nervous?" *Fortune* 42 (September 1950): 73.

Fortune cites several statements made by Stalin in an article he wrote for the Communist Party journal *Bolshevik*, most notably his assertion that the state apparatus, which, according to Marxism, would "wither away" under socialism, must, in the short run, become more powerful. Stalin's assertion was a response both to Tito's then recent attack on Soviet-Marxism and to his own need for a huge military apparatus in order to hold power and promote communism, according to *Fortune*.

440 Kennan, George F. "Document: Excerpts from a Draft Letter Written at Some Time during the First Months of 1945." *Slavic Review* 27, no. 3 (September 1968): 481-84.

In these excerpts from a draft letter written at the American Embassy in Moscow soon after the end of World War II, the author, who was then serving as Minister-Counselor at the embassy, suggests that Stalin was not actually able to exercise a continuous and effective control over the

machinery of the Soviet government, and that the real source of authority in Russia at that time was the men in the Politburo who control the Communist Party and the NKVD, Georgi Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria in particular. Kennan does not believe that Stalin had become a puppet at that time, or that his word did not still carry tremendous authority, but rather that Malenkov and Beria, as Stalin's trusted lieutenants and holders of positions on which "the whole machinery of Communist rule depends," were virtually irreplaceable for Stalin and, therefore, "they could probably do pretty much as they pleased with impunity" so long as their actions did not appear to threaten his personal position or the security of his rule. The inconsistencies between official Kremlin foreign policies of 1945 and some of the actions of the Stalin regime, Kennan believes, may well be examples of how Malenkov and Beria could, in effect, "sabotage with impunity the major directives of Soviet policy," knowing that if anyone wished to bring their actions to Stalin's attention, he would "back them up in the end rather than try to dispense with their services." For a reply to Kennan's remarks, see William O. McCagg Jr.'s "Letter to the Editor." *Slavic Review* 28, no. 2 (June 1969): 363-64.

441 "Kipps in the Kremlin." *Saturday Review* 158 (25 August 1934): 7.

The Stalin in this fanciful and satiric rendering of English novelist and historian H. G. Wells's interview with the Soviet leader on 23 July 1934 in Moscow is a man who keeps a bomb, a grenade, and a revolver in the desk drawer of his Kremlin office to remind him of his pleasurable days as a revolutionary when he was killing tsarist officials; boasts that the proletariat are slaves under communism just as they had been under the tsars; had the corpse of a Ukrainian Cossack brought to him as proof that his orders to starve the Ukrainians to death were being carried out; and likened the ridiculous expression on the face of a Wells left shocked and stumbling by Stalin's statements to that of a Menshevik he shot in 1917.

442 Kutulas, Judy. "The 'Scientific Morality': Independent Marxists and Stalin's Russia, 1935-1940." *UCLA Historical Journal* 4 (1983): 66-91.

Kutulas examines the thought of a small group of American independent Marxists active during the 1930s who were neither popular nor influential at a time when Stalin's Russia enjoyed general acceptance within liberal and radical intellectual circles but whose emotional anti-Stalinism formed a main ideological current of Cold War anticommunism during the 1940s and 1950s. Their restructuring of Marxism into a more scientific form, one devoid of Marxian dialectics, in accord with their commitment to science as a tool for creating more effective methods of social organization; their distaste for Stalin because they considered him to represent—through his establishment of a system of government which sought power as its end—the antithesis of their "objective" Marxism; their interpretation of the trials of the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution as a "massive miscarriage of justice accomplished for Stalin's benefit"; and their belief that Stalin's power was total and no policy was too evil for him to adopt all receive consideration in Kutulas's analysis as does the process by which their anti-Stalinism and disappointment with Soviet socialism spread among nearly all of the American intellectual left by 1950.

443 Leites, Nalhan. "Panic and Defenses against Panic in the Bolshevik View of Politics." *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences* 4 (1955): 135-44.

This psychoanalytic study deals with the Bolshevik central belief that the party was threatened by "enemies with annihilatory designs" and with the existence of an unadmitted Bolshevik conflict about the danger posed by "the penetration of the enemy into one's interior." Suggesting that a major factor behind this central belief is the "classical paranoid defense against latent homosexuality," Leites discusses the Bolshevik insistence on eliminating groups and individuals not controlled by the party along with the Bolshevik fear of being eliminated by rivals or powerful enemies as "part of an effort to ward off fear-laden and guilty wishes to embrace men and to be embraced by them," a psychoanalytic hypothesis he sees as being consistent with such "pervasive

trends of the Bolshevik psyche as the fear of passivity, the fear of being controlled and used, and the fear of wanting to submit to an attack.” Stalin enters into this analysis as the chief representative of the view that the party must do its utmost to exclude any contacts with “enemies which are viewed as enemy penetrations of the party’s domain; and it must at any moment exhaust all possibilities for actually destroying enemy elements” as a means of countering the danger of annihilation.

444 “Looking Outward.” *Time* 47 (18 February 1946): 29-30.

This report on the February 1946 national election in the Soviet Union presents a sampling of the public statements made by party leaders, including Stalin, during the election campaign, most of which stressed the danger of attack from the capitalist world, and the need for industrial production and the strengthening of the Red Army to provide for the nation’s security. Describing the election as “the biggest, most meaningless on earth,” and noting that Stalin received one hundred percent of the vote in his own Moscow precinct, the report suggests that the Soviet leader’s emphasis of the threat passed by “capitalist enemies” stems from his need to justify continued sacrifices on the part of a Soviet population that has grown restless waiting for an improvement in its living conditions and hoping for an increase in the production of consumer goods.

445 Luck, David. “Soviet and Chinese Political Development.” *Survey* 74/75 (1970): 28-48.

Luck draws upon German socialist Max Weber’s concept of “charismatic” and “bureaucratic” ideal types of leadership to conduct a comparative historical elite analysis of Soviet and Chinese political development. Examining Soviet politics during the period of Stalin’s rise to power and the years 1933-39, Luck considers the emergence of Stalin as Lenin’s successor in terms of the triumph of the bureaucrat-organizers over the ideologue-intellectuals within the Bolshevik elite. He sees the purges of the 1930s as being a manifestation of Stalin’s desire to eliminate not only the threat posed to his personal power position by the Old Bolshevik intellectuals but also any challenges to his authority—real, potential, or imagined—within the new party, state, and military bureaucracies. In discussing how the ideologue-bureaucrat split within the Bolshevik leadership under Lenin and the early Stalin years played out in Chinese political development, Luck describes how the integration of bureaucratically—and ideologically—inclined leaders and tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party during the long years of rural revolutionary practice help to explain the “why” of the similarities and differences between developments in Russia during the 1920s and 1940s, on the one hand, and aspects of the Cultural Revolution in China in the 1960s, on the other.

446 Lynch, Allen. “Comments on Robert V. Daniels’s Paper, ‘Was Stalin Really a Communist?’” *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 20, nos. 2-3 (1993): 177-82.

This commentary on Robert Daniels’s exploration of the question of whether Stalin or Stalinism was an inevitable result of or a deviation from Bolshevism mainly deals with how Stalin, in exploiting the organizational, political, and ideological opportunities afforded to him by the early Leninist party-state system, presided over the construction of “an identifiably ‘Communist’ political system” and bequeathed to his successors a powerful legacy in foreign and domestic affairs. Lynch also discusses the efforts of the post-Stalin leadership to adapt the Soviet political system to changing economic conditions, and how the integrity of the Stalinist party-state system proved fragile under the reform efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev, who aimed to separate the Stalinist legacy from the structure the dictator created.

447 McNeal, Robert H. “Demonology: The Orthodox Communist Image of Trotskyism.” *International Journal* 32, no. 1 (1976-1977): 20-40.

McNeal discusses the evolution of the orthodox communist image of Trotskyism over a span of fifty years. The Bolshevik view of Trotskyism in the 1920s as a deviant form of Marxism akin to

Menshevism, McNeal writes, shifted during the purge trials of the mid-1930s in accord with Stalin's assertion that Trotskyism had ceased to be an ideology altogether, and that Trotsky and his allies aimed "to sneak into power at any cost" and, to this end, were willing to engage in sabotage and conspiracies with foreign enemies of socialism. Following World War II, Stalin's image of Trotskyism shifted once again, this time toward anti-Semitism, with the image of Trotsky approximating that depicted in White Russian posters during the 1918-21 Civil War which caricatured him as the devil wearing the Star of David. McNeal also comments on how the image of Trotskyism in Khrushchev's Russia shifted from a criminal nonideology/Zionist plot to an erroneous form of socialism, and on how the image of Trotskyism has been refashioned in various ways by communists beyond the Soviet Union as well.

448 "Men around Stalin." *Living Age* 345 (February 1934): 510-12.

This report reproduces the political profile of Stalin's closest collaborators provided by the Moscow correspondent of the *Sozialistische Boten*. Receiving most attention in the report are Kaganovich and Postishev, Stalin's own "representatives" to the all-important Party Secretariat, Yezhov, the head of the department which oversees appointments and dismissals of party members, and Stezki, "the Russian Goebbels and head of the *Kultprop*," all of whom, reportedly, are deeply loyal to Stalin and indispensable to his exercise of power.

449 "Mobilization." *Time* 30 (20 December 1937): 17-19.

The first national elections held in accord with the promises of the 1936 Stalin Constitution are the subject of this commentary. The article repeats the statements made by Stalin to his constituents in the Moscow district—where his name was on the ballot for election to the Russian Parliament—regarding the supremely democratic nature of the Soviet elections; points out that the example set in the Stalin district, where candidates withdrew their names in favor of the candidate backed by the Communist Party, was followed across the nation; and discusses how the promised secret ballot was compromised by a Soviet press campaign urging voters to sign their ballots as a way of proving their loyalty to Bolshevism and the Stalin regime.

450 Nahaylo, Bohdan. "The Case of Nikolai Bukharin." *Encounter* 72 (January 1989): 54-60.

Nahaylo takes aim on the image of Nikolai Bukharin as a heroic and moderate communist leader whose "humane socialism" represented a viable alternative to Stalinism, arguing that Bukharin was amoral and intolerant in political life; played a leading role in routing the innerparty opposition; ignored warnings about what Stalin really represented; and acted as "an apologist for the system and 'a mouthpiece of the Stalinist line'" even after he himself had been politically defeated and discredited. The emergence of a "Bukharin cult" in the aftermath of his February 1988 official rehabilitation emphasizing his anti-Stalinist stance and subsequent martyrdom "fuels the myth that, had it not been for Stalin, the Soviet system would no doubt have evolved into the prototype of 'socialism with a human face,'" according to Nahaylo.

451 "Never Really Certain." *Time* 48 (28 October 1946): 40.

Time casts doubt on the validity of the statement made by Giffard Le Quesne Martel, who headed the British military mission to Moscow during World War II, that Vyacheslav Molotov and Andrei Vishinsky had usurped Stalin's power, and on the claim made by Harold Laski, in the *New Republic*, that Stalin is "the leader of a team," the Politburo, which does not simply rubber-stamp his every policy wish.

452 Nove, Alec. "A Note on Trotsky and the 'Left Opposition.'" *Soviet Studies* 29, no. 4 (1977): 576-89.

This review of the 1929-31 issues of the *Bulletin of the Opposition*, published first in Paris and then in Berlin by a group of Trotskyists and containing numerous articles written by Trotsky himself during the first years of his forced exile from Russia, aims to shed light on the "Left Opposition's" view of the world and their own country at a critical time in Soviet history. Nove comments on the relative merits of the analyses offered by Trotsky and others in the "Left Opposition" in the articles they wrote for the journal dealing with such subjects as the motivation for Stalin's "left turn" in 1928; the bureaucratization of the party and the suppression of free discussion within the party at all levels; the consequences of Stalin's policy of forced collectivization and anti-kulak campaign; the repression of opposition, including the "trial of the wreckers" of the so-called industrial party in 1930 and the trial of the Mensheviks in 1931; and Stalin's conduct of foreign affairs, particularly "the errors and follies" of the Comintern acting under the influence of his control.

453 Pettler, Pamela. "Stalin's A-List." *American Film* 13, no. 6 (April 1988): 21-22.

A statement from Vyacheslav Molotov's 11 November 1986 obituary in the *New York Times* citing a claim made by Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs that Molotov's power was declining and Stalin had begun to shun him, even ordering that he no longer be invited to movies shown in Stalin's Kremlin theater, serves as a springboard for this satirical commentary on both the supposed film tastes of Stalin and his inner circle, and on the opinions voiced by the various members of "Stalin's A-List" regarding the significance of Molotov's absence from Kremlin showings of *Pardon My Sarong* and, later, *Hold That Ghost* and *It Ain't Hay*.

454 Ploss, Sidney I. "Soviet Party History: The Stalinist Legacy." *Problems of Communism* 21, no. 4 (1972): 32-41.

Ploss outlines the essential characteristics of Stalinist party history and considers the extent to which these characteristics changed during the two decades following Stalin's death. He describes how the Stalinization of party historical studies unfolded progressively, beginning with an inquisitorial bias into the writing of party history, and then moving to the establishment of the legend of Stalin's infallibility as the party's leader, to the rewriting of the party's past to eradicate any lingering nostalgia for intraparty debate, and to the embellishment of Stalin's role in the party's early history. Ploss notes that de-Stalinization, in dismantling the Stalin cult and providing some leeway for differences of historiography, corrected a number of the most flagrant distortions of Stalinist historiography, but that nothing resembling real objectivity or freedom of interpretation can be seen in party historiography under either Khrushchev or Brezhnev.

455 Pomper, Philip. "Historians and Individual Agency." *History and Theory* 35, no. 3 (1996): 281-308.

Pomper draws upon W. H. Dray's findings about historians' concepts of causation and A. Giddens's structuration theory to examine the methodological differences in how historians treat individual agency with respect to the power and personal control over events exercised by Hitler and Stalin. He uses Isaac Deutscher's *Stalin, A Political Biography* (1949) and J. Arch Getty's *Origins of the Great Purges* (1985) as case studies of historical works that reduce Stalin's individual agency in the collectivization drive and the Great Purge, and Robert Tucker's *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1929-1941* (1990) as a work that accords Stalin a major role in determining key events in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Pomper also discusses the shape that a general theory of individual agency in history might assume.

456 Powell, David E. "Mao and Stalin's Mantle." *Problems of Communism* 17, no. 2 (1968): 21-30.

Powell describes how the architects of China's Cultural Revolution resuscitated Stalin's thesis that as communism draws nearer, the class struggle intensifies, along with the corollary proposition

that the state must therefore become stronger to counter the increasingly desperate and dangerous efforts of class enemies to subvert the new order. He notes Lenin's few observations on the question of class relations during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat; discusses Stalin's transformation of Lenin's scattered remarks into a full-blown theory on the postrevolutionary intensification of the class struggle and use of this concept as the ideological basis for the terror and purges; and comments on the repudiation of this aspect of Stalin's legacy by Khrushchev in his February 1956 "secret speech" at the Twentieth CPSU Congress. He also examines the reaction of Mao Tse-tung and his followers to the Kremlin's abandonment of Stalin's theory of intensified class struggle, showing how Mao's initial compromise position between Stalin's theory and the new Kremlin line gave way to a harder, Stalinist line toward class enemies as the Cultural Revolution unfolded.

457 "Premier Stalin." *Newsweek* 17 (19 May 1941): 30-32.

Newsweek, in noting the 8 May 1941 announcement on Radio Moscow that Stalin had become Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars or Premier of the Soviet Union describes the nature of the chairman's position and the chairman's place in the Soviet political structure. The article also points out a series of steps taken during that same week in May that indicate closer Soviet cooperation with the Axis powers, including the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from German-held Yugoslavia, Belgium, and Norway, and the denial by TASS, the official Russian news agency, of rumors of Soviet military preparations for the possibility of war with Germany.

458 Priestland, David. "Soviet Democracy, 1917-91." *European History Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2002): 111-30.

Priestland argues that "Soviet democracy" was not a meaningless concept, as often maintained, but rather one which, despite considerable changes in its meaning during the lifespan of the Soviet Union, retained some coherence throughout the seventy-four years of the USSR's existence and had "a significant and even sometimes de-Stalinizing effect on Soviet politics." As part of this argument, Priestland discusses how Stalin's "democracy" campaigns of the late 1920s and mid-1930s, including his call for "proletarian democracy," self-criticism, and criticism from below as a means of enhancing the regime's legitimacy among the working class, proved to be disruptive to the economy and dangerous to the regime itself, and led to the toning down of the campaigns to the point where they were less worrisome to the leadership.

459 "Report from the Kremlin: Will Stalin Retire Next Winter?" *Newsweek* 32 (5 July 1948): 33.

Newsweek cites the informed prediction provided by "confidential sources" that Stalin, at the forthcoming Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, will announce that he wants to retire from his active duties in government while keeping the job of General Secretary of the Communist Party. This decision emanates primarily from Stalin's desire to begin the transfer of power in the Kremlin that will take place upon his death, according to *Newsweek*.

460 Rigby, T. H. "Political Patronage in the USSR from Lenin to Brezhnev." *Politics* 18, no. 1 (May 1983): 84-89.

Rigby identifies some of the distinctive features of political patronage in the Soviet system and attempts to demonstrate that patronage remains a vital element in Soviet political life in the post-Stalin era despite the expectation of some scholars that it would wither away as the system became more institutionalized. In examining political patronage in the Stalin era, Rigby describes how Stalin's first patronage network, which was based on calculations of reciprocal benefit, gave way, after the Great Terror, to a new following—one whose loyalty and obedience were based not only on calculations of advantage but also on fear as a means of ensuring the unconditional loyalty and obedience that Stalin required for his own security. He maintains that the lasting nature of Stalin's

relationship with his closest supporters runs counter to the conventional picture of the Soviet dictator as “one of those pathologically suspicious tyrants who constantly murders off their officials and put others in their place,” and he argues for the period of high Stalinism as being the time during which the Soviet political elite enjoyed greater security of tenure than at any period before or since. The Leninist roots of patronage politics; Stalin’s exploitation of the powers vested in the Central Committee Secretariat to allow patronage politics to flourish; the reliance of Stalin’s successors on patronage in their rise to power; and the ways in which their practice of patronage politics both resemble and differ from that of Stalin also receive consideration in Rigby’s analysis of the patronage phenomenon in the Soviet system.

461 ———. “Was Stalin a Disloyal Patron?” *Soviet Studies* 38, no. 3 (1986): 311-24.

Rigby challenges the standard view that Stalin was a disloyal patron who discarded and destroyed successive supporters once they had served their current purpose. Taking aim at three propositions about the rate of attrition in the Soviet elite under Stalin—namely, that it was exceptionally high, was greater as one approached the innermost circle of Stalin’s collaborators, and that it most affected those who had been longest in his service—Rigby contends that, in fact, proximity to Stalin made one less likely to suffer repression, not more; that attrition in the upper ranks of the Soviet political elite was far from being even relatively high; and that Stalin did not do away with his “closest collaborators in crime” but rather “surrounded himself with long-term favourites and collaborators to the end of his days.”

462 Rittersporn, Gábor Tamás. “Soviet Politics in the 1930s: Rehabilitating Society.” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 19, no. 2 (1986): 105-28.

This examination of the role played by officialdom in the evolution of Soviet politics in the 1930s and of the question of Soviet society’s responsibility for the convulsions of that decade shows how the Stalin regime—in its effort to deal with the loss of control over the party and state apparatus upon which it was compelled to delegate vast powers in order to manage the conflict between itself and the population triggered by the programs of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization—resorted to such methods as control agencies and widespread purges to impose order and obedience on rank-and-file party members and lower levels of administration, only to find that such an approach was both ineffective and counterproductive. In describing this process and how the members of the apparatus came to achieve elite status by the end of the thirties, Rittersporn casts doubt on the view that the Great Purge was masterminded and micromanaged by a Stalin bent on securing his authority as an omnipotent dictator. He also advances the argument that the leader cult that developed around Stalin may be viewed as a product of the need of Soviet officials to see coherence, design, and purpose in the disorder they were responsible for; as “a symbol of their supposed unity”; and as a way for officials “to legitimize any act and especially their own moves.”

463 Rosenfeldt, Niels Erik. “‘The Consistory of the Communist Church’: The Origins and Development of Stalin’s Secret Chancellery.” *Russian History* 9, nos. 2-3 (1982): 308-34.

Rosenfeldt examines the creation and early development of Stalin’s special chancellery, detailing the evolution of its structure, administrative procedures, responsibilities, and purposes, and weighing the viability of the various interpretations that have been advanced regarding this particular Stalinist power apparatus. He suggests that since Stalin’s ability to impose his will on the Soviet people stemmed primarily from the complete control he gained over the secret apparatus of the party and state, the special chancellery should be considered as the “decisive structural counterpart to Stalin’s enormous political power.”

464 “Roy Howard’s Interview with Joseph Stalin.” *Communist* 15 (April 1936): 337-45.

The Communist publishes here the full text of the interview conducted with Stalin by Roy Howard, Chairman of the Board of Scripps-Howard publications. Among the questions Howard put to the Soviet leader are "Should war come, where is it most likely to break out?" "What situation or condition . . . furnishes the chief war menace today?" "How do the subversive activities of the American Communist Party square with the commitment of non-interference in American domestic affairs which the Soviet Union made at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA?" and "To what degree can the system of elections provided for by the new Soviet constitution alter the political situation in the USSR, since formally only one party will come forward at elections?" In addition to providing the complete text of the Howard-Stalin interview, the editors of *The Communist*, in an introduction to the document, chastise Howard for omitting from the version of the interview he released to the press all reference to Soviet democracy as described by Stalin in some detail in responding to Howard's question on the new Soviet constitution.

465 Salisbury, Harrison E. "Stalin Is Gray." *Collier's Weekly* 117 (9 February 1946): 15+.

The first part of this article, written at the time of Stalin's sixty-sixth birthday, deals with the question of who might become the next leader of the Soviet Union in the event of the dictator's death, speculating that while Georgi Malenkov, Andrei Andreyev, and Andrei Zhdanov are the three Politburo members with sufficient power, prestige, and influence to fill the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party held by Stalin, Zhdanov is the odds-on favorite to secure that post. The second half of the article centers on the state of Stalin's health, his work habits, and relationship with the ruling Politburo. Salisbury suggests that there are certain restrictions on Stalin's power, including the Politburo with which Stalin must cooperate; public opinion as funneled back to him by his subordinates as means of gauging popular reaction to the regime's policies; and the NKVD which not only controls Stalin's movements for security purposes but also intervenes directly in Kremlin policy when national security interests are deemed to be at stake. These various limitations on Stalin's power tend to reduce the likelihood of any radical change in the event of his death, in Salisbury's estimate.

466 Sandle, Mark. "Stalin: Did He Preserve or Destroy Bolshevism?" *Modern History Review* 13, no. 4 (2002): 16-19.

Sandle considers the relationship between Stalin and Bolshevism, defining the latter as a vanguard of elite revolutionaries committed to a program of revolutionary transformation and to the use of any and all means to advance the revolutionary cause. He describes how Stalin extended many of the processes that were at work in the vanguard party from its earliest days but took them to the point of extreme; how his economic program was broadly in line with Bolshevik imperatives but, when implemented, turned out to be quite different from what was envisaged by most Bolsheviks; and how his militant, ruthless, amoral political behavior constituted an extreme example of the mentality embodied in Bolshevism. With respect to the question posed in the article's title, Sandle concludes that "much of what emerged under Stalin had the appearance of a form of Bolshevism, but this appearance is not necessarily confirmed if we scratch beneath the surface."

467 Schapiro, Leonard. "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU." *Survey* 21, no. 3 (1975): 53-65.

Schapiro discusses the political importance of the General Department of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party from its functioning as the Secret Department (subsequently known as the Special Sector) under Stalin through the Brezhnev years, when it was transformed into the General Department once again. He describes how Stalin, from the time of his appointment as General Secretary in 1922, used the Secret Department/Special Sector as his personal secretariat in order to facilitate his manipulation of the party machinery. Its duties and responsibilities at this time, Schapiro explains, included the registration of party members, the handling of

security reports on party officials, and the processing of secret files and transmissions—all of which made it an agency of great importance for Stalin and one that was well positioned to assist him in purging his political opponents. In examining the operations of the Special Sector after it was transformed into the General Department following Stalin's death, Schapiro describes how the agency was changed in order to curtail the power of the party's First Secretary and to facilitate the establishment of collective leadership.

- 468** Schmitt, David P. and David G. Winter. "Measuring the Motives of Soviet Leadership and Soviet Society: Congruence Reflected or Congruence Created?" *Leadership Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (1998): 293-307.

The authors draw upon the first Communist Party Congress speeches of Stalin (1924), Khrushchev (1956), Brezhnev (1966), and Gorbachev (1986) to explore the relationship between the motive profiles of Soviet leadership and Soviet society. Using a scoring system based upon evidence of concern for achievement (competition and quality of performance), affiliation (establishing, maintaining, or restoring friendly relations among people, groups, or nations), and power (influence or control on people, groups, or the world at large) in the four men's speeches, and the appearance of achievement, affiliation-intimacy, and power motive imagery in a random selection of pages from Soviet short stories and novellas, Schmitt and Winter show that the societal motive profile, during the two years before the leaders' speeches, tended to diverge from that reflected in the speeches but demonstrated considerable convergence with leadership motives during the two years after the speeches. Such a pattern, the authors maintain, indicates that in Soviet society the leadership most likely shaped or influenced societal motives, rather than reflected them, and lends credence to the "totalitarian" hypothesis as a model for understanding the relationship between leadership and society in the Soviet political system.

- 469** Service, Robert. "Stalinism and the Soviet State Order." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 7-23.

Service argues that Stalinism cannot properly be comprehended without reference to the kind of state order Stalin inherited. Political practices and policies, Service argues, were not provoked by the whim of Stalin but rather were a response to problems which existed independently of period, environment, or leader, and were largely the product of an administrative stratum that was corrupt, untrustworthy, and resistant to change. He describes what he sees as the essentials of the Soviet state order, its interconnected nature, and the limits imposed by the state apparatus on Stalin and his successors in their efforts to address the chronic internal and external challenges they faced. The cycle of "pressurization and compromise" that characterized the attempts of the Kremlin's leaders to deal with the chronic changes they faced also receives consideration in Service's analysis of Stalinism and the Soviet state order.

- 470** Shamberg, Vladimir. "Stalin's Inner Circle." *Harriman Review* 10, no. 1 (1997): 29-41.

Shamberg outlines the careers of Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, and Andrei Zhdanov, the most powerful figures in Stalin's final inner circle, describing each man's personality, power base, allies, and rivals, and commenting on the power the three men wielded and on their roles in determining some of the key events in the last years of Stalin's life as they sought to improve their respective positions in the struggle for succession. Shamberg, whose ties to the Malenkov family and professional career in the Soviet Union gave him an opportunity to observe the Soviet ruling elite at close range, also discusses, and dismisses, the possibility that Stalin's death was not a natural one. He also considers the question of why Malenkov emerged as Stalin's immediate successor yet was able to hold that rank for only a short time.

- 471** Shaw, George B. "Stalin and Wells." *New Statesman and Nation* 8 (3 November 1934): 613-14.

Shaw comments on the conversation between Stalin and H. G. Wells, the full report of which appeared in the 27 October 1934 issue of the *New Statesman and Nation*, maintaining that the behavior of Wells in his meeting with Stalin shows him to be a wonderful talker but a miserable listener and firmly attached to the conversational tactic, "Never argue: repeat your assertion." In illustrating Wells's limited sense of hearing and Stalin's "invincible patience," Shaw describes the efforts of Wells to lecture the Bolshevik leader on such issues as the nature of the class war, the chaotic condition of capitalism, and the possibility of creating a world socialist state without revolution, all with the effect of leaving Stalin "in some doubt as to whether he (Wells) is a friend or enemy of the new Russia." For a satirical review of the Wells-Stalin interview, see "Kipps in the Kremlin." *Saturday Review* 158 (25 August 1934): 7. For commentaries on the talk between Wells and Stalin and on Shaw's remarks, see *New Statesman and Nation*, "A Comment by Ernst Tollers," (3 November 1934): 614-15; J. M. Keynes, "Shaw on Wells on Stalin," (10 November 1934): 653-54; H. G. Wells, "A Reply to Mr. Shaw," (10 November 1934): 654-55; George Bernard Shaw, "Stalin-Wells Continued," (17 November 1934): 709-10; and "Correspondence: The Stalin-Wells Talk," (17 November 1934): 713-15; (29 November 1934): 750-51; (1 December 1934): 786-87; (8 December 1934): 822-23; and 29 (December 1934): 967.

472 Shore, Cris. "Lenin and the Crisis of Communism: The View from Inside." *Government and Opposition* 26, no. 1 (1991): 86-100.

This analysis of the failure of communism centers on how Lenin's theory of democratic centralism, reinforced by the ordinance passed at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 temporarily banning factional activity within the party, served to cripple the principle of opposition and paved the way for the degeneration of the revolutionary dictatorship of a class into the dictatorship of one man, Stalin. Shore does not deny that a number of problems contributed to the "crisis of communism," including the failure to deliver economic prosperity and political emancipation and the inability to compete with the West on a material level, but he believes the root cause of what went wrong with communism rests on Lenin's blueprint for Bolshevik party organization, which, combined with his ban on factionalism and his concept of the one-party state, planted the seeds for the Stalinist authoritarian regime by spawning a political culture which virtually ensured that the party would become tyrannical not only with respect to opposition beyond the party but with regard to its own membership as well.

473 Snow, Edgar. "Stalin's Sinister First Lieutenant." *Saturday Evening Post* 224 (17 May 1952): 29+.

Snow makes a case for Georgi Malenkov as the man most likely to succeed Stalin, suggesting that, while Stalin is too shrewd to indicate his personal feelings about an heir for fear of jeopardizing his own security and compromising his strategy of "divide and rule," the nature of the power that he has delegated to Malenkov, particularly Malenkov's appointment to the role of Stalin's chief of staff, makes him the person most likely to emerge victorious in the inevitable struggle that will follow the dictator's death.

474 ———. "Strong Men around Stalin." *Saturday Evening Post* 217 (24 March 1945): 12-13+. Snow describes the operation of the Soviet Communist Party complex; the practical limitations on Stalin's freedom of action; and the political careers of the Politburo's leading members, devoting most attention to the powers of Andrei Zhdanov and Andrei Andreyev and to the two men's ties with Stalin.

475 "Soviets Ratify New Constitution—Stalin Claims Solution of Unemployment Problem." *China Weekly Review* 79 (12 December 1936): 41-43.

This article outlines the freedoms guaranteed to Soviet citizens by the Stalin Constitution of 1936 and speculates on why such a document has been put forth by the Stalin regime at this point in

time. The article suggests that, while the granting of democratic rights must be viewed within the context of the monopoly of power resting in the hands of a Soviet Communist Party which has been so successful in eliminating opposition elements that a partial inauguration of certain democratic rights may be possible without threatening the party's power, the new constitution indicates that success, in the form of the "remarkable economic and social progress" that the USSR has made under the five-year plans, "has reached such a level that embodiment of this improvement can be made in constitutional forms."

476 "Stalin As the New Lenin." *New Republic* 63 (23 July 1930): 275-77.

New Republic links Stalin's defeat of the leaders of the "Right Opposition" at the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in 1930 to his ability to control the Politburo's decisions "by means of manipulation and judicious expulsions." Describing Stalin as an opportunist guided by few principles of conduct, the article sees his political success as stemming from his ability to gauge the exact degree of strain which the country is able to bear; to alter his course suddenly in order to meet new exigencies; and to adopt the programs and methods of his defeated opponents when he considers it opportune to do so. The article describes how these three political traits figure into Stalin's pursuit of an agrarian policy appropriated from the "Left Opposition," into his victory over the "Right Opposition," and into his decision to call a temporary halt to collectivization in March 1930 over concern for the program's negative effects amidst its "dizzying success."

477 "Stalin at Bay with His Home Foes." *Literary Digest* 101 (20 April 1929): 19.

Reports from newspapers in Prague, Paris, and Berlin regarding the strife within the leadership of the Communist Party, particularly the role played by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Alexei Rykov in leading "the dissidents of the Right" in their effort to remove Stalin from the post of Secretary General of the party, are cited in this article. The article also describes how the deterioration of the economic situation in Russia, especially in the countryside, has given Stalin's foes within the party a golden opportunity to move against him.

478 "Stalin Concentrates His Power." *Business Week* (23 April 1949): 6.

Stalin's concern over the implications of the then newly forged North Atlantic Treaty Organization has led him to a reorganization of his whole administration which includes taking all real power from the Politburo and concentrating it further in his own hands and advancing the authority and influence of Georgi Malenkov, his most trusted deputy, at the expense of the position of some of the Communist Party's veteran leaders, according to *Business Week*. The article also comments on whether the new structure of the Kremlin's power pyramid is likely to be permanent, with Malenkov ensconced as Stalin's successor, or whether Stalin has simply formed "a crisis cabinet."

479 "Stalin Tramples on His Enemies." *Literary Digest* 114 (28 October 1932): 12-13.

This article cites the official charges brought against Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and twenty-two other prominent party figures and the reports in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* attributing counterrevolutionary activities to these veteran Bolshevik leaders. The article places Stalin's move against this group within the context of a report, written some time before the official disclosures, about a "conspiracy" within the Communist Party in Russia and an unsigned note of appeal to the members of the party calling for Stalin's removal from power because of his responsibility for the failure of the Five-Year Plan and for his establishment of dictatorial control over the party and the Soviet state.

480 "Stalin's Life of Dread." *Literary Digest* 108 (31 January 1931): 14.

The official unmasking of the "Syrtsov conspiracy" to overthrow Stalin serves as the entry point for this brief commentary on opposition to Stalin within the Communist Party and on how Stalin,

who “lives in constant, paralyzing fear,” manages to hold his ground as Russia’s supreme dictator by resorting to “constant espionage over his colleagues” and “violent reprisals” against suspected, or imagined, enemies.

481 “Stalin’s 100th.” *Time* 114 (31 December 1979): 42.

Time describes the somewhat ambivalent image of Stalin conveyed by an editorial run by *Pravda* on the 100th anniversary of his birth; the celebration of his memory by thousands of Georgians who gathered in Gori, his hometown; and the nostalgia felt by some Russians for the Stalin era in response to the moral laxity and lack of unity that has troubled the nation since his death.

482 Strong, Anna Louise. “Stalin in Action.” *Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 34 (January 1934): 19-21.

Stalin’s technique of governing, according to Strong, rests upon his uncanny ability to quietly draw out individual opinions and to mold group decisions without ever giving the group cause to believe that he is attempting to impose his will on anyone. Drawing upon her own experience of Stalin presiding at a small committee meeting convened to decide a minor matter which she had brought to the Soviet leader’s attention, Strong describes how Stalin deftly managed to focus the group’s attention on the heart of the matter under review; to reveal the essential truth of a statement made by one of the group’s members; to induce another to reveal himself further; and to guide the group in settling quickly and reasonably the question at hand—all while saying less than anyone else in attendance at the meeting. She states that, while Stalin’s policy decisions may not always be right and his economic program may seem costly in terms of human suffering, the principal shortcomings of the Soviet system are primarily the fault of the “petty men” in the Soviet bureaucracy who spoil the leadership’s policies “with bad organization, poor discipline, [and] no sense.”

483 “Succession.” *Time* 48 (23 December 1946): 31.

Time cites a report from “a knowledgeable European source” that, early in December 1941, Stalin called a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo at Sochi and said that, because of his failing health, it was time to name his successors for his party and government posts. Stalin proposed that Vyacheslav Molotov serve as Soviet Premier, Lavrenti Beria as Vice-Premier, and Andrei Zhdanov as First Secretary of the Communist Party—a proposal that was accepted unanimously but, for tactical reasons, was not to be announced until the following spring, according to the report.

484 Svenbro, Jesper. “Stalin As Wolf.” Translated by John Matthias and Gorän Printz-Påhlson. *Kenyon Review* 5, no. 1 (winter 1983): 25-27.

In this brief poetic statement about the role of the “wolf” in Russian politics, the author writes of Stalin’s wolf-like characteristics, the most dominant being his sense of distrust and bloodthirstiness, and of how the principle of absolute mistrust triumphed over equality as the “Bolshevik pack” closed ranks around Stalin amidst the “whirling snowstorms” in Soviet society and politics in the 1930s.

485 Szamuely, Tibor. “The Elimination of the Opposition between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses of the CPSU.” *Soviet Studies* 17 (1966): 318-38.

Szamuely examines Stalin’s actions between 1929 and 1934 in eliminating opposition to his policies and leadership and in establishing the monolithic system that was to characterize Soviet political life for the remainder of his rule. He describes the steps taken by Stalin against the “Right Opposition” led by Bukharin; the so-called “Right wing-Leftist bloc” led by Sergei Syrtsov and Vissarion Lominadze; the supporters of the 1932 anti-Stalin platform drawn up by Martemyan Ryutin; and the last case of communist opposition to Stalin recorded in Soviet annals—the group headed by one of the oldest and most highly regarded Bolsheviks, A. P. Smirnov. Szamuely also

discusses Stalin's decimation of "nationalist deviationism," particularly in Ukraine; the political trials of the industrial party in November-December 1930 and the Mensheviks in March 1931; the regime's campaigns against assorted "saboteurs" and "foreign agents" in the early 1930s; and, finally, Stalin's emasculation of Soviet trade unions. When the Seventeenth Party Congress was held in January 1934, Stalin, Szamuely explains, found himself in complete control—the party had weathered the storm spawned by the rigors of his "revolution from above"; his enemies, real and imagined, had been defeated and degraded; the cult of Stalin was in full bloom; and the party's Central Committee and Politburo had been subordinated to his will, with opposition to "the Leader" coming to be viewed as a form of suicide.

486 Trotsky, Lev. "Is Stalin Weakening or the Soviets?" *Political Quarterly* 3 (July 1932): 307-22.

The exaggerations, distortions, and outright lies that mark Stalin's renewed campaign against the Trotskyist Opposition are the opening subject of this 1932 article by Leon Trotsky, the exiled Bolshevik leader and principal rival of Stalin in the intraparty struggle for power following Lenin's death. Trotsky locates the campaign against "Trotskyism" in the need for the Stalinist conservative bureaucracy to justify both its right to power and its hijacking of the opposition's economic program, which the Stalin faction had so adamantly opposed from 1923 to 1928. He sees the repressive measures adopted by Stalin against the opposition, along with his suppression of party democracy, as prime examples of his crudity and abuse of power about which Lenin wrote in a deathbed letter to the party. While the workers gave the Stalin bureaucracy the powers it needed to restore order following the chaos and destruction of the revolution and civil war years, the economic zigzags of the Stalin regime, the astounding character of the campaign against opposition within the party, and the emergence of an economic situation in the Soviet Union which increasingly places the workers in opposition to the omnipotence of the Stalinist bureaucracy will be the undoing of the Stalin regime, according to Trotsky.

487 "Truman: Stalin Is No Communist." *US News and World Report* 28 (14 April 1950): 25.

The subject of this report is President Harry Truman's contention that Stalin is not a true communist because his regime has fostered the growth of a privileged class of Soviet bureaucrats and an all-powerful state, both of which fly in the face of Marxist doctrine regarding the nature of a communist society. In Truman's view, the Stalinist system has far more in common with the former Nazi police state than it does with the dictatorship of the proletariat described by Marx.

488 Tucker, Robert C. "The Dictator and Totalitarianism." *World Politics* 17, no. 4 (1965): 555-83.

Tucker isolates the recurring themes and basic ideas that tend to be shared by those who subscribe to the theory of totalitarianism in their analysis of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, contending that the theoretical model of a totalitarian polity is seriously deficient because of its obliviousness to the impact of the dictator's personality upon the dynamics of totalitarianism. He develops the argument that both Hitler and Stalin possessed what may be called "warfare personalities" laced with paranoid characteristics which proved to be a powerful motivating factor in their decision making and which found expression in their political ideology and political activity as well. In describing how the dynamics of totalitarianism in Stalin's Russia were profoundly influenced by the totalitarian dictator's psychodynamics, Tucker explains how the psychopathological themes and tendencies expressed in Soviet internal policy—particularly with respect to Stalin's conspiracy mentality and resort to aggressive behavior in dealing with perceived enemies—found expression in foreign relations as well, and how Stalin's role in the crimes and abuses that characterized his regime was, in reality, a determining one. Tucker also offers a critical analysis of the sources of scholarly resistance to the idea that the personality of the dictator may play a decisive part in the politics of totalitarianism.

489 Utis, O. "Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government." *Foreign Affairs* 30, no. 2 (January 1952): 197-214.

Utis suggests that the seemingly inexplicable zigzag pattern of both Kremlin foreign policy and the party line within the Soviet Union can be interpreted as the product of Stalin's creation of an original instrument of government—"the artificial dialectic"—that has enabled him to steer a course between the self-destructive Jacobin fanaticism that threatens any regime established by a revolution and postrevolutionary weariness that carries with it the risk of society returning to the ways from which it has momentarily been lifted by revolution. Arguing for the need for Western observers to recognize the method behind the apparent madness of Soviet policy and politics, Utis explains how the oscillations of the party line and Soviet practices at key points in the nation's history can be understood as expressions of Stalin's exceptional gift for deciding the exact moment to either stiffen or relax official posture and for determining the right degree of force required to swing the political and social pendulum to obtain the results desired. Utis also discusses how the art of government as practiced by Stalin has created for the Soviet people "a condition of unrelenting tautness lest they be caught by one of the sharp turns made whenever a given operation begins to yield insufficient or undesirable results."

490 Viola, Lynne. "Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s: Soliloquy of a Devil's Advocate." *Kritika* 1, no. 1 (winter 2000): 45-70.

Viola considers some of the complexities inherent in the identification and study of the nature of resistance in Stalinist society. She discusses the question of popular opposition to the Stalinist dictatorship in the 1930s in terms of what the state chose to label as resistance and in view of the manifestations of resistance among workers, peasants, and other ordinary citizens. She suggests that the variety and scope of popular defiance of Stalinism calls into question conventional notions of the realities of living under the Stalinist dictatorship as well as the standard view of the Stalin regime's ability to shape and control society. She also points out the need to avoid magnifying and valorizing resistance and to appreciate that resistance was but one part "in a wide continuum of societal responses to the Stalinist state that included accommodation, adaptation, acquiescence, apathy, internal emigration, opportunism, and support."

491 "A Vivid Russian Portrait of Russia's Strongman." *Literary Digest* 100 (5 January 1929): 15-16.

This report cites a series of articles in *Vozrozhdenye*, an anti-Bolshevik Russian daily published in Paris, that were written by Boris Bazhanov—Stalin's former secretary who broke from the Communist Party and fled Russia in 1928—describing Stalin's thirst for power, domination of the Communist Party, and commitment to a program of action that will "keep moving to the Left farther and farther away from the Right." The report also notes Bazhanov's description of Stalin's personality and habits as well as of the method he has used in rising to the top of the Communist Party and securing his position as "Russia's strongman."

492 Waller, Michael. "The -isms of Stalinism." *Soviet Studies* 20, no. 2 (October 1968): 229-34. Waller looks at terms ending in the suffix "izm" in Ushakov's dictionary, the first official dictionary of the Bolshevik Revolution, describing how Ushakov's eighty-seven -isms, including such terms as *trotskyism*, *menshevism*, *feminism*, and *freudism* (Freudism), were politicized to fit the official line of the Stalin regime. In discussing why such an inordinately large number of -isms, many of which were foreign words, can be found in the Stalinist dictionary, Waller suggests that the terms were included because the dictionary, which was published at a time when Russian nationalism was ascendant, aimed to use "their foreignness to help discredit the meanings of many of them."

493 Willen, Paul. "Can Stalin Have a Successor?" *Commentary* 16 (July 1953): 36-44.

Willen points out the virtually insurmountable problems facing the Kremlin leadership in providing a true and legitimate successor for the recently deceased Stalin, including the impossibility of replacing a man whose authority over the nation was not derived from the offices or titles he held but rather developed over the years of his leadership during the heroic days of Bolshevism. Stalin's acquisition of a godlike stature as a consequence of the cult which grew up around him, and his adoption of an "après moi, le déluge" attitude toward the issue of succession also receive consideration in Willen's commentary on the succession question as do the efforts of the then current Kremlin leader Georgi Malenkov to create a "seal of legitimacy" which the Stalinist system so systematically denied him while the dictator was alive.

494 Willey, Fay. "Stalin's Man on Golden Pond." *Newsweek* 99 (3 May 1982): 44.

This brief commentary on Soviet historian Roy Medvedev's biographical portrait of Vyacheslav Molotov, which was then circulating underground in Moscow, includes a brief account of the sketch's portrayal of Molotov's relationship with Stalin, the services he provided to the Soviet dictator, and of how an aging and increasingly paranoid Stalin was on the verge of turning on Molotov before death overtook the dictator.

495 Woll, Matthew. "American Trade Unionists' Interview with Joseph Stalin." *Current History* 27 (February 1928): 691-92.

Woll, the Vice President of the American Federation of Labor, provides an account of the American Trade Union delegation's 9 September 1927 interview with Stalin and a critical commentary on the Soviet leader's replies to some of the questions on Soviet politics put to him by various members of the delegation. Among the questions to which Stalin responded are: Does the Communist Party control the Soviet government? In a one-party system, how can it be determined if the masses favor communism? How can the opinions of the proletariat and peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, find legal expression in the Soviet Union? How far can Soviet Russia cooperate with the capitalist industry in other countries? and What is the nature of the society which communism is trying to create? Woll's comments on Stalin's responses largely deal with how the Soviet leader's statements confirm that the Communist Party, in effect, runs "the so-called government of Russia"; that there is no freedom of expression in Russia; that labor unions are under the control of the Communist Party; and that the party dominates the communist international movement and uses it to conduct revolutionary propaganda in the United States and other capitalist countries.

496 Yekelchik, Serhy. "How the 'Iron Minister' Kaganovich Failed to Discipline Ukrainian Historians: A Stalinist Ideological Campaign Reconsidered." *Nationalities Papers* 27 (1999): 579-604.

This examination of the ideological purification campaign in Ukrainian historical scholarship carried out under the leadership of Stalin's trusted troubleshooter Lazar Kaganovich during his tenure as the head of the Ukrainian party organization in March-December 1947 takes aim at the claims made by post-Soviet Ukrainian historians who, in adopting the traditional Western concept of Stalinism as a totalitarian dictatorship in which society was but a passive object of an all-powerful state, have largely viewed the campaign as a comprehensive one "masterminded by Stalin, planned by his envoy Kaganovich, faithfully implemented by servile republican functionaries, and submissively endured by terrorized Ukrainian intellectuals." Drawing upon recently declassified archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, Yekelchik, in challenging these assertions, argues that the 1947 campaign against "nationalist deviation" in Ukrainian historiography was, in fact, initiated by Ukrainian republican leadership without Moscow's support; that at least some local functionaries were reluctant to sponsor a major ideological purge; and that Ukrainian historians were able to limit the scope of the denunciations pronounced against them

and to undermine the ideological authority of their immediate superiors as well. In addition to describing how the campaign lacked planning and coherence and was far from successful, Yekelchik discusses Stalinism as a system seeking to achieve total control over Soviet society but finding its ability to do so limited in the face of resistance marshaled by individuals who, in learning how “to speak Bolshevik,” proved to be capable of negotiating the meaning of the official Stalinist language to defend or promote their own agendas.

497 Yurechko, John J. “The Day Stalin Died: American Plans for Exploiting the Soviet Succession Crisis of 1953.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3, no. 1 (1980): 44-73.

Yurechko discusses how political leaders and foreign policy strategists in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, acting in accord with George Kennan’s prediction that the Soviet system would face a serious political crisis when Stalin died, developed the idea that the United States could exploit the inevitable Soviet succession crisis to seize the initiative in world affairs and force the Soviet Union into a defensive posture but nonetheless still failed to draw up any detailed plans to do so in advance of Stalin’s death, largely because they believed the contest for power within the Kremlin would be a prolonged one and that the pressures the struggle would exert on the Soviet system would be slow to manifest themselves. As a result, Yurechko shows, the Eisenhower administration was not prepared to take advantage of Stalin’s death in 1953.

498 Zubkova, Elena. “The Soviet Regime and Soviet Society in the Postwar Years: Innovations and Conservatism, 1945-1953.” *Journal of Modern European History* 2, no. 1 (2004): 134-52.

The stated goal of this article is to attempt to present the most characteristic tendencies of the Soviet Union’s development in the postwar years of the Stalin era—particularly with respect to the institutions of state and power, social processes, and ideological markers—by drawing upon the most significant works dedicated to the first postwar decade of Soviet history and new Soviet archival materials. Dividing her analysis into sections entitled “War and Soviet Society,” “Changes in the Power Structures and Administration,” “Ideological Innovations,” “Crisis of Expectations and the ‘Tightening of the Screws,’” “Social Programs and Military Ambitions,” and “Vision of the Future and ‘the Great Construction-Sites of Communism,’” Zubkova describes how the Stalin regime sought to restore the prewar Soviet system while taking into account the liberalizing tendencies that manifested themselves during the war and immediate postwar years. With respect to Stalin, Zubkova examines the changes that occurred in the relations between the dictator and his closest associates as his most senior colleagues gradually assumed secondary roles; the emergence of a core of new functionaries—Beria, Bulganin, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Khrushchev—who came to hold the key posts in the party and government; and Stalin’s formation of a “cadre ‘reserve’”—consisting of “secretaries” (party workers) and “technocrats” (managers)—as a counterweight to both the authority of the “old guard” and the influence of the “new core.” She also discusses how Stalin, having restored the strictly centralized vertical administrative system that existed in the prewar period and having retained his position at the center of the decision-making process, moved away from the mild ideological relaxations that took place during the war years and immediately afterwards, and launched a broad ideological campaign to discredit the Western way of life, instill fear of the West in the minds of the Soviet people, incite Soviet patriotic feelings, encourage the people to make further sacrifices in order to service the needs of the military-industrial complex, and dispel the liberal illusions of 1945.

Repression, Terror, and Purges

499 Agursky, Mikhail. “‘God’ Is Dead.” *Midstream* 31, no. 1 (January 1985): 38-41.

Agursky presents an account of how the growing wave of state anti-Semitism generated by the so-called doctors' plot in 1952-53 affected conditions at the Moscow technical institute, nicknamed "Stankin," which he attended, a school which he describes as one of the second-rate institutions open to Soviet Jews interested in higher education. He notes that with the death of Stalin, the situation at Stankin quickly returned to normal, and he credits the dictator's death with having spared "a new holocaust" for Soviet Jews. Agursky also describes the chaotic scene in central Moscow as throngs of Soviet citizens rushed toward Red Square in hope of seeing the body of the dead leader, and how hundreds were crushed to death in the excited crowd as people tried to move toward the site where Stalin's body was to be viewed.

500 Alexopoulos, Golfo. "Victim Talk: Defense Testimony and Denunciation under Stalin." *Law and Social Inquiry* 24, no. 3 (1999): 637-54.

Alexopoulos draws upon official Soviet documents regarding 500 case files of individuals who, having been identified as "anti-Soviet elements," were deprived of their political and economic rights, and who petitioned in the years between 1926 and 1936 for the reinstatement of those rights. While Stalin by name does not enter into Alexopoulos's examination of these records, in discussing the denunciatory speech that was part of the defense testimony of those who had been condemned as anti-Soviet elements, he explains how some of the Stalin regime's victims responded to their predicament by identifying another as an enemy in order to enhance their own self-image as an innocent, and, in this way, "transformed themselves from mere pawns to participant agents in the system of repression," helping to perpetuate the very policy that condemned them and showing how "a system of repression can be self-generating in most unexpected ways."

501 Argenbright, Robert. "Red Tsaritsyn: Precursor of Stalinist Terror." *Revolutionary Russia* 4, no. 2 (1991): 157-83.

Argenbright examines Stalin's regime in Tsaritsyn in 1918 with the aim of illuminating patterns of behavior in "Red Tsaritsyn" that would return in later years as fundamental features of Stalinist terror. Stalin's practices and behavior in heading the 1918 expedition to obtain food from the southeast to ease the food crisis in Soviet cities, in Argenbright's view, show him to be an inspired plotter, a resourceful handler of opportunists and sociopaths, and a man devious enough to uncover nonexistent conspiracies in order to do away with presumed threats, willing to foment chaos at critical moments, and eager to embrace terror as a means of rule. Other features of Stalin's actions in Tsaritsyn identified by Argenbright that presage the institution of terror under Stalinism include the execution of individuals who disagreed with the regime's policies or actions; the slandering of these individuals afterward; arrests conducted in a virtually random manner; charges applied on the basis of political or ideological grounds; and the use of torture and false promises of clemency to prisoners if they would implicate others as enemies of the Bolshevik regime. Neither Leninist ideology nor conditions in Russia made Stalinist terror inevitable, but rather "the regime of terror was a major social innovation, for which Stalin, far more than anyone else, must be held accountable," according to Argenbright.

502 Barmine, Alexander. "Russian View of the Moscow Trials." *International Conciliation* 337 (February 1938): 43-52.

In this critical commentary on the Moscow trials of 1938, a long-time Bolshevik who served in the Soviet government in various capacities and who quit his post as Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at Athens rails against Stalin's systematic extermination of the party figures who were Lenin's close associates and who helped to make the October Revolution possible and develop the USSR. Referring to what was then happening under Stalin's rule as "the greatest lie in the world and the greatest crime against the world workers' movement that has ever been known," Barmine lauds the record of Stalin's victims and describes the lengths to which the Soviet dictator has gone to reconcile the Soviet people to the trials and "to the club of the executioners who form the government."

503 Blackstock, Paul W. "The Tukhachevsky Affair." *Russian Review* 28, no. 2 (1969): 171-90. Blackstock traces the unfolding of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy—which allegedly aimed to replace the Stalin regime with a military dictatorship—from Stalin, its originator, through the émigré General Skoblin in Paris, to Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Nazi *Sicherheitsdienst*, who amplified the forged evidence by implicating the German General Staff in a "plot" to liquidate both Stalin and Hitler. He also describes the means by which the forged documents were returned to Moscow from Berlin, and how they were used by Stalin as a decisive weapon against the last potential source of leadership which could rival his own, clearing the way, in Blackstock's view, for him to implement his long-range plan to establish a working partnership with Hitler.

504 Brandenberger, David. "Stalin, the Leningrad Affair, and the Limits of Russocentrism." *Russian Review* 63, no. 2 (2004): 241-55.

Brandenberger contends that rumors of the formation of a Russian Communist Party played a much larger role in the enigmatic purge known as the Leningrad affair than is generally acknowledged in the scholarly literature on the subject. Drawing upon newly available Soviet-era archival materials, Brandenberger situates the purge within the cultural context of the postwar years, showing how the affair was closely related to Soviet ideological dynamics during this time, and how it "ultimately illustrates the nature and limits of official russocentrism over the course of the entire Stalin era." He also discusses why Stalin reacted with such suspicion and hostility to the idea of a Russian Communist Party, given the russocentric atmosphere of the late 1940s, and how the Leningrad party leadership misunderstood the official line on Russian ethnic leadership during the mid-to-late 1940s, coming to the mistaken, and evidently fatal, conclusion that Russian self-rule within the RSFSR was condoned.

505 Brumberg, Abraham. "Khrushchev and Stalin." *New Republic* 137 (12 August 1957): 10-13. Brumberg challenges the argument advanced by some commentators in 1957 that Khrushchev's move against the "anti-party" group headed by Georgi Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov bears comparison to the Great Purge of the 1930s, when Stalin moved to consolidate his personal hold over the party and state by eliminating his real and potential rivals for power. Unlike the case of Khrushchev's Kremlin shake-up, Brumberg writes, Stalin's terror was carried out by a secret police which he fully controlled, and the purges which he launched were directed not only against rivals but served as the midwife of "a social upheaval of staggering proportions" during which an entire generation of veteran Bolsheviks was eliminated and replaced by a whole new cadre of bureaucrats loyal to the Soviet dictator. Furthermore, the Khrushchev purge was not "a Stalinist-type 'vigilance' campaign but rather an act designed to better the lot of the Soviet population" by removing from positions of power a group accused of opposing measures that would improve the standard of living in the USSR. Where the Soviet population was trampled upon and intimidated during the Stalin purges, Brumberg continues, they find themselves, amidst the Khrushchev purge, in the unique position of being catered to and wooed.

506 Cassidy, Julie A. "Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights: Theatrical and Cinematic Modeling of Soviet Show Trials in the 1920s." *Slavic and East European Journal* 42, no. 4 (1998): 640-60.

This discussion of how the trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries in 1922 and the prosecution of those involved in the Shakhty Affair of 1928 incorporated the cinema and theater into legal propaganda and resulted in a shift in the paradigm of the Soviet show trial does not note any direct role played by Stalin in this development, but as a study of the legal melodramas which served as the precursors of the show trials of the 1930s, it sheds light on the techniques that were to be honed to virtual perfection during the Stalin regime's 1936-38 purge trials of such veteran Bolshevik leaders as Alexei Rykov, Mikhail Tomsky, and Nikolai Bukharin.

507 Cockburn, Alexander. "Beat the Devil." *Nation* 248 (6 March 1989): 294-95.

Cockburn reviews the debate among historians and demographers regarding the number of people who died as a consequence of the crimes of Stalin. He suggests that the figures on the number of Stalin's victims cited by Soviet historian Roy Medvedev and endorsed by the prominent Sovietologist Robert Conquest are significantly inflated. He criticizes those who draw from the high estimates of Stalin's victims to equate the Soviet leader with Hitler, and who tend to view those who disagree with their estimates as being "soft on Stalin." For commentaries on Cockburn's article by Paul Robeson Jr. and Robert Conquest, see "Stalin's Victims" *Nation* 248 (7 August 1989): 154, and (14 August 1989): 181-84. For further commentary on the Cockburn-Conquest debate, see Arch Puddington, "Alexander Cockburn: A Voice of Moderation." *National Review* 41 (24 November 1989): 27.

508 Cohen, Stephen F. "Bukharin's Fate." *Dissent* 45, no. 2 (spring 1998): 58-68.

Cohen draws upon terror-era Soviet archives to describe how Bolshevik leader and Marxist theorist Nikolai Bukharin spent his last years dangling between life and death in Lubyanka Prison as he haggled stubbornly over the terms of the confession his NKVD inquisitors were under orders to extract from him in preparation for the March 1938 Moscow trial that would eventually result in his admission of guilt for the preposterously false charges levied against him by Stalin. Cohen also discusses his discovery of four prison manuscripts written by Bukharin during his year of confinement (a collection of poems, a treatise on the culture of socialism, a theoretical work on Marxism, and an unfinished novel), and how the writings are laced with anti-Stalinism.

509 ———. "To Be Preserved Forever." *Nation* 261 (27 November 1995): 672+.

Cohen discusses the four prison manuscripts written by Bolshevik leader and theoretician Nikolai Bukharin during his 1937-38 incarceration in Lubyanka Prison while being prepared for trial as an "enemy of the people," photocopies of which Cohen was able to obtain, after considerable effort, from the Kremlin's Presidential Archive. Bukharin's prison writings, Cohen states, indicate that he was not "broken" during his year in Lubyanka, and that he did not actually "confess" to the crimes attributed to him at his March 1938 trial, but rather that "he ultimately agreed to participate in the grotesque spectacle in order to save his family and to speak publicly for the last time, in every Aesopian way available to him, about crucial, even anti-Stalinist matters." Cohen also comments on "Stalin's perverse need" for Bukharin's participation in the show trials; the likelihood that Bukharin gained permission to write in his cell through Stalin himself, "who was in turn Bukharin's essential and probably only reader"; and the need of historians to gain access to other important documents, including the typescript copy of the original trial transcript—which includes handwritten "corrections" by Stalin—and the records of Bukharin's initial interrogations in Lubyanka, in which he protested his innocence, in order to have a more complete understanding of Bukharin's struggle with Stalin as a condemned "enemy of the people."

510 Connor, Walter D. "The Manufacture of Deviance: The Case of the Soviet Purge, 1936-1938." *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 4 (1972): 403-13.

This study of the Great Terror of 1936-38 as a modern instance of the manufacture of deviance compares the nature, development, outcome, and limits of the Stalinist purge with campaigns against witches and heretics in England, Europe, and Puritan Massachusetts. With respect to Stalin himself, Connor discusses how the Soviet dictator's suspicions regarding opposition or potential opposition to his authority gave the initial push for the purge, and how, under the influence of Stalin's personality and arbitrary wielding of power, the secret police engaged in a campaign in which pressure from Moscow for ever-increasing vigilance promoted the detection of growing numbers of deviants, leading to "a spillover of victimization" and to a purge that had reached the limits of its elasticity as a repressive control system. In view of the fact that the deviance detected in the

purge was invented—that is, the victim's crimes were acts that had not yet taken place—the purge, Connor writes, may be viewed as a preemptive strike on potential opposition, but inasmuch as it made clear “the degree of political dissent that would be tolerated (nil), and the degree of personal security one might expect (relatively little) even if one were performing a responsible job to the best on one's abilities,” the purge may also reflect Stalin's desire to redefine Soviet society's behavioral boundaries.

511 Conquest, Robert. “Coming to Terms with the Past.” *National Review* 41 (10 March 1989): 14-16.

Conquest maintains that the statistics from recent Soviet sources regarding the number of Stalin's victims confirm the figures suggested years ago by the cumulative testimony of defectors, escapees, and others ill-affected by the Stalin regime—figures that were long considered to be unreliable by many Western scholars. Citing examples of Stalin's responsibility for Soviet deaths totaling over twenty million, Conquest considers the vast dimensions of the Stalin terror; the reasons why Westerners failed to believe such practices were possible; and the need for a better appreciation of the hideous effect that the terror had and continues to have on the Soviet people.

512 ———. “Comment on Wheatcroft.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 8 (December 1999): 1479-83.

Conquest continues here his critical dialogue with Stephen Wheatcroft over the reliability and significance of the Soviet documents Wheatcroft relies upon in his December 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article on the extent of the repression and mass killings under Stalin in the 1930-45 period. He counters the charges leveled against him by Wheatcroft in a March 1999 *Europe-Asia Studies* response to his earlier criticism of the December 1996 article; develops further his objections to Wheatcroft's interpretation of the documents in question; and argues, again, for the need for skepticism when dealing with such records and for the importance of non-documentary sources in investigating the scale of repression and mass killings during the Stalin era.

513 ———. “The Great Purge.” *Encounter* 31, no. 181 (1968): 80-91.

Conquest describes the scope and brutality of the Great Purge under Stalin and how Soviet materials that surfaced in the 1960s regarding this event confirm the reports about it provided by Soviet defectors. In discussing why so many Western analysts dismissed the writings of defectors as “anti-Soviet slander” and chose to ignore the overwhelming information available in the West on the extent and nature of the mass terror and the labor camp system, Conquest points to the unwillingness of liberal analysts to accept the very notion that the terror could be occurring, and to the ability of the Stalin regime to conceal from observers what, in fact, was happening in the camps to which prisoners were sent. Conquest sees those writers who abandoned their critical faculties in accepting the Stalin regime's massive falsification of every aspect of the Great Purge as “bearing some of the responsibility of accomplices in these political murders,” and he calls on scholars of all ideological persuasions to come to grips with the fact that the Great Purge was an unparalleled historical event, horrific in scope, and set the foundation for a new kind of state.

514 ———. “The Historiography of the Great Purges.” *Survey* 22 (1976): 157-64.

In this discussion of the historiography of the purges of 1937-38, Conquest argues that recent, more accurate dating suggests that the extent of the Moscow trials was on a scale greater than previously thought, and that the record of who was executed and when is inaccurate in a number of cases. New knowledge of various clandestine trial cases, inaccuracies in reporting the dates of entire trials, and discrepancies in listing the names of those executed and the dates of their execution, while still only fragmentary, “give additional perspective to our ideas about the depth and nature of the falsification carried out in the Stalin epoch and provide fresh insights into Stalinist methods during the era of the purges as well,” according to Conquest.

515 ———. "Lenin's Guffaw." *New Republic* 195 (15 September 1986): 18-20.

Bertrand Russell's claim that when he spoke with Lenin the Soviet leader "guffawed" at the thought of those who had been massacred by the Bolsheviks serves as a launching point for this indictment of Stalin as a dictator who was responsible for Soviet deaths on a massive scale, and who, in private, loved to hear accounts of the suffering and executions of his victims, all while publicly preaching humanism.

516 ———. "Unearthing the Great Terror." *Orbis* 33, no. 2 (1989): 239-46.

This introduction to a 27 November 1988 *Izvestia* article on the criminal investigation triggered by the discovery of mass graves in the Kuropaty Woods near Minsk, in the Belorussian Republic, treats the Kuropaty revelations as both a new phase in the Soviet campaign to tell the truth about the Stalinist terror and as a development which indicates that revisionist estimates on the number of Stalin's victims seriously understate the extent and significance of the Great Terror. The appended *Izvestiya* article, "The Truth about the Kuropaty," quotes a few pages from the court case dealing with this atrocity in order to recreate what happened at the Kuropaty Woods; portrays Stalin as being ultimately responsible for the 1937-41 Kuropaty executions; and calls for a public trial of Stalin, not to condemn anew the former dictator, but to prove that "socialism has nothing in common with Stalinism."

517 ———. "Victims of Stalinism: A Comment." *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997): 1317-18.

Conquest contends that Stephen Wheatcroft's estimates on the size of the gulag, the number of executions carried out by the Stalin regime, and the total number of victims of Stalinist repression, as stated in his 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article, "The Scale of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-45," are based on questionable statistics from Soviet sources that are both incomplete and incompatible with one another, and, therefore, the article is "fundamentally flawed." Wheatcroft also ignores some key statistics and dismisses other figures which do not fit his sources, is guilty of incorrect and unwarranted assumptions, and is reluctant to accept that Stalin consciously inflicted the 1932-33 massive famine that ravaged Ukraine, according to Conquest. For Wheatcroft's reply to Conquest's criticisms, see "Victims of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data—Not the Last Word" *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 2 (March 1999): 315-45; for Conquest's rejoinder, see "Comment on Wheatcroft" *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 8 (December 1999): 1479-83; and for a commentary on Wheatcroft's reply, see John Keep's "Wheatcroft and Stalin's Victims" *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999): 1089-93.

518 Cowley, Malcolm. "Echoes from Moscow: 1937-1938." *Southern Review* 20, no. 1 (1984): 1-11.

In this essay, American literary critic Malcolm Cowley writes about the reasons why he, like so many other politically conscious Western intellectuals—the so-called men of good will—failed to understand what was really happening at the Moscow show trials of 1937-38 and continued to endorse Stalin's policies despite the Soviet dictator's costly errors and unsympathetic personality. Among the reasons Cowley cites for his obstinate credulity during Stalin's purges are the sympathy toward Moscow generated by Stalin's support of the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War; the Soviet call for a collective front against Nazi aggression; the belief that, while there were flaws in the evidence presented at the show trials, the confessions of the defendants had to contain more truth than falsehood; and the acceptance of Stalin as the prime representative of the Russian Revolution, the ideals of which still held some attraction for many leftward leaning members of the Western intelligentsia.

- 519** Davies, R. W. "Forced Labour under Stalin: The Archive Revelations." *New Left Review* no. 214 (1995): 62-80.

Davies presents a summary of the data on the extent of forced labor available from Soviet archives as of 1995 and outlines what the archives have revealed about the number of deaths in the gulag system; the fate of Red Army officers during the Great Purge of 1937-38; the economic significance of forced labor, particularly in the NKVD industrial sector; and the dismantling of the forced-labor system in the years following Stalin's death. He also comments on the archive-based data of historians who have estimated the number of returning Soviet prisoners of war and other "repatriates" who were sent to labor camps and the total number of excess deaths under Stalin, including those who died during the years of collectivization and dekulakization, the famine of 1932-33, and the Great Purge of 1937-38.

- 520** Davies, Sarah. "Stalin, Propaganda and Soviet Society during the Great Terror." *Historian* 56 (1997): 24-29.

Davies makes use of the records of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the surveillance organs of the Communist Party to explore the evidence that amidst the terror which swept through Soviet society in the second half of the 1930s, and despite Soviet propaganda and censorship which worked to restrict the emergence of dissent, an alternative shadow political culture was able to survive in Stalin's Russia. Describing the mechanisms that enabled the Stalinist state to spy on its population, and the nature of the reports produced by the NKVD and the party's information-gathering network, Davies explains how the Stalin regime monitored and documented so-called anti-Soviet remarks. She notes that while it is not possible to establish how widely negative opinions were articulated during the terror period, official records clearly create a picture of recurring tendencies and themes within popular opinion which suggest that "the seemingly all-pervasive Soviet propaganda failed to eliminate dissonant opinion" and that "the terror failed to silence people altogether." In illustrating how dissonant opinions managed to survive at the grass-roots level, and how alternative views were circulated within Stalin's "totalitarian" system, Davies cites such forms of dissemination as rumors, personal letters, subversive leaflets, and popular culture, including anecdotes, political jokes, songs, and four-line ditties. While the existence of such dissent is not symptomatic of outright opposition to the Stalin regime, Davies concludes, the fact that "a shadow culture evidently flourished in the USSR even during the worst moments of Stalinist authoritarianism" calls into question the validity of the totalitarian model of Stalinism, according to which society under Stalin was atomized by an all-powerful state.

- 521** De Jonge, Alex. "A Semiotic Analysis of Notions of Guilt during Stalin's Terror." *Kodikas/Code-Ars Semeiotica* 11, nos. 3-4 (July-December 1988): 235-50.

De Jonge explores the ways in which the mythical universe of Stalinist discourse during the years of the terror operated according to modes of patterning consistent with the principles of semiotics developed by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, particularly with respect to how the terror created "a world of signs" that enjoyed a remarkable degree of independence from the world to which it purported to refer. He describes how the Stalinist security forces, in arresting people not for what they had done, but because they resembled, in some fashion, "the kind of person who *might* have transgressed," operated on the basis of a system incapable of detecting specific and actual crimes while privileging the relevance of "categories of similarity and difference" in determining the nature of the charges they leveled against and the substance of the confessions that they were to extract from their hapless victims. In addition to discussing the relevance of basic semiotic concepts to notions of what passed for guilt during the years of the great purges, de Jonge examines Stalin's role as the ultimate controller of the sign world of the terror; the relevance of Freudian concepts of displacement and condensation in establishing guilt in Stalin's system of terror; and the extent to which Stalin's twin compulsions to destroy anyone who might restrict his

power and to annihilate his archrival Leon Trotsky may have entered into the dictator's dream world and interacted with the world of the terror.

- 522** Dunlop, John B. "The Gulag Archipelago: Ideology or 'Point of View'?" *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars in the USA* 8 (1974): 20-26.

Dunlop discusses how Solzhenitsyn, in *The Gulag Archipelago*, attributes the evils of the Soviet system—including the use of repression and terror and the employment of a massive labor camp system to deal with "opponents" of the Soviet regime—to the brutal ideology of Bolshevism, rather than the aberrant personality of Stalin, the impact of which could be seen even in the early years of Soviet rule. He describes the book as "a kind of primer on how to resist a totalitarian state," one which suggests that in order to resist totalitarianism people must be armed with a viewpoint different from that preached by the reigning ideology, ideally a religious worldview, so that they are able to fight back spiritually.

- 523** Ellman, Michael. "The Soviet 1937 Provincial Show Trials: Carnival or Terror?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 8 (2001): 1221-33.

This paper draws from published archival documents and recent developments in social history to reconsider the 1937 provincial trials as discussed by Sheila Fitzpatrick in a 1993 *Russian Review* article entitled "How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces." He suggests that, contrary to Fitzpatrick's interpretation that the peasants had an important part in the show trials, the central party leadership played the determining role in the trials. The trials, Ellman maintains, were initiated by Stalin personally, most likely to recruit peasant support for his power and policies; NKVD personnel stage-managed the trials; and the main sentences were decided by Stalin himself—all of which point to the conclusion that "the peasants were mainly minor characters in a play written by someone else." Questioning both Fitzpatrick's contention that the trials failed to win the peasant support Stalin sought as well as the adequacy of her "carnival interpretation" of the trials, Ellman argues that the provincial show trials are best understood as a small yet highly visible part of the form assumed by the general terror of 1937-38 in rural areas.

- 524** ———. "The Soviet 1937-1938 Provincial Show Trials Revisited." *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 8 (2003), 1305-21.

Ellman draws upon recent research in Soviet era archives to add to his earlier critique of Sheila Fitzpatrick's interpretation of the 1938 provincial show trials, in her 1993 *Russian Review* article "How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces." While he commends Fitzpatrick for focusing scholarly attention on the *raion* show trials of 1937-38 and for demonstrating that the purpose of the trials was to arouse popular support for Stalin and his policies, he argues anew for Stalin as the architect of the trials, questions once more Fitzpatrick's emphasis on the role of the peasants in the trials, and asserts that the purpose of the trials was not simply to arouse popular support for Stalin and his policies, as Fitzpatrick writes, but rather to facilitate a very specific policy, the "kulak operation." The significance of the recent surfacing of evidence concerning the 1939 reversal of some of the verdicts in the *raion* trials also receives consideration in Ellman's article, as does the broader question of the relative merits of political and social approaches to understanding Stalinism.

- 525** Erlich, Victor. "World of the Gulag." *Dissent* 22 (winter 1975): 86-91.

Reviewing volume one of *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation* (1973), Erlich opens with a commentary on what the subtitle, "literary investigation," implies about Solzhenitsyn's procedure in blending history, political commentary, personal reminiscence, and eyewitness testimony in his exploration of Stalin's gulag. He then focuses on the ways in which Solzhenitsyn develops the theme that the evil done by the agents of the Soviet system

stems not from the totalitarian nature of the Stalinist state but rather from an all-embracing ideology—the Bolshevik version of Marxism—which gives the evildoers a justification for their acts. Erlich also notes that Solzhenitsyn's insistence on tracing the foundations of Stalinist arbitrariness and lawlessness, particularly the use of terror as the chosen "mode of persuasion," back to the time of the October Revolution, and his tendency to understate the differences between the Stalin and pre-Stalin periods in Soviet history have been questioned by some critics, but he maintains that, while "modulated political analysis is not Solzhenitsyn's forte," the "monstrous distinctiveness of Stalin's contribution emerges unmistakably" from Solzhenitsyn's massive documentation of the man-made hell within the world of the gulag.

526 Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces." *Russian Review* 52, no. 3 (1993): 299-320.

Fitzpatrick takes advantage of reports published in local and regional Russian newspapers to examine the provincial counterparts of the Moscow show trials of 1937. She describes how the themes and accusations featured in the trials were taken from denunciations and complaints sent by local peasants to the authorities; how the trials were a kind of political theater characterized by a "master plot," casts of characters, and scripts; and how the peasants, in effect, used the purge process to settle accounts with their former tormentors of the collectivization period. Fitzpatrick contends that the failure of peasant witnesses in the rural show trials to credit Stalin with bringing corrupt lower officials to justice, or even refer to him at all, reflects their belief that he was primarily responsible for their sufferings of the early 1930s, and that this belief may account for why they did not respond favorably to the efforts of Moscow to curry their favor through suggestions that if Stalin had only known about the malpractices of local officials he would have brought the abusers to justice. In Fitzpatrick's judgment, the perspective "from below" reveals the shortcomings of the view that the terror was carefully orchestrated by Stalin and inflicted on a passive populace powerless against the dictates of an all-controlling state. For a response to Fitzpatrick's views, see Michael Ellman's "The Soviet 1937 Provincial Show Trials: Carnival or Terror?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 8 (2001): 1221-33.

527 ———. "A Response to Michael Ellman." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 3 (2002): 473-76. Fitzpatrick replies to Michael Ellman's criticism of her 1993 *Russian Review* article, "How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of 1937 in the Russian Provinces," maintaining that Ellman misrepresents her argument in his rebuttal. In her effort to set the record straight, Fitzpatrick clarifies and defends some of the key issues she addressed in the article, including such questions as who initiated the trials? what role did local peasants play in shaping the themes and accusations featured in each trial? in what sense can the show trials be considered as "political theater"? and how should the peasants' reaction to the downfall of local officials be interpreted.? She also objects to Ellman's portrayal of her as a social historian who underestimates the importance of political history, explaining that her article belongs to the genre of cultural rather than social history, and describing herself as "a strong advocate of work on Soviet political history."

528 Flaherty, Patrick. "Stalinism in Transition, 1932-1937." *Radical History Review* 37 (1987): 41-68.

Flaherty examines the interplay of the two crucial dynamics among the various factors which engendered the centrifugal tendencies that the Stalinist central apparatus sought to combat in the mid-1930s and that triggered the terror of 1937-38. He explains how the winding down of the mobilization stage of Stalinism after 1931 gave rise to a new set of social contradictions, the first of which was the splintering of the party-state into a central apparatus determined to defend its authority and the emergence of increasingly assertive segments of the power elite within the state economic apparatus which, if allowed to entrench themselves into a corporatist infrastructure, could challenge the Stalin faction's effective authority; and the second being centered around a

generation spawned during Stalin's modernization offensive and an older revolutionary generation reverting to the oligarchical governing patterns of the New Economic Policy. Extrapolating to a national scale the pattern of terror in 1937-38 in the Abkhazian Oblast in the Georgian Republic, Flaherty illustrates how the terror, in accord with the dynamics of the pair of social contradictions he has identified, fell hardest on senior administrative cadre with an institutional or regional power base which empowered them "to assert a growing measure of autonomy from the central authorities," and affected most heavily the revolutionary generation which was "the vanguard of those forces working to bring about the corporatization of the new Soviet power structure. . . ." Describing the terror as "an executive coup against dissident elements of the power bloc to contain and cauterize the germs of an embryonic corporatism," Flaherty concludes that "without the blood purges, the central apparatus could never have consolidated the fluid social relations of the new state collectivist economy on its own autocratic terms."

- 529** Frye, Roland Mushat. "Hitler, Stalin and Shakespeare's *Macbeth*: Modern Totalitarianism and Ancient Tyranny." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 142, no. 1 (1998): 81-109.

Frye contends that much of what can be found under the terrorizing regimes of Hitler and Stalin can also be seen in Shakespeare's presentation of the medieval Scottish tyrant Macbeth, and that a number of traits characteristic of Macbeth are shared in common by the two twentieth-century dictators. Among the similarities shared by the two modern tyrants and the legendary Scottish king, in Frye's view, are a propensity for playacting, a tyrannical ruthlessness, a coarse and bullying pattern of behavior, a lust for domination and destruction, a drive for assurance and security, and a willingness to impose terror, ruination, and death on their own subjects in order to achieve their goals and govern their societies as they saw fit. While the terror inflicted by the two modern totalitarian rulers was on a scale unimaginable in Shakespeare's time, the kind of evil from which this terror emanated was addressed by the Bard in *Macbeth*, centuries before the Age of Totalitarianism, according to Frye.

- 530** Garrard, J. G. "Things Left Unsaid: Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*." *Books Abroad* 49 (spring 1975): 244-48.

This review of volume one of *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973) centers on Solzhenitsyn's effort to show that Soviet oppression is not limited to the reign of Stalin in general, nor to the Great Purge of 1937-38 in particular, but rather that it began, in virtually all of its forms, with the practices of Lenin and stems from an ideology, the Bolshevik variant of Marxism, which has provided a "justification" for the perpetuation of evil. Garrard also comments on how the book shines light on the magnitude and monstrous absurdity of what took place under Stalin, and on how Solzhenitsyn employs his literary talents in an effort to compel the reader to absorb the horror of what has happened under Soviet rule and "to endure a process of cathartic purification, which will then lead to a new resolve never to permit such things to happen again."

- 531** Getty, J. Arch. "Excesses Are Not Permitted: Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s." *Russian Review* 51, no. 1 (2002): 113-38.

Getty makes use of newly available party and police archives to examine the "kulak operation" carried out from mid-1937 to the end of 1938. He points out the ways in which the records lay bare the operation's poor planning and its careless and abrupt implementation, and indicate that local officials were active players in the process, helping to instigate and shape the campaign. Getty also considers the possible reasons for launching the kulak operation, Stalin's personal role in the campaign, and the existence of "a kind of dialectical relation between Stalin and peripheral officials in the mass terror operations."

- 532** ———. "Party and Purge in Smolensk: 1933-1937." *Slavic Review* 42, no. 1 (1983): 60-79.

Getty draws upon the Smolensk Archive, which contains the records of the party organizations of the Western Region from 1917 to 1939, and the contemporary Soviet press to investigate the nature of party controls in Smolensk during the 1930s. He suggests that, contrary to those who believed that by the 1930s a full-blown totalitarian regime existed in the USSR in which all lines of control converged in the hands of Stalin, party controls in Smolensk “were surprisingly weak in many respects and that the party was more inefficient than totalitarian.” He points to evidence of considerable administrative chaos in regional and local party committees and a consequent widening rift between Stalin and his provincial apparatus in arguing that the destruction of the regional bureaucracy authorized by Stalin in 1937 was “part of a dynamic and developing political situation in which the center tried to control and rationalize the regional administration” rather than part of a general witch hunt, as is often maintained. While Getty states that the traditional landmarks of the Great Purge do not seem directly related to the main events that took place during the course of the central-regional struggle, he believes that the timing of Stalin’s destruction of his own regional political machine strongly suggests that the Tukhachevsky affair and the subsequent liquidation of the military high command “may have been the catalyst for moving against the regional secretaries in a cataclysm of panic or paranoia.”

533 ———. “Samokritika Rituals in the Stalinist Central Committee, 1933-38.” *Russian Review* 58, no. 1 (1999): 49-70.

Getty takes advantage of recently released Soviet internal documentation to examine certain arraignment meetings of the Central Committee in the 1930s in an effort to understand their purposes by looking at them as rituals. He considers the cases of A. P. Smirnov (1933), A. S. Enukidze (1935), N. I. Bukharin (1936, 1937), and P. P. Postyshev (1938) in arguing that it was the job of ritual and performance within the Central Committee plenums to confirm the “norms of ideology and unity within and to the leadership itself” amidst the chaos and anxiety produced by the Stalin Revolution and to serve Stalin’s need to affirm and glorify his personal dictatorship. “Ritual and discourse were basic components, rather than optional tactics or functional components, of Stalinist politics, and suggest the inseparable connection between symbolic practice and politics,” according to Getty.

534 Getty, J. Arch, Gábor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov. “Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence.” *American Historical Review* 98, no. 4 (1993): 1017-49.

The authors makes use of newly available Soviet secret police records to document the scale of the repression under Stalin in the period of the Great Purge, showing how the data on the number of arrests, political prisoners, and executions, and on the general camp populations, tend to confirm the order of magnitude suggested by historians labeled as “revisionists” and challenged by those proposing high estimates. They describe how the data also argue against the contentions that the terror fell particularly hard on non-Russian nationalities and that most camp prisoners were “political” but confirm the judgments that the terror was aimed at the Soviet elite, that penal practice in the 1930s was uncertain, and that “much of the process was characterized by high-level confusion and by local actions in excess of central plans.”

535 Glasgow, George. “Mr. Stalin at Bay.” *Contemporary Review* 151 (March 1937): 357-68. Glasgow outlines the common features of the trials staged in Moscow from 1929 to 1937, including the levying of fantastic allegations against the accused, the “encouragement” of confessions by the defendants, and the launching of an intensive propaganda campaign after the trial urging the Soviet people to prepare for the possibility of attack by the forces of the “imperialist” powers. In discussing the sources of Stalin’s show trials, he emphasizes the dictator’s felt need to exterminate those perceived to be his enemies and to be constantly on guard against any loss of prestige, no matter how small.

- 536** Glavatskii, Mikhail. "Stalin, Vodka and Herring." *Russian Studies in History* 38, no. 4 (2000): 28-32. Translated by M. E. Sharpe from *Rodina* no. 9 (1977): 77-78.

Glavatskii presents a series of documents dealing with the 1934-35 case against V. K. Zyrianov, a geography teacher in Sverdlovsk whose sketch of Stalin deep in thought foregrounded by a bottle of wine and a "herring that had been picked over" was deemed to be counterrevolutionary. He briefly comments on the efforts of the investigators to detect in the drawing an anti-Soviet orientation intended to discredit Stalin in the eyes of the teachers and students to whom Zyrianov showed the portrait.

- 537** Goldfarb, Clare R. "Solzhenitsyn's Literary Experiment." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 75 (spring 1976): 173-81.

This review of *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation* (1973) centers on Solzhenitsyn's use of literary methods to explain the real world of the Stalinist camps from the point of view of both the prisoners and the state. Receiving most attention are Solzhenitsyn's explanation of how language became a tool that the state used to create a façade behind which it carried on a policy of terror; his use of old maxims and folk sayings in contexts where they gain new power; his reliance on an assortment of animal imagery to describe those caught within the prison system; and his employment of metaphor to convey the horrors of the gulag and to provide the figure—the archipelago—which unifies the book.

- 538** Grossman, Peter Z. "The Dilemma of Prisoners: Choice during Stalin's Great Terror, 1936-38." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 1 (1994) 43-55.

Grossman looks to Stalin's Great Terror for a setting to consider how a purge of great intensity might be self-limiting. He uses the case of a doctor who was the head of the local medical council of Kharkov and was interrogated by Stalin's secret police at the height of the Great Terror to show that "if prisoners implicate their interrogators and play what is called a 'transformation' strategy, they raise the cost of conducting the purge," thus making it difficult to sustain the purge for a long time.

- 539** Haslam, Jonathan. "Political Opposition to Stalin and the Origins of the Terror in Russia, 1932-1936." *Historical Journal* 29, no. 2 (1986): 395-418.

Haslam discusses the reasons for the terror the Stalin regime unleashed in 1936 in the light of fresh research into the social, economic, and political problems faced by Stalin at that time, describing how events and developments within and beyond the Soviet Union during the four years prior to the terror shaped the dictator's thinking on the need to eliminate the critics of his policies. Among the subjects Haslam considers in his analysis of political opposition to Stalin during the years under review are the Ryutin platform, reactions to the effects of Stalin's collectivization drive, the party purge of 1933-35, and discontent aroused over the regime's foreign policy, particularly the policy of collective security against Nazi Germany.

- 540** ———. "Why Rehabilitate Stalin?" *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no. 2 (1987): 362-67.

The core of this review article consists of a highly critical commentary on J. Arch Getty's *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938* (1985). Taking issue with Getty's claims to have drawn upon more reliable sources than his predecessors, to have used existing sources more reliably, to have taken an approach in examining the origins of the purges that is more comprehensive than the line he claims others have followed, Haslam suggests that Getty himself sometimes depends on unreliable sources, makes little use of Soviet secondary sources based on access to central party and state archives, and adopts an approach that is far less comprehensive than he claims. Taking Getty's treatment of the 1933 party purge as an illustration,

Haslam points out what he sees as a series of omissions, unfounded assumptions, and leaps in logic in Getty's version of the origin and purpose of the purge. He also contends that Getty's work suffers from the untested assumption that the role of Stalin's personality in affecting the events under study was less important than structural, institutional, and ideological factors, and from giving Stalin "the benefit of the doubt" wherever possible to the extent that his book has the net effect of rehabilitating the Soviet dictator. Haslam closes his review with a brief commentary on Robert Conquest's *Inside Stalin's Secret Police: NKVD Politics 1936-39* (1985), a work which Haslam claims lays itself open to Getty's barbs by relying upon the testimony of former Soviet security agents Alexander Orlov and Walter Krivitsky, but which nonetheless comes closer to explaining what actually happened during the purges than Getty's book does.

541 Heller, Michael. "The Gulag Archipelago and Its Inhabitants." *Survey* 20, nos. 2/3 (spring/summer 1974): 211-27.

Heller reviews the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* describing how Solzhenitsyn sketches the contours of the archipelago on the map of Russia and recounts the ways and means by which people came to be on its islands. Stating that, for Solzhenitsyn, the gulag is "the fruit of a system and the basis of a system, the expression of the political, economic and social impossibility of holding on to power without terror and camps," Heller describes how the book traces both the history of the process by which Soviet law, in effect, enshrined lawlessness, and the metamorphosis that took place within Soviet society as the people were reduced "to an obedient herd awaiting extermination." He also discusses what he considers to be the best chapter of the book, "That Spring," which deals with the fate of Soviet soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the Germans and who, upon their return home, were declared traitors and sent to labor camps—a measure which Solzhenitsyn attributes to Stalin's desire "to preserve the prewar 'curtain' which separated the land of the Soviets from the rest of the world." The moral code espoused by Solzhenitsyn, one which holds justice and truth in higher regard than life itself and which sees the torments and sufferings of the gulag's victims as "a trial of the human spirit, a necessary part of its purification and strengthening" in a society which is amoral on principle, also receives consideration in Heller's review.

542 ———. "Gulag Archipelago, Volume 2: Life and Death in the Camps." *Survey* 20, no. 4 (autumn 1974): 152-66.

Heller continues his review of *The Gulag Archipelago*, this time commenting on volume two of Solzhenitsyn's trilogy in which the intolerably hard labor, the terrible starvation, and the tyranny of camp authorities are the main focal points. While Heller comments at length on Solzhenitsyn's analysis of the many and varied aspects of camp labor and on the panorama of camp life the book provides, he primarily describes Solzhenitsyn's account of the conflict between camp inmates unwilling to work and overseers trying to squeeze as much labor as possible out of the convicts; Solzhenitsyn's treatment of the questions of the economic viability of the camps; his analysis of the psychology of the archipelago's inhabitants; and his satirization of "Soviet officialese, the basis of Soviet ideology, which occurs in condensed form in the language of Stalin."

543 ———. "Gulag Archipelago, Volume 3. Outlines of the Future." *Survey* 22, no. 1 (winter 1976): 165-76.

Heller reviews the final volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* which contains the last three parts of the book—"Penal Servitude," "Exile," and "Stalin Has Gone." He outlines Solzhenitsyn's account of conditions in penal labor camps—later called "special camps" and viewed by Solzhenitsyn as the highest point in the development of Stalin's gulag and its most cruel manifestation—and his description of the forms of mass resistance by prisoners and of how the initial acts of resistance by prisoners came as a complete surprise to the authorities. Heller also provides a brief commentary on the final chapter of the book in which Solzhenitsyn develops the position that the archipelago is

unlikely to change with Stalin's death, largely because "the society which engendered it and with which it has a blood relationship has remained immutable." He maintains that the reason why the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was so horrified at *The Gulag Archipelago* and has taken such grave measures in its fight against the book "was not so much because it told the truth about the past as because it foretold the future and revealed the outlines of that future."

- 544** Hook, Sidney. "A Bolshevik Reconsidered: The Case of Comrade Bukharin." *Encounter* 43, no. 6 (1974): 81-92.

This review essay on Stephen Cohen's *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 1888-1938* (1973) includes an exploration of the question of whether Stalin was Lenin's genuine political disciple or his nemesis who perverted his legacy and transformed his vision into a nightmare. According to Hook, while there was a cruelty and ruthlessness about Lenin's behavior toward those he regarded as enemies, and he was not ill-disposed toward executing those hostile to the Bolsheviks, Stalin added a dimension to terror that went beyond anything Lenin ever conceived, turning the machinery of terror against the party itself and employing terror in a vindictive and irrational fashion. Hook also discusses Cohen's contention that Bukharin's fear that the Soviet regime would be imperiled by factional strife within the party's leadership proved to be his undoing at the hands of Stalin.

- 545** ———. "Geniemoral." *Midstream* 30 (May 1984): 33-36.

Hook relates a 1935 conversation he had with German dramatist and poet Bertolt Brecht about Stalin's arrest and imprisonment of Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and other members of the opposition on charges of involvement with foreign powers and complicity in the 1934 assassination of Leningrad party leader Sergei Kirov. Brecht replied to Hook's statement of indignation about the arrests by saying that, "As for them (Zinoviev and Kamenev), the more innocent they are, the more they deserve to be shot," and he refused to clarify what he meant by such an outrageous assertion. Hook places Brecht's statement within the context of the writer's well-known loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union, and he discusses the misrepresentation of his conversation with Brecht by Eric Bentley, a disciple and admirer of Brecht, and the misinterpretation of the meaning of Brecht's statement by Hannah Arendt, who, in a 1969 essay in *The New Yorker*, attempted to show that Brecht was not a firm apologist for Stalin's terror.

- 546** Hopkins, Mark W. "Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev: Three Concepts of the Press." *Journalism Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (1965): 523-51.

The first part of this study of the shaping of the Soviet press system centers on how Lenin, through his emphasis on the role of the press in achieving and maintaining political power and by his establishment of the concept of a centralized press whose function was to propagate Bolshevik doctrine, set forth the principles that were to become the foundation of the party's view of the press. The second part deals with how Stalin amplified and instituted the most repressive elements of Lenin's press theory, building a press system that incorporated oppression, dullness, repetition, and censorship. The third section shows how Khrushchev, like Stalin, had nothing really original to propose to Soviet press theory but, in contrast to Stalin, allowed for some loosening of controls so that Soviet newspapers could, to some extent, serve as a forum of ideas. Overall, Hopkins emphasizes that under all three leaders a fundamental flaw in Soviet press theory remained, namely, that "the press, while freed from those abuses rising from private ownership of the mass media, became subject to another master, a dictatorial political party."

- 547** Humphrey, Caroline. "Stalin and the Blue Elephant: Paranoia and Complicity in Postcommunist Metahistories." *Diogenes* 49, no. 2 (2002): 26-34.

Humphrey analyzes certain contemporary narratives among Buryats of Russia and China regarding the Stalinist persecution of Buryat Buddhists, describing how, in these accounts, political lead-

ers, Stalin included, appear as reincarnations, destined to unleash terrible events. Humphrey suggests that Buryat Buddhists, in their effort to explain the Stalinist repressions, are creating a narrative of displacement in which “the actions attributed to another (in this case Stalin) are in some way ‘about’ oneself.” She maintains that the reincarnation tales, which are silent about the question of local participation in the repressions, highlight “the crucial moral issue erased by socialist metahistory, the ethical problem of individual accountability,” and she suggests that the tales reveal “an uneasy, and probably unconscious, identification with Stalin.”

548 Ihanus, Juhani. “Water, Birth and Stalin’s Thirst for Power: Psychohistorical Roots of Terror.” *Journal of Psychohistory* 29, no. 1 (1999): 67-84.

This psychoanalytical study of the origins of Stalin’s thirst for power keys on the role played by the damaging effects of the young Dzhugashvili’s despotic upbringing and the restrictive practices of his instructors at the Tiflis Theological Seminary. The abuse Stalin suffered in his early years, Ihanus writes, made him a callous, bitter, and distrustful individual who, in response to deep-seated feelings of persecution, dreamed of becoming an all-powerful, avenging hero who would seek to redress injustice in its various forms. The feelings of shame, anger, and rage held by the youthful Dzhugashvili impacted the leadership style and policy of oppression of the adult Stalin, with the dictator’s brutal policies becoming manifestations of his power-driven fetishes and as a restaging of previous traumas, according to Ihanus.

549 Keep, John. “Recent Writings on Stalin’s Gulag: An Overview.” *Crime, Histoire and Sociétés* 1, no. 2 (1997): 91-112.

Keep evaluates a number of works written by historians in the former Soviet Union and the West on Stalin’s gulag as Soviet archival records became more readily available under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost. He constructs a typology of the recent literature and summarizes what the new studies have revealed about such topics as the categorization of prisoners in the gulag, the size of the convict population, mortality rates in the prison camps and colonies, and the ethnic allegiance of those exiled to the gulag. He argues for the need to integrate the descriptive, literary, and statistical approaches that have characterized the stages of writing on Stalin’s gulag; considers the merits of juridical and moral approaches to dealing with the question of the crimes committed in the gulag; and comments on the need for critical scrutiny in making use of the official data which has become available on the gulag.

550 ———. “Wheatcroft and Stalin’s Victims.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999): 1089-93.

Keep critiques Stephen Wheatcroft’s 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article, “The Scale of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-1945,” pointing out what he sees as a series of discrepancies in the statistics contained in the sources Wheatcroft cites in his effort to determine the population of the gulag camps; the incomplete nature of the data Wheatcroft relies upon; and the pitfalls of treating currently available “official” sources as definitive when trying to determine the number of Stalin’s victims.

551 Kuromiya, Hiroaki. “Stalinist Terror in the Donbas: A Note.” *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 157-61.

Kuromiya draws on data found in the Central State Archive of the National Economy of the Soviet Union in Moscow and local newspapers in the Donetsk region of the Ukrainian Republic to provide some concrete figures on the number of victims of the 1936-38 state terror under Stalin in the Donbas—the nation’s leading coal-mining area. The terror, Kuromiya explains, virtually decimated the Donbas party leadership and claimed the lives of at least a quarter of the senior officials in the Donbas coal-mining industry, yet these individuals comprise only a small percentage of the

total number of victims of a terror that found “enemies,” “wreckers,” and “saboteurs” across a wide range of groups in the Donbas population.

- 552** Lang, Sean. “Terror under Stalin.” *Modern History Review* 14, no. 3 (February 2003): 12-15.

Part of the *Modern History Review*’s “Aiming High” series, this article provides guidance for students wishing to address the question, “To what extent did Stalin’s rule remain faithful to the principles of Bolshevism in the years 1929-41?” The article also offers guidance on how to use sources to research this question, listing brief excerpts from the works of noted scholars Robert Conquest, Allan Bullock, and Mary McAuley, and asking a series of questions regarding how to compare and cross-reference the information and viewpoints presented by the three authors.

- 553** Lenoe, Matt. “Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?” *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 3 (June 2002): 352-80.

This review article on the question of Stalin’s responsibility for the 1934 murder of Sergei Kirov, head of the Leningrad party organization, examines in detail the evidence pointing toward Stalin’s complicity in the crime and the analysis of this event advanced by various historians. Focusing on the interpretations developed by Russian scholars Alla Kirilina and Oleg Khlevniuk, and by Amy Knight, in *Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin’s Great Mystery* (1999), Lenoe lends his support to the case made by Kirilina and Khlevniuk, namely, that the conventional narratives of Stalin’s complicity in Kirov’s assassination are almost entirely false and that “ordering a hit on Kirov did not make political sense for Stalin, nor did it fit with the *modus operandi* of Soviet politics in the mid-1930s.” The fact that the interpretations of Kirilina and Khlevniuk are based on extensive research in newly opened Soviet archives, whereas Knight’s argument, which favors Stalin’s responsibility for Kirov’s murder, relies more on second- and third-hand accounts transmitted by word of mouth, Lenoe argues, makes the evidence for Stalin’s innocence more credible than the long-standing stories of his guilt in the affair. In the broad scheme of things, the question of Stalin’s complicity in Kirov’s assassination is not a matter that is central to the history of the Soviet Union in any case, according to Lenoe.

- 554** Letkemann, Peter. “Mennonite Victims of ‘The Great Terror,’ 1936-1938.” *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 16 (1998): 35-58.

Letkemann draws upon his interviews and correspondences with Mennonite men and women in North America and Europe about their memories of the Stalin terror of 1936-38 to record the names of Mennonite victims and the circumstances of their arrests, interrogation, exile, and execution to attempt to answer the question of why these people were arrested and to counter the view of those scholars who maintain that the terror fell most heavily on Soviet political, economic, and military leaders, with Russians being targeted more often than non-Russian minorities. According to Letkemann’s estimates, the ratio of arrests for the Mennonite population during the terror was approximately nine percent, considerably higher than that of the general Soviet population and double the ratio put forward by Robert Conquest, a leading authority on the terror. Letkemann suggests that the arrest ratio of Mennonites was relatively high because Mennonite-Soviet relations had suffered during Stalin’s collectivization campaign—since the Mennonites were largely prosperous and therefore branded as kulaks and anti-communists—and had further deteriorated with Hitler’s rise to power and the consequent rumors spread by the Stalin regime about the existence of a vast underground of German spies and saboteurs within Soviet society.

- 555** “Mad Fascist Dogs Meekly Admit Plot to Kill Stalin with Aid of Reich Secret Police.” *Newsweek* 8 (29 August 1936): 10-11.

Newsweek describes the proceedings of the August 1936 trial of sixteen men, including veteran Bolshevik leaders Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, accused of plotting to overthrow the Stalin

regime and kill Stalin and his loyal aides, noting how the defendants, in confessing to the crimes attributed to them, wrangled with one another and heaped accusations on exiled Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky. The article also cites the closing statement of prosecutor Andrei Vishinsky and the tearful response of the defendants to his accusations and his call for the court to sentence them to death.

556 Madievski, Samson. "The Doctors' Plot." *Midstream* 49, no. 6 (September/October 2003): 9-13.

Madievski presents a history of "the doctors' plot," an alleged conspiracy of a "group of doctor-saboteurs" who, according to the 13 January 1953 TASS special bulletin that announced the conspiracy, aimed to cut short the lives of party and military leaders "by means of pernicious treatment," and who were in league with a front organization established by American intelligence for the purpose of conducting a wide range of espionage, terrorist, and other subversive activities within the USSR. Madievski describes how the doctors' affair got under way; Stalin's personal role in the investigation and in convincing his entourage that he had uncovered the secret intrigues of his enemies; the likelihood that the Soviet dictator—a man in the grips of a "full-blown persecution complex" and tormented by a fear of a global terrorist conspiracy whose goal was his extermination—came to believe in the existence of a doctors' conspiracy which had, in fact, originated in his own mind; the propagandistic hysteria and wave of arrests that followed the official announcement of the plot; and the reactions to the whole affair within the Soviet Union and beyond. Madievski also comments on whether "the doctors' plot" indicated that the country was facing both a new bloody purge in the upper echelons of power and the deportation of Jews from European Russia to Siberia and the Far East. A brief discussion of the Kremlin's rehabilitation of the condemned doctors following Stalin's death closes out the article.

557 Malia, Martin. "A War on Two Fronts: Solzhenitsyn and the Gulag Archipelago." *Russian Review* 36, no. 1 (January 1977): 46-63.

This wide-ranging review of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's monumental three-volume work *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973-75) addresses such subjects as the trilogy's account of the process that moved individuals through "the Soviet 'meat-grinder'"; its analysis of the historical developments that brought Soviet society from the October Revolution to the holocaust of Stalinism; the approach taken by Solzhenitsyn in his effort to pass judgment not just on the camps but on the Soviet regime and communism as well; and, most notably, the overall pattern of Solzhenitsyn's opinions on the many issues he addresses. Reducing this pattern to a set of "theses," Malia describes how Solzhenitsyn argues for the enormity of the evil perpetuated by the Soviet regime, for the essential continuity between Leninism and Stalinism, and for Marxism-Leninism as the root source of the scourge that overwhelmed Russia under Soviet rule. While Malia refrains from entering into the debate over the philosophical position which underlies *The Gulag*, he comments briefly on Solzhenitsyn's effort to displace the false postulates of Soviet ideology with a religious theory of evil and original sin, and on the range of reactions to the book in Russia and the West.

558 Mandel, Ernest. "Solzhenitsyn, Stalinism and the October Revolution." *New Left Review* 86 (July-August 1974): 51-61.

Mandel has a few kind words to say about Alexander Solzhenitsyn's ability to bring Stalin's crimes to light in *The Gulag Archipelago*, about the series of vignettes through which Solzhenitsyn sketches the personalities he met while an inmate in prison and the camps, and about how the book offers a thorough condemnation of institutionalized repression as a system of government. The majority of his review, however, is devoted to a sharp critique of Solzhenitsyn's claim that the institutionalized terror and the absence of law and legality began not with Stalin but rather at the time of the October Revolution; that Stalin was the continuer of Lenin's Bolshevism; that all communists were politically defenseless against Stalin and collaborated in the terror of the 1930s

and 1940s; and that Marxism, in breeding ideological fanaticism, is the root source of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist terror in the Soviet Union. In pointing out what he sees as the contradictions in Solzhenitsyn's thought, the inconsistencies in his moral stance, and his disregard for basic historical facts, Mandel offers his own explanation for the Stalinist terror, one which, in line with the thinking of Leon Trotsky, argues for Stalinism as the product of the victory of political counter-revolution in the Soviet Union and as a betrayal of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.

559 McNeal, Robert H. "The Decisions of the CPSU and the Great Purge." *Soviet Studies* 23, no. 2 (1971): 177-85.

McNeal discusses the Soviet Communist Party's deliberations and decisions from January 1933 through the February-March plenum of 1937 regarding the purge of party members. He contends that the direction, tone, and persistence of the efforts of the Central Committee's members during this time indicate that there was a plea within the committee to normalize legal proceedings against those accused of being "enemies of the people"; to require the secret police to present adequate evidence of wrongdoing before a party member could be expelled, and to consider those who were overzealous in exposing and punishing enemies of the people were themselves the real class enemies. While this defensive effort of communist bureaucrats to safeguard law and order within the party could not be realized in the face of Stalin's opposition and the basic value system of the party, their efforts serve to confirm "the claims of official post-Stalin historiography that the party, and especially its Central Committee, resisted the most dangerous attacks of the Stalin purge against the party," according to McNeal.

560 Medvedev, Roy. "On Gulag Archipelago." Translated by Tamara Deutscher. *New Left Review* 85 (May-June 1974): 25-36.

In this review essay on the first volume of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*, the author, a prominent Soviet dissident historian, attests to the accuracy of the main facts the book presents in detailing the life and torment of those who were imprisoned in Stalin's gulag and commends Solzhenitsyn for the immense artistic investigation he has undertaken; for bringing to light much of which was previously unknown about one of the main sectors of the Stalinist regime; and for helping his readers comprehend the whole criminal inhumanity of Stalinism as a system. Medvedev, however, disagrees with a number of Solzhenitsyn's judgments and conclusions, including his minimization of Stalin's personal role in the creation of the archipelago and in the tragedy of the 1930s; his contention that Stalinism flowed directly from the political practices and framework of relations between party, state, and society created under Lenin; and his assertion that Marxism-Leninism was responsible for the perversions of Stalinism. Medvedev also sees little merit in Solzhenitsyn's own proposals for building a human moral community based upon religion and belief in God, arguing instead that Russia's future society should be based on the unity of socialism and democracy which the Russian Revolution aspired toward and which Stalinism betrayed through a bloody counterrevolution.

561 ———. "Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*." Translated by George Saunders. *Dissent* 23 (spring 1976): 155-63.

Medvedev acknowledges the artistic and social significance of the second volume of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* and its preeminence among Soviet literature on the communist regime's concentration camps. The main focus of his review of *The Gulag*, however, is on the fundamental shortcomings of the book, most of which he feels emanate from the one-sided and categorical nature of Solzhenitsyn's judgments and opinions and the lack of a solid foundation for many of his general observations. Chief among these shortcomings, in Medvedev's view, are Solzhenitsyn's equation of the political camps of the civil war period with those of Stalin's time; his categorization of all the revolutionary Bolsheviks as criminals who got what they deserved in

Stalin's purges of the 1930s; his judgment that the Soviet people submitted with pleasure to the Communist Party and Soviet government and therefore deserved the unhappy fate they suffered under Stalin; his contention that directives were issued to make things easier for the communist prisoners in the camps; and, most importantly, his identification of socialism with Stalinism and his consequent failure to understand that "socialist convictions can be the basis for a genuinely humanist set of values and a profoundly humane morality" which can provide humanity with a firm guarantee that the crimes committed under Stalin will never be repeated.

562 Medvedev, Zhores A. "Stalin and the Atomic Gulag." *Spokesman* no. 69 (2000): 91-111.

Medvedev presents a detailed account of the establishment and development of the atomic gulag in accord with a series of decisions approved by Stalin personally. He describes the sacrifices that the tens of thousands of prisoners sent to the camps in the gulag were called upon to make, the dangers with which the prisoners had to cope, and the problems and mishaps that further threatened their lives, including the failure at the atomic plant in Chelyabinsk in January 1949 which developed into a "radioactive catastrophe" exceeding that of Chernobyl, the extent of which remained secret until 1995. He also comments on Stalin's role in the decision to segregate those who once worked as slave labor in the atomic gulag from the rest of the Soviet population, and on the connection between the Stalinist political/economic model of the state and the wholesale use of forced labor for the atomic bomb project.

563 Methvin, Eugene H. "The Unquiet Ghosts of Solzhenitsyn's Victims." *National Review* 41 (1 September 1989): 24-25+.

Methvin presents an account of developments in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s concerning the further exposure of the extent of the political repressions and executions carried out by the Stalin regime, including articles in the Soviet press about the discovery of a mass grave in the Kuropaty Woods near Minsk containing an estimated 102,000 bodies; the airing on national television of a documentary film equating Stalin with Hitler; and the emergence of the Moscow movement called Remembrance which has worked to present a full account of Stalin's terror, called for a memorial to Stalin's victims, and pushed for the holding of a formal trial on Stalin's crimes.

564 Morris, Wayne. "Stalin's Famine and the American Journalists." *Continuity* 18 (1994): 69-78.

Morris considers why foreign journalists in Moscow during the famine of 1932-33, by and large, failed to report on the immense catastrophe that raged in the Soviet countryside, and why some American reporters not only misled their readers about this tragedy but tried to conceal its extent and even attempted to denigrate those few correspondents who told the truth about what was taking place in Ukraine and the North Caucasus region. Keying on the coverage provided by Walter Duranty, who was the chief correspondent for the *New York Times* in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s, and whose reports earned him a Pulitzer Prize in 1932, Morris indicts those foreign journalists who, by failing to write about what they had heard or otherwise learned about the Stalin famine, not only participated in a conspiracy of silence but became propaganda instruments of the Stalin regime by simply reporting summaries of the Soviet press regarding the collectivization campaign and conditions in the countryside or by failing to inform their readers that dispatches from Moscow passed through the hands of Soviet censorship and therefore reflected the Kremlin's official position. Morris states that while foreign journalist faced expulsion from Russia if they filed reports about the famine, and Duranty in particular risked loss of a lucrative position in Moscow which had made him an international celebrity if he gave an accurate account of what was occurring in the famine region, the potential loss of a job is wholly unacceptable as a rationale for assisting the Kremlin in its cover-up of the famine.

565 "The Moscow Purges: The 'Great' Djughashvili." *International Peasant Union Monthly Bulletin* (March/April 1953): 20-30.

566 Muggeridge, Malcom. "Stalin's New Purge." *Fortnightly* 146 (October 1936): 437-44. Muggeridge considers the possible reasons for the execution of Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kameney, including Stalin's belief that it was necessary "to chasten the Communist Party's spirit in readiness for the introduction of a new constitution"; his desire to terrorize and execute all who had at once accepted leadership or avowed sympathy with the ideas of his exiled political rival Leon Trotsky; and his need to nip in the bud opposition to his rule which might arise if war with Germany were to break out. He writes that, while each of these considerations may have played a role in Stalin's new purge, ultimately "once the principle of government by fear is accepted, fear becomes the prevailing emotion and terror, often unreasonable in its choice of victims, becomes the order of the day until it consumes itself."

567 Norlander, David J. "Origins of a Gulag Capital: Magadan and Stalinist Control in the Early 1930s." *Slavic Review* 57, no. 4 (1998): 791-812.

Norlander examines the growth of the Dal'stoi labor camps, established in the 1930s in the Magadan region of the Soviet Far East, and explains how this infamous subdivision of the gulag was administered and politically controlled. He contends that while the remote location of Magadan and the general inefficiency and incompetence of the Soviet bureaucracy were a major hindrance to close supervision of the Dal'stoi camps, Stalin managed, through various means, to retain "close oversight of the distant agency from its very birth" and to maintain "a preponderant control over Magadan throughout the 1930s." In view of the degree of control Stalin managed to exercise over decision making regarding administrative, economic, and labor matters in the camps, and in light of his ability to establish a system of surveillance to ensure obedience to his directives aimed at the distant camps, the legacy of Magadan raises serious questions about revisionist interpretations which privilege overt recalcitrance or independence on the part of regional officialdom in their study of the relative forces involved in the center-periphery relationship between Moscow and the provinces, according to Norlander.

568 Nove, Alec. "Terror Victims—Is the Evidence Complete?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 46 (1994): 535-37.

Nove points out the limitations of the figures on the level of political arrests and executions under Stalin gleaned from Soviet archival documents by V. P. Popov and published in a 1992 *Otechestvennye arkhivy* article on the state terror in Soviet Russia during the period 1921-53. While Popov's numbers may include nonpolitical cases classified as "political" and his archival sources may have underestimated the number of "political condemnations" imposed by ordinary courts, the statistics Popov presents on the total number condemned by the political police from 1921 to 1953 (4,060,306) and the number shot during this period (799,455) may still be considered to be close to the truth, indicating that estimates made in and out of Russia which name much higher figures have to be revised downward, according to Nove.

569 Orlov, Alexander. "Ghastly Secrets of Stalin's Power." *Life* 34 (6 April 1953): 110-12+; 34 (13 April 1953): 160-62+; 34 (20 April 1953): 142-44+; 34 (27 April 1953): 145-46+.

In this four-part series of excerpts from the book *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (1953), the author, a former NKVD general who broke with Stalin in 1938 and defected to the West, sets forth his version of the inside story of the 1936-38 purges. Stalin, Orlov writes, arranged for the assassination of Leningrad party boss Sergei Kirov and then arrested leaders of the opposition once headed by the exiled Lev Trotsky and charged them with Kirov's murder; orchestrated and micromanaged the details of the show trials of such leading Bolsheviks as Lev Kamenev, Grigori Zinoviev, and Nikolai Bukharin; and then ruthlessly silenced the secret police who staged the ju-

ridical murder of his political enemies. Orlov also provides a number of anecdotes about Stalin's personal behavior and describes Stalin's relationship with the leading members of his entourage, including Vyacheslav Molotov, Andrei Vishinsky, and Georgi Malenkov.

570 Paloczi-Horvath, George. "The Theoretical and Legal Origins of 'Stalinist Terrorism.'" *Review* 4, nos. 2/3 (1962): 21-31.

571 Pavlova, I. V. "Contemporary Western Historians on Stalin's Russia in the 1930s." *Russian Social Science Review* 42, no. 6 (2001): 4-31.

Pavlova critiques the revisionist approach of contemporary Western historians in their study of Stalin's Russia in the 1930s, arguing that the revisionists' minimization of the scale of the Great Terror, emphasis on the participation of Soviet society in the events of the 1930s, and contention that the Stalin regime had less control over society than it imagined amounts to a depreciation of the responsibility of the regime's top echelon for the horrors of the 1930s. She comments on the problems that attend the tendency of the revisionists "to attribute absolute worth to the official documents of the Stalinist period," and she discusses the drawbacks of an approach to the study of Soviet society of the 1930s that uses "the yardstick of Western civilization and an understanding of state and society that prevails in the West."

572 Penner, Peter. "Breaking the Silence." *Journal of American Historical Society of Germans from Russia International* 25, no. 3 (2002): 1-6.

In this address before the Calgary Chapter of the American Historical Society, the author describes the suffering Stalin inflicted upon the Soviet people—especially on Germans in Russia—in implementing his programs to collectivize and industrialize the USSR and during the terror of the 1930s; the Stalin regime's cover-up of the crimes it committed; and how the regime's brutal policies and practices were eventually brought to light. Penner also discusses the ways in which recently opened Soviet archival records present opportunities for further disclosures of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by Stalin and his followers. He calls upon Germans from Russia interested in researching the fate of their countrymen who suffered at the hands of the Stalin regime to help to recover the records that lie in various archival deposits of the former Soviet Union and to become familiar with the publications of Russian historians who have conducted research in some of these archives.

573 Pistrak, Lazar. "Khrushchev and the Purges." *Problems of Communism* 11, no. 1 (1962): 21-27.

This excerpt from *The Great Tactician*, a biography of Nikita Khrushchev, deals with the reasons why Stalin chose Khrushchev to be his vicar in Ukraine and the steps taken by Khrushchev in liquidating the "enemies of the people" during his leadership of the purges in Ukraine in 1938. Pistrak also describes how Khrushchev attempted to ingratiate himself with Stalin not only by way of his ruthlessness during the purges but also by avoiding self-promotion as the political boss of Ukraine, reserving for Stalin the status of "vozhd" of the Ukrainian people. Despite his critical role in the Ukrainian purges, Khrushchev, Pistrak writes, still managed to put on a mask of indignation in his February 1956 "exposure" of Stalin's criminal abuse of power.

574 Popov, V. P. "State Terror in Soviet Russia, 1923-1953." *Russian Social Science Review* 35, no. 5 (1994): 48-70.

The official documents in the archives of the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and of Justice and in the Office of the Procurator General serve as the basis for this examination of criminal statistics in the Russian Republic for the years 1923-53 for the twin purposes of determining the total number of persons convicted in the RSFSR during this period and providing a more complete picture of the nature of the Stalin regime's repressive policies. Establishing that nearly forty

million people were convicted of crimes during these years, Popov describes how the Stalin regime used accusations of crimes as a pretext for what amounted to the systematic extermination of various social groups and strata as a means of securing the regime's power, and how the Stalinist hypothesis that a sharpening of the class struggle accompanied progress in building socialism was adopted as "the principal social law in an attempt at a theoretical justification of the unceasing repression against the people."

- 575** Pringle, Robert W. "Modernization of Terror: The Transformation of Stalin's NKVD, 1934-1941." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17, no. 1 (spring 2004): 113-23.

This analysis of the 1934-41 transformation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) draws primarily upon newly published biographical records of Russian secret police personnel and several recent institutional histories of the secret police to describe Stalin's reconstitution of the security service by purging older professionals and replacing them with better educated younger men, leading ultimately to the mutation of the corps of service personnel "from Leninist believers to Stalinist technicians of power." Pringle examines the character and make-up of three generations of NKVD leaders—those headed by Genrikh Yagoda (1934-36), Nikolai Yezhov (1936-38), and Lavrenti Beria (1939-53)—maintaining that the first generation gave way to the second largely because Stalin came to doubt the loyalty of the NKVD and felt it incompetent to pursue the purging of the Communist Party; that the second was decimated as Stalin and his closest associates came to believe that they had lost control of both the police and the purges, and may have blamed the NKVD; and that the third generation headed a "new NKVD," one staffed with men more able to help run the Soviet state and better equipped to handle the growing expansion of the security police's domain of action during the wartime and postwar years.

- 576** Puddington, Arch. "Denying the Terror Famine." *National Review* 44 (25 May 1992): 33-36.

Puddington lends his support to the theory that the 1932-33 Ukrainian famine was an act of terror engineered by Stalin to crush Ukrainian national aspirations, annihilate its independent-minded peasantry, and destroy the Ukrainian people's will to resist Soviet domination—an interpretation endorsed by Robert Conquest's study *The Harvest of Sorrow* (1986). He also attempts to deflate the arguments advanced by Sovietologists who have challenged Conquest's views, particularly the charge leveled by some that the idea of the terror-famine was concocted by a Ukrainian nationalist lobby straining to cloak its own history of both Nazi collaboration and anti-Semitism and eager to propagate the myth of injury at communist hands and to fan the flames of the Soviet-American Cold War.

- 577** Reed-Purvis, Julian. "The Party That Ate Itself." *History Review* 40 (September 2001): 13-18.

This exploration of the genesis of the Great Terror deals with the respective roles of party attitudes, the purge of 1933-34, the Ryutin platform, and the Kirov affair in triggering the terror as well as with Stalin's personal responsibility for the terror campaign. Framing his discussion within the context of the interpretations of this event advanced by representatives of the "intentionalists" and "revisionists" schools of thought on the purges, Reed-Purvis locates the terror's roots in the example set by Lenin with respect to the infallibility of the party and the handling of intraparty dissent; in the feelings of insecurity felt by Stalin and his supporters as the country slumped into the chaos during the First Five-Year Plan; and in the catalytic effect of the murder of Leningrad party boss Sergei Kirov in 1934.

- 578** Rees, E. A. "The Great Terror: Suicide or Murder?" *Russian Review* 59, no. 3 (July 2000): 446-50.

Rees examines J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov's *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (1999), a book which contains 199 hitherto unpublished documents from Soviet Communist Party archives, accompanied by an extended commentary in which the authors, in attempting to explain why the terror took place, advance the argument that the purges did not occur according to some master plan devised by Stalin but rather were shaped by a number of factors and unfolded in a series of stages, the outcome of which could not be foreseen. While Rees notes the value of the documents contained in the book, the contribution the book makes to illuminating an episode in Soviet history which still remains obscure, and the attractiveness of the interpretation that Getty and Naumov offer, he nonetheless questions the authors' explanation of the hesitations and retreats which they detect in Stalin's approach toward the terror, their assertion that Stalin was constrained by limits on his own power, and their case for the responsibility of Stalin's deputies for the purges—even though they stood in awe of him, were in no position to contradict him, and were subject to his ability as a tyrant to compel them to act in accordance with his will.

579 Reiman, Michal. "Political Trials of the Stalinist Era." *Telos* no. 54 (winter 1982-83):101-13.

Reiman traces the history of the show trial phenomenon from the trials of the early 1920s aimed at the ideological opponents of the Bolsheviks; to the trials of the late 1920s and early 1930s aimed at economists, engineers, and technicians accused of industrial sabotage; to the trials of the late 1930s targeting prominent Bolsheviks; and, lastly, to the trials of major political figures in Soviet bloc countries after World War II. Arguing that the Soviet leadership approached the show trials in a different manner from repression in general and for the lack of any official justification that can fully account for the trials, Reiman examines the trials as political events. He discusses the unique methods of investigation and courtroom examination that characterized the trials; the content and legal inadmissibility of the charges levied against the defendants; the extensive publicity which accompanied the trials; and the use of the trials as an instrument of mobilizing the masses in support of the Stalin regime's specific goals—all of which, for Reiman, point to the conclusion that the authorities were never interested in the "crimes" of the defendants but rather in confirming the theses on which each particular trial was based. Stalin was, from the start, predisposed towards the abuse of power and imposition of force, but, out of concern for maintaining the moderate image he had cultivated for tactical purposes, did not utilize political trials extensively until the advent of the economic and social crises of the late 1920s and did not take advantage of the full political power of this weapon until he had eliminated the moderates from the ruling circle of the Communist Party, according to Reiman.

580 Rittersporn, Gábor T. "Stalin in 1938: Political Defeat behind the Rhetorical Apotheosis." *Telos* no. 46 (1980-81): 6-42.

The Great Purge of 1936-38, according to this study, was not a punitive enterprise inflicted victoriously from above by Stalin but primarily an intense internal struggle within the state apparatus resulting from the need to ensure the smooth functioning of its administrative, economic, and political machinery. Separating "real Stalinism," meaning Stalin's Stalinism, from verbal Stalinism, meaning "the official account that obsessively appealed to a single authority to legitimate what in reality could be diametrically opposed political initiatives," Rittersporn describes how this internal struggle involved antagonistic strategies at the center of the apparatus of which genuine Stalinism was just one unsuccessful variant. For Rittersporn, Stalin, far from being the prime mover of the violent convulsions within the state-party, was "merely the leading figure of one of the conflicting tendencies" in the internal struggle of an apparatus seeking to perfect itself, a fact overlooked by Sovietologists who, misled by "a ritual invocation of Stalin's name to legitimate every political initiative," too quickly "identify the particulars of the regime's internal mechanisms with his irresistible will."

- 581** ———. “The State against Itself: Socialist Tendencies and Political Conflict in the USSR, 1936-1938.” Translated by Brian Singer. *Telos* no. 41 (fall 1979): 87-104. First published in *Libre* 4 (1978): 3-38.

Stalin by name does not figure prominently in this article, but as a study of the internal conflicts within the Soviet ruling strata during the Great Purges of 1936-38, specifically the clash between the Soviet state’s “centrifugal tendencies” and the leadership’s desire to maintain strict central control, it calls into question the viability of the view that Soviet society of this era was dominated by a bureaucratic apparatus whose empire extended over all activities and functioned in line with the will of one man—Stalin.

- 582** Roberts, Geoffrey. “‘Stalin’s’ Terror? New Interpretations.” *Modern History Review* 6, no. 4 (1995): 18-20.

Roberts describes how new evidence that has come to light from Soviet archives casts doubt on the “intentionalist” theory of the Great Terror of the 1930s, according to which Stalin was the prime mover behind a terror which enabled him to assume complete control over the Soviet Union. Briefly outlining the “decisionist” interpretation of the purges and the terror, Roberts cites new research suggesting that the main events of the terror were largely the result of a series of unconnected decisions; that the Stalin leadership lost control of the terror it was attempting to use for its own political purposes; that the magnitude and scope of the repression of the 1930s were unforeseen and unintentional; and that Stalin’s power was consolidated not with the launching of the terror but rather only after he had brought it to an end.

- 583** Rosefielde, Steven. “Documented Homicide and Excess Deaths: New Insight into the Scale of Killing in the USSR during the 1930s.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997): 321-31.

New demographic evidence and NKVD criminal homicide data confirm that, contrary to the claims of scholars J. Arch Getty, Gábor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov that no more than two million people could have perished at the hands of the Stalin regime of the 1930s, at least 5.2 million people, classifiable as excess deaths, perished during the thirties, according to Rosefielde. In support of his interpretation of the lethality of Stalinism, Rosefielde reviews the data provided by new Soviet archival sources; explains why the new criminal and demographic evidence can be pooled to prove that excess death calculations are accurate estimators of the scale of killing under Stalin; and describes the relationship between excess deaths and Stalinist homicides. While the new archival revelations do not shed light directly on how many people were killed intentionally on political grounds or perished as a consequence of Stalin’s brutal policies, Rosefielde writes, the scale of slaughter indicated by homicide verified excess deaths suggests that the number of deaths due to political repression and Stalin’s economic policies is far greater than the figures cited by those historians who deny that the scale of Stalinist lethality was “Orwellian” in its sweep.

- 584** ———. “Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 6 (September 1996): 959-87.

Rosefielde casts doubt on the reliability of newly released NKVD materials dealing with various aspects of Stalinist oppression during the 1930s. He points out a number of internal inconsistencies in the NKVD data—particularly regarding homicides and prison camp populations—and how the data, aside from doubts about their provenance, merely provide a lower threshold for one class of Stalinist homicides, which, when combined with new documentary evidence on other killings, verifies the estimates made by those scholars who have maintained that the human costs of Stalinism were Orwellian in their magnitude. The new evidence also shows, for Rosefielde, that Stalin’s economic program of the 1930s was a record of colossal failure made even more dismal in view of

the human consequences of collectivization, forced industrialization, and the terror, and was responsible, ultimately, for the economic stagnation that led to the implosion of Soviet communism—all of which calls into question, in Rosefielde's view, the relatively favorable characterization of the methods, economic achievements, and human costs of Stalinism offered by such scholars as J. Arch Getty, Gábor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov.

585 Scheffer, Paul. "From Lenin to Stalin." *Foreign Affairs* 16, no. 3 (April 1938): 445-53.

Scheffer presents a series of tables that list the names and fates of the members of the Politburo and the *Sovnarkom* (Council of People's Commissars) and other individuals close to Lenin at the time of the Bolshevik leader's 1924 death, and then discusses the reasons why none of the "old timers" really near to Lenin were eliminated by Stalin during the early years of his rule. He contends that the trials and liquidation of the Bolshevik old guard resulted from a premeditated and carefully-timed plan conceived by the ever-cautious Stalin to retaliate against "Lenin's group" for the condescending attitude its members adopted toward him while Lenin still ruled and to strengthen his grip on the party by eradicating any "monuments of a past that did not bear his mark."

586 ———. "Stalin's Revenge." *Fortnightly* 147 (March 1937): 257.

Scheffer places the 1937 trial of Karl Radek within the context of the long and lingering process of Stalin's revenge against those Bolshevik leaders who, in the early years of the party's history, viewed him as a crude and ignorant provincial and treated him with disdain, and who he considered to be "chattering" Europeanized intellectuals ignorant of what was necessary to both win and secure power. He also discusses how the spectacular show trials of 1936-37, through which Stalin was able to humiliate and strike down those who had belittled him, reveal both the dictator's utter indifference to the civilized world's notions of law as well as his intention to concentrate on securing his own power within the Soviet Union rather than on working with Britain and France to promote the cause of peace in a Europe threatened by fascist dictators.

587 Schmemmann, V. Rev. Alexander. "On the Gulag Archipelago." *Transactions of the Association of Russian-American Scholars in the USA* 8 (1974): 15-19.

Stalin per se does not figure into this assessment of the meaning of *The Gulag Archipelago*, but as a commentary which approaches Alexander Solzhenitsyn's epic work in terms of what is seen as the book's true message—what happens to humanity and to the world when man and life are reduced to ideology—Schmemmann's analysis shines light on how Solzhenitsyn, in his assault on Bolshevism, the October Revolution, and Stalinism, locates the evil done by the Soviet regime in the very nature of ideologies as such and suggests that liberation can come only when man rids himself of the ideological approach to life itself.

588 Schwarz, Fred C. "Communism—Murder Made Moral." *American Mercury* 84 (April 1957): 92-97.

The Executive Director of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade describes Joseph Stalin and Lazar Kaganovich as the greatest murderers of all time whose foul deeds emanated from the fundamental ideas of communism, a doctrine which, in essence, "makes murder a moral act." Schwarz also criticizes Nikita Khrushchev for denouncing Stalin's murder of "good communists" while ignoring the dictator's murder of millions of kulaks, entire ethnic groups, and countless numbers of other Soviet citizens. He contends that the crimes of the Stalin era did not stem merely from the triumph of brutal men within the Communist Party but rather from "the fact that Communism turns men into brutes."

589 Shearer, David R. "Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD during the 1930s." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 42, nos. 2-3-4 (2001): 505-34.

Shearer makes use of central state and party archives and NKVD records to examine the background to the mass repressions of 1937 and 1938, describing the mechanisms, social context, and motivation for this operation, and the politics of policy formation at the apex of the NKVD, the party, and the Soviet state. Revising his own previous assessment of the mass repressions as a response to an ongoing social crisis, Shearer contends that the 1937-38 operations, while similar in their focus and operational procedures to earlier campaigns against marginal populations, criminal elements, so-called kulaks, and a host of other categories of suspect people, were aimed at suspected anti-Soviet elements, primarily in rural areas, which, in accord with Stalin's belief that enemy states might attempt to organize rear-guard uprisings if war broke and hostile powers such as Germany and Japan invaded the Soviet Union, were considered to be sympathetic with, or under recruitment by, oppositionists working with foreign agents bent on organizing socially disaffected populations into a fifth-column force. The fear of Stalin and other Soviet leaders that war with the fascist states was likely, their long-standing fear of political opposition and social disorder, and their growing xenophobia combined to give the campaigns of mass repression of 1937-38 their particular characteristics and virulence, including their targeting of significant numbers of national minorities, according to Shearer.

590 Sherlock, Thomas and Vera Tolz. "Debates over the Number of Stalin's Victims in the USSR and in the West." *Report on the USSR* (8 September 1989): 10-15.

Sherlock and Tolz outline the historical debates of the late 1980s over the question of Stalin's repressions and the number of his victims. In critiquing the conflicting interpretations regarding this subject advanced by leading Soviet reformists, conservative Russian nationalists, and Western scholars, the authors point out that all the estimates of the population losses under Stalin, owing to the lack of solid statistical data, are essentially speculative and many are made by people who are involved in ideological rather than demographic debates. An accurate picture of demographic losses under Stalin awaits the release of state records—particularly those of the courts and the KGB—data from the 1947 census, and additional information about the reliability of the published census of 1939, Sherlock and Tolz conclude.

591 Shernock, Stanley Kent. "Continuous Violent Conflict As a System of Authority." *Sociological Inquiry* 54, no. 3 (1984): 301-29.

Shernock presents an analysis of several models of how authority can be maintained by structuring reality through continuous violent conflict. Drawing upon the case of Stalin as a means of examining the morphology of a continuous conflict within a particular societal context, Shernock describes how Stalin, in seeking to eliminate potential threats to his problematic leadership before they became present dangers, practiced a terror which fluctuated between periods of intensification and relaxation, with the Soviet people "routinizing evil" as they focused on degrees of terror rather than questioning the policy of terror itself. Stalin's public documentation of the "threat" to which the terror was a response by providing an official definition of reality favorable to enhancing the legitimacy of his regime also receives consideration in Shernock's analysis as does the public's complicity in the terror by opting for the lesser of two evils—endorsement of the arrests and punishments rather than exposure to persecution due to lack of vigilance or cooperation. "As public complicity in the terror through repeated compliances conjoined with the official definition of reality, Shernock writes, "commitment to the leadership and system was acquired."

592 Shoskes, Henry. "Stalin's Prisoner in Mexico." *Saturday Evening Post* 223 (16 June 1951): 24-25+.

Shoskes discusses the circumstantial evidence linking Stalin to the August 1940 murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico City by a man calling himself Jacques Mornard. Shoskes writes that, while professional investigative agencies, including the FBI, Scotland Yard, and the Gestapo, have

failed to uncover the factual evidence of Stalin's complicity in Trotsky's murder, Stalin, who may well have feared that Trotsky still posed a threat to his leadership, clearly had the motivation along with the means to instigate the assassination and most likely was responsible for it.

593 Solomon, Peter H., Jr. "Soviet Penal Policy, 1917-1934: A Reinterpretation." *Slavic Review* 39, no. 2 (June 1980): 195-217.

Solomon analyzes Soviet penal policy during the years 1917-34, showing how the progressive penal policy adopted and implemented in the 1920s—meaning a policy which reflected the reform ideas and ideals then common in Western penology—gave way in 1929 to a much more severe policy in accord with Stalin's reliance upon criminal repression as an instrument for achieving economic goals. With the subordination of penal policy to economic ends, Solomon explains, came a series of edicts identifying new crimes, most of which were promulgated in response to the various forms assumed by peasant resistance to the collectivization campaign. These edicts required the imposition of drastically higher penalties on their offenders, including more frequent awarding of prison terms, a significant increase in the length of prison confinement, and a more liberal application of the death penalty. Solomon also shows that while Stalin, in reversing the penal policy followed under the New Economic Policy, used criminal repression as an instrument for dealing with opponents of unpopular policies and deemed convict labor to be an exploitable economic resource, Stalinist penal policy, until 1941, "coexisted with a significant remnant of the earlier policy, the lenient use of noncustodial sanctions for hundreds of thousands of ordinary criminals."

594 Soloveytschik, George. "Whither Stalin?" *Contemporary Review* 153 (February 1938): 148-57.

Soloveytschik discusses the unfolding of the Stalin purges of the 1930s, describing their pattern and the extent to which they decimated the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and the Red Army. Commenting on the possible sources of the purges, he discounts the view that Stalin had to be mentally deranged to act in such a brutal and seemingly illogical fashion, and suggests instead that the purges emanated from the dictator's refusal to tolerate any potential or embryonic rivals around him, and that once he began resorting to the use of the purge as a political tactic he felt "compelled to go on, lest one day he should himself fall a victim of this ghastly terrorism."

595 "'Soso' Strikes." *Literary Digest* 123 (19 June 1937): 10-11.

This brief report lists the names and duties of the eight Red Army generals executed for treason on Stalin's orders in June 1937 and repeats some of the rumors then circulating in Moscow regarding why eight of Soviet Russia's most prominent military leaders were put to death.

596 Souvarine, Boris. "Last Conversations with Isaac Babel." Translated by Adrienne Foulke. *Dissent* 28 (summer 1981): 319-30.

This account of the author's conversations with Soviet writer Isaac Babel in Paris in 1932 and again in 1935 includes a number of anecdotes cited by Babel about Stalin's leadership style, particularly with respect to the way he mistreated his subordinates and disposed of those he believed were no longer of any use to him. Babel, who was arrested by the Soviet secret police on 15 May 1939 and disappeared thereafter, also comments on the likelihood of Stalin's responsibility for the suicides of a number of prominent figures in Soviet society and for the murder of Leningrad party leader Sergei Kirov on 1 December 1934.

597 Thurston, Robert W. "Fear and Belief in the USSR's 'Great Terror': Response to Arrest, 1935-1939." *Slavic Review* 45, no. 2 (1986): 213-34.

Thurston examines the pattern that emerges from recollections of the Great Terror provided by Soviet memoir literature for insights into people's response to arrest, either their own or others', and whether the arrests created a system of terror in which fear held the population in check and ensured its loyalty. The various reactions to arrest revealed in the memoir literature, according to Thurston, indicate that people who remained at liberty often felt some event in the backgrounds of the detained individuals justified their arrests; that only those who were arrested believed that the innocent were being widely persecuted; and that the sense that anyone could be next was largely absent—all of which suggests that general fear did not exist under Stalin in the late 1930s and that claims made by various writers of pervasive fear and a system of Stalinist terror that affected the majority of the Soviet population are unacceptable. See Robert Conquest's "What Is Terror?" for a critical commentary on Thurston's evidence and conclusions; and "On Desk-Bound Parochialism, Commonsense Perspectives and Lousy Evidence" for Thurston's reply to Conquest's criticisms, *Slavic Review* 45, no. 2 (1986): 235-44.

598 ———. "Social Dimensions of Stalinist Rule: Humor and Terror in the USSR, 1935-1941." *Journal of Social History* 24, no. 3 (1991): 541-62.

Thurston aims to improve understanding of Soviet social cohesion and personal relations in the span of the Great Terror by examining the incidence and nature of jokes in Soviet society during this time along with the points of contact and encouragement for private laughter in the humor officially permitted by the Stalinist state. Focusing on political humor, particularly jokes about Stalin, his regime, the political police, and Soviet life in general, Thurston shows that private humor, complemented by Soviet official humor, thrived in the 1930s, with anecdotes about economic defects and low standards of living being more pervasive than those about the terror or lack of civil liberties. Close examination of the social dimensions of both official and unofficial humor, Thurston believes, suggests that the Soviet people maintained the ability to laugh and have close personal ties through the Stalin terror, indicating that Soviet society was not nearly as badly off during the terror as some standard works on the subject maintain, particularly with regard to the levels and kinds of trust that operated in society and the degree of social cohesion they imply.

599 Tolz, Vera. "Archives Yield New Statistics on the Stalin Terror." *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 36 (7 September 1990): 1-4.

In this review of the archive-based findings presented by Soviet historian Alexander Dugin, in a 1990 article regarding the numbers and types of prisoners and exiles under Stalin, the author commends Dugin for shedding light on the dimensions of the Stalin terror, particularly regarding the number of people sent to NKVD labor camps in 1937 (roughly one million) and the number of inmates executed (approximately 480,000) in 1937 and 1938. Tolz also offers some conclusions about the data published in 1990 by *Vechernii Leningrad* regarding those shot in 1937 and buried in mass graves near Leningrad, most notably that very few of the victims were party members, most were Russians, the vast majority were male, and the names of the victims are often grouped territorially, suggesting that that is how the NKVD collated the data and conducted the executions.

600 ———. "How to Run a Show Trial: The Stalin-Molotov Letters." *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 36 (7 September 1990): 4-5.

Tolz comments briefly on the insights provided into Stalin's central role in orchestrating the terror in the USSR by the recent publication of letters written in 1930 and 1933 by Stalin to Vyacheslav Molotov and to secret police head Vyacheslav Menzhinsky. The letters, Tolz explains, show that Stalin gave the OGPU (secret police) detailed instructions about the exact content of the testimonies to be extracted from the defendants in three important 1930-31 cases—"the trials of the 'Labor Peasants Party,' the 'Industrial Party,' and the 'Union Buro of the Mensheviks.'" The letters also indicate that Stalin alone "dreamed up" the cases, and that he intended to use the testimonies

of the “saboteurs” and “plotters” against top Soviet officials he wanted to dispose of or keep under strict control.

- 601** ———. “Publication of Archive Materials on the Stalin Terror.” *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 32 (10 August 1990): 12-16.

Tolz describes the shortcomings of the Soviet publication of archival materials on Stalin’s terror, citing the limited nature and imbalances in the documents released on such issues as Stalin’s connection to the assassination of Leningrad party head Sergei Kirov in 1934, the number of people who died as a result of Stalin’s repressions, and the overall scale of the terror. According to Tolz, the three main sources of the deficiencies in the publication of archival materials are the desire of the CPSU leadership and the KGB to keep certain materials secret for ideological and political reasons; the toll taken by bureaucratic inertia on the opening of the archives; and the inexperience of Soviet historians in working with archives and in “knowing what to look for and where to look.”

- 602** Traina, Mira and Grigorii Kravchik. “The ‘Lawyers’ Plot’: An Unknown Chapter of Stalin’s Last Repressions.” *Soviet Union* 13, no. 2 (1986): 217-32.

The authors discuss the circumstances surrounding Stalin’s March 1949 launching of a political campaign against “cosmopolitanism” in Soviet legal science which led to the condemnation of prominent Soviet legal scholars on such grounds as prostrating themselves before bourgeois science, revision of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine on a host of issues, and neglect of the role of the Russian people and state in the history of the peoples of the world. They describe the fate of the professors unjustly accused of these “crimes” and how the war waged against the “cosmopolitans” in legal science laid the groundwork for the case against the so-called “jurist-wreckers” which, beginning in February 1953, targeted a group of well-known attorneys in Moscow of Jewish nationality and which represented another link in the chain of anti-Jewish cases fabricated by the security organs. Traina and Kravchik also discuss the post-Stalin exposure of the groundless nature of the anti-Jewish cases, including the so-called doctors’ plot; the secret police’s execution of the falsely convicted Valentin Lifshitz after Stalin’s death so that he could not reveal the truth about the case of the “jurist-wreckers”; and the subsequent sparing of the lives of the other intended victims in the case.

- 603** Tromly, Benjamin. “The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, no. 5 (July 2004): 707-29.

Tromly contends that the so-called Leningrad affair (1949-53)—the most destructive purge of the Soviet elite in the last decade of Stalin’s rule—is best viewed as an effort by Stalin and some members of his entourage to uproot the patronage network in the Soviet party-state elite. Taking aim on the interpretations that explain the fate of the Leningraders in terms of their ideological differences with Stalin, the threat posed by their desire to create an institutional base for the Russian nation, or Stalin’s long-standing dislike of Leningrad as a potential alternative base of power in the USSR, Tromly, in privileging the role played by patronage politics in structuring the Leningrad purge, draws on the documents of the Committee for Party Control (KPK)—the agency which was responsible for enforcing innerparty discipline and which played a major role in orchestrating the Leningrad affair—to show how the KPK located and purged party members who, because of their patron-client ties to the victims of the Leningrad Affair, were suspected of belonging to the “Leningrad anti-party group.” In addition to explaining the affair as the product of Stalin’s suspicion of the patronage network comprised of officials with personal ties based on their work in Leningrad, Tromly also discusses how high-level patronage network politics became more prominent in the postwar than in the prewar Stalin period, and how the actions of Stalin and his close associates indicate that they clearly understood the role of patron-client bonding in Soviet politics.

- 604** Tsao, Roy T. "The Three Phases of Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism." *Social Research* 69, no. 2 (2002): 579-619.

This examination of the three distinct phases of Hannah Arendt's thought on Nazism and Bolshevism, as expressed in her classic study *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1966, third edition), that correspond to the three successive phases of the book's composition includes a discussion of her interpretation of Stalin's terror, his ideological reasoning as a practitioner of "total domination," and the overall correlation between terror and ideology in the behavior of the Stalin regime as compared to the regime of Hitler.

- 605** Tucker, Robert C. "On the 'Letter of an Old Bolshevik' As an Historical Document." *Slavic Review* 51, no. 4 (1992): 782-85.

Tucker opens with a description of Nikolai Bukharin's March-April 1936 meetings in Paris with Mensheviks Boris Nicolaevsky and Theodor Dan, and of Bukharin's fears at that time regarding the direction in which Russia was heading under Stalin's leadership. He then examines the article written by Nicolaevsky—which took the form of a letter penned by an anonymous "old Bolshevik"—and which aimed to convey to the world some understanding of "the dread events afoot in Russia." He sees the prime value of the "Letter" as a historical source as resting in its account of events leading up to the Great Terror. The depiction of Stalin in the "Letter," Tucker believes, lessens its value as a historical source because, rather than shedding light on the course Stalin was actually pursuing in the turning-point year of 1934, it portrays him as "the object of a 'fight for his soul'" waged between hard-liners and proponents of "reconciliation with the people," and, in so doing, overlooks the distinct possibility that for political self-interest, Stalin may have endorsed some elements of the reconciliation line while preparing in secret "the impending transformation of the elite by terror in the late 1930s."

- 606** ———. "Stalin, Bukharin, and History As Conspiracy." *Dissent* 12, no. 2 (spring 1965): 253-87.

Tucker draws upon a number of Soviet documents to argue that Stalin personally conceived, initiated, and directed the 1938 Moscow trial at which Nikolai Bukharin was the main defendant. He describes how Stalin managed to blend real facts and incidents into "a gigantic texture of fantasy" from which emerged the great counterrevolutionary conspiracy Bukharin was charged with leading. He also considers the extent to which the trials were driven by a paranoid-like logic stemming from Stalin's sincere belief that criticism of himself or his policies was tantamount to treason, and the connection between the purge trials and Stalin's need to soften the shock that a treaty of alliance with Hitler, for which he was then preparing, would administer to Soviet public and world communist opinion. The conduct of Bukharin during the trial, including why he confessed to a mythical conspiracy and how he sought to turn the tables on Stalin "in a brilliant display of Aesopian language in his final statement," also receives consideration in Tucker's examination of what is widely considered to be the culminating episode in Stalin's show trials of the 1930s.

- 607** Uldricks, Teddy. "Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs." *Slavic Review* 36 (June 1977): 187-204.

Uldricks describes the destruction of the Soviet diplomatic corps during the Great Terror in an attempt to establish the impact of the terror on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (*Narkomindel*) and to shed additional light on the general nature of Stalin's purges. He shows that the Great Terror accomplished the near total destruction of the talented and urbane corps of diplomats organized under Boris Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov, and that the gap in the *Narkomindel*'s ranks created by the purges was filled by a new breed of Soviet diplomats who differed from their predecessors by being farther removed from the decision-making process in foreign affairs and by carrying out Stalin's instructions precisely and without question or challenge. In discussing

the motivation behind both the decimation of the Soviet foreign office and the purges as a whole, Uldricks discounts the theories that Stalin used the purges as an instrument to crush his opponents or to eliminate potential opposition to striking a deal with Nazi Germany, suggesting instead that the purges were primarily “a psychological phenomenon—a bloody trauma necessary to bring Russia’s external view of Stalin and his own internal image of himself into alignment” by eliminating the generation of veteran Bolsheviks who knew that his roles during the October Revolution and the Lenin era were far removed from what was then being attributed to him by the propagators of the “cult of personality.”

608 Unger, A. L. “Stalin’s Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the Great Purge.” *Soviet Studies* 20, no. 3 (1969): 321-30.

Unger discusses Stalin’s renewal of the Soviet leading stratum as a two-pronged campaign, with one pincer consisting of the purges of 1937-38, which cleansed the ranks of the party and refashioned it in the mold of Stalinist discipline, and the other comprising the absorption of tens of thousands of recently trained specialists into the ranks of the refashioned party—the end result being the elimination of the technical backwardness of the party’s cadres at the same time as the elimination of those within the party who fell short of the ever-more-rigorous standards of loyalty that accompanied the iron rule of Stalinist totalitarianism. He also comments on how the criterion of social origin, which was vital in the early years of the Stalin regime, lost all relevance when the regime’s primary concern turned to finding sufficient cadres to run Soviet Russia’s expanding economy, with “education, ability, ambition and blind loyalty to the cause of the party and the commands of its leader” becoming the keys to success.

609 Vihavainen, Timo. “The Yezhovshchina: Premeditated Social Engineering or the Result of Unforeseen Circumstances? Some Objections to J. Arch Getty’s Revision of the Great Purges.” *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* 2, no. 3 (1985): 129-36.

Vihavainen questions the revised version of the terror of 1937, the so-called Yezhovshchina, offered by J. Arch Getty in his 1985 book *Origins of the Great Purges*, according to which the first half of 1937 witnessed a genuine campaign for “party democracy” initiated by Andrei Zhdanov, not to annihilate the old leadership but to force them by means of criticism and political education to toe the Stalinist line, while the latter part of 1937 saw the unleashing of the populist terror under Nikolai Yezhov, not as part of some master plan conceived by Stalin but rather in response to the conflict created by the “Tukhachevsky affair” and Bonapartism scares in June of that year. In Vihavainen’s opinion, the so-called campaign for democracy was never intended to deal with the political failings in the party pointed out by Stalin in his speeches at the February-March party plenum but rather was “no more than a phase of a preconceived plan for another operation of Stalinist social engineering,” one which would use the confessions extracted during the campaign of criticism to make the old leadership culpable for the party’s political failings, thus providing the grounds of their removal from the picture and opening the way for the promotion of fresh cadres committed to the new socialist society and indebted to Stalin for their position within it. Vihavainen concludes that while the Yezhovshchina may not have been planned in advance, “it fits too well to certain facts we know already” and corresponds too closely to Stalin’s pattern in dealing with “opposition” to his authority to be just an accident.

610 Viola, Lynne. “The Aesthetic of Stalinist Planning and the World of the Special Villagers.” *Kritika* 4, no. 1 (winter 2003): 101-28.

A case study in the world of Stalinist planning, this article centers on the early history of “special settlements,” villages which, at the beginning of the 1930s, initially housed dekulakized peasants and, later, additional contingents of social and ethnic “enemies” of the Soviet state. Examining the vision and planning behind the special villages, their location, construction, and internal order, and the system of controls established to allow Moscow to oversee their administration, Viola de-

scribes how “the awful reality of the special villages”—the poverty, filth, hunger, exploitation, and despair—was far removed from the world of the special settlers laid out by the Moscow planners, and how Moscow, in refusing to let go of the façade of reeducation and transformation which was at the core of the original plans, attempted to uphold this charade “with a scaffolding of checks and controls, every bit as ‘scientific’ as the plans” themselves. Stalinist planning, Viola writes, represented reality as it was intended and imagined, and, in this sense, shared more in common with Socialist Realism than with “scientific” social engineering. Unlike Socialist Realism, however, “the aesthetic of planning was superimposed onto reality, translating in the case of the special villages into utopian quagmire and dystopian nightmare.”

611 Watson, George. “The Cycle of Terror.” *Quadrant* 48, no. 2 (December 2004): 33-35.

Watson discusses the practice of terror as a century-long cyclical phenomenon born in Germany in the nineteenth century with Marxian revolutionary doctrine, coming to fruition during the regimes of Lenin, Hitler, and Stalin, and being “finally turned against the Germans in the Soviet zone of occupation in 1945,” with Stalin using some of the Nazi concentration camps for their original purpose. Writing that the last link in the cycle of terror is least known, Watson attempts to educate his readers about the similarities between the Nazi and Soviet camp systems and about the story of Stalin’s use of former Nazi camps in East Germany, as related by camp survivors following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

612 Weinberg, Robert. “Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan in 1937.” *Slavic Review* 52, no. 1 (1993): 13-27.

This study of the dynamics of the 1937 purge of Matvei Pavlovich Khavkin, the First Party Secretary of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR), located along the Chinese border in the Soviet Far East, demonstrates that, while Stalin and his closest associates encouraged a generalized rank-and-file attack on local party leaders, local conflicts, pressures, and personalities, along with the machinations of the party leadership in Moscow, helped to determine Khavkin’s fate. In arguing that Khavkin’s case is best understood within the framework of local political developments and their interaction with national events and policies, Weinberg lends his support to the interpretation advanced by J. Arch Getty, Gábor Rittersporn, and other scholars who hold that the cleansing of the party, far from being part of a grand scheme designed by Stalin to silence his opponents in the party and coerce it into unquestioning submission to his will, was “the partial product of a conflict between national and subnational officials, with initiative from below sometimes playing as important a role as central directives in fueling the purges.”

613 Wheatcroft, Stephen G. “A Further Clarification on the Famine, the Camps and Excess Mortality.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 3 (May 1997): 503-5.

Wheatcroft maintains that Steven Rosefielde, in his September 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article “Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s,” misuses and misunderstands the NKVD data upon which he relies in the article, leading to a gross exaggeration of the scale of labor camps and labor camp mortality in Stalin’s Russia. He also criticizes Rosefielde’s treatment of demographic data and his method of determining the level of excess mortality under Stalin in the 1930s.

614 ———. “The Scale of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-45.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 8 (December 1996): 1319-55.

This article opens with an account of the accepted views on the scale and nature of repression and killings under Hitler and Stalin and then moves on to a comparative analysis of the statistics provided by two reports by the KGB to political authorities in the 1950s and 1960s and by several articles written by Soviet analyst Viktor N. Zemskov dealing with the victims of Stalinism in the 1930-45 period. Wheatcroft constructs an elaborate set of tables consisting of figures from Soviet

and Western sources dealing with such categories of Stalinist repression as arrests and sentences by the secret police; the populations and deaths in labor camps, colonies, and prisons; and the exile of kulaks and repressed nationalities. On the basis of these numbers, he constructs a case for Stalin's gulag as being neither as large nor as deadly as it is often presented, and for the mortality levels in the different categories of repression as being not nearly as high as estimated by some analysts, Robert Conquest in particular. A comparison of the Soviet figures to the data on repression and mass killings under Hitler, Wheatcroft maintains, shows that Hitler was responsible for more purposefully caused deaths than Stalin, but when the broader categories of death by criminal neglect and ruthlessness are considered, "Stalin probably exceeds Hitler." For replies to Wheatcroft's article, see Robert Conquest, *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997): 1317-18, and John Keep, 51, no. 6 (September 1999): 1089-93. For Wheatcroft's rejoinder, see *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 2 (March 1999): 315-45, and for Conquest's comment on Wheatcroft's rejoinder 51, no. 8 (December 1999): 1479-83.

- 615** ———. "Victims of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data—Not the Last Word." *Europe-Asia Studies* 51 no. 2 (March 1999): 315-45.

Wheatcroft offers a lengthy response to the criticisms advanced by Robert Conquest, in the November 1997 issue of *Europe-Asia Studies*, against his December 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article "The Scale of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-45." In replying to Conquest's allegation that the analysis of archival data considered in the December 1996 article is fundamentally flawed and suffers from conceptual errors, Wheatcroft argues for the reliability of the data on the victims of the Soviet secret police during Stalin's rule, and he contends that Conquest is wrong in claiming that the new evidence vindicates his own earlier camp and mortality data; in suggesting that the data in the reports analyzed in the December 1996 paper is incompatible and should be dismissed as fabricated and of no use; and in implying that he (Wheatcroft) considers the archival data to be "perfect reflections of the 'truth.'" Separate from the question of the reliability of the gulag data, Wheatcroft criticizes Conquest for rejecting out of hand the work of those who have provided evidence that Stalin did not consciously plan the devastating 1932-33 famine in Ukraine, and he points out what he sees as a series of misconceptions that attend Conquest's own analysis of the Ukrainian famine. Overall, Wheatcroft maintains that "the conclusion that has to be made from a careful analysis of Conquest's claims is that his criticisms are groundless, and that he does not understand the material he seeks to reject." For Conquest's rejoinder, see *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 8 (December 1999): 1479-83.

- 616** "Will Stalin Explain?" *New Statesman and Nation* 13 (30 January 1937): 148-49.

This article calls upon Stalin to explain why he has permitted the then ongoing trials of Karl Radek, Grigori Sokolnikov, and other remnants of the Bolshevik old guard to be publicly staged and to allow the defendants' confessions of treason to be announced to the Soviet people and the outside world, given the damaging effects that such "revelations" would have on the confidence of the people in his own regime and on the image of Russia in the eyes of those in the outside world. The article repeats some of the wild speculations that were then being raised regarding Stalin's motives for staging the show trials, and it suggests that the trials may be best understood as "the climax of the long struggle between those who supported Stalin's doctrine of 'socialism in one country' and those who have continued to believe that Trotsky was right in advocating the policy of fomenting world revolution."

- 617** "The Worms Squirm." *Time* 67 (23 April 1956): 36-37.

Time offers a brief account of Khrushchev's revelation that Stalin practiced and tolerated anti-Semitism and of newspaper reports in some of the Soviet satellite nations regarding both Stalin's purge of Jewish intellectuals in the 1930s and his postwar purge targeting prominent Soviet Jews,

a move which supposedly was prompted by his fear of Zionist influence in Russia and in the Soviet satellite states.

618 Zizek, Slavoj. "When the Party Commits Suicide." *New Left Review* 238 (1999): 26-47. Zizek offers a favorable review of J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov's *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks* (1999), a book based upon the archives of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and which describes the unique social dynamics that culminated in the great purges of the 1930s. Zizek's focus is on the nature of the guilt and "crimes" that leading Bolsheviks, Nikolai Bukharin in particular, were charged with; how the show trial proceedings and the confessions of guilt given by the accused relate to the peculiar phenomenon of "communist sacrifice" for the good of the cause; and how, at the peak of the terror, the implicit discursive rules governing the purges and trials were violated by Stalin himself, who, in directly appealing to the lower rank-and-file party members to articulate their complaints against the arbitrary rule of local party bosses, set in motion a spiraling cycle of violence leading to an orgy of destruction directed against the *nomenklatura* itself—including its highest strata—and, ultimately, to the self-destruction of the Bolsheviks. For Zizek, the Stalinist purges are not simply a betrayal of the revolution or an attempt to erase the traces of the authentic revolutionary past, but rather are the manifestation of the compulsion of the postrevolutionary order "to reinscribe its betrayal of the revolution within itself, to 'reflect' it or 're-make' it in the guise of arbitrary arrests and killings which threatened all members of the *nomenklatura*."

Cult of Stalin

619 Bonnell, Victoria E. "The Leader's Two Bodies: A Study in the Iconography of the VOZHD'." *Russian History* 23, nos. 1-4 (1996): 113-40.

Bonnell describes Lenin's support for monumental propaganda to celebrate publicly individuals who were thought to have had some connection with the October Revolution; the 1918-23 extension of the monumentalization campaign to include Lenin himself; and the quantum leap taken by the cult of Lenin in the years immediately following his 1924 death. She examines the rapid rise of the cult of Stalin beginning in 1929; Stalin's profiting from assertions of Lenin's infallibility by establishing himself as the successor of an iconic figure beyond criticism; and the ways in which Stalin's public stature and representation came to surpass that of Lenin. In discussing how Lenin's star, through the 1930s and 1940s, steadily grew smaller and dimmer next to Stalin's, Bonnell focuses on the strategies employed by artists to depict Stalin not only as "the Lenin of today" but also as a great statesman, teacher, and general, the wise master of the country, and the father of his people.

620 "Compleat Geniius; Or, What Stalin Does in His Spare Time." *Newsweek* 33 (9 May 1949): 30.

Newsweek presents a compilation of the accomplishments attributed to Stalin in the *Complete Soviet Encyclopedia* and several other Soviet publications. Among the achievements cited are his leading place in such endeavors as defining Socialist Realism for Soviet writers and painters, drafting strategic plans during the Great Patriotic War, fostering the educational role of cinema, and formulating answers to the basic problems of communist philosophy.

621 Davies, Sarah. "The 'Cult' of the *Vozhd'*: Representations in Letters from 1934-1941." *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 24, nos. 1-2 (spring-summer 1997): 131-47.

Davies discusses the emergence of the cult of the leader, the procedure and role of sending letters and petitions to the *vozhdi* (leaders), and historical precedents for this phenomenon in tsarist Russia. She examines hundreds of letters and petitions to the *vozhdi* from various archives to discover

what effect the propaganda of the leader cult had upon the discourse used by ordinary people in their letters to the leaders. Her analysis shows how certain aspects of the form and imagery of Soviet letters and petitions often echoed their tsarist predecessors, although couched in the new "Soviet" language; how the notion of Stalin as a demi-god appears infrequently in the letters as do outpourings of love for Stalin and other Soviet leaders; and how the need to create icons or symbols out of the *vozhd* appears to have come partly from the grassroots level and to have encouraged the charismatic representation of the leader in the official propaganda of the leader cult. "In order to dispel the myth of universal acclaim for Stalin and his colleagues," Davies also considers some of the few letters directly critical of the leader cult.

622 Draitser, Emil. "The Death of Stalin: A Memoir." *Michigan Quarterly Review* 42, no. 2 (spring 2003): 280-91.

Draitser describes the image of Stalin that he had as a youth growing up in Odessa, and his reaction to the news of Stalin's illness and death, commenting on the mythology that surrounded Stalin and its effect on the way he reacted to the dictator's death.

623 Du Bois, Pierre. "Stalin: Genesis of a Myth." *Survey* 28, no. 1 (1984): 166-80.

Du Bois traces the origin and evolution of the cult of Stalin, describing the role played in the propagation of the Stalin myth by the first authorized biography of Stalin, written in 1927 under the name of Ivan Tovstokha, (personal secretary to the Bolshevik leader); the collection of articles written by his closest colleagues on the occasion of his 50th birthday; the first official life history of the Soviet leader—*Stalin: A New World Seen Through One Man's Life*—written by French novelist, journalist, and communist Henri Barbusse and published in 1935; *History of the Communist Party of the USSR (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, published in 1938 and the most famous of all official party histories; the 1940 biography of Stalin produced by Emelyan Yaroslavsky; and the last official biography of the Soviet leader, published in 1947 and written by a team of six Soviet authors. Showing how exaggeration, invention, concealment, and adulation served as the key components in the construction of the myth upon which the Stalin cult was based, Du Bois demonstrates that Stalin's own history was not only revised but given an ideological form bordering on hagiography, with Stalin initially being portrayed as Lenin's faithful partner and the "best Leninist," and then later overshadowing Lenin through the constant elevation of his role in the party's history and the glorification of his contributions as leader of the Soviet Union. Du Bois also comments on Stalin's direct participation in the writing of several of the works propagating the Stalin myth, and how the discourse of the myth doubles as an indictment of Stalin's opponents by denigrating, downgrading, or eliminating altogether their role in shaping Bolshevik and Soviet history.

624 Fischer, Louis. "Why Stalin Won." *Nation* 131 (13 August 1930): 174-76.

Fischer maintains that to explain Stalin's victory over his opponents at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 by his domination of the party apparatus is to neglect the most decisive psychological and economic factors of the Soviet situation, namely, Stalin's success in instilling optimism in his followers regarding the ability of the Soviet Union to "overtake and out step" the capitalist nations, and his forcefulness in arguing for the necessity of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization of the Soviet economy. While Stalin currently dominates the Soviet political scene, if he continues to permit himself to become "the object of thickly smeared praise, fawning adulation, and tasteless obeisance," he may jeopardize his position by giving his political enemies an opportunity to exploit his toleration of a campaign of personal glorification that is "as unBolshevik as it is politically unwise," according to Fischer.

625 Genêt. "Letter from Paris." *New Yorker* 25 (17 December 1949): 82-83.

The French Communist Party's unveiling of an exhibit of birthday gifts to be sent to Stalin on the occasion of his seventieth birthday is the subject of this report from Paris. The report notes the

range of gifts displayed, the pageantry of the official evening opening of the exhibit under the banner "Homage to Stalin, Champion of Peace, Liberty and Human Happiness," and the importance of the propaganda value of Stalin's birthday gifts for a French Communist Party that was then struggling to calm the political waters roiled by reports of appalling conditions in Soviet labor camps.

- 626** Gill, Graeme. "Personality Cult, Political Culture, and Party Structure." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 17 no. 2 (1984): 111-21.

Gill examines the question of the origins of the cult of personality in the Soviet Union and in the People's Republic of China, arguing that the roots of the cult can be found in the inherent structural characteristics of both the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties. Taking aim at the case developed by Jeremy Paltiel, in the spring/summer 1983 issue of *Studies in Comparative Communism*, for the relationship between political culture in Leninist regimes and the emergence of a cult of personality, Gill contends that such structural features as the low level of the institutionalization of the party; the lack of definition in leadership positions within a party formally operating under the guiding principles of collectivism; and the uncertainty about tenure at every level of the party's structure—reinforced by the circumstances surrounding the party's growth in an economically underdeveloped society—provide a better explanation of the emerging personality cult than does Paltiel's favoring of some vague set of principles inherited mysteriously from traditional political culture.

- 627** ———. "Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the Soviet Union." *British Journal of Political Science* 10, no. 2 (1980): 167-86.

Gill analyzes the cults of Stalin and Brezhnev as embodied in the images of the two leaders projected through the party press. He describes how the basic support for both images rested upon a link with Lenin, and upon the two leaders' roles in the achievement of Soviet successes, their writings, and their relationship with the people of the USSR. For Gill, the emergence and growth of a leader cult in the Soviet Union were primarily encouraged by certain structural aspects of the Soviet political system, particularly the limited capacity of the formal political structure to convey a sense of personal legitimacy within leadership circles. In view of this limitation, the cult sought to associate the leader with the four symbolic bases upon which the system claims to rest—"Lenin and Leninist heritage, scientific Marxism-Leninism, the continuing improvement of Soviet society, and the love and support of the system"—and thus locate the legitimacy of the leader in "the complex of symbol and myth" upon which the party itself relied for legitimacy within Soviet society.

- 628** "It's Stalinmas, Not Christmas." *Newsweek* 34 (26 December 1949): 22-24.

Newsweek describes various manifestations of the cult of Stalin associated with the celebration of his seventieth birthday in the communist world, including the state art-publishing house's reproduction of one million portraits of Stalin and two million Stalin posters; the issuing of forty-five Stalin songs and fifty-five songbooks by the state music-publishing house; and the countless gifts sent to him by the worshipful in the Soviet satellite states.

- 629** "J. V. Stalin and the Individual in History." *Political Affairs* 59, no. 7 (1980): 28-36.

In this excerpt from a 1979 editorial in the journal *Kommunist*, the materialist view of history and the role of the masses and individuals in the historical process are reaffirmed, and the attempt of "philistine-minded bourgeois ideologues" to portray the negative features of the personality cult as being integral to the Soviet system is assailed as "imperialist and revisionist propaganda" aimed at discrediting Soviet achievements and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. The editorial also comments on the accomplishments of Stalin as leader of the USSR and the exposure of his shortcomings by the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1956, both within the context of the role to be

played by the leaders of the proletariat in guiding the revolutionary movement and in the building of socialism.

630 Kennedy, Stetson. "Cultism: Its Genesis and Exodus." *Political Affairs* (September 1956): 33-38.

Kennedy maintains that to pass judgment on Stalin one must first take into account the tremendous achievements of the Soviet Union under his rule; Stalin's sincere belief that Soviet security and the growth of socialism required harsh measures on the part of the party and government; and the responsibility of his entourage and communists around the world for the cultist perversion that developed under Stalinism. With this said, Kennedy suggests that Stalin himself contributed to the genesis of the cult of personality because of his affliction with a serious mental disease, most likely "a neurosis or psychosis involving both delusions of grandeur and a persecution complex." Verification of Stalin's mental illness, in Kennedy's view, is necessary to prevent the evil he did in violating socialist legality and morality from living on after him and to help resolve "the ambivalent emotional conflict of all those who loved the younger Stalin for his good works, and yet are now obliged to abhor his later atrocities."

631 Lauterbach, R. E. "Stalin at 65 Has Become Savior, Symbol and Living Legend in Russia." *Life* 18 (1 January 1945): 62-68.

Ten photographs reflective of the deification of Stalin appear alongside this account of some of the legends and stories about "the Leader" that were circulating in wartime Russia and that illustrate the "wonderful storehouse of knowledge" he supposedly possessed about virtually every topic under the sun. Lauterbach also comments briefly on Stalin's personal habits and tastes, fondness for children, fervent Russian nationalism, and professed advocacy of peace rather than revolution.

632 Leites, Nathan, Elsa Bernaut, and Raymond L. Garthoff. "Politburo Images of Stalin." *World Politics* 3, no. 3 (April 1951): 317-39.

This examination of the articles written by top Politburo members, published in *Pravda*, and reprinted in the Soviet press at large celebrating Stalin's 70th birthday, aims to determine what this body of material reveals about the distribution of influence and attitudes within the Politburo. The authors identify two basic types of statements about the image of Stalin which can be discerned in the articles, one being the image of Stalin in comparison to Lenin ("the Bolshevik image"), the other characterizing Stalin as the ideal father ("the popular image"). The authors distinguish two main groups within the Politburo, one comprising Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria—presumed to be the most influential members of the Politburo—who employed the "Bolshevik image" to describe Stalin; the other consisting of Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Kosygin, who relied on the "popular image" to offer crude adulation and private, rather than political, comments on the Soviet dictator. They contend that, given the value that Bolsheviks attached to political as opposed to private life, the use of the "Bolshevik image" indicates the speaker's higher political status within the Politburo. They see the differentiation in imagery and political language evident in the articles as stemming from individual choices rather than from a central decision aimed at propagating both images of Stalin and at assigning specific roles among the Politburo's members in presenting each of the images.

633 Lester, D. M. "Stalin: Genius of Socialist Construction." *Communist* 20 (March 1941): 257-75.

634 Little, Robert. "Demigod That Was Stalin." *Reader's Digest* 69 (April 1956): 52-55.

Little moves from a brief account of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress to describe some of the manifestations of the cult of Stalin, including the flattering portrayals of Stalin by writers, poets, and the popular press, and the sustained effort to make him

seem larger than life, a god among mortals. He also notes the irony in the fact that those who took the lead in the demolition of Stalin's image were the same individuals who had previously called him "wise, eternal, great, and dear."

635 Lukacs, Georg. "Reflections on the Cult of Stalin." *Survey* no. 47 (April 1963), 105-11.

This analysis of the development of the cult of Stalin revolves around how the Soviet leader, acting in response to the problems that came with the imposition of the "revolution from above" and to the international challenges the Soviet Union faced in the 1920s and 1930s, and behaving in accord with his belief in the need for an authority not subject to question, attached himself to the authority of Lenin's name, refashioned the Communist Party into an obedient and fawning supporter of his views, policies, and actions, and created a pyramid-like apparatus to sustain his power, with himself at the apex and a horde of "little Stalins" at the base serving as the creators and guardians of the cult of "the leader." Lukacs, a prominent Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic, also comments on the merits of Stalin's positions on the key issues of the twenties, the errors in Trotsky's thinking on these very same issues, and the probability that if Trotsky had won power the Soviet Union would have been no more democratic than it was under Stalin and that the cult of the individual would have developed around the personality of Trotsky. Stalin's departures from Marxist-Leninist doctrine and his lack of scruples in treating his own tactical retreats as newfound general principles that had somehow escaped Marx, Engels, and Lenin and needed to be synthesized into Soviet communist doctrine also receive attention in Lukacs's commentary.

636 Lyons, Eugene. "Dictators into Gods." *American Mercury* 46 (March 1939): 265-72.

The idolatry surrounding Hitler and Stalin has led to the two leaders being credited with divine attributes, and the elaborate ceremonials on state occasions, the catechisms of official ideologies, and "the hyperbolic oaths of faith in the Cause and the Leader" suggest that new state religions are taking shape in Germany and Russia, according to Lyons. In providing a sampling of the form and substance of the worship of Stalin, Lyons cites a number of poems and psalms that not only glorify the Soviet leader but indicate that the feeling behind such adulation is "indisputably religious."

637 Margolin, Victor. "Stalin and Wheat: Collective Farms and Composite Portraits." *Gastronomica* 3, no. 2 (2003): 14-16.

The portrait of Stalin composed of multihued grains of wheat which appeared in a 1939 special issue of the Soviet magazine *USSR in Construction* dealing with the Stalin Collective Farm in Ukraine is the subject of this article. According to Margolin, the composite portrait, which was created by the little-known Socialist Realist artist A. Zykov, makes use of countless flecks of grain, on one level, to signify agricultural abundance and attributes this abundance to Stalin by arranging the flecks in an image of the Soviet leader. On another level, each grain might be seen to represent a collective farm worker, and together these workers proclaim metaphorically their allegiance to the Soviet leader. "The seamlessness with which a multitude of grains could become a composite picture of the nation's leader," Margolin writes, "shows how successfully the Soviet government was able to rewrite the history of agricultural collectivization" and to glorify Stalin in the process.

638 Meier, Reinhard. "Stalin and the Georgians." *Swiss Review of World Affairs* 25, no. 11 (1976): 9-11.

Meier describes the sentimental devotion to Stalin in the Georgian Republic years after the Soviet dictator's death, including the treatment of the Stalin Museum in his hometown, Gori, as a national shrine and the public display of his portrait throughout his native territory. He also discusses why the passing years apparently have transformed Stalin's image in the minds of the Georgian

compatriots, who, in terms of actual historical events, would seem to have little reason to honor the dead dictator's memory, as well as why the then current leaders of the Soviet Union permitted the Stalin cult to live on quietly in his native Georgia.

639 Mitin, M. "The Power of Stalinist Prediction." *Communist* 19 (February 1940): 141-48.

640 "Myth of Stalin." *Newsweek* 41 (16 March 1953): 24-25.

Newsweek takes the occasion of Stalin's death to present an outline of his rise to power and a brief account of the legend of the dictator and how it flourished "within a miasma of personal secrecy."

641 O'Connor, Timothy E. "Did Lunacharskii Contribute to Stalin's Cult of Personality?" *European Studies Journal* 12, no. 1 (1995): 17-38.

O'Connor examines the concept of "god-building" as the philosophical foundation for Commissar of Enlightenment A. V. Lunacharsky's ideas about the new Soviet man and as the principal source for his promotion of the cult of Lenin and a possible source for the development of the Stalin cult. According to O'Connor, while Lunacharsky must indirectly bear some of the responsibility for the Stalin revolution and the emergence of the personality cult, Stalin went far beyond the commissar's concept of god-building by "glorifying himself as the 'all-powerful, all-knowing, all-holy god of the new religion,'" and by manipulating and distorting, for his own political gain, Lenin's unique contribution to Bolshevik revolutionary utopianism. In considering why Lunacharsky resigned his post as Commissar of Enlightenment, O'Connor suggests that Lunacharsky's decision was in response to his frustration over his inability to prevent Stalin's implementation of cultural and educational policies contrary to his own beliefs and values.

642 "Our Sun!" *Time* 30 (15 November 1937): 22-23.

Time presents a number of examples of testaments to Stalin's greatness, or to "our sun" as the Soviet press was then referring to him, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The article also gives an account of two attempts on Stalin's life which were reported in the 29 October 1937 issue of the Tiflis newspaper *Zarya Vostoka*, one in 1933, the other in 1935, and both being made by natives of Soviet Georgia.

643 Paltiel, Jeremy T. "The Cult of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist Regimes." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 16, nos. 1-2 (spring/summer 1983): 49-64.

Paltiel offers a preliminary explanation of the importance of autocracy to traditional political cultures in connection with the growth of personality cults under Stalin and Mao. He links the emergence of the cult to a particular development crisis in Leninist regimes, one which gives rise not only to the cult but to its associated violent manifestations as well. Defining the cult of personality as a phenomenon which appears when the personality of the leader becomes the fountainhead of authority for an entire political system, Paltiel maintains that the exaggeration of the leader's personal authority takes place only after the organizational basis of party authority has been violently undermined, and that Leninist party culture, with its attachment to "monolithic unity" and a combat mentality, and with its polemical tradition, contributed to the ability of Stalin and Mao, by proclaiming that the principal enemy had come to reside within the party itself, to refocus the party's revolutionary struggle on its own apparatus and leadership. Whereas previously their persons had been symbols of party unity, with the violent destruction of the party apparatus, and in a political atmosphere in which personal insecurity and vulnerability held sway, both leaders managed to displace the party itself and to establish that all authority resides exclusively in themselves, according to Paltiel.

- 644** Phillips, Joseph B. "Fanciful Thought for the New Year." *Newsweek* 35 (9 January 1950): 33.

Phillips compares the personal aggrandizement of Stalin to the peasants' adulation of Russian tsars, and he speculates that, upon Stalin's death, his successors will move to deify the deceased dictator as a means of perpetuating Stalinism.

- 645** Rai, Lajpat. "The Cult and Magic Politics in China." *China Report* 20, no. 2 (1984): 17-27. This account of how the cult of personality of Mao, the cult of the Chinese Communist Party, and the cult of the infallible doctrine of Marxism-Leninism proliferated in China and hindered the socioeconomic development of Chinese society includes a description of the origins and manifestations of the cult of Stalin's personality and of how its "poisonous heritage" served as the launching point for Mao's personality cult. As in the case of Stalin, the cult of Mao, Rai writes, flourished once the Chinese leader managed to acquire decisive political power and was able to isolate and denigrate his opponents within the party, and assumed "monstrous proportions" in the hands of Mao's disciples who assigned to him superhuman attributes, behaviors, and accomplishments similar to those attributed to Stalin at the height of his personality cult.

- 646** Smith, Michael G. "Stalin's Martyrs: The Tragic Romance of the Russian Revolution." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 95-126.

Smith explores the manner in which the cult of suffering, martyrdom, and redemption developed in the revolutionary underground of nineteenth-century Russia and how it came to occupy a central place in Bolshevik ideology. He maintains that the cult helped to make sense of individual suffering, legitimized the dispensing of corporal justice in return, and provided the Bolshevik regime and its subjects with "a system of values and beliefs couched in the idiom of religion." With respect to Stalin, Smith discusses how the young Dzhughashvili participated in, absorbed, and propagated the Bolshevik culture of violence and martyrdom, and how, later in his career, the official biographers of the personality cult, in glorifying Dzhughashvili's exploits as a revolutionary and in cultivating his standing as a comrade of Bolshevik martyrs, elevated him to the status of a living martyr. He also explains how elements of Stalin's political behavior fit within the Bolshevik culture of martyrdom and violence, including his veneration of "the dead Lenin in his saintly and martyred poses"; his political capitalization on the 1934 murder of Leningrad party leader Sergei Kirov; and his incorporation of the rhetoric of Bolshevik martyrology into the apologetics of the Great Terror of the 1930s. Stalin's death, Smith writes, completed the cycle of tragic remembrance in the technique of his commemoration, yet his passing also led to the rupture of this cycle with Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's tyrannical behavior and crimes against many of the party's most prominent figures.

- 647** "Summa cum Laude." *Time* 54 (19 December 1949): 19.

Time notes the subjects of the papers to be delivered at an upcoming Romanian symposium on the scientific achievements of Stalin, occasioned by his forthcoming seventieth birthday, including such titles as "J. V. Stalin—The Military Genius of Our Time," "J. V. Stalin—As Mirrored in the Literatures of the Peoples of the World," and "J. V. Stalin—Lenin's Perpetuator in Creating the Theory of the Construction of Socialism."

- 648** Swearer, Howard. "Bolshevism and the Individual Leader." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (March/April 1963): 84-94.

This analysis of the gap between communist theory and practice with respect to the role of the leader in history includes a discussion of the elevation of the significance of individual endeavor in such fields as psychology, education, and history in the Stalin era, and of the attempt of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to square the orthodox Marxist characterization of the role of the individual with the appearance of the "cult of personality" in Stalin's Russia. Swearer examines

the Khrushchev regime's rationalization of the cult of Stalin, particularly the Kremlin's admission that the centralization of power allowed Stalin's pernicious traits to come into play, and then explores the dimensions of Khrushchev's personal impact on Soviet historical development. A list of "Stalinisms" which appeared in the Soviet press is provided in the article, including such gems as "Stalin is the driver of the locomotive of history," "the greatest scholar of our epoch," "the greatest Marxist," and "the greatest man on our planet."

649 Thompson, Robert J. "Reassessing Personality Cults: The Case of Stalin and Mao." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 21 (1988): 99-128.

The central point of this article is that the reassessments of the personality cults of Stalin and Mao symbolize fundamental reconsiderations of the revolutionary goals and methods identified with the two leaders by their succeeding elites and had significant implications for the priorities of the two regimes; for the role of the party as an organization in fulfilling its goals; for the nature of ideology and party authority; and even for the role of individual leaders themselves. Having postulated that the reconsiderations of Stalin's and Mao's leadership were symbols of broader regime conflicts and commitments to change by the two leaders' successors, Thompson offers a comparative analysis of these reassessments, noting the conditions in the Soviet Union and China under which they took place; the nature and extent of the reevaluation process as it unfolded in the two countries; and the various themes conveyed in the official reappraisals of the two leaders. He also comments on the broader political and conceptual implications of the reassessments of Stalin and Mao in light of the work of Robert Conquest and Kenneth Jowitt in constructing conceptualizations of the patterns of postrevolutionary politics in Marxist-Leninist societies.

650 Tucker, Robert C. "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult." *American Historical Review* 84, no. 2 (April 1979): 347-66.

Tucker traces the rise of Stalin's personality cult from its opening episode—the celebration of Stalin's fiftieth birthday in 1929—up to 1933, by which time the cult had become a part of official Soviet political culture, with a life and momentum of its own. Tucker's account of the cult's construction centers on how Stalin, acting in accord with his political interests and his psychological need for adulation, sought to promote an image of himself as the premier living Marxist philosopher—a thinker on a par with Marx, Engels, and Lenin—and to secure for himself a position on a level with Lenin's in the party's history. He sees Stalin's self-aggrandizing October 1931 letter to the editors of the journal *Proletarian Revolution*, written as a critical response to an article by A. G. Slutsky which questioned Lenin's position in connection with the internal divisions in the pre-1914 German Social Democratic Party, as marking a turning point in the cult's evolution, with each field of Soviet culture "finding inspiration for its activities in Stalin's letter," and with idolatry of Stalin becoming "one of Russia's major growth industries" from the time of the letter's appearance forward.

651 Warth, Robert O. "Stalin's Ghost and Khrushchev's Thaw: Soviet Historians in the Crucible." *Antioch Review* 20 (1960-61): 417-25.

Warth describes the liberal turn on the historical front signaled at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 and the retrenchment that followed the historiographical thaw later that year. He also presents an account of the decline and near extinction of Russian historical scholarship during the Stalin era, with Stalinist historiography being marked by a tailoring of the past to fit the current party line, the inflation of Stalin's role as a revolutionary, and the discrediting of the "Old Bolsheviks."

652 Werth, Alexander. "The Stalin Cult." *New Statesman and Nation* 51 (28 January 1956): 95.

Werth entertains and then discounts the possibility that Stalin, who reportedly would laugh at the bootlicking and extravagant deification he had to endure day after day, was, in fact, hostile to the

hero worship which surrounded him during the last twenty-five years of his life. Werth's comments were prompted by an attempt in the Soviet press, on the seventy-sixth anniversary of Stalin's birth, to lend credence to the assertion that the "Stalin myth" was something to which Stalin himself was deeply opposed by citing a 1938 letter he wrote to the state publishing house for children criticizing the publication of a sentimental book called *Stories from Stalin's Childhood* on the grounds that it was not only full of errors and exaggerations but also guilty of propagating the "theory of 'the hero,'" which is not a Bolshevik idea.

653 Wilson, Edmund. "Stalin As Ikon." *New Republic* 86 (15 April 1936): 271-73.

Wilson's attendance at the 1936 "Physculture Parade," one of the great demonstrations of the year in Moscow and an event which he describes as "an apotheosis of Stalin," serves as the starting point for a commentary on the then current glorification of Stalin. Wilson relates some of the conversations he had with Russians at that time about why Stalin has assumed such a divine stature, and he shares several anecdotes indicating the attitude of the Soviet people toward Stalin and the cult which has developed around him. He also points out that the cult has nothing to do with Marxism, which, "by definition, is irreverent toward persons in authority," and why the cult, which he states would have been roundly condemned by Lenin, in no way can be justified by a socialist dictatorship.

Economics

- 654** Anderson, Barbara A. and Brian D. Silver. "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR." *Slavic Review* 44, no. 3 (fall 1985): 617-36.

Stalin by name does not enter into this demonstration of the sensitivity of estimates of excess mortality to assumptions about "normal" trends in fertility and mortality, but as a study which takes aim on Steven Rosefielde's estimates of the number of excess deaths in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, it sheds light on some of the issues in demographic analysis that need to be addressed before more definitive estimates of the scale of Soviet population losses under the impact of Stalin's economic policies of the 1930s can be made. For Rosefielde's reply to the criticisms raised by Anderson and Silver, see *Slavic Review* 45, no. 2 (summer 1986): 300-306.

- 655** Bailes, Kendall E. "Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers." *American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (April 1974): 445-69.

Bailes examines the widespread arrests of technical specialists in connection with the "industrial party" trial of November-December 1930, maintaining that, while the evidence presented in court was contrived and at times ludicrous, and the whole affair served as a means of diverting public attention from the mistakes of the Stalinist leadership during the First Five-Year Plan by finding scapegoats among the engineers, the trial can also be viewed as a major effort by the Stalin regime "to discredit pretensions among the technical intelligentsia for a greater role in Soviet society" by way of an attack on the group's authority and overall sense of community. In arguing for the political rationality of the trial from Stalin's point of view, Bailes suggests that the technocratic outlook of the men targeted in the affair, along with their previous opposition to the Stalinist version of the First Five-Year Plan, may have led Stalin, in view of his public comments on the "industrial party" affair, to consider the technical intelligentsia, especially the old bourgeois specialists, as a potential source of opposition to his authority. This suspicion may have been reinforced in his mind by fear that some form of an alliance might be formed between the group and the "Right Opposition" led by Alexei Rykov and Nikolai Bukharin and might constitute a viable alternative to his leadership in the eyes of not only the oppositionists but for the mass of young technical specialists as well, according to Bailes.

- 656** Baron, Nick. "Stalinist Planning As Political Practice: Control and Repression on the Soviet Periphery, 1935-38." *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, no. 3 (2004): 439-62.

Baron analyzes the rationality of Stalinist rule as exemplified by the interaction between economic planning and the behavior of regional officials in the Karelian Autonomous Republic in northwestern Russia during the Second Five-Year Plan. He describes how the chaotic nature of Stalinist planning made it necessary for Karelian economic administrators to second-guess the regime's priorities, leading them to commit multiple commonplace violations of central directives and to adopt a series of behaviors to protect themselves against the possibility of punishment, all of which worked to the detriment of Karelian economic performance. He examines the Stalin re-

gime's efforts to tighten control over the Karelian economy in the mid-1930s, and how this move served to aggravate self-protective behaviors and economic underperformance. According to Baron, the regime's intervention in Karelia combined with the milieu of insecurity that characterized everyday life in the republic to generate, in mid-1937, the mass purging of regional officials—a process which expanded to dysfunctional proportions, disrupting the regime's control over the administration and the economy, and compelling central authorities to intervene once again. "Intervention inevitably generated further, more radical interventions. This constituted the 'rationality' of Stalinist rule: by forgoing everyday control it correspondingly extended its power," Baron concludes.

- 657** Bettelheim, Charles and Bernard Chavance. "Stalinism As the Ideology of State Capitalism." Translated by Ramnath Narayanswamy from *Les Temps modernes*, April 1979. *Radical Political Economics* 13, no. 1 (1981): 40-54.

This paper examines two major themes running through the ideology of Stalinism: state socialism as a political ideology, and the "socialist mode of production" as an economic ideology. In considering the first theme, the authors key on the double nature of official language regarding this aspect of Stalinist theory, describing how the reinforcement of the state is identified with the reinforcement of socialism itself; the denial of social contradictions is combined with praise for the Stalinist dictatorial apparatus; certain pretended qualities of workers, such as discipline and self-sacrifice, are used as a means of repression; and the existence of a "worker base" is construed as a guarantee of the party's revolutionary character. In discussing the second theme, the authors' emphasis is on the ways in which the political economy of Stalinist socialism functioned as "a vulgar economy couched in the 'Marxist' terminology of state capitalism."

- 658** Bilocerkowycz, Jaroslaw. "Focusing on the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33." *Problems of Communism* 38, no. 4 (1989): 133-40.

This review of Miron Dolot's memoir *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust* (1985), Robert Conquest's study *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (1986), Ewald Ammende's work *Human Life in Russia* (1984), the Congressional report of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine (1988), *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-33* (1988), and James Mace's *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (1983) sheds light on a number of questions about the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, including its causes; the degree of responsibility for the famine borne by Stalin personally; the scope, costs, and consequences of the famine; and the sources of the inaction of the American and British governments at the time of the famine, despite their awareness of its severity.

- 659** Bordiugov, G. A. and V. A. Kozlov. "The Turning Point of 1929 and the Bukharin Alternative." *Soviet Studies in History* 28, no. 4 (1990): 8-39.

Bordiugov and Kozlov examine the intraparty debates that took place in the late 1920s when the plans for the gradual transformation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the smooth acceleration of socialist development, as formulated at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, ran afoul of the grain procurement crisis, leading to the abolition of NEP and a fundamental turnaround in economic policy. In considering the causes of the crisis and the measures proposed to deal with it put forth by the Bukharin group and by Stalin and his allies, they explain how Bukharin's program, which advocated the importation of grain from abroad to normalize the food situation in the cities and stood opposed to the use of "extraordinary measures" to resolve the crisis, gradually lost out to the solution advanced by Stalin, which sanctioned the spread of large-scale socialized farming by means of "extraordinary measures." Discussing how the process of transformation in the countryside set in motion by the Stalin group took on a life of its own, leading to gross violations of legality and to the exacerbation of an already critical situation in the na-

tion, Bordiugov and Kozlov locate the root causes of the dramatic events and horrific suffering of the late 1920s and early 1930s in the lag of theory behind practice, and they see Bukharin's defeat and subsequent forced exit from the political arena by the Stalin-led majority as signaling, in essence, the transformation of theory into "policy's handmaiden." Stalin's personal responsibility for the errors committed during this critical time in Soviet history, the authors conclude, rests in his total subordination of policy formulation to his struggle for power, and in his consequent failure to "perform the main function assigned to the General Secretary under the conditions of the developing political system—that of seeking correct solutions while taking into account all shades of opinion."

660 Brower, Daniel R. "The Smolensk Scandal and the End of NEP." *Slavic Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 689-706.

Brower draws upon documents in connection with the major political scandal involving the state and party cadres of Smolensk province in 1928 to show how the Smolensk affair, which revolved around the unauthorized actions taken by local party officials in constructing an arrangement with enterprising peasants that would enable the party to control the countryside and meet the economic tasks of the New Economic Policy (NEP), became a prominent issue in party politics and the economic debates of that time. Locating the Politburo's reaction to the Smolensk affair in the failure of local party officials to obey fully the Stalin-orchestrated directive—issued in response to the food crisis during the winter of 1927-28 and authorizing repressive measures to extract "surplus agricultural produce" from speculators and kulaks—Brower discusses how the nature of the Politburo's investigation into the affair sheds light on the factional conflict between Stalin and Bukharin, particularly with respect to the debate over whether the moderate policies of NEP should be continued or abandoned in favor of a leftist economic program. In considering why Bukharin, despite his opposition to both Stalin's hasty economic initiatives and reckless threats against class enemies, and at the peril of his own defense of NEP and search for a humane path to socialism, joined Stalin in the prosecution of the Smolensk affair, Brower develops the view that Bukharin's support for the investigation was both reflective of his deep concern over signs of the decay of communist standards of morality and consistent with the backing he had given earlier that year to a national drive initiated by Stalin against bureaucratism and party degeneracy.

661 Burns, Emile. "Stalin's Great New Contribution." *Communist Review* (December 1952): 355-63.

662 Campbell, Robert. "What Makes a Five-Year Plan Feasible?" *Slavic Review* 32, no. 2 (June 1973): 258-63.

Campbell comments on Holland Hunter's June 1973 *Slavic Review* critique of the growth strategy embodied in the First Five-Year Plan, questioning Hunter's explanation of why the plan was infeasible; his account of why the planners produced such an infeasible plan; and his treatment of the relation between the internal inconsistency of the plan and the various extraneous factors in explaining why the plan was underfulfilled. In addition, Campbell discusses Stalin's responsibility for eliminating the equilibrium concept from the working ideas of the Gosplan economists on how to make the plan consistent, and he comments on Hunter's reasoning in suggesting that there were alternatives to the Stalinist economic development strategy embodied in the First Five-Year Plan that could have resulted in growth almost as good as that actually achieved and "with far less turbulence, waste, destruction, and sacrifice."

663 Carr, E. H. "Editorial Changes in Stalin's Speech of 9 July 1928." *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 3 (January 1965): 339-40.

This comparison of the version of Stalin's speech of 9 July 1928 to the CPSU's Central Committee on industrialization and economic policy which appears in his *Collected Works* (1949) and the

original stenographic record of that speech housed in the Trotsky Archives at Harvard's Houghton Library reveals that the *Works* version contains a number of changes, the most striking being the almost complete elimination of the references to personalities in several sections of the original speech. The prime motive for the changes, Carr suggests, seems to have been "a desire to attenuate the element of personal polemic in the printed version, in order not to antagonize unnecessarily those who might still be hesitating, and not to create the premature impression of a split between the leaders."

664 ———. "The Russian Revolution and the Peasant." *Proceedings of the British Academy* 49 (1963): 89-93.

Carr discusses the Russian Revolution with relation to the peasant, beginning with the emancipation of the nation's serfs under Alexander II in 1861, and continuing through the Stolypin reforms under Nicholas II, the New Economic Policy (NEP), and the collectivization of agriculture under Stalin in the First Five-Year Plan. He explains why the capitalist approaches taken by Stolypin and NEP to encourage the growth of large efficient individual farms which would provide, at a profit, the grain needed by cities failed to meet the needs of the Soviet regime and gave way to a socialist approach, championed by Stalin, which called for the creation of large-scale collective farms working in accord with a program laid down by a central authority and delivering grain at fixed prices. Carr also considers why Stalin, in December 1929, broke with the moderate camp within the Politburo and championed forced and massive collectivization of the peasantry and liquidation of the kulaks as a class, noting the role played here by the failure of NEP to provide for the needed reorganization of agriculture, but emphasizing Stalin's belief that, in view of the growing menace of international capitalism in the late 1920s, rapid industrialization was not only an absolute must but had to be accompanied by mass collectivization in order to rid the nation of the fragmentation of agriculture, improve agricultural efficiency, and provide the market with low-price grain supplies which "were a *siné qua non* of industrialization."

665 Cleinow, George. "Hoover and Stalin." *Commonweal* 14 (26 August 1931): 396-98.

Cleinow juxtaposes the 20 June 1931 speech by Herbert Hoover, in which the American president spoke of the economic crisis the world was then facing and called for leaders of the democratic nations to turn away from nationalistic capitalism and come together to deal with their common problems in a humanistic fashion as a means of coping with the deepening economic crisis, and the 23 June 1931 speech by Stalin to a group of Soviet industrialists, in which he summarized the experiences which Russia's industrial leaders had encountered during the initial three years of the First Five-Year Plan, and in which he outlined a seven-point program calling for a more intelligent utilization of the Soviet work force. Cleinow considers Stalin's address to be geared toward harnessing Soviet industrial energies in the most effective way possible, and as being prompted by the need to encourage personal responsibility and individualism and to reward men according to their achievements in order to avoid the inner collapse of Bolshevism.

666 Cohen, Stephen F. "Stalin's Revolution Reconsidered." *Slavic Review* 32, no. 2 (June 1973): 254-70.

In the June 1973 *Slavic Review*, Holland Hunter, in an article entitled "The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan," argued for the inherent infeasibility of the industrial plan adopted by the Stalinist leadership in May 1929 and for the existence of alternatives open to the party at that time which may have been both feasible and preferable in terms of the nation's economic capacity and the modernizing goals of the Bolsheviks. In "Stalin's Revolution Reconsidered," Stephen Cohen lends his support to Holland's overall analysis, and he discusses the question of why "impossible" industrial goals were adopted in terms of the 1928-29 political struggle between the Stalinist and Bukharinist factions of the Communist Party. Cohen's commentary on the Stalin-Bukharin struggle primarily deals with why the key political actors in the party debate on the First Five-Year

Plan, who apparently wavered between Stalin and Bukharin, came to endorse Stalin's position almost unanimously; how Stalin's victory over Bukharin, in the form of the economic resolutions adopted by the Central Committee in April 1929, did not mandate what actually followed months later—the abolition of the New Economic Policy and the launching of the “revolution from above”—and how Stalin, in accord with his extreme radicalization of official policy after April–May 1929, became the chief inspirer of the campaign to transform the party's outlook and ideology along warfare lines.

667 Colmer, William M. “Interview with Stalin.” *American Affairs* 8 (October 1946): 245.

The Chairman of the Select Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning briefly describes here Stalin's responses to the questions he asked him in an October 1946 Kremlin interview regarding postwar Soviet-American trade. Colmer informed Stalin that the United States was interested in doing as much postwar trade as possible with the Soviet Union and, to this end, asked for more information regarding the six-billion-dollar loan the Soviets wished to obtain from America. He asked Stalin to comment on how he expected to use this money, how he intended to pay it back, and what America could expect in return. He notes that Stalin's answers to these questions “were on the whole responsive, although at times . . . evasive,” and that the Soviet leader “seemed a bit ruffled” over the repayment question, stating that America was “talking of great loans to China who had no resources with which to repay,” and questioning why he should be asked about “the ability of Russia to repay her loans with all the natural resources which she has.”

668 Danilov, Victor. “Collectivization As It Was.” *Social Sciences* 20, no. 3 (1989): 222–43.

Danilov traces the process of the collectivization of agriculture under Stalin during the First Five-Year Plan, describing how Stalin's directives to launch an all-out collectivization campaign, with wide-scale application of emergency measures, wholesale violence against peasants, and a concerted effort to liquidate the kulaks as a class, were not only contrary to Leninist principles but encouraged the tempo of collectivization to exceed all bounds of rationality and led to the most tragic page in the history of Soviet agriculture—the great famine of 1932–33. In addition to detailing the drastic steps taken by Stalin in executing the collectivization campaign, and to describing his efforts to consolidate the successes scored and attribute the excesses committed during the campaign to mismanagement by local officials and their failure to abide by the principles of “voluntary collectivization,” Danilov discusses the fate of those who fell prey to Stalin's extremist measures and speculates on the total number of people who perished as a result of the collectivization campaign and the 1932–33 famine.

669 ———. “The Historical Significance of Alternatives to Stalinism.” *Russian Studies in History* 42, no. 4 (spring 2004): 53–69.

This analysis of the question of alternatives to Stalinism opens with a discussion of the tendency of mass thinking along with various political organizations and sociopolitical commentators in post-Soviet society to justify and glorify Stalinism and reject the concept of alternatives to Stalin's “revolution from above.” Danilov then proceeds to examine the nature of the conflict between the positions of Bukharin and Stalin on industrializing the country and bringing about the socialist transformation of the peasant economy; the viability of the Bukharin alternative to the Stalinist approach to building the new society; the process by which Stalin was able to exclude Bukharin and his supporters from participation in the political leadership; and the dire effects of both Stalin's approach to modernization and his thesis that as Soviet society moved toward socialism the class struggle would intensify and a policy of repression in countering the opposition of capitalist elements would be necessary. Danilov concludes with a critical commentary on the vindication of Stalinism and the “revolution from above” by Alexander Zinoviev, a prominent sociologist and logician and author of *The Yawning Heights*, a scathing satire on Soviet society. Here, Danilov primarily deals with the enormous human losses that came with Stalinism; the insurmountable

obstacles Stalinism placed in the way of genuine socioeconomic, scientific-technical, and cultural development of Soviet society; and the reasons why he believes Zinoviev's reverence of Stalin and Stalinism is, in fact, grounded on ignorance.

- 670** Davies, R. W. "The Socialist Market: A Debate in Soviet Industry, 1932-33." *Slavic Review* 43, no. 2 (1984): 201-33.

Stalin does not occupy critical space in this examination of the discussions that took place between June 1932 and March 1933 in *Za industrializatsiiu*, the official newspaper of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, regarding the advisability of changes in economic policy and the official model of the Soviet economic system. But in examining the proposals put forth in the newspaper by contributors headed by M. I. Birbraer, and in tracing the history of the "Birbraer debate" and the fate of the major changes Birbraer advocated in the Soviet economic mechanism, Davies comments on Stalin's position on the economic matters under review and on his possible role in imposing stricter limitations on debate within the Soviet economic press. Davies also discusses how the Birbraer debate both confirms the view that the economic model associated with Soviet industrialization under Stalin was not fully formed as late as the end of 1932 and shows that possibilities still existed in the early 1930s for advocacy in the economic press of significant changes in economic policy and the economic system—indicating that Stalin had not, as of that time, "established automatic authority, or did not care to exercise it, over all major economic issues."

- 671** Davies, R. W., M. B. Tauger, and S. G. Wheatcroft. "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933." *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 642-57.

This paper makes use of Politburo protocols, records from agricultural agencies, and documents from the Council of People's Commissars to investigate the possibility that Stalin was holding immense grain stocks during the famine of 1932-33, as some analysts have claimed in their arguments for the Soviet dictator's responsibility for the catastrophic effects of the famine. The authors' archival findings reveal that Stalin did not actually have under his control huge amounts of grain which could easily have been used to eliminate the famine, and, therefore, cannot be accused of exacerbating the famine by hoarding immense grain reserves during the crisis of 1932-33. However, in view of the possibility that he could have used the grain stocks that were available to reduce the severity of the famine, and when considering that his shortsighted agricultural policies contributed to the 1932-33 crisis, and that if he had been more open about the famine, international aid would have been available to alleviate the disaster, he is clearly not without responsibility for the famine, the authors conclude.

- 672** Eaton, John. "Stalin's Contribution to Economic Theory." *Communist Review* (April 1953): 120-26.

- 673** "The Economic Brain Trust of Soviet Russia Will Decide on War and Peace." *Business Week* (15 May 1948): 22-24.

This article briefly comments on what are seen as Stalin's main concerns in overseeing Soviet economic development and on his absolute authority in determining the goals of the Five-Year Plans, and then moves on to outline the role played in his regime by each of the members of the Kremlin's "economic brain trust," including Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, Andrei Zhdanov, Lavrenti Beria, Nikolai Voznesensky, Andrei Andreyev, Lazar Kaganovich, Alexei Kosygin, and Anastas Mikoyan.

- 674** Ellison, Herbert J. "Comment on the Context of Early Soviet Planning." *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 3 (January 1965): 326-27.

Ellison questions several points made by Rudolf Schlesinger, in his July 1964 *Soviet Studies* article "A Note on the Context of Early Soviet Planning." He contends that Schlesinger, in attempting

to demonstrate the rectitude of Stalin's decisions and policies in association with the First Five-Year Plan, "creates a false picture of Stalin as a bold advocate of industrialization fighting for his policy against 'right-wing opposition' which is described as 'supporting in substance though not in form the traditions of the peasant-wing of the Russian revolutionary movement.'" Stating that Bukharin and other leaders of the right-wing group were no less satisfied than Stalin with the existing agricultural situation, were just as much distressed by the failure of the agricultural sector to produce the surpluses needed to promote industrial growth, and were no less concerned with the slow pace of industrialization, Ellison maintains that Schlesinger's contention that the opposition resisted industrialization and had to be eliminated at least from the party leadership does a disservice to Bukharin and his supporters whose main concern was to find a more effective means of industrialization than that championed by the Stalin group.

675 ———. "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture." *American Slavic and East European Review* 20, no. 2 (April 1961): 189-202.

Ellison examines both the official Stalinist explanation of the decision for collectivization and the alternative possibilities to the path taken by the Stalin group. He maintains that in as much as the Stalinist economic rationalization of the collectivization decision is based on an inaccurate picture of agricultural conditions of the 1920s, that Soviet policy tended to aggravate the problem of agricultural production, and that collectivization was by no means an exclusive solution to the agrarian problem—"unless one was already committed to agrarian socialism"—one must conclude that the driving force behind the collectivization decision "was not impersonal economic 'forces' but rather preconceived political objectives and economic experience politically interpreted." This, then, would suggest, in Ellison's view, that the key question is not "what were the economically viable alternatives to collectivization" but rather "what were the politically viable alternatives." Continuing this line of thought, Ellison examines the chain of arguments that attended Stalin's assertion that "there is no other solution" than collectivization; the position advanced by Nikolai Bukharin and his allies with regard to how best to implement the collectivization decision reached at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927; the tactics followed by Stalin in his effort to stigmatize the Bukharin group as right-wing deviationists opposed to collectivization and rapid industrialization; and Stalin's subsequent abandonment of the hitherto accepted party line on collectivization, once he had gained firm control of the party apparatus, in favor of "a refurbished left-wing program" which called for rapid industrialization at the expense of agriculture and which, contrary to the leftist position, added rapid agrarian collectivization without waiting on European revolution. Ellison also contends that there has too often been a facile acceptance of the official Soviet rationalization of the collectivization decision by Western scholars, and he suggests that Western writers would do well to consider that the objective of agrarian socialism was largely settled in advance, politically, and subsequently rationalized economically.

676 Ellman, Michael. "On a Mistake of Preobrazhensky and Stalin." *Journal of Development Studies* 14, no. 3 (1978): 353-56.

Ellman briefly explains why an important rationale for collectivizing agriculture put forth by Stalin and based on an earlier argument by Evgeni Preobrazhensky, namely, that the resources for Soviet industrialization would have to come, in part, from the peasantry, appears to be fallacious in view of new empirical work on quantitative developments in both Soviet and Chinese agricultural-industrial relationships which indicates that collectivization, in fact, did not lead to a net transfer of commodities from agriculture.

677 Evenitsky, Alfred. "Preobrazhensky and the Political Economy of Backwardness." *Science and Society* 20, no. 1 (1966): 50-62.

Evenitsky reviews Evgeni Preobrazhensky's *The New Economics*, published in Russia in 1926 and appearing in English in 1965, placing the book within the context of the debate among Soviet

leaders in the mid-1920s about the method and tempo for the industrialization of the Soviet Union, given the nation's economic conditions, the lack of popular support for socialism, and the existence of foreign hostility toward the Bolshevik state. In commenting on the merits of Preobrazhensky's doctrine of primitive socialist accumulation as well as the alternatives to Preobrazhensky's approach, Evenitsky describes Stalin, with his theory of "socialism in one country," as the lone Bolshevik leader willing to adopt "the only policy that was feasible—barbarous methods to overcome barbarous backwardness." While the cost of such a policy was frightful, it was "the harsh exigencies of history, not the character of Stalin, that were to blame," according to Evenitsky.

- 678** Filtzer, Donald. "Labour and the Contradictions of Planning under Stalin: The Working Class and the Regime during the First Years of Forced Industrialization." *Critique* 20/21 (1987): 71-104.

Filtzer examines the problem of the emerging Soviet elite's relations with the working class during the early years of forced industrialization; the deleterious effects that the labor issue had on the implementation of the early Stalinist five-year plans; and how the Stalin regime's attempt to implement its economic policy in the face of hostility from both older workers and peasants served "to break down the last remnants of the working class as a collective entity and create an atomized work force whose members could relate to production only as individuals." He describes the Stalin regime's efforts to cope with an acute labor shortage and the problem of labor turnover; how these problems affected the basic pattern of manager-worker relations in Soviet industry and were exacerbated by strikes, mass protests, and work slowdowns that served as important weapons of working class action up to the mid-1930s; and how the series of measures the regime instituted in 1930-32 to curb turnover, absenteeism, and overt indiscipline failed to achieve their objectives. By the mid-1930s, Filtzer explains, managers and factory laborers had normalized their working relationship, and the Stalinist elite had successfully crushed the danger of organized resistance from the working class, but "by totally individualizing the workers' relation to production, and by creating a system where both managers and workers had a mutual interest in keeping pressure at a minimum, the elite made 'planlessness' a permanent feature of the Soviet system."

- 679** Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "The Foreign Threat during the First Five-Year Plan." *Soviet Union* 5 (1978): 26-35.

Fitzpatrick examines the motivation behind Stalin's linking of the danger of economic intervention against the Soviet Union with "the proletariat's 'class enemies'—the kulak, hoarding grain, and the 'bourgeois specialist,' committing acts of sabotage." She sees the Stalinist leadership as having linked the foreign threat with the class struggle at home as part of an effort to discredit the "rightist" group in the party leadership—headed by Alexei Rykov and Nikolai Bukharin—which was objecting to the politics of confrontation and emergency rule Stalin was introducing amidst the crisis atmosphere created around the industrialization and collectivization drives. Factional politics alone, however, were not the only consideration at this time, Fitzpatrick maintains. The Stalin camp was also worried about real opposition to its economic program and a backlash against the cultural revolution, and was concerned over the need to foster a mood of alarm and vigilance to spur the industrialization drive and maintain a high level of popular and party anxiety. As the climate of vigilance and alarm proved to be counterproductive to sustained industrial development, members of the Soviet leadership, Stalin included, "formally acquitted the 'bourgeois specialists' of the collective accusation of treason," and officially announced, in June 1931, that the danger of foreign intervention had definitely retreated—allegedly in the face of "the increase of Soviet might"—and that the battle of industrialization had been won.

- 680** Foss, Clive. "Stalin's Topsy-Turvy Work Week." *History Today* 54, no. 9 (2004): 46-47. This account of the Soviet government's experiment with the continuous work week, implemented in 1929 and abandoned in 1940, includes a brief discussion of Stalin's initial support for the plan

and his criticism of its application, in a June 1931 speech, which marked the beginning of the end of this approach to increasing industrial production.

- 681** Goldman, Marshall I. "Diffusion of Development: The Soviet Union." *American Economic Review* 81, no. 2 (1991): 276-81.

Goldman points out what he sees as the negative consequences of Stalin's approach to accelerating Soviet economic growth, emphasizing how the Soviet leader, in making increases in production the measure for judging factory managers as well as national economic performance, ignored many of the basic laws of economics and created an economic system fraught with distortions, wastefulness, and inefficiency. Goldman also comments on how some of the critical economic problems which Mikhail Gorbachev was then trying to overcome can be considered as consequences of the Stalinist approach to development taken in the 1920s and 1930s.

- 682** Graziosi, Andrei. "Stalin Antiworker Workerism, 1924-1931." *International Review of Social History* 40, no. 2 (1995): 223-58.

Graziosi traces the background of the development of the "workerist myth" in the Soviet Union during the years 1924 to 1931 from a vigorous antiworker campaign during the first half of this period, to the glorification of the exemplary "shock workers" as "enthusiastic builders of socialism" by the early 1930s. Graziosi first describes the evolution of Soviet labor conditions during this period, the genesis of the workerist myth, and how myth-building accompanied the ascent to power of the Stalinists as a new ruling class. He then isolates the main sources of the myth, most notably the strong current of anti-intellectual populism prominent among Stalin's followers, and Stalin's recognition that by adopting the core components of workerist-populist ideologies he could use the proletariat as a tool in his struggle to reshape the party and advance his own personal control over it. In considering the various sources of the fabrication of the workerist myth, Graziosi discusses the roles played by leftist leaders, particularly Karl Radek, members of Stalin's inner circle, Soviet writer Maxim Gorky, and Stalin himself. Graziosi also comments on the use of the myth to shape the regime's image in the West as exemplified by the efforts in this regard by the magazine *SSR na stroike*.

- 683** Gregory, Paul R. and Andrei Markevich. "Creating Soviet Industry: The House That Stalin Built." *Slavic Review* 61, no. 4 (2002): 787-814.

This paper draws upon Soviet state and party archives to examine how high-level resource allocation decisions were made in the Soviet industrial commissariat of the 1930s; the motivations behind and implementation of such decisions; and the degree of support they enjoyed from subordinates. While Stalin per se does not occupy a prominent place in the authors' description of the manner in which the dominant industrial administrative units of the 1930s operated, their study describes, among other things, how the commissariat tended to feed misinformation to Stalin just as its enterprises tended to mislead it; how "resources were shifted in response to petitions, complaints, and arbitrary charges from the center"; and how supply disputes divided production units against one another, compelling the dictator and the commissar to fight against this disruptive tendency. Gregory and Markevich also discuss Stalin's consistent opposition to ministerial empire building, suggesting that the long-term and problematic process of splitting up commissariats was "most likely motivated by the dictator's desire to inhibit the growth of potential rivals."

- 684** Griffin, Andrew T. and Larry D. Soderquist. "The Soviet Cooperative before Perestroika: The Leninist versus the Stalinist Concept." *American Journal of Comparative Law* 39, no. 3 (1991): 599-609.

The authors set forth the views of Lenin and Stalin on the cooperative in the Soviet economy, showing how Gorbachev-era ideologists and observers, in juxtaposing Leninist and Stalinist thinking on the cooperative, attempted to justify the major shifts in the methodology of building a So-

viet communist society under the policy of perestroika. Contrasting Lenin's belief that state ownership of the means of production would ensure the socialist character of the cooperatives, and that popular participation in cooperative operations could be brought about through the education of the masses in the benefits of the cooperative concept, with Stalin's view of the cooperatives as a means of assimilating all workers and producers into an economic monolith through state coercion, Griffin and Soderquist discuss how the Stalinist approach to cooperatives prevailed in mainstream Soviet thinking until Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, when, in an effort to provide an ideological anchor for the new regime's changes in the direction of a market economy, reformers recalled the basic premises of Lenin's "scheme for 'cooperation'" and attempted to show how it was diametrically opposed to that of Stalin.

- 685** Harrison, Mark. "Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective." *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 3 (May 1997): 499-502.

Harrison questions the economic evaluation of Stalinist development made by Steven Rosefielde, in his September 1996 *Europe-Asia Studies* article "Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s." He contends that Rosefielde's argument that Stalinist economic growth was impoverishing, and that the outcomes of Soviet economic growth were valueless, is oversimplified, and that his claim that Stalin's economic policies had no redeeming aspects is unwarranted in view of the likelihood that Soviet institutions became entrenched and resistant to reform precisely because Stalinist industrialization offered real gains to many different sectors of Soviet society.

- 686** "Has Stalin Junked Communism?" *Literary Digest* 110 (18 July 1931): 11-12.

This article cites the main points of Stalin's June 1931 speech, in which he called for a general overhauling of Soviet labor and industrial conditions, and then presents the results of a *Literary Digest* poll of journals in England, France, and Germany regarding the significance of the proposed reforms. The consensus view of the publications polled is that Stalin's speech represents both an abandonment of basic communist principles in favor of capitalistic methods, and a confession that the Five-Year Plan has been a failure.

- 687** Hazard, John N. "Gorbachev's Attack on Stalin's Etatisation of Ownership." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 28 (1990): 207-23.

Hazard examines the rejection of Stalin's formula for structuring a proper socialist society around the twin pillars of state ownership of property and central planning—from which flowed such measures as the forced collectivization of individual farms, the abolition of producers' cooperatives, and the restriction of consumers' cooperatives to the village level—by Mikhail Gorbachev, who, in introducing various elements of a mixed economy, redefined socialism as practiced under Stalin's direction.

- 688** Hazlitt, Henry. "Stalin As Classical Economist." *Newsweek* 40 (20 October 1952): 102.

Hazlitt maintains that the revisions Stalin was forced to make in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine in order to bring communist theory into a more plausible relation with Soviet practice, as revealed by this 25,000-word memorandum indicating what the new official communist textbook must say, amount to an admission that complete socialism is unworkable and elements of capitalism, including the capitalist price system and payment of laborers in accord with the work they perform rather than their needs, are to be tolerated in the Soviet economy. Hazlitt suggests that if Stalin "continues his progress, he may end up as the world's leading classical economist, and its foremost champion of laissez-faire capitalism."

- 689** Hessler, Julie. "A Postwar Perestroika? Toward a History of Private Enterprise in the USSR." *Slavic Review* 57, no. 3 (1998): 516-42.

Hessler traces the evolution of the private sector in the Soviet economy, in both law and practice, from the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP) to the last years of Stalin's rule, describing how, despite the Soviet leader's many assertions that the Soviet Union was a society without capitalists, and his ready use of coercion against the violators of the socialist model, private enterprise was neither categorically prohibited nor did it disappear with the demise of NEP. Private enterprise, Hessler writes, continued in the form of small-scale informal trade and artisanal manufacturers which "occupied a considerable portion of the population during the 1930s but became nearly universal during World War II" and were supplemented in the postwar 1940s by "a more formal type of small business, exemplified by private restaurants, barbershops, and stores." In response to this growth in the variety, scope, and scale of the private economy, Stalin, by 1948, felt compelled to clamp down on private enterprise, launching a policy which punished small-business owners and reestablished private enterprise largely within the bounds of toleration formulated in the years following NEP.

690 Himmer, Robert. "The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy: An Analysis of Stalin's Views." *Russian Review* 53, no. 4 (1994): 515-29.

This analysis of Stalin's response to the shift from militant socialist construction to the New Economic Policy at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 challenges the interpretation that Stalin, as a faithful disciple of Lenin, welcomed NEP, pointing out his criticism of NEP at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, and how his disenchantment with Lenin's abandonment of militant communism had deep roots reaching back before the Tenth Party Congress. Himmer contends that, given the fact that Stalin willfully held fast to a revolution of uncompromising class warfare as Lenin moved toward greater realism and moderation in 1920-21; that he questioned Lenin's commitment to Bolshevism when he instituted NEP; and that he blasted NEP at the Twelfth Party Congress for fostering nationalistic and reactionary thinking, the notion that he did not think much on his own but rather took his cue from Lenin seems to be open to question in the case of his response to NEP. Himmer believes that Stalin's reaction to the NEP "suggests a need to reexamine his political behavior and relationships later in the decade," particularly with respect to the judgment that he was "an opportunistic man of the middle who stole the economic program of the Left after circumstances in the late twenties compelled him to take extreme measures."

691 Holubnychy, Vsevelod. "The Causes of the Famine of 1932-33." *Meta* 3, no. 2 (1979): 22-25.

Holubnychy draws upon official government resolutions, economic and census statistics, and Moscow and Kiev periodicals of the early 1930s to reconstruct the causes and circumstances surrounding the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine. Pointing to the role played by falling prices and declining demand for agricultural products in the West, Stalin's misassessment of Ukrainian grain production capacity, and the problems that came with the policy of forced collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture in contributing to a situation which led the Stalin regime to set Ukrainian grain quotas at unrealistic levels and to launch a brutal campaign of grain requisitioning rather than lower the quotas prescribed, Holubnychy describes how, in response to the regime's disastrous agrarian policies, hunger spread across Ukraine, assuming massive proportions following the failure of the harvest of 1932. He maintains that, while the famine was not specifically planned by Stalin, it could have been greatly reduced had he been willing to lower grain requisition levels and slow the tempo of industrialization. Stalin's refusal to take such steps in 1932, when it was within his power to do so, supports the conclusion that the famine can be considered an artificially created one, with Stalin as its architect, according to Holubnychy.

692 Howard, M. C. and J. E. King. "'State Capitalism' in the Soviet Union." *History of Economic Review* no. 34 (summer 2001): 110-26.

This paper explores the reactions to the Bolshevik Revolution by critics from the Left—both within and beyond the Soviet Union—who saw the Soviet experiment as ushering in a new form of capitalism. Stalin himself does not figure prominently in the authors' analysis of the controversy over what was called "state capitalism"—a term which came to designate the persistence in the Soviet Union of many phenomena associated with capitalism, including "alienation, exploitation, wage labour, inequality and the law of value"—but in pointing out the deficiencies of the state capitalist hypothesis, Howard and King comment on the leading features of the Stalinist economic system and on how the Stalin economic revolution in the Soviet Union affected the debates on state capitalism, both during the Stalin era and in the decades following the dictator's death.

- 693** Hughes, James. "Capturing the Russian Peasantry: Stalinist Grain Procurement Policy in the 'Ural-Siberian Method.'" *Slavic Review* 53, no. 1 (1994): 76-103.

Hughes makes use of the so-called Ural-Siberian method of grain collection as a vehicle for the study of policymaking in the Stalinist state during the grain crisis of the late 1920s. He contends that the Stalinist leadership's adoption of this initiative—which essentially called for party activists in the countryside to mobilize the poor and middle peasantry to assist the state in taking grain by compulsory delivery quotas and to exploit the traditional governing institution of the peasantry, the *skhod*, as a means of ruling the countryside by proxy under the guise of the *skhod*—emerged as the result of a complex dialogue between the central, regional, and local tiers of the government rather being "vertically channeled 'from above' in a pure totalitarian fashion," as some historians have maintained. While ultimately the Ural-Siberian method was a product of desperate economic conditions connected with the harvest failures of 1927-28 and of Stalin's personal ambition along with Bolshevik ideology, the "input side of the policy-making process" needs to be considered for a full appreciation of the Stalin regime's adoption of this method as a solution to the grain procurement problem and as a means of dealing more effectively with the perennial problems of party-peasant relations as well, Hughes concludes.

- 694** Hunter, Holland. "The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan." *Slavic Review* 32, no. 2 (June 1973): 237-57.

This essay applies a rather technical method of testing the feasibility of the First Five-Year Plan; sketches a few alternative feasible growth paths; and explores the question of why the plan's overambitious targets were pressed for and accepted by the party's leadership. Stalin's struggle for personal power at the time the plan was being considered, specifically his willingness to push policy positions to an extreme degree in whatever direction would advance his campaign against his opponents, enters into Hunter's analysis as one of a series of factors which account for why the plan's targets were set too high, the other factors being fear of foreign military intervention; the belief that drastic change in agriculture was essential for rapid industrial expansion; and the conviction that a broad and ambitious campaign was necessary to fire the Soviet people with enthusiasm and shake them out of stodgy habits. The analytical model Hunter employs to examine the plan's workability suggests that alternative paths were indeed available to increase the economy's capacity and output to the levels reached under the initial five-year plans with far less turbulence, waste, destruction, and sacrifice than that which resulted from the draconian methods Stalin used. Furthermore, the dire long-run historical consequences of Stalin's overambitious First Five-Year Plan, namely, a permanently weakened agricultural sector, a disregard for consumer needs, an embittered population, and a terrorized party, may also have been avoided and fundamental Bolshevik economic targets met had one of the alternative paths available to the party been chosen at that time, according to Hunter. Hunter's article is followed by commentaries by Robert Campbell, "What Makes a Five-Year Plan Feasible?"; Stephen Cohen, "Stalin's Revolution Reconsidered"; and Moshe Lewin, "The Disappearance of Planning in the Plan," in this same *Slavic Review* issue.

- 695** ———. "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928-1940." *Slavic Review* 47, no. 2 (1988): 203-16.

This argument for the existence of a feasible alternative to Soviet agricultural collectivization flows from hypothetical projections for the growth of animal tractive power, together with its potential consequences for sown acreage and grain yields over the 1929-40 period. While Stalin does not directly enter into Hunter's analysis, his article has bearing on the oft-debated question initially raised by Alec Nove of whether Stalin "was really necessary," meaning was the forced collectivization of agriculture necessary for the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union. In Hunter's view, not only was there an alternative course of agricultural development in the prewar period that would have yielded more agricultural output and supported a substantially better standard of living, but the path taken by the Stalin regime—forced collectivization—actually undermined deliveries from agriculture and required an emergency flow of mechanized equipment to replace lost animal tractive power. For a critique of Hunter's position, see Lynne Viola's "Back on the Economic Front of Collectivization or Soviet Agriculture without Soviet Power."

- 696** "The Iron of Dictatorship Bent by the Hands of Individualism." *Law and Labor* 13 (October 1931): 225-26.

At the conference of Managers of State Industry, held in Moscow on 23 June 1931, Stalin made a statement concerning the need for the recognition and reward of the individual in Soviet industry according to his talents, a summary of which appeared in the 10 August 1931 issue of the Soviet publication, *Industrial and Labor Information*. That summary is reproduced here in the October 1931 issue of *Law and Labor* and is accompanied by a brief introduction in which Stalin's statement is discussed as a tacit admission of the weakness of communism in the face of the forces of individualism.

- 697** Johnston, Eric A. "My Talk with Joseph Stalin." *Reader's Digest* 45 (October 1944): 1-10. The President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States describes here his meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin in the fall of 1944. Johnston opens with a few remarks on Stalin's demeanor, mannerisms, and habit of doodling on a tablet of paper, and then goes on to describe his conversations with him on such subjects as the wartime assistance which the Soviet Union had received from America; Soviet-American postwar economic relations, particularly Russia's need for technical assistance and long-term credits for the purchase of American manufactured goods to help in the postwar reconstruction of the USSR; Soviet foreign trade policy and industrial production; and the need for a long period of peace in which both countries should seek to maintain positive political relations with one another and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. Johnston also remarks on Stalin's keen interest in American politics, his habit of reading translations of American newspapers; and his concern over the direction of Washington's postwar policy.

- 698** Karcz, Jerzy F. "Back on the Grain Front." *Soviet Studies* 22 (October 1970): 262-94.

This consideration of the problems that attend estimates of pre-World War I grain marketings in Russia includes an account of the debate on grain statistics which took place among prominent Soviet economists and statisticians during the 1920s, and of how, following Stalin's 28 May 1928 speech on grain problems, the figures which he cited on grain marketings and gross output for the prewar period as well as for 1926-27 quickly became the officially sanctioned ones and came to affect the party's posture on the "peasant problem." Examining the figures quoted by Stalin from the findings of the noted Marxist statistician Vasili Nemchinov, Karcz attempts to establish the grounds on which the Stalin/Nemchinov comparative statistics on grain output for the prewar period and for the mid-1920s were actually based, questions the accuracy of their figures, and considers whether the lack of comparability in the Stalin/Nemchinov comparison, apart from data problems and differences in methodology, suggests that Stalin may have deliberately falsified the situation. In response to criticisms raised by R. W. Davies, in a January 1970 article in *Soviet*

Studies, Karcz also revises some of his own earlier conclusions on gross marketings of grain in 1926-27.

699 ———. "Thoughts on the Grain Problem." *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 4 (April 1967): 399-434. Karcz examines Stalin's attempt to quantify the Soviet grain problem of the mid-1920s in a 28 May 1928 speech to a joint meeting of students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy, and Sverdlovsk University by citing figures on grain output and marketings for the prewar period in comparison to the years 1926-27 supplied by the prominent Soviet economist and statistician Vasili Nemchinov. Describing Nemchinov's tabulations as "the alpha and omega of virtually all Soviet explanations of the grain problem and of many of its repercussions, including the collectivization of agriculture," and maintaining that the calculation, as presented by Stalin and reproduced by Nemchinov, is "completely misleading and provides an exceedingly distorted picture of the relation between 1913 and 1926/27 grain marketings," Karcz explains at some length why the Stalin/Nemchinov tabulation, in fact, contains "a comparison between two incomparable magnitudes" which resulted in an inflated image of the performance of collectivized agriculture in comparison with peasant farming of the 1920s and an inferior performance of the same peasant farming in relation to pre-1917 agriculture. Stating that available information on the relationship of prerevolutionary gross marketings of grain to those of the twenties suggests a picture "entirely different from Stalin would have it," and contending that it is immaterial whether Stalin did or did not believe in the basic accuracy of the Nemchinov tabulation—meaning whether Stalin perpetrated a hoax—Karcz discusses how the impression conveyed by the Nemchinov figures came to affect the thinking of the Bolshevik leadership on the viability of the New Economic Policy in the agricultural sector, on the nature of a solution to the grain crisis of 1927-28, and on the decision to collectivize agriculture on a massive scale. Karcz also suggests that inasmuch as the roots of the Soviet grain problem are to be found primarily in the policy errors of 1926-28, the grain crisis of that time may have been avoidable, and that alternatives to mass collectivization were available to Stalin and his colleagues that may have yielded better results than the collectivization program and with fewer adverse affects. For a commentary on Karcz's conclusions in the light of various Soviet estimates on marketed grain published between 1927 and 1930, see R. W. Davies's "A Note on Grain Statistics," *Soviet Studies* 21, no. 3 (January 1970): 314-29.

700 Katz, Barbara G. "Purges and Production: Soviet Economic Growth, 1928-1940." *Journal of Economic History* 35, no. 3 (1975): 567-90.

Katz maintains that the precipitous drop in the annual growth rate of Soviet industrial production from ten to twelve percent in the period 1928-37 to only two to three percent per annum in the period 1937-40 is best viewed as a product of Stalin's chaos-producing political purges rather than as a result of preparations World War II, as some analysts have contended. Among the purge-related factors contributing to the disruption in industrial production cited by Katz are the elimination of a disproportionately large number of plant managers, engineers, technicians, and those entrusted with important economic and planning functions; the decline of overall labor efficiency due a vast increase in labor turnover; a generalized increase in risk-averse behavior; a reluctance on the part of managers to exert discipline over their labor force for fear of being denounced to purge authorities by angered workers; and broken informal relationships within the economic-bureaucratic hierarchy along with the consequent collapse of informal channels of securing inputs as the number of arrests mounted.

701 Keep, J. L. H. "Comments on 'The Context of Early Soviet Planning'—II." *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 4 (April 1965): 467-70.

Keep comments on Rudolf Schlesinger's reply to Herbert Ellison's critique (*Soviet Studies*, January 1965) of the July 1964 *Soviet Studies* article written by Schlesinger on early Soviet planning. Keep mainly questions Schlesinger's contention that the variant of the First Five-Year Plan en-

dorsed by Stalin was both necessary and rational given the range of realistic options available to the party leadership when the crucial decisions about the tempo of industrialization were made. He suggests that the gradualist line expressed in the resolution of the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 and endorsed by Nikolai Bukharin might have provided for a respectable rate of industrialization with far less dislocation than the plan implemented by the Stalin group and without leading to an erosion of Bolshevik power and a capitalist restoration, as the critics—Stalin included—of Bukharin's so-called "kulak alternative" predicted. Keep also maintains that the Stalinists' argument that grain for the cities and export could only have been obtained by wholesale coercion, and not by the fiscal restriction of the kulak and encouragement of voluntary cooperation envisaged by Bukharin, rests on an assumption that has yet to be conclusively proved. For Schlesinger's reply to Keep's observations, see "A Note on 'Confrontations of Opposite Value Systems,'" *Soviet Studies* (July 1965): 103-04.

702 Kozminski, Andrezej K. "Consumers in Transition from the Centrally Planned Economy to the Market Economy." *Journal of Consumer Policy* 14, no. 4 (1991-1992): 351-69.

The vast majority of this article deals with the key consumer policy issues that attended the transition of Central and East European economies from regimes of central planning to those in which a market economy prevailed. In analyzing the role of consumers in the evolution of communist economies, Kozminski discusses how consumption was consistently sacrificed and kept at a minimum level under the influence of Stalin's economic policy and industrialization strategy, and how the consistent shortages of both consumer and producer goods that came with Stalin's efforts to facilitate the industrialization drive produced a situation in which households had monetary incomes exceeding the available supply of goods and services at the fixed price level, making rationing necessary to channel demand, and encouraging the development of an extensive black market.

703 Krammer, Arnold. "Russian Counterfeit Dollars: A Case of Early Soviet Espionage." *Slavic Review* 30, no. 4 (1971): 762-73.

This history of the Stalin-inspired scheme to counterfeit American one-hundred-dollar bills as an answer to Russia's massive foreign currency shortages emphasizes the grandiose and ill-conceived nature of the 1928-1934 counterfeit venture, and how it failed miserably under the combined leadership of Stalin's choice of directors for the plan—the newly appointed and "dubiously qualified" head of the embryonic Soviet espionage unit in America, Alfred Tiltin, and Nicholas Dozenberg, an early member of the American Communist Party and Tiltin's choice for a second-in-command in the budding Soviet spy ring in America. The scheme, Krammer explains, was initiated by Stalin as a means of acquiring foreign currency that was desperately needed to purchase machinery and equipment from the West for the freshly launched First Five-Year Plan, but, through repeated and near comic mismanagement, the venture "ended as quickly as it had begun," leaving Moscow embarrassed over its alleged association with the counterfeit ring, and casting a cloud over the Kremlin's efforts to obtain diplomatic recognition from America.

704 Krawchenko, Bohdan. "The Great Famine of 1932-3 in the Soviet Ukraine: Causes and Consequences." *Critique* 17 (1986): 137-46.

This account of the sources, extent, and impact of the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine locates the responsibility for this tragedy in the Stalin regime's imposition of draconian grain requisition quotas in order to maintain the rapid pace of industrialization; its willingness to allow millions of peasants to starve to death to achieve its own economic and political goals; and its active encouragement of the spread of the food crisis by refusing offers of international aid and sealing the Ukrainian borders so that starving peasants could not seek food elsewhere. In addition to maintaining that the Ukrainian famine was artificially created, and that the Stalin regime contributed to the plight of the famine's victims, Krawchenko discusses the famine as "a lived experience" in which the main

players were not even the imagined enemies of the regime, the kulaks, but rather the poor and middle peasantry of all ages who died by the millions. Ukrainization policies adopted in the early 1920s, Krawchenko writes, were also victims of the famine as Stalin abandoned these initiatives in favor of a program of Russification largely over fears that the policies were fostering Ukrainian autonomy, which threatened his plans for Ukraine's exploitation.

- 705** Krivitsky, W. G. "When Stalin Counterfeited Dollars." *Saturday Evening Post* 212 (30 September 1939): 8-9+.

The author, a former Red Army general and a top officer in Soviet military intelligence who defected to the West in 1937, provides an account of what he calls "Stalin's Five-Year Counterfeiting Plan," according to which Soviet Russia's acute shortage of foreign currency was to be addressed by printing millions of dollars worth of counterfeit one-hundred-dollar Federal Reserve bank notes. Krivitsky, who links the genesis of the plan to Stalin's "primitive nature as a political boss," desperation for foreign exchange, and profound ignorance of world financial conditions, discusses, among other things, the counterfeiting procedure itself; how the fake currency was distributed, and by whom; and why the plan, which he sees as being both juvenile and preposterous, was doomed to failure. He notes that he was appalled over the involvement of Soviet intelligence agencies in this outlandish enterprise, and he discusses his efforts to protect the Soviet military intelligence network from exposure as authorities searched for the source of the counterfeit money.

- 706** Kuchеров, Samuel. "Communism vs. Peasantry in the Soviet Union." *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (1955): 181-96.

Kuchеров takes the occasion of Georgi Malenkov's 8 February 1955 "resignation" from the leadership of the Soviet government due to "the unsatisfactory state of affairs that had arisen in agriculture" to review the phases of the struggle between communism and the peasantry from 1917 through the mid-1950s, and to explain why the peasant, after nearly four decades of efforts by the communist regime to solve "the agricultural problem" in the Soviet Union, still remained hostile to the concept of collectivized agriculture. In discussing the approach to agriculture in the early five-year plans, Kuchеров details the Stalin regime's discrimination against peasants, war against the so-called kulaks, and brutal imposition of collectivization against the backdrop of the persistence of the capitalistic frame of mind of the peasantry. He also surveys Stalin's views on the continued existence of a class of peasants in a socialist society and on the *kolkhoz* system as the key obstacle in the transition from socialism to communism, as expressed in the Soviet leader's last major work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952).

- 707** Lazarev, Valery and Paul Gregory. "Commissars and Cars: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Dictatorship." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31, no. 1 (2003): 1-19.

The authors make use of recently opened Soviet archives to study the allocation of automobiles and trucks in 1933 by "Team Stalin"—a three-person commission of top leaders of the Soviet state and Communist Party headed by Vyacheslav Molotov. Referring to "Team Stalin" as "the collective dictator" responsible for the allocation of this extremely scarce and highly prized commodity, and maintaining that the Molotov Commission acted in accord with the wishes of Stalin and the other members of the Politburo, Lazarev and Gregory contend that, in the case of vehicles, the archival data supports a political gift exchange model of dictatorial allocative behavior, in accord with which the dictator acts on the basis of short-term political considerations and the political influence of his clients, rather than an economic planning model which privileges attributes related to economic efficiency and the production capacity of the claimants for the vehicles. Inferring that the larger wholesale process was subject to the same pattern seen in vehicle allocation, and suggesting that the relative weight of direct allocation by the leadership of the Stalin regime grew over time, the authors argue that political bias in resource allocation was undermining the dicta-

tor's power in the long run, and that the devolution of the Soviet command economy actually began in the Stalin era.

708 "Leaders—Russian and American." *New Republic* 67 (12 August 1931): 327-29.

This article summarizes the key points made by Stalin in his 5 July 1931 speech dealing with the shortcomings of Soviet industry and agriculture and the changes needed to improve productivity. The author maintains that Stalin's approach to dealing with such economic problems as a labor shortage, labor turnovers, improper organization of labor about the job, the lack of a well-trained technical engineering force, and the inefficiency of large, unwieldy combinations of factories does not indicate that communism is evolving in the direction of capitalism, as many commentators suggested at that time, but rather that Stalin, in accord with his commitment to the creation of a socialist economy that will benefit all members of Soviet society, has wisely chosen to be flexible in choosing the most appropriate methods to carry out the production plan that he has set forth for the Soviet economy.

709 Lewin, Moshe. "The Disappearance of Planning in the Plan." *Slavic Review* 32, no. 2 (1973): 271-87.

In this response to Holland Hunter's *Slavic Review* article "The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan," in which a case is made for the infeasibility of the First Five-Year Plan and for the viability of alternative and less costly paths to promoting the party's modernizing agenda, Lewin discusses the political and economic circumstances and pressures which led Soviet planners to write into the plan figures in which they did not believe, and he describes how subsequent events attest to the unrealistic nature of the plan's figures and projections. Lewin devotes most of his attention to detailing the cascade effect which set in as the plan, in all its essentials, not only failed to yield the targeted results but dislocated the economy and led to a cycle of ever more impossible targets and haste. He describes how the unreachable targets and emphasis on urgency made effective economic planning impossible; necessitated an enlargement of the scope of administrative controls; and contributed to the emergence of a new state system, with a new leadership structure, a party transformed into a "politico-administrative bureaucracy," and coercion elevated to a "scale that made the term 'police state' applicable." Stalin's militarization of the industrial drive, his proposition that the class struggle would grow fiercer as socialism was developed, and readiness to justify the use of massive force in terms of "socialist transformations" also enter into Lewin's analysis of the impact of the First Five-Year Plan, as does the Stalinist leadership's need to adapt itself and the state to the task of running, directly and in detail, the whole economy by building "an appropriate machinery, in which 'repressive organs' loomed very large."

710 ———. "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization." *Soviet Studies* 17, no. 2 (October 1965): 162-97.

This article, published as the third item in a discussion arising from Rudolf Schlesinger's July 1964 *Soviet Studies* paper "Note on the Context of Early Soviet Planning," takes issue with Schlesinger's assertions that the elimination of the opposition within the Communist Party was indispensable if the Soviet regime was to survive and to succeed in its task of industrialization, and that a leadership such as Stalin's and a person of his character were, given the situation at that time, necessary for the accomplishment of this task. Focusing on the circumstances, events, and developments which conditioned the decision to collectivize agriculture on a massive scale and to use coercive measures to secure this goal, Lewin points to a series of oversights, miscalculations, and errors made by the Stalin leadership in launching and pressing ahead with the forced collectivization campaign; argues for the existence of alternatives to the path taken by the leadership; and suggests that the course of events during the industrialization and collectivization drives was shaped as much by the subjective choices of the Stalin leadership in their efforts to find practical solutions to the problems they faced as it was by urgent social needs dictated by circumstances

beyond the party's control. Given the fact that Stalin's espousal of the policy of forced collectivization emanated from a series of improvised and sometimes impetuous decisions made in response to an economic crisis that had arisen, in no small part, from the disastrous effects of Stalin's own "great leap forward," it is difficult to accept Schlesinger's argument that Stalin was the only man capable of transforming Russia into an industrial country and that the proposals of the opposition were basically wrong and Stalin's were basically right, according to Lewin. For Schlesinger's response to Lewin's remarks, see "On the Scope of Necessity and Error" *Soviet Studies* 17, no. 3 (January 1966): 353-67.

- 711** Lord, Lewis. "A Reign of Terror a World Away." *U.S. News and World Report* 134, no. 23 (30 June-7 July 2003): 4.

On the seventieth anniversary of the great Soviet famine of 1932-33, Lord briefly describes Stalin's class war against the "kulaks"—meaning all peasants who resisted collectivization—and the measures he adopted that led to the deaths of millions of peasants, mostly in Ukraine, from one of the deadliest famines in modern history.

- 712** Mandeville, J. Parnell. "Stalin's Changes of Policy." *New Statesman and Nation* 2 (18 July 1931): 70-71.

Mandeville comments on a 5 July 1931 *Izvestia* report on a speech given by Stalin regarding the need to improve the urban workers' lot and to deal with the industrial defects of the First Five-Year Plan. For Mandeville, the incredible success of the collective farm movement compelled Stalin to propose improvements in factory conditions and in the level of living for urban workers as a means of stemming the flow of labor from the cities to the countryside where the standard of living was perceived to be better.

- 713** ———. "Stalin's Changes of Policy, Part II." *New Statesman and Nation* 2 (25 July 1931): 103-4.

Continuing his assessment of Stalin's July 1931 speech outlining the reforms needed in the industrial program of the Five-Year Plan, Mandeville writes about the proposed changes of policy in terms of the difficulties that were bound to be created by the rapid expansion of mass-production industrial facilities for which the plan called, most notably an acute shortage of skilled workers, engineers, and technical experts, and the inefficient operation and poor performance of industrial plants. The reforms outlined by Stalin, particularly the promotion of skilled nonparty men to the positions they deserve and the recruitment of the technical intelligentsia of the old regime, represent a great addition of strength and a significant step toward dealing with the main problem of fulfilling the industrial program of the plan, in Mandeville's view.

- 714** Marples, David R. "Stalin's Emergent Crime: Popular and Academic Debates on the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33." *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19, nos. 1-2 (2004): 295-309.

This paper, written at the time of the seventieth anniversary of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, aims to explore how the famine came to be established as a key part of modern Ukrainian national history and to provide an assessment of the treatment of the famine by the end of the period of official commemoration as reflected in public and academic debates on this event. Tracing the development of the Soviet debate on the famine from December 1987, when it was first publicly acknowledged by the Communist Party, through the 1990s, when, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the famine became an important issue in the analysis of the Stalinist past, Marples describes how Soviet writers and scholars began to delve more deeply into the events of the early 1930s, with the theory that the famine was an act of genocide orchestrated by the Stalin regime in a war against the Ukrainian peasantry emerging as the most popular interpretation. He reviews the trends regarding the nature of the famine evident in world opinion and among Ukrainian academics, writers, and publicists at the time of the famine's seventieth anniversary, and he comments on

how the famine issue has been treated in Ukrainian schools as well. The three main conclusions that Marples draws from his survey of writings and general trends regarding the famine are 1) “the famine has not yet attained the sort of status in Ukraine that is warranted by the scale of the event and the suffering incurred”; 2) “there remains a wide gap between the perception of the famine among Ukrainian diaspora, non-diaspora Western scholars, and popular opinion in various parts of Ukraine,” particularly with respect to the acceptance of the famine-genocide concept; and 3) the diffusion of information and viewpoints from Ukrainian scholarly publications to the new national textbooks on Ukrainian history has been slow and hesitant, and the interpretation of the event at the school level varies widely from one region to another.

715 Meeks, Ronald L. “Stalin As an Economist.” *Review of Economic Studies* 21, no. 3 (1953-1954): 232-39.

Meeks discusses Stalin’s article “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” published in the journal *Bolshevik* a few months before his death. Maintaining that Stalin’s statements about the economic laws of socialism in the Soviet Union are also statements about opinions within the country on contemporary economic policies and about the economic policies to be adopted for the future, Meeks explains how Stalin, in commenting on the economic laws of socialism, rejected the viewpoint, expounded in a 1943 article on “The Teaching of Political Economy in the Soviet Union,” that the economic laws of socialism were fundamentally different from those of capitalism and could be extended to embrace the conscious actions of the state and planning agencies in promoting socialist development, and argued instead that such an approach confuses laws of science with laws issued by governments and encourages adventurism at the expense of realism in economic policy. Stalin’s assault on the thesis of the 1943 article, Meeks speculates, can be viewed as an expression of his concern over the key question of the organization of agriculture, specifically with how best to convert collective-farm property into state property. In rejecting an approach that would have used the state’s power to force a transition from collective to state property similar in character to the one used to bring about mass collectivization during the First Five-Year Plan, and in supporting a series of gradual transitions operating over a fairly long period of time, Stalin, Meeks writes, drew upon the Marxist concepts of “commodity,” “commodity relations,” and the “law of value” to provide a set of theoretical concepts applicable to a form of socialist society in which a state sector and a collective-farm sector continue to exist side by side for a considerable period of time. Meeks concludes by linking Stalin’s analysis of the conditions of agricultural development in the USSR to the Soviet leader’s account of the preconditions of the transition from socialism to communism, and to his belief that such a transition was neither a simple matter nor likely to take place in the near future.

716 Millar, James R. “Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan.” *Slavic Review* 33 (December 1974): 750-66.

This review of two Russian language studies by Soviet historian A. A. Barsov dealing with the net material contribution of Soviet agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan explains how Barsov’s research, which is based upon previously inaccessible archival data, provides an empirical demonstration that Soviet agriculture’s net contribution to industrialization for the period 1928 through 1932 was, at most, exceedingly modest, and that, as an economic measure, Stalin’s program of mass collectivization was counterproductive not only in the long run, as most Western scholars have maintained, but in the short run as well. Millar also attempts to explain why most Western and Soviet analysts were led to overstate the development role of Soviet agriculture.

717 ———. “Soviet Rapid Development and the Agricultural Surplus Hypothesis.” *Soviet Studies* 22 (July 1970): 77-93.

The first half of this essay aims to demonstrate that the commonly accepted formulations of the role of agriculture in Soviet rapid economic development are founded on “analytically ambiguous

concepts of an agricultural surplus.” The second develops an alternative framework for description and appraisal of the role of agriculture in Soviet development and suggests that this role has been generally misconceived. Stalin by name does not enter into either of the essay’s two sections, but as a study which suggests that Soviet agricultural policy in support of rapid industrialization was grounded on an incorrect analysis of peasant economic behavior, and that “the decision to collectivize may have been taken on the basis of inappropriate statistical information, or, perhaps, for completely non-economic reasons,” it sheds light on the possible shortcomings of the models—particularly the model sanctioned by Stalin—underlying the intraparty industrialization debates preceding the decision to collectivize and exploit agriculture in furtherance of industrialization.

- 718** Millar, James R. and Corinne A. Guntzel. “The Economics and Politics of Mass Collectivization Reconsidered: a Review Article.” *Explorations in Economic History* 8, no. 1 (fall 1970): 103-16.

Millar and Guntzel review Moshe Lewin’s *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (1968) in terms of what the book has to say about a series of questions they believe are crucial to an understanding of the economics and politics of mass collectivization, namely, “What were the basic economic and political issues raised by the NEP, and how were they conceived by Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders?” “What links can be and were at the time established between the imperatives of a commitment to industrialize as rapidly as possible and the abandonment of the NEP in favor of collectivized agriculture?” “What was Stalin’s intellectual and political role in bringing mass collectivization about, and how was it related to Stalin’s struggle for political ascendancy?” Was forced collectivization a conscious policy decision . . . or did it just happen as the concatenation of numerous decisions, indecisions, actions, and inactions of the leadership?” and “How appropriate was mass collectivization as a policy solution?” The authors also comment on Alec Nove’s argument, set forth in the preface of *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*, that collectivization was “objectively necessary,” and on how the lack of reliable information on the actual course of events and their consequences poses a serious obstacle to an objective evaluation of collectivization.

- 719** Millar, James R. and Alec Nove. “A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary?” *Problems of Communism* 25 (July/August 1976): 49-62.

This article consists of the transcribed and edited version of the record of the debate on Soviet collectivization which took place at Duke University on 10 November 1975 between the noted economists James Millar and Alec Nove. Millar primarily addresses the deficiencies of what he refers to as the “standard story” of the role of agriculture in industrialization in the USSR, according to which Stalin, in resolving the conflict between the views expressed by Nikolai Bukharin and Evgeni Preobrazhensky regarding the need for and feasibility of exploiting the peasants in support of rapid industrialization, maintained that the only way for the Soviet Union to achieve the rate of industrial growth that it needed in the 1930s was by forcing the peasants into collective farms and exploiting them in support of industrialization. After pointing out what he feels is wrong with the standard story, Millar argues that Stalin’s collectivization program, far from being required to finance industrialization, was neither necessary nor optimal for the industrialization drive, and that rapid industrial development took place in the First Five-Year Plan not only without any net accumulation from agriculture but with a net outflow of resources to agriculture. Nove responds to Millar’s statements by developing the argument that—in view of the situation the Bolsheviks found themselves in after seizing power in the name of building socialism in a peasant country, and in light of “the logic of the one-party state,” the Russian autocratic tradition, and the perception of the Bolsheviks that the need for rapid industrialization was a matter of survival—it was difficult for the Bolsheviks to accept any alternative to the forced collectivization of agriculture for which Stalin and his cohorts called. Add to these circumstances the condition of Soviet agriculture in the 1920s, and the belief of the Bolsheviks that the emergence of a commercially minded peasantry constituted a real danger for them, and one can see why the solution to the

“peasant problem” that the party adopted—the one put forth by Stalin—was, in the mind of the Bolsheviks, the best available option, according to Nove. While the collectivization program was marked by excesses attributable, in part, to Stalin’s personal predilection for violence and cannot be morally justified by the outcome of the industrialization drive of the 1930s, collectivization, for the Bolsheviks, really was necessary, Nove concludes. The debate between Millar and Nove includes rejoinders in which the two economists spar over Nove’s use of the concept of necessity and over the question of the suffering caused by rapid industrialization and the collectivization drive. The debate is accompanied by an introduction and afterthoughts by moderator Jerry Hough.

720 Narkiewicz, O. A. “Stalin, War Communism and Collectivization.” *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 1 (July 1966): 20-37.

This paper argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Stalin, as late as October 1929, did not intend to carry out a mass collectivization of agriculture but rather merely planned to use persuasion and coercion to squeeze every bit of grain out of the peasants in order to guarantee industrial expansion and intended to delay full-scale collectivization until the party and state had the agricultural technology and administrative apparatus to execute such a complex and costly operation. Narkiewicz contends that what was referred to as “collectivization” in the winter of 1929-30 was not collectivization at all but rather a series of drastic measures carried out in the name of collectivization to quell peasant revolts triggered by the grossly mismanaged grain procurement campaign. Stalin needed the excuse that the peasants were rebelling against collectivization rather than against grain procurements, Narkiewicz explains, so as to protect himself from both the Central Committee and the expelled opposition leaders who had predicted the peasants’ hostile and potentially destructive response to the coercive procurement policy he endorsed. Despite their realization of what was happening in the countryside, fear of an all-out peasant revolution led the Commission on Collectivization as well as the Central Committee to assent to Stalin’s adoption of hard measures to quell peasant unrest and to his billing of peasant rebellions as a counterrevolution against collectivization, according to Narkiewicz.

721 “The New Line.” *Time* 60 (13 October 1952): 32.

Stalin’s October 1952 memorandum in *Bolshevik*, the party’s leading magazine on matters of communist theory, in which he stated that economic rivalry among the capitalist states is stronger than the ideological rivalry between the communist East and capitalist West, is the focus of this article. The author summarizes the memo’s key points, suggests that its aim was to sow discord among the Western powers, and comments on Stalin’s statements regarding what was needed for the Soviet Union to move from the socialist to the communist stage of development.

722 Nove, Alec. “Ideology and Agriculture.” *Soviet Studies* 17, no. 4 (1966): 397-407.

Nove explores the possible ways ideology may have shaped the decision to impose collectivization on a hostile peasantry. He contends that ideology provided no direct argument in favor of the course chosen by Stalin but contributed to the choice indirectly by eliminating certain alternative solutions to the problem and by predisposing the party leadership to the idea of a social revolution from above, a concept which was implicit in Lenin’s whole line of seizing power in a backward country unripe for socialism. Ideology also influenced the organizational shape of collectivized farming as well as the measures directed against the private sector, in Nove’s view, but, again, not in a direct or determining capacity.

723 Owen, G. L. “The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934.” *Slavonic and East European Review* 49, no. 114 (1971): 92-112.

Owen argues that Stalin personally orchestrated the 19 April 1933 arrest, trial, and conviction of five British engineers who worked for the Metropolitan-Vickers Electric Company on charges of spying, sabotage, and counterrevolutionary activity as a means of counteracting British intransi-

gence in the negotiation of a new Anglo-Soviet agreement and to help consolidate his own political position within the Soviet leadership. According to Owen, Stalin intentionally precipitated the crisis with Britain as a means of dealing with right-wing opposition to him within the secret police by faulting that agency for its unilateral role in precipitating the Metro-Vickers affair. He then "elevated his creature Akulov" to the newly created post of Prosecutor of the USSR, granted him full control over the OGPU, and integrated the secret police into his machinery of personal despotism, thereby setting the scene for "the complete elimination of every lingering trace of opposition by means of the Purges." Having brought the OGPU under his control, Stalin, armed with the knowledge that Moscow's growing industrial self-sufficiency reduced its economic dependence on London, had Soviet diplomats work to repair relations with Britain, and succeeded in arranging for the renewal of negotiations for a new trade agreement. The resulting treaty, in practice, failed to alter the pattern which had prevailed in Anglo-Soviet trade relations prior to London's 17 April 1933 denunciation of the 1930 trade agreement, and marked the failure of Britain's effort to alter trade relations in its favor by taking advantage of what it mistakenly perceived to be Soviet dependency on British imports.

724 Penner, D'Ann R. "Stalin and the *Ital'ianka* of 1932-1933 in the Don Region." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 39, nos. 1-2 (1998): 27-68.

This analysis of the 1932-33 grain crisis in the Don region takes issue with the interpretation that the famine triggered by the crisis was orchestrated by the Stalin regime in accord with a plan worked out beforehand. According to Penner, government policies and peasant reactions from 1929 to 1932 created conditions highly unfavorable to agricultural stability and set the stage for the total breakdown in political relations between the peasantry and the party in response to the announcement of the 1932-33 grain procurement plan and the imposition of a kind of "insurance policy" quota-setting strategy determined by Stalin. Focusing on the *ital'ianka*—a term used by Stalin to describe peasant resistance, both passive and active, to the government's agrarian policies—Penner details how the villagers' angry and fearful responses to the regime's practices, particularly during the critical months of the harvest season, escalated the grain shortage crisis into a famine, with Stalin interpreting the *ital'ianka* as a declaration of war against the Soviet government and responding by using "starvation politics" to discipline and instruct the troublesome peasants. While this response led to the famine's final death toll being "considerably higher than it might otherwise have been," Penner concludes, the "intentionalist" famine school of thought does not seem well founded in the case of the Don region.

725 Rosefielde, Steven. "An Assessment of the Sources and Uses of Gulag Forced Labour 1929-56." *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 1981): 51-87.

Rosefielde examines the reliability of available estimates of Soviet forced concentration camp labor, attempting to bring into a coherent perceptive the disparate data from primary document material, published secondary material, official testimony, *zek* (camp prisoner) testimony, and circumstantial socioeconomic evidence. He maintains that the wealth of evidence from these various sources confirms beyond reasonable doubt that forced labor occurred under Stalin on an enormous scale; that the use of forced labor in significant amounts commenced with Stalin's industrialization drive and persisted well into the 1950s; and that the dynamics of Soviet economic development cannot be fully understood until the influence of forced labor is comprehensively determined and factored into the growth process.

726 ———. "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR: A Rejoinder to Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver." *Slavic Review* 45, no. 2 (summer 1986): 300-306.

Rosefielde responds to the criticisms put forth by Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, in the *Slavic Review*'s fall 1985 issue, regarding his estimates of the number of excess deaths under Stalin in the 1930s and to their assertions about the sensitivity of estimates of excess mortality to assump-

tions about “normal” trends in fertility and mortality. Rosefielde reiterates the arguments he has advanced in his previous writings on excess deaths in the thirties; defends the methodology he used in arriving at his figures; and explains why the allegations of Anderson and Silver that his excess death estimates are exaggerated through misuse of official data cannot be objectively sustained. For Rosefielde, Anderson and Silver, in attempting, in effect, “to demonstrate that the Stalinist characterization of the human and material costs of forced industrialization is broadly correct” underestimate “the catastrophic potential of Stalin’s policies and the critical statistics that bear on them.”

727 ———. “Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-1933: New Demographic Evidence.” *Slavic Review* 43, no. 1 (spring 1984): 83-88.

Rosefielde briefly discusses how the evidence presented by Soviet demographer Boris Ulanis, in two studies written in the mid-1970s, which include revised natality figures and a previously unpublished official population estimate for the 1930s, sheds light on the magnitude of the discrepancy between expected and observed deaths in the Soviet Union during the period between 1929 and 1933. The new demographic evidence suggests that the full extent of the demographic losses sustained under Stalin’s program of forced collectivization may well exceed the roughly five million excess collectivization deaths accepted by many Western scholars, according to Rosefielde.

728 ———. “Excess Deaths and Industrialization: A Realist Theory of Stalinist Economic Development in the Thirties.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 2 (April 1988): 277-89.

Rosefielde attempts to illuminate the nature of the divergent appraisals of the size and character of Soviet economic achievements under Stalin in the 1930s by examining their analytic underpinnings and by evaluating them in terms of the relationship between excess deaths and the achieved levels of economic development as indicated by Soviet statistics. He contends that the extraordinary number of excess deaths observed during the thirties “diminishes the credibility of economic development estimates based on official statistics and calls into question the efficacy of the Stalinist development model.” In postulating a “realist theory” of Soviet economic development process in the 1930s, Rosefielde argues that economic development was a subordinate objective of Stalin’s program to transform the Soviet social order; that planning, administrative, and managerial mechanisms of the period were substantially less efficient than those of the competitive market; and that the driving force behind industrialization was resource diversion, not resource mobilization as commonly supposed. Overall, Rosefielde suggests that industrialization under Stalin was accomplished primarily through coercive political means rather than by advances in economic efficiency or through rapid technological progress, and that economic growth was considerably retarded by the adverse effects of impeded labor-force growth due to excess deaths and widespread use of compulsory concentration camp labor.

729 ———. “Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialization, 1929-1949.” *Soviet Studies* 35, no. 2 (June 1982): 385-409.

In this reassessment of the demographic consequences of Stalin’s forced industrialization strategy throughout the period 1929-49, Rosefielde considers the viability of the principal rival hypotheses centered about the excess death estimates derived from Antonov-Ovseyenko’s 1937 census information versus those based on the official 1939 census. He lends his support to the plausibility of Antonov-Ovseyenko’s estimates but maintains that whichever hypothesis is favored by analysts, the implications of the basic estimates for 1929-49 clearly suggest that the forced industrialization program adopted by Stalin culminated in a demographic disaster for the Soviet population, with a total population deficit approaching 46,000,000 people attributable to the Soviet dictator’s forced industrialization policies.

- 730** ———. "The First Great Leap Forward Reconsidered: The Lessons of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*." *Slavic Review* 39, no. 4 (December 1980): 559-87.

Rosefielde points out the revolutionary implications of the wealth of detailed economic information presented by Alexander Solzhenitsyn's three-volume work *The Gulag Archipelago* (1973-78) and then formulates a theory of Soviet economic development during the First Five-Year Plan that reflects Solzhenitsyn's perception of Stalin's "Great Leap Forward." According to Rosefielde, and in line with Solzhenitsyn's writings, official statistics on Soviet industrial production during the "Great Leap Forward" were, for various reasons, falsified to a significant degree, leading to exaggerated accounts, both by the Stalin regime and Western scholars, of the rate of industrialization achieved during that time. Rosefielde contends that the growth achieved during the First Five-Year Plan is primarily attributable to the reallocation of skilled labor from agriculture into industrial activity conducted initially in the cities, but then increasingly in forced labor camps, and that the standard of living in the Soviet Union, when evaluated in terms of gross material product, fell during 1929-33, supporting the conclusion that economic development during Stalin's "Great Leap Forward" was, in fact, immiserizing.

- 731** ———. "Incriminating Evidence: Excess Deaths and Forced Labour under Stalin: A Final Reply to Critics." *Soviet Studies* 39, no. 2 (1987): 293-313.

Rosefielde responds anew to the criticisms raised against the excess death and forced labor estimates he presented, in conjunction with his effort to reassess the nature and consequences of Stalin's economic development strategy, in essays published in the January 1981 and June 1983 issues of *Soviet Studies*. He explains why he believes the various technical arguments against his figures are inconsequential and lack merit, and why, in his judgment, Stalin's coercive policies and strategy of industrialization proved to be humanly and materially catastrophic for the Soviet Union. Those scholars who have presented Stalinism in the opposite light, Rosefielde concludes, must explain how the Stalinist experience could have been anything but catastrophic given forced collectivization, the gulag, the terror, and "the ineffectuality of the Stalinist economic system."

- 732** ———. "New Demographic Evidence on Collectivization Deaths: A Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft." *Slavic Review* 44, no. 3 (fall 1985): 509-16.

In this response to Stephen Wheatcroft's criticism of the author's fall 1985 *Slavic Review* article, "New Demographic Evidence on Excess Collectivization Deaths," the main contention is that Wheatcroft misunderstood both the article's method for estimating excess deaths during Stalin's collectivization campaign of 1929-32, and its interpretation of the population statistics for 1933 presented by the prominent Soviet demographer Boris Ulanis in his 1974 study *Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSR*. Rosefielde also comments on what he sees as growing statistical evidence indicating that "the demographic cost of Stalin's political and economic programs vastly exceeded the few million excess deaths attributable to official acts of violence and repression Wheatcroft may be willing to concede."

- 733** "Russia's New Chief Abandons the World Revolution." *Literary Digest* 91 (30 October 1926): 8-9.

Reporting on Stalin's then recent triumph over "the insurgent Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev group of Bolshevik leaders" and emergence as Lenin's successor, this article centers on the conciliatory attitude adopted by Stalin toward the capitalist nations of the West, and his rejection of the idea of "world revolution" in favor of promoting the stability and economic development of the Soviet Union, including the use of capitalist methods to encourage the nation's peasants to be more productive and the securing of foreign credits needed to help Russia grow its economy.

- 734** Scheffer, Paul. "Russia on the Brink: Is Stalin Doomed?" *Living Age* 337 (15 January 1930): 594-600.

Scheffer describes how the drastic measures taken by the Stalin regime in its effort to force the pace of the collectivization of agriculture have produced an agrarian crisis so grave that it threatens the very existence of the Soviet regime. He writes that Stalin's ruthless drive toward communism is not confined to agriculture but extends to the entire economy and to virtually every activity of Soviet citizens, and that the gigantic gamble Stalin has taken in launching such an ambitious campaign may trigger a revolt not by the oppressed peasants or the crushed bourgeoisie but from within the ranks of the Communist Party itself if the gamble fails to yield the promised results.

- 735** Schlesinger, Rudolf. "A Note on 'Confrontations of Opposite Value Systems.'" *Soviet Studies* 17, no. 1 (July 1968): 103-04.

Schlesinger responds to John Keep's observations on the question of the necessity of the collectivization drive in view of the realistic choices open to the Bolsheviks as Marxists committed to the socialist transformation of the Soviet Union. Rejecting explanations of the collectivization decision merely in terms of national survival against external threats or the intraparty struggle for power, Schlesinger develops further his earlier argument that within the context of the economic situation in the Soviet Union in 1927-28 and when considering the basic principles of the Bolsheviks and the party's decision to force the pace of industrialization, the collectivization drive or some similar enforcement measures against the peasants became unavoidable.

- 736** ———. "Note on the Context of Early Soviet Planning." *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 1 (July 1964): 22-44.

This examination of the internal Bolshevik disputes of the mid-1920s about the extent, pace, and timing of industrialization in association with the systematic elaboration of a five-year plan for the development of the Soviet economy includes a discussion of how the problem of industrialization came to be expressed in factional terms and of the clever factional maneuvering by which Stalin secured both his own ascendancy and that of the industrializing wing in the party caucus. Schlesinger, an economist, sociologist, and Marxist political theorist who witnessed some of the industrialization debates in Moscow, advances the view that those elements in the party, on both the Left and the Right, which resisted industrialization had to be eliminated, at least from its leadership, and that the need to break both oppositions was "so deeply rooted in the actual situation that it is difficult to see how a leadership other than Stalin's could have avoided internal crisis . . ." and that it is "questionable whether a person not of his character . . . could have achieved and, *a fortiori*, kept the leadership in the given situation." For commentaries on Schlesinger's article, see the articles by Herbert Ellison, John Keep, and Moshe Lewin in *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 3 (January 1965): 326-27; 16, no. 4 (April 1965): 467-70; and 17, no. 2 (October 1965): 162-97 respectively. For Schlesinger's replies see 16, no. 3 (January 1965): 327-29, and 17, no. 3 (January 1966): 353-67.

- 737** ———. "On the Scope of Necessity and Error. Some Observations on Dr. Lewin's Article." *Soviet Studies* 17, no. 3 (January 1966): 353-67.

Schlesinger comments on Moshe Lewin's October 1965 *Soviet Studies* article dealing with the needs and circumstances which gave shape to the policy of forced collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s; with the degree of personal responsibility within the leadership for the disaster which attended the collectivization campaign; and with the connection between the approach taken to industrialization and the emergence of a Stalin-type dictatorship. Schlesinger's critique centers on Lewin's arguments that the party's leaders failed to undertake early preparations for solution of the agrarian problem short of enforced collectivization; that forms of collective husbandry could have been developed at an earlier date which would have avoided the need for a drastic "leap"; that, given the economic and political circumstances at that time, the exaggeration of the collec-

tivization drive could have been avoided; and that Stalin's elimination of the opposition from the leadership was an inevitable consequence of the agrarian crisis.

738 ———. ["Reply"] *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 3 (January 1965): 327-29.

Schlesinger counters the criticisms raised by Herbert Ellison, in this same issue of *Soviet Studies*, regarding his portrayal of the views of right-wing Bolshevik leaders during the party debates of the 1920s on industrialization, and he restates his case, originally advanced in the July 1964 issue of *Soviet Studies*, that those on the Right "were incapable of supporting practical policies required for industrialization"; that they had to be removed from the party's leadership if the country was to pass the crisis it found itself in during the late 1920s; and that Stalin's position on the approach to be taken in industrializing Russia was, in the context of that time, necessary to the survival of the Soviet state.

739 Schwendemann, Heinrich. "German-Soviet Economic Relations at the Time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, 1939-1941." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 36, nos. 1-2 (1995): 161-78.

Schwendemann examines the circumstances and motives which gave rise to the intensive economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany from the autumn of 1939 up to the German attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941 and then moves on to analyze the development of German-Soviet economic relations during this period and their connection to Stalin's failure to anticipate the Nazi attack. He maintains that as economic cooperation between the two states increased dramatically during this time, reached record levels by 1941, and continued until the eve of the German invasion, Stalin concluded that the German military preparations along the Soviet border were intended to pressure him to increase Soviet material support for the Nazi war economy rather than as an indication that a German attack was imminent. This conclusion was reinforced by Stalin's mistaken belief that Hitler was the architect of the German economic demands and had little reason to attack a state from which he could get maximum support under peaceful conditions, according to Schwendemann.

740 Sirc, Ljubo. "Economics of Collectivization." *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 3 (1967): 362-70.

Sirc conducts an economic analysis of Stalin's collectivization of agriculture, examining the program's aims, its establishment of large-scale, mechanized production, its connection with industrialization, and the technical necessity of such an approach to developing agriculture. He points out a number of shortcomings of the Stalinist collectivization of agriculture in each of these respects, concluding that "collectivization can hardly be considered 'sensible' on any economic grounds," and that "the only rationale behind it is that it strengthened the grip of the party on the Soviet Union."

741 Solovey, Dmytro. "On the 30th Anniversary of the Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1963): 237-46; 19, no. 4 (1963): 350-63.

Solovey argues that party leaders, Stalin in particular, "consciously and premeditatively" created the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine as the culminating step in a planned colonial policy dating back to the early 1920s and having as its aim the extermination of a Ukrainian nation which kept striving for its independence. He provides a step-by-step account of the measures adopted by the Stalin regime for the accomplishment of the genocidal actions to be taken against Ukrainian peasants, including the brutal manner in which the collectivization campaign in Ukraine during the First Five-Year Plan was carried out; the establishment of unreachable grain supply quotas in Ukraine, leading to seizure of all the grain and food products from the Ukrainian peasants; the failure to counter the spread of famine across the region, compounded by Moscow's attempt to shut off Ukraine from surrounding areas where the food shortage was not as severe; and the regime's efforts to cover up what was happening in famine-ravaged Ukraine so as to allow the effects of its genocidal actions to run their full course. Solovey also discusses the question of why "the all-

pervading collectivization terror of 1929-32 and the heinous man-made famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine remains officially unknown,” maintaining that Khrushchev “evidently considers the acts of genocide against millions of Ukrainians as something quite in order, necessary, and lawful.”

742 “Stalin Airs His Views on Mr. Roosevelt’s New Deal.” *Newsweek* 4 (20 October 1934): 16. This report provides a brief account of Stalin’s Kremlin conversation with British author H. G. Wells regarding the nature of FDR’s New Deal, particularly with respect to the extent to which the program posed a threat to the future of capitalism in America. Stalin reportedly said that if the New Deal were to pose a real challenge to the established system, Roosevelt would be removed from office by the nation’s capitalist leaders.

743 “Stalin As Book Critic.” *Collier’s Weekly* 131 (21 March 1953): 78.

This article provides the highlights of the March 1953 memorandum produced by Stalin and printed in *Pravda* in which he sought to give direction to those Soviet professors entrusted with the task of producing a handbook on political economy that would describe to the world how the Soviet economy was remade in the spirit of socialism, and what the glorious future of communism would look like. Stalin’s dismay over the slowness of the project’s progress and his dissatisfaction with the failure of the Congress of Soviet Professors to reach an agreement on what the book should say also receives attention as does his rebuke of the academician who was to head the project.

744 “Stalin on Trade: Sell It to the Peasants.” *Newsweek* 29 (12 May 1947): 80.

The text of the part of Harold Stassen’s May 1947 interview with Stalin dealing with the subject of American business and trade conditions is provided by this report. Stalin’s interest in the quantity of orders being received by American factories, in the ability of the factories to fill these orders, and in the possibility that government intervention would be necessary to assure that a supply-demand imbalance would not lead to an economic crisis are the main components of this segment of Stassen’s interview.

745 “Stalin Reports.” *Nation* 162 (16 February 1946): 185.

This report summarizes the February 1946 address to the Soviet people given by Stalin on the eve of the nation’s general election, noting how he sought to justify his regime’s relentless pursuit of industrial and military might by linking the five-year plans to the Soviet victory over its enemies in the Great Patriotic War. In noting Stalin’s promise that during the next five-year plan rationing would be abolished and more attention would be paid to expanding the production of consumer goods and to improving the standard of living, the report suggests that the address, by giving the masses hope of reaping some material rewards for their years of sacrifices and suffering, reflects the Stalin regime’s concern about its standing with the Soviet people.

746 “Stalin’s Speech.” *New Republic* 114, no. 7 (18 February 1946): 235-36.

Stalin’s February 1946 speech on the new five-year plan is largely a defense of the prewar forced industrialization policy as a key contributor to of the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, according to this article. In commending the prewar policy, Stalin, the article maintains, has established a rationale for continuing the emphasis on heavy industry, while his statements on capitalism as the cause of the war and on the inevitability of future wars under capitalism speak to the need for a large-scale strengthening of the Red Army. Accepting Stalin’s condemnation of monopoly capitalism, but rejecting his fatalistic attitude toward war, the article calls for American economic aid to the USSR as a means of permitting the expansion of both heavy and light industry, thereby demonstrating America’s “good faith” and removing Stalin’s need to create a political atmosphere of distrust and fear of other nations in order to justify the sacrifices that the Soviet people must make for the sake of expanding the nation’s military-industrial capacity.

- 747** Tauger, Mark B. "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (spring 1991): 70-89.

The argument that the 1933 famine in the Soviet Union was a man-made one caused by the Stalin regime's imposition of harsh grain procurement quotas on Ukrainian peasants and various other groups in order to suppress nationalism and to overcome opposition to collectivization is, according to this article, questionable in view of new Soviet archival data which indicates that the 1932 harvest was much smaller than has been assumed and made famine likely, if not inevitable, in 1933. In presenting the new data on the condition of Soviet agriculture in the early 1930s, Tauger explains why such factors as the severity and geographical extent of the famine, the sharp decline in grain exports in 1932-33, and the widespread chaos in the Soviet Union during these years point to the conclusion that even a complete cessation of exports would not have been enough to prevent the famine. The fact that the Stalin regime actually sought to alleviate the famine and that the harsh procurements only displaced the famine from urban to rural areas further calls into question the merits of the view that the famine was artificial and a conscious act of genocide by Stalin and his supporters, in Tauger's estimate.

- 748** Temin, Peter. "Soviet and Nazi Economic Planning in the 1930s." *Economic History Review* 44, no. 4 (1991): 573-93.

Temin analyzes the aims of economic planners under Hitler and Stalin in the 1930s and the process and outcome of planning in the Nazi and Soviet economies. He argues for the existence of similarities between the two economies, most notably with respect to their employment of fixed prices and economic coercion and use of socialist planning primarily as a means for military preparation and mobilization. He also discusses some of the differences between the German and Soviet economies, noting the role of Stalin's paranoia in his less selective use of coercion than Hitler in directing the economy, and how Soviet planning was more destructive of consumption than its Nazi counterpart.

- 749** Viola, Lynne. "Back on the Economic Front of Collectivization or Soviet Agriculture without Soviet Power." *Slavic Review* 47, no. 2 (1988): 217-22.

In this critique of Holland Hunter's *Slavic Review* article "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928-1940" in which a case is made for a feasible alternative to Soviet agricultural collectivization under Stalin, the author takes issue with Hunter's projections regarding agricultural productivity if traditional peasant agriculture had been allowed to continue, arguing that his analyses and projections are too narrowly focused on animal tractive power and "too dependent on additional 'what ifs' and untested assumptions." These problems, in Viola's view, derive from a larger, underlying problem—the lack of historical context for Hunter's analysis, particularly with respect to the ideological and political inputs that conditioned the decision to collectivization. In this regard, Viola points to such factors as the multidimensional nature of the crisis of the New Economic Policy; the party's attitude of distrust and disdain for the peasantry; and a Bolshevik mentality, epitomized by Stalin, that was voluntaristic, precluded moderation, and was marked by "a willingness to disregard individual human suffering in the interests of the party, the revolution, and history." Furthermore, Hunter's alternative is his own—a hypothetical projection—rather than an actual policy alternative that was on the table during the party debates of the 1920s, and while, "in the abstract, alternatives are always possible, if an alternative policy is not implemented, then it was, in retrospect, not viable for some reason or another, whether economic, political, or social," Viola maintains. Hunter's reply to Viola's critique appears in this same issue of *Slavic Review*.

- 750** Volin, Lazar. "Stalin's Last Testament and the Outlook for *Kolkhozy* during the Succession." *Journal of Political Economy* 61 (August 1953): 291-305.

This paper examines Stalin's much-publicized 1952 article "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" for insights into the dictator's thinking on the position of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) and the peasantry in the Soviet system and on the future outlook, organizationally, for collective farming. Volin evaluates Stalin's proposals for the consolidation of the state and *kolkhoz* sectors of agriculture, the replacement of market exchange by a barter system, and the abandonment of the personal farming of the *kolkhozniki*, and considers his contention that the proposed changes had to take place gradually, so as to limit any negative effects on agricultural production, but steadfastly since the *kolkhozy* were deemed to be absolutely essential to the achievement of a fully socialist economy. Volin also discusses why he believes Stalin's heirs are unlikely to abandon neither the "agrarian supercollectivism" proposed by Stalin nor the anti-peasant policy he pursued throughout the years of his rule.

- 751** Wegren, Stephan K. "From Stalin to Gorbachev: The Role of the Communist Party in the Implementation of Agriculture Policy." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 23, no. 2 (summer 1990): 177-90.

This review of Daniel Thorniley's *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Rural Communist Party, 1929-39* (1988) and Cynthia Kaplan's *The Party and Agricultural Crisis Management in the USSR* (1987) centers on how the party's role in the countryside changed from the years of the First Five-Year Plan, when its main tasks were collectivization and "dekulakization" of the countryside, to the years 1934-39, when, as a consequence of the emasculation of the rural party in the Stalin purges, it withdrew from involvement in production activities, and, lastly, to the postwar years under Stalin, which witnessed a return to an emphasis on party involvement in production in accord with Stalin's emphasis on clamping down on the violations of the socialist system that had occurred during the war, on reestablishing communist institutions in the countryside, and on restoring production to prewar levels. Wegren also discusses how Thorniley's study indicates that the rural party was ill-prepared to handle the tasks it was charged with during the years of collectivization, and how both Kaplan and Thorniley, in arguing that the rural party was fundamentally different from its urban counterpart, call into question the applicability of the totalitarian model which sees the party as being monolithic during the Stalin period.

- 752** Wheatcroft, Stephen G. "New Demographic Evidence on Excess Collectivization Deaths: Yet Another *Kliukva* from Steven Rosefielde?" *Slavic Review* 44, no. 3 (1985): 505-8.

Wheatcroft voices two criticisms of Steven Rosefielde's article "Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-1933: New Demographic Evidence," which appeared in the spring 1984 issue of the *Slavic Review*. The first concerns Rosefielde's assertion that the estimate of the 1933 population level of the USSR made by Soviet demographer Boris Ulanis in his 1974 work *Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSSR* is a "previously unpublished official population estimate," and Rosefielde's use of what, in fact, was a rough estimate by Ulanis—one not based on unpublished official sources—to suggest that as many as five million Soviet peasants died as a result of Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture. The second deals with Rosefielde's claim that these very large estimates of excess collectivization deaths under Stalin represent the standard Western scholarly view. For Rosefielde's rejoinder to Wheatcroft, see *Slavic Review* 44, no. 2 (1985): 509-16.

- 753** Wintrobe, Ronald. "The Tin Pot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 849-72.

This attempt to use the basic tools of economic theory to construct a model of the characteristics and behavior of dictatorship includes some discussion of Stalin as an example of a totalitarian leader whose level of political repression, in accord with the model developed here, was affected by economic change and was, at its height in the late 1930s, adversely affecting the attainment of the "supply of loyalty" and the absolute power which he sought. Wintrobe also discusses the features of the totalitarian party under Stalin that facilitated investments in loyalty to the party, par-

ticularly the party's use of loyalty-based property rights as a means of rewarding political participation and proper political behavior.

Society and Social Policy

- 754** Bailes, Kendall E. "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite: A Comment." *Slavic Review* 39, no. 2 (1980): 286-89.

Bailes lends his support to the fundamental argument advanced by Sheila Fitzpatrick, in her September 1979 *Slavic Review* article "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1938-1939," according to which Stalin took special interest in the selection of new cadres for the Soviet bureaucracy during the 1928-37 period because he believed that existing communist cadres lacked the training and technical expertise required for Soviet leadership. Bailes takes issue, however, with what he sees as Fitzpatrick's lack of attention to the *praktiki*—those promoted into the new cadres without any formal specialized education—and to their relationship to Stalin and the new elite. For Fitzpatrick's reply to Bailes's comments, see *Slavic Review* 39, no. 2 (1980): 290-91.

- 755** Bergman, Jay. "Valerii Chkalov: Soviet Pilot As New Soviet Man." *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 1 (1998): 135-52.

Bergman describes how the Soviet government's representation of the life story of Valeri Chkalov—the most famous of the Soviet pilots of the 1930s who were celebrated in the press for the records they set—sheds light on Stalin's image of the "New Soviet Man" and many of the features of a communist society as Stalin imagined it. He also discusses how Stalin's vision of the "New Soviet Man" was influenced by the paternalism that permeated his concept of dictatorship, and how it is possible to discern in this vision and in the story of Chkalov some of the reasons why the Stalinist system was ultimately a dysfunctional one.

- 756** Brower, Daniel R. "Stalinism and the 'View from Below.'" *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 379-81.

Part of an exchange between social historians and their critics prompted by Sheila Fitzpatrick's October 1986 *Russian Review* essay "New Perspectives on Stalinism," this article questions the validity of the conclusions drawn regarding Stalinist society as a whole in studies which rely heavily on local or regional documents. Brower also maintains that the structuralist approach that guides the study of the social history of the 1930s may not be applicable to the years of the Stalin revolution and terror, given the fact that the hypothetical "average man" to be depicted in the type of social history Fitzpatrick proposes is classically situated in an idealized society of system, structure, and repetitiveness, one which bears little resemblance to the Stalinist society of the 1930s in which conditions of disorder prevailed.

- 757** Chase, William. "Social History and Revisionism of the Stalin Era." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 382-85.

Chase comments on Sheila Fitzpatrick's October 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism" and on its criticism by Stephen Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred Meyer in that same issue of the *Russian Review*. He questions the general tendency of these scholars,

Fitzpatrick and Cohen in particular, to equate revisionism and social history and to see as examples of social history works that “in reality are studies of selected socio-political processes and the attendant state-society relationships.” Chase is also troubled by Fitzpatrick’s “desire to see scholars write social history devoid of politics” and by the misrepresentation of the revisionists’ writings and the questioning of the revisionists’ moral sensibilities by Cohen and Kenez.

- 758** Cohen, Stephen F. “Stalin’s Terror As Social History,” *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 375-84.

Cohen takes issue with Sheila Fitzpatrick’s essay “New Perspectives on Stalinism,” which considers the likely impact of social historians on the study of the Stalin period, for giving the impression that the new social historians of Stalinism have no scholarly predecessors or intellectual debts, and he cautions this small group of scholars “not to rush to interpretation in order to justify the social history cause.” He also contends that, in all their publications to date, the members of Fitzpatrick’s cohort have ignored, obscured, or minimized in one way or another the prolonged mass terror of the Stalin years. Cohen indicates some of the ways in which the terror was an authentic social phenomenon, explaining why he feels that the terror must be considered as a central feature of the social history of Stalinism rather than simply as Stalinist repression limited to the political realm “above” and without major or lasting impact on society “below,” as implied in most of the writings of the young social historians.

- 759** Conquest, Robert. “Revisionizing Stalin’s Russia.” *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 386-90.

Conquest targets the revisionist views of the young social historians discussed by Sheila Fitzpatrick in her 1986 *Russian Review* essay “New Perspectives on Stalinism,” taking aim, in particular, on their notion of historical evidence and what he sees as their propagation of various myths about the established view of the Stalin regime. Keying on the revisionists’ tendency to privilege official Soviet documents over the accounts of defectors and other eyewitnesses who suffered under Stalinism, Conquest identifies certain assertions and assumptions made by the revisionists—most notably with respect to the Stalin terror and the degree of popular support the Stalin regime enjoyed—that he feels stem from an approach to the study of the Stalin period marked by “parochialism, limited vision, and ignorance of the nature of historical (and other) evidence.”

- 760** Edelman, Robert. “Stalin and His Soccer Soldiers.” *History Today* 43 (February 1993): 46-51.

This account of the circumstances surrounding the assembling of the Soviet national soccer team for the 1952 Helsinki Olympics and of the dissolution of the team and punishment of the team’s coaches and some of its players following its shocking defeat by the Yugoslavian team includes some discussion of the historical debate over Stalin’s possible role in the political interference and pressure that worked to the detriment of the team’s performance, and in the decision to disband the team following its poor showing in the Helsinki games.

- 761** Eley, Geoff. “History with the Politics Left Out.” *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 385-94. In this critique of Sheila Fitzpatrick’s appraisal of the budding field of social history, in her 1986 *Russian Review* article “New Perspectives on Stalinism,” the author argues that while there is much in her survey to applaud, it is incomplete “historiographically because it fails to give an accurate picture of the range and strengths of existing work and fails to capitalize on the achievements of social historians elsewhere; theoretically, because it lacks a sense of social totality and fails to theorize the state-society relationship; [and] substantively, because it fails to combine the discussion of social context with an appraisal of the Stalinist state.” Eley maintains that Fitzpatrick and her revisionists could benefit by coming to terms with Moshe Lewin’s pioneering work in exploring the social, economic, and cultural dynamics of Stalinism.

761a Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Afterward: Revisionism Revisited." *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 409-13.

Fitzpatrick replies to some of the remarks made by four commentators—Stephen Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred Meyer—about her 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism." She fends off the criticism that she neglected the major traditional interpretations of Stalinism and clarifies her attitude toward the limitations of the totalitarian model and Marxist approaches to the study of Soviet society of the Stalin period. Fitzpatrick also discusses the place of politics and the state in the thinking of social historians; how social historians might best address the theme of terror as part of Soviet social history; and the various ways of dealing with the Stalin terror that social historians should avoid.

762 ———. "New Perspectives on Stalinism." *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 357-73.

Fitzpatrick considers the likely impact of social historians on the study of the Stalin period, describing the current work under way in this field; some of the challenges social historians of the Stalin era will face; and the extent to which the perspective "from below," favored by most social historians, might lead scholars to alter the accepted Sovietological view that the social changes of this era were "products of radical policies initiated by Stalin's regime without social support and ruthlessly implemented without regard to society's responses." She also discusses some of the complexities surrounding the various revisionist approaches social historians might take in challenging the totalitarian model assumption that society is irrelevant to an understanding of Stalinist political process, noting that the new data presented by social historians indicates the shortcomings of that model's image of the interaction of state and society as well as the limited control the Stalin regime actually had over the outcome of the radical policies it initiated—particularly with respect to its ability to rebuild society in accord with preselected blueprints. Fitzpatrick's "New Perspectives on Stalinism" generated considerable academic controversy and is the subject of four other essays in this issue of the *Russian Review*. See also the essays in the "Discussion" section of the October 1987 issue of the *Russian Review* for a continuation of the exchange of views on the social history of the Stalin era.

763 ———. "The Russian Revolution and Social Mobility: A Re-examination of the Question of Social Support for the Soviet Regime in the 1920s and 1930s." *Politics and Society* 13, no. 2 (1984): 119-41.

Fitzpatrick investigates patterns of social mobility in the period 1917-31 and their relation to the general issues of social support for the Bolshevik regime and the social outcomes of the revolution. She describes how the number of upwardly mobile workers and peasants, especially during the years of Stalin's "revolution from above," increased dramatically, and how this movement of workers, most notably into the rapidly growing bureaucracy, or new elite, of the Stalinist state needs to be considered when examining the question of the social support for the regime. Fitzpatrick also discusses how most interpretations of the Russian Revolution and Stalinism—including the conventional totalitarian model, Marxist analyses, and even the social analyses popular among younger Sovietologists—fail to take social mobility into account, even though "tens of millions changed their occupation and social status in the fifteen years after the October Revolution."

764 ———. "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1937." *Slavic Review* 38, no. 3 (1979): 377-402.

The thesis of this article is that Stalin had a special interest in the new cadres for the Soviet bureaucracy, one which flowed from his belief that the existing communist cadres lacked the training and technical expertise essential for Soviet leadership. Taking aim on the conventional view in scholarly literature, which holds that the Soviet leader had neither a particular interest in nor spe-

cific criteria for the selection of the new cadres, other than they meet the criteria of unconditional loyalty to him and a lack of individual distinction, Fitzpatrick argues that Stalin, in accord with his belief that the shortcomings of existing communist cadres in 1928 exposed the regime to manipulation by its enemies, initiated a program through which over 100,000 workers and communists from the factories and apparatus were mobilized and sent to higher technical schools during the First Five-Year Plan, and that this group, as a result of the Great Purge, received dramatic promotions into positions of leadership in industry, the Soviet government, and the Communist Party, becoming a core group in the Soviet elite for decades to come. Fitzpatrick identifies several key implications of the Stalin initiative to train new cadres, including the extent to which the program represents the Soviet leader's abandonment of the concept of proletarian dictatorship and revision of the formal status of the intelligentsia; the likelihood that the availability of trained, communist personnel cadre positions in the second half of the 1930s made the mass purging of the established elite a much more viable policy; and the probability that the elite he created by providing for upward social mobility from the working class and peasantry felt a sense of indebtedness to the revolution and to Stalin as well. For a discussion of Fitzpatrick's argument, see *Slavic Review* 39 (June 1980): 286-91.

765 Getty, J. Arch. "State, Society and Superstition." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 391-96. Getty responds to some of the points made by Sheila Fitzpatrick in her 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism" and to the criticisms voiced by Stephen Cohen and Peter Kenez regarding the revisionists whose work Fitzpatrick discussed. He takes issue with Fitzpatrick's assessment of the revisionists' work on the Stalin period within the conceptual framework of the state/society, revolution from above or below polarity, arguing for the value of a three-dimensional matrix that would take into account the complexity of Stalinist society in mapping its political sociology and for the need for specialized empirical social history studies on the Stalin period. In responding to Cohen's and Kenez's criticism of revisionism, Getty—the author of the revisionist study *Origins of the Great Purges*—focuses on their comments regarding the revisionists' treatment of the terror question, pointing out how they have misrepresented the views of revisionists on the importance of state intervention in the life of society and on the Stalin leadership's responsibility for the mass murder of the 1930s, and how Kenez, in particular, has gone astray in suggesting that "the quantitative stress on terror in a scholarly work is a barometer of the author's moral sensibility."

766 Gorlizki, Yoram. "Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II." *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 7 (1999): 1245-65.

Gorlizki examines the limits on the Stalin regime's capacity to control policy implementation as revealed by a study of the Soviet industrial and criminal justice bureaucracies, both of which were administered by highly complex, multilayered hierarchies whose practices and behaviors, in the postwar years, were increasingly guided by rules reinforced by incentives which helped convert these regulations into bureaucratic norms. Focusing on the 1947 campaign against theft—an offensive which drew upon the leader's personal authority and assumed the form of "campaign justice" by virtue of its "military mobilization of justice to attain strategic ends defined by Stalin"—Gorlizki argues that bureaucratic norms acted as a brake on the campaign "by forcing procurators to weigh up the quality of their cases against the politically driven need to hunt down thieves." While the 1947 campaign "did not bring about a meltdown in the legal system through a disregard for legal procedures, . . . or a marked fall in standards of normal, non-campaign justice," Stalin succeeded remarkably well in "radically pushing up punishments and in making the sentencing regime far more repressive than it had been," indicating that the behavior of local officials still tended to conform to the wishes of the central leadership, and that, in the case of postwar criminal justice, Stalin retained his power to have "everything his own way," according to Gorlizki.

- 767** Gray, David J. "Russian Sociology: The Second Coming of August Comte." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 53, no. 2 (1994): 163-74.

The reemergence of Russian sociology as an academic discipline during the political liberalization under Khrushchev and its blossoming during the Gorbachev glasnost period are the focal points of this paper. Gray's analysis includes a brief discussion of Stalin's initiation of the official Soviet position on sociology, according to which the historical laws determining social life were clearly established by Marx, and the discipline of sociology was but a bourgeois pseudoscience of no value for a Marxist society. Gray also comments on the problems faced by those who pursued sociological interests during the Stalin era.

- 768** Healey, Dan. "Homosexual Existence and Existing Socialism: New Light on the Repression of Male Homosexuality in Stalin's Russia." *GLQ* 8, no. 3 (2002): 349-78.

Healey takes advantage of newly available Soviet archival records to reconsider Bolshevik policies toward male homosexuality and the reasons for their reversal in 1933-34 by the Stalin regime. Arguing that the motives for the Stalin regime's homophobic turn were more diverse than existing accounts acknowledge, Healey describes how the ideological and international explanations for the shift to an antihomosexual policy fail to take into account such factors as early Bolshevik displeasure with the nation's urban male homosexual subculture, and, more importantly, the Stalinists's branding of homosexuality as an "undesirable identity" subject to the policy of "social cleansing" that came with the "social engineering" of the First Five-Year Plan. Healey maintains that the survival of homosexual street culture during the height of the Great Terror calls into question the interpretation that a Stalinist totalitarian regime was able to "secure a final stranglehold over the Soviet population in the mid-thirties."

- 769** Hellbeck, Jochen. "Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stephen Podlubnyi." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996): 344-73.

Hellbeck explores the diary of Stephan Podlubnyi, a young worker and student of peasant origins who recorded his life experience throughout the 1930s, as a means of shedding light on the question of whether individuals living in Stalinist Russia were able to articulate a private identity distinct from the political system, and of gauging how members of Soviet society subjectively experienced the Stalinist system. Focusing on Podlubnyi's evolving self-portrayal and the ways in which it was shaped by his environment, Hellbeck describes how Podlubnyi, in pointing to discrepancies between the Stalin regime's policies and its proclaimed goals, invoked these very same goals as a higher truth, and remained bound to the fundamental principles and values of the regime, even while striving to realize his notion of individual subjectivity. In Hellbeck's view, the fact that Podlubnyi's gradual detachment from the Stalinist order caused him distress to the point where he perceived his estrangement from the collective as "an incurable illness" and a measure of his personal degeneration speaks to the ability of the Soviet system of social identification to pervade even the individual's personal domain, as well as to the difficulty of an individual living in the Stalinist system to "formulate a notion of himself independently of the program promulgated by the Bolshevik state."

- 770** Hoffman, David L. "Mothers in the Motherland: Stalinist Pronatalism in Its Pan-European Context." *Journal of Social Science* 34, no. 1 (fall 2000): 35-54.

Hoffman compares pronatalist policies under Stalin with those of western Europe to demonstrate that Stalinist pronatalism and efforts to buttress the family were consistent with a new type of population politics practiced in the modern era in Europe. While noting the unique features of Soviet society and ideology, Hoffman describes how individual reproductive rights—in view of the demands of industrial labor and mass warfare—were, across Europe, subordinated to the concern of governments for maximizing their nation's populations, and how motherhood and the family were extolled in service of state goals regarding procreation and social stability. In each of these

regards, the reproductive policy of the Stalin regime, according to Hoffman, paralleled policies in Western Europe, with the principal exception being that “the Soviet family model was distinguished in its insistence that women retain their position in the workforce at the same time they produced and raised children.”

771 Hough, Jerry F. “The ‘Dark Forces,’ the Totalitarian Model, and Soviet History.” *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 397-403.

This entry in the academic debate prompted by Sheila Fitzpatrick’s 1986 *Russian Review* article “New Perspectives on Stalinism” describes the various facets of the totalitarian model; comments on the criticisms that have been raised against the totalitarian model over the years; and asserts that even scholars who call themselves revisionists have attacked different aspects of the model while implicitly accepting some of its facets. In commenting on the arguments advanced about the totalitarian model and the Stalin period by the young revisionists discussed by Fitzpatrick, Hough accepts the revisionists’ contention that there was some social support for Stalin’s worst policies—particularly among the so-called dark masses—but questions their suggestion of a link between input from the “forces from below” and the key decisions and actions of the Stalin regime, including the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges of the 1930s.

772 Keep, John. “Recent Western Views of Stalin’s Russia: Social and Cultural Aspects.” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 149-66.

Keep surveys the range of work done in recent years on the social and cultural history of Stalin’s Russia, highlighting both the potential and attendant risks of the new methodological approaches that have been adopted. He begins with a brief outline of revisionism in Soviet studies and some of the assumptions made by postmodernist-oriented scholars. He then discusses recent work done by Western researchers on four topics: peasants, workers, gender and everyday life, and higher culture, noting the merits of methodological approaches which put ordinary citizens in the spotlight as a means of promoting a clearer understanding of both the various ways they reacted to pressures from above and the role that many of them played in constructing the Stalinist collective order. While Keep commends the new social and cultural studies for having managed to relativize the political structure over which Stalin presided, he argues for the need to refine, rather than discount, the applicability of the term “totalitarian” in describing the aspirations of the Stalinist leadership and the institutional set-up through which they governed in light of what recent research has shown about the limitations imposed on the party’s ability to rule as it pleased. Keep also comments on the tendency of some revisionist scholars to overinterpret evidence, undervalue the degree of social mobilization and control achieved by the Stalin regime, and adhere too rigidly to postmodernist canon.

773 Kenez, Peter. “Stalinism as Humdrum Politics.” *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 395-400.

In this critique of Sheila Fitzpatrick’s “New Perspectives on Stalinism”—a 1986 *Russian Review* article dealing with the work on the Stalin era by a group of young revisionist historians—Kenez takes issue with four main aspects of the revisionists’ presentation of Soviet politics of the 1930s. He maintains that the revisionists are wrong in absolving the Stalin regime of the 1920s from the responsibility for mass murder by virtue of the party’s lack of a reliable apparatus; in assigning a role to the factional struggles within the party in shaping the Stalin terror; in contending that there was genuine social support for the crucial decisions of the Stalin government, and in denying the extraordinary nature and importance of state intervention in the life of Soviet society, particularly with respect to the terror of the 1930s.

774 Kuromiya, Hiroaki. “Stalinism and Historical Research.” *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 404-6.

The author offers a few brief comments on Sheila Fitzpatrick's 1986 *Russian Review* article, "New Perspectives on Stalinism" and on some of the criticisms raised by Stephen Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred Meyer in their discussion of that piece. For the most part, Kuromiya questions why the critics of the young revisionists' work about which Fitzpatrick wrote are so adamant in damning their approach to the Stalin era. He suggests that the critics, Kenez and Cohen in particular, may be more interested in imposing their own interests and interpretations on other historians than in giving the revisionists a chance to test their ideas and interpretations. He also defends the revisionists against the charge that they are insensitive to the moral dimensions of Stalinist politics.

775 Lovell, Stephen. "The Making of the Stalin-Era Dacha." *Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 2 (2002): 253-85.

Lovell addresses a number of questions concerning the dacha's place in Stalin-era society and culture, including the extent to which the history of the dacha in the 1930s exemplifies the mingling of "modernization" and "traditionalism" in Stalinist socialism and can be regarded as a measure of emerging social networks and hierarchies and symptomatic of a "great retreat" under Stalin which entailed the partial abandonment of revolutionary values. He also discusses the Stalin-era dacha as an illustration of "concealed conspicuous consumption," and how the fate of the dacha settlements during the Great Terror reveals the vulnerability of their residents, "the new Soviet middle class," to being victimized as "enemies of the people."

776 Manning, Roberta T. "State and Society in Stalinist Russia." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 407-11.

Manning comments on the discussion of the social history of the Stalin era published in the summer 1986 issue of the *Russian Review*. She describes the work of the new generation of revisionist scholars and how it differs from that produced by first-generation revisionists by extending the questioning of the totalitarian thesis to the prewar Stalin era. Manning explains how the second-generation revisionists, herself included, differ from Sheila Fitzpatrick—whose "New Perspectives on Stalinism" was the center of the *Russian Review* discussion—in believing that the study of politics should be at the forefront of the efforts of social historians to understand the relation of state and society in Stalin's Russia, and in maintaining that the complexity and dynamics of state-society relations in the Stalin era far transcend the confines of the "either-or" proposition regarding Stalinist politics, according to which either the state shaped the historical process, with the Soviet people "reduced to passive tools of those at the helm of government," or society dictated politics, compelling the state "to accommodate the desires of particular social strata out of fear of provoking revolution."

777 Meyer, Alfred G. "Coming to Terms with the Past . . . And with One's Older Colleagues." *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 401-8.

In this commentary on Sheila Fitzpatrick's 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism," the author discusses the roots of the totalitarian model, its history within the context of the Cold War, and the efforts of Fitzpatrick's new cohort of social historians to challenge the totalitarian concept. Meyer sees the thrust of revisionist historiography as a much-needed corrective and the new cohort as having made valuable contributions to the study of Stalinism and Soviet society, but he maintains that the revisionists, in their "pride for having discovered the Soviet *narod* (people) and slain the dragon of totalitarianism," have tended "to forget how often and with how many weapons that beast has been killed over and over again for several decades." Meyer also discusses how the revisionists have emasculated Marxism by transforming it into a sociological method of description and analysis, and he suggests that an application of Marxism to the study of the Soviet Union might "yield generalizations that have not been made in this form either by the adherents of the totalitarian model or by their revisionist critics."

- 778** Nove, Alec. "Stalinism: Revisionism Reconsidered." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 412-17.

In this response to Sheila Fitzpatrick's commentary on the work of a group of young revisionist scholars, in her 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism," the author takes issue with Fitzpatrick's statement that social processes unrelated to state intervention are virtually absent from the literature on the prewar Stalin regime, and with her contention that mainstream scholars of the Stalin period hold the view that "society is irrelevant to an understanding of Stalinist processes." Nove also criticizes the argument advanced in J. Arch Getty's revisionist work, *Origins of the Great Purges* (1985), for the existence of significant policy disagreements within the party, and he objects to the tendency of some revisionists to downplay the importance of unofficial sources and to underestimate the effect of the Stalin terror on Soviet society.

- 779** Patrikeef, Felix. "Stalinism, Totalitarian Society and the Politics of 'Perfect Control,'" *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 23-46.

This essay opens by pointing out the conceptual shortcomings of studies of Stalinism which, in resorting to a "pinnacle-base configuration when imparting a physical form to Stalinism in their work," resign themselves to a "two-dimensional" representation of Stalinism. Patrikeef argues for the merits of approaching Stalinism in a multidimensional fashion, one which would provide an all-important dynamism to the study of this complex phenomenon by considering how the masses embodied Stalinism and gave life and direction to it in accord with their desire for a dramatic rearrangement of the socioeconomic order. Such an approach, in Patrikeef's view, would be made both flexible and dynamic by discounting the idea of "the existence of, or need for, a fixed base and imposed, homogenized society," and by considering how ferment and change within society were not dictated by Stalin but rather emerged from society itself. Furthermore, such a multidimensional model of analyzing the base-pinnacle relationship would be "unfettered by the rigidity of a framework characterized by the crude hierarchy implicit in 'dictatorship'"; would counter the tendency to equate Stalinism with the "all-encompassing personality" of Stalin; and would allow for the consideration of how directives from the center and Stalin's pronouncements interacted with popular perceptions and desires, and conventional and localized relations of power as well, according to Patrikeef.

- 780** Pethybridge, Roger. "Stalinism As a Social Conservatism?" *European Studies Review* 11 (October 1981): 461-85.

Pethybridge interrogates the thesis advanced by Nicholas Timasheff in his 1946 study *The Great Retreat—the Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia*, according to which Stalin, during the 1930s, engaged in a massive retreat on all fronts from previous Bolshevik aspirations and policies. Focusing on the policy of the Stalin regime toward the family, Pethybridge maintains that Timasheff's contention that Stalinism led to the imposition of conservative policies in the social sphere is unsound with regard to such aspects of the family as marriage, divorce, abortion, and the disposal of ancestral estates. Stalinist family policy is best understood when viewed in connection with the leading Soviet economic problems and demands of the day rather than as the result of a deliberate policy of social conservatism on Stalin's part, according to Pethybridge.

- 781** Rittersporn, Gábor Tamás. "History, Commemoration and Hectoring Rhetoric." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 418-23.

In this response to some of the comments made by critics of Sheila Fitzpatrick's 1986 *Russian Review* article "New Perspectives on Stalinism," the author, a representative of the "new cohort" of revisionist historians whose work Fitzpatrick discussed, takes aim at the conventions of style and reasoning imposed by the traditional historical image of Stalinist Russia of the 1930s. Rittersporn believes that such conventions have tended to transform historical analysis of Stalin's Rus-

sia into a commemorative rite centered around the preservation of the memory of that era's atrocities and the condemnation of those who perpetuated them, and have contributed to the inability of some of the commentators—Stephen Cohen and Peter Kenéz in particular—to comprehend what the work of this “new cohort” actually entails. He outlines the ways in which the work of the young revisionists parts company with the “commemorative tradition,” describing how these scholars seek to understand the intrasystemic factors that help to explain the evolution of the Stalin regime in the 1930s, and how this endeavor does not in any way resemble an attempt to absolve anyone from responsibility for the regime's misdeeds or to minimize the Stalin terror.

782 ———. “New Horizons: Conceptualizing the Soviet 1930s.” *Kritika* 2, no. 2 (spring 2001): 307-18.

Rittersporn comments on how recent archival research on the Soviet 1930s has brought about a quantum leap in historical understanding of the period and has expanded the field of issues to be explored, posing new problems and raising new questions for Soviet scholars to address. Among the many issues on the merging research agenda on the 1930s that Rittersporn considers are the ways Soviet territorial administrations worked, and how different groups within the Stalin elite interacted with central policies; the significance of new findings on penal policy and on the changing Soviet vision of crime and criminality; the manner in which the Soviet population perceived the mass arrests carried out by the Stalin regime; the extent to which Soviet citizens identified with officially prescribed norms; and the manner in which the regime and Soviet power were viewed by the public, particularly by young people in the population. Rittersporn also comments on two larger issues: the comparison of the sociopolitical arrangements of the Soviet 1930s to other dictatorial systems of the epoch, particularly Nazi Germany; and the place of the 1930s in the broader history of the social, political, and cultural space occupied by the former Soviet Union, most notably with respect to both the degree to which that decade represented a decisive break with significant tenets of early Bolshevism, and the relevance of designating “the 1930s or the period to which it belongs as ‘Stalinism.’”

783 Shearer, David. “Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin's Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression.” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 39, nos. 1-2 (1998): 119-48.

This paper draws upon a range of archival materials on crime and the Soviet Union's police apparatus to challenge the thesis of the “great retreat,” according to which the middle years of the 1930s constituted a period of social stabilization, political moderation, and a turn away from revolutionary ideology toward authoritarian conservatism, with the period 1934-36 witnessing a hiatus between the violent, state-initiated upheavals of the early and latter part of the decade. The argument of social and institutional stabilization advanced in the “great retreat” literature, in Shearer's estimate, does not bear up in view of the social unrest of the middle 1930s, which assumed the form of tens of thousands of small acts of disobedience directed against state property and state officials. Keying on the operations of the mass repression that began in the summer of 1937, Shearer describes how that campaign is best understood within the context of the Stalin regime's largely failed attempt to subdue crime and bring order to a Soviet society plagued by waves of criminal acts and social disobedience in the early and middle 1930s—acts which the regime came to believe posed a political threat to Soviet power. The police response to this problem, Shearer maintains, provided the infrastructure that was eventually used for mass repression and surveillance of the population in the latter part of the decade.

784 Tucker, Robert C. “The Stalin Period As an Historical Problem.” *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 424-27.

Tucker comments on the case advanced by Sheila Fitzpatrick for a newer social history of the Stalin era in her controversial 1986 *Russian Review* article “New Perspectives on Stalinism.” He ar-

gues for the need to consider both the value of a political-cultural approach and the importance of taking into account Stalin's character in any effort that aims to come to grips with the nature of the Stalin era. Tucker also discusses the need for a general history of Stalin's time, and why such a study should not take the form of social histories of the type which Fitzpatrick called for in her article.

785 Viola, Lynne. "In Search of Young Revisionists." *Russian Review* 46, no. 4 (1987): 428-31. In this commentary on the summer 1986 *Russian Review* discussion centered on Sheila Fitzpatrick's article "New Perspectives on Stalinism" regarding the work of a new school of young revisionists emerging in the field of Sovietology, Viola, who was cited by Fitzpatrick as a part of this new school, takes issue with those who have interpreted the article as a "new cohort manifesto." She states that there is no clearly identifiable cohort, and that the article "should not be construed as an endorsement of the individuals alleged to adhere to 'young revisionism.'" She also maintains that the article misrepresented some of her own views and failed to illuminate fully the work of the supposed cohort, and she contends that the commentaries by some of the scholars who critiqued the article, most notably Peter Kenez, are also flawed and incomplete.

786 Yekelchik, Serhy. "The Making of a Proletarian Capital: Patterns of Stalinist Social Policy in Kiev in the Mid-1930s." *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 7 (1998): 1229-44.

Yekelchik makes use of the recently declassified files of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine to discuss the political motivation for moving the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from Kharkov to Kiev in June 1934, and how the most notable consequences of this political decision for Kiev itself were social and cultural. Describing "the radical architectural, social and cultural surgery" that Kiev experienced during 1934 and the years immediately following, Yekelchik traces the efforts of the Stalin regime to convert Kiev into a "proletarian capital," maintaining that the regime's social policy in pursuit of this aim "reflected in condensed form the Stalinist 'revolution from above,'" with the initial period of revolutionary transformation giving way in the mid-1930s to the process of "normalizing" a society shaken by the socialist transformation that came with making Kiev a Stalinist capital. Yekelchik also discusses the various obstacles the party faced in this endeavor, and its use of coercion, purging, and disciplining to deal with the unexpected response from a population that panicked over rumors regarding housing shortages and labor turnover and that was struggling to adapt to the class policy and cultural priorities of a Stalin regime more interested in the gradual Russification of Ukraine than in developing Ukrainian cultural life or increasing the percentage of Ukrainians among Kiev's workers.

Nationalism and Nationality Policy

787 Adamovich, Anthony. "Towards a Single Socialist Nation." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 1, no. 3 (1962): 33-40.

This analysis of the Soviet concept of "a nation" and the process by which a "single socialist nation" was to be forged draws primarily upon Stalin's pronouncements on the nature of the "socialist nation"—as put forth in his 1913 work *Marxism and the National Question* and supplemented in his later work *The National Question and Leninism*—to argue that, in practice, the internationalism identified by the Soviet leader as a characteristic of the socialist nation and counterposed to the nationalism and imperialism he attributed to the "bourgeois nation" turns into Soviet Russian nationalism, with the "single socialist state" being forged in the USSR akin to the bourgeois nation as defined by Stalin himself. In supporting this argument, Adamovich primarily discusses what he sees as the linguistic and demographic Russification of the USSR. He constructs a "continuum of Russification" for the major nationalities and a selection of minor nationalities based on the 1959 census figures for nationality and native language, using the percentage of persons who regard the language of their nationality as their mother tongue as indexes of resistance to Russification, at least linguistically. This "continuum," Adamovich writes, shows that approximately ten percent of the total non-Russian population of the USSR regard Russian as their native language, suggesting that "the road towards a single Socialist nation via linguistic Russification is obviously a long one."

788 Barghoorn, Frederick C. "Nationality Doctrine in Soviet Political Strategy." *Review of Politics* 16, no. 3 (1954): 283-304.

Barghoorn examines the problem of nationality in Soviet political strategy from the early years of the Soviet state through the mid-1950s, describing how national symbols and all systems of identity came to be harnessed in support of ideological and propaganda campaigns to sell the idea that the Bolsheviks were the champions of national liberation movements and that Soviet nationality policy was a progressive one, worthy of emulation around the world. Dividing the history of the domestic application of Soviet nationality policy into three periods: 1922-24, 1924-33, and 1934-54, Barghoorn describes how the noncommunist world's knowledge and understanding of the true nature of Soviet nationality policy and of Stalin's efforts to exploit national problems beyond the USSR were highly limited due to the Kremlin's careful manipulation of cultural relations and to the operations of Soviet "friendship societies." He discusses at some length the contrast between the second and third period, describing how during the second, nationalism and Great Russian chauvinism were initially condemned as "capitalist survivals" and were attacked by Stalin at all the party congresses down to the Seventeenth Congress in 1934—largely because both of these forms of nationalism were deemed to represent a threat to his and the party's centralist policy—while in the third period nationalism underwent a revival, with the emergence of a new Stalinist xenophobic Soviet elite and with the threat posed by the rising power of Nazi Germany leading

Stalin, for tactical reasons, to permit and even encourage the development of a Soviet nationalism in which Russian symbols played an important part.

- 789** Bordyugov, Gennady. "War and Peace: Stalin's Regime and Russian Nationalism." *History Today* 45, no. 5 (1995): 27-34.

Bordyugov draws upon newly released Soviet archival materials to discuss the encouragement of Russian nationalism by the Stalin regime during the "Great Patriotic War" and the countermeasures adopted by the Kremlin, as the war's end neared, in response to its concern over the effects of the nationalistic impulse and the rising expectations of the Soviet populace.

- 790** Borys, Jurij. "Who Ruled the Ukraine in Stalin's Time? (1917-1939)." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 14 (1972): 213-33.

This discussion of Moscow's approach to the Ukrainian national problem centers on how the Russian communists, in accord with their desire to preserve Ukraine within their sphere of power, pursued a policy fixed upon keeping Ukrainian nationalist elements outside the real domains of power. The system of limited pluralism within the Ukrainian Communist Party established by Lenin, Borys writes, gave way, under Stalin, first to a limited effort to de-Russify the Ukrainian party and state apparatuses in the 1920s, and then, in conjunction with Stalin's reevaluation of nationalist tendencies among Ukrainian communists and determination to place the party apparatus firmly under his personal control, to a new policy which sought to de-Ukrainize all politically important structures of power; reestablish the dominant position of the Russian language and culture; and stock the Ukrainian party apparatus with *apparatchiki* wholly subordinated to the central leadership in Moscow. Borys attributes the fact that there was only a single Ukrainian in the top hierarchy of power during Stalin's entire rule to the Soviet leader's total distrust of the Ukrainian nation—a distrust he believes is confirmed by Khrushchev's revelation that Stalin would have deported all the Ukrainians, as he had other "troublesome" nationalities, if they had not been so numerous.

- 791** Caryl, Christian. "Ghosts from the Gulag: Lithuania Tries to Remember Stalin and Forget Hitler." *U.S. News and World Report* 123 (20 October 1997): 38-39.

Lithuania seems more intent on remembering its victimhood under Stalin after the nation was gobbled up by the Soviet Union in 1940 and in pressing for the extradition trial of former NKVD officers accused of Stalinist genocide against Lithuania during the guerrilla war of 1940 than it is interested in pursuing Lithuanians who collaborated with the Nazis in the murder of more than 200,000 of the nation's Jews, and who remain alive and free in Lithuania, according to this report.

- 792** Ciuciura, Theodore B. "The Ukrainian Alternative to Stalin's Design for the USSR, 1923." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (1982): 396-402.

Ciuciura describes how the views of the ailing Lenin on the scope and the powers of the central government in the new Soviet community of nations were consistently and increasingly disregarded by Stalin and his supporters, who, contrary to Lenin's call for a federation of equal republics and the maintenance of the independence of each of the Soviet states, managed to incorporate into the first Constitution of the USSR sweeping powers for the central government, limit the sovereign rights of the independent Soviet republics, and create an atmosphere which favored Great Russian chauvinism. In response to the antifederalist changes that were made in the provisions of the December 1922 Treaty on the Formation of the USSR and incorporated into the first Constitution of the USSR, Ukrainian communists came up with an alternative proposal which included a series of corrections "in order to preserve the attributes of national identity and statehood of the non-Russian 'allied' republics and thus to serve the legitimization of their sovietization," only to encounter defeat at the hands of Stalin, who, while trying to appease the non-Russians with "at-

tractive but transitory expedients,” denounced the “confederalist” tendencies of the Ukrainian communists and further enhanced the already strong centralizing arrangements in the 1922 treaty.

- 793** Dadrian, Vahakn N. “The Development of the Soviet Posture on Nationalities: A Reappraisal of the Roles of Lenin and Stalin.” *Armenian Review* 19 (1966): 32-47. For a slightly revised version of this article, see *Indian Sociological Bulletin* 6, no. 1 (1968): 18-38.

This critical assessment of the development of Bolshevik thinking on nationalities deals primarily with Lenin’s shifting views on such aspects of the national question as territorial cultural autonomy, federalism, self-determination, and the right of separation; his postulation of the formula “national in form, socialist in content” as a solution to the antagonism separating nationalism from communism; and his reformulation of Marxism in light of the advent of the era of imperialism to allow for the possibility of socialist assistance to bourgeois nationalist movements struggling against imperialism, as long as such assistance did not encroach upon the interests of socialism. While Stalin figures into the article mainly as the party’s specialist on Transcaucasian nationalism and as a theorist who both echoed and amplified Lenin’s postulates on the national question, Dadrian also comments on Stalin’s emphasis on the importance of respecting national differences and national languages in the Soviet republics; his treatment of the issue of Great Russian chauvinism; and the dispute that developed between Lenin and Stalin over the latter’s tactics in dealing with the Georgian effort for autonomy. With respect to the Georgian question, Dadrian notes the Leninist source of the rationale Stalin presented in justifying his actions and Lenin’s deviation from his own postulate on the right of succession.

- 794** Davis, Horace B. “Lenin and Nationalism: The Redirection of the Marxist Theory of Nationalism, 1903-1917.” *Science and Society* 31, no. 2 (1967): 64-85.

This study of the new turn Lenin gave to Marxist nationality theory in the ten years prior to the 1917 Revolution includes a discussion of Stalin’s 1913 essay *Marxism and the National Question*, a work with which Lenin essentially agreed and which came to assume the role of a textbook on nationality problems for the world communist movement. Davis discusses how Stalin’s definition of “a nation” was lacking in several key respects; how Lenin, though in agreement with Stalin’s theoretical approach to the national question, differed with him over the means by which to solve national problems in practice once the Soviet Union was formed; and how, following Stalin’s suppression of an incipient nationalist revolt in his native Georgia in 1922, Lenin warned the party about Stalin’s strong-arm tactics in dealing with the national question. The essay ends with a series of quotations from Lenin’s memorandum on Stalin’s severe methods, the full text of which was not published in the Soviet Union until 1956.

- 795** Delfiner, Henry. “Hitler’s Propaganda and Stalin’s Silence: Soviet and Nazi Anti-Semitism.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 5 (1971): 1-9.

Stalin does not figure prominently in this examination of the aims and forms assumed by Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda in the USSR during World War II, but as an account of the impact of German propaganda on Soviet attitudes toward the Jews, both during and after the war, and of Moscow’s failure to react to Berlin’s propaganda effort to portray the Stalin regime as a “Jewish-Bolshevik government” which oppressed the Soviet people and to sell the German invasion as being aimed at the Jews rather than the Soviet people, the essay sheds some light on Stalin’s own anti-Semitic sentiments and on the source of the official Soviet wartime policy of silence on Jewish issues.

- 796** Dittrich, S. R. “Stalin As a Georgian.” *Plural Societies* 7, no. 1 (1976): 13-14.

Dittrich traces the course of Stalin’s personal development from a Georgian into a Russian, beginning with an account of the young Dzhugashvili’s emergence as a fierce Georgian nationalist and an outspoken opponent of Russification, and then describing how, with his early involvement in

the “*Mersame Dasy*” nationalist movement, which combined the struggle for Georgian national emancipation with social-democratic ideas, Dzhugashvili was gradually encouraged to place his nationalist position into a larger, more international perspective. Dzhugashvili’s personal union of Georgian nationalism and Marxism began to unravel, Dittrich explains, when, in 1903, the Russian Social Democratic Party split into two divergent factions, he chose to join the Bolshevik faction, which was largely comprised of Russians, rather than the Menshevik faction, which the vast majority of Georgians joined. Through his association with the Bolsheviks, Dzhugashvili underwent a process of spontaneous Russification, with his anti-Russian sentiments giving way to the ideology of class struggle, and with Dzhugashvili himself becoming increasingly assimilated to his Russian milieu in his use of language, personal contacts, and way of life. By the time Dzhugashvili, now Stalin, became the party’s authority on the national question and was assigned to deal with Georgian opposition to the new Soviet regime, his identification with the Russian nation and Russian interests was complete, as reflected by his brutal establishment of an exclusively Bolshevik dictatorship in conquering his native country of Georgia. Dittrich also discusses how Stalin, during the 1930s, identified himself more and more emphatically with the Russian people and with Russian state traditions and replaced the previous and relatively benevolent Soviet policy toward the non-Russian nationalities with a policy of Russification. He suggests that “Stalin’s metamorphosis from a Georgian into a Great Russian was, from a psychological point of view, a clear case of identification with the enemy.”

797 Goble, Paul A. “Stalin Draws the Borders.” *Central Asia Monitor* 2 (January-February 1995): 12-14.

Goble makes use of several entries from the book *140 Conversations with Molotov*, which consists of selections from conversations Russian journalist Feliks Chuyov had with former Soviet Premier Vyacheslav Molotov between 1969 and 1986, to shed light on Stalin’s involvement in the decisions that determined the borders of the Soviet republics and on his thinking on the external borders of the Soviet Union as well. According to Chuyov, Molotov indicated that Stalin himself made the final decision on nationality issues and border questions, largely because so few other Bolshevik leaders cared deeply about nationality problems, and that he drew the borders of the republics with the aim of increasing tensions among the non-Russians, thus deflecting hostility away from Moscow and the Russians. Molotov is also reported to have recollected that Stalin, following World War II, expressed satisfaction about the new borders of the USSR and expressed no interest in the further expansion of the Soviet Union, with the exceptions of the southern part of the Caucasus, where he hoped to push the Soviet border southwards, and the straits to the Black Sea, where he hoped to compel Turkey to accept Soviet bases.

798 Greenbaum, Alfred A. “Soviet Jewry during the Lenin-Stalin Period.” *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 4 (April 1965): 406-12; 17, no. 1 (July 1965): 84-92.

Part one of this two-part article deals with the political background of the question of Jewish status under the Soviet regime. Here, Greenbaum discusses the argument advanced by Stalin, in his pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, in opposition to national-cultural autonomy for the Jews; the relatively relaxed approach taken toward the forced assimilation of the Jews in the early years of Stalin’s rule; the Stalin regime’s support for the formation of Jewish national districts in the western USSR and for the development of Birobidzhan, in the Soviet Far East, as a Jewish Autonomous Region; the attacks on Jews and Jewish cultural institutions during the purges of the 1930s as part of “the ‘spy mania’ which affected all minorities having ties with the West”; the attempt of the Stalin regime to capitalize on international Jewish ties by forming the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee as a means of advancing Western support for the Soviet Union during the war; and, finally, the anti-Semitic campaign launched by Stalin in the late 1940s, culminating in the so-called doctors’ plot in early 1953. Part two of the article deals with the socioeconomic changes in the life of Soviet Jewry during the Stalin years. Stalin by name does not enter into this segment of

Greenbaum's discussion, but the process of linguistic assimilation and the general problem of denationalization of Soviet Jews under Stalin's rule are taken up by Greenbaum here, with the overall conclusion being that neither the cultural assimilation of the pre-1948 period nor the deliberate destruction of the Jewish cultural base from 1948 to 1952 placed Soviet Jewry in danger of disappearance by absorption by the end of the Stalin period.

799 Gurevitz, Baruch. "Bolshevism and the National Question." *International Problems* 15, nos. 1-2 (1976): 75-82

Gurevitz outlines the positions of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin on the national question and Jewish national identity. He establishes that all three men regarded the "nation" as a phenomenon peculiar to the capitalist era and believed it would vanish with the growth of the international unity of the proletariat. But where Marx and Lenin never developed a general theory on the national question and determined their attitudes toward various national demands, self-determination in particular, in accord with whether the class instigating a given national movement was a progressive or reactionary one, Stalin, Gurevitz writes, not only developed a more comprehensive theory, one which included a distinct definition of "a nation," but also clearly defined the kind of national movement the proletariat would support; made it perfectly clear that the interests of the proletariat would supersede the right of self-determination; and considered federalism as a practical apparatus to settle the national question in the Soviet Union without limiting the centralized power of the Communist Party or granting true national autonomy to the Soviet republics. Stalin also developed most fully the Bolshevik attitude toward Jewish national autonomy, and it was Stalin who eventually abandoned the Soviet regime's efforts to find a "national-practical solution" to the Jewish question, reverting to a policy of "assimilation" in dealing with Soviet Jews.

800 Hodnett, Gary. "The Debate over Soviet Federalism." *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 4 (April 1967): 458-81.

This examination of the Soviet academic debate following the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 over the benefits and possible costs of the nation's federative system and over the future of federalism in the USSR includes an assessment of the views of Lenin and Stalin on the nature of the nationality problem, the two men's attitude toward federalism, the degree to which their thinking on federalism evolved, and an account of how scholars for and against federalism have, in their efforts to develop their respective positions in the debate under review, offered conflicting evaluations of the degree to which Stalin's position on federalism deviated from Lenin's. The anti-federalists, Hodnett explains, sought to establish that Stalin agreed with Lenin, thus suggesting that Stalin's opposition to federalism was Leninist and lending support to their own position. Conversely, the pro-federalists have argued that Stalin's stance on federalism diverged fundamentally from Lenin's, meaning that the Stalinist hostile attitude toward federalism has nothing in common with Leninism, and that the case for a more benevolent approach toward federalism is in harmony with Lenin's views on this issue.

801 Horak, Stephan M. "From Internationalism to Nationalism, or the Soviet Version of *Val-uevshchina*." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1972): 266-85.

This assessment of Soviet policy in Ukraine contrasts the Great Russian chauvinism practiced by Stalin under the guise of "Soviet patriotism," in his effort to de-nationalize the non-Russians in the USSR, with the internationalism which was at the core of the new order proclaimed by Lenin. Describing the foundation of the Soviet system under Stalin as resting upon the formula of "autocracy, Bolshevism, and Soviet Russian nationalism," and likening Stalin's approach to dealing with Ukraine to that followed in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, Horak details the steps taken by Stalin to advance the image of the Russians as "the chosen people" assigned to the historical mission of implementing Marxism, and to promote Russian as the language of socialism—much to the detriment of Ukrainian culture and national independence. Stalin's return to time-honored

Russian nationalism, Horak suggests, stemmed not only from the need to promote national unity during World War II, but also from “the decline of Communist ideology as an attractive focus, the inability of the ideology to remain creative and productive, and . . . the missionary-colonial complex embedded in the Russian mentality.”

- 802** Hula, Erich. “Nationalities Policy of the Soviet Union: Theory and Practice.” *Social Research* 11 (May 1944): 168-201.

Hula examines Stalin’s 1913 essay *The National Question and Social Democracy*, describing how it serves as a clear and comprehensive statement of the basic conceptions underlying Soviet nationalities policy through the 1930s. Among the components of the essay that Hula discusses are Stalin’s definition of “a nation”; his views on how to depoliticize nationalism and amalgamate ethnic groups in a multinational state; and his defense of class over nation in advocating the right of self-determination within the context of the overriding interests of the proletariat. The policy of ethnic differentiation which the Soviet regime followed up to 1932 and the subsequent policy of ethnic amalgamation, despite the various oscillations and diversions, represent an application of Stalin’s principles of 1913, according to Hula.

- 803** Ibragimbeili, Khadzhi-Murat. “To Tell the Truth about the Tragedy of Peoples.” *Soviet Review* 32, no. 2 (1991): 65-76.

This article describes the 1943-44 forced deportation of the peoples of the North Caucasus under Stalin’s orders and carried out by Lavrenti Beria and his associates in the state security apparatus; the tragedy of the deported peoples of the Chechen and Ingush nations and the crimes committed against them “by the punitive organs during the period of the cult of personality”; and the baselessness of the rationale provided by the Stalin regime for its brutal actions against entire nationalities. The author also discusses how the crimes perpetrated by Stalin and his underlings represent a gross deformation of Lenin’s nationality policy, and how the Soviet Communist Party, “having subjected Stalin’s personality cult to definitive criticism,” has undertaken practical steps to restore justice toward the peoples of the North Caucasus who suffered under his repressive policies.

- 804** Liber, George. “*Korenizatsiia*: Restructuring Soviet Nationality Policy in the 1920s.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14, no. 1 (1991): 15-23.

Liber examines the unfolding and eventual abandonment of the policy of *korenizatsiia* (indigenization or nativization) adopted by the Communist Party in April 1923 in order to reduce the hostility the Bolsheviks provoked among the large non-Russian Soviet population during the Civil War. The party’s efforts, through the policy of *korenizatsiia*, to legitimate a predominately Russian and urban-based revolution by promoting non-Russians into leading positions in the party, the government, and the trade unions, and by subsidizing the development of distinct national cultures in the Soviet Union, in Liber’s view, served to strengthen ethnic assertiveness and local nationalism, threaten Soviet Russian control of non-Russian republics, and thwart the national industrialization effort, compelling Stalin to adopt a policy during the latter part of the 1920s that emphasized order over both legitimacy and national identity and that gave preference to Russians throughout the USSR.

- 805** Martin, Terry. “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing.” *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 4 (1998): 813-61.

Stalin by name does not figure prominently in this analysis of the roots of Soviet ethnic cleansing, but as a study which deals with how Soviet xenophobia stemming from fear of foreign capitalist encirclement and contamination, compounded by concern over the harmful effects of cross-border ethnic ties, led to ethnic cleansing and ethnic terror being conducted against “a limited set of stigmatized nationalities,” the essay sheds light on what is described as “the most striking paradox of

the last two decades of Stalin's rule," namely, "the simultaneous pursuit of nation building and nation destroying."

806 McNeal, Robert H. "Stalin's Conception of Soviet Federalism (1918-1923)." *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 9, nos. 1-2 (1961): 12-25.

McNeal draws upon Stalin's writings and statements on the concept of federalism from 1918 to 1923 in an attempt to demonstrate the Soviet leader's devotion to "centralized authority, the precedence of party interests over the interests of the national minorities, and the predominance of the Russian nation" throughout this period and the rest of his career as well. According to McNeal, Stalin's conception of federalism held that this political form was but a transitional step on the path to future socialist unity; that any Soviet federation would coincide with the boundaries of the old tsarist empire; that such a federation would be the means by which the "borderlands" would be joined with the Russian "center," not in an association of more or less equal partners but rather with Russia in a position of dominance; and that the new Soviet federation would be, in essence, merely an expansion of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Stalin's tactical position in the discussion of the new federation, McNeal explains, underwent numerous shifts between September 1922 and June 1923—largely in response to Lenin's objections to his September 1922 recommendations on federalism as head of a commission of the Politburo charged with dealing with the question of the admission of the independent republics into the RSFSR—but "at all times his objective was to maximize the degree of centralization in the new federal Russian state and to insure the leading role of the Russian nation within the federation." While Stalin was forced by unwelcomed circumstances to become an advocate of federalism and to accept a federal scheme that at least presented a semblance of formal equality among the constituent nations, his conversion to his political arrangement, McNeal writes, "was about as balky and halfhearted as possible," and while he subsequently enjoyed the official adulation of millions as the founder of the federal system of the USSR, he "gave fairly clear expression of his contempt for federalism, except as an empty formula."

807 Mukhamedyarov, Sh. F. and B. F. Sultanbekov. "Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev: His Character and Fate." *Central Asian Survey* 9, no. 2 (1990): 109-17.

This article highlights the key events and developments in the life of Sultan-Galiev (1892-1940), a revolutionary socialist who served as the Bolshevik leader in Kazan, fostered the establishment of Soviet power in the region, and played an important role in the decisions taken on the national question at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923. The authors discuss how Sultan-Galiev ran afoul of Stalin at the congress by insisting that the rights of the autonomous republics be increased in order to bring them closer to the status of the union of republics, and by refusing to support Stalin in his effort to eliminate Bashkir nationalist leader Zeki Velidi Togan. These "transgressions," the authors explain, along with Sultan-Galiev's having turned to Trotsky for support against Stalin at the height of the 1922 "Georgian affair," resulted in a Stalin-inspired campaign against Sultan-Galiev's "anti-Soviet behavior and actions," leading to his expulsion from the party, a subsequent life as a social outcast, and, ultimately, to his arrest and his execution on 28 January 1940 in Moscow.

808 Nedasek, N. (Anthony Adamovich) "National Self-Determination under the Soviets." *Belorussian Review* no. 8 (1960): 3-16.

Nedasek examines the Bolshevik theory of national self-determination and the general course of Soviet nationality policy, describing how true national self-determination was, in fact, barred by the Russian communists from the very beginning of the Soviet regime. Stalin enters into Nedasek's analysis as the primary source of the fiction of Soviet national self-determination; the champion of the large centralized state under Russian rule; and the architect of the policy of "Russo-Sovietization," under which all national cultures within the USSR were eventually forced

into one, Soviet Russian, culture. Nedasek also maintains that under Stalin even the linguistic autonomy granted to the national republics during the early life of the Soviet Union was denied eventually and transformed under the same line of integration and assimilation that constitutes Russo-Sovietization once native languages had been exploited to achieve the goal of establishing Soviet power.

809 Oliver, Bernard. "Korenizatsiia." *Central Asian Survey* 9, no. 3 (1990): 77-98.

Oliver examines the policy of *korenizatsiia*, or "indigenization," carried out by Stalin in the 1920s and early 1930s in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union and designed to involve the native populations in the process of administering the areas in which they lived as a means of securing support for the new Soviet regime. He discusses the obstacles Stalin had to confront in implementing *korenizatsiia*; the steps taken to deal with these problems; and the degree of success enjoyed by the *korenizatsiia* of the main institutions and spheres of activity in different nationality areas. Oliver shows that while the policy was relatively successful in dealing with linguistic and educational issues and in the fostering of Sovietized forms of art and culture, it came to be seen by native leaders as a poor substitute for real political autonomy, and it also resulted "in exacerbating the animosity between the Russians and the non-Russians, increasing Great Russian chauvinism as well as local nationalism." By 1934, Oliver explains, Stalin, recognizing that *korenizatsiia* was increasingly hard to guide and control; that with his leadership now secure, support from the non-Russian nationalities was no longer crucial; and that the objectives of national economic planning under the five-year plan called for the maximization of power at the national level, reinterpreted the concept of *korenizatsiia* as a departure from internationalism and abruptly and silently abandoned the policy.

810 Pohl, J. Otto. "Stalin's Ethnic Cleansing of the Crimean Tartars and Their Struggle for Rehabilitation, 1944-1985." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 60, nos. 1-2 (spring-summer 2004): 33-56.

Pohl discusses how Stalin's decree of 11 May 1944, which accused the Crimean Tatars of massive collaboration with the German occupiers of Crimea and collective treason against the USSR, led to the deportation of virtually the entire Tatar population from their ancestral homeland to the harsh climates of the Urals and Uzbekistan, from which they managed to return in the 1990s after more than thirty years of struggling with the Soviet government for the right to go back to their homeland and reclaim their former rights. He describes in detail the NKVD operation ordered by the Stalin regime which forcibly removed nearly 200,000 Crimean Tatars from their homeland; their harsh life in exile under the restrictions of the special settlement regime; and their various efforts to have their former statehood restored following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's deportations and verbal affirmation of Leninist nationality policies. Pohl also comments on how the Crimean Tatars, once they were finally allowed to return to their historic homeland, were placed in the unenviable position of being a minority in their homeland, "with no special protective status connected to their indigenous origins."

811 ———. "Stalin's Genocide against the 'Repressed Peoples.'" *Journal of Genocide Research* 2, no. 2 (2000): 267-94.

The main contention of this essay is that the motivation behind Stalin's deportation of thirteen whole nationalities to remote areas of the Soviet Union from 1937 to 1951 was ethnic, not political, and that the deportations of the "repressed peoples" and the conditions of their subsequent exile fit the UN's definition of genocide. Pohl draws support for his ethnic cleansing argument from documents released from Soviet-era archives and from various studies based on official records—sources which he believes place in question the claim made by some revisionist historians that the process of repression under Stalin was an arbitrary one and did not consider ethnicity.

- 812** Possony, Stefan T. "Communism and the National Question: Some Recent Developments." *Plural Societies* 6, no. 3 (1975): 51-68.

Stalin's definition of "a nation" and its application by some European Marxist writers in the 1970s to the problem of national identity in politically divided nations, most notably Germany and Yugoslavia, are the central concerns of this article. Possony discusses the limitations inherent in Stalin's definition of nation as being a stable evolving community characterized by five major factors only (language, territory, economic life, psychological makeup, and culture); the shortcomings of the definitions advanced by the unavowed Marxist critics, who have altered Stalin's concept of "nation"; and the degree to which these definitions are truncated to accomplish specific purposes—all within the framework of showing how the communist theory on national questions has fallen into disarray in the face of "intractable national problems."

- 813** Rapoport, Louis. "The Ossetain Connection; Letter from the Caucasus." *Encounter* 73, no. 1 (June 1989): 42-46.

Rapoport maintains that Stalin was at least half Ossete, exhibited some of the behavioral characteristics for which the Ossetians are known, and maintained his connections with individual Ossetians and the Ossetian people as a whole throughout much of his life. While Stalin may have favored certain Ossetians and loved Ossetia too, his nationality policies indicate that he was always the "quintessential assimilationist," identifying totally with the Great Russians and considering the minorities, including his fellow Caucasians, as untrustworthy, even hostile, according to Rapoport.

- 814** Rothstein, Andrew. "Stalin on Nationalism and Internationalism." *Communist Review* (April 1953): 112-19.

- 815** Roucek, Joseph S. "Soviet Russia's Brand of Nationalism." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1964): 45-58.

This examination of the place of nationalism in communist theory and Soviet practice from Lenin through the Khrushchev years includes a discussion of Stalin's concept of "a nation" and approach to the nationalities problem. Roucek primarily describes how the harsh national minorities policy implemented by Stalin as People's Commissar of Nationality Affairs was a prime source of the antagonism which developed between Stalin and Lenin, and how Stalin, as leader of the Soviet Union, came to abandon the relatively liberal *korenizatsiia* policy followed in the nationality field during the era of the New Economic Policy (1921-28) in favor of one which had a pro-Russian orientation and elevated the needs of the Russian-dominated central government over the interests and independence of the Soviet Union's nationality groups. He also considers the extent to which the Stalin regime may have manipulated nationalistic appeals as a tactical maneuver to advance domestic support, and describes the ways in which the content of the concept of Soviet patriotism has varied with time and circumstance.

- 816** Schafer, Daniel E. "The Politics of National Equality under the Early NEP: Factions in the Tatar Republic, 1920-1924." *Central Asian Survey* 9, no. 2 (1990): 51-77.

This exploration of the changing nature of the relationship between the political groupings in the struggle within local politics in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the first half of the 1920s includes an account of how the party's view on and approach to leftism and rightism in the Tatar Republic changed with the rise of Stalin to power. Schafer maintains that where Lenin "had tried to strike a balance between centralization and concessions to the nationalities and would try to reach compromises that extremists on both sides could be persuaded to accept," Stalin "shifted the balance toward greater centralization and a lack of tolerance and patience for the objections raised by the Left and Right to Moscow's policies." Under Stalin, the state came to be subordinate to the local party organization, which in turn followed the orders of the Central Com-

mittee in Moscow, meaning that the rights accorded to the autonomous republic were qualified by a crucial condition: "those serving in Party and state must be committed to political centralization and obediently implement the orders of the center. . . ." Schafer also discusses why the Stalinist platform on the national question found significant support in the Tatar Republic of the mid-1920s, and how the growing centralization in Tataria during this time "cannot be blamed solely on Stalin's thirst for regimentation and control" but must also be understood as a development conditioned by the need to remove from the political equation the long-lived, bitter, and paralyzing factional disputes in the Tatar Republic.

817 Smith, Jeremy. "The Georgian Affair of 1922—Policy Failure, Personality Clash or Power Struggle?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 3 (May 1998): 519-44.

Smith takes advantage of newly available Soviet archival documents relevant to the dispute over Georgia in the latter part of 1922 to argue that the "Georgian affair" was not simply an episode in the power struggle surrounding Lenin's physical decline nor a crisis rooted in an incoherent or empty national policy followed by the Bolsheviks, but rather an affair whose development and final outcome are best understood in view of the differing interpretations of Bolshevik nationality politics, the personal characteristics of the protagonists, and a series of "small accidents of history whose significance is often ignored."

818 ———. "The Origins of Soviet National Autonomy." *Revolutionary Russia* 10, no. 2 (1997): 62-84.

This examination of the roots of Soviet national autonomy revolves around Stalin's leading role in advancing the idea of national territorial autonomy as a solution to the vexing question of the formal relationship between Russia and the nominally independent Soviet republics of the border regions. Smith describes the evolution of Stalin's thinking on this subject from his 1913 pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question* through the proposals he put forth in his capacity as head of the commission appointed by the Politburo on 10 August 1922 to deal with the question of the amalgamation of the independent republics into a single federation. He gives special attention to Stalin's 21 September 1922 letter to Lenin explaining his proposals, which called for the incorporation of the various national republics into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) with much the same status as the already existent autonomous republics within that political entity, and to Lenin's subsequent persuasion of Stalin to alter his call for autonomization within the RSFSR in favor of the creation of a new and equal union of states. Smith minimizes the extent of any substantive differences between the two men regarding the national question at this point in time, noting that Lenin accepted the vast majority of Stalin's proposals and objected to his proposal to incorporate the republics into Russia not in principle but because he believed such a move would be perceived internationally as a return to the ways of the tsarist empire on the part of the first socialist state.

819 Stam, Arthur. "The Interethnic Prelude to the USSR." *Plural Societies* 16, no. 3 (1986): 201-20.

Stam outlines the policies of Lenin and Stalin on the national question during the period from 1903 to 1923, describing the two men's manipulation of self-determination as a means of promoting revolutionary agitation against the existing order, and their differing views on the place of self-determination and national identity within the new Soviet state. Receiving most attention in Stam's examination of the interethnic prelude to the establishment of the USSR are the arguments advanced by Stalin in *Marxism and the National Question*, written in response to Lenin's request that he produce an article on ethnicity and the national question; the ambiguous nature of the stand taken by Lenin and Stalin on self-determination, both before and after the 1917 Revolution; the divergence, beginning in 1921, between Stalin's ethnic policies and Lenin's concerns and priorities regarding the national question, accelerated by Stalin's heavy-handed methods in dealing with

Georgian resistance to bolshevization; and Lenin's criticism of Stalin's proposal—as chairman of the Central Committee commission entrusted with the union of all the Soviet republics into a single federation—to insert all the republics into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) with the same status as the autonomous republics within the RSFSR. Stam also describes how Stalin, at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, acting in response to Lenin's insistence that the Soviet state must be a union of equal republics shorn of any signs of Great Russian chauvinism, managed to address most of Lenin's criticisms and, subsequently, to portray the 31 January 1924 creation of the USSR as “a free association of liberated peoples” endowed with the right to secession, while, in effect, guaranteeing the subservience of the republics within a centralized, multiethnic party-state.

820 Sukiennicki, Wiktor. “Stalin and Byelorussia's ‘Independence.’” *Polish Review* 10, no. 4 (1965): 84-107.

Sukiennicki examines the dealings between Stalin and Belorussian Bolshevik leader Alexander Miasnikov in 1918 on the question of Belorussian independence. He describes how Miasnikov managed to bolster his own political position among the groups trying to shape the future of the Belorussian state, and how Stalin, in promoting the previously slighted Belorussia to the ranks of all other “free and independent” nations; in assigning Miasnikov the task of establishing the “independent” Belorussian Socialist Republic and a “separate” Belorussian Communist Party; and in insisting on the strict application of party rules and discipline in dealing with opposition to the line imposed by Moscow, gave Miasnikov a complete victory in his struggle with his rivals for leadership in the new Belorussian state and played the decisive role in the proclamation of an “independent” Soviet Belorussia at the end of December 1918.

821 Szporluk, Roman. “Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the USSR: A Historical Outline.” *Journal of International Affairs* 27, no. 1 (1973): 22-40.

Szporluk presents a brief history of the Soviet formula of national relations within the USSR, focusing on how the Soviet regime, in its effort to find a solution to the nationalities problem of old Russia while guaranteeing the unity of the Soviet socialist state and the dominance of the Communist Party, gradually moved in the direction of transforming the nations of the USSR into sub-nations in relation to the Russians; physically decimating the elites of the non-Russian peoples; replacing them with Russians or Russified cadres; and according Russian language and culture a privileged position within the Soviet Union. Szporluk's account of this historical process includes an examination of Lenin's thinking on the national question, particularly his opposition to Stalin's plan to incorporate the various socialist republics as autonomous republics within the Russian Federated Republic; Stalin's motives for tightening central control over the Soviet republics, purging non-Russian national elites, rehabilitating Russian nationalism, and Russifying the republics of the USSR; and the revision of the Stalinist solution to the nationality problem by the Soviet dictator's successors amidst the party's denunciation of the excesses of Stalinism.

822 Van Ree, Erik. “Stalin and the National Question.” *Revolutionary Russia* 7, no. 2 (1994): 214-38.

This paper traces the development of Stalin's theoretical thinking on the phenomenon of nations from his earliest writings to his 1950 work *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics*, showing how his prerevolutionary writings on this subject, in which his main focus was on support for the principle of “internationalism” embodied in the centralized multinational state, came to be modified in the face of his grudging recognition, as leader of the Soviet Union, that nations were resilient bodies and were bound to exist beyond capitalism and within the framework of the socialist state. Van Ree devotes special attention to the roots of Stalin's 1913 adoption of a definition of nation which, contrary to the hostility toward nationalism that so characterizes most of his prerevolutionary writings on the question, describes them as organic wholes with unique psycho-cultural characteris-

tics. Here, Van Ree acknowledges Stalin's allegiance to the Austromarxist concept of psycho-cultural community within nations but argues for the value of placing Stalin's definition within the tradition of nineteenth-century Russian organicism, particularly the writings of the reactionary Russian thinker Nikolai Danilevsky.

- 823** Veidlinger, Jeffrey. "Soviet Jewry As a Diaspora Nationality: The 'Black Years' Reconsidered." *East European Jewish Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2003): 4-29.

Veidlinger argues that the persecutions suffered by Soviet Jews at the hands of the Stalin regime in the period 1948-53 were not only rooted in popular anti-Semitism, Stalin's nationality policies, and his "psychological profile," as has been traditionally maintained, but were also part of a more general Soviet persecution of those national minorities whose territorial homeland lay outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Pointing to the fact that the earliest victims of Stalin's ethnic cleansing were members of "diaspora nationalities," a category which, until 1948, excluded Soviet Jews, Veidlinger contends that only with the creation of the state of Israel and the transformation of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union into a diaspora nationality did Soviet Jews become subject to the regime's purification drives. As Soviet Jews began to assert nationalist sentiments with the creation of Israel, and as Israel laid claim to the loyalties of Soviet Jews and pushed for their right to emigrate to the new Jewish state, Veidlinger explains, the Stalin leadership, with existing anti-Semitism intensifying, took a series of aggressive steps to dispel what it regarded as hostile activity by a strategically placed diaspora nationality acting under the influence of a foreign government increasingly in league with the capitalist West.

- 824** Weinberg, Robert. "Stalin's Forgotten Israel: Birobidzhan Experiences Jewish Cultural Renaissance." *East European Jewish Affairs* 22, no. 2 (winter 1992): 39-45.

Weinberg provides a brief history of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR), established in the Soviet Far East in 1934 and recognized by the Kremlin as the official territory of Soviet Jewry. In line with Bolshevik nationality policy, as formulated by Lenin and Stalin, the JAR was permitted to maintain its cultural and linguistic traditions but was expected to foster the development of a secular, proletarian culture rooted in Yiddish and devoted to socialist construction. This enterprise, Weinberg explains, failed miserably for a variety of reasons, and with the intensification of official anti-Semitism during Stalin's last years, any pretense that the JAR was a national Jewish homeland vanished, leading to an increase in the Soviet government's efforts to facilitate the assimilation and integration of the Jewish populace. The fiction of Stalin's Jewish homeland did not end by disbanding the JAR altogether, however. Government officials and Jewish activists, as of the early 1990s, were attempting, with the advent of glasnost and perestroika, to revive Jewish culture in the region and breathe new life into the JAR, according to Weinberg, who saw signs of this transformation during his month long visit to the region in March 1992.

- 825** Weitz, Eric D. "Racial Policies without the Concept of Race: Reevaluation of Soviet Ethnic and National Purges." *Slavic Review* 61, no. 1 (2002): 1-29. Discussion by Francine Hirsch, Amir Weiner, and Alaina Lemon, 30-61; Rejoinder by Eric D. Weitz, 62-65.

This discussion of the traces of racial politics, without the overt concept and ideology of race, in Soviet nationality policies focuses on the Stalin era, rather than on Stalin himself. Weitz describes how the Soviet regime, in the period from 1937 to 1953, promoted the development of national institutions, national consciousness, and a diversity of cultural and linguistic expression, yet "defined certain nations as suspect and dangerous, and those unreliable characteristics were seen to inhere in each and every member of the group." He illustrates how such a mindset by the Stalin regime led to security policies being conducted through a racial lens, with whole groups being branded as "an enemy of the people" as a consequence of their allegedly possessing an "irrevocable identity" and a set of "immutable behaviors."

- 826** Williams, Brian Glyn. "The Hidden Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in the Soviet Union: The Exile and Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars." *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 3 (July 2002): 323-47.

This essay, in placing the May 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars within the context of Stalin's effort to take advantage of the wartime chaos to eradicate small ethno-nations deemed to be historic enemies of Russia or the Soviet State, describes the horrendous and massive casualties the Crimean Tatars suffered during the process of their exile from the Crimean Peninsula and resettlement in the depths of Soviet Central Asia as an act of genocide cloaked behind fabricated charges of the group's cooperation with the German army in its war against the Soviet Union. Williams also discusses the 1989-94 return of the Crimean Tatars to their ancient homeland in accord with an initiative taken by Mikhail Gorbachev to rectify the injustice the group suffered at the hands of the Stalin regime, noting that many Russians nonetheless "still believe that Stalin's spurious charges of treason against the Crimean Tatars were valid."

- 827** Zinam, Oleg. "Georgians in Tsarist Russia and the USSR." *International Review of History and Political Science* 12, no. 2 (1975): 52-75.

As part of an examination of relations between Georgia and the rulers of both Imperial and Soviet Russia, this article explores the question of self-determination and describes the cruelties inflicted on the Georgian people by the Stalin regime, including the steps taken by the NKVD in the second half of the 1930s against Georgian "enemies of the people," and the repurging of the Georgian Communist Party in 1952 following the "discovery" of evidence of an alleged Georgian secret national organization that aimed to liquidate Soviet power. Zinam also discusses why many Georgians seem to respect the memory of Stalin despite the suffering he caused in his own native land.

- 828** Zuckerman, Frederic S. "To Justify a Nation: Inter-War Soviet Nationalism." *History of European Ideas* 15, nos. 1-3 (1992): 383-90.

Zuckerman examines the Soviet leadership's interwar struggle with the concept of nationalism as an essential ingredient in nation-state formation, showing how Stalin first fostered nationalism as an integral part of the Soviet future through the doctrine of "socialism in one country," then, with the ascendancy of Hitler in Germany, sought to promote "Soviet patriotism" by reviving national identity through exposing the population to its past, especially its cultural heritage and martial traditions. Zuckerman also discusses the various shortcomings of the massive campaign to implant Soviet patriotism within the hearts of the Soviet people.

Culture

General

- 829** Azadovskii, Konstantin and Boris Egorov. "From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of the 'Anti-Cosmopolitan' Campaigns on Soviet Culture." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 1 (2002): 66-80.

The authors trace the origin and evolution of the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s and then examine the purge of the philological faculty at Leningrad State University in 1948-49, showing how the events in Leningrad provide a microcosm of what was occurring in the Soviet Union at large under the patriotic and antibourgeois campaign in the cultural sphere launched by Stalin and spearheaded by Andrei Zhdanov. The campaign, Azadovskii and Egorov explain, was spurred initially by the anti-Western orientation of Soviet policy during the early Cold War, and was intended "to place blame for the continued hardships of Soviet life on fascists, 'American imperialists,' and other 'alien elements' and to keep the populace in a constant state of tension," but beginning in 1949, anti-cosmopolitan campaigns, under Stalin's personal influence, took on an overtly anti-Semitic tone, targeting first the theater world, then spreading to the field of literary studies, and finally affecting virtually all professions. Peaking with the campaign to eliminate Leningrad's "cosmopolitans" amidst the furor that attended the so-called Leningrad Affair of 1949-52, this sordid episode in the history of Soviet culture under Stalin served to corrupt and destroy entire fields of study, left Soviet intellectual life in a state of shock, and had poisonous effects on Soviet society for decades following the dictator's death, according to Azadovskii and Egorov.

- 830** Barghoorn, Frederick C. "Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage." *Review of Politics* 14 (1952): 178-203.

This examination of the Stalin regime's exploitation of national and patriotic symbols focuses on how and why imagery of Russian traditions, culture, and character figure prominently in Soviet official statements and in the general stream of Soviet propaganda under Stalin since 1939. Barghoorn first discusses the Stalin regime's exploitation of the Russian cultural heritage historiographically, highlighting the regime's propagation of such themes as "the liberating traditions of the Russian people" in their capacity of the "older brother" of the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and others; the Russian people's heroic military struggles and victories from medieval times through the Napoleonic War; and the "gathering of the lands" under the leadership of Moscow, including the glorification of Ivan the Terrible as a national hero. The Stalin regime's revival of pride in prerevolutionary Russian cultural, intellectual, scientific, and technical achievements, and its emphasis on the role of the Russian language in Soviet and world culture are treated in the second half of Barghoorn's study. Stalin's personal intervention in the debate on linguistics which took place in the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, particularly his nationalistic approach to linguistics in opposing the doctrine put forth by the

prominent Soviet academician Nikolai Marr, also receives consideration here. Overall, Barghoorn maintains that the Stalin regime's "patriotism" was as synthetic as its "international proletarianism" and was little more than a tool used by the Kremlin to promote the specific and immediate needs of the Stalinist state.

- 831** Berlin, Isaiah. "The Silence in Russian Culture." *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 1 (October 1957): 1-24.

Berlin opens with a description of the vibrant nature of the Russian intelligentsia during the nineteenth century and through the first decade of Bolshevik rule and then goes on to discuss how the Stalin regime, in its effort to eliminate anything that might jeopardize its own security or stand in the way of the maintenance and increase of Soviet power, sought to put an end to critical thought and all ideological controversy in the Soviet Union, and to focus the intelligentsia on the task of educating the "new Soviet man" and propagating a set of approved truths. Stalin, in Berlin's view, succeeded in stifling independent thought by virtue of his own original contribution to the art of government, namely, by use of a deliberate policy of carefully timed purges and counterpurges of various intensities—a kind of "artificial dialectic"—designed to preserve his regime and keep the revolution moving forward by steering Soviet society along a zigzag path marked by periods of ideological fanaticism and temporary relaxation. This method of rule, in effect, enfeebled the intelligentsia by making individual self-preservation "dependent on a gift for perceiving at which precise moment the central authority is about to order a retreat or an advance, and on a knack for swiftly adjusting oneself to the new direction." In demoralizing the Soviet intelligentsia and preventing the growth of any center of intellectual authority, Stalin was able to stifle virtually every form of intellectual endeavor, but at the expense of creating a system that "crushed the life out of what once was one of the most gifted and productive societies in the world" and making the Soviet Union home to most of the standard vices "so monotonously attributed by Marxists to capitalism," Berlin concludes.

- 832** Bowlt, John E. "Stalin As Isis and Ra: Socialist Realism and the Art of Design." *Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts* 24 (1999): 34-63.

This heavily illustrated essay focuses on the Soviet visual arts, especially the decorative or applied arts, under Stalin during the 1930s and 1940s. Bowlt's point of entry into this topic is the simple poem "May There Always Be Sunshine" written by a four-year-old boy in 1928 and later incorporated into the lyrics of a popular Soviet song of the 1960s, which—with its references to illumination, fertility, life everlasting, and the yearning for divine intervention—Bowlt regards "as an apotheosis of and commentary on the spirit of Stalin's Russia." Identifying sunshine and light as the motifs most recurrent in representations of Stalin in the art of design under the Socialist Realist aesthetic formulated in 1932, Bowlt not only describes how "May There Always Be Sunshine" relates to the cultural perspective of the decorative arts of Stalin's time, but also how the Soviet fixation with light, whether solar or artificial, with hydraulic culture, and with external life brings to mind ancient Egyptian civilization and the pharonic cult of Ra (the god of the sun) and Isis (the goddess of motherhood and fertility.) In suggesting that "the Stalin culture of the 1930s and 1940s can be regarded as a pharonic one, and that the model upon which Stalin wished to construct his new state may well have been the territory of the Nile and its delta," Bowlt points to the central place of solar power and hydraulic projects in Stalin's efforts to harness nature to the Soviet cause, and to Stalin's supervision of the plans for the mummification of Lenin in accord with same bid for eternity "that inspired the Egyptians to create their pyramids, their sarcophagi, and their statuary."

- 833** Boym, Svetlana. "Paradoxes of Unified Culture: From Stalin's Fairy Tale to Molotov's Lacquer Box." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 94, no. 3 (summer 1995): 821-36.

Boym describes how the attempt to create a unified socialist realist culture under Stalin foundered on a series of paradoxes evident in two newly revived genres of Stalinist art: the “mass song”—which, in reflecting the technological dreams of the recently defeated avant-garde, flirted with the future and “affirmed that ‘fairy tales would come true,’” and the lacquer box, which, by embodying the desire to preserve and rewrite Russian national traditions, recreated, through the very “peasant art” the avant-gardists opposed, the allure of the past and made “fairy tales look realistic.” She also discusses how, in the last years of Stalin’s power, “the lacquer box became a kind of Pandora’s box for Stalinist criticism, reflecting the debates over mimesis in socialist realism and the ‘lacquering’ (or ‘varnishing’) of reality. . . .”

834 Brooke, Caroline. “‘May You Live in Interesting Times’: Recent Literature on the Stalin Era.” *Contemporary European History* 12 (February 2003): 119-27.

Brooke reviews *Thank You Comrade Stalin: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (2000), by Jeffrey Brooks; *Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941* (1997), by Sarah Davies; *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1920s* (1999), by Sheila Fitzpatrick; *Enemies of the People: The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s* (2002), edited by Katherine Bliss Eaton; and J. Otto Pohl’s *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949* (1999). With the exception of Pohl’s book, Brooke describes how these works, collectively, shed light on the shaping of the “new Soviet man” during the Stalin era, and on the ways in which urban residents of the Soviet Union in the 1930s sought to cope with living in Stalin’s Russia. In discussing Pohl’s work, Brooke deals mainly with the value of the volume as a reference book detailing the factual record of the deportation of selected non-Russian ethnic groups both before and during World War II, and with the failure of Pohl to provide sufficient commentary or analysis with respect to the “why and how” of these cases of ethnic cleansing under Stalin.

835 Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “Culture and Politics under Stalin: A Reappraisal.” *Slavic Review* 35, no. 2 (1976): 211-31.

Fitzpatrick reviews the interpretation of the relationship of culture and politics under Stalin put forth by scholars who adhere to the totalitarian model, according to which culture during the Stalin period suffered under a policy marked by arbitrary repression, destruction of traditional associations, enforced conformity, and “injunctions to writers and artists to act as ‘engineers of the human soul’ in the communist transformation of society.” The party/culture relationship described in the totalitarian model, in Fitzpatrick’s view, is, at best, an ideal type toward which the Soviet Union may have been evolving only toward the end of Stalin’s rule. When looking at the whole Stalin period, however, Fitzpatrick believes that, while “the political leadership was determined to prevent the arts from posing a political or philosophical challenge, or from depicting reality so starkly that a challenge might be provoked,” the Stalin regime’s attitude toward many established cultural values was “more often deferential than destructive,” and the party, which had absolute power to discipline the intelligentsia and repress its members, nevertheless tolerated other types of cultural authority, allowed each cultural association to negotiate its own professional norms, and frequently sought to legitimize cultural policy not by reference to ideology or pronouncements by party leaders but by reference to nonparty cultural figures with prominent status in their own professions, such as Maxim Gorky, Konstantin Stanislavsky, Ivan Pavlov, and Anton Makarenko.

836 ———. “The ‘Soft’ Line on Culture and Its Enemies: Soviet Cultural Policy, 1922-1927.” *Slavic Review* 33, no. 2 (1974): 267-87.

This examination of the “soft” line which characterized official government and party policy on culture before 1928 centers on the argument that the line was neither liberal nor non-communist, as its critics maintained, but rather “the product of a policy of expedient accommodation with the intelligentsia, on non-negotiable terms laid down by the party leadership and without institutional

guarantees.” Fitzpatrick considers why the party’s leaders believed the “soft” line was necessary; the arguments advanced against this policy by the “hard” liners from the lower ranks of the party and by other militants; and the shifting and evolving balance between policies of accommodation with the intelligentsia and pressures toward coercion and protection of the proletarian interest in three specific areas: literature, university enrollment, and policy toward rural teachers. She maintains that, while the victory of the “hard” line of cultural class war over the “soft” line of conciliation coincided in time with Stalin’s victory over the “Right Opposition,” there is no evidence to indicate that the policy of class war was Stalin’s own. She suggests that Stalin had little interest in class war policies as such but let the hardliners win because of the support their position enjoyed within the party by the late 1920s, and because, in political terms, “they were a convenient weapon to use against his opponents in party and government and . . . to intimidate the intelligentsia.”

837 Hingley, Ronald. “The Cultural Scene.” *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (1963): 41-47.

This exploration of the extent to which Soviet citizens have managed to reclaim the cultural wilderness the nation found itself in at the time of Stalin’s death includes, in its opening segment, a discussion of Stalin’s crippling of Soviet culture through a ban on experiment in form, through the severance of foreign cultural contacts, and by way of the fetters placed on the artistic rendering of the real life of the Soviet people. Hingley also considers the options open to Russians who wished to “keep their souls alive” amidst the onslaught on culture by the Stalin regime.

838 Hoffman, David L. “Was There a ‘Great Retreat’ from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered.” *Kritika* 5, no. 4 (fall 2004): 651-74.

The thesis of this paper is that the reorientation in Stalinist culture during the mid-1930s did not constitute a return to traditional, conservative ways, as contended by Nicholas Timasheff in his 1946 classic work *The Great Retreat*, but rather represents “the selective use of traditional institutions for modernization purposes.” In explaining why he disagrees with Timasheff’s characterization of Stalinist culture as an ideological retreat, and in substantiating his own argument that the Stalinist leadership turned to traditional institutions and culture as a means of supporting and furthering the new Soviet order, Hoffman focuses on four sub-themes covered by Timasheff in the central chapters of *The Great Retreat*—Stalinist family policy, the reestablishment of authority, traditional cultural forms, and patriotic appeals. According to Hoffman, the reason that Soviet leaders were willing to use traditional institutions and culture was not that they had abandoned socialism, but that they believed they had established the foundations of socialism and had eliminated capitalist remnants, and that it was, therefore, both safe and wise to draw upon previously suspect institutions and values to further their version of socialism. For critical commentaries on Hoffman’s analysis of Timasheff’s *The Great Retreat*, see Evgeny Dobrenko, “Socialism as Will and Representation, or What Legacy Are We Rejecting?” 675-708; Jeffrey Brooks, “Reclassifying a ‘Classic,’” 709-20; and Matthew E. Lenoe, “In Defense of Timasheff’s ‘Great Retreat,’” 721-30. For Hoffman’s response to these three commentaries, see “Ideological Ballast and New Directions in Soviet History,” 731-33, in this same issue of *Kritika*.

839 Horowitz, Irvine Louis. “Totalitarian Origins and Outcomes of Political Orthodoxy.” *Modern Age* 41, no. 1 (1999): 19-31.

This examination of the origins and outcomes of political orthodoxy from the 1930s through the 1990s opens with an account of the Stalin regime’s efforts to ensure that every area of scientific and intellectual endeavor would confirm the philosophy of dialectical materialism as interpreted by the Soviet dictator and his cohorts. Horowitz details the means used by Stalin to enforce his concept of political orthodoxy; cites examples of the Stalin regime’s campaign for orthodoxy in the fields of biology, psychology, and linguistics; and describes how Stalin’s policies toward science and culture—by stifling creative and independent thought, promoting individuals on the basis of political loyalty and proletarian purity rather than in accord with their ability and integrity, and

purging those who dared to disagree with his concept of political correctness—played a key role in promoting the backwardness that was to lead to the downfall of the Soviet communist system.

840 Joravsky, David. "The Stalinist Mentality and the Higher Learning." *Slavic Review* 42, no. 4 (1983): 575-600.

Joravsky examines the intrusions of political authority into the various fields of Soviet higher learning under Stalin. He emphasizes how Stalin, in positing that practice is the fundamental criterion of truth, and that the party's leaders are "the supreme readers of the lessons of practice" and, therefore, "the ultimate arbiters of truth," transformed the concept of praxis into a sanction for meddling in the world of scholars and scientists. The condition that precipitated the emergence of the Stalinist concept of practice; the peculiar history of the conflict between political and scholarly authority in each field of higher learning; and the stultifying effects of Stalinist intrusions into the world of academia all figure prominently in Joravsky's exploration of the "scandalous political assault on higher learning" in the era of high Stalinism.

841 Lunacharskaia, Irina. "Why Did the Commissar of Enlightenment A. V. Lunacharskii Resign?" Translated and condensed by Kurt S. Schultz. *Russian Review* 51, no. 3 (1992): 319-42.

In this article, the daughter of Commissar of Enlightenment A. V. Lunacharsky draws upon her father's writings and speeches during the years 1928-30 to argue that the commissar's resignation was "provoked by an enforced retreat, under the pressure of industrialization, along the entire educational and cultural front in the Soviet Union." The judgment that Lunacharsky was "Stalin's victim," Lunacharskaya maintains, does not take into account the complexities surrounding his decision to resign, particularly his struggle against those who sought to rationalize Soviet industry at the expense of the education of the masses. While Stalin by name does not figure prominently in Lunacharskaya's analysis, her article sheds light on the party debate which surrounded the Stalin regime's decision to press forward with rapid industrialization, and on the Commissar of Enlightenment's efforts to prevent popular education and Russian culture from being sacrificed to "the policy of 'barracks socialism,' of the strict pragmatism that excluded humanity from the political and social sphere."

842 Morse, David. "'Enemies of the People': Poetry and Politics in the Time of Stalin." *Social Education* 65, no. 4 (May/June 2001) 198-207.

Morse attempts to throw light on the fate of Soviet intellectuals during the Stalin era by examining the works of three writers who survived the purges: Evgenia Ginzburg, Nadezhda Mandelstam, and Varlam Shalamov. Morse's analysis revolves around the recurrent patterns in the methods used by Stalin and the party in the cultural war they waged—particularly with respect to their efforts to undermine the Soviet people's critical faculties and to promote a simplistic faith in the party and its leaders—and how the three authors under review provide insights into such issues as the party's attempt to harness literature to the cause of creating a new hero for the Soviet people—the "Hero of the Labor"; Stalin's manipulation of people's hope by instilling in the public's mind a vision of a utopian communist society toward which all could aspire; and the Stalin regime's promotion of surrender and sacrifice to the ideals of the party.

843 Reising, Russell J. "Lionel Trilling, the Liberal Imagination and the Emergence of the Cultural Discourse of Anti-Stalinism." *Boundary 2* 20, no. 1 (1993): 94-124.

This inquiry into Lionel Trilling's place in the ideological history of American cultural criticism focuses on his understanding of Stalinism as expressed in the essays collected in *The Liberal Imagination* (1950), a work "written directly and powerfully against Stalinism and Stalinized American writers and critics." While Reising's primary concerns are the nature, manifestations, and influence of Trilling's hostility to the "Stalinization" of the American intelligentsia in the

1930s and 1940s, particularly with respect to Trilling's thinking about Theodore Dreiser and Vernon Parrington, he examines at some length recent trends in Sovietology regarding the Stalin phenomenon, how and why Stalinism emerged, and the view that it comprised an all-controlling formation of organized and systematic terror. He also questions why the same deconstructive interrogation that historians have conducted with respect to Stalin and Stalinism has not yet been applied to Trilling's work in the forties, especially to "his influential 'demolitions' of Dreiser and Parrington" as part of his anti-Stalinist polemics.

- 844** Slezkine, Yuri. "The Fall of Soviet Ethnography, 1928-38." *Current Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (1991): 476-84.

This account of the 1928-38 course followed by Soviet ethnography amidst the ebb and flow of the battle fought between young Marxist ethnographers, led by Nikolai Marr, and the non-Marxist Russian leaders in this field of study takes place within the context of the cultural war unleashed by Stalin in 1928 in conjunction with the launching of the First Five-Year Plan, and the effects of the Soviet leader's October 1931 letter to *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya* that signaled the beginning of the end of the cultural revolution.

- 845** Vihavainen, Timo. "A Note on a Spurious Source: *Finskii Vestnik*." *Russian Review* 44, no. 1 (1985): 69-70.

Vihavainen points out that the journal *Finskii Vestnik*—allegedly edited and published by Russian revolutionaries in Helsinki from 1891 to 1944—on which Francis Randall's 1965 book *Stalin's Russia* relies in elucidating the Soviet leader's cultural views, could not be found in the Helsinki University Library, although it was to get a free copy of everything published in Finland, and the journal was unknown to old Russian immigrants living in Finland, indicating that it may therefore be a "spurious source." Accompanying Vihavainen's charge is a reply by Randall explaining how he came to find the journal; why it could not be found in the Helsinki University Library; and how the views stated by Stalin in the interviews published in *Finskii Vestnik* are wholly consistent with the views he expressed on culture on many other occasions.

- 846** Williams, Robert C. "The Nationalization of Early Soviet Culture." *Russian History* 9, nos. 2-3 (1982): 157-72.

Williams traces the development of early Soviet culture from the pre-Stalin era—when culture was divided between party and intelligentsia, native and Western sources, and encompassed elements of both collectivism and individualism—to the advent of a Stalinist culture in the 1930s based on national traditions, party controls, and an ideology of socialist realism, with the individual hero being acknowledged as a necessary contributor to the collective well-being. Under Stalin, Williams explains, "transformation of self and society, rather than sacrifice of self to society, became the cultural ideal," the end result being the birth of a "new technocratic culture," a national culture based not on proletarian myth but party authority.

Literature/Drama/Poetry

- 847** Autant-Mathieu, Marie Christine. "Stalin and the Moscow Art Theatre." *Slavic and East European Performance* 23, no. 3 (fall 2003): 70-85.

This article, in describing how the Moscow Art Theater found itself hampered by ideological and bureaucratic imperatives and came directly under the control of the Politburo, examines Stalin's privileged relationship with what was considered to be one of the preeminent cultural institutions in Russia since its founding in October 1898. Autant-Mathieu discusses the nature of Stalin's special interest in the Art Theater; his leading role in the choice of plays to be staged at the theater and in verifying the "correctness" of the ideological line it followed; and how the fate of the thea-

ter's artists, regardless of their loyalty, hinged upon Stalin's approval of their work. She also provides a number of examples of the fascination that Stalin exercised in the world of the theater over performers and the general public alike.

848 Frankel, Edith Rogovin. "Literary Policy in Stalin's Last Year." *Soviet Studies* 28, no. 3 (July 1976): 391-405.

Frankel examines literary policy in Stalin's last year in order to determine the degree of uniformity prevailing in the regime's policy regarding this field during that time. She maintains that, in contrast to the increasing repression and push for strict ideological conformity that characterized Stalinist internal policy in the early 1950s, an atmosphere of relaxation, albeit strictly limited, was felt in the literary world, particularly in the field of drama where the so-called no-conflict theory which had produced a deadening effect on the Soviet theater came under fire. According to Frankel, the attack on the no-conflict theory, led by playwright Nikolai Virda, permitted a less stereotyped publication policy, a development she attempts to illustrate through a look at the output of the literary journal *Novyi Mir*—"the most experimental journal in the fifties and the one quickest to reflect a change of policy." She describes how two major works which appeared in *Novyi Mir* in the summer and early autumn of 1952—Vasili Grossman's *Za pravoe delo* (*For the Just Cause*), a lengthy novel centered on the Battle of Stalingrad, and Valentin Ovechkin's "*Raionnye budni*" ("District Routine"), the first in a series of sketches on contemporary *kolkhoz* life—along with other items published in the journal during the last year of Stalin's life contributed to a general atmosphere of moderation in publishing policy and established a view of the Soviet literary scene "clearly redolent of variety, limited experimentation, and of chance-taking on the part of the editors." For Frankel, the developments and writings described present a cumulative image of a literary life far more variegated than is typically recognized, and which suggests that the generally accepted view that the "thaw" began in the months following Stalin's death and represented a sharp break with literary life under late Stalinism needs to be reconsidered.

849 Golub, Spencer. "The Curtainless Stage and the Procrustean Bed: Socialist Realism and Stalinist Eminence." *Theatre Survey* 32, no. 1 (1991): 64-84.

Golub looks at drama and theatrical productions in the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule, describing how "Stalinist Procrusteanism," while at odds with the original concept of Socialist Realism, came to permeate Soviet performing arts in the 1930s and 1940s. According to Golub, the new aesthetic of Socialist Realism came to represent the ruthlessness of Stalin, with the Soviet dictator and his cultural henchman Andrei Zhdanov engaging in a social reengineering of theater which "sought to typify stage and auditorium by purposely confusing performance and spectatorship"; plunging both the actor and the spectator into anonymity; subverting authenticity by means of theatricalized authority; and "bestowing upon Bolshevik culture not simply legitimacy or paternalism but the tyranny of authority as authenticity." Golub also describes Stalin's habit of frequenting the Bolshoi, Maly, and Moscow Art Theaters, where in the confines of special government boxes he watched the frightened actor, "who literally choked on his impersonation of him in those dramas portraying the mythological Stalin and the Stalinist utopia."

850 Heller, Michael. "Stalin and the Detectives." *Survey* 21 (winter/spring 1975): 160-75.

Heller draws upon letters published in Stalin's *Collected Works* and upon documents which have come to light since 1953 to describe the Soviet leader's literary interests, attitude toward literature, and the influence he exerted on Soviet literature through both his "instructive criticism couched in rigid formulae and ready-made clichés" and his unfavorable criticism, which could virtually destroy an author. He also discusses how Stalin's celebrated and enigmatic 1934 conversation with Soviet writer Boris Pasternak about the arrest of the poet Osip Mandelstam suggests that Stalin had literary ambitions of his own and would have liked to have written poetry, and how Stalin's 9 July 1929 reference to Mikhail Sholokhov as "an outstanding writer of our time" figures into the

controversy then surrounding the true authorship of Sholokhov's novel *Quiet Flows the Don*, and sheds light on the grounds on which Stalin judged "good" literature. Stalin figures into the closing theme of Heller's article—the low-grade yet highly popular Soviet detective story in the post-Stalin era—by virtue of his influence on the general character of the "positive hero" in Soviet literature, and the encouragement he gave to the public's appreciation of the role of the secret service in the building of socialism.

- 851** Ivanov, Viacheslav Vs. "Why Did Stalin Kill Gorky?" *Russian Studies in Literature* 30, no. 4 (1994): 5-40.

In this article, the son of the prominent Russian writer Vsevolod Ivanov presents an account of the life of Maxim Gorky between 1919 and 1936, describing Gorky's personal life, political and literary activities, and relationships with Lenin and Stalin. In documenting the last years of Gorky's life, Ivanov discusses the deterioration of the writer's ties with Stalin, noting the differences of opinion between the two men regarding a number of issues of the day; Stalin's growing suspicion that the independent-minded Gorky was involved with former oppositionists in a scheme to depose him; Gorky's reticence to write a biography of Stalin; and the negative change in the Stalin regime's official attitude toward Gorky. Gorky's growing isolation from Stalin along with the fact that the issues of the newspapers Gorky read during the last ten days of his life had been printed for him separately—without the bulletins announcing his failing health that were being served up to prepare the country and the world for his death—lead Ivanov to speculate that Gorky's death was a case of premeditated murder orchestrated by Stalin.

- 852** Ivanova, Natal'ia. "The 'Companion of Groves' and the Leader: A Certain Assonance." *Russian Studies in Literature* 39, no. 1 (winter 2002-03): 33-59.

Ivanova examines the relationship of poet and novelist Boris Pasternak with Stalin, focusing on the writer's "choices made with respect to strategies of life and creativity under Stalin's immediate influence." In Ivanova's estimate, Pasternak was neither a Stalinist nor anti-Stalinist but rather his attitude toward the Soviet leader evolved from delight, to estrangement, silent hostility, and, finally, a definitive break. Ivanova draws primarily upon Pasternak's poems and novel *Dr. Zhivago* for evidence to support her reading of Pasternak's attitude toward "the Leader."

- 853** ———. "Cryptic Precision: The Poet and the Master." *Russian Studies in Literature* 39, no. 1 (winter 2002/2003): 60-79.

Ivanova discusses the relationship between Soviet writers Boris Pasternak and Mikhail Bulgakov; their impressions of and ties with Stalin; and their incorporation of portraits of "the Leader" into their art. At the core of the article is Ivanova's interpretation of how Pasternak's failure to respond directly to the question, "So, he's a master, then, is he?" put to him by Stalin during a telephone conversation regarding the poet Osip Mandelstam, triggered a quarrel between Bulgakov and Pasternak, with Bulgakov ultimately answering the "master" question through the hero of his cryptic novel *The Master and Margarita*. Ivanova also discusses the impact of *The Master and Margarita* as a work of cryptography on the poetics of Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*.

- 854** McLean, Hugh. "Et Resurrexerunt: How Writers Rise from the Dead." *Problems of Communism* 19, no. 2 (1970): 14-26.

McLean examines the Stalinist practice of officially obliterating writers and their works from the collective memory of society, and the rescue of many of these individuals from Stalin's "memory hole" during the literary resurrection that comprised one of the elements of de-Stalinization. He identifies three different "circles" of Stalinist oblivion, the outermost encompassing the "abjured," a group of writers from various periods whose works were condemned but not exactly forbidden; the middle circle belonging to the "accursed," a group including those who professed an alien ideology, and who committed some act of defiance against communism serious enough to become an

“unperson” who never existed; and the innermost circle consisting of the “damned,” who were the true believers in communism but, despite their “superhuman efforts to obey the all-wise party,” were swept into the memory hole during the years of the terror. McLean discusses the manner, speed, and extent of resurrection in the post-Stalin era for those who occupied the various categories within the Stalinist memory hole, showing how literary rehabilitation, like so many other aspects of de-Stalinization, was full of ambiguities and contradictions and was subject to the recurrent cycles of relaxation and repression evident in the Soviet Union during the years since Stalin’s death.

855 Medina, Sara C. “Artful Candor.” *Time* 128 (10 November 1986): 48.

The focus of this report is the spread of glasnost to the realm of culture, where the renewed atmosphere of artistic freedom allowed for the appearance of controversial works dealing with the long-suppressed Stalin era. Medina briefly describes the critique of the Stalin period and the dictator himself offered by Tengiz Abuladze’s film *Repentance* and Anatoli Rybakov’s novel *Children of the Arbat*, noting how the then current cultural ferment recalls the atmosphere of the early 1960s, when Nikita Khrushchev allowed the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, the first detailed description of life in Stalin’s prison camps.

856 Medvedev, Roy. “European Writers on Their Meetings with Stalin.” *Russian Politics and Law* 42, no. 5 (2004): 78-92.

Medvedev provides an account of the series of meetings Stalin had with a number of outstanding European writers in the 1930s, including George Bernard Shaw, Emil Ludwig, Henri Barbusse, H. G. Wells, Romain Rolland, and Lion Feuchtwanger. He also discusses the sources of the blindness displayed by these individuals regarding “the events, processes and circumstances taking place in the Soviet Union at that time.”

857 Miller, Frank J. “Image of Stalin in Soviet Russian Folklore.” *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (1980) 50-67.

Miller outlines the history of folklore in the Soviet Union, describing how folklorists gradually fell under the control of the party and were used to promulgate official party doctrine among the masses. In demonstrating how “Soviet folklore” came to signify works which praised the Soviet people, their life, government, and leaders, Miller uses Stalin folklore as his prime illustration, providing a wide range of examples of how Stalin’s role in the history of the October Revolution, Russian Civil War, and the Soviet Union was distorted and glorified in the folklore devoted to him to the point where he became the embodiment of the people’s dream for a benevolent, wise, and heroic leader.

858 Oinas, Felix J. “The Political Uses and Themes of Folklore in the Soviet Union.” *Journal of the Folklore Institute* 21 (1975): 157-75.

Oinas discusses the harnessing of folklore in service of the Stalin regime’s social and political purposes following Soviet writer Maxim Gorky’s speech at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934 extolling the high artistic value of folklore, its connection with concrete life and the working conditions of the common people, and its role in shaping the moral and human aspirations of the masses. Citing examples of short rhymed songs, folk songs employing contemporary life as their subject, folktales, and letters and poems addressed to Stalin, Oinas describes how these various forms of folklore served the Stalin regime and helped to propagate the cult of Stalin. He also discusses how folklorists, with the condemnation of Stalin in 1956, criticized the propagandizing of pseudo-folklore as genuine folklore during the Stalin era and themselves for “yielding to the influence of the propaganda of the personality cult in their idealization and glorification of Stalin.”

- 859** Rees, Goronwy. "Ending a Deafness in the Land." *Encounter* 37, no. 2 (August 1971): 61-64.

In this review article on Nadezhda Mandelstam's *Hope Against Hope* (1970), the author describes the ways in which the memoir conveys, more directly and intensely than any other book, the atmosphere of fear and insecurity which engulfed the Soviet Union amidst the organized brutality and arbitrary malevolence of the Great Terror under Stalin. As part of this description, Rees discusses the circumstances that surround the telephone call to Stalin made by Nikolai Bukharin, at the urging of Boris Pasternak, on behalf of Nadezhda Mandelstam's husband Osip, who had been arrested by Stalin's police, and how the call led to a temporary reprieve for the great Soviet poet. Rees also discusses the fate of the Russian intelligentsia under Stalin as a recurring theme in *Hope Against Hope*, particularly with respect to why, in the 1930s, the Russian intelligentsia not only capitulated to but largely supported the dictatorship of Stalin.

- 860** Schull, Joseph. "The Ideological Origins of 'Stalinism' in Soviet Literature." *Slavic Review* 51, no. 3 (1992): 468-84.

The central theme of this article is that Soviet discourse on writers and literature, articulated soon after the October Revolution and established during the New Economic Policy, "set a pattern which led to the absorption of writers into a unitary organizational apparatus and which culminated in the formation of the Writers' Union in April 1932." Tracing the development of a "strategy of absorption of Soviet writers into a state-directed stream" during the 1917-28 period, Schull discusses the "Stalinist" organizational fusion of writers that came with the establishment of the Writers' Union as "a rough and uncompromising variation on a by-then conventional Soviet theme" and as a development that was "essentially in continuity with the previous development of Bolshevik ideology." He suggests, however, that what Stalin, with his increasing reliance on coercion to consolidate the structural relationship between the Soviet state and the arts, "ultimately made of the Writers' Union was not, perhaps, what some Bolshevik leaders who supported the 1932 decision wished."

- 861** Urbaszewski, Laura Shear. "Canonizing the 'Best Most Talented' Soviet Poet: Vladimir Mayakovsky and Soviet Literary Celebration." *Modernism/Modernity* 9, no. 4 (November 2002): 635-65.

This analysis of the canonization of Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky as a cultural process includes a discussion of the role played in the state cultivation of Mayakovsky's image by Stalin's famous statement published in *Pravda*, on 5 December 1935, in which he declared Mayakovsky to be "the best, most talented poet of our Soviet epoch" and asserted that "indifference to his memory or his works is a crime." Stalin's comment, Urbaszewski explains, fixed Mayakovsky's official cultural and literary value, resolved the debate within the Soviet literary community over the poet's significance, and signaled the party's new degree of involvement in literary matters. She sees Stalin's statement about Mayakovsky as being part of a larger merger of political and cultural authority that would be expressed most clearly in the state-sponsored celebration of literary figures, particularly poets, in the late 1930s—a development which she illustrates in some detail in describing the diverse events and publications that attended the large, state-controlled commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Mayakovsky's death. She notes that the celebration included widespread textual repetitions of Stalin's comment about Mayakovsky—implying that the jubilee was a direct expression of Stalin's will—and involved both intellectuals and the public in creating and revising the poet's persona and legacy.

- 862** Walker, Barbara. "Kruzhok Culture: The Meaning of Patronage in the Early Soviet Literary World." *Contemporary European History* 11, no. 1 (2002): 107-23.

Walker explores the place of patronage in early Soviet literary history within the context of a broader ethnographic phenomenon—the "circle" ("*kruzhok*") culture of the Russian literati which

consisted of a complex pattern of networking and clientelist behavior centered on the intelligentsia circle. Examining the state-intelligentsia relationship through the prism of *kruzhok* culture, Walker argues that writers, by virtue of their networking and clientelistic activities, had a great deal of agency in establishing that relationship, and, ultimately, were able to forge what could be called “a ‘social contract’ between themselves and the state, whereby the state offered a welfare system of economic support in return for political acceptance.” She shows that an important side effect of this process was a pattern of personality cult formation around influential state-based patron figures, two of whom—the realist author Maxim Gorky and the modernist poet and artist Maximilian Voloshin—she presents as examples to illustrate how cult/patron figures operated in early Soviet history. Stalin enters into Walker’s study only briefly as a cult/patron figure who, amidst the literary battles of the late 1920s and early 1930s, assumed control over the patronage chains and established himself as the dominant patron of the literary world. Walker also comments on how Stalin’s command of the patronage chain helped to fuel the personality cult which was then developing around him.

Music/Art/Film

863 Blomqvist, Lars Erik. “Some Utopian Elements in Stalinist Art.” *Russian History* 11, nos. 2-3 (1984): 298-305.

This discussion of how the notion of utopia as a representation of the ideal socialist society was used under Stalin draws parallels between old Russian icon painting and Stalinist art, particularly with respect to how the two sought to symbolize harmony and show the correctness of basic state myths. Continuing the parallel, Blomqvist contends that the emblematics and ecclesiastical features of some of the monumental canvases completed in connection with Stalin’s seventieth birthday can be likened to aspects of the old Russian iconostasis.

864 “Crack! Crack!” *Time* 27 (24 February 1936): 21-22.

Pravda’s lashing out against Nikolai Bukharin, for expressing the opinion that the Russian people were lazy, good-for-nothing dreamers prior to their awakening by the 1917 Revolution, and against Dmitri Shostakovich, for his “un-Soviet, unwholesome, cheap eccentric and tuneless” opera, *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*, is the focus of this brief report. The report also notes the general belief within the Russian artistic community that Stalin was the source of the *Pravda* editorial assailing Shostakovich’s work.

865 Eisenstein, Sergei and Nikolai Cherkasov. “A Conversation in the Kremlin: Stalin on ‘Ivan the Terrible.’” *Encounter* 72, no. 2 (1989): 3-6.

Reproduced here is the transcript made by Sergei Eisenstein and Nikolai Cherkasov immediately following their 25 February 1947 conversation with Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Andrei Zhdanov regarding Part II of the film “Ivan the Terrible,” produced by Eisenstein, with Cherkasov playing the role of Ivan, but not released until 1958 due to its shortcomings in the eyes of the party’s leaders. The Stalin team, the transcript shows, criticized the film for presenting a false picture of Ivan’s *oprichnina*; for not showing why it was necessary for Ivan to be ruthless; and for making Ivan seem irresolute and psychologically confused. Stalin himself commented on a number of historical inaccuracies in the film, comments that reveal his ignorance of history, according to Vladimir Kobrin, whose brief article “Stalin as an Historian” (originally published in the *Moscow News*) is included with the Eisenstein/Cherkasov record.

866 Fay, Laurel E. “Shostakovich versus Volkov: Whose ‘Testimony’?” *Russian Review* 39, no. 4 (October 1980): 484-93.

This review of Solomon Volkov's *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* (1979) opens with an account of the uproar created by the publication of an apparently "authorized" memoir in which the most prominent and respected composer in the Soviet Union reveals the fear and oppression that plagued his life under the Stalin regime and presents a powerful indictment of Soviet cultural politics during the Stalin years. Fay then considers the question of the authenticity of *Testimony* and the veracity of a number of the statements made in the book. She considers Volkov's methodology to be problematic; points out various deficiencies in his scholarship and a number of inconsistencies in the book; and suggests that Volkov may have misrepresented the nature and contents of the book to Shostakovich himself, who signed the original manuscript, and may be misrepresenting them to the reader as well.

867 Hughes, Robert. "Icons of Stalinism." *Time* 143 (24 January 1994): 65-66.

Referring to Soviet Socialist Realism as "the most coarsely idealistic kind of art ever foisted on a modern audience," Hughes describes the purposes that Socialist Realism was to serve, and some of the Soviet paintings and sculptures of Stalin on display in early 1994 at New York City's Institute for Contemporary Art, including works that depict the Soviet dictator planning the October Revolution "cheek by jowl with Lenin"; conducting the defense of Stalingrad; towering over members of the Politburo or generals who in real life were considerably taller than he; and appearing in the literal form of "the Pantocreator, contemplating a new world he has brought into being."

868 Jelagin, Juri. "New Year's Eve in the Kremlin." *New Yorker* 24 (9 October 1948): 113-16+.

Jelagin describes his New Year's Eve 1938 experience as a young violinist playing in the State Jazz Band before an audience comprised of the Soviet elite. He notes the extensive security precautions taken to safeguard Stalin and other Kremlin leaders; Stalin's enthusiastic response to the band's performance; and Stalin's complete disinterest in the performance of the band's most talented jazz singer, Nina Donskaya, who was dismissed the week following her New Year's Eve performance because, according to the band's director, she had dragged "an unhealthy, capitalistic, decadent, formalist style into Soviet jazz."

869 Kulikovič, M. "Stalin and Post-Stalin Elements in Soviet Ukrainian Music." *Ukrainian Review* 7 (1959): 83-92.

Kulikovič examines the infiltration of Bolshevik influence into Ukrainian music—beginning with the introduction of the "Stalin genre" into Ukrainian folk songs in the mid-1930s—and describes how the style of folk song devoted to Stalin set the pattern for mass songs in general and contributed to the later development of choral-orchestral pieces in praise of Stalin and to the penetration of the "Stalin motif" in choreography as well. Flattery and glorification of Stalin were the most typical characteristics of Soviet Ukrainian music of the 1930s and 1940s, Kulikovič explains, but Ukrainian music also included more serious attempts at reflecting Stalinist doctrines, namely, support for the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the so-called reunion of Ukraine; encouragement of loyalty to the USSR rather than to one's ethnic homeland; the resurrection of Ukrainian historical figures, such as Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in accord with the new Stalinist view of history; and the utilization of general Soviet and Russian subjects that, while demonstrating the friendly solidarity of the Soviet people under Stalin, "encouraged a servile admiration of the culture of the 'elder brother' and a prejudice against the ideas of independence and equality." Kulikovič also discusses how Ukrainian composers who kept in step with official policy were rewarded for their services, and how the death of Stalin, the transfer of power to the collective leadership of the party, and the subsequent discrediting of the deceased Soviet dictator resulted in an absence of direct dedications and eulogies addressed to him—while not resulting in any immediate lessening of the ideological character of Ukrainian music—eventually led to a growing number of works that can be called original Ukrainian compositions, works dealing with national, historical, and everyday phenomena of Ukrainian life.

- 870** Larson, Kay. "Hero Today, Gone Tomorrow." *New York Magazine* 26 (29 November 1993): 66+.

Larson takes the occasion of the American arrival of the art show "Stalin's Choice: Soviet Socialist Realism 1932-1956" to discuss Stalin's role in stamping out revolutionary modernism in Soviet art and in ensuring that art would serve the needs and interests of the socialist state. Placing Socialist Realism under Stalin in its Russian context, Larson maintains that Soviet citizens, by and large, did not politicize Stalinist art, even though it was an art born of dictatorship, but rather tended to place the classics of Socialist Realism in the same category as Americans place Gilbert Stuart's portrait of George Washington. Stalin's prize-winning artists, however, proved to be "heroes only for a long day," Larson writes, as art that tied itself to Stalin's vision of "what an art of and for the people should look like" shared the fate of the Soviet dictator when the political scene in the USSR changed abruptly with Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin's crimes and abuses.

- 871** Liber, George O. "Adapting to the Stalinist Order: Alexander Dovzhenko's Psychological Journey, 1933-1953." *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 7 (2001): 1097-1116.

Liber discusses what he sees as the three phases in Soviet Ukrainian film director Alexander Dovzhenko's twenty-two-year relationship with Stalin and accommodation to the Stalinist order. During the first phase, from 1933 to 1935, Dovzhenko's cordial meetings with Stalin, in Liber's view, led him to imagine that the party's leader actually respected him and his opinions—an illusion which encouraged him to subscribe to Stalinist reality in defending the arrests and purges in Ukraine, and to propagate the myth among his friends and colleagues that he was in a position to serve as a negotiator between the central authorities and Ukrainian cultural interests. During the second phase, from 1935 to 1939, as Dovzhenko worked on his film *Shchors*, Stalin's charismatic spell on him weakened under the influence of the compromises Stalinist censors demanded in the creation of *Shchors* and in response to the arrest of his closest friends in the purges conducted during that time. At this point in time, Dovzhenko experienced psychological trauma which eroded his illusions about his relationship with Stalin and about his understanding of the Stalinist order. In the final phase, Dovzhenko, in response both to Stalin's January 1944 harsh condemnation of the filmmaker's *Ukraine in Flames* and the consequent marginalization of his creativity by the Stalin regime, became psychologically unstable, vacillating, within the confines of his diary, between admitting his mistakes in *Ukraine in Flames* and challenging Stalin and his allies to prove their charge that he was a "Ukrainian nationalist" and an opponent of the policies of the party. In the end, Dovzhenko's attempt to deal with his turbulent and unpredictable environment by establishing for himself the illusion that he had Stalin's trust and could manipulate circumstances so as to be the author of his own fate worked to the detriment of his emotional stability, self-esteem, and creative abilities, according to Liber.

- 872** ———. "Dovzhenko, Stalin, and the (Re)Creation of *Shchors*." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21, no. 4 (1997): 271-86.

The trials and tribulations endured by Alexander Dovzhenko as a consequence of Stalin's personal involvement in the production of the Ukrainian filmmaker's work *Shchors* are the focal points of this paper. Liber describes Stalin's "encouragement" of Dovzhenko to make a film about Mykola Shchors, a Ukrainian Bolshevik military leader during the Russian Civil War, and to do so in a way that, contrary to historical fact, represented Shchors as a selfless Bolshevik and an accomplished revolutionary hero and suggested that the efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, rather than Bolshevik intervention from Russia, constituted the primary source of the communist victory in Ukraine. Stalin's interference in the film's production; the frustration of seeing censors arbitrarily alter entire sequences in the film to conform to the latest changes in the official record of the October Revolution and Civil War; and the need to second-guess continuously the contours of what

was politically acceptable, Liber shows, took their toll on Dovzhenko's physical health and emotional stability, all at the time when arrests, trials, and executions of "enemies of the people" dominated the political scene and even claimed Dovzhenko's military consultant for *Shchors* as one of its victims. While Dovzhenko, during an emotional breakdown, complained bitterly about the conditions under which he had to work and condemned the actions of the Communist Party during the height of the purges, he nonetheless managed to complete *Shchors* and live to see the film enthusiastically received by prominent colleagues and Stalin himself, thus scoring a personal political triumph amidst an experience that weighed heavily upon him psychologically, Liber writes.

873 McBurney, Gerard. "Surviving Stalin." *Index on Censorship* 27, no. 6 (1998): 52-61.

This account of the ups and downs of the career of Dmitri Shostakovich centers on the Soviet composer's treatment by the Stalin regime during the repression of the mid-1930s. McBurney describes how Stalin's critical response to Shostakovich's opera *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District* was followed by a vicious campaign depicting him as "a toady of the West" and an enemy of socialism, transforming him into "another kind of artist altogether, the composer we now think of as the dark tragedian of the mid-twentieth century." McBurney also discusses the circumstances surrounding Shostakovich's return to official favor with his *Fifth Symphony* and *Leningrad Symphony*; his second fall from grace following World War II amidst a new assault on Soviet composers by the Stalin regime; and the revival of his career during Khrushchev's cultural thaw and the Brezhnev years.

874 Reid, Susan E. "All Stalin's Women: Gender and Power in Soviet Art in the 1930s." *Slavic Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 133-73.

Reid examines the ways in which the representations of gender in Soviet art during the 1930s, particularly as shown in the *Industry of Socialism* and *Food Industry* exhibitions of that era, articulated relationships of domination in Stalinist society. She describes how painting and sculpture, in using female characters to stand for "the people" as a whole, "drew on conventional gender codes and hierarchy to naturalize the subordination of society to the Stalinist state and legitimate the sacrifice of women's needs to those of industrialization." She also discusses how the prevalence of female protagonists in art directly promoting the Stalin cult suggests that the audience for such images "was imagined as female, and spectatorship was construed as an act of 'feminine' identification and submission."

875 ———. "Socialist Realism in the Stalinist Terror: The Industry of Socialism Art Exhibition, 1935-41." *Russian Review* 60, no. 2 (2001): 153-84.

Stalin by name does not figure prominently in this analysis of the genesis, fate, and significance of the first All-Union art exhibition *Industry of Socialism* (1939), but in highlighting how the collection, by the dominant criteria of 1939-40, failed as an art exhibition as well as in its original purpose to inspire the mass viewer with enthusiasm for industrialization, Reid presents the exhibition as a further case of "the dysfunctionality of the Stalinist system, in which terror, infighting, and competing bureaucratic competencies brought a grand project to its knees." Reid also discusses how the exhibit, while a monumental fiasco in many respects, still managed to play a key role in shaping the practices and critical discourse of Socialist Realism, and in "the fine-tuning of the centralized bureaucratic system for the management of art under Stalin's rule."

876 Robinson, Harlow. "Born That Way." *Opera News* 55, no. 9 (19 January 1991): 22-24.

Robinson writes about Stalin's lack of taste in serious music and the Soviet leader's destructive and frequently illogical policies toward opera, detailing in particular his 1936 campaign against Dmitri Shostakovich following the Moscow staging of the composer's *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*. He also describes a number of other incidents that illustrate Stalin's interference

into matters operatic, including the arrest and execution of the prominent stage director Vsevolod Meyerhold; the hounding of composer Sergei Prokofiev over Part II of his epic *War and Peace*; and the campaign against the “heinous formalism” of Shostakovich, Prokofiev and a number of other leading Soviet composers that followed the 1947 staging of *The Great Friendship*, by Georgian composer Vano Muradeli. Stalin’s heavy-handed policies toward opera did not emerge from any aesthetic considerations but rather came from his “insatiable, psychopathic drive” to assert control over all aspects of Soviet life, according to Robinson.

877 Ross, Alex. “Ruined Choirs.” *New Yorker* 76, no. 4 (20 March 2000): 124-29.

Ross reviews the controversy surrounding the question of the authenticity of *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich, as Related to and Edited by Solomon Volkov* (1979). In Ross’s opinion, the book, from which Shostakovich emerges as a dissident whose ostensibly Socialist Realist symphonies contained veiled critiques of Stalin and the Soviet system, may well be authentic, but it most likely tells its readers what the Soviet composer was thinking about at the end of his life in the early 1970s rather than what he actually thought and attempted to do in his music after he fell out of grace with Stalin following the Soviet dictator’s January 1936 critical response to the composer’s opera *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*. Receiving special attention is Shostakovich’s revisionist interpretation of his own *Fifth Symphony* as a work which may have seemed doctrinaire but was in fact subversive—a view Ross finds wholly unconvincing, and which he believes may be part of an effort by Shostakovich “to improve his image in the eyes of the younger generation.”

878 Shostakovich, Dmitri. “Improvising under Stalin’s Baton.” *New York Times Magazine* (7 October 1979): 122-23+.

The difficulties of surviving in Russia during the Stalin era are recollected in these excerpts from *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* (1979), as related to Solomon Volkov. Shostakovich, a celebrated Soviet composer whose career proceeded along a precarious and fitful course under Stalin’s rule, describes, among other things, Stalin’s heavy-handed involvement in the war-time contest to write a national anthem, a contest in which Soviet composers were required to participate; Stalin’s complete lack of understanding of music; and the impact of Stalinist censorship on Russian cultural life. The atmosphere of fear established by Stalin, the unwillingness of anyone to say no to Stalin or disagree with him, and his morbidly suspicious nature and unbalanced mentality also are described by Shostakovich. For a review of the debate over the authenticity of *Testimony*, see Terry Teachout’s “The Composer and the Commissars,” *Commentary* 108, no. 3 (October 1999): 53-56.

879 Taylor, Richard. “Soviet Cinema: The Path to Stalin.” *History Today* 40 (July 1990): 43-48.

This account of the shortcomings of the traditional view of the development of Soviet cinema in the interwar period, which sees the 1920s as a golden age of experimentation and the 1930s as a period of decline and stagnation, includes a brief discussion of how Stalin’s view of Soviet reality became increasingly detached and illusory under the influence of the steady diet of films portraying a politically correct version of conditions and life in the Soviet Union, upon which he fed cloistered behind the walls of the Kremlin. Taylor also comments on Stalin’s obsessive concern for ensuring an acceptable portrayal of Soviet reality on screen, a concern which led him to vet a large number of scripts himself.

880 Teachout, Terry. “The Composer and the Commissars.” *Commentary* 108, no. 3 (October 1999): 53-56.

Teachout reviews the debate surrounding the question of the authenticity of Russian musical journalist Solomon Volkov’s *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* (1979), a book purporting to be an account of the Soviet composer’s life and thoughts, as related to Volkov in a series of

interviews conducted in the early 1970s, and revealing that many of Shostakovich's best-known works were pieces of program music in which he had secretly sought to depict the horrors of life under Stalin. Laurel Fay's argument (*Russian Review*, October 1980) that *Testimony* is, in fact, a fraud; Richard Taruskin's 1989 *New Republic* article sanctioning Fay's allegations; and the defense of Volkov and *Testimony* mounted by Allan B. Ho and Dmitri Feofanov, in a collection of essays entitled *Shostakovich Revisited*, all receive consideration in Teachout's account of the *Testimony* controversy, with the final conclusion being that the evidence presented by Ho and Feofanov is "sufficiently convincing to ensure that *Testimony* will henceforth be generally acknowledged as what Volkov has always said it was: the autobiography of Dmitri Shostakovich."

881 ———. "Composers for Communism." *Commentary* 117, no. 5 (May 2004): 57-62.

This article deals with both American composer Aaron Copeland's relationship with the Communist Party and Soviet composer Dmitri Shostakovich's compromises with the Stalin regime to save his own musical career. In examining the mix of politics and music in Shostakovich's career, Teachout discusses how Shostakovich's service as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace, held in New York City in 1949, came at the "request" of Stalin, who lifted the ban on the composer's music to encourage his participation in the conference for propaganda purposes. In his speech, Shostakovich endorsed the Central Committee's anti-Formalist edicts initiated by Stalin, urged "progressive Americans" to oppose "warmongers," and even responded affirmatively to a provocative question from the audience as to whether he agreed personally with the attacks in *Pravda* on leading Western composers. While Shostakovich's own account of the speech, as recorded in the controversial book *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich*, by Solomon Volkov, indicates the pain he suffered in being compelled to deliver such a talk, Teachout writes, Shostakovich "continued toadying to the Kremlin" and to the end of his career proved willing to "say, do, or sign anything in order to stay alive and continue composing." In considering the speech Copeland gave at the conference, Teachout speculates that Copeland's critical remarks about the Soviet Union's official disapproval of much of contemporary art may have been voiced because the American composer had been "jolted out of his pro-Soviet complacency by Shostakovich's public degradation."

882 ———. "The Problem of Shostakovich." *Commentary* 19, no. 2 (February 1995): 46-49.

Teachout describes how the reputation of Soviet composer Dmitri Shostakovich as a man who bent his knee to the Kremlin in an effort to attain official favor, and who scrupulously obeyed the wishes of Soviet cultural commissars in "grinding out simpleminded film scores and mass choruses by the pound and expounding the idiot tenets of socialist realism" in his various writings, dramatically changed with the 1979 publication of Solomon Volkov's *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich*—a work which presents Shostakovich as a "secret dissident" who spoke bluntly of his loathing of Stalin, and a composer whose music is filled with coded criticisms of the Stalin regime. While the veracity of *Testimony* has been challenged by various writers, most notably the American musicologist and specialist in Russian studies Laurel Fay, *Testimony*'s portrayal of Shostakovich as a "secret dissident," in Teachout's view, has largely been confirmed by the most important English-language book about the Soviet composer, Elizabeth Wilson's *Shostakovich: A Life to Remember*, in which Shostakovich's hatred of Stalin, communism, and the Soviet cultural bureaucrats are well documented as are both his self-loathing for nominally cooperating with the Stalin regime, and the recognition by his colleagues that much of his music is about the horrors of the Stalin era.

883 Tupitsyn, Margarita. "Shaping Soviet Art." *Art in America* 82 (September 1994): 41-43+.

This report on two 1993-94 exhibitions in Germany, "From Malevich to Kabakov: The Russian Avant-Garde in the 20th Century" and "Agitation for Happiness: Soviet Art of the Stalin Era," includes some discussion of the Stalin regime's efforts to extend the state's control over literally

every aspect of Soviet life, and of the propagandistic power of Socialist Realism in service of the images of Soviet society which Stalin sought to promote. Tupitsyn also describes how the "Agitation for Happiness" exhibit's portrayal of "the great happiness" of the Soviet people in building socialism was combined with reminders of Stalin's presence and all-powerful control over the Soviet paradise.

- 884** Youngblood, Denise J. "The Fate of Soviet Popular Cinema during the Stalin Revolution." *Russian Review* 50, no. 2 (1991): 148-62.

Youngblood explores the impact of Stalin's cultural revolution and the First Five-Year Plan on entertainment films popular with ordinary Soviet moviegoers in the 1920s. Using Soviet film production in 1926-27 as her benchmark, Youngblood shows that Stalin's cultural policy led to a dramatic decline in the number of entertainment films produced, and to a redefinition of the contemporary melodrama in the form of simplistic tales involving heroic exploits to expose evil saboteurs, wreckers, and other opponents of Soviet industrialization and collectivization. The profoundly negative effect that the Stalin revolution had on Soviet cinema through its progressive and persistent devaluation of entertainment pictures that were truly for the masses, Youngblood concludes, "gives lie to Lenin's frequently repeated dictum that 'cinema is for us the most important of all arts.'"

Education and History

- 885** Artizov, A. N. "To Suit the Views of the Leader: The 1936 Competition for the [Best] Book on the History of the USSR." *Russian Studies in History* 31, no. 4 (1993): 9-29.

The circumstances surrounding the publication of the *Short Course of the History of the USSR*, including the reasons for holding a competition as a means of generating the book; the organization, course of events, and characteristics of the competition; and the role played by the party leadership, particularly Andrei Zhdanov, in orchestrating the campaign are the focal points of this paper. Artizov also discusses how the competition, which was announced on 1 March 1936, and emanated from the Politburo's growing dissatisfaction with the textbooks being produced by Soviet historians and with the overall situation in Soviet historical science, coincided with vigorous criticism of historian Mikhail Pokrovsky and his followers, and how both campaigns pursued a common goal—the eradication of manifestations of dissident thinking and the completion of "the process of Stalinization of Soviet historical science in order to make it into an obedient tool for shaping the kind of political consciousness of the masses that suited the Leader." The role of Stalin in influencing the review of the manuscripts submitted in the competition and in the revision of the textbook selected as the winner also receives consideration in Artizov's paper.

- 886** Avrich, Paul H. "The *Short Course* and Soviet Historiography." *Political Science Quarterly* 75, no. 4 (1960): 539-53.

Avrich provides an account of the genesis of the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, the goals of the book, and its heroic treatment of Stalin from his early years as a revolutionary through the mid-1930s. He discusses the purposes the *Short Course* served as a work designed to be the most important textbook in the educational systems of both the Soviet government and Communist Party, the status of the book in Soviet historiography, and how, with the changing political situation following Stalin's death, a new approach to historiography was required—one that did not accent the role of the individual in history. He also comments on the ways in which the new summary of party history, published only four months after Stalin's death, presaged the violent criticism of the *Short Course* at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 and the emergence of a new official history of the party some three years later.

- 887** Bailey, Sydney D. "Stalin's Falsification of History: The Case of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty." *Russian Review* 14, no. 1 (1955): 24-35.

Bailey examines Stalin's attempt, in the official history of the Russian Communist Party published in 1938, to rewrite the history of the intraparty deliberations leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He describes the attitudes of the differing groups within the Bolshevik Party regarding the treaty and then details the ways in which Stalin falsified the Soviet historical record of these debates by assigning disreputable motives to those who disagreed with Lenin; by lumping together all of Lenin's opponents into one category and branding them as traitors; and by maintaining that the opposition planned to assassinate Lenin and Stalin and form a new government.

- 888** Barber, John. "Stalin's Letter to the Editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*." *Soviet Studies* 28, no. 1 (1976): 21-41.

Barber considers Stalin's motivation for sending an October 1931 letter to the editors of the historical journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* in which he sharply criticized several recent historical publications, called for a tightening up of discipline among Bolshevik historians, and urged historians to concentrate their attention on the task of exposing "Trotskyites and other falsifiers" of the party's history. According to Barber, the letter, which triggered a campaign against ideological unorthodoxy not only in the historical world but in other spheres of intellectual activity as well, and which, in effect, marked a vital turning point in the evolution of the Stalin regime's monolithic control over intellectual expression, was not intended to have the effect that it had but rather had the limited aim of bringing some semblance of order to a historical world that was then in a state of profound disarray so that Bolshevik historians could be more effective in providing support for the regime's efforts to strengthen the ideological backbone of party recruits. The lack of involvement in the letter affair by loyal Stalinist intellectuals and influential figures in the historical world committed to Stalin; the party leadership's evident surprise at the sweeping scope and intensity of the reaction provoked by the letter; and the leadership's efforts to curb the witch hunt triggered by the letter in the scientific and cultural arenas all point toward the conclusion that Stalin's letter is best considered within the context of the pressure of immediate circumstances rather than in connection with any long-term aims, according to Barber.

- 889** Dewitt, Nicholas. "The October Revolution and Soviet Education." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 10, no. 3 (1968): 235-53.

In this appraisal of Soviet educational policy during the half-century following the October Revolution, the author discusses how, under Stalin's rule, the earlier extreme experimental projects in Soviet education were abandoned in the early 1930s in favor of a policy which privileged the promotion of polytechnical education—meaning the acquisition of applied knowledge through the learning of the natural sciences, physics, chemistry, and mathematics—and the use of traditional methods of instruction. According to DeWitt, while the reaction against innovation in Soviet schooling may be considered as part of Stalin's turn toward conservatism in the early 1930s and as a by-product of an overall adjustment in ideological orientation reflecting the restoration of traditional symbols in Soviet society, the critical motivating factor was "the pressing need for an educational system capable of producing the kind of young people required by the emergent industrial society—young people with training in science and technology and with habits of work and of disciplined obedience." Despite the modifications in Soviet education introduced by Stalin's successors, the restoration of traditional schooling introduced by his regime in 1931, Dewitt explains, essentially remained intact through the fifth decade of Soviet rule.

- 890** Dorotich, Daniel. "Stalin and the Writing and Teaching of History." *New Review* 7, no. 3 (1968): 102-22.

Dorotich traces the development of Soviet history textbooks up to the mid-1930s in an effort to show how both an understanding of the various problems that hindered the production of new

textbooks under the Soviet regime and an appreciation of the determining and controlling role of the party in the writing and teaching of history during this period are necessary to comprehend the logic behind Stalin's 16 May 1934 intervention in the teaching of history—an action which eventually led to the rewriting of Russian history and a new phase in Soviet historiography. While Stalin does not enter directly into Dorotich's description of the problems that attended the standardization of history textbooks and the difficulties faced by authors in their efforts to write new textbooks to the satisfaction of the special commission established by the party's Central Committee to oversee the textbook project, his essay sheds light on how the changing needs of the Soviet regime in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Stalin's attainment of undisputed power in the Communist Party and Soviet government, and how the advent of the Stalinist cultural revolution affected the textbook project, the reintroduction of traditional methods, and the study of the nation's past.

891 ———. "A Turning Point in the Soviet School: The Seventeenth Party Congress and the Teaching of History." *History of Education Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1967): 295-311.

This discussion of the radical revision of the party's line toward the teaching of history in the months immediately following Stalin's speech at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934 centers on how the Soviet leader's appraisal of the international situation and the nation's domestic needs came to affect the way in which Russia's distant past was to be treated in Soviet secondary schools. The former official policy of deliberately ignoring most of pre-1917 history, Dorotich explains, was replaced by one which called for the resurrection of Russia's heroic past—with emphasis on the teaching of "facts" about the most outstanding events and historical personages in the country's history—and which, in effect, assigned to history teachers a leading role in preparing ardent young patriots eager to defend the homeland. Citing editorials in *Istoriik-Marksist* (the official journal of the Society of Marxist Historians), *Pravda*, and the decree "On the Teaching of Civic History in Secondary Schools," issued in May 1934 by Stalin and Molotov on behalf of the party and the Soviet government, Dorotich discusses how the history program, the style of teaching, and the substance of the new textbooks to be written for the history classroom were shaped in accord with the party's, or Stalin's, changing interests, particularly with respect to the leadership's growing concern over how to counter the threat posed by the newly established Hitler regime.

892 Ewing, Thomas E. "Stalinism at Work: Teacher Certification (1936-39) and Soviet Power." *Russian Review* 57, no. 2 (1998): 218-35.

Ewing examines the campaign to certify all elementary and secondary teachers that began in April 1936 on the initiative of the Communist Party's Central Committee. He begins with an exploration of the relationship between teacher certification and the terror of the mid-1930s, with the goal of gauging the boundaries of Stalinist repression. He then explores the relationship between knowledge and power in Stalinism as well as between teachers and the Stalin regime at this time of significant political tensions. Here, he discusses how the examples of certification at Moscow School no. 61 reveal one of the most perplexing dualities of Stalinism, namely, "as the state . . . subjected teachers in vulnerable positions to interrogation and examinations, . . . [it] also defended teachers from the arbitrary power of the local educational bureaucracy." In view of the varied experiences and competing objectives of certification revealed in the case of School no. 61, Ewing concludes that "the power of Stalinism was found less in the application of massive terror than in the combination of intensified and more focused control and strategic accommodations to certain kinds of established beliefs and shared experiences."

893 Fletcher, George. "The New Party History." *Survey* 57 (1965): 162-72.

This critical appraisal of the first volume of the revised *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (1964) includes a brief discussion of the signs of Stalin's personal involvement in the writing of the 1938 work *History of the All-Union Communist Party of the USSR (Bolsheviks)*:

Short Course, and of how each of the official histories of the CPSU is noteworthy as an indicator of party policy and the state of Soviet society at the time of its writing. Fletcher also comments on how the hastily produced party history following Stalin's denunciation at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, by denying Stalin's leading role in the party and by maintaining the cover-up of long-suppressed truths, was "an even more flagrant travesty than the *Short Course* had been," and on how this shoddy work reflects the halting and inconsistent nature of de-Stalinization during the Khrushchev era.

- 894** Giffin, Frederick C. "The *Short Course*: Stalin's History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)." *International Review of History of Political Science* 25, no. 3 (1988): 41-47.

In this critique of *History of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, which was written by a committee under the direct guidance of Stalin and issued at the height of the Great Purge, the author describes the distinguishing characteristics of the book, and how it subordinated historical truth to immediate political aims. He points out the ways in which the book distorts Stalin's role during the Bolshevik Party's developmental years (1903-1917) and his contributions during the October Revolution and Russian Civil War; misrepresents Trotsky's motives and actions in the peace negotiations with Germany at Brest-Litovsk; and promotes an image of Stalin as a brilliant successor to Lenin who guided, without error, the day-to-day activities of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

- 895** Holmes, Larry E. "What Next? The Agenda for the Study of Soviet Education in the 1930s." *East/West Education* 15, no. 1 (1994): 3-18.

Holmes outlines the historiographical agenda for studying Soviet schools during the 1930s under four broad categories: history from inside the school itself, from the perspective of the teaching profession itself, from the middle level of the Stalinist bureaucracy, and from the top, meaning the decisions and decision making process at the peak of the party-state hierarchy. In dealing with the category of "history from the top," Holmes writes that recent access to the Stalin papers at the former Central Party Archive "demonstrates Stalin's dominance over educational policy to a degree unacknowledged even by biographers who have emphasized his personal dictatorship." Under Stalin's order and initiative, Holmes explains, the Central Committee, in August 1931, signaled official support for a return to a traditional curriculum, and Stalin himself played "a direct and personal role" in the committee's adoption, in May 1934, of resolutions restoring history and geography to an important place in the school curriculum. Stalin also issued instructions leading to the committee's resolutions of 2 and 14 September 1935 "requiring a single school system and the production of notebooks, pencils and pens according to detailed specifications," carefully edited the final draft of the first resolution, and may have actually written parts of the two resolutions. Holmes suggests that with greater access to records in the Presidential Archives the full extent of Stalin's role in initiating and perhaps writing the early drafts of these critical decrees and his motivation for assuming such a direct role in educational policy and reform may be revealed.

- 896** Husband, William B. "Secondary School History Texts in the USSR: Revising the Soviet Past, 1985-1989." *Russian Review* 50 (October 1991): 458-80.

This examination of the revision of Soviet secondary school history textbooks includes some discussion of the distortion of Soviet history under Stalin and the deadening effect that the Stalinist conception of education had upon teachers and students alike. Husband also comments on the shortcomings of the new generation of Soviet history textbooks which appeared in the late 1980s, particularly with respect to their neglect of Stalin's central place in the intraparty struggles of the 1920s and in the industrialization and collectivization drives, and to their inadequate treatment of the phenomenon of Stalinism. He sees the limitations of these texts as being due, in part, to the

concern of writers over the possibility of being criticized for being overly negative and sensation-alist if they went too far in revising the old official version of Soviet history.

897 Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. "Stalin's School." *History of Education Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (fall 2002): 403-13.

This review of *Stalin's School: Moscow's Model School No. 25, 1931-1937* (1999), by Larry E. Holmes, and *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (2000), by Karen Petrone, revolves around how the two books examine the processes, meanings, and outcomes of Soviet education of the 1930s as "a means of illuminating the nature not only of Stalinist schools but of Stalinism as a whole." Receiving most attention in Kirschenbaum's critique are the ways in which the two studies show that at the heart of Stalinist education were "inequities, dysfunctional bureaucracies, and citizens who sometimes subverted or evaded and sometimes enthusiastically embraced the identities proffered by the Soviet state," and that "the state, its massive 'coercive power' notwithstanding, attempted to and sometimes succeeded in getting citizens, especially young people, to 'identify voluntarily' with Stalinism."

898 Lerner, Warren. "The Unperson in Communist Historiography." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 65, no. 4 (1966): 438-47.

Lerner provides an account of the technique of the "unperson"—the individual out of favor whose activities and very existence are purged from the historical record—in Stalinist history, most notably in the official *History of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course*, first published in 1938. He describes how Soviet historians, subsequent to the denunciation of the Stalinist terror at the 1956 Party Congress, were able to refer to certain unpersons rehabilitated under de-Stalinization, such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, but were not provided with any guidelines on how to handle those Bolshevik leaders who were obviously slated to remain in the unperson category for having been previously condemned for opposing Stalin's basic program of "socialism in one country." He points out that even in such works as the revised official *History of the Communist Party* (1959), the fifth edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (1957-65), and the multivolume Soviet historical encyclopedia published in the 1960s, unpersons, while sometimes mentioned, largely remain absent from the Bolshevik historical record. Lerner notes that Soviet citizens who can read Polish may learn about unpersons and their fate under Stalin through the multivolume *Great General Encyclopedia* published in Warsaw beginning in 1961, a fact which he illustrates by comparing the biographical sketch of Nikolai Bukharin provided by Polish communist historians with that which appears in Lenin's *Works*.

899 Medvedev, Roy. "The Making of a Concise Course by J. Stalin." *Social Sciences* 35, no. 4 (2004): 72-89.

Medvedev details Stalin's leading role in compiling *The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Short Course*, a book officially dubbed "an encyclopedia of fundamental knowledge in the field of Marxism-Leninism" and informally referred to as "the Bible of Communism." Tracing the evolution of *Short Course* from Stalin's letter published in the journal *Bolshevik* on 1 May 1937, declaring all past textbooks on party history unsatisfactory and making a number of recommendations on how to write and periodize a new textbook, to the October 1938 publication of *Short Course* in book form with a circulation of six million, Medvedev describes the steps taken by Stalin to ensure the production of a new textbook in accord with his own creative version of party history. He provides a chapter-by-chapter account of the corrections and deletions Stalin made in the typewritten texts of *Short Course*; notes that Stalin replaced much of the text with his own and wrote all of the book's theoretical sections; gives examples of the slavish praise accorded Stalin for his editorial work by the book's nominal editors and the party's leading figures; and describes how Stalin endeavored to cover up the fact that he was the prime author of *Short Course* so as to make it "easier to retain lavish quotes from his own works and excessive

praise of himself in the textbook.” For Medvedev, the publication of *Short Course*, in conjunction with the mass terror of 1937-38, “marked the end of the history of the party that could be described as Lenin’s party and the formation of a new party, which could be designated Stalin’s party.”

900 Olberg, Paul. “Teaching of History under Stalin.” *Contemporary* 155 (April 1939): 464-69. Olberg critiques the book *School History of the Soviet Union* as a work reflective of the mentality of the dictatorship of Stalin, describing how the book—in glorifying the role of the ruler in each successive period of Russian history, making clear the danger of opposition to the agents of progress throughout the ages, and supporting the policy of force pursued by Ivan IV and Peter I—served to justify Stalin’s harsh policies and leadership. Olberg also discusses the book’s distorted picture of the development of Russia under Stalin’s rule, and its glorification of Stalin’s personality “to such an extent as to remind us of the Caesars.”

901 Platt, Kevin M. F. and David Brandenberger. “Terribly Romantic, Terribly Progressive, or Terribly Tragic! Rehabilitating Ivan IV under I. V. Stalin.” *Russian Review* 58, no. 4 (1999): 635-54.

The authors argue that the rehabilitation of Ivan the Terrible in the Stalinist period, which saw Russia’s first tsar and his Muscovite domain represented as glorious antecedents to Stalin and Soviet society, was much more complicated than it has often been shown to be. Where some analysts have maintained that the rehabilitation of Ivan was a monolithic enterprise directed from above by an all-powerful party apparatus, and that fluctuations in how Ivan was portrayed indicate shifts in state policy or Aesopian dissent on the part of the artists themselves, Platt and Brandenberger contend that “Stalinist cultural agents intentionally promoted competing conceptions of the Ivan narrative, repeatedly clashing over the myth’s use as a political metaphor.” Furthermore, they consider the party’s attempts to control and mediate this activity as being “remarkably haphazard and inconsistent,” and they see deviation of some representations from the official line as being “indicative of a diversity of opinion concerning Ivan and his relevance to Soviet society, rather than evidence of willful subversion on the part of Soviet elites.” In detailing the actual rehabilitation of Ivan and the controversies surrounding this development, the authors draw upon portrayals of Ivan in Soviet literature, drama, film, and the works of professional historians, and on the views of party ideologues on the rehabilitation campaign, considering not only the sources of the disagreements over Ivan’s rehabilitation but also the broader implications of the varying Stalinist perspectives on him.

902 Schlesinger, Rudolf. “Soviet Historians before and after the XX Congress.” *Soviet Studies* 8, no. 2 (1956): 157-72.

This discussion of the articles which appeared in the issues of *Voprosy Istorii* in 1956 and the speeches delivered at a January 1956 conference of Soviet historians centers on their criticism of the state of Soviet historical science, and on their call for both a revision of conventional attitudes toward the study of the Soviet past and for a reassessment of the version of the party’s history offered by the *Short Course of the History of the CPSU* produced under Stalin. With respect to Stalin, Schlesinger surveys the criticisms voiced against the exaggeration of the deceased dictator’s role in the Bolshevik revolutionary movement, the October Revolution, and the Russian Civil War; the misrepresentation of the intraparty struggles that culminated in Stalin’s victory; the erroneous nature of Stalin’s concept of a sharpening of the class struggle after the elimination of the hostile classes; his violation of democratic principles in the party and state; misapplication of Leninist national policy; neglect of agricultural development; and propagation of the cult of the individual. Schlesinger also discusses some of the views expressed by those opposed to the revision of the traditional version of party and Soviet history, and he comments on the tasks facing Soviet

historians in their effort to overcome a quarter-century of harm done to the discipline of history and to the representation of the nation's past.

903 Solski, Waclaw. "Stalin's Bible." *American Mercury* 72 (January 1951): 58-64.

This critique of *A History of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course* centers on how the book, as "a monument to the Big Lie," revised the history of the party, the 1917 Revolution, and the postrevolutionary years by assigning a leading role to Stalin and erasing or disparaging the true roles played by many of the party's leaders. The *Short Course*, Solski writes, in providing "the one and only correct answer to every conceivable question of Communist faith and Soviet objectives," serves as the "Bolshevik bible" and as such, offers an alarmingly clear picture of the central strands of the Stalinist faith, namely, that peaceful coexistence with the capitalist nations is both undesirable and impossible and that worldwide victory of the communist cause is inevitable.

904 White, John. "Two National Curricula—Baker's and Stalin's. Toward a Liberal Alternative." *British Journal of Educational Studies* 36, no. 3 (October 1988): 218-31.

The fundamental features of the Stalin curriculum, particularly its core courses and publicly avowed underpinning, figure briefly in this argument against the establishment of a national curriculum in Britain.

905 Wolfe, Bertram D. "Operation Rewrite: Agony of Soviet Historians." *Foreign Affairs* 31 (October 1951): 39-57.

Wolfe describes the continual retroactive rewriting of history under Stalin's influence, and how it generated a steadily deepening crisis in Soviet historiography from 1931 to 1952 as the nation's historians struggled to attune their writings with the dictates of the sudden shifts in the party line. Along with his account of "the agony of Soviet historians," Wolfe discusses how Stalin, in using history as a weapon in his fight for power in the Bolshevik Party, impressed a ruthless political utilitarianism upon the writing of history and enlarged the scope of his revisions of the past as his control over the party steadily increased. Wolfe also comments on the rational and irrational impulses at work in Stalin's effort to "invent himself" through the rewriting of personal and party history; on his various public directives on the spirit of the new historiography which he championed; and on how the real policies and intentions of the Kremlin can be deduced from the twists and turns of the historiographical line under Stalin.

906 Zhu, Lisheng. "The Problem of the Intelligentsia and Radicalism for Higher Education under Stalin and Mao." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 8 (2000): 1489-1513.

This examination of Soviet and Chinese educational radicalism, in focusing on the relations between the problem of the intelligentsia and higher education, deals with Mao and Stalin's attitudes toward the old intelligentsia (who were defined as "bourgeois" but whose expertise was needed); toward the creation of a new intelligentsia who would be both Red and expert; and toward the place of the intelligentsia in a socialist society. Zhu begins with an analysis of the common causes of the class war against the bourgeois intelligentsia and the similar impact of this class conflict on higher education during the First Five-Year Plan in the Soviet Union and the Great Leap Forward in China, explaining how both these periods witnessed steps to create a new intelligentsia from the ranks of the proletariat and peasantry. He then discusses how Mao came to develop a position quite unlike Stalin's on the question of the place of the intelligentsia in a socialist society. Where Stalin, in recognizing that his industrialization program was laced with a technological utopianism which conflicted with the class war he waged against the old intelligentsia, came to terms with the old intelligentsia, abandoned the peasant/worker education campaign, and allowed both the old and new members of the intelligentsia to become part of the privileged stratum, Mao gave more weight to the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses than to modern technology in the promotion

of economic development and refused to rehabilitate the old intelligentsia politically or to countenance a privileged status for intellectuals irrespective of their class origins, championing instead an egalitarianism that included both the elimination of differences between mental and physical labor and the self-effacement of the intelligentsia as a group distinct from workers and peasants in their lifestyle and thinking.

Science

- 907** Bailes, Kendall E. "Soviet Science in the Stalin Period: The Case of V. I. Vernadskii and His Scientific School." *Slavic Review* 45, no. 1 (spring 1986): 20-37.

The fate of the prominent Soviet earth scientist Vladimir Vernadsky and his scientific school in the years between 1928 and 1945, according to Bailes, suggests some of the diversity and complexity of Soviet science, even during the worst years of the Stalin era, and illuminates some of the ways Soviet scientists like Vernadsky were able to protect their scientific enterprises, continue a critical tradition in Russian science despite political interference from the Stalin regime, and survive this period relatively unscathed by the Stalinist purges. Vernadsky, a well-known critic of Marxism, managed to conduct his scientific work in the area of biogeochemistry and to escape the fate suffered by many Soviet scientists at the hands of the Stalin regime, Bailes writes, because of "a peculiar combination of circumstances" which included the prestige he enjoyed in the Western scientific community, which made his persecution or arrest problematic for the Soviet reputation with so-called progressive world opinion; his well-known Russian patriotism, which served him well in the atmosphere of growing nationalism in the 1930s; his limitation of his dissent to the question of the validity of dialectical materialism as a helpful tool for scientists, rather than directing his criticisms toward the Soviet political or socioeconomic system; and his advocacy of combining theoretical studies with applied science, especially science for the needs of the economy and national defense, which "appealed to one of the strongest Stalinist biases about the role of science and scientists in this period."

- 908** Foss, Clive. "Russia's Romance with the Airship." *History Today* 47, no. 12 (1997): 10-16. This account of the grandiose, much troubled, and ultimately unsuccessful Soviet program to construct the world's largest fleet of dirigibles includes a brief discussion of Stalin's support for the airship construction venture and involvement with the massive publicity and propaganda campaign which accompanied it. Foss describes how the airship phenomenon fired the imagination of the Soviet people and became a propaganda tool for the Stalin regime at home and abroad in its effort to promote the powers and accomplishments of communism in the 1930s.

- 909** Glad, John. "Hermann J. Muller's 1936 Letter to Stalin." *Mankind Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (2003): 305-20.

This reproduction of American geneticist Hermann J. Muller's 1936 letter to Stalin advocating the creation of a eugenics program in the Soviet Union includes a brief account of Stalin's rejection of the proposal and support for Trofim Lysenko's environmentalist new-Lamarckian school of thought.

- 910** "How the Bomb Saved Soviet Physics." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 50, no. 6 (1994): 46-55.

This excerpt from David Holloway's 1994 book *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* centers on the conditions surrounding the work of Soviet scientists on the atomic bomb project headed by Lavrenti Beria, and on how the campaign in the late 1940s for ideological orthodoxy and the attack on Western ideas orchestrated by Stalin and headed by Andrei Zhdanov were not extended to Soviet physics because of Stalin's decision—in response to the

pleas from leading physicists working on the atomic bomb project—to cancel the 21 March 1949 opening of a high-profiled physics conference at which leading physicists were to be officially accused of “spreading cosmopolitanism and idealism, of not citing Russian scientists, . . . of refusing to develop fundamental physics, and of spying for Germany.” Stalin’s decision, which was motivated by his desire to avoid delays in the atomic project and by his belief, according to Beria, that if necessary, he could have the physicists shot later, had the effect of sparing physics from most of the negative effects that the anti-cosmopolitan campaign had upon science and the scientific community in the USSR.

911 Joravsky, David. “The Perpetual Province: ‘Ever Climbing Up the Climbing Wave.’” *Russian Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 1-9.

Joravsky comments on the analysis of Stalinist scientific culture put forth by Alexei Kojevnikov in an article in this same issue of the *Russian Review*. He commends Kojevnikov for the boldness of his analysis of how Soviet scientists used the Stalinist system to their own advantage, and for the breadth of his scholarly reach, but he sees certain limitations in Kojevnikov’s assessment of ritualized behavior in late Stalinist culture, particularly his underplaying of the substantive issues that divided Soviet scientists. Joravsky also questions Kojevnikov’s tendency to place Soviet scientists in a single category—people seeking to work the system to their advantage—and disagrees with how he goes about explaining the capricious nature of the Stalin regime’s ideological intervention in the scientific disputes of that time.

912 Josephson, Paul R. “Soviet Scientists and the State: Politics, Ideology, and Fundamental Research from Stalin to Gorbachev.” *Social Research* 59, no. 3 (1992): 589-614.

Josephson examines the impact of social, political, and cultural factors on the development of Soviet science from Stalin through the Gorbachev years. He describes how the policies of Stalin shaped science through harnessing it to the program of industrialization and bringing scientists strictly under party control by centralizing policy making, infiltrating research institutes, establishing the hegemony of ideology, and imposing international isolation. Stalin’s fascination with technology, Stalinist “gigantomania,” and the cult of science fostered by the Stalin regime also receive consideration in Josephson’s analysis, as do the trends in science that remained constant from leader to leader throughout the Soviet era.

913 Kneen, Peter. “De-Stalinization under Stalin? The Case of Science.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16, no. 4 (December 2000): 107-26.

Kneen primarily assesses the relative significance of disciplinary and policy differences in explaining why the science of genetics in the late Stalin period was profoundly damaged by the cultural campaign which became known as the Zhdanovshchina while that of physics survived relatively unscathed. Pointing out the advantages possessed by leading physicists in the Stalinist science system in accord with the exactness of physics as a science and the priority attached to the atomic bomb project, Kneen explains how physicists were not only less susceptible to manipulation and less affected by the Zhdanovshchina than those in the natural and life sciences—genetics in particular—but also faced less formidable opponents than geneticists, who were confronted by a cohesive alternative in the form of Lysenkoism. Stalin enters into Kneen’s analysis in a number of instances, particularly with regard to his role as the final arbiter of all matters in the Soviet science system whose intervention could bring about devastation, as in the case of his support for the views of Lysenko in genetics, or respite, as shown by his opposition to the full extension of the Zhdanovshchina to physics.

914 ———. “Physics, Genetics and the Zhdanovshchina.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 7 (1998): 1183-1202.

Kneen draws upon Soviet archival materials to address the relative merits of the approaches taken and the views put forth in recent works by Alexei Kojevnikov and David Joravsky in their respective analyses of the postwar campaign on science in the Soviet Union and their interpretations of the role of science in the politics of the postwar period. Kneen's assessment revolves around the nature of and extent to which the party-inspired rituals of *diskussii* (discussion), *kritika* (criticism), and *samokritika* (self-criticism) were adopted by leading scientists; the effects of the imposition of an intrusive form of *partiinost'* (the requirement to conform to the party line) in science; whether Stalinist ideology when applied to science amounted to something more complex than a means of thought control; and whether the intensity of the science campaign abated before Stalin's death. Chief among the conclusions that he draws are: the most authoritative scientists proved unwilling to adopt the rituals of intraparty democracy; there was a retreat from *partiinost'* in the early 1950s, largely because of the underlying conflict between the party's priorities in the areas of ideology and propaganda, on the one hand, and science and technology, on the other; and scientists exploited the tension between the party's priorities to alleviate the impact of the postwar campaign in science. "While these developments," Kneen concludes, "may not justify the attribution of the term de-Stalinization, they do show that symptoms of the profound changes which followed Stalin's death were beginning to accumulate in science during the immediately preceding period."

915 Kojevnikov, Alexei. "Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science in Intraparty Democracy circa 1948." *Russian Review* 57 (January 1998): 25-52.

Kojevnikov examines the campaign of ideological discussions in science in the late-Stalin period, arguing that the contents and results of the disputes in this campaign, as shown in the cases of philosophy, biology, and linguistics, lacked coherence, whereas on the level of formal rules and rites of public behavior in Stalinist political culture regularity can be found. Outlining the rules of the communist "games" of *diskussii* (discussion), *kritika* (criticism) and *samokritika* (self-criticism), as practiced in the domain of intraparty democracy within Stalinist political culture, Kojevnikov describes the campaign of ideological discussions in terms of the transfer of the rites of intraparty democracy from communist political culture to academic life, showing how the rules in these games were such that scholars engaged in academic conflicts provoked from above were able to interpret and exploit the conflicts—leading to variability in the outcome of these debates. In shining light on the rituals of Stalinist culture at work and on the relationship between science and ideology, Kojevnikov comments on those rare instances in which Stalin personally intervened in an academic controversy, most notably in the case of the Soviet linguistics debate in 1950. For responses to Kojevnikov's interpretation of the campaign of ideological discussions in Soviet science, see David Joravsky, "The Perpetual Province: 'Ever Climbing up the Climbing Wave,'" *Russian Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 1-9, and Peter Kneen, "De-Stalinization under Stalin? The Case of Science," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16, no. 4 (December 2000): 107-26.

916 Komarov, V. L. "Joseph Stalin: Scientist and Strategist." *Voks Bulletin* 3-4 (1945): 29-31. The President of the Academy of Scientists of the USSR describes here his meeting with Stalin toward the end of World War II to discuss the tasks then facing Soviet science. Komarov primarily notes Stalin's statements on the place of science in the rehabilitation of the national economy and the role of the academy in stimulating scientific innovation; on providing scientists with "the maximum supply of foreign literature"; and on coordinating the work of science centers in all the republics of the Soviet Union. Describing Stalin as a man who combines the finest qualities of a general and a scientist, Komarov commends the Soviet leader for giving his attention to matters concerning the nation's scientific life, even while engrossed in bringing to a victorious end the country's war against fascism.

917 Lysenko, T. D. "Coryphaeus of Science." *Science* 118 (3 July 1953): 32.

Reproduced here is a translation of Soviet biologist Trofim Lysenko's eulogy of Stalin, which appeared in *Pravda* on 8 March 1953, in which the deceased dictator is depicted as a source of inspiration for all Soviet scientists and commended for his disclosure of "a series of most important biological principles" and for pointing out "the paths for development of the theory of Michurinist materialist biology."

918 McCutcheon, Robert A. "Stalin's Purge of Soviet Astronomers." *Sky and Telescope* 78 (October 1989): 352-57.

McCutcheon draws upon letters and other papers archived in St. Petersburg as well as on interviews with the relatives of the victims of Stalin's 1936-37 purge of Soviet astronomers to describe the events and circumstances surrounding the purge. He does not comment on Stalin's direct involvement with the purge but rather discusses the reasons why astronomers attracted special attention from the NKVD, stressing the concern aroused by the "suspicious" contacts the scientists made during their frequent travels to foreign observatories and conferences.

919 "Peter Kapitsa: The Scientist Who Talked Back to Stalin." Translated by Thomas Hoisington. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46 (April 1990): 26-33.

This article includes the letters sent to Stalin by Soviet scientist and Nobel Prize winner in physics Peter Kapitsa and a commentary on the letters, all of which appeared in June 1989 in the Soviet weekly *Ogonyok*. The letters recount Kapitsa's persistent yet losing battle against Lavrenti Beria, head of Stalin's security network and overseer of the atomic bomb project, during which Kapitsa protested to Stalin about Beria's high-handed treatment of scientists, interference with their work, and promotion of a work climate hostile to the fostering of scientific research. Stalin, who failed to respond to Kapitsa's letters, was impressed with the scientist's moxie, did not react harshly to the criticisms raised by him, and refused to have him arrested as Beria demanded, but, in May 1946, nonetheless removed Kapitsa as head of liquid oxygen research and as director of the Institute of Physical Problems, which Kapitsa himself had founded. The article also includes two letters sent by Kapitsa to Khrushchev regarding the Stalin letters, and a note of remembrance by Kapitsa's son, Sergei.

920 Richards, Pamela Spence. "Scientific Information for Stalin's Laboratories, 1945-1953." *Information Processing and Management* 32, no. 1 (1996): 77-88.

Stalin does not figure prominently in this account of the pathways along which Western scientific publications traveled to scientists in the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1953, but the article does discuss how Soviet science was impacted negatively by the Stalin regime's postwar campaign against "cosmopolitanism," and how the Kremlin leadership, contrary to the official xenophobia which marked the last years of Stalin's rule, but in line with the Soviet state's strategic needs, supported the acquisition of foreign scientific information and its dissemination to certain controlled groups.

921 Rossianov, Kirill O. "Editing Nature: Joseph Stalin and the 'New' Soviet Biology." *Isis* 84 (December 1993): 728-45.

Rossianov outlines the editorial changes made by Stalin in the original manuscript of the talk presented by Soviet academician Trofim Lysenko for a 31 July 1948 meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences which witnessed the rout of genetics in the USSR. Rossianov provides an overview of Stalin's editorial work in each of the ten sections of Lysenko's original text, and then gives a systematic account of the Soviet leader's specific changes, organizing them into four groups: deletions, changes of single words, reformulation of sentences, and insertions. He shows that Stalin, in accord with his belief in the universal character of scientific knowledge, sought to soften the political thrust of Lysenko's talk and make it sound more objective as a means of re-

placing the concept of two, classed-based sciences (bourgeois and Marxist) with “the much more traditional dichotomy between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ science.” While Lysenko did not mention Stalin’s role in editing his manuscript in his talk at the academy session, there can be no doubt that the Soviet leader played a leading role in the construction of the “new” Soviet biology and in the rout of genetics in the USSR, according to Rossianov.

- 922** ———. “Stalin As Lysenko’s Editor: Reshaping Political Discourse in Soviet Science.” *Russian History* 21, no. 1 (1994): 49-63. Also in *Configurations* 1, no. 3 (1993): 439-52.

Rossianov discusses the background of the 31 July-7 August 1948 session of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences which ended in the crippling of the field of genetics in the USSR and triggered similar campaigns in other sciences. He draws upon Soviet Communist Party archives to detail the role played by Stalin in editing the keynote address given at the 1948 session by Trofim Lysenko, President of the Agricultural Academy, who was the principal opponent of genetics and the spokesman for the new “Michurinist biology.” Stalin’s corrections in the text of Lysenko’s speech, Rossianov shows, dealt not only with the political dimension of the genetics debate, and the sociopolitical dimension of Lysenko’s reasoning, but also with issues in the philosophy of science—the end result being a toning down of the class-based rhetoric of Lysenko’s original text, and a discourse that sounded less “political” and more “objective.” Speculating on the reasons for such profound editorial changes in the ideological language of Lysenko’s text, Rossianov suggests that Stalin’s revisions reflect the Kremlin’s postwar renunciation of the ideological heritage of the 1920s and early 1930s, and the emergence of a new ideological climate in which science was considered to depend not on class interests but on the “objective” laws of nature. Rossianov also comments on Stalin’s sanctioning of articles attacking Lysenko for his use of revolutionary rhetoric in several papers published in the early 1950s criticizing Darwinism as a “theory of all-around gradualism.”

- 923** Schattman, Stephan E. “Dogma vs. Science in Soviet Statistics.” *Problems of Communism* 5, no. 1 (1956): 30-36.

This article, in describing the stultifying effects of communist totalitarian ideology on scientific freedom under Stalin, includes a discussion of how the Stalin regime moved from getting rid of Soviet statisticians whose evaluations of economic conditions and prospects were inimical to the fundamental policies of the First Five-Year Plan to an attempt, in the postwar years, to formulate a highly arbitrary and artificial redefinition of statistics which would assure its subordination to Marxist dogma.

- 924** Stone, Richard. “Stalin’s Forgotten Cure.” *Science* 298, no. 5594 (25 October 2002): 728-31.

This discussion of bacteriophage therapy as a potential weapon against drug-resistant bacteria and stubborn infections includes a brief account of the promotion of this unique brand of medicine by Stalin and of his support for the establishment of a bacteriological research center in Tbilisi under the leadership of Giorgi Eliava, who later incurred the disfavor of Lavrenti Beria and was executed during the Stalin purges of the 1930s.

- 925** Vucinich, Alexander. “Soviet Mathematics and Dialectics in the Soviet Era.” *Historia Mathematica* 27, no. 1 (February 2000): 54-76.

Vucinich examines the conflict within the Soviet mathematics community between the champions of Marxist theory, who considered the trend in the mathematization of science an invitation to mathematical idealism—the “archenemy of materialistic dialectics”—and those who welcomed this trend. He discusses how Soviet mathematicians were influenced by such factors as the intense Stalinist pressure in favor of applied rather than “pure” mathematics; Stalin’s plan, launched in the mid-1930s, to make “dialectical materialism” both the official philosophy of Soviet science and a

monolithic system of Marxist epistemology; his war on free expression in science and campaign to break the spirit of the scientific community; and the efforts of the Stalin regime during World War II to bolster Russian nationalism by emphasizing the substantial breadth and historical depth of mathematical thought in Russia and by contrasting—during the anti-cosmopolitanism that marked the waning years of the Stalinist era—the “progressive” character of Russian mathematics and the “decadence” of its Western counterpart.

Portrayals of Stalin

926 Bailey, John. “The Shock of the Old.” *New Republic* (23 May 1988): 40-42.

This review of Anatoli Rybakov’s *Children of the Arbat* centers on how the book fits well within the tradition of the Russian novel, with its wealth of biographical and local historical detail, use of the venerable conventions of historical fiction, and ability to compel the reader to accept the world it offers. In discussing the novel’s picture of Stalin, Bailey mainly comments on Rybakov’s rendering of the Soviet dictator’s personality; Rybakov’s suggestion that nothing was wrong with the party, but rather only with Stalin and his henchmen who abused it; and his ability to lead his readers to the point of sympathizing with the view that Stalin’s “line was correct but his methods unacceptable.”

927 Bazin, André. “The Stalin Myth in Cinema.” Translated by Georgia Gurrieri, with an introduction by Dudley Andrew. *Film Criticism* 3, no. 1 (1978): 17-26.

In this slightly revised version of an article which appeared in the July-August 1950 issue of the French journal *L’Esprit*, the author compares the image of Stalin proposed in three Soviet films: *The Third Blow*, *The Battle of Stalingrad* (Part I), and *The Vow*. The first two war films, Bazin writes, endow Stalin with “hyper-napoleonic military genius,” portraying him as having an intuitive sense of the measures to be taken to turn the tide of battle in Russia’s favor, and crediting him with conceiving the Soviet victory in the war with Germany. In attributing to Stalin the transcendence which characterized living gods and dead heroes, and in making him the principal hero and main determiner of a real historic event while he was still alive, the two films, in Bazin’s estimate, not only historicize Stalin’s biography but attempt to present as “real” an image of him that “conforms exactly to what a myth of Stalin would have him to be.” Bazin sees clear evidence of this same kind of cinematic reconstitution of Stalin in *The Vow* as well, with its portrayal of him as an omniscient and infallible leader who stands apart from Lenin’s other disciples “not only because of his wisdom and genius, but because of the presence in him of History.” Bazin’s essay is followed by a brief appendix, written in 1958, in which he cites with satisfaction some passages from Khrushchev’s 1956 speech regarding Stalin’s sense of omniscience and late in life tendency “to inform himself of Soviet reality through the cinema of Stalinist mythology and to see confirmation of his own genius by viewing Stalinist films.” For another version of this article, see the translation by Alain Piette and Bert Cardullo in *New Orleans Review* 15, no. 3 (fall 1988): 5-17.

928 Berg-Pan, Renata. “Poetry and the Party Line: How Bertolt Brecht Re-Invented Marxism.” *Soundings* 58, no. 1 (1975): 84-96.

This exploration of Bertolt Brecht’s attraction to Marxism centers on how the scientific method of Marx’s analysis and the principle of dialectics as a form of thinking shaped the content and aesthetics of the German writer’s artistic works, and how he reinvented Marx so as to live within the constraints of the Stalinist party line. Brecht’s conviction that Stalin’s methods—including the show trials, the terror, and the labor camps—were “based upon absolute proof that the world could be changed” made him a lifelong supporter of Stalin, and led him to write a number of works which praised the Soviet dictator. Berg-Pan also discusses how Brecht, in a work called *Me-ti*, or the *Book of Changes*, “tried to come to terms with his actual views of Stalin and his secret doubts

about many of his policies” in dividing himself into two personalities—one “official and didactic,” the other “private and Poetic”—through whom he could express both his professed beliefs and his private doubts.

- 929** Blackburn, Robin. “*The First Circle*.” *New Left Review* 63 (September/October 1970): 56-64.

Blackburn discusses Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *The First Circle* (1968) in terms of what is seen as the book’s central theme—an investigation of how the Stalinist system actually worked. Describing the novel as “the most vivid and eloquent account of Stalinism to have emerged from the contemporary Soviet Union,” Blackburn considers, among other facets of the book, Solzhenitsyn’s portrayal of the arbitrary and vicious workings of the Stalinist apparatus of coercion; his ridicule of Stalin’s rampant chauvinism, elitism, and obscurantism along with the more conventionally odious aspects of his rule; and his provision of his readers with a “glimpse of those forces making for the mutation and stabilization of the Stalinist system in post-Stalin revisionism.” He also sees Solzhenitsyn’s writing as being animated by a fierce egalitarianism and a profound sense of justice, both of which stand in stark opposition to the heart of Stalinism as portrayed in *The First Circle* and in Solzhenitsyn’s other writings as well.

- 930** Boym, Svetlana. “Stalin’s Cinematic Charisma: Between History and Nostalgia.” *Slavic Review* 51, no. 3 (1992): 536-43.

This review of *I Served in Stalin’s Bodyguard* (1989), directed by Semen Aranovich, *The Inner Circle* (1992), directed by Andrei Konchalovsky, *The Journey of Comrade Stalin to Africa* (1990), directed by Irakli Kvirikadze, and *The Abyss* (1992), directed by Ivan Dukhovichny, places the four films within the context of the changing character of cinematic representations of Stalinism in the postglasnost period, particularly with respect to how the films, collectively, engage and estrange charismatic images of Stalin and Stalinism and expose the process of historic mythmaking during the Stalin era.

- 931** Brinkley, Tony and Raina Kostova. “*The Road to Stalin: Mandelstam’s ‘Ode to Stalin’ and the ‘Lines on the Unknown Soldier.’*” *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 21, no. 4 (2003): 32-63.

In this introduction to new translations of two poems written by Osip Mandelstam in 1937 toward the end of his exile in Voronezh, “Ode to Stalin” and “Lines on the Unknown Soldier”—both of which were composed with the public in mind but neither of which was published until long after the Soviet poet’s death—the authors argue for the value of considering the poems as complementary works and reading them in terms of one another. Brinkley and Kostova, in offering an interpretation of the “Ode” which sees irony behind the poem’s exaggerated compliments of Stalin and views the work as “a texture of ambiguities” suggesting an image of Stalin far removed from that which emerges from a surface reading of the “Ode” as a hymn of praise, point to a number of connections between the “Ode” and “Unknown Soldier,” including the difficulties that attended their creation; Mandelstam’s need to “tack and maneuver” in navigating the dangerous terrain the two works crossed; the image of Stalinist Russia that the poems suggest; and the ways in which they offer a self-portrait of Mandelstam and serve to predict his fate.

- 932** Brougher, Valentina G. “Ivan the Terrible and Stalin in the Historical Novels of Valerii Poluiko.” *Georgetown Journal of Languages and Linguistics* 2, no. 1 (1991): 1-9.

Brougher describes how Valeri Poluiko’s exploration of the world of Ivan IV in the historical novel *The Year 7071*, published in 1979, allowed the writer to direct the reader’s thoughts, through parallel association and allusion, to similar phenomena under Stalin’s rule. He examines the question of whether in Poluiko’s later narrative about Ivan IV in *Ivan the Terrible*—published at a time when he no longer needed to resort to veiled symbols and Aesopian themes to comment

on Stalin's role in Soviet history—the depiction of the Russian tsar changes in any significant way, perhaps evoking a different image of Stalin. He maintains that whereas in *The Year 7071* the unspoken parallels between Ivan IV and Stalin largely consist of how both refused to share power with any group or institution; insisted on unequivocal support for their policies; increasingly relied on fear, imprisonment, torture, and murder to silence opponents, whether real or imaginary; and aspired to expand Russia to the north and make the nation a great international power. In *Ivan the Terrible*, however, the nature of the connection between the two rulers is “bidirectional,” meaning that where in *The Year 7071* “the specter of Stalin seemed to be suggested by and projected out of the portrait of Ivan IV,” *Ivan the Terrible* not only suggests parallels with Stalin but also takes on added power and meaning as a result of Poluiko's creative utilization of features that came to be popularly associated with Stalin for the Soviet reader of the 1980s—particularly with respect to duplicity and hypocrisy as the dominant features of the two leaders' personalities, the destructiveness of their thirst for vengeance, and their desire to be worshipped as the saviors of the Russian nation of their respective eras.

- 933** ———. “Vsevolod Ivanov's Satirical Novel *Y* and the Red Rooster Metaphor.” *Slavic Review* 53, no. 1 (spring 1994): 159-72.

Brougher argues for the likelihood that the metaphor of the rooster in the surrealistic dream of Egor Egorovich in Vsevolod Ivanov's 1931 novel *Y* satirically embodies the image of Stalin at the beginning of the 1930s and also sheds light on the complex system of allusions and associations the Soviet writer devised in capturing the image of Stalin within the pages of the novel. In connecting the elements of the dream to details in the text and to the novel's thematics, Brougher describes how Ivanov, in effect, presents Stalin as “an arrogant Napoleonic rooster who had willed his own transformation and hypnotized the masses into worshipful awe of what was in reality only an illusion.”

- 934** Brown, Clarence. “Into the Heart of Darkness.” *Slavic Review* 26, no. 4 (December 1967): 584-604.

The subject of this paper is the creative difficulties encountered by Osip Mandelstam in his effort to write—from mid-January to mid-February 1937 while in exile in the town of Voronezh—an adulatory ode to Stalin which the Soviet poet hoped would save him and his wife from ruin at the hands of the Stalin regime. According to Brown, Mandelstam, try as he might, could not bring himself to write down the ode he had composed in his head but instead, amidst the shame and revulsion he felt toward penning such a work, found himself inundated with sounds and images which were “subtly infected with the themes and words, greatly misshapen and transformed, of the ode that would not come.” In laying bare some of the metamorphoses of the ode that can be discerned in the twenty-four poems that came at the end of the collection named the *Second Voronezh Notebooks*, Brown frames his analysis of Mandelstam's struggle to write the ode within the context of a nightmarish series of interrogations, tortures, exiles, provocations, and rearrests which the poet suffered and which ended finally with his death in December 1938 “on the garbage heap of a camp near Vladivostok.”

- 935** Brown, Deming. “*Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle*.” *Slavic Review* 28, no. 2 (June 1969): 304-13.

This review of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* (1969) and *The First Circle* (1968) centers on the varied uses of irony in the two works, and on how Stalin permeates both novels thematically and as a literary device. Brown describes how Stalinism provides much of the cement that holds each novel together, particularly with respect to how the dictator serves as a device for characterization as “an ironic narrative refrain, and as the sinister symbol of a way of life and system of belief.” Stalin's role in the narrative structure of *The First Circle*, as both a character and as “the evil genius whose caprice determines the fate of every other character in his Inferno” also

receives consideration in Brown's review as does the way in which Stalin's presence, residually and thematically, enters into *Cancer Ward* in scenes of frustration, cruelty, and suffering. Beyond Stalin's place in the two novels, Brown discusses a range of stylistic features of Solzhenitsyn's art; his talent for rigorously restricting his works in time and space; and how the two novels function as "strong polemics against the official norms of Soviet literature," with staunch attacks upon "Stalinist literary whoredom."

- 936** Brown, Edward J. "Solzhenitsyn's Cast of Characters." *Slavic and East European Journal* 15, no. 2 (1971): 153-66.

Brown examines the "human material" which Alexander Solzhenitsyn reveals to his readers in *The Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle* in relation to the reality that the two books reflect. In considering *The Cancer Ward*, Brown primarily discusses the ways in which the life histories of the novel's characters reveal, in terms of firsthand experiences, the overwhelming tragedy of Russian life during the Stalin period, and how Solzhenitsyn weaves his rich tapestry of human characters around the pursuit of the culprit Volodin by Stalin's police. Approaching *The First Circle* as a novel which offers not only a gloomy portrait of Stalin but a sense of the spirit of the Stalin era, Brown describes how Solzhenitsyn makes use of the technique of interior monologue to shed light on the Soviet dictator's psychic makeup, including his banality and narrow-mindedness, his megalomania and belief in his own infallibility, and the artless repetitions, fixed dogmatic formulas, and heavy-handed efforts to manipulate Marxist concepts which characterize his language and style of writing. Commenting on Solzhenitsyn's answer to the question, "How was a man such as Stalin able to hold supreme power in Russia for nearly twenty-five years?" Brown lends his support to the writer's suggestion that Stalin, "a banal nonentity," sustained his power and managed to be revered as truly great by eliminating all men of ability from the Soviet political arena and by creating a narrow dogmatic system within which the horrible crimes he committed received "a perverse logical justification."

- 937** Brown, Royal S. "The War Symphonies: Shostakovich against Stalin." *Cinéastes*, 24 no. 2/3 (1995): 88-89.

The author critiques Larry Weinstein's *The War Symphonies: Shostakovich against Stalin*, maintaining that the film, in overemphasizing the place of Stalin and the Soviet state in the music of Shostakovich, relies on facile explanations of the composer's music and turns his war symphonies "into cheap vehicles for anti-Stalin propaganda."

- 938** Buckley, William F., Jr. "Solzhenitsyn's Stalin." *National Review* 25 (12 October 1973): 1104-1108+.

This article consists of excerpts from Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle* (1968) which offer a critical portrait of Stalin, his policies, and the Stalin phenomenon. The article includes a brief introduction by editor William F. Buckley Jr. which describes Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of Stalin as "one of the greatest portraits in literature" and which comments on why many Western intellectuals either disguised or refused to recognize Stalin's shortcomings.

- 939** Carrier, David. "Meditations on a Portrait of Comrade Stalin." *Arts Magazine* 59, no. 2 (1984): 100-102.

This commentary on *The Origin of Socialist Realism*, a 1982-83 painting by Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid which features a dummy-like Stalin in a glowing white uniform sitting with his arm around the shoulders of a kneeling, partially nude nymph who is stroking his chin as she paints the shadow he casts on the base of a pillar, includes a brief discussion of how the Russian-born avant-garde artists revive the motif of the Corinthian maid and use it in an imaginative way to portray a satirical image of Stalin and Socialist Realism.

- 940** Cavanagh, Clare. "Rereading the Poet's Ending: Mandelstam, Chaplin, and Stalin." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 109, no. 1 (1994): 71-86.

Cavanagh attempts to accommodate the "playful, provocative, unpredictable poetics" Osip Mandelstam cultivates throughout his late writing—when the poet experienced privation and eventual imprisonment at the hands of the Stalin regime—with the conventional portrait of the artist as a martyr of Stalinism. She shows how Mandelstam, in the late lyrics he dedicates to the medieval French outlaw and poet François Villon and to the American silent-film comedian Charlie Chaplin, sought to provide a kind of comic counterweight to "the sacerdotal image of poet-prophets" by composing "mocking, lighthearted self-portraits" to place alongside somber visions of his impending doom, and by attempting to preserve his most cherished beliefs in giving them into the sage-keeping of a notorious thief and a silent-film comedian.

- 941** Chances, Ellen. "Keeping the Lies Alive: Case Studies of the Psychology of Stalinism in Contemporary Soviet Literature and Film." *Harriman Institute Forum* 4, no. 4 (1991): 1-8.

The ways in which the Stalin era sent ripples of lasting and irreparable psychological trauma through the whole of Soviet society, as depicted in Andrei Bitov's 1971 novel *Pushkin House* and in Tengiz Abuladze's 1984 film *Repentance*, are the subject of this essay. Describing how these two creative works depict Stalin's disastrous imprint on subsequent generations, Chances discusses how the two works portray the effects of the disease of Stalinism on the personal, creative, and family existences of the Soviet people, ruining people's capacity to live normal lives.

- 942** Cheever, Leonard A. "Stalin, Relativity Theory, and Quantum Mechanics in Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle*." *RE: Artes Liberales* 3, no. 2 (1977): 1-7.

In chapter nineteen of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* (1968), the narrator says of Stalin, "It would have been more impressive to refute the counterrevolutionary theory of relativity . . . or the theory of wave mechanics, but because of affairs of state he simple did not have the time." In view of the fact that by this point in the novel, Stalin has been shown to be an overblown mediocrity who is on the verge of senility, the very idea that he might be capable of refuting such theories seems completely absurd and the passage, therefore, appears to be merely satirical and intended to heap additional abuse upon Stalin and his grandiose intellectual pretensions. Cheever maintains, however, that the point Solzhenitsyn is making here is that the theories of relativity and wave mechanics really are counterrevolutionary in that they seem to undermine "historical materialism," and the same would be true for any idea or theory not accepted or created by Stalin, the sole arbiter of truth. Moreover, Solzhenitsyn, in Cheever's view, attempts to show that Stalin actually was trying to meddle with or alter the reality described by relativity theory and wave mechanics by attempting to manipulate time, annihilate space, and survive the inevitable decay to which the theory of quantum mechanics says all matter is subject.

- 943** Esslin, Martin. "Verses on Stalin." *Encounter* 62, no. 1 (1984): 13-15.

The poems written on Stalin by the German dramatist, poet, and lifelong Marxist Bertolt Brecht in 1956 to clarify his own position on the Soviet leader following the revelations about Stalin provided by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress are the focus of this brief commentary. Esslin, in noting how the poems present graphic evidence of Brecht's struggle to come to terms with the official announcement of the fact of Stalin's crimes, comments on how the poems collectively attempt to rationalize Stalin's criminal actions while at the same time reflect their author's recognition that the consequences of the Soviet leader's misdeeds call for an honest assessment of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. The poems, published in West Germany twenty-seven years after they were written, are translated into English by Esslin and appended to his commentary.

- 944** Fenander, Sara. "Author and Autocrat: Tertz's Stalin and the Ruse of Charisma." *Russian Review* 58, no. 2 (1999): 286-97.

This article focuses on the portrait of Stalin presented by Soviet writer Andrei Sinyavsky, both in his role as cultural critic and in his guise as the provocateur, Abram Tertz. Fenander mainly describes the uniqueness of Sinyavsky/Tertz's approach to Stalin as a charismatic leader and to the dictator's fall from grace in the second half of the 1950s.

- 945** Frankel, Edith Rogovin. "A Note on Pilnyak's 'Tale of the Unextinguished Moon.'" *Soviet Studies* 24, no. 4 (1973): 550-53.

Frankel contends that Soviet writer Boris Pilnyak's *Tale of the Unextinguished Moon* (1926), which has typically been regarded as a fictionalization of the death of Mikhail Frunze, not only points an accusing finger at Stalin for the celebrated Red Army commander's death as a result of surgery deemed unnecessary by medical advisers yet ordered by the Soviet leader, but portrays the dehumanized and impersonal nature of Soviet society as well. At the heart of Frankel's contention is an account of how Pilnyak, through the character Nikolai Gavrilov—a high-ranking officer in the Red Army and an Old Bolshevik—exploits the concept of *comme il faut*, as employed in Leo Tolstoy's *Childhood, Boyhood and Youth*, "substituting for nineteenth-century aristocratic standards of dress and manner those of party reliability, discipline and the correct expression of party ideas," and thereby suggesting how "external means of judging a man's worth completely eliminated the all-important human factor. . . ."

- 946** Freiden, Gregory. "Mandel'shtam's 'Ode to Stalin': History and Myth." *Russian Review* 41, (1982): 400-26.

Freiden examines the circumstances under which Mandelstam's "Ode to Stalin" (1937) was composed, placing the work in the ideological and mythological framework of the poet's writings. He contends that Mandelstam's writings suggest that his attitude toward the entire Soviet project and Stalin's role in it was far more complex than scholars have assumed, and that the "Ode" must be considered within the context of the poems dealing with Stalin which Mandelstam wrote in the two years preceding his completion of that work. In addition to a stanza-by-stanza analysis of the "Ode," which illustrates how Mandelstam's idea of himself and his art along with his vision of Stalin are contained in the "Ode," Freiden addresses the question of how an ode to the odious Stalin reflects on the image and legacy of Mandelstam as one of Russia's greatest poets.

- 947** Haimson, Leopold H. "The Solitary Hero and the Philistines: A Note on the Heritage of the Stalin Era." *Daedalus* 89 (summer 1960): 541-50.

Haimson examines the Soviet intelligentsia's confrontation with the legacy of the Stalin era during the early years of the post-Stalin cultural thaw. He describes how the early Soviet version of "the solitary hero" was reconfigured under Stalin to serve the regime's purposes, and how the image of the positive hero has been transformed anew in the literature of the thaw written about the Stalin era—this time in the form of an individual who finds the means to assert his personal autonomy and channel his creative impulses while remaining true to the values of socialism.

- 948** Halperin, David M. "Solzhenitsyn, Epicurus, and the Ethics of Stalinism." *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1981): 475-97.

Halperin interprets the character Innokenti Volodin's repudiation of Epicureanism in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle* as a vehicle for a destructive critique of Stalinist moral theory. He identifies a number of structural correspondences between Epicurean and Stalinist ethics which are reflected in *The First Circle*, most notably a utilitarian teleology, ethical egoism, hedonism, natural determinism, hostility to religion, and political quietism—all of which Solzhenitsyn sees as flowing from the principle of materialism to which both ethical systems subscribe. Halperin contends that the novel enjoys a considerable degree of success in using Volodin's repu-

diation of the Epicureanism which he previously favored to prompt readers "to apply his reevaluation of Epicurean ethics to a new moral understanding of Stalinism by a transferal of value judgments from one ideology to the other."

949 Heino, Honnes. "The Figure of Stalin in the Poetry of Boris Slutskii." *Slovo* 8, no. 1 (1995): 1-11.

950 Hoberman, J. "Socialist Realism from Stalin to Sots." *Artforum International* 32 (October 1993): 72-75.

This commentary on Socialist Realism as an organic development in Russian culture and on its mutation into "Sots," meaning socialist, art—a term coined in 1972 by the Moscow artists Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid, and equated with "Russian postutopianism"—includes a discussion of the artistic portrayals of Stalin in Grigori Shegal's 1937 painting, *Leader, Teacher, Friend* and in Mikhail Chiaureli's 1946 film *The Vow* as examples of the figure of the so-called living positive hero, who was "the brave, steadfast, allegorical personification of Bolshevik ideals, the embodiment of history's 'forward' trajectory." Hoberman also discusses how several scenes from *The Vow*, which deify Stalin and aim to confirm him as Lenin's heir, figure into Yugoslav director Dusan Makaveyev's intense critique of the October Revolution and mockery of the Stalin cult in his 1961 film, *WR: Mysteries of the Organism*.

951 Holmes, T. M. "Descrying the Dialectic: A Heterodox Line on the Prologue to Brecht's *Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis*." *Journal of European Studies* 7, no. 2 (1977): 85-106.

In this assessment of the meaning of the prologue to Bertolt Brecht's play *Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis*, Holmes argues that the prologue is "a symbolic association with both the hopeful inception and the dubious culmination of Stalin's career, a symbolic connotation of the historical vicissitudes of Bolshevism." In developing this line of thought, Holmes discusses Brecht's consideration of Stalin as both an oppressor and a liberator, with Stalin's dictatorship being "a revolutionary phenomenon, which, by its epochal transformations of social and economic life, was preparing the way for the liquidation of all dictatorship."

952 Jackson, James O. "Tales from a Time of Terror." *Time* 129 (27 April 1987): 45-46.

The stir in the Soviet Union surrounding the then upcoming publication of Anatoli Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*, a novel set in the early years of Stalin's terror and in which Stalin appears as a major character, is the focus of this brief article. Jackson comments on why many Soviet intellectuals consider *Children of the Arbat* to be the most important work of fiction by a Soviet author since Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*; the difficulties Rybakov encountered in his more than twenty-year-long effort to have the book published in the Soviet Union; and the autobiographical character of *Children*, as described by Rybakov himself.

953 Jangfeldt, Bengt. "Osip Mandel'stam's 'Ode to Stalin.'" *Scando-Slavica* 22 (1976): 35-41.

Jangfeldt presents the full text of Osip Mandelstam's "Ode to Stalin," with the exception of the missing eighth line in the fifth stanza, along with text of the poem *Esli b menja naši vragi vzjali* as it appears in the first (1964) edition of Mandelstam's collected works. In Jangfeldt's view, *Esli b menja naši vragi vzjali* constitutes a second "ode" to Stalin but has not been previously regarded as such due to "an arbitrary change" of the text of the last two lines of the poem as it appears in the second (1967) edition of the poet's complete works. Jangfeldt also comments on Mandelstam's motivation for writing the Stalin poems, speculating that the poet, while feeling compelled to write such poems as a matter of survival, "really felt some kind of awe toward the almighty Leader."

954 Kern, Gary. "Solzhenitsyn's Portrait of Stalin." *Slavic Review* 33, no. 1 (March 1974): 1-22.

Kern first describes how the block of four chapters in which Stalin appears in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* fits within the complex artistic structures of the novel. He then looks closely at the portrait of Stalin presented by Solzhenitsyn, discussing how the Russian writer employs a series of artistic devices—"the omniscient author who unmask and judges, the interior monologue which betrays its own inner contradictions, the ironic author who ridicules, the quotations and historical references which testify"—to present a highly unflattering image of the Soviet dictator in flesh and spirit and to reveal the enormity of Stalin's evil. For Kern, the novel defines Stalin's evil in three basic ways: by comparing it to Satan and giving it mythic significance; by contrasting it to Lenin and placing it in historical perspective; and by setting it against its antithesis—the moral paragon. For Kern, Solzhenitsyn's portrait of Stalin acts as a catalyst for the entire novel, with "Stalin's whim and his straining memory" activating the whole world of the novel's characters, and with his absolute evil being the measure against which all of them are to be judged.

955 Kodjak, Andrej. "Political Conversion in Solzhenitsyn's Fiction." *Modern Fiction Studies* 23 (1977): 119-31.

Kodjak discusses how Solzhenitsyn's fiction, while detailing life in the totally controlled environment of the Stalinist police state, depicts the vitality of the human urge for freedom and truth in a sterilized Soviet society. Noting that the point of departure in each of Solzhenitsyn's narratives is a man's total obedience to Stalinist philosophy and law, Kodjak discusses how key characters in Solzhenitsyn's leading works undergo political and spiritual conversions central to the author's fiction and message. He sees Solzhenitsyn's characters as comprising two basic categories: those who seek ideas to counter suppression, and those who provide the ideas, with the recipients of ideas assuming central roles in the author's works, with the donors being somewhat removed from the society depicted and often from the mainstream of the plot, and with the messages delivered by the donors becoming a kind of absolute, religious truth. While the new ideas offered by their providers—absorbed as a matter of faith by the recipients—oppose the ideology of the Stalinist power structure, one must question whether Solzhenitsyn's characters strive for freedom at all inasmuch as the donors are transformed into oracles who must be trusted unconditionally, and the recipients, whether they worship or condemn Stalin, "seem incapable of living without a higher authority," according to Kodjak.

956 Laqueur, Walter. "Beyond Glasnost." *Commentary* 84, no. 4 (October 1987): 63-65.

Laqueur outlines the plot of the third and last part of Anatoli Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*, describes Rybakov's critical portrayal of Stalin and the Stalinist repression of the early 1930s, and notes how the novel seems to suggest that Stalin's "iron fist was somehow indispensable to the development of the Soviet state." He contends that Rybakov himself may subscribe to this line of thought, as a member of the generation of people which, though totally disillusioned, still finds it difficult to accept that Stalinism had no redeeming features. He also comments on the relative silence of Soviet historians on the Stalin question, and on the need for the Soviet people to go beyond glasnost and restore a sense of optimism and idealism in Soviet society.

957 Layton, Susan. "Mind of the Tyrant: Tolstoj's Nicholas and Solženicyn's Stalin." *Slavic and East European Journal* 23 (winter 1979): 479-90.

Layton examines the kinship of the mentality displayed by Tsar Nicholas I as a character in Leo Tolstoy's story *Hadji Murat* and Joseph Stalin in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle*. She shows how Solzhenitsyn's treatment of Stalin and the totalitarian state is analogous to Tolstoy's representation of Nicholas as the embodiment of "cruel, self-aggrandizing bureaucratic power" and as the antithesis of other types of consciousness evident in *Hadji Murat*. Layton also points out the stylistic affinities between Tolstoy's portrayal of Nicholas I and Solzhenitsyn's image of Stalin, and she describes how Tolstoy's Nicholas and Solzhenitsyn's Stalin use language in a way that announces the hypocrisy of the leaders' respective regimes.

958 Lewis, Barry E. "Vladimir Voinovich's Anecdotal Satire: *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin*." *World Literature Today* 52 (1978): 544-50.

Lewis places Vladimir Voinovich's *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin* (1975) in the comic tradition of Nikolai Gogol, describing how the satirical novel uses the literary device of the mirror which distorts and magnifies a series of episodes about life in Stalinist Russia at the outbreak of war in 1941, rendering them absurd and illogical. Lewis discusses how Stalin enters the novel in the form of caricature and parody, never appearing as a reality but rather as a comic absurdity, a myth to be exposed and ridiculed. Citing a series of scenes and passages in which Stalin is the target of parody, caricature, and farce, Lewis characterizes the novel as "an extended political anecdote," with Stalin, his war policies, and life in Stalinist Russia being the targets of a satirical wit which "exorcises the spirit of Stalin, laying it firmly to rest in the carnival tradition of the first part of Gogol's *Dead Souls*, whose gaiety illuminates every page of *Chonkin*."

959 Livers, Keith A. "The Soccer Match As Stalinist Ritual: Constructing the Body Social in Lev Kassil's *The Goalkeeper of the Republic*." *Russian Review* 60, no. 4 (2001): 592-613.

This analysis of Soviet writer Lev Kassil's *The Goalkeeper of the Republic*, composed between 1932 and 1937 and published in 1939, centers on how Kassil uses the seemingly innocuous genre of the adolescent adventure novel to tell an edifying tale of lifelong friendship and Stalinist family values. Livers also discusses how the ritualized soccer match featured in the novel provides a microcosm of Stalinist society's struggle and an avenue of expression for Stalinism's fabled battle with nature; how the soccer stadium inhabits "the mythological center of the Stalinist polis" and serves as a model of the Stalinist state itself; and how the Gidraer soccer club is portrayed by Kassil as a microcosm of the Stalinist family.

960 "Mandelstam's Ode to Stalin." *Slavic Review* 34, no. 4 (1975): 683-91.

This brief, anonymous commentary on the circumstances surrounding Osip Mandelstam's writing of his "Ode to Stalin," a work long thought to have been lost, focuses on the difficulties the Soviet poet had in applying himself to the task of praising a man such as Stalin and in attuning his ode to the canonic features of the poems of the 1930s eulogizing the Soviet dictator. The article also discusses how, despite the standard aspects of Mandelstam's portrait of Stalin, the work is no ordinary poem of praise but rather "is laden with ambiguity throughout," with the final four lines presenting "a terrifying image which coexists strangely with the poignant persona of the poet." The poem, which failed in its intended purpose of releasing Mandelstam from the persecution he was then suffering at the hands of the Stalin regime, is printed here for the first time.

961 McLaughlin, Sigrid. "Rybakov's *Deti Arbata*: Reintegrating Stalin into Soviet History." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 90-99.

McLaughlin discusses Russian writer Anatoli Rybakov's widely acclaimed novel *Children of the Arbat* (1978)—the first to portray Stalin as a major character—as a diptych which presents two complementary critical assessments of the rise and role of Stalinism. McLaughlin holds that in one plot line, "the 'intentionalist' approach" prevails, according to which "Stalin created the conditions that led to lawlessness and arbitrariness," and "his personality, his pathology, victimized society." This part of the novel is "fictionalized political history," and in it Stalin is shown to be cruel, calculating, and narcissistic, obsessed with his own greatness, driven by ambition and a hunger for power, and consumed by envy and suspiciousness—in essence, a man having "the character and ethics of a snake." Here, Rybakov uses a variety of devices, including "internal monologues, sketches of gestures, speech intonation, facial expressions, external description, scenic representation, and perceptions of other people," in making Stalin credible and understandable as a psychological phenomenon and in enlivening him as a character. The other plot line, McLaughlin contin-

ues, is “fictionalized social history” centering on the autobiographical character Sasha Pankratov’s life before his arrest and during his imprisonment and exile. This plot line “complements or even contradicts the interpretation of Stalinism in novel one by suggesting other factors facilitated terror and coercion” and the rise of Stalinism, and by implying that “Stalin not only created but also reacted to, and was himself a manifestation of, social and moral conditions of his time and that he alone cannot be blamed.” In addition to describing how the novel, in reintegrating Stalin into Soviet history, succeeds in capturing the interplay of forces that gave rise to Stalinism, McLaughlin also discusses how Rybakov’s portrait of Stalin and of Soviet society reflects the point of view of a reformist Marxist who faults neither Lenin nor Marxism for the tragedy that occurred under Stalin’s rule.

- 962** Merrill, Reed B. “*Darkness at Noon* and the Political Novel.” *Neohelicon* 14, no. 2 (1987): 245-56.

Merrill discusses Arthur Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon* (1941) as a work which, in addressing Stalin’s regime of terror in terms of whether a noble end justifies ignoble means, personifies the genre of the political novel at its very best. In commending Koestler for his artistic portrayal of the final days of former Soviet Commissar Rubashov—an old-guard Bolshevik intellectual and hero of the October Revolution in the manner of Nikolai Bukharin, Karel Radek, and Leon Trotsky who finds himself arrested and imprisoned during the Stalin purge trials of the 1930s—Merrill takes aim at the interpretation of *Darkness at Noon* advanced by Irving Howe, in *Politics and the Novel* (1957), which holds that the book illustrates all the negative attributes of the ideological novel, arguing that Howe “misunderstood Koestler’s real intention in the novel, and that the novel pretty clearly meets all of Howe’s own standards for the ‘ideal’ political novel.”

- 963** Muchnic, Helen. “Solzhenitsyn’s *The First Circle*.” *Russian Review* 29, no. 1 (1970): 154-66.

Muchnic discusses Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *The First Circle* as a novel that is both a vision of depravity and a tribute to man’s stature and endurance in the face of terrible physical suffering. Her commentary on the novel includes a brief assessment of the Russian writer’s portrayal of Stalin’s spying apparatus, and of the Soviet dictator as a pathologically suspicious, revolting, and pathetic individual, whose hatred and helplessness are projected onto his world, permeating it in the shape of terror.

- 964** Nelson, Byron. “Individual Talent and the Will of People in David Pownall’s *Master Class*.” *Midwest Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (1988): 157-70.

This analysis of British playwright David Pownall’s 1984 work *Master Class*, a comedy dealing with the reeducation of Soviet composers Dmitri Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev under the sinister tutelage of Stalin and his cultural minister, Andrei Zhdanov, revolves around how the play presents the case made by Stalin and Zhdanov for the new socialist aesthetic announced at the Conference of Musicians in January 1948; portrays the creative artist as victim of a repressive and authoritarian regime; highlights Stalin’s deconstruction of “his own claim to authority by abusing his power”; and calls attention to the failure of the two composers “to refute Stalin’s call for collective responsibility” and “to make the romantic artist’s case for the autonomy of the individual.”

- 965** Pontuso, James F. “On Solzhenitsyn’s Stalin.” *Survey* 29, no. 2 (1985): 46-61.

Pontuso describes Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s portrait of Stalin and analysis of the Stalin era, as developed in both the Russian writer’s fictional and nonfictional writings. He first discusses how Solzhenitsyn discounts the interpretations of Stalinism that locate the roots of the Stalin terror in the necessity of enforcing strict discipline in the face of the threat posed by hostile capitalist powers; in Stalin’s desire to prepare the nation for war by eliminating potential threats to national unity; in his need to deal with serious differences of opinion within the party and to counter the

threat posed by organized opposition to his rule; or in the experiences in Russian culture and history that predisposed the nation to accept a tyrant acting in the name of Russian nationalism. Pontuso then considers Solzhenitsyn's own view of Stalin, one which assigns much of the blame for the terror to the peculiar personality of the Soviet dictator and to his quest for personal aggrandizement, and which places Stalin's policies and actions within the context of both the historical precedent set down during the reign of Lenin and the ideology of Marxism. Solzhenitsyn's emphasis on the pivotal role of slave labor in building socialism under Stalin and on how the camps became the main prop of the Stalin regime also receive consideration in Pontuso's examination of Solzhenitsyn's indictment of the Soviet system.

- 966** Rancour-Laferriere, Daniel. "The Boys of Ibansk: A Freudian Look at Some Recent Russian Satire." *Psychoanalytic Review* 72 (1985): 639-56.

This psychoanalytical commentary on Soviet satirical literature of the 1970s and 1980s includes a brief discussion of Solzhenitsyn's portrait of Stalin in *The First Circle*. Rancour-Laferriere, in describing how Solzhenitsyn satirically portrays the Soviet dictator's paranoid behavior, relates the pleasure Stalin took from hearing about plots against him to a kind of "hole" in his paranoia, "a spot where mistrust is perversely unveiled into trust, a spot where Stalin invites anal aggression by the aggressor."

- 967** ———. "The Deranged Birthday Boy: Solzhenitsyn's Portrait of Stalin in *The First Circle*." *Mosaic* 18, no. 3 (1985): 61-72.

Rancour-Laferriere looks at the long passage devoted to Stalin in the 1978 uncensored version of *The First Circle* for psychoanalytical insights into the character of Stalin as portrayed in the novel. Looking at the pathological aspects of Solzhenitsyn's Stalin according to their order of appearance in the text, Rancour-Laferriere examines Stalin's psychopathologies, namely, his paranoia, hyperdeveloped narcissism, megalomania, agoraphobia, obsessive hunger for power, sadism, and defective conscience, showing how the character of Stalin is "a fragmented, perverse and pathological personality."

- 968** ———. "From Incompetence to Satire: Voinovich's Image of Stalin As Castrated Leader of the Soviet Union in 1941." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (spring 1991): 36-47.

This paper presents a psychocultural analysis of the images of Stalin in Vladimir Voinovich's *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin* (1976), a satirical novel situated within the time of the onset of the Great Patriotic War. Pointing out the subtexts from the Stalinist culture that Voinovich manipulates, and the specific imagery and particular linguistic material he uses to satirize Stalin, Rancour-Laferriere describes how the image of a castrated Stalin is put before the reader by several of the novel's characters, including "Chonkin in a dream of Stalin as a woman, Osoaviakhim in his own person as a castrated horse, and Ermolkin in a misprint that gelds the Soviet leader." He also explains how the crippled airplane, around which the plot of the novel revolves, serves as "an emblem of Stalin's military impotence in the face of the German invader," and how, "given the sexual symbolism of flight," the plane's destruction "signifies the castration of the Soviet leader." In addition, Rancour-Laferriere briefly discusses how Stalin appears as a gelding yet again in Voinovich's sequel to *Chonkin* (*Pretender to the Throne: The Further Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin*).

- 969** Reed, Susan. "Tearing a Veil from Soviet History, Anatoli Rybakov Tries to Exorcise the Monstrous Spirit of Stalin." *People's Weekly* 29 (27 June 1988): 73-74.

Reed briefly describes Soviet novelist Anatoli Rybakov's twenty-year struggle to publish his novel *Children of the Arbat*, and how the book, with its "unsparing account of Stalin's cruelty," became a literary sensation in the Soviet Union following its 1987 publication. She also discusses

the autobiographical nature of *Children*, and how the book, while revered by many, has been attacked by some who still admire Stalin's strong leadership.

- 970** Reeder, Roberta. "Anna Akhmatova: The Stalin Years." *New England Review: Middlebury Series* 18, no. 1 (winter 1997): 105-25.

This assessment of Anna Akhmatova's poetic response to the pressure of historical events from the outbreak of World War I through the cultural thaw under Nikita Khrushchev centers on the celebrated Russian poet's work *Requiem* (1935-40), a cycle of poems about the Great Terror. Reeder describes how the poems in *Requiem* depict both the universal suffering of women who "must stand on the side and witness helplessly the suffering of those who are compelled to meet an incomprehensible destiny," and a number of specifically Russian cultural and historical allusions relative to the suffering and loss of freedom that came with Stalin's repressive policies. She also comments briefly on Akhmatova's indirect references to Stalin in the *Requiem* poem "Stanzas," in her later poem "Shards," which compares Stalin to a butcher, and in her early 1960s poem addressed "To the Defenders of Stalin," in which she places the dictator's defenders "in a long historical line of those who supported the despots, who tormented the innocent."

- 971** Roland, Albert. "Christian Implications in Anti-Stalin Novels." *Religion in Life* 22, no. 3 (summer 1953): 400-12.

Roland discusses five anti-Stalinist novels written in the 1940s—Victor Serge's *The Case of Comrade Tulayev*, George Orwell's *1984*, Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, and Ignazio Silone's *Bread and Wine* and *The Seed Beneath the Snow*—within the framework of the interpretation that the five works, inasmuch as they "all postulate the affirmation of certain values as the indispensable premise for a human condition," reflect both their authors' disillusionment with Stalinism's betrayal of the ideals of social justice and freedom and disregard for the human person, and the changed intellectual climate of the forties, which witnessed a "renewed search for spiritual values to give meaning to man's life and to provide a coherent foundation for his society."

- 972** Ryan-Hayes, Karen. "Destalinization and Self-Consumption in Iskander's *Kroliki i udavy*: The Other Within." *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 43, no. 4 (1998): 431-44.

Ryan-Hayes maintains that Fazil Iskander's analysis of Stalin in *Kroliki i udavy* (*The Rabbit and the Python*), first published in book form in 1982, is an attempt to render him foreign, "to locate him socially, ethnically, and morally in a position that is alterior." She illustrates how Iskander draws upon the generic tradition of using animals as characters in satire as the story equates Stalin with a python to achieve the satiric effect of diminution, and makes use of "a complex of biblical, literary, folkloric, and mythological sources to support his effort to liminalize Stalin." Among the textual evidence Ryan-Hayes cites in support of her reading of the Great Python as a satirical portrait of Stalin are the character's display of paranoia and ruthless vengeance, his megalomania, and the echoes of Stalinist aphorisms in his speech. She also provides examples of how Iskander uses psychology in encouraging a phobic response to his Stalin character.

- 973** ———. "The Devil You Know: Postmodern Reconsiderations of Stalin." *Mosaic* 36, no. 3 (2003): 87-111.

This essay looks at postmodern treatments of Stalin in the writings of Viktor Erofeev, the series of works entitled *Nostalgic Socialist Realism* by artists Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid, and in Semen Aranovich's film *I Served in Stalin's Bodyguard* to show how recent Russian literature, art, and film deconstruct the Stalinist mythology created by official Soviet art while actively engaging the anti-Stalinist mythology that has responded to official art. According to Ryan-Hayes, no longer content to accept the notion that Stalin was demonic and to cast him as Satan or Antichrist, Erofeev, Komar, Melamid, and Aranovich portray Stalin in a way that compels us to confront his dis-

turbing humanity, revealing that he shares qualities with ordinary mortals, and raising the question of the Russian people's responsibility for Stalinism.

- 974** Rylkova, Galina S. "The Double Murder in Pil'nyak's *The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon*." *Russian Review* 56, no. 2 (April 1997): 233-48.

In this analysis of Boris Pilnyak's *The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon* (1926), a work that has been treated by some as a real-life account of the death of the Red Army Commander Mikhail Frunze in October 1925, who, some say, was the victim of a medical murder by virtue of being forced to undergo an operation urged on him by Stalin but which he could not stand, Rylkova acknowledges that the Stalin-Frunze aspect of the *Tale* certainly exists; notes how the story reveals certain features of the emerging Stalinist personality cult; comments on Pilnyak's efforts to deny any connection between his story and Frunze's death; and analyzes the relationship between Nikolai Gavrilov—the protagonist of the tale—and the "unbending man," an old friend of Gavrilov who orders him to have the operation which causes his death. She also considers the question of whether there is an omniscient narrator in the *Tale*, and the extent to which the plot of the story can be "described as the 'education' of a Soviet reader, who is taught to read between the lines."

- 975** Schaefer, David Lewis. "The Limits of Ideology: Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, I and II." *Modern Age* 29, no. 4 (fall 1985): 319-29; 30, no. 1 (winter 1986): 10-21.

This two-part analysis of *Darkness at Noon*, Arthur Koestler's story of the Soviet purge trials and a novel considered to be a classic of anti-Stalin literature, centers on how much of the work's power stems not only from Koestler's connection of the evils of Stalinism to difficulties inherent in Marxism, but also to the problematic orientation of modern political philosophy as a whole, particularly with respect to the conflict between revolutionary ethics and expediency in pursuit of noble ends. While neither Stalin nor the Soviet Union by name enter into the personal-political crisis that the novel depicts through the life of its protagonist, N. S. Rubashov, its resemblance to real events in the Soviet Union of the mid-1930s is unmistakable, most notably with regard to Rubashov's manner of thinking, which, according to Koestler's autobiography, was modeled on that of Nikolai Bukharin, the Old Bolshevik leader whose 1938 trial and execution was a climactic event in the Stalin purges.

- 976** Schultze, Sydney. "The Moral Dimension of Rybakov's *Deti Arbata*." *Russian Language Journal* 47, nos. 156-158 (winter-spring 1993): 147-55.

Schultze describes how the moral dimension serves as the main theme of Anatoli Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*, a novel depicting life in Russia on the eve of the Great Purges and offering a psychological portrait of Stalin. Schultze discusses how the book traces the fortunes of five children through the year 1934 to show how their lives are affected, directly or indirectly, by the poisonous atmosphere created by Stalin, and how the education of the child Sasha lies at the heart of the novel, with Sasha personifying the qualities needed to be a moral person in Stalin's time and to ensure continued freedom from oppression for modern Russians. Schultze also comments briefly on the novel's portrayal of the cult of personality and of the material and human costs of Stalin's effort to concentrate all authority in himself in building the kind of Russia he envisioned.

- 977** Siegel, Paul N. "The Political Implications of Solzhenitsyn's Novels." *CLIO* 12, no. 3 (spring 1983): 211-32.

Siegel explores the political implications of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's major novels through an examination of the views expressed on Leninism, the October Revolution, and Stalinism by some of the key characters in these works. Citing Solzhenitsyn's description of his own novels as a campaign to overthrow the Soviet regime by sweeping away the misconceptions about the October Revolution and the social system established by the revolution, Siegel examines the changing and critical images of Lenin and Stalin and the Soviet system which, collectively, shine through *One*

Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962), *The First Circle* (1968), *Cancer Ward* (1968), and *August 1914* (1971); Solzhenitsyn's depictions of the early Bolsheviks and the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism; and the writer's turn from an espousal of a mixture of Tolstoyism and Leninism to anti-Tolstoyism and anti-Leninism and to the Christianity of the Russian Orthodox Church.

978 Smaryl, O. L. "Stalin's Revolution." *Encounter* 72, no. 3 (1989): 34-36.

The image of Stalin and Stalinism presented by Anatoli Rybakov in his novel *Children of the Arbat* and by Arthur Koestler in *Darkness at Noon* are the subject of this article. Smaryl briefly discusses the thesis advanced in each of the two books, Rybakov's being that Stalin, out of sheer paranoia, attempted to destroy anyone perceived to be a deviationist and betrayed the revolution in order to glorify his own person, and Koestler believing that Stalin's acts were the logical consequence of Bolshevik revolutionary ideals. Smaryl then lends his support to the interpretation advanced in *Darkness at Noon*, although he raises the unlikely possibility that Stalin realized that "one day his name would be mud" for the harshness of his policies but nonetheless opted to "sacrifice his reputation for the survival of the Soviet system."

979 Spiridonova, Lidiia. "Gorky and Stalin." Translated by Michael S. Boyd. *Russian Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 413-23.

Spiridonova draws upon new material from Maxim Gorky's archive to examine the Soviet writer's relationship with Stalin, showing how Gorky was far from being the "friend and ideological accomplice" of Stalin and his retinue. Among the subjects Spiridonova discusses are Gorky's belief that a terrorist dictatorship could be averted if Stalin's "crudeness and harshness were modified"; his failure to complete a biographical essay on Stalin for a book to be published in the West and called *Russia Today*; his efforts to serve as a buffer between the Stalin regime and the Soviet intelligentsia; and the more critical attitude toward Stalin assumed by Gorky in the last years of his own life. Stalin's efforts to capitalize on the immense authority of Gorky to create "a command-bureaucratic system of leadership over culture," and, more generally, to lend support to the program of building socialism also receive consideration in Spiridonova's analysis of the Gorky-Stalin relationship.

980 Thompson, Kristin M. "Ivan the Terrible and Stalinist Russia: A Reexamination." *Cinema Journal* 17, no. 1 (1977): 30-43.

This examination of Sergei Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* revolves around the contention that the film is best understood within the context of how Eisenstein was influenced by the then current situation of war with Germany and the figure of Stalin rather than as a subtle anti-Stalinist allegory, as claimed by some analysts, Dwight Macdonald in particular. Thompson—in describing Eisenstein's adaptation of various biographical and historical facts about Ivan into a screenplay portraying the controversial tsar as a heroic figure who struggled successfully against boyar treachery and the forces of Livonia to create a unified Russia—notes the similarities between Ivan's reign and Stalinist Russia as well as between the two rulers themselves, conceding that there are grounds for an allegorical reading of *Ivan the Terrible* as a tribute to Stalin, but seeing little justification for the interpretation that Ivan represents Stalin in any specific sense, and virtually no evidence to sustain an anti-Stalinist reading of the film.

981 Tibbetts, John C. "Shostakovich's Fool to Stalin's Czar: Tony Palmer's *Testimony* (1987)." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 22, no. 2 (2002): 173-96.

This commentary on Tony Palmer's 1987 film adaptation of Solomon Volkov's 1979 book *Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich* revolves around how the British filmmaker, in drawing upon the self-portrait of the Soviet composer that emerges from the book, and in bringing to the screen an image of the complex relationship between Shostakovich and Stalin, portrays the

composer as a divided soul—part loyal Soviet citizen and part dissident artist—who, in the covert codings of his music, satirized and attacked both communism and Stalin. Tibbetts's analysis includes both an assessment of the techniques and strategies employed by Palmer in conveying a sense of the fractured and surreal world of Shostakovich during the Stalin era, and an account of how Palmer, in his portrait of Stalin and presentation of the dictator's relationship with the composer, deploys a central metaphor derived from Volkov's book, that of the *Yurodivy*—a hallowed figure in Russian history and folklore who enjoyed the tolerance of the tsar while critiquing societal ills in an intentionally paradoxical way.

982 Weeks, Stephen. "Stalin's Face: On History and Its Deconstruction in Howard Barker's *The Power of the Dog*." *Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism* 16, no. 1 (fall 2001): 58-80.

This poststructuralist reading of Howard Barker's *The Power of the Dog* (1981), a play situated at the Kremlin and on the battlefields of Poland near the end of World War II and populated, in part, by Stalin and his entourage, includes a discussion of Barker's manner of illuminating Stalin and the historicity of Stalinism, and of how certain deconstructive gestures associated with Jacques Derrida are recalled by Barker's imagery of erasure and effacement with respect to Stalin and can be linked to the mechanisms of oppression practiced under Stalinism as well.

983 White, D. Fedotoff. "Aristocrat at Stalin's Court." *American Slavic Review* 9 (October 1950): 207-17.

White discusses how the themes of Russian writer Alexis N. Tolstoy's epic historical novel *Peter I* and his dramatic work *Ivan the Terrible* reflect the political, social, economic, and military realities of Stalinist Russia and had an intimate connection with the radical change in the attitude of the Stalin regime toward Russian history, which manifested itself in the 1930s. While these works, along with Tolstoy's novel *Bread*, which was published at the height of the purges, have a strong anti-Trotsky bias, enhance Stalin's role during the revolution and civil war, won fame and popularity for Tolstoy, and secured his favor with the Soviet dictator, his writing in accord with the Stalinist party line was neither self-serving nor dictated by party controls over Soviet literature, but rather reflected his hopes for the spiritual unification of Russia and his desire "to play an important role in the rebuilding in the Soviet Union of the consciousness of Russia's glorious past and to prepare his land for the great struggle with the Nazis," according to White.

984 Woll, Josephine. "Soviet Cinema: A Day of Repentance." *Dissent* 35, no. 2 (1988): 167-69.

Woll briefly guides her readers through the story told in Tengiz Abuladze's 1987 Soviet film *Repentance*, commending the work for its artistry and sophistication in recreating the experience of the Stalin years through a blend of realism, allegory, and fantasy which empowers its viewers to both feel and understand the nightmare of Stalinism.

985 Ziolkowski, Margaret. "A Modern Demonology: Some Literary Stalins." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 59-69.

Ziolkowski reviews the large body of Soviet novels, stories, and poems in which Stalin figures prominently, describing how the image of the Soviet leader presented in these writings has been shaped by the interaction of two, generally antithetical bodies of cultural material, one being the official Stalinist-era literary propaganda that surrounds the glorified leader, the other the historical and memoristic works devoted to Stalin and Stalinism and largely critical of both. She shows how many of the recent literary portrayals of Stalin single out for satire precisely the positive qualities he was alleged to have possessed, and how these works are characterized by remarkable coincidences in their physical, verbal, and psychological depictions of him. In illustrating how the recurrent negative imagery in recent literary portrayals of the Soviet dictator point toward a coherent demonology counterposed to the hagiographical perspective that dominated the portraits of the leader produced during his lifetime, Ziolkowski primarily draws her examples from the works of

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Anatoli Rybakov, Vladimir Maksimov, and Vladimir Voinovich. She also discusses how these critical portraits, in delineating the contours of Stalin's evilness, "often resort to evocative topoi that may appear to be realistic detail but are stock motifs," leading most analysts of recent Soviet fictional writings devoted to the dictator to the conclusion that, for now, "in literature Stalin remains a predominately abstract, symbolic figure."

Religion

986 Agursky, Mikhail. "Stalin's Ecclesiastical Background." *Survey* 28, no. 4 (1984): 1-14.

Agursky draws upon a wide range of Russian language secondary sources to examine the character of the Tiflis Theological Seminary, its teaching staff, and the young Dzhughashvili's experiences while a student at the seminary from 1894 to 1899, arguing that Stalin's attitudes and some of his policies as Soviet leader were influenced by his intense exposure in his formative years not only to Orthodox theology but also to the militant Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism of the prominent spiritual leaders of the Russian Radical Right as well. Stalin's ecclesiastical background, Agursky maintains, may have influenced his "preference for traditional Russian Orthodoxy" over the ecclesiastical radicalism of the so-called Living Church; his orchestration of the 1943 concordat with the Russian Orthodox Church; and his acceptance of the Georgian Orthodox Church's independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the murders of several Russian Orthodox clergymen and the later rise to positions of power of other members of the clergy reflect the nature of their contact with Stalin during or after his years at the Tiflis Seminary, according to Agursky.

987 Bilas, Ivan. "The NKVD and the Tragedy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church." *Ukrainian Review* 40, no. 4 (1992): 10-16.

Bilas draws upon newly available Soviet archival records to document how Stalin, in September 1943, manipulated the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) by assuring them that the church would be granted privileged status and all of its needs would be met, and by securing their acceptance of the creation of a Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, to be headed by H. Karpov, the NKVD officer in charge of religious affairs. Maintaining that the ROC leaders, in succumbing to their own personal interests, embarked on a path that established the church as an instrument of the state, Bilas contends that Soviet authorities, operating through "the NKVD-infiltrated church," and in accord with a devious plan devised by Karpov for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC), followed the twin strategy of discrediting the Vatican and Roman Catholicism and of forming an initiative group—comprised of "orthodox Catholics" and set up by the NKVD—that would propose an "alliance" between the Ukrainian Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches, which, in effect, led to the UCC's forced "unification" with the ROC.

988 Bociurkiw, Bohdan R. "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 7 (1965): 89-113.

Bociurkiw examines the annihilation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church during the second half of the 1940s, analyzing the motivations behind the Soviet decision to liquidate the Uniate Church; the techniques employed to do so; the degree of success attained by the "reunion" of the Ukrainian Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches; and the larger political significance of these events. Stalin's personal involvement in either the decision to liquidate the Ukrainian Church by way of its "reunion" with the Russian Church or in the determination of the techniques applied in

executing the campaign to eliminate the Uniate Church does not enter into Bociurkiw's study, but the Soviet dictator's increasingly receptive attitude toward the traditional notions of Russian national interest; his awareness of the Uniate Church's close identification with Ukrainian national aspirations; and the support that his government gave to the Moscow Patriarchate for its contribution to the Soviet war effort do figure into Bociurkiw's account of the partnership forged between the Stalin regime and the Russian Orthodox Church in their struggle against the Uniate Church and Ukrainian nationalism.

- 989** Dickinson, Anna. "A Marriage of Convenience? Domestic and Foreign Policy Reasons for the 1943 Soviet Church-State 'Concordat.'" *Religion, State and Society* 28, no. 4 (2000): 337-47.

In this examination of the roots of the Soviet Church-State agreement orchestrated at a 4-5 September 1943 meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Metropolitans Sergei, Nikolai, and Alexei, the author maintains that domestic concerns far outweighed foreign policy considerations in Stalin's mind in reorienting Soviet church policy at that time. The "concordat," far from being an act of goodwill on Stalin's part, "combined a return to 'top-down' cultural policy with a recognition of the power and potential usefulness of the Russian Orthodox Church," and was concluded with the aim of eliminating a potential enemy by co-opting "trustworthy elements of the church" who could "control believers and eliminate counterrevolutionary threats from religious communities," according to Dickinson. In addition to exploring the question of why the Kremlin opted for an agreement with the church at this time, Dickinson comments on the relative merits of the various hypotheses advanced regarding Stalin's motives for making concessions to the church.

- 990** Donahoe, Bernard. "The Dictator and the Priest: Stalin's Meeting with Father Stanislas Orlemanski." *Prologue* 22, no. 2 (1990): 169-83.

The circumstances surrounding and consequences of the two April 1944 private meetings between Stalin and Father Stanislas Orlemanski, a relatively obscure Polish-American Roman Catholic clergyman, are the subject of this article. Donahoe places the decision to invite Orlemanski to come to Moscow within the context of Stalin's concern for the construction of a Polish provisional government that would be subservient to the Kremlin and acceptable to American voters whose favor for President Roosevelt in the coming 1944 presidential election he sought to curry in view of Roosevelt's unofficial sympathy for Soviet postwar territorial ambitions in eastern Poland. While Stalin's attempt to influence American voters was clumsy and ill-considered, Donahoe explains, his favorable responses to the questions Orlemanski put to him concerning religious toleration in the Soviet Union led some White House staff members and the liberal media to conclude that he was making a gesture toward a concordat with the Vatican. This, along with the immense publicity that Orlemanski's mission to Moscow generated, contributed to the growing popularity of the Soviet Union in America, making Stalin's move "a minor master stroke, whether he intended it that way or not," Donahoe concludes.

- 991** Dunn, Dennis J. "Pre-World War II Relations between Stalin and the Catholic Church." *Journal of Church and State* 15, no. 2 (1973): 193-204.

Dunn discusses the intensification of the official campaign against the Catholic Church during the prewar years of Stalin's rule; the reaction of the Vatican to the Kremlin's efforts to destroy the church as a functioning institution in the Soviet Union; and the motives behind Stalin's persecution of the church. While Dunn notes the 1925 hiatus in Stalin's assault on the church, when Moscow, in an effort to improve its isolated diplomatic position, engaged in discussions with a Papal representative over the position and activities of the Catholic Church in the USSR as a step toward a possible concordat with the Vatican, and the ability of a few priests, particularly those who serviced the French and American diplomatic communities in Moscow, to continue to function, his emphasis is on the persecution, arrest, and, in some cases, execution of the Catholic clergy in the

Soviet Union. Stalin's "incubus against the Catholic Church," in Dunn's estimate, stemmed primarily from his desire to achieve total power—the attainment of which he believed required the annihilation of the Church—rather than from any commitment to atheism or to Marxist principles.

992 ———. "Stalinism and the Catholic Church during the Era of World War II." *Catholic History Review* 59, no. 3 (October 1973): 404-28.

Dunn examines Stalin's attitude toward the Catholic Church during the wartime period and the years immediately following, arguing that the Soviet leader's approach to the church during this time is best understood within the framework of his interest in "power and power for its own sake" rather than in terms of his commitment to the atheistic ideology of Marxism or his behavior as a traditional autocrat. The Nazi invasion of Russia, Dunn explains, set in motion a general reappraisal of organized religion by Stalin, which culminated in his abandonment of Marxist atheism and the reestablishment of the Orthodox Patriarchate as a means of rallying and unifying the Russian people into defending not only their country but his own government and position as well. While Stalin sought to normalize relations with the Vatican during and after the war as a way to facilitate Soviet occupation and control of Eastern Europe, his revival of Orthodoxy, in effect, prohibited an understanding with the Catholic Church, especially after his support of the forced assimilation of the Catholic Uniate Church into the Orthodox Church. Following Pope Pius XII's unfriendly response to Stalin's efforts to reach an accord with the Vatican, Moscow launched a coordinated attack on the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, ending Stalin's attempt to use the Vatican as he had used the Orthodox Patriarchate in service of his political needs. With the Vatican's 13 July 1949 issuance of a decree forbidding all Catholics to cooperate with communist governments, the Vatican, in condemning Stalin's system of absolute control, finally recognized that the Soviet dictator's will to power, not any attachment he might have to either Marxism or Russian traditionalism, was behind his policy toward the church, according to Dunn.

993 Kapuściński, Ryszard. "The Temple and the Palace." Translated by Klara Glowczewska. *New Yorker* 70 (23 May 1994): 72-76.

This article presents an account of the 1838-83 construction of the massive Temple of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, the 1931 razing of the structure upon orders from Stalin, and Stalin's plan to construct the Palace of the Soviets on the site where the temple once stood. According to Kapuściński, Stalin's approval of the design submitted by architects Shchuko and Iofan for a palace that would be six times as massive as the Empire State building, stand 130 stories tall, and be crowned by a statue of Lenin more than double the size of the Statue of Liberty stemmed from the Soviet leader's desire to surpass America in some way. The erection of the palace on the exact site where the Temple of Christ the Saviour had stood reflects not just a step in atheism's war against religion but also Stalin's desire to transform symbolically the place where the faithful had worshipped a heavenly God to one where they would pay homage to himself. Kapuściński also writes that the planned colossal palace was never built because Stalin could not find the time to oversee its construction as his attention was diverted first by his need to organize ever new rounds of purges, trials, and massacres, and then by the demands of World War II and postwar domestic needs.

994 Markham, R. H. "Stalin and the Orthodox Church." *Christian Century* 62 (18 April 1945): 90-92.

The Russian Orthodox Church, according to Markham, has been revived by Stalin for the purpose of further entrenching the Kremlin's influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The main currents, Markham writes, carrying "the mighty Stalin" forward—mounting Russian nationalism nourished by wartime victories; a "flaming secular religion of apocalyptic social reform"; a Pan-Slavism which tends to draw every Slav group toward Mother Russia—will be reinforced by the

revived Eastern Orthodox Church, “encouraging and sanctifying a Russian messianism as natural and dynamic as America’s own ‘manifest destiny.’”

995 Pospelovsky, Dmitry. “The ‘Best Years’ of Stalin’s Church Policy (1942-1948) in the Light of Archival Documents.” *Religion, State and Society* 25, no. 2 (1997): 139-62.

This assessment of Soviet church-state relations during the years 1942-48 centers on how formerly unavailable archival documents confirm or amend earlier understandings and scholarly hypotheses and shine light on previously inexplicable twists and turns in Stalin’s church policy during this time. Receiving most attention in the article is the 4 September 1943 meeting between Stalin and the three senior hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, which the newly available documents show to have stemmed from his desire to improve Moscow’s image in the eyes of the British people by adopting a more tolerant attitude toward religion, and, in this way, to bring pressure to bear on the British, in advance of the upcoming Tehran meeting of the Big Three, to open a second front in Europe. Pospelovsky also discusses what the new documents reveal about Stalin’s renegeing on the promises made at the 2 September meeting; his use of the Russian Orthodox Church to liquidate the Uniate Church; and the Kremlin’s return to the previous policy of religious persecution in the postwar years. While Stalin’s subordinates, Vyacheslav Molotov and Alexei Kosygin in particular, took the lead in restraining Church influence and in reestablishment repressive church policies, the absence of any evidence of grievances presented to Stalin by the church leaders themselves suggests that all policies were closely coordinated with him, and that they were well aware of this fact, according to Pospelovsky.

996 “Stalin Shows His Good Sense.” *Christian Century* 47 (19 March 1930): 357.

Christian Century notes the easing up of the collectivization drive in the Soviet countryside and the cessation of the worst excesses directed against churches and churchmen in accord with Stalin’s warning that the policy of communizing rural regions and repressing religion has been so successful that it has gone to the heads of members of the Communist Party, thus producing a “dizziness” which is leading to counterproductive excesses. While noting Stalin’s “good sense” in putting an end to an assault on religion that was “little more than a mob action,” the report sees little hope for any fundamental change in the Soviet regime’s anti-church policy.

997 Yakunin, Gleb. “The Moscow Patriarchate and Stalin’s Cult of Personality.” *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* 28, no. 1 (1989): 37-43.

Father Gleb Yakunin examines the servility of Russian Orthodox Church leaders toward Stalin in the 1930s through the 1950s, and the failure of the church hierarchy to confront its history of “playing the profoundly degrading role of ‘court jester’ to a bloody tyrant” even though Stalin has been dead for over thirty years and his crimes have been denounced by the Communist Party itself. Yakunin presents numerous examples of how church leaders helped to promote the cult of personality and gave support to the Stalin regime’s policies, particularly after Stalin, for pragmatic reasons, changed his attitude toward the church with the coming of World War II. Yakunin suggests that while most church figures were well aware of Stalin’s abusive policies, they nonetheless sang his praise not only to protect church interests but also because some leaders of the Patriarchate, including Patriarch Alexei himself, were “largely sincere in their attitude toward Stalin,” believing that he would become the “new Constantine” who would overhaul the Communist Party, proclaim the country a Pan-Slavic Russian Orthodox empire, and assume the role of tsar of the long awaited “Third Rome.” Although the errors committed by church leaders in placing faith in Stalin have long been revealed, the Moscow Patriarchate, under the domination of conservative forces, has yet to condemn the cult of Stalin, allowing the past participation of the church in the glorification of Stalin to remain “a festering wound on the conscience of many Orthodox Christians,” Yakunin concludes.

Philosophy and Theory

998 Arthur, Chris. "Stalinism and Dialectics." *Critique* 20/21 (1987): 114-15.

Arthur criticizes Stalin for having suppressed the laws of the Marxist dialectic, in his 1938 article in the *Short Course*, by omitting the "negation of the negation" in his discussion of the dialectic. In criticizing Stalin, Arthur also questions Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser both for having denied that Stalin turned away from Hegel to establish his own dogmatism and for considering Stalin's expulsion of the "negation of the negation" from the domain of the Marxist dialectic as evidence of Stalin's "theoretical perspicacity."

999 ———. "Stalinism, Historical Materialism, and Marx's Method." *Critique* 20/21 (1987): 111-13.

Arthur contrasts the thinking of Marx on the proletariat's development of class-consciousness and experience of self-activity with the treatment accorded the proletariat in Stalinist theory and practice, arguing that Stalinism, in seeking to subordinate the energy of the proletariat to its own narrow goals and interests, systematically degrades and displaces the revolutionary proletariat with the so-called party of a new type, whose will is substituted for the heterogeneity of the experience of the workers as the guarantee of "an objectively correct policy." Arthur also discusses how the "incoherent amalgam of objectivism and voluntarism" in Stalin's theoretical essay in the *Short Course* runs counter to the fundamental tenets of historical materialism and serves as "a recipe for gross subjectivism," with everything depending on the whims of the leader.

1000 Aspaturian, Vernon V. "The Contemporary Doctrine of the Soviet State and Its Philosophical Foundations." *American Political Science Review* 48, no. 3 (1954): 1031-57.

Aspaturian analyzes Stalin's views on the theoretical problem of the Soviet state, as set forth in *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938), *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics* (1950), and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952), arguing that Stalin's various pontifications on the state constitute neither a new nor a revised theory of the state, but rather represent "a formal and open repudiation of Marxist political theory." In addition to contending that Stalin, in his effort to justify the failure of the Soviet state to wither away in accord with classical Marxist theory, attempted to rationalize the expansion and intensification of the Soviet state's power, Aspaturian sees Stalin as having deviated from the fundamentals of Marxism through his theory of "revolution from above"; his subordination of social existence to social consciousness; reformulation of the dialectical process as a "harmonious conflict between the base and superstructure of society"; and revision of Marxist doctrine with respect to the role of the "great personality" in history.

1001 Barany, Zoltan. "The 'Volatile' Marxian Concept of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." *Studies in East European Thought* 49, no. 1 (March 1997): 1-21.

This analysis of the development of the Marxist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat by such figures as Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Stalin centers on the ways in which the Bolshevik

leaders misrepresented Marx's thought on this subject, often to fit their own specific purposes. Barany maintains that Marx's preference for a peaceful dictatorship of the proletariat that would constitute a large majority of the population was grossly misinterpreted by Lenin, who believed the dictatorship had to be violent and understood it as the rule of the Bolshevik Party over the rest of society. Barany considers Stalin's thoughts on the proletarian dictatorship, as set forth in *Foundations of Leninism* (1924), as the climax of a long process of misinterpreting Marx's views on this concept. Stalin, Barany writes, not only envisioned the dictatorship of the proletariat as being violent and as the instrument of the proletarian revolution as he defined it but as an entire historical, rather than a brief interlude in the evolution of the communist state, and under his rule the proletarian dictatorship degenerated into heavy-handed and often irrational attacks on any and all opposition, real and presumed, to his oppressive policies and practices.

1002 Burin, Frederic S. "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War." *American Political Science Review* 57 (June 1963): 334-54.

Burin traces the history of the communist doctrine of the inevitability of war from the writings of Marx and Engels through Khrushchev's formulation of the doctrine of the avoidability of war between the capitalist and communist states and among the capitalist powers themselves as well. In discussing Stalin's thinking on this subject, Burin describes how the Soviet dictator initially incorporated war against the Soviet Union into his theory of "capitalist encirclement" and attempted to convey the impression that his views on the likelihood of such a conflict, as well as on the inevitability of wars among the imperialist powers, were consistent with Lenin's theory of imperialism. Stalin's thinking on the inevitability of wars between the capitalist states and of a capitalist attack on the Soviet Union, Burin argues, never assumed the form of an actual theory but rather his position on the question of war—as demonstrated by the substance and timing of the shifts in his views on this issue during the 1930s, when the fascist threat loomed large for the Soviet Union; during World War II, when cooperation with the Western capitalist states was necessary; and in the postwar years, when, amidst the developing Cold War, the inevitability of wars within the imperialist camp was reaffirmed—was constructed to meet the ideological and propaganda needs of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. The thesis on the inevitability of war, Burin concludes, while beginning with a genuine theoretical proposition formulated by Lenin, deteriorated under Stalin into "one more item in the huge grab bag of miscellaneous argumentative tricks" drawn upon to justify Soviet policies and the power positions of the Kremlin's leaders.

1003 Burns, Emile. "Stalin's Development of the Theory of the State." *Communist Review* (April, 1953): 126-28.

1003a Clarke, Simon. "Stalinism As Ideology." *Critique* 20/21 (1987): 126-27.

Clarke briefly discusses Stalinism as a "technologicistic ideology," meaning an ideology that acclaims the power of reason to control both nature and society. This ideology, in Clarke's view, has been ascribed to primarily by a stratum of Stalinist society—including not only scientists and technicians but also managers, administrators, bureaucrats, economists, and other members of the intelligentsia—that came into being with the growth of the regulative and interventionist activity of the Stalinist state and that has used state power to secure its own dominant position over manual laborers in Soviet society.

1004 D. B. Y. "The Stalin-Marr Philological Controversy in the USSR." *World Today* 6 (January-December 1950): 355-64.

The May-June 1950 debate in *Pravda* over the theory of linguistics developed by Academician Nikolai Marr in the late 1920s, a controversy which came to an end when Stalin, ostensibly in reply to a group of puzzled youngsters, dealt a death blow to Marrism and indicated the lines along which Soviet philology should develop in the future, is the subject of this article. The author out-

lines the key components of Marr's Japhetic Language Theory, or New Linguistics as it came to be called, and describes how Stalin, in a "clumsy and extremely ill-written article," not only echoed the main line of the anti-Marrists's attack but went beyond it and the teachings of Marxism as well by denying that the nature of a given language is directly determined by the economic basis and social structure of the community using it. The free battle of opinions during the 1950 philological debate, along with Stalin's break with the classical Marxist view on the superstructure nature of language, should not be viewed as a sign that an era of greater freedom has dawned in Soviet intellectual life, but rather that the party, as Stalin's direct intervention in the philological controversy indicates, is tightening, not slackening, its control of intellectual life, according to the author.

1005 Daniels, Robert V. "Fate and Will in the Marxian Philosophy of History." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21, no. 4 (1960): 538-52.

This analysis of the fate of Marxist economic determinism in Soviet hands describes how Marxian determinism was, in effect, repudiated under Stalin as he attempted to show the continuity of a voluntaristic historical theory with Marx's teachings in order to bring theory more explicitly in line with a Soviet reality that had demonstrated the historical significance of political institutions and leaders in fashioning the new socialist society. The obviously contrived and compulsory nature of the Stalinist reinterpretation of Marxism, Daniels maintains, does not mean that the previously accepted version of Marxist determinism was entirely accurate. Close analysis of the writings of Marx and Engels indicates that "the extreme determinist reading of the doctrine of Marxism is almost as much an exaggeration as the latter-day Soviet voluntarism." Describing how Marxism does not offer a simple and entirely one-sided answer to the question of whether "man makes history or history makes man," Daniels explains how Marxian determinism, prior to the Stalin era, had been qualified in three basic ways: 1) by Lenin's assertion, in justifying revolutionary action, that conscious and willful action could alter social circumstances; 2) by Engels's analysis of historical causation as a matter of statistical probabilities in which individual actions and historical accidents play a significant role; and 3) by Engels's emphasis on the notion of revolution as a "leap to freedom." Paradoxically, "the dictatorial Soviet Union clings to the formula of a deterministic philosophy while all its political experience has revolved around the most exaggerated voluntarism," yet "American democracy treasures the illusions of free will while the central virtue of its system guarantees that impersonal forces will have a preponderant influence on society's future course," Daniels concludes.

1006 ———. "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology." *American Slavic and East European Review* 12, no. 1 (1953): 22-43.

The first part of this article deals with how the idealistic spirit which permeated the political program Lenin detailed in his 1917 work *State and Revolution* gave way, after the October Revolution—when the Bolsheviks were compelled to deal with the problems of organizing and defending political power—to the practice of pragmatic politics which facilitated the formation of a new bureaucratic, hierarchical political order. The second half describes how Soviet institutional development in the 1920s and 1930s was mirrored in ideology, with party doctrine shifting from a view of the state as a necessary evil destined to wither away after the revolutionary transformation of society was accomplished to a view that extolled the state as "the highest form of social organization and a great creative force." Stalin, Daniels explains, played the key role in explicitly modifying the doctrine of the withering away of the state. Making his definitive statement on the theory of the state at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, Stalin put forth a view of the state which, in contradiction to the teachings of Marx and Engels, and in accord with Soviet reality, elevated the state to the level of a prime mover of history, designating it as "the chief instrument for overcoming class differences and for the preparation of the material and spiritual prerequisites for the transformation to communism," and asserting that the state would be retained as an institution

even during the period of communism as long as the “capitalist encirclement” of the USSR continued to exist.

1007 Donoso, Anton. “Stalinism in Marxist Philosophy.” *Studies in Soviet Thought* 19, no. 2 (1979): 113-41.

The two focal points of this paper are Stalin’s contribution to Marxism as seen in four of his works—*Foundations of Leninism* (1924), *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938), *Marxism and Linguistics* (1950), and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952)—and the influence of Stalin and Stalinism as seen in selected philosophical works from the Soviet Union, East Europe, and the People’s Republic of China during the decades immediately following the dictator’s death. Stalin’s two major contributions to Marxist philosophy, in Donoso’s opinion, are his emphasis on the role of ideas in changing a society—the basis of his “revolution from above”—and his detachment of language from both the base and superstructure, a proposition which led to linguistics being freed from the ideological control of the party. These two contributions, according to Donoso, were made by a man who was virtually devoid of philosophical acumen, and who was fond of positing “an immediate connection between the crudest factual data and the most general theoretical propositions,” a tendency “resulting in dangerous oversimplifications and the justification of an action—regardless of how inhumane—as ‘scientific’ by an appeal to overarching ‘laws’ of nature, society, and history.” While Stalin’s contributions to Marxism have largely been downplayed, viewed critically, or gone unacknowledged by Marxist philosophers within and beyond the Soviet Union since his death, Donoso writes, his emphasis on the more active role of the superstructure has been adopted by Soviet and East European Marxists, and his explanation of language seems to have been accepted as well.

1008 ———. “Stalin’s Contribution to Soviet Philosophy.” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (May 1965): 267-303.

Donoso looks at four major philosophical works by Stalin—*Foundations of Leninism* (1924), *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938), *Marxism and Linguistics* (1950), and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952)—in presenting a history of Stalin’s philosophical activities and examining his contributions to Soviet dialectical materialism. For Donoso, Stalin’s primary contribution to the development of Soviet Marxism was the “practical genius” he displayed in amplifying the main body of Marxism in order to give his decisions and policies “a sort of scientific necessity” and, in this way, “to justify in theory what he had been doing in fact.” Donoso also discusses the impact of de-Stalinization on Stalin’s reputation as a theoretician, as reflected in Soviet textbooks in philosophy published up to the mid-1960s, maintaining that, despite significant changes in the presentation of dialectical materialism, Stalin clearly remains “the most ‘realistic’ of all contributors to the ‘treasury’ of Marxism” by virtue of his efforts to bring Marxist theory in line with Soviet practice.

1009 Femia, Joseph. “Marxism Contra Marx?” *Journal of Communist Studies* 9, no. 4 (1993): 182-88.

Femia reviews S. H. Rigby’s *Engels and the Formation of Marxism: History, Dialectics and Revolution* (1992), and *Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism* (1991), a compilation of articles and conference papers written over a period of four decades by Robert Daniels. Femia’s commentary on the book by Daniels centers on what is seen as the two unifying themes of the collection: the inadequacy of Marxism as a theory of revolution, and Stalin’s radical departure from the principles laid down by Marx. He suggests that, while the arguments advanced by Daniels, though provocative, “reveal a rather simplistic understanding of Marxism”—particularly with respect to how the vagueness of what Marx said about the future communist society allows for conflicting interpretations of Marxism, including that of Stalin—and that, while Daniels “exaggerates the distance between Marx and

Stalin," the thesis of the book is in its essence still convincing: "the Russian Revolution was not 'betrayed'; it was doomed from the start by the inherent flaws in Marxist analysis."

1010 Florinsky, Michael T. "Stalin and Marxian Theory." *Current History* 8 (April 1945): 289-93.

Florinsky considers the significance of an unsigned article entitled "Some Problems of the Teaching of Political Economy" which appeared in the July-August 1943 issue of the Soviet magazine *Under the Banner of Marxism*. He sees the article as constituting a new attempt to align Marxist theory with Soviet practical policies and, in this sense, believes it to be consistent with Stalin's practice of adapting doctrine to fit the policies decided upon by the Kremlin, such as in the cases of the theory of "socialism in one country" and the explanation of why the state has not "withered away" as Marx forecast. Florinsky also comments on why he believes the anonymous article under review, while significant from the perspective of Marxian theory, offers no key to the future evolution of the Soviet Union, and on why any appraisal of the general trend of Soviet thinking must begin with an understanding of the unique position occupied by Stalin as the sole authoritative exponent of Marxism.

1011 Frame, William V. "Mao, Stalin and Khrushchev: The Role of Materialism in the Sino-Soviet Dispute." *Asian Thought and Society* 2, no. 3 (1977): 290-317.

Frame questions the view expressed by some scholars that Mao Tse-tung's posthumous championing of Stalin was insincere and primarily a function of the Sino-Soviet rift, and that the Chinese leader's Marxism was far removed from Stalin's Marxism. Arguing that the distance between the Marxism of the two leaders is very small, Frame explains how Mao's understanding of history, consciousness, culture, and the obligation of Marxist leadership in the socialist epoch is startlingly similar to Stalin's, and how Mao's affinity with Stalin's thinking in these regards helps to account for the intensity of his criticism of Khrushchev's "revisionism" and of post-Stalin Soviet Marxism in general. Frame devotes special attention to Mao and Stalin's sharing of the belief that the operation of the historical process is contingent on revolutionary leadership, and to the two leaders' efforts to square this conviction with the Marxist assumption that "history constituted an objective process automatically motivated by contradictions."

1012 Gerratana, Valentino. "Althusser and Stalinism." *New Left Review* nos. 101-102 (February/April 1977): 111-21.

This critique of the various attempts of Louis Althusser to come to terms with the theoretical problems posed by Stalinism and the questions raised by the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU revolves around how the French Marxist philosopher moved away from a position marked by ambiguous concessions regarding Stalin's "historical merits"; a tendency to accord him "theoretical discernment" in writing about problems of the Marxist dialectic; and a willingness to treat his *Foundations of Leninism* as a faithful summary of Lenin's thought toward a phase of reflection in which he speaks of a collapse of philosophy into ideological practice under Stalin, and of Stalinism's cultivation of a servile philosophy that ultimately functioned as but "a technique of legitimation of power."

1013 ———. "Stalin, Lenin and 'Leninism.'" *New Left Review* no. 103 (May 1977): 59-71.

Gerratana examines how the notion of "Leninism" as a theoretical system emerged within the Bolshevik Party after Lenin's death; the way in which it was used by Stalin as a weapon against his opponents and to legitimize his own authority as the party's leader; and how Lenin's characteristic approach to leadership and the overall conceptual structure of his thought are antithetical to Stalinism. He also discusses how the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, with the exception of Trotsky, committed themselves, after Lenin's death, to the use of "Leninism" in support of their various and conflicting positions, contributing to the conversion of Lenin into a source of authority and

arming Stalin with the very instrument of ideological legitimation he would later turn against them in consolidating his absolute power.

- 1014** Gray, Piers. "Totalitarian Logic: Stalin on Linguistics." *Critical Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (spring 1993): 16-36.

This critical appraisal of Stalin's 1950 pamphlet *Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics*, which, in effect, freed Marxist linguistics from the constraints imposed upon it by the theories of Georgian academician Nikolai Marr (1865-1934) that had dominated the field of study since the late 1920s, revolves around the "totalitarian logic" behind Stalin's assertion that language, in Marxist parlance, exists outside the base-superstructure dialectic; that languages developed not through the destruction of existing ones and the creation of new ones, but by extending and perfecting the basic elements of existing languages; and that language does not have a distinctly class character but rather belongs to the whole people of a particular nation. Stalin's radical emphasis on the essential national characteristics of a language, in Gray's view, stemmed from his desire to legitimize as many regional dialects as possible so as to encourage minor differences to flourish among the Turkic languages in the national republics, allowing those languages "to look far more different from each other than in fact they are," ensuring that Russian remained the language of administration and control, and thus advancing "the continuous central domination of Moscow over its linguistic others and their fragmented ethnic groups." In developing this argument, Gray draws upon Chapter 19, "Language Is a Tool of Production," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle*, to suggest how language, for Stalin, was an instrument of political power. He also notes the high regard for *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics* shown by Chinese Communist leaders eager for a Marxist rationale for a linguistic policy that would promote Beijing's political control of the nation's individual nationalities.

- 1015** Hu Yicheng. "A Comparative Study of Epistemology in the Philosophies of Stalin and Mao Zedong." Translated by Nick Knight. *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* 23, nos. 3-4 (1992): 233-46.

The focus of this comparative analysis of the epistemology within the philosophies of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung is on how Mao both supplemented and corrected certain shortcomings of Stalin's thinking as expressed in the latter's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. The author shows how Mao, in his treatise "On Practice," responds to such problematic features of *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* as Stalin's deviation from dialectics in dealing with the struggle of opposites without mentioning their unity; his reaffirmation of "Feuerbachian-style reflection theory" in elaborating on the opposition of the philosophical materialism of Marxism to idealism without considering its opposition to metaphysical materialism as well; and his general neglect of the epistemology of a Marxist philosophy which takes practice as its foundation.

- 1016** Karavaev, A. "The Soviet State: Theory and Practice: The 'Withering Away' of the State." *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR* 8, no. 4 (1961): 3-13.

Karavaev draws attention to the discrepancies between Marxist theory and Soviet practice with respect to the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the form to be assumed by proletarian democracy, and the onset of the withering away of the socialist state's functions. In discussing Stalin's rule, Karavaev primarily describes how the weakening of the state's oppressive functions under the New Economic Policy gave way under Stalin "to the most violent reaction in the opposite direction" in accord with the Soviet dictator's theory that the class struggle would intensify even after socialism had been built. This shift in Marxist theory, Karavaev explains, was necessitated by Stalin's need to find a theoretical justification for Soviet political practice, specifically, for the emergence and continued existence of an all-powerful dictatorship of a tiny minority over

the Soviet people—a political situation born in Stalin’s “revolution from above” and which required a strengthening of the state as the vehicle for organized oppression.

1017 Klugmann, H. “Stalin and Dialectical Materialism.” *Communist Review* (May 1953): 137-40; (June 1953): 171-79.

1018 Leichter, Otto. “The New Statesman.” *Progressive* (March 1953): 13-15.

The proclamations made by Stalin in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952) that war is inevitable within a capitalist world plagued by imperialism and economic decline, that peaceful coexistence is possible between the capitalist and communist states in the phase of capitalism’s universal decline, and that communism will spread around the world through the implosion of capitalism rather than by proletarian revolution represent the severance of the last ties which connected Soviet Russia with the original philosophy of the Russian Revolution, according to this analysis of the Soviet leader’s then recent reformulation of Marxist theory in its Bolshevik form. The new Soviet philosophy of Stalin, in Leichter’s view, was not formulated for theory’s sake but rather in order to eliminate “certain concepts of Marxian thought which could be used to weaken Soviet claims before the world,” most notably the unavoidability of war between the West and the Soviet Union, and the need for the proletariat to suffer through war and revolution in order for communism to triumph. By advancing Soviet claims to be a peace-loving power, emphasizing the self-destructive nature of capitalism, and portraying Western policy toward the underdeveloped nations as a militaristic and reactionary one, Stalin, Leichter warns, hopes to calm Western fears of the Soviet Union, encourage his followers to believe that their cause is bound to win, and exploit existing social and economic problems around the world to promote the increase of Soviet power and influence wherever possible.

1019 Leites, Nathan. “Stalin As an Intellectual.” *World Politics* 6, no. 1 (October 1953): 45-66.

This appraisal of Stalin as an intellectual centers on his last and most widely heralded theoretical writing, the article “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” which appeared in the October 1952 issue of *Bolshevik* and which consists of his remarks on the economics discussion then being held in connection with the evaluation of the draft of a textbook of political economy and of his answers to letters written to him by three economists who commented on his remarks. Stalin’s remarks and his subsequent “debates” with several mid-level technocrats, for Leites, show him to be a man of limited theoretical ability who tends to use tautologies as “evidence” for empirical hypotheses; who accepts as axiomatic propositions that are wholly unfounded; and whose defects in logic are matched by “a good deal of ignorance and distortion in his substantive Marxism.” Stalin’s article, Leites suggests, reveals the existence of dissent among the technical intelligentsia, including a “left enthusiasm”—akin to that evident in the early 1920s—for a more rapid tempo of advance toward communism, and a “right mood” emanating from a desire for less Bolshevik interference with the job of production.

1020 Levine, Norman. “Lukacs on Lenin.” *Studies in Soviet Thought* 18, no. 1 (1978): 17-31.

Levine examines essayist and critic Georg Lukacs’s attraction to the Leninist version of Bolshevism and opposition to Stalinized Bolshevism throughout his life as a Marxist. Taking issue primarily with the view that Lukács had an “ambiguous, often times acquiescent attitude toward Stalinism,” Levine contends that Lukács, whose Marxism “was in flagrant violation of the Stalinist understanding on Marxism,” saw Stalinism as the decadent, sectarian side of Bolshevism, one marked by a rigid and intolerant mentality which contained the seeds of totalitarianism and which stood in stark contrast to Lenin’s Bolshevism, with its creativity, openness to facts, and willingness to adapt to new realities.

1021 Lowenthal, Richard. "Stalin and Ideology: The Revenge of the Superstructure." *Survey* 33 (1960): 31-37.

This paper discusses the changes Stalin made in Marxist-Leninist doctrine in order to bring the ideology of the Soviet Communist Party in line with the practices that became necessary in the face of the challenges the party faced by having seized power before the time was ripe for the rule of the class which it represented. Lowenthal identifies what he sees as four fundamental doctrinal changes made by Stalin: 1) the promulgation of a law of development for socialist revolution that "stood Marxism on its head" by declaring that political power could transform the economic "basis" of society; 2) the establishment of the concept of "a 'socialist' Soviet Union as a harmonious society of several toiling classes, permitting permanent inequalities of income and privilege, and an indefinite extension of the creative role of the state"; 3) the assertion that the supposed temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, even though socialism had been achieved in the USSR, was to be permanent because of the need to protect the Soviet state from the increasing fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes and because of the permanence of the revolutionary transformation of society; and 4) the equation of the interests of the Soviet "socialist state" with those of the "World Revolution," thereby subordinating world communism to the cause of Soviet national power. In addition to describing how each of these doctrinal revisions came about, Lowenthal discusses the fate of Stalin's four "contributions" to Marxist-Leninist doctrine under the dictator's successor, Nikita Khrushchev.

1022 ———. "Stalin's Testament." *Twentieth Century* 153 (March 1953): 180-94.

Lowenthal discusses the October 1952 pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* as a "political testament" in which Stalin, in presenting a guide to the next stage in the development from "socialism" to "communism," outlines the long-term program of the permanent revolution from above. Describing the preference for accumulation over consumption, for the extension of society's mechanical equipment over the present satisfaction of the needs of its members, as "the red thread" running through Stalin's pamphlet, Lowenthal contends that the Soviet economy, according to Stalin's own analysis, is not a socialist economy but rather one of "continuous, automatic, maximum accumulation, justified by the fiction that today's sacrifices will benefit tomorrow's consumers, but insisting that the guiding principles which impose these sacrifices shall prevail tomorrow as well." Lowenthal explains how this distortion of the economic process in favor of maximum accumulation negatively affects the other conditions for the transition to communism outlined by Stalin, and how Stalin's insistence, in the last segment of his pamphlet, on the pressing nature of the need to liquidate the limited freedom of the collective farmers to dispose of their own produce has little to do with any theoretical pattern of voluntary long-term evolution toward socialism or communism, and everything to do with the practical needs of an economic policy of maximum accumulation regime which maintains its power by maximum accumulation. For Lowenthal, Stalin's pamphlet is, in effect, the latest Bolshevik justification for the conquest of power by a small minority, for the retention of that power into the distant future, for the imposition of permanent sacrifices on the Soviet people, and for the use of totalitarian state power to keep the process of permanent revolution going.

1023 Medalie, Richard J. "The Communist Theory of State." *American Slavic and East European Review* 18, no. 4 (1959): 510-25.

Medalie questions Robert Daniels's interpretation of the Marxist theory of state, as put forth in an article in the December 1953 issue of the *American Slavic and East European Review*. He contends that Daniels's analysis of the origin of the state, the nature of its oppressive function, the steps the state takes amidst the class struggle, and the extent to which the state withers away when the class struggle is terminated by the proletarian revolution is not in harmony with the original Marxist theory but rather in accord with the theory of state propounded by Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev. Dividing his discussion of Marxist theory into sections dealing with the state under

capitalism, the state in transition from capitalism to communism, the state under communism, and the state under Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, Medalie develops the thesis that, contrary to Daniels's interpretation, and in accord with the original theory, "it is the oppressive function of the state which is the basic reason for the state's existence; that the state creates order by modifying the class struggle only in order to legalize and preserve class oppression and domination; that the common interests which the state serves are in reality the specific interests of the ruling class; and that after the proletarian revolution, the state as such is supposed to wither away completely." In dealing with Stalin's understanding of the state, Medalie primarily discusses how the Soviet dictator's doctrine of socialism in one country and his theses on capitalist encirclement, the intensification of the class struggle as socialism progressed, and the transition from socialism to communism revised the Marxist theory of state in accord with Soviet reality.

1024 Möller, Dietrich and Ulrich Picht. "Khrushchev and Stalin on the Intensified Class Struggle." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 3, no. 1 (1963): 48-53.

The first half of this article deals with Stalin's concept of the class struggle, most notably his affirmation of the prolongation of the class struggle by the continued existence of diverse "enemies of the people"; his argument that the class struggle would intensify as the Soviet Union advanced toward socialism; and his justification of the need for extraordinary vigilance and mass terror by identifying the people's internal enemies with external, capitalist enemies. The second part describes the Khrushchev regime's assault on Stalin's understanding of the class struggle, and how Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" is incompatible with the international class struggle as described by Lenin and endorsed by Stalin. The authors also discuss how the Kremlin, in dealing with the uprisings against the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, subscribed to elements of the Stalin thesis on the class struggle which Khrushchev had previously attacked.

1025 Narayanswamy, Ramnath. "Utopia and Determinism in Marx, Lenin and Stalin." *China Report* 22, no. 2 (1986): 129-40; 22, no. 3 (1986): 259-76; 22, no. 4 (1986): 473-83.

This three-part analysis of Marxist doctrine and its evolution in Soviet Marxism develops around the contention that the Leninist and Stalinist interpretations of Marx's teachings were legitimate interpretations of a doctrine which is amenable to several diametrically opposed readings. Part one centers on the complex interaction of a utopian as well as determinist trend in Marx's writings; the contradiction between the political vision that characterized Marx's utopia and the economic rationality that underlined its realization; and Marx's vagueness on how his theory was to be translated into concrete action. The second part deals with how Lenin, in developing the theory of the leading role of the party in the proletarian revolution and in the socialist transformation of Soviet society, faithfully applied the principles of Marxist historical materialism while developing a practical means of realizing the revolution envisioned by Marx. The third part focuses on the essential continuity between Stalinism and Leninist principles, particularly with respect to how Lenin's idea of party hegemony in the political sphere developed naturally into the party's leading role in the socialist transformation of Soviet society under Stalin's rule. Part three also deals with how the totalitarian system established under Stalin was in accordance with Lenin's equation of "truth" with a proletarian worldview that can only be legitimately interpreted by the proletariat's vanguard, the party. As Marxism became fully institutionalized under Stalin, and the authoritarian implications of Leninism came to full fruition, civil society progressively deteriorated with the development of the Stalinist state, all in accord with a brand of totalitarianism operating under the banner of Marxism, according to Narayanswamy.

1026 Nordahl, Richard. "Stalinist Ideology: The Case of the Stalinist Interpretation of Monopoly Capitalist Politics." *Soviet Studies* 26 (April 1974): 238-59.

Nordahl first examines the revisions of Stalinist tenets regarding the nature of monopoly capitalist politics put forth by Soviet scholar Eugene Varga in his 1946 study *Changes in the Economy of*

Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War. He then discusses how the book was criticized and rejected for being incompatible with Stalin's interpretation of the nature of monopoly capitalist politics, particularly with respect to Varga's views on how the wartime changes in capitalist society might soften the effects of capitalism's periodic crises, encourage the state to act in the interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole, and allow the workers to again more power within the existing political structure. In using Varga's revisions and the criticisms leveled against them as a means of highlighting the Stalinist interpretation of monopoly capitalist politics, Nordahl points out the obvious deficiencies of the Stalinist model of monopoly capitalist politics, and how the model served important political ideological functions by painting a picture of monopoly capitalist politics which helped to justify the domestic and international policies of the Stalin regime, minimize the dissatisfaction of Soviet citizens with domestic conditions, maximize the people's fear of Western hostility, and legitimize the existing authoritarian structure of the regime.

- 1027** Oppenheimer, Max, Jr. "Marr and Stalin: Soviet Linguistics and Political Correctness." *Geolinguistics* 19 (1993): 145-56.

The vast majority of this article deals with the career of academician Nikolai Marr and the theory of language which he succeeded in presenting as Marxism in linguistics and which, despite its obvious shortcomings, served as the dominant theory in Soviet linguistics until 1950. The closing section of the article describes the debate which developed among Soviet linguistics in the late 1940s, as Marrists leveled charges against "reactionary" Soviet linguists for servile imitation of Western European linguistics, and Stalin's intervention in the debate by way of a 20 June 1950 *Pravda* article in the form of replies to questions allegedly put to him by "a group of young comrades" regarding his opinion on the linguistics controversy. Oppenheimer summarizes Stalin's case against the Marrist position, particularly his argument that language, in Marxist parlance, exists apart from the superstructure and does not have a class character and his criticism of the Marrists for introducing theoretical confusion into the discipline of linguistics. Oppenheimer does not offer an explanation as to why Stalin intervened in the Marrist controversy as he did, other than the possibility that the Soviet leader, as a man who possessed a great deal of common sense, was appalled by the mess in Soviet linguistics and "decided that enough was enough."

- 1028** Parsons, Wilfrid. "Democracy—Stalin and St. Thomas." *Modern Schoolman* 23 (March 1946): 131-34.

The description of democracy offered by Saint Thomas Aquinas and derived from Aristotle's teachings on the bad forms of government is in accord with what Stalin and Molotov have in mind when they call Soviet Russia a democracy, according to Parsons. For Aristotle and Saint Thomas, Parsons explains, democracy is a bad form of government in which the masses, acting as a tyrant, dominate to the exclusion of all other classes and, by force of numbers, oppress the wealthy. When Saint Thomas called democracy a perverted form of government, Parsons argues, "he was thinking of a government where the proletariat rose up against the bourgeoisie, 'oppressed' . . . it, and ran the state wholly according to personal interests," which precisely describes the realities of the "democracy" practiced in Soviet Russia under Stalin's tyrannical rule.

- 1029** Robinson, Geroid Tanquary. "Stalin's Vision of Utopia: The Future Communist Society." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 99, no. 1 (1955): 11-21.

Robinson assembles the scattered comments of Stalin on the full-blown communist society of the future for the purpose of composing, through inference, interpretation, and speculation, a more systematic picture of this utopia than Stalin himself ever presented. In Robinson's estimate, when one cancels out the contradictions in Stalin's promise for utopia and considers the full effect of the primacy of his demand for a communist unity of thought and action, the net content of his offerings appears to be a utopia in which all men will perform the amount and kind of work that suits their abilities, enjoy an abundance of goods as suited to their needs, live on a high intellectual and

moral level, and be permitted and assisted to rise to a high cultural level—all in accord with the determinations of an omnipotent, worldwide communist organ of authority. For Robinson, freedom in Stalin's utopia reduces itself to "an almost perfect negation of freedom," with the 'new communist man' being "free" "to accept, affirm, promote, and participate" in, but not dissent from, the new communist system. Furthermore, as mankind will be trained "to rejoice in this new way of life," the new communist man will have not only lost his freedom but "the consciousness that he is unfree" as well.

1030 Robinson, William S. "Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (June 1994): 151-64.

Stalin by name does not enter into this appraisal of the attack on determinate qualia—meaning real events that are not merely judgments or dispositions to react to stimuli—mounted by Daniel Dennett, in his 1991 work *Consciousness Explained*, but in rejecting Dennett's argument and in introducing his own model that provides a way of understanding qualia and the processes that yield them, Robinson advances the case against qualia that is based on features of the distinction between what are termed "Orwellian," and "Stalinesque" understandings of the "properties of real seemings."

1031 Schlesinger, Rudolf. "Marxism and Stalin. II—Nations in the Revolution." *New Statesman and Nation* 45 (28 March 1953): 364-65.

The second in a two-part favorable review of Stalin as a theoretician, this article argues for the insightfulness of Stalin's analysis of the nation as a social phenomenon and of his elaboration of both the Bolshevik theory of nationality and of socialist policy toward national liberation movements. Schlesinger also presents a positive reading of Stalin's 1952 pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, particularly with respect to the Soviet leader's thinking on the practical conditions which had to be dealt with before the transition to communism was feasible.

1032 ———. "Stalin and Marxism. I—Theory and Realism." *New Statesman and Nation* 45 (21 March 1953): 330-31.

This favorable assessment of Stalin as a theoretician portrays him as a creative Marxist who, in accord with his conviction that the theory proves itself by its effect as an organizing force, devoted his political life to the transformation into a living social organization the socialism envisioned along general lines by Marx and Engels. In describing the identity between Stalin's theoretical work and organizational achievement, Schlesinger keys on Stalin's development and implementation of the theory of "socialism in one country," depicting his work in this regard not as a deviation from an ideal type of socialism but rather as a practical reading of Marxism within the framework of the conditions in which socialism was possible in the Russia of that time.

1033 Schwartz, Harry. "Marx to Khrushchev: A Four-Act Drama." *New York Times Magazine* (12 November 1961): 12+.

The thrust of this article is that the history of communism is marked by a steady shift among its leaders from the intellectual to the pragmatic politician, and that 1924, the year Lenin died, marked "the great divide" in this history, with Marx and Lenin, who "had illusions common to theorists divorced from power," standing on one side, and Stalin and Khrushchev, who "taught doctrines shaped by the pressures of the practical problems they faced," standing on the other. With respect to Stalin, Schwartz mainly considers the role played by pragmatic considerations in the Soviet leader's espousal of the theory of "socialism in one country" and the thesis that the class struggle would intensify as socialism progressed. Schwartz also comments on Stalin's elevation of paranoia "to the dignity of a canon in Marxism-Leninism" amidst the discontent generated by the enormous sacrifices his economic programs demanded of the Soviet people.

1034 Sukiennicki, Wiktor. "The Vision of Communism—Marx to Khrushchev." *Problems of Communism* 9, no. 6 (1960): 1-10.

Sukiennicki outlines the theory of communism as jointly formulated by Marx and Engels and describes how Lenin and Stalin, in effect, abandoned the central strand of Marxist reasoning by shifting the agent of societal change from material to human forces. Under Stalin, Sukiennicki writes, the egalitarian ideal was abandoned in favor of a course of radical social and economic differentiation which included the use of material incentives and various symbols of distinction to evoke more effective and productive labor, and an intensification of the dictatorship of the proletariat—meaning the use of extreme measures, including terror—to drive the wide mass of citizens to the limit of their abilities in building socialism. While a number of Stalin's theories and practices were officially condemned by the party following his death, his fundamental thesis asserting the possibility of building the future communist society by means of conscious, planned action was reaffirmed by his successors and constitutes his primary legacy for Soviet Marxism, according to Sukiennicki.

1035 Táborský, Edward. "De-Stalinized Stalinism." *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 37 (1957): 311-29.

This analysis of the post-Stalin shifts in Soviet communist ideology includes an account of the shift in the function of theory during the years of Stalin's rule in which the author contends that Stalin, while continuing to emphasize the paramount importance of theory, used doctrine primarily as a tool for justifying his policies and for promoting party discipline as a pretext for eliminating those who disagreed with him or whose loyalty he deemed questionable. Táborský also discusses how, with Stalin's death and subsequent downgrading, allegiance to the party and to communist theory, rather than loyalty to Stalin, became the supreme test of a good communist, and how, with the absence of a single person to decide what was the correct line and what was heresy, the strait-jacket of rigid orthodoxy was somewhat loosened. He sees the party's campaign condemning "the cult of the individual" and extolling the virtues of collective leadership as being an effect of the absence of any one man among Stalin's heirs who could assume his mantle, even though Khrushchev, by 1957, had managed to assert himself as the guiding theoretician of the post-Stalinist "new look" endorsed at the Twentieth Party Congress.

1036 Tauer, Bernard. "Stalin's Last Thesis." *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 3 (April 1953): 367-81.

The statements made by Stalin, in an October 1952 article published in *Bolshevik* revising his 1925 thesis about the temporary stabilization of capitalism, the stabilization of the Soviet system, and the need to coexist peaceably with the capitalist world as long as the temporary equilibrium between the capitalist and socialist camps remained disadvantageous to the revolutionary movement are the focus of this essay. In Tauer's view, Stalin, by discarding his thesis which had granted capitalism a kind of reprieve during the period of the "temporary equilibrium," by reaffirming the thesis of the inevitability of wars between capitalist states, and by promising support for communist-led "liberation" movements, announced, in effect, the arrival of an era during which the Kremlin will underwrite greater risks in the international field while, at the same time, attempt "to deceive the free world in regard to the timing, the direction, and the nature of future blows against 'imperialism.'"

1037 Ticktin, H. H. "Marxism after Stalin." *Critique* 20/21 (1987): 119-25.

Ticktin advances three theses about the nature of Stalinism. The first is that Stalinism—understood in its original form as the doctrine of socialism in one country—is neither a theory nor an ideology but a formal justification for proceeding slowly to socialism through the use of whatever forms deemed necessary, including capitalist and anti-worker forms. The second maintains that Stalinism consists of both Marxist concepts and bourgeois ideology concocted as a justification for the actions of the Stalin regime. The third holds that Stalinism has no history—meaning

that there are no theories or ideas which led up to Stalinism—but rather was simply born of the need to apologize for the extreme voluntarism practiced by the Stalinists and to invent a justification for Stalin's practices. Ticktin also offers his view of the consequences of Stalinist doctrine and its identification with Marxism, including the debasement of the labor theory of value and the Marxist dialectic, and the rise of the popular belief that tyranny and inefficiency are part and parcel of a planned economy.

1038 Van Ree, Erik. "Stalin and Marxism: A Research Note." *Studies in East European Thought* 49, no. 1 (1997): 23-33.

Van Ree considers Stalin's contributions to dialectical and historical materialism, arguing that his theses on the enormous role of ideas and on the existence of social phenomena, language in particular, that do not belong either to the basis or superstructure did not originate with him but rather were copied from the Russian Marxist philosopher Georgi Plekhanov's "monism." While Stalin's views on these subjects were adoptions of views expressed earlier by Plekhanov and therefore do not represent original contributions to historical and dialectical materialism, he did, in Van Ree's estimate, provide some distinctive formulations of his own, including his insistence on the primacy of the idea, even under achieved socialism, and his elaboration of the idea of a nonclass sphere "by taking it out of the superstructure, and turning it into a new category of social phenomena, and by including elements of the productive relations." Van Ree also addresses the problem of the apparent contradiction between Stalin's insistence on the importance of noneconomic and class-neutral factors on the one hand, and his firm rejection of idealistic dialectics on the other, explaining how, appearances to the contrary, Stalin's "historical theory was not to become an 'idealist' construct but remained a variety of materialism."

1039 ———. "Stalin As a Marxist and Philosopher." *Studies in East European Thought* 52, no. 4 (2000): 259-308.

The research done by the author in Stalin's private library during the winter of 1994 indicates that Stalin, as suggested by his choice of books and the notes he made in the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, until the end of his life felt himself in general agreement with these writings. Van Ree notes that Stalin may have admired Tsars Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, and consciously emulated some of their policies, but his reading interests and the thrust of the notes he made on the works that he read show that he always considered himself as a Marxist; was in agreement to a remarkable degree with the teachings of the Marxist classics; and had no interest in the systems of thought which traditional Russia produced. Even on those rare occasions when he disagreed with Marx, Engels, and Lenin, such as in his thesis that class oppression was not the sole function of the state and that the state was not fated to wither away quite in the manner Lenin described, he consciously tried to remain within a Marxist context, according to Van Ree.

1040 ———. "Stalin's Organic Theory of the Party." *Russian Review* 52, no. 1 (1993): 43-57.

Van Ree discusses the origins of Stalin's mystical interpretation of party unity, which aimed at "the complete, psychological submersion of the individual party member in the larger collective," arguing that Stalin's interpretation developed from a biological theory of the party, according to which the party was a living organism endowed with only one will, and enforced identity of thought was the natural state of affairs. Van Ree locates the roots of Stalin's mystical concept of unity in the collective mysticism of the Orthodox Church to which the young Dzhugashvili was exposed and in the Darwinist trend in Russian Marxism, particularly the collectivism of Alexander Bogdanov. He traces the development of Stalin's thinking about the nature of the party from his initial 1905 article on the subject, through his speeches and articles on the party up to the time of Lenin's death, and, finally, to the climax of his thinking on the party organism at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, at which he confirmed his victory over the Left Opposition. A brief discussion of the sinister implication of Stalin's view that the party is a living organism in

which the “dying off” of “obsolete stuff” is a natural and beneficial process rounds out Van Ree’s analysis of the Soviet leader’s thinking on the concept of party unity.

- 1041** Watt, Roderick H. “‘Du Liegst Schiel, Genosse Klemperer’: Victor Klemperer and Stalin on the Language of a Divided Germany in the 1940s and 1950s.” *Forum of Modern Language Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2001): 252-71.

This article traces the efforts of German scholar Victor Klemperer to adapt his analysis of the detrimental effects of an ideologically driven divergence of language in East and West Germany to the Marxist view of linguistics and national languages established by Stalin in a series of five articles published in *Pravda* in June-July 1950. In illustrating Klemperer’s efforts to accommodate his views to the official party line promulgated by Stalin on the indivisibility of German as a national language, Watt conducts a comparative analysis of the published version of Klemperer’s *Zur gegenwärtigen Sprachsituation in Deutschland* (SD) and the original typescript of his article “*Stalins Sprachtheorie und die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen Sprache*,” describing the extent to which Klemperer, in reluctantly bowing to political pressure and in conforming to the Stalinist orthodoxy of his day so as to secure the publication of his essay, compromised his own views on the pernicious effects of the politically driven changes he perceived in the German language.

- 1042** White, James D. “Theories of Imperialism in Russian Socialist Thought from the First World War to the Stalin Era.” *Coexistence* 30, no. 2 (1993): 87-109.

Stalin enters into this analysis of the part played by theories of imperialism in early Russian conceptions of socialism primarily as the individual who, in a series of 1924 lectures entitled “The Foundations of Leninism,” falsely attributed to Lenin the theory that the chain of imperialism would break at its weakest link, and who then used “Lenin’s weakest link” theory as an important concomitant to his own theory of “socialism in one country.” White also discusses how the association between theories of imperialism and theories of socialism figured into the controversy between Stalin and Trotsky; how the version of tsarist Russian economic development set forth in the famous *History of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course* (1938) provided Stalin’s “weakest link” theory with the historical context it had hitherto lacked; and how the fact that, to this day, scholars still state that it was Lenin who wrote somewhere that “the chain of imperialism broke at its weakest link” attests to the durability of Stalin’s powers of persuasion.

- 1043** Wu Tie-ping. “A Note on Stalin’s Work on Marxism and Linguistic Problems.” *Russian Language Journal* 36, nos. 123-124 (winter/spring 1982): 253-55.

Charles Townsend presents here a note he received from Professor Wu Tie-ping of the Institute of Linguistics in Peking focusing on a mistranslation made by Stalin, in his work *Marxism and Linguistics*, of an expression used by French linguist Paul Lafargue, in his book *La Langue Française avant et après de Révolution*. The author maintains that nowhere in the book did Lafargue mention the phrase “a common national language” (“*la langue nationale*”) which Stalin ascribes to him, and which runs counter to Lafargue’s emphasis on the differentiation of languages among the classes in seventeenth-century France. Furthermore, Stalin’s wrong translation of Lafargue’s expression had, for socialist countries, a deadening effect on the study of language differentiation among different classes, according to Wu.

- 1044** Yurchak, Alexei. “Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 3 (July 2003): 480-510.

This exploration of the question, “What was it about the Soviet system that made its ‘collapse’ appear completely unimaginable and surprisingly fast not only to most Western Sovietologists but also to most Soviet people?” uses a dynamic conception of knowledge to analyze what official ideology meant to Soviet citizens during “late socialism,” meaning the thirty years preceding the

beginning of perestroika. Stalin enters into Yurchak's analysis as the architect of an "uncanny paradigm shift" in the science of language that both destroyed the Marrist theory of language which had dominated Soviet linguistics for two decades, which held that language was part of the superstructure, and that attacked the view of language as a tool of production, meaning as part of the "base," a view that was then dominant in the ideological work of the party organs. Communist language, argued Stalin, had to be understood in terms of "objective scientific laws," a proposition which, in Yurchak's view, "marks the beginning of the gradual transformation of the model according to which Soviet ideology was evaluated for scientific accuracy—from a model based on subjective opinion of a 'principal' who publicly evaluated formulations, toward one based on 'objective scientific laws' anonymously stated and never publicly contested or discussed." This shift, Yurchak writes, contributed to the unanimous replication of ideological forms which, coupled with public affinity for many communist values, added to "the appearance of Soviet reality as monolithic and eternal," while at the same time, "the constant internal reinterpretation of the ideological meanings . . . contributed to the conditions of possibility for the system's imminent implosion. . . ."

Foreign Relations and International Communism

General

1045 Andrew, Christopher and Julie Elkner. "Stalin and Foreign Intelligence." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (summer 2003): 69-94.

Andrew and Elkner describe the remarkable success of Soviet intelligence collection in the Stalin era and the often miserable quality of intelligence analysis due largely to Stalin's determination to act as his own intelligence analyst and to his recurrent tendency to substitute conspiracy theory for evidence-based analysis when assessing the intention of the capitalist powers he so distrusted. In explaining how Stalin's "pathological suspiciousness" not only warped his thinking as an intelligence analyst but also molded that of professional Soviet intelligence analysts as well, Andrew and Elkner cite, among other examples, the Soviet dictator's misassessment of the Anglo-French attitude toward a rapprochement with the Hitler regime in the 1930s; his refusal to accept as fact the intelligence reports that pointed toward a surprise German attack on Russia in June 1941; and his belief that his wartime allies were involved in a plot to replace Hitler with a conservative German government with which they could negotiate a separate peace at the Soviet Union's expense. Andrew and Elkner also discuss Stalin's use of foreign intelligence agencies to pursue "enemies of the people" abroad—"Trotskyites" in particular—and to conduct various covert operations, including the "supervision" of the transition to so-called people's democracies in Eastern Europe.

1046 Bess, Demaree. "American Who Knows Stalin Best." *Saturday Evening Post* 224 (15 September 1951): 34+.

Bess describes the career of Charles Bohlen in the Foreign Service of the United States Department of State during which he witnessed private meetings between Stalin and two presidents, acted as interpreter in the conversations between FDR and Stalin at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences, and sat in on hundreds of hours of closed meetings between Russia's top leaders and American Secretaries of State. In addition to tracing the highlights of Bohlen's seventeen years of active involvement in Soviet-American affairs, Bess comments on Bohlen's understanding of the nature of Stalin's plans for the postwar world, and on how they spelled an end to Soviet-American cooperation, as well as on why Bohlen chose not to go public with the firsthand information he had about the views of the men in the Kremlin.

1047 Dallin, David J. "The Main Traits of Soviet Empire Building." *Russian Review* 18, no. 1 (1959): 3-13.

Dallin examines the empire building conducted by Stalin, showing how, initially, it represented a continuation of the tsarist and early Soviet trend of extending the nation's realm to adjoining lands through outright incorporation of new territories into the USSR, but later, in the case of postwar Eastern Europe, opted for a federation of "sovereign socialist nations" under Moscow's control. He discusses the reasons why Stalin opposed the annexation of the "people's democracies"—most

notably his belief that such a move would revive the image of tsarist imperialism and discourage other nations from joining the “world revolution”—and the limits of Stalin’s toleration of the satellites’ independence, particularly with respect his unwillingness to allow a challenge to Soviet “democratic centralism” to emerge in the form of a second “socialist camp.”

1048 Djilas, Milovan. “What Stalin Was Like.” *U. S. News and World Report* 52 (23 April 1962): 20.

These brief excerpts from the 1962 book *Conversations with Lenin*, written by the man who was at one time the second-ranking Yugoslav communist and was involved in the decision to break with the Kremlin, describe Stalin as a brutal, cynical despot who distrusted his wartime allies and predicted that Germany would recover quickly from defeat and there would be another major European war within a decade or two. Djilas also cites Stalin’s statements that, “Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system . . . as far as his army can reach.”

1049 Eastman, Max. “Behind Soviet Foreign Policy.” *American Mercury* 63 (September 1946): 261-69.

Eastman criticizes American officials who, in the afterglow of the Grand Alliance, continued to regard the Soviet Union as a friend of democracy and as a state willing to join the capitalist nations in a sincere effort to bring peace to the world. The Kremlin may want peace with the great powers for the immediate future, Eastman concedes, but he warns that Stalin remains firmly committed to promoting worldwide communist domination and is willing to use all means, war included, to advance that goal whenever and wherever it is feasible to do so. Eastman supports this argument by describing how Stalin, in the tradition of Lenin, has followed the principle of expediency in his dealings with the capitalist states, and by pointing out that the Soviet dictator’s belief in the inevitability of armed conflict between the forces of socialism and capitalism and in the future victory of communism stands out clearly in his writings and speeches to his fellow communists.

1050 Frieden, Jeff. “Internal Politics of European Communism in the Stalin Era, 1934-1949.” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 14 (spring 1981): 45-69.

Frieden draws upon material published from the archives of Soviet and European communist parties and from memoirs of communists and former communists to argue that internal Comintern politics were often far more complex than indicated by the conventional view, according to which the Comintern, after Stalin’s rise to power, was but a tool of Soviet foreign policy. He contends that during the Stalin era of international communism, when discussion centered on the interrelated topics of communist attitudes toward political alliances, and on the possible forms of the transition from capitalism to socialism, there existed beneath the seeming uniformity imposed by Stalin and his followers a fairly coherent “Right,” gradualist line which stood apart from the strategic intransigence and political rigidity that characterized the Stalinist line but ultimately caved in to the Stalinist position, primarily because of “Stalin’s preponderance within the Comintern and his great prestige within the various national parties.” Frieden also discusses the ultimate significance of the political trend which Stalin represented for the development of international communism, and he argues for the essential continuity of the Rightist, “reformist” line in European communism from the Sixth Comintern Congress through the Eurocommunism of the post-Stalin era.

1051 Griffiths, Franklyn. “Origins of Peaceful Coexistence.” *Survey* 50 (1964): 195-201.

This account of the origins of the slogan of peaceful existence locates the roots of the term in Trotsky’s 22 November 1917 call for *mirnoe sozhitelstvo* (peaceful cohabitation between people) and discusses how the slogan continued to be used with varying connotations by Commissar for Foreign Affairs Boris Chicherin, Lenin, and later Stalin, until the Fifteenth Party Congress, when, in the midst of the elimination of Trotsky from the political scene, and with the issuance of the

first Soviet proposals for total disarmament, Stalin stated that the period of *mirnoe sozhitelstvo* had receded into the past, giving way to a period of imperialist attacks, and that the party's task was now to delay war by applying all measures to maintain *mirnoe sosushchestvovanie* (peaceful coexistence) of capitalism and socialism, thus giving the term official sanction. Griffiths also discusses the motivating factors behind the adoption of the posture of peaceful coexistence, and the subsequent evolution of pronouncements on coexistence from Stalin's "acceptance" of Trotsky's concept to Khrushchev's active pursuit of coexistence.

1052 Guertner, Gary L. "Coexistence and Succession: Three Looks Backward and One Step Forward." *Air University Review* 35 (November/December 1983): 2-14.

Guertner looks at the doctrine of peaceful coexistence as developed by Lenin and practiced under the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev regimes. With respect to Stalin, he primarily discusses the Soviet leader's acceleration of both Lenin's turn toward placing the national interests of the USSR above proletarian internationalism and toward support for peaceful coexistence as a means of allaying capitalist hostility toward Moscow and of providing the Soviet state with an opportunity to build its political and economic power. The role played by the concept of peaceful coexistence in the debate between Stalin and Trotsky over the proper relationship of the new Soviet state and the noncommunist world; Stalin's commitment to peaceful coexistence as a prerequisite for economic reconstruction and the development of Soviet power rather than as a general strategy of coexistence with the West; and the pragmatic diplomacy he practiced in balancing his tactical support for peaceful coexistence with his thesis of capitalist encirclement all receive consideration in Guertner's analysis of Stalin's approach to peaceful coexistence. Guertner also comments on the Soviet leader's assumption of a more aggressive posture toward the end of his reign as he came to believe that postwar geopolitical developments—including the economic and military recovery of the Soviet Union, the consolidation of communism in Eastern Europe and China, and the growth of revolutionary movements in the Third World—indicated that "the 'ebb tide of revolution' had been replaced by a 'flow tide'," meaning that the essentially defensive foreign policy pursued since 1921 could be safely abandoned in favor of a more assertive one.

1053 Harris, Jonathan. "Historicus on Stalin." *Soviet Union* 1, no. 1 (1974): 54-73.

Harris takes issue with the assumptions, methodology, and conclusions of George Morgan's influential article "Stalin on Revolution," which appeared in the January 1949 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym of "Historicus" and which advanced the argument that Stalin's statements of the mid-1920s on the goal of worldwide proletarian revolution reflect the Soviet leader's real position on world revolution, whereas his statements delivered from 1941 to 1947, which either ignored or denied the goal of proletarian revolution, were simply tactical efforts to deceive the West about his actual intentions. In Harris's view, Stalin's pronouncements of the 1920s on world revolution, contrary to Morgan's analysis, can be seen "as an effort to define the prerequisites for revolutionary change by applying certain key Leninist ideas to European society" and to transmit this definition to communists elsewhere, while his subsequent statements may be viewed "as attempts to determine whether or not these prerequisites are actually being met at particular times in history." Continuing along this line of thought, Harris discusses Stalin's pronouncements on proletarian revolution from the mid-1920s to the late 1940s, devoting particular attention to the shortcomings of Morgan's reading of Soviet policy in postwar Eastern Europe in terms of Stalin's commitment to the use of armed force for revolutionary purposes, as derived from Stalin's 1924 statements about the Soviet Union as a "base of revolution" and from his "alleged 'tactical flexibility'" in pursuit of the goal of world revolution.

1054 Historicus (George A. Morgan). "Stalin on Revolution." *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 2 (January 1949): 175-214. Excerpts in *Time* 52 (27 December 1948): 20-21.

This influential 1949 article, in emphasizing the stress laid by Stalin on the importance of theory, summarizes the principal components of the Soviet leader's conception of the nature of revolution, as revealed in his published writings and statements on the subject between February 1919 and March 1948, including his views on the objective determinants of revolution, the role of conscious organization, and the future course of world revolution. Contending that Stalin had long viewed the Soviet Union as an instrument of world revolution, and that his statements of the 1920s on the goal of proletarian revolution reflect his long-term strategy for the achievement of that end, Morgan argues for the need to distinguish between Stalin's statements of the 1940s, which may be viewed as mere propaganda, and those early pronouncements in which he indicates his real intentions. A member of the U.S. State Department and First Secretary in the American Embassy in Moscow from 1948 to 1950, Morgan maintains that the evidence available on Stalin's thinking on revolution, particularly with respect to the applicability of the "law of ebb and flow" to the international revolutionary wave that surged forward following World War II, suggests that the post-war years may well witness more aggressive efforts by the Kremlin to foster revolutionary movements and promote the communist cause. For a sampling of the largely favorable response to "Stalin on Revolution" recorded in the American press in 1949, see "How Stalin Sees the Future," *Reader's Digest* 54 (March 1949): 1-4. For a critical commentary on Morgan's views, see Jonathan Harris's article "Historicus on Stalin" *Soviet Union* 1, no. 1 (1974): 54-73.

1055 "How Stalin Sees the Future." *Reader's Digest* 54 (March 1949): 1-4.

This article consists of a series of excerpts from the largely favorable commentaries which appeared in leading American newspapers and magazines regarding the analysis of Stalin—his goals, plans, and strategies—published in the January 1949 issue of *Foreign Affairs* and written under the pseudonym "Historicus" by George Morgan, who was then serving as First Secretary of the United States Embassy in Moscow. The commentaries, which came from such publications as *Time*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Washington Post*, and *New York Times*, deal mostly with Morgan's portrait of Stalin as a fanatic who, while attempting to deceive Western leaders about his real aims and intentions, has always been committed to the goal of world revolution and has always viewed the Soviet Union as an instrument for achieving that end.

1056 Hu Shih. "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 29, no. 1 (October 1950): 11-40.

In this article, the former Nationalist Chinese Ambassador to America isolates the principal elements of Stalin's "grand strategy of world conquest" as it can be discerned in China from 1924 to 1949. Reducing Stalin's whole plan to "a strategy of naked militarism aided by the most unscrupulous use of all possible forms of trickery and deceit," the article details Stalin's role in creating, preserving, and nurturing the Chinese Red Army; in shaping the strategy of retreat and compromise the Chinese communists temporarily adopted along their path to power; in deceiving President Franklin Roosevelt about Soviet interest in supporting Chinese communism; and in undermining the ability of the Chinese Nationalist government to resist the armed takeovers of the nation by the forces of MaoTse-tung.

1057 Johnson, Alvin. "The Russian Bear Walks Again." *Social Research* 23 (autumn 1956): 323-30.

Johnson outlines Soviet expansionist aims and policies under Stalin and his successors, arguing that the Kremlin's goal during these years has been to establish Russian dominance in East Europe, Asia, and Africa. For Johnson, the dream of Russia as the supreme Eastern power is neither a tsarist nor a communist dream but rather a Russian one.

1058 Kirilin, I. "Lenin and Stalin on the Coexistence of the Two Systems." *USSR Information Bulletin* 12 (11 February 1952): 82+.

Soviet historian I. Kirilin offers excerpts from the speeches and writings of Lenin and Stalin and from statements they made to the press or in interviews, and he points to a number of steps taken by the two leaders which illustrate that both men believed in the establishment of friendly economic relations with the capitalist world and in the possibility and desirability of peaceful relations and cooperation between socialist and capitalist states. The efforts made by Stalin to organize collective security against the threat of fascism, to secure nonaggression and mutual assistance pacts with a number of countries, to cooperate with the capitalist states during world War II, and to wage "a stubborn struggle for peace, friendship and cooperation" among all nations in the postwar years also receive attention in Kirilin's account of the Soviet Union's commitment to a peaceful foreign policy.

1059 Lowenthal, Richard. "Stalin and Khrushchev: The Real Change." *New Leader* 44 (1961): 8-12.

This discussion of the change in the scale and style of Soviet operations on the international scene under Nikita Khrushchev centers on how Stalin's successor has adopted a far bolder concept of the area within which the Soviet Union could take effective action, particularly with respect to the independent revolutionary forces which it could confidently support. Where Stalin never committed Soviet power and prestige to any political or military action outside a geographically contiguous area, did not look to advance communist revolution separate from territory adjoining to and controlled by the Soviet Union, and never doubted that "the 'sphere of influence' in which he could act decisively was limited by the existence of one or more 'enemy' spheres," Lowenthal explains, Khrushchev "has developed a truly world-wide policy," seeking to intervene in critical situations far beyond the Soviet sphere of influence and accepting the propositions that there are "different roads" to communist power and that communist revolutions outside the areas accessible to Soviet troops are both possible and desirable. Lowenthal also discusses how the dangers and opportunities confronting Soviet leaders of the 1960s are "utterly different than those that confronted Stalin during most of his reign," and how the new world policy of the Soviet state under Khrushchev makes it "a more formidable antagonist of the West than in Stalin's time, both because it is based on a far greater power combined with a revival of militancy at the top, and because it is carried out with greater flexibility and realism."

1060 Mackintosh, J. Malcom. "Stalin's Policies towards Eastern Europe, 1939-1948: The General Picture." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 11, no. 4 (1971): 200-14.

Mackintosh examines Stalin's policies toward Eastern Europe during the period 1939-41, the wartime years, and the postwar period to 1949, showing how his behavior and policies during each of these periods, particularly his "preoccupation with such traditional matters as frontiers, buffer zones, and defense problems," can be understood in relation to both his deep commitment to his concept of a Great Russia enhanced by Soviet power, and the inspiration he derived from his "incomplete understanding of classical Marxism-Leninism." Receiving most attention in Mackintosh's discussion are Stalin's wartime plans for Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the attitude he displayed at the three major Allied conferences, and the methods he adopted and pattern he followed in the Soviet takeover and communization of Eastern Europe.

1061 Mancall, Mark. "Russia and China: Perennial Conflict." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (1963): 60-68.

Mancall points out the mistakes made by Stalin in his policy toward China, describing how his insistence, in the years 1924-27, on an urban-based, proletarian-led revolution in China almost destroyed the Chinese Communist Party; how his support of Chiang Kai-shek and the United Front policy blinded him to the power of the Chinese communists during World War II; and how, after 1949, he again misread Chinese political realities in attempting to reestablish Russia's influence in her traditional Far Eastern sphere of interest. In considering the roots of Stalin's errors in

formulating the Kremlin's China policy, Mancall stresses the influence of the Soviet leader's Marxist-Leninist predilection for a proletarian, urban-based revolution, reinforced by the example of Russia's October Revolution, which saw the Bolsheviks come to power by seizing control in the urban metropolises of Petrograd and Moscow.

1062 Marantz, Paul. "Prelude to Détente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev." *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1975): 501-28.

Marantz outlines the central tenets of Stalin's worldview and then contrasts them to the major revisions that Khrushchev introduced concerning the inevitability of war among capitalist states, the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union, peaceful coexistence with the capitalist nations, and the final victory of socialism. In describing the basic components of foreign policy doctrine under Stalin, Marantz examines the Soviet leader's convictions that wars among capitalist states were inevitable and would spill beyond their initial confines to engulf the Soviet Union; that international disarmament could not be achieved as long as capitalism continued to exist; that peaceful coexistence was impossible amidst the Soviet Union's encirclement by capitalist powers committed to the destruction of the socialist state; and that the victory of socialism could be achieved within the Soviet Union but could not be considered secure or final as long as capitalism held sway in Europe and America.

1063 McDermott, Kevin. "Rethinking the Comintern: Soviet Historiography, 1987-1991." *Labour History Review* 57, no. 3 (1992): 37-58.

McDermott discusses the progress made in Comintern studies by Soviet historians who, operating under the impact of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, have made use of newly available archival sources to illuminate some of the many blank spots within the Comintern's twenty-four-year existence. He structures his review of the new Soviet literature on the Comintern around six themes: Lenin and the Comintern's conception of world revolution; the ideological and political struggles within the Comintern; the problems of strategy and tactics in the years 1924-34; the Comintern's mechanism of functioning; Comintern activities during World War II; and the Comintern's relations with the Soviet Communist Party. McDermott's commentary on the new Soviet research dealing with these six themes covers such subjects as the qualitative differences between the Leninist and Stalinist phases of the Comintern; the massive repercussions of Stalin's triumph within the Soviet party on the internal life of the Comintern apparatus and communist parties abroad; Stalin's influence on the "third period" of Comintern history; the origin and effects of the Stalinist terror in the Comintern; and the pitfalls of demonizing Stalin in the Comintern's acceptance of Stalinist attitude, policies, and practices. Overall, McDermott stresses that the new studies shed light on the omnipotence of Stalin in Comintern affairs, his determining voice in the most crucial moments of the organization's history, and the harm caused by Stalinism to the world communist movement.

1064 Nordling, Carl O. "Stalin's Insistent Endeavors at Conquering Finland." *Journal of Slavic Military History* 16, no. 1 (2003): 137-57.

This paper details the steps taken by Stalin between 1938 and 1948 to annex Finland to the Soviet empire, including his use of such tactics as diplomatic "negotiations," military force (in 1939-40 and again in 1944), subversive "fifth column" methods, and, finally, pressuring Finnish communist leaders to seize power directly and make Finland "a people's democracy." Nordling also discusses the reasons why Stalin failed to include "little Finland among his acquisitions," emphasizing the role played by the Soviet dictator's misplaced faith in the intelligence he received that the workers in Finland were dissatisfied, would not resist an invasion by Soviet military forces, and would welcome a communist regime, and by Finnish communist leaders Arvo Tuominen and Yrjö Leino, who acted as Finnish patriots at key moments in the history of Soviet attempts to conquer their nation, betrayed Stalin, and "tipped the scale to the benefit of Finland."

- 1065** Polonsky, Antony. "Stalin and the Poles 1941-7." *European Historical Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1987): 453-92.

The aim of this article is to attempt to account for the two failures which the author believes are the key to understanding the evolution of political life in Poland between 1941 and 1948, namely, "the failure of Stalin to find the basis for a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with any of the politicians making up the Polish government in London," and the failure of the national front strategy of the Polish Workers' Party to win noncommunist support. In addition to detailing the events and conditions that account for these failures, Polonsky also discusses the primacy of the external factor, meaning Soviet backing, in the establishment and maintenance of communism in Poland, focusing here on Stalin's maneuverings in his ruthless determination to have his way over Poland.

- 1066** Pons, Silvio. "The Papers on Foreign and International Policy in the Russian Archives: The Stalin Years." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 40, nos. 1-2 (January-June 1999): 235-50.

Pons discusses some of the problems that attend research in Soviet foreign policy archives, and considers the ways in which the available archival materials have affected how scholars view Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. Among the conclusions which Pons draws with respect to what the new materials reveal about Stalin's foreign policy are: there is a close connection between the Soviet leader's security strategy in the Cold War and prewar years; there is a clear indication that his unprincipled pragmatism in foreign policy was not detached from his ideological vision, particularly with respect to Bolshevik theory about the nature of the capitalist world and the inevitability of war; and there is evidence suggesting that, while Stalin may have had a coherent strategic plan, considerable ambiguity and uncertainty existed in Soviet foreign policy decision making, and that the interaction between ideology, policy planning, and external circumstances needs to be taken into account when analyzing why individual decisions were taken.

- 1067** Roberts, Frank. "Soviet Policies under Stalin and Khrushchev: A Comparison Based on Personal Experiences between 1939 and 1962." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 72, no. 3 (1973): 440-50.

In this comparison of Soviet policy under Stalin and Khrushchev, the author, who served as Britain's ambassador to Moscow in the mid-1940s and again in the early 1960s, outlines the dominant qualities of the two rulers, describing how Stalin was more realistic, cautious, and persistent than Khrushchev. He contrasts the policies of restraint followed by Stalin in Iran and Finland, the Middle and Far East, Latin America, and Germany with the explosive, ill-considered, and contradictory policies of Khrushchev that led to both the Berlin and Cuban crises. Roberts also discusses the troubles Khrushchev encountered through his proclaimed policy of de-Stalinization and his failed agricultural policy, and how these ventures, along with the debacle in Cuba, contributed to his downfall.

- 1068** Rousset, David. "The Class Nature of Socialism and China." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 23 (1957): 355-61.

This account of the devastating effects of Stalinism on the world communist movement, particularly on the course of social revolution in China, centers on the theme that Stalin, in constructing a parasitic hierarchy—a new ruling class—to assure his domination, managed not only to vanquish the opposition within the Soviet Communist Party but also to establish the means by which he was able to generate and perpetuate the myth which represented the Soviet Union as the first example in history of a state in which the working class was the ruling class, and which portrayed himself and his henchmen as the legitimate stewards of the revolutionary process initiated by Lenin. Rousset also discusses how the revolutions in Poland and Hungary following the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev have set in motion, through the rejection of the myth of the Soviet workers' state, a process which may prove to be the undoing of the Stalinist system.

1069 Shapiro, Henry. "George Kennan's Russian Opposite Number." *New Republic* 117 (22 September 1947): 23.

In this brief discussion of the political character, diplomatic style, and foreign policy aims of Stalin, the author describes the Soviet leader as "his own Department of State," a man who is extraordinarily well-informed on a wide range of subjects, and a micromanager preoccupied "with administrative details which elsewhere are the headache of minor officials." Stalin's principal concerns, in Shapiro's view, are the development of the Soviet state and the maintenance of Soviet security, concerns which do not run counter to his hope for an eventual worldwide communist society but which produce in him a pronounced unwillingness to risk the concrete achievements of Soviet communism to bring about Marxist revolutions elsewhere. Since Stalin has shown flexibility in the fulfillment of his objectives, the Western powers should play on his domestic and security concerns as a means of winning his support for a pact of friendship, according to Shapiro.

1070 Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "The World Revolution As Geopolitical Instrument of the Soviet Leadership." *Russian History* 26, no. 3 (1999): 315-34.

In this analysis of the role of world revolution in Soviet politics and ideology, the emphasis is on how the Kremlin, beginning in the 1920s, moved away from regarding world revolution as a goal in itself, and an essential condition for modernizing Russia's backward society and securing the base of the world's first socialist regime, and toward viewing it as an ancillary goal in service of Russian national interests. Focusing on Stalin's use of the social demagoguery and phraseology of world revolution and international class solidarity for propaganda purposes, Shlapentokh sees the Soviet leader as having waved the flag of world revolution to legitimize the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet people's eyes, to sustain public optimism, to encourage productivity in the country, and to justify, as the defender of socialism, the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy and interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries. "The rapid adjustment of the world revolution to the needs of the totalitarian state demonstrated one of the major strengths of the Soviet leadership" and enabled the Kremlin to bolster its "foreign and domestic policies with the valuable propagandistic resources embedded in this concept," Shlapentokh concludes.

1071 Tang, Peter S. H. "Stalin's Role in the Communist Victory in China." *American Slavic Review* 13 (October 1954): 375-88.

Tang contends that Stalin's doctrines on revolutionary strategy and tactics had far more influence on Mao Tse-tung and the course of revolutionary events in China than is commonly supposed. Drawing primarily upon Stalin's speeches and writings, Tang outlines the main points of the Soviet leader's position on the nature of the Chinese revolutionary movement and the path it should follow in its march toward proletarian revolution, including his teachings on the need to establish the leadership of the proletariat and its party in the Chinese revolutionary movement; to support the peasantry in their struggle against the feudal landlords; to fashion the Red Army into the principal weapon of revolution; to form revolutionary blocs with the nonproletarian classes and groups—a "united front policy"—in order to maximize the force of the revolutionary movement; and to establish a revolutionary regime of the soviets of the workers' and peasants' deputies as a necessary step in the transition from the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution. Throughout, Tang cites the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese communist leaders to suggest that the counsel of Stalin on the matters cited was deeply appreciated and helped to steer the party along the course it followed in achieving the victory of the communist revolution in China.

1072 Taylor, A. J. P. "Stalin As Statesman: A Look at the Record." *New York Times Magazine* (18 November 1951): 9+.

Taylor argues that Stalin's conduct of foreign policy shows him to be committed to the single aim of advancing Soviet security and to be a political tactician of the first order but lacking many of

the skills required for a great statesman. While Stalin has proven to be tenacious, patient, and a master of defense, Taylor maintains, he is barren of constructive ideas, relies on fear as his main tool of persuasion, and, most importantly, does not know how to cooperate with men of equal political stature. Taylor concedes that Stalin has managed to make great gains for the Soviet Union but contends that, with more skill and understanding, he could have made practically all of them by cooperating with the other great powers, which would have enabled him to attain a real security for the USSR.

1073 Thorpe, Andrew. "Stalinism and British Politics." *History* 83, no. 272 (October 1998): 608-28.

Thorpe examines the attitude toward Stalinism adopted by the British Communist Party and the political consequences of its pro-Stalinist posture. He shows how the British Communist Party's allegiance to Stalinism was not a decisive factor in its failure to win support for communism in Britain, and how the party's support of the Stalinist line proved to be problematic once de-Stalinization began in the Soviet Union. Thorpe also comments on the Labor Party's lack of enthusiasm for Stalinism, and on how Stalinism, "by providing a development against which to guard, . . . helped to keep the British Conservative Party together."

1074 Todorov, Tzvetan. "Stalin Close Up." Translated by Karine Zbinden. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 1 (2004): 94-111.

Todorov comments on the insights into Stalin's political character, beliefs, and behavior provided by the diary of Bulgarian communist leader, Comintern chief, and member of the Kremlin's inner circle, Georgi Dimitrov. The Stalin who emerges from the pages of Dimitrov's diary, Todorov explains, is a leader who was merciless toward his adversaries; brutal and menacing in working with his collaborators; strongly inclined toward the practice or threat of terror; prone to speak firmly but to be deliberately vague about his ultimate intentions; and fond of joking, even at the most inopportune times. The diary also illustrates the nationalist form assumed by Stalin's communism; his conviction that action should only be taken when victory is virtually assured; his complete, Machiavellian elimination of all ties between moral virtues and political qualities; and his belief that what was good for the power of the Soviet Union and/or his own political position was, by definition, good for the cause of communism.

1075 Werth, Alexander. "How Isolationist Is Stalin?" *Political Quarterly* 20 (October 1949): 326-36.

This commentary on Stalin's development of and attachment to the policy of "socialism in one country" largely takes place within the framework of his desire to put Russia first and world revolution second, as described by Isaac Deutscher in his political biography of Stalin. Werth lends his support to Deutscher's judgment that Stalin's paramount concern for security colored many of his major policy decisions and actions, including the launching of the Soviet purge trials of the 1930s; the pursuit of Popular Front tactics and of an alliance with the Western powers against the fascist states in the 1930s; his decision to press for an accord with Hitler in 1939; and his drive to gain Western acceptance of Soviet spheres of influence in the postwar world. He also discusses the actions taken by Stalin "to succeed 'socialism in one country' with 'socialism in one sphere'"—Eastern Europe—and how this development fits within the Soviet leader's adherence to a policy of isolationism, both culturally and politically, in the postwar European world.

1076 Westad, Odd Arne. "Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War History." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 2 (spring 1997): 259-71.

Westad argues for the importance of understanding Soviet ideology in explaining the Kremlin's foreign policy in the Stalin era and afterwards. He describes how the elements of Marxism that Lenin and Stalin underlined—including their use of the concept of class struggle to analyze poli-

tics abroad, belief that contradictions among capitalists would lead to wars from which the communist movement could profit, and conviction that the ultimate victory of socialism was inevitable—became integral parts of the Soviet elite's envisionment of the world and came to influence Moscow's international policy. Westad also argues for the need for historians to reconsider their thinking on Soviet-era foreign policy, particularly with respect to the Cold War, in view of the information that has become available from Russian and East European foreign affairs archives.

- 1077** Winston, Henry. "Stalin: Champion of Lasting Peace." *Political Affairs* (January 1950): 14-29.

Pre-World War II

- 1078** Agnew, Jeremy and Kevin McDermott. "Stalin, the Comintern and European Communism, 1934-39." *Modern History Review* 7, no. 3 (1996): 28-30.

The authors comment briefly on Stalin's involvement with the Communist International and European communism in the second half of the 1930s, pointing out that, while he had total control over the Comintern apparatus in Moscow, he did not intervene in Comintern affairs on a day-to-day basis but rather primarily when Soviet state interests or diplomacy were at stake, and in these instances he always privileged Soviet concerns and needs over those of the Comintern.

- 1079** Alvin, Milton. "Was Stalin's Pact with Hitler Justified? *International Socialist Review* 33, no. 2 (1972): 20-23+.

Alvin dissects the argument advanced by Ivan Maisky—Soviet Ambassador to Britain at the onset of World War II—in a series of three articles published in the 30-31 August and 1 September 1971 issues of the *New York Times* that Stalin was compelled to enter into a nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939 because the British and French governments refused to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union to check fascist aggression. According to Alvin, Stalin's Popular Front tactics and pursuit of collective security with capitalist regimes was an eminently unsuccessful response to fascism which saw Stalin attempt to forge alliances of dubious value and to use the communist parties of other countries in a shameless effort to protect the Soviet Union from the Nazi threat. The pact with Hitler, orchestrated amidst the bankrupt policy of collective security, may have brought twenty-two months of peace for Moscow, but it confused and demoralized communist parties beyond Russia; cost Stalin the support of the Western European working classes; and, contrary to Maisky's claim, did not allow the Soviet Union to prepare militarily for the eventual confrontation with Germany—a fact made painfully clear by the dismal performance of a wholly unprepared Red Army in the face of the Nazi assault in the summer of 1941.

- 1080** Barrett, James R. "The History of American Communism and Our Understanding of Stalinism." *American Communist History* 2, no. 2 (2003): 175-82.

Barrett responds to Bryan Palmer's article "Rethinking the Historiography of United States Communism," published in this same issue of *American Communist History*, commenting on Palmer's juxtaposition of New Left and New anti-Communist historiography and on his use of anti-Stalinism as an organizing principle in his analysis of the setbacks experienced by the international workers' movement under Stalin and of their implications for the American Communist Party (ACP). Barrett contends that, while the degeneration of the ACP took a decisive turn with the ascendancy of Stalin, the deformity of the party started before Stalin's rise, when instances of Soviet intervention and manipulation were already clearly in evidence. While the ACP's relationship with Moscow certainly was a decisive factor in its history, Barrett explains, developments and influences within the United States helped to shape the party's strategy, including the strategy of the Popular Front, and party activists, particularly toward the end of Stalin's reign, sought to

distance the ACP from Stalinism and the Leninist notion of a vanguard party, an effort whose failure led to the ACP's ultimate demise as a viable political organization.

1081 Basseches, Nikolaus. "The Sphinx of the Kremlin." *World Review* 7 (May 1939): 25-37.

Basseches considers what the dismissal of Maxim Litvinov from his post as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs suggests about Stalin's foreign policy. He believes that, in view of both Stalin's recent accusation that the Western press has been trying to create an atmosphere of irritation between Germany and the USSR and his statement that he will not allow the Soviet Union to "be drawn into the adventures of the capitalist states," and when considering that, in his last three speeches, Hitler has omitted his customary attacks on the Soviet Union, the replacement of "the Jew Litvinov" with "the Aryan Molotov" is most likely intended as a warning to the democracies that they must either accept Moscow's proposals regarding the terms for an antifascist alliance or else Soviet foreign policy will take a radical change in course, most likely toward a rapprochement with Berlin.

1082 ———. "Stalin's Plans: World Revolution Still the Goal." *World Review* 8 (March 1940): 40-42.

Basseches maintains that Stalin's rapprochement with Hitler should be viewed within the context of the Soviet leader's "theory of 'alliances' or 'friendships,'" according to which formal relationships with other nations or foreign groups are never to be considered as arrangements for "the achievement of common aims, but only of those which correspond with Soviet policy." Stalin's ultimate aim remains world revolution, and he will make whatever foreign policy shifts he deems necessary in order to promote the eventual attainment of that goal, according to Basseches.

1083 Batbayar, Tsedendambyn. "Stalin's Strategy in Mongolia, 1932-1936." *Mongolian Studies* 22 (1999): 1-17.

Batbayar maintains that the spectacular failure of the Comintern's leftist policies in Mongolia during the years 1928-32, coupled with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and creation of a puppet state, Manchuko, in 1931, created a dramatically different situation for Soviet policy toward Mongolia, leading Stalin to become preoccupied with the prospect of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Describing how Stalin's view of Mongolia's geopolitical importance coalesced into an active and systematic policy in the years from 1932 to 1936, Batbayar, in drawing upon newly available archival records in Moscow and Ulan Bator, discusses Stalin's leading role in orchestrating a defense protocol with and sending Soviet troops to the MPR both to deter a possible full-scale Japanese attack through Mongolian territory which would threaten the Trans-Siberian railway and to bring the MPR firmly under Soviet control.

1084 Bess, Demaree. "Stalin over Europe. Behind the Stalin-Hitler Deal." *Saturday Evening Post* 212 (14 October 1939): 5+.

Stalin knowingly plunged Europe into war by concluding the August 1939 nonaggression agreement with Hitler, not to forge a lasting Nazi-Soviet alliance aimed at world domination, as alarmists maintain, nor because of any belief in the likelihood of communist revolutions rising from the ruins of war-torn Europe, as those who believe he is wedded to the cause of world revolution contend, but rather as a means of inducing the capitalist powers to weaken themselves by warfare so that Russia could achieve the "breathing spell" which has been the chief aim of his diplomacy since his assumption of power, according to this article written in the second month of World War II. Stalin's reprehensible provocation of war among his European rivals, along with his jackal-like behavior in taking Russia's share of the spoils in defeated Poland, Bess writes, represent further confirmation of the Soviet dictator's ruthlessness and moral bankruptcy and signal the end of the Russian Revolution as an expansive world force.

1085 ———. "Stalin Prefers Siberia." *Saturday Evening Post* 212 (22 July 1939): 23+.

Bess describes what he sees as the policies and actions of Stalin indicating that he envisions Russia as a great Eurasian empire, including the territorial and economic expansion to the east orchestrated under his rule, and the propaganda campaign his regime has conducted urging the Soviet people to believe that Russia's future lies primarily in Asia.

1086 Blank, Stephen. "Soviet Politics and the Iranian Revolution of 1919-1921." *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 21, no. 2 (1980): 173-94.

This examination of Moscow's pursuit of competing and essentially incompatible policies with respect to the Iranian Revolution of 1919-21 takes place against the background of the troubled relationship between Soviet goals in the region and the aspirations of Moslem nationalities and Pan-Islamists. As part of this discussion, Blank describes how Stalin's aspiration to liberate all of Transcaucasia and the East by force led him to pursue an adventurist military policy in the region in an attempt to wed the divergent forces of Russo-centric international socialism, and how this policy led to serious international difficulties in border regions and upset the governments of Iran, Turkey, and England to the point where war loomed on the horizon. Blank also discusses the policy shift in Moscow that came with the recognition that the costs of military intervention in Iran and the dangers that attended the espousal of Pan-Islamism far outweighed any benefits that might accrue from pursuing such policies.

1087 Brooks, Jeffrey. "Official Xenophobia and Popular Cosmopolitanism in Early Soviet Russia." *American Historical Review* 97, no. 5 (December 1992): 1431-48.

Brooks examines the efforts of Stalin and his supporters to create, for political purposes, a xenophobic perspective on the world in the 1920s through reports in the Soviet press on the bad life under capitalism and on foreign threats to the nation's security. Examining material appearing in three national newspapers—*Pravda*, *Krest'ianskaia gazeta*, and *Trud*—relevant to four themes—the growth of peaceful relations with other countries, prospects for world revolution, the evils of life under capitalism, and foreign dangers—Brooks shows how the attempt of the Stalin group to create a press-inspired "sense of irreducible bipolarity in the world" collided with a persistent respect for foreigners and interest in foreign places and was never finalized in the public discourse of the 1920s.

1088 Bruegel, J. W. "Dr. Beneš on the Soviet 'Offer of Help' in 1938." *East Central Europe* 4, no. 1 (1977): 56-59.

Bruegel draws upon a report by British historian John Wheeler Bennett, contained in the archives of the British Foreign Office for the year 1946, establishing that Edvard Beneš, then President of Czechoslovakia, never received a formal offer from Stalin, or anyone else in the Kremlin, of Soviet military help to Czechoslovakia in 1938 in the event of a Nazi attack irrespective of the previous limitation that France would first have to fulfill her contractual obligations to a Czechoslovakia attacked by Germany. Furthermore, not only did the Soviet government fail to place an offer on paper to specify the form its assistance would take, but, if provided at all, Soviet aid would have come far too late to have been of any value for Czechoslovakia, according to Bruegel.

1089 Buchanan, Meriel. "What Is Stalin Plotting?" *Saturday Review* 162 (31 October 1936): 552-53.

Buchanan accuses Stalin of "criminal responsibility and double-faced tactics" in his efforts to turn Spain into a communist state amidst the Spanish Civil War. Stalin's charges against Germany, Italy, and Portugal in connection with the tragic affair in Spain, Buchanan argues, were designed to create tension and bring about a crisis in Europe from which Moscow and the communist cause would benefit. Buchanan criticizes the British government for succumbing to the "anti-Italian,

anti-German fever” Stalin has spread and insists that Britain’s best interests would be served by joining the Italian-German united front against Bolshevism.

1090 Carley, Michael Jabara. “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-41.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12, no. 3 (2001): 159-74.

Carley contends that Soviet foreign policy during the interwar years was, for the most part, rational, pragmatic, and cautious, and that the West—specifically, Britain, France, and America—recognized Soviet pragmatism but failed to match it. Taking aim at the conventional assessment of early Soviet foreign policy and Cold War stereotypes, which, in privileging the role of ideology in shaping Kremlin policy, see Stalin as an evil left-wing ideologue willing to say and do almost anything to advance Soviet power and the communist cause, Carley points out Soviet efforts to come to terms with the Western powers, first, during the 1920s, when trade was the main motivation of Western-Soviet rapprochement, and then, in the 1930s, when collective security against the fascist threat was the driving force. He also describes how anticommunist ideologues triumphed over the realists in shaping the largely unfavorable Western response to Soviet pragmatism.

1091 ———. “Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936-1941: A Review Article.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, no. 7 (November 2004): 1081-1100.

Carley reviews *Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941* (2002), by Silvio Pons, and *Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941* (2002), by Albert L. Weeks, in terms of what the two books have to say about Stalin’s foreign policy aims and strategy; Soviet-German relations in the 1930s; the Kremlin’s behavior during the Munich crisis of September 1938; Moscow’s conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Berlin in August 1939; and, lastly, the steps leading up to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, including the question of whether Stalin was considering a preemptive strike against Hitler sometime during the summer of 1941. While treating the work of Pons, who made extensive use of Russian foreign policy archives in Moscow in conducting his research, more favorably than that of Weeks, whose book is largely based upon secondary sources, Carley nonetheless questions Pons’s basic contention that Soviet foreign policy was motivated by ideology—by the inevitability of war doctrine—along with Weeks’s thesis that Soviet diplomacy “was a dishonest cover up for the real purposes of the Soviet Union, the spread of world socialist revolution.” He suggests instead that, while hindsight allows one to envision how the Kremlin could have conducted a more successful defense of Soviet national interests during the immediate prewar years, Stalin, given the status of Soviet negotiations with Britain and France for a defensive alliance against Germany, and in view of the Soviet Union’s need to buy time to further develop its military capabilities, most likely believed he had few realistic alternatives to the diplomatic course that he chose, risky as it was, in trying to provide for Soviet security as the clouds of war thickened.

1092 Cohen, Barry Mendel. “Moscow at Munich: Did the Soviet Union Offer Unilateral Aid to Czechoslovakia?” *East European Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (1978): 341-48.

The offer of direct Soviet military aid to Czechoslovakia at the time of the Munich crisis of September 1938, purportedly made by Stalin to President Edvard Beneš via Czech Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald and cited by six Soviet sources over a decade later, is fictitious and was invented by Gottwald himself in 1949, according to Cohen. While Cohen believes the Gottwald offer of unilateral aid to be a spurious one, he argues for the authenticity of an offer of Soviet military aid made by Soviet Ambassador S. Alexandrovsky in a 21 September 1938 telegram to President Beneš. He cites various private sources which seem to confirm the existence of the telegram, and speculates on the reasons why the Soviets have suppressed such an important document, and on why Beneš neither responded to the offer nor mentioned it directly in his memoirs.

1093 Dallin, Alexander. "Personality, Nationalism and Commitment." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 596-98.

This brief commentary on Robert Tucker's paper "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," published in this same *Slavic Review* issue, primarily deals with Tucker's thinking on Stalin's role in determining the course taken by Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet leader's Russian nationalist outlook, and the extent of his commitment to the ties forged between the Soviet Union and Germany. Dallin also considers Tucker's analysis of the elements in Stalin's mindset that led him to expect a new European war which would lead to impressive gains for the revolutionary cause.

1094 Davis, Kenneth S. "Have We Been Wrong about Stalin?" *Current History* 1, no. 1 (September 1941): 6-11.

Davis argues for a revision of the negative estimate of Stalin occasioned by the Kremlin's decision to conclude the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939, maintaining that Stalin was convinced of Hitler's intent to conquer the world, did all he could to promote collective security against fascist aggression as an international policy, and was left with no choice but to conclude a deal with Berlin due to the unalterable opposition of Western leaders to the policy of collective security, and to their apparent desire to use fascism as a buffer against communism. Davis believes Stalin clearly recognized that the pact with Germany would only delay a Nazi assault on Russia, and that he effectively used the time between August 1939 and the German attack of June 1941 to place his nation in a better position to repel the Nazi assault. He also suggests that, by the summer of 1941, Stalin believed that the policy of stalling Hitler had reached a point of diminishing returns and therefore took a number of steps that, in effect, forced the issue of war, including baiting Hitler by leaking information that Soviet forces would be ready to attack Germany by August 1941.

1095 Dewey, Donald O. "America and Russia, 1939-41: The Views of the *New York Times*." *Journalism Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (1967): 62-70.

Dewey provides an account of the views expressed toward the Soviet Union in the editorial pages of the *New York Times* from the months preceding the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact up to the eve of the 22 June 1941 German invasion of the USSR. Among the subjects addressed in the editorials are Stalin's mind-set in attempting to negotiate an anti-Nazi alliance with Britain and France; his motives for concluding the 1939 treaty of non-aggression with Germany; the balance of power between Hitler and Stalin in their uneasy coalition; the direct connection between Stalin's purge of the Red Army's officer corps and the failure of the 1939-40 Russian military campaign in Finland; and the Kremlin's 14 April 1941 signing of a neutrality agreement with Japan—an event that marked the low point of the editorial attitude of the *Times* toward the Soviets. Overall, Dewey shows how the editorials in the *Times* on Russia during this period, though marked by a number of shifts and turns, were characterized by angry outbursts against Stalin and Soviet international behavior, with Moscow's alliance with Berlin attracting the most attention and criticism.

1096 Draper, Theodore. "The Strange Case of the Comintern." *Survey* 18, no. 3 (1972): 91-137.

This paper focuses on the period 1926-28, when Nikolai Bukharin headed the Comintern, to offer a reassessment of the origins of the "third period" in the Comintern's history which extended officially from 1928 to 1934 and witnessed the inception of full-fledged Stalinism in the international communist movement. Pointing out the shortcomings of the prevailing view, according to which Stalin was the mastermind of the third period and the left turn which it represented was conceived by Stalin, the "leftist," in his struggle against Bukharin, the "rightist," Draper argues that the third period was conceived by Bukharin, not Stalin—a fact he feels has been misunderstood by analysts who have assumed that Bukharin's allegedly rightist line in Soviet domestic policy must have carried over to his leadership of the Comintern. What Bukharin started, Draper maintains, Stalin finished as he emerged victorious in the struggle for Soviet leadership, appropriated the work done by Bukharin in drafting the Comintern's program at the Sixth World Congress, and gave Buk-

harin's ideas "a characteristic Stalin twist," taking them in a direction which their author never intended.

1097 Dubofsky, Melvyn. "The Devil Is Not in the Details: He is Stalin!" *American Communist History* 2, no. 2 (2003): 191-94.

Dubofsky comments on Bryan Palmer's article "Rethinking the Historiography of United States Communism," which appears in this same issue of *American Communist History*. He commends Palmer for his thorough and searching analysis of the historiography of American communism in the interwar period, but takes issue with his contention that Stalin, in perverting the Soviet Communist Party as well as the Comintern, was responsible for both the peculiar relationship between the Soviet Union and communist parties around the world and the ills and evils associated with communism in the America after 1928. In questioning Palmer's "casting of Stalin as the devil incarnate" and his positive portrait of the pre-Stalin communist movement," Dubofsky briefly discusses how the policies followed by Lenin and his associates served to alienate many radicals in North America and elsewhere and did as much "to rupture what remained of working-class internationalism as had the socialists in the Second International in their response to the calamity of World War I."

1098 Dziwianowski, M. K. "Stalin and the Polish Communists." *Survey* no. 35 (1961): 61-64.

This exploration of the sources of the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland (CPP) on the orders of the Communist International in 1938 discounts the interpretation offered by the official historian of the communist movement in Poland, Tadeusz Daniszewski, namely, that the party was disintegrating due to infiltration by provocateurs and spies and had been contaminated by Trotskyite influences. According to Dziwianowski, the real reason for the CCP's demise was that Stalin, having decided to strike a bargain with Hitler, opted to wage a preventive war against potential opposition to such an agreement by purging the CCP's entire top strata and dissolving the party entirely.

1099 Eley, Geoff. "International Communism in the Hey-Day of Stalin." *New Left Review* 157 (1986): 90-100.

Eley points out the virtues of Paolo Spriano's *Stalin and the European Communists* (1985), particularly the book's account of the impact of the entrenchment of a Stalinist mentality in the Comintern, and the dampening effect that the character and policies of the Stalinized Comintern had upon cooperation with the noncommunist Left.

1100 Fischer, Louis. "Litvinov Answers Stalin." *Nation* 153 (19 July 1941): 47-48.

Fischer interprets the statement made by Maxim Litvinov, in a broadcast to Britain and America following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, about how Hitler has typically relied upon the principle of divide and attack in his efforts to fulfill his dream of world domination as a criticism of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and of Stalin for not frustrating Hitler's divide and conquer strategy by organizing a common resistance with England and France. Stalin's stubborn defense of a pact "which stands revealed as a self-defeating piece of appeasement, is the height of absurdity and exposes his fatal love of the crown of infallibility which he has set upon his own head," in Fischer's opinion.

1101 Garver, John W. "Chiang Kai-shek's Quest for Soviet Entry into the Sino-Japanese War." *Political Science Quarterly* 102, no. 2 (1987): 295-316.

The focus of this paper is the diplomacy practiced by Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1930s in his effort to achieve a Chinese victory in the Sino-Japanese War. In discussing Chiang's efforts to secure Soviet intervention in the conflict with Japan, Garver examines the circumstances which led Chiang, like Stalin, to promote the formation of an "anti-aggressor peace-camp"; the benefits, both

material and political, that came to China by way of the Sino-Soviet alignment during the first eighteen months of the Sino-Japanese War; and the various considerations which led Stalin to stop short of entering the war against Japan. While Stalin's policy in China failed in its aim to advance the policy of collective security against Japan, his attempt to benefit from the conflict in China by diverting the forces of Russia's enemy, Japan, was successful, Garver concludes.

- 1102** ———. "Comment: Mao, the Comintern and the Second United Front." *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 171-79.

In this commentary on Michael Sheng's *China Quarterly* article "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-37," Garver mainly agrees with Sheng's view that in the mid-1930s repeated interventions by the Comintern induced changes in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy which brought it successively closer to a united front with Chiang Kai-shek, but he takes issue with Sheng's positions on the degree of consistency between the Comintern and CCP lines on a united front; Stalin's attitude toward arming the CCP and on the creation of a CCP-controlled state in northwest China; Stalin's motives for pushing the CCP toward a united front with Chiang; and Mao's responses to the Comintern's directives. For Sheng's response to Garver's reply, see "Response: Mao and Stalin: Adversaries or Comrades?" *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 180-83.

- 1103** Gillette, Philip S. "Motivational-Ideational Analysis of Stalin's Foreign Policy." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 592-95.

Gillette responds to Robert Tucker's *Slavic Review* article "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," questioning the usefulness of Tucker's "motivational-ideational" interpretation in illuminating Stalin's policy toward the Far East as well as toward Germany during the years of Hitler's rise to power and immediately thereafter. He also raises the question of whether Soviet foreign policy would have been significantly different under Trotsky or Bukharin, suggesting the possibility that the policies of the three men would have been similar, and casting further doubt on the inclusiveness of Tucker's "motivational-ideational" approach to Stalin's foreign policy.

- 1104** Harper, Samuel N. "The Soviet Union—National or International." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 175 (September 1934): 51-60.

Harper maintains that the Bolsheviks, while starting off in a crusading spirit, working for world revolution, have, in fact, under the Stalin regime, "set up a system that manifests in its relations with other countries for the characteristics of a national state." Focusing on the ways in which both the failure of world revolution to develop as the Bolshevik leadership forecast and the subsequent adoption of the policy of "socialism in one country" affected the Soviet attitude toward peace and the normalization of relations with the capitalist powers, Harper discusses how the Kremlin's foreign, nationality, economic, and educational policies clearly indicate that the balance between the international and national outlooks of the Stalin regime has tilted to the favor of the latter.

- 1105** Haslam, Jonathan. "Soviet Foreign Policy, 1939-1941: Isolation and Expansion." *Soviet Union* 18, nos. 1-3 (1991): 103-21.

This paper deals with the circumstances surrounding Stalin's decision to abandon the pursuit of collective security with the West in favor of reaching an accord with Nazi Germany as the best means of promoting Soviet security, and how Stalin, in imagining that his pact with Berlin had foiled the formation of a hostile Western coalition to destroy the Soviet Union and had bought time "to rearm and expand to meet the future German menace," steered Soviet foreign policy in a disastrous direction in the years 1939-41. In critiquing Stalin's judgment and actions during this period, Haslam focuses on how the Soviet leader, in misassessing Anglo-French intentions toward Russia, underestimating Germany's ability to establish military hegemony over Western Europe, and misreading the signs that Hitler was preparing to launch an all-out military assault on the So-

viet Union, was guilty of a series of miscalculations that worked to the detriment of the very security he sought to advance. Haslam also discusses both the role played by Stalin's near-paranoid suspicion of others in misjudging the motives of the democratic powers, and the influence of Commissar of Foreign Affairs and long-time Politburo member Vyacheslav Molotov in convincing him of the rectitude of the line adopted toward Germany in August 1939, even though Soviet intelligence reports in the spring of 1941 warned of German plans to attack Russia.

1106 ———. "The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938." *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 3 (1979): 441-61.

Haslam draws on newly available Soviet documentation to argue that, contrary to the view that the Kremlin had no intention of coming to the aid of the Czechs during the Munich crisis of 1938, the Soviets preferred and worked toward a common front to stem Hitler's aggression toward Czechoslovakia, and that this policy, which was based on Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov's judgment that Hitler would retreat in the face of a united front against him, had Stalin's backing until it became apparent that the Soviet position lacked Anglo-French support.

1107 Haynes, John Earl. "Poison or Cancer? Socialism and American Communism." *American Communist History* 2, no. 2 (December 2003): 183-90.

This commentary on Bryan Palmer's "Rethinking the Historiography of United States Communism," published in this same issue of *American Communist History*, centers on Palmer's attack on the writings of traditionalist historian Theodore Draper, particularly with respect to the nature of the movement created by the Bolshevik seizure of power and Stalin's impact upon it. Challenging Palmer's contentions that the Bolsheviks affected a genuine workers' revolution, but "one weakened by adverse circumstances and then poisoned with Stalinism and deformed into something abhorrent," Haynes argues that "the communist movement founded by the Bolshevik revolution was tyrannical in both theory and practice," and that Stalinism, rather than being a poison which infected the basically healthy body of Soviet communism and spread inexorably throughout the similarly healthy international communist movement, as Palmer maintains, acted more like a cancer on the Soviet party, the Comintern, and the American communist movement in the sense that cancer is not a foreign invader but "is of the body's own unique organic nature and there is no violent response or attempt to throw it off."

1108 Hyde, Earl M., Jr. "Still Perplexed about Krivitsky." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no. 3 (fall 2003): 428-41.

This account of the reasons for the 1937 defection of Walter Krivitsky, the former head of Soviet intelligence operations in Western Europe, the life he led while in France and America, and the circumstances surrounding his "suicide" in a Washington, D.C., hotel on 9 February 1941 includes a discussion of Stalin as the driving force behind the KGB's hounding and probable murder of Krivitsky. Stalin's actions against Krivitsky, Hyde suggests, stemmed from his outrage over a series of articles the general wrote for the *Saturday Evening Post* describing the Soviet leader's atrocities and efforts to reach an accord with Hitler, and from his fear that Krivitsky was about to disclose to American authorities the kind of information he had already given to British officials about the operations and identities of top-level Soviet spies, thus compromising the KGB's effectiveness in America and damaging relations between Moscow and Washington.

1109 "Interview with Stalin." *National Republic* 18 (January 1931): 13.

This article questions the statements made by Stalin in an interview with a United Press correspondent that he believes communist and capitalist nations can live peacefully with one another and that he is committed to the cause of peace and disarmament. The article describes Stalin as the prime fomenter of world revolution and the greatest obstacle to disarmament, and it criticizes the Scripps-Howard chain of papers and "reds and pinks" in America for using this interview as a

basis to argue that the United States government should recognize Soviet Russia, and, in effect, "welcome to our soil an official center of revolutionary propaganda directed against the life of our government."

1110 Kennan, George F. "Some Thoughts on Stalin's Foreign Policy." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 590-91.

Kennan responds to some of the views expressed by Robert Tucker in his *Slavic Review* paper "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy." He mainly comments on Tucker's presentation of Stalin's views on capitalist encirclement and on the wars that were supposedly an inherent part of the capitalist system; on the parallels that Tucker sees between Soviet Russia's situation and that of tsarist Russia at various points in time; and on Tucker's reading of Stalin's reluctance to see the German communists come to power.

1111 ———. "Stalin and China." *Atlantic Monthly* 207 (May 1961): 35-43.

This excerpt from the author's book *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (1961) primarily deals with the sources of the disastrous failure of Stalin's policy in China in 1926-27. In Kennan's view, Stalin, in attaching more importance to the anti-imperialist potentialities of the Kuomintang than to the domestic-political potentialities of the Chinese communists, in calling for the collaboration of the communists with the nationalist forces of the Kuomintang, and in reading the Chinese situation in terms of the stereotypes of Marxism failed to grasp what was really going on in the world of Chinese politics, understood very poorly the consequences of his own position, and ended up sacrificing the fledgling Chinese communist movement to a Chiang Kai-shek who had little concern for Moscow's interests and no compunction about turning on his communist "allies" and decimating their ranks. Kennan also considers why Mao Tse-tung was able to succeed where Stalin had failed, suggesting that the old order in China became vulnerable to communist pressures only after the post-World War II emergence of a power vacuum in China which Mao could exploit, and that Mao, being situated at the scene of action, was much better equipped to push the revolutionary cause effectively than Stalin, who was 5,000 miles away and was wholly unfamiliar with the oriental world of China.

1112 Koch, Eric. "Stalin's Pact with Hitler." *International Perspectives* (September/October 1984): 13-15.

Koch takes the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact to examine the motivation of both parties and to determine whether the pact has any relevance to contemporary Soviet-German relations. He sees Hitler as having been motivated by his desire to isolate Poland, defeat the Western powers, and then attack the Soviet Union. Stalin, Koch writes, signed the pact knowing that Britain and France would fight Germany if it attacked Poland, hoping for a long, bloody conflict that would weaken the belligerents and help smooth the way for world revolution. He assumed that Hitler, if victorious in the West, would turn against the Soviet Union, but, having bought time to prepare for a German invasion by concluding the pact with Berlin, believed the Red Army would be ready to repel the attack. Koch suggests that, in many respects, the substance of the Kremlin's attitudes and policies of the 1980s is not so different from Stalin's, and that the Soviet leadership may well try to pull off a diplomatic revolution comparable to 1939 by arranging for the unification and neutralization of Germany, a move he feels is unlikely to succeed.

1113 Kozlov, Nicholas N. and Eric D. Weitz. "Reflections of the Origins of the 'Third Period': Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany." *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 3 (1989): 387-410.

This article, in arguing against the conventional view that the harsh line enunciated by the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in 1928 was heavily influenced by Stalin,

maintains that the supposed rightist Nikolai Bukharin was the real author of the notion that a new period of capitalist crisis—the “third period” in Comintern parlance—was creating a fresh revolutionary upsurge, one which called for an elevation of the workers’ assaults on the existing system and opposition to all forms of collaboration with the organs of the capitalist system. Bukharin’s formulation of a third postwar period in capitalist development, Kozlov and Weitz contend, involved not only immediate political issues but arose from views he articulated as early as 1915 on the origins of the breakdown of capitalism and from his analysis of the international economic situation of the 1920s. Inasmuch as Stalin, at this point in time, took little sustained interest in communism outside the Soviet Union and played only a minor role in the deliberations of the Comintern, claims that the third period was the international analogue of a Stalinist left turn in Soviet domestic policy, or that the third period policy was engineered upon Stalin’s personal orders, have little merit, according to Kozlov and Weitz.

1114 Krammer, Arnold. “When Stalin Counterfeited American Dollars.” *American History Illustrated* 19, no. 3 (1984): 42-49.

Krammer presents an account of an ambitious scheme hatched by Stalin in 1928 to counterfeit American one-hundred-dollar bills, describing the whole affair as a classic example of the kind of grandiose scheme and dismal mismanagement typical of the early years of Soviet espionage activity. While Stalin was enthused about the possibility that a flood of counterfeit currency might weaken the stability of the American dollar in the Western world, his prime and “unbelievably naïve” motive for launching the operation was to address the problem of Russia’s dire need for foreign currency by simply counterfeiting the necessary funds. Equally misguided was his choice of two “dubiously qualified” members of the embryonic Soviet intelligence operation in America as directors of the entire operation, a decision he probably made so as to circumvent his own professional espionage directors whom he felt would have tried to dissuade him from undertaking such a risky venture, according to Krammer.

1115 Krivitsky, W. G. “Stalin Appeases Hitler.” *Saturday Evening Post* 211 (29 April 1939): 12-13+.

Krivitsky, a former Red Army general and leading figure in Soviet military intelligence until his defection to the West in 1937, describes Stalin as a long-time proponent of close ties with Germany who, in response to the Nazi purge of 30 June 1934, became convinced that Hitler had consolidated his power and had become a force to be reckoned with, and that therefore the time had arrived to do everything possible to appease and befriend the German leader. Despite rebuffs from Berlin, Krivitsky explains, Stalin worked beneath the surface toward a rapprochement with Hitler while pursuing, at the same time, a policy of collective security designed to align the great and small powers of the world against the threat of fascists and to play the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis against the London-Paris axis.

1116 ———. “Stalin’s Hand in Spain.” *Saturday Evening Post* 211 (15 April 1939): 5-7+.

Krivitsky, who as chief of Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe had a direct hand in organizing Soviet intervention of Spain, presents an account of why Stalin chose to intervene in the Spanish Civil War; how he conducted his operations there; and what he gained from his Spanish adventure. Stalin intervened in Spain, Krivitsky states, because he hoped to establish a Soviet client state in that country and, with the assistance of a vassal Spanish regime, promote ties with Britain and France and strengthen his bargaining position with Germany and Italy, thus finding the security he was seeking for the Soviet Union. Once Germany and Italy intervened openly on Franco’s side in Spain’s war, Stalin chose to withdraw Soviet support rather than risk involvement in a major war, leaving him with only a cache of Spanish gold, worth perhaps as much as a half-billion dollars, to show for his efforts, according to Krivitsky.

- 1117** Large, J. A. "The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32." *Soviet Studies* 30, no. 2 (1978): 212-36.

This study of the roots of the collective security policy pursued by Stalin in the mid-1930s argues that the turn toward such a policy was not precipitated by the deterioration of Soviet-German relations that came with Hitler's rise to power, as has often been claimed, but rather that the groundwork for the policy was laid in 1932 in the form of a series of nonaggression pacts with Russia's hitherto implacable enemies, France, Poland, and the Baltic states, and the downturn in Soviet-German relations served only to consolidate a trend that was already underway. The 1932 nonaggression pacts, Large maintains, reduced the level of tension between the Soviet Union and France, on the one hand, and Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, on the other, but furthered the deterioration of Soviet-German relations, thus providing additional grounds for Stalin's worry over the aggressive posture of the German state, fueling Moscow's subsequent pursuit of nonaggression and neutrality agreements with other European states, and leading to Stalin's decisions to join the League of Nations and inaugurate the Popular Front policy as a further means of advancing the policy of collective security toward which he had turned in the early 1930s.

- 1118** Levine, Alan J. "Communist Anti-Fascism." *Continuity* 6 (1983): 35-53.

Levine takes aim at the widely accepted notion that the Soviet Union and the world communist movement were more consistently opposed to fascism than the Western democracies. He argues that the antifascist policy pursued by Stalin from 1934 until 1939, including the Soviet positions in the Spanish Civil War and during the Munich crisis of 1938, was a superficial one, and that his ultimate goal throughout this period was to make an arrangement with Germany. In securing a deal with Hitler, Levine maintains, Stalin hoped to turn the German threat against the Western powers and to profit from the revolutionary situation throughout Europe that he believed would be created by an exhausting war between the imperialist nations. For Levine, Stalin's pursuit of collective security with Britain and France and promotion of Popular Front policies were efforts to push the West into resisting Germany, thus compelling Hitler to seek a deal with Russia to secure Germany's eastern flank in a war with the Western powers, and providing Moscow with the opportunity to partition Eastern Europe with Berlin while waiting for additional opportunities to extend Soviet power to arise from the protracted European war Stalin believed would commence following his conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Hitler.

- 1119** Loventhal, Milton and Jennifer McDowell. "The Stalin Resolutions and the Road to World War II." *San Jose Studies* 6, no. 3 (1980): 78-104; 7, no. 1 (1981): 6-39.

This two-part article describes how a body of documents consisting of 242 nearly consecutive resolutions of the Politburo on Soviet foreign policy directed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID); five briefings presented to the Politburo, emanating from various sources; and an exchange of thirty-four letters and telegrams between the Vienna Section of the Soviet Intelligence network attached to the NKID and the Special Section of the NKID for Western Europe in Moscow—all for the period 1934-36—offers an inside view of the workings of the Politburo and a portrait of Stalin's approach to foreign policy issues. Collectively designated the "Stalin Resolutions," the Politburo material, in the authors' own words, "reveals important facets on Stalin's approach to national and international problems, his strategy and tactics, ideological outlook, nationalism, personal qualities of realism, pragmatism, and willingness to compromise, his readiness to employ methods of deception, sense of messianism, political acumen, vanity, slyness, and his insatiable desire for vengeance." Loventhal and McDowell provide a description of the Stalin Resolutions—including their physical and technical features, general content, complexity, thematic unity, and stylistic features—and present an account of the early history of the resolutions; the uses to which the documents were put by the German government; Hitler's attitude toward the documents and personal use of them; their capture by the American Army at the close of World War II; and their languishing in the National Archives until researchers at the Hoover Institution at

Stanford University gained access to the documents and concluded the material warranted extensive study. Part II of the article includes an outline of the method used by Loventhal and McDowell to authenticate the documents, and a translation from the Russian of twenty-one of the Resolutions.

1120 Ludwig, Emil. "What Comrade Stalin Thinks of the U.S." *China Weekly Review* 61 (25 June 1932): 117.

This article consists of a brief excerpt from the then recent interview with Stalin conducted by German novelist and biographer Emil Ludwig and published in Moscow in the journal *Bolshevik*. Ludwig asked Stalin why the Soviets seem to have "an extraordinary respect for everything American." He replied that there is no special admiration for all things American but there is respect for American "matter-of-factness, in technique, in literature, in life," and for the American approach to work and customs in industry. Stalin also commented that if by "respect" Ludwig meant "sympathy," then Germany not America would be the nation that would hold pride of place for most Soviets.

1121 Lukes, Igor. "Did Stalin Desire War in 1938? A New Look at Soviet Behaviour during the May and September Crises." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 2, no. 1 (1991): 3-53.

Lukes examines the conflicting testimonies about and analyses of the Soviet role during the 1938 Czech crisis, suggesting that the striking discrepancies of Soviet intentions and behavior during the crisis stem directly from "a deliberate Soviet policy of saturating, and sometimes bombarding, the Prague policy-makers as well as international diplomatic circles with conflicting information." Attempting to determine whether Stalin was ready to go beyond his obligations toward Czechoslovakia under the 1935 treaty between Moscow and Prague and assist his Czech ally unilaterally, meaning without France, Lukes hypothesizes that once it became clear that Prague was the next target of German aggression, Soviet diplomats exposed Czech President Beneš to conflicting information regarding Moscow's plans if war broke out. While they tried to strengthen Prague's willingness to resist if attacked by Germany, when the situation dangerously escalated in May and September, Moscow withdrew and allowed events to progress without any Soviet intervention. Having failed to secure a seat for itself at the Munich Conference in September 1938 which addressed the Czech situation, Stalin, Lukes speculates, may have sought to manipulate Prague into an open conflict with Germany, in which the Red Army would have remained a passive observer.

1122 ———. "Stalin and Beneš at the End of September 1938: New Evidence from the Prague Archives." *Slavic Review* 52, no. 1 (1993): 28-48.

This paper considers some widely held views about Stalin's policy toward Czechoslovakia during the last days of September 1938 and about the conduct of Czech President Edvard Beneš in accepting the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938, a pact which allowed Hitler to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Lukes contends that, contrary to the long-standing official claim by both Moscow and Prague that Stalin was prepared in September 1938 to assist Czechoslovakia against Germany unilaterally and in disregard of the League of Nations, his offer of unilateral aid was of questionable sincerity and arrived after the signing of the Munich agreement. Beneš, therefore, who had actually hoped for a military resolution to the crisis, found his pleas for help from Moscow unanswered by Stalin until it was too late, and chose to accept the Munich deal not because he feared violence or because he considered war immoral, as some analysts have claimed, but rather because, having been abandoned by his French ally and the Soviet Union at the critical moment of Czechoslovakia's need, he chose not to battle Hitler alone in a war he could not possibly win.

1123 Maddux, Thomas R. "American News Media and Soviet Diplomacy, 1934-41." *Journalism Quarterly* 58 (spring 1981): 29-37.

Maddux surveys editorials, feature articles, and columns from thirty-five newspapers during the period 1933-41 to illustrate how the American press interpreted the Kremlin's foreign policy objectives. Noting the degree of interest in foreign affairs typically expressed by each of the newspapers selected, dividing the papers into conservative and moderate categories, and describing how the newspapers within these two groupings interpreted Stalin's various diplomatic maneuverings in terms of Moscow's pursuit of either national security, traditional tsarist Russian objectives, or the spread of world communism, Maddux describes how the various shades of the American press interpreted such turns in Stalin's diplomacy as the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy toward a traditional, nationalistic approach; the Kremlin's pursuit of a policy of collective security against fascist aggression; the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939; the Soviet invasion of Finland on 29 November 1939; and the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

1124 ———. "Watching Stalin Maneuver between Hitler and the West: American Diplomats and Soviet Diplomacy, 1934-1939." *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 2 (spring 1977): 140-54.

This paper examines the evaluations of Soviet diplomacy made by American officials during the years 1934-39 and the impact of their assessments on both the Russian policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and on their own long-term attitudes toward Soviet diplomacy as well. Maddux maintains that, while some assessments of Soviet policy emphasized the dominance of nationalistic self-interest, and others stressed the importance of ideology, most officials believed that the Kremlin's commitment to eventual communist expansion made the Soviet Union unacceptable as a potential ally against fascism. Such suspicions blinded American diplomats to the possibility that Stalin, rather than following a master plan for the promotion of communism and Soviet power, was responding to diplomatic problems with "an opportunistic approach designed to avoid war or exploit it from the sidelines," and led them to underestimate the importance of his overtures to the West as well as the potential benefits of encouraging this dimension of Soviet diplomacy, if only to keep Stalin away from Hitler, according to Maddux. Furthermore, the refusal of American diplomats, including George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and Loy Henderson, to believe in the possibility of friendly relations with Stalin led them to oppose Roosevelt's Russian policies during World War II and to advocate a strategy of firmness against Stalin during both the closing months of the war and the "preliminaries of the Cold War."

1125 McDermott, Kevin. "Stalin and the Comintern during the 'Third Period,' 1928-33." *European History Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (1995): 409-29.

McDermott examines Stalin's role in the 1928-29 defeat of the so-called "right-wing deviation" in the Communist International; the changes in Comintern policies that came with the triumph of the organization's Stalinist faction; and the extent to which Stalin and his entourage were able to manipulate the Comintern central apparatus and determine the political line of the communist parties in the years 1920-33—all within the context of the "third period" as a phase in the Comintern's history during which ultraleftist tactics were followed in accord with the forecast made by Comintern theoreticians that the period of capitalist stabilization was at an end and the victory of revolutionary socialism was on the immediate horizon. According to McDermott, while the Comintern's policies reflect the line followed by Stalin in defining and defeating his opponents in the power struggle within the Soviet Communist Party, and although the Comintern certainly adapted the revolutionary line of the third period to the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, the conventional wisdom that Stalin decided everything in the formulation and implementation of policy may need revising in view of evidence clearly indicating that he was "a more distant ruler than this interpretation would allow." Moreover, it is feasible that "the details of the third period line were elaborated by others, both within the Comintern hierarchy and the national parties," McDermott suggests.

1126 ———. “Stalinist Terror in the Comintern: New Perspectives.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 1 (January 1995): 111-30.

This article, in reviewing recent Russian and Western literature on the Stalinist terror in the Communist International and in examining conventional and new explanations of its origins and scope, deals with such questions as Stalin's role in the 1937-38 onslaught on the Comintern; the mechanisms through which he achieved his ends in the terror; the identity of the terror's victims and why they were targeted; the role played in the purges by the Comintern's leaders themselves; and the impact of the terror on the communist movement and the antifascist Popular Front strategy of the Comintern. McDermott's analysis yields the conclusions that Stalin was instrumental in inciting the terror that was unleashed on the Comintern; that the mass arrest of foreign communists was influenced by not one but many factors, particularly Stalin's felt need to crush any resistance, real or potential, to his authority within the Comintern, just as he was then doing within the Soviet party-state complex; and that, in designing and carrying out the purges, Stalin used the network of party and NKVD organizational and personal controls he had established by the mid-1930s over the Comintern's key bodies and personnel, including such leading Comintern officials as Georgi Dimitrov, Dmitri Manuilsky, and Otto Kuusinen.

1127 McIlroy, John and Alan Campbell. “‘For a Revolutionary Workers' Government': Moscow, British Communism and Revisionist Interpretations of the Third Period, 1927-34.” *European History Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2002): 535-69.

The authors take aim at the interpretation advanced by revisionist historians regarding the impact of the ultraleft policies of the Comintern—adopted in accord with the theory of the “third period” propounded at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in August 1928—who, contrary to traditional judgments regarding the effects of the Comintern's new line upon the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), suggest that the third period was indigenous, inevitable, and had consequences more beneficial than previously assumed. Drawing upon newly accessible Comintern archives, the authors reaffirm the merits of the conventional view that the third period was inextricably bound up with Russian developments, most notably the factional struggle inside the Soviet Communist Party as Stalin made a leftwards shift; that the Soviet leader was instrumental in ensuring adherence to the new line; and that the CPGB, in following the Comintern/Stalinist line during the third period, ended up alienating itself from the British working class.

1128 Monds, Jean. “Krivitsky and Stalinism in the Spanish Civil War.” *Critique* 9 (1978): 7-35.

Monds argues for the credibility of the claims made by former high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer Walter Krivitsky, in an April 1939 *Saturday Evening Post* article, about the true nature of Stalin's aims and methods of operation in intervening in the Spanish Civil War on behalf of the Republican government of Spain. In lending support to Krivitsky's account of Stalin's self-serving motives in intervening in Spain, motives which included the acquisition of the large reserves of gold known to be held in the Bank of Spain; the desire to brighten his image in the eyes of the world working class movement by making a show of international proletarian solidarity in Spain; and the opportunity to initiate a Soviet secret police operation to exterminate anti-Stalinist revolutionary organizations in Spain, Monds discusses how Stalin's intervention, in effect, destroyed the Spanish revolution, and how Krivitsky's evidence raises questions not only about the historical realities of the Soviet intervention but also about the methods employed by liberal historians who have written about the events in Spain. Monds also comments on Krivitsky's brief political life as an émigré in America and on the likelihood that his 10 February 1941 death in a Washington, D.C., hotel room was the work of a Soviet assassin rather than the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound, as the official police report concluded.

1129 Morton, Brian. “Pathetic Fallacies.” *Nation* 243 (29 November 1986): 614-17.

Morton questions Ronald Radosh's assertion, in an article published in the October 1986 issue of *New Criterion*, that Stalin managed to transform the once free Spanish Republic into "a prototype of what became the People's Democracies in the postwar world," and that Stalin's takeover of most of the Republic's institutions by the war's end made the defense of the Republic a cause no longer worth fighting for. Explaining why the Spanish Civil War cannot be reduced to merely a struggle between Stalin and rebel leader General Francisco Franco, as Radosh seems to believe, and maintaining that, contrary to Radosh's contention, a victory for the Republicans would not have been a victory for Stalin and communism, Morton argues that, in view of the fact that Spain, unlike most of the East European countries, "had a militant working class with deep egalitarian traditions" and that the Republican war effort had a base of its own separate from Stalin's support, a Republican victory might well have resulted in the establishment of an independent and egalitarian Spain and may even have deterred, if not prevented, the outbreak of World War II, possibilities that clearly suggest the Spanish cause was one well worth fighting for.

1130 "Negotiator Stalin." *Time* 34 (6 November 1939): 25-26.

Time repeats several anecdotes about Stalin that appeared in the *New York Times* regarding his "friendly manner" in his negotiations with Baltic diplomats following the Soviet advance into that region. The article also comments on Stalin's diplomatic offensive to bring Finland into the Soviet orbit and to secure a mutual assistance pact with Sweden.

1131 Nekrich, Alexander. "Stalin and the Pact with Hitler." *Russia* 4 (1981): 44-52.

Nekrich contends that Stalin's decision to reach a broad political, military, and economic agreement with Nazi Germany was not the result of a sudden about-face in 1939 but rather the fruit of long-range political and diplomatic calculations. Arguing that the entire history of Soviet policy toward Germany confirms this contention, Nekrich discusses the history of Soviet-German economic and military collaboration in the pre-Hitler years; the persistence of the belief within the Stalin leadership that once the initial troubled phase of establishing Nazi rule had passed it would be possible to restore German-Soviet harmony; the secret talks arranged by Stalin with Nazi representatives in 1935-37 to feel out chances for improving Soviet-German relations; and, lastly, Stalin's renewal of his advances to Hitler with the failure of the Munich Pact of September 1938. In addition to explaining how diplomatic documents from the period under study confirm that Stalin inclined toward a Soviet-German pact long before the actual rupture of talks with Britain and France over a defensive military accord directed against Germany, Nekrich also considers Stalin's motives in pushing for an agreement between Berlin and Moscow, chief among which, in Nekrich's view, was his belief that the pact would lead to a war in the West among capitalist rivals which he hoped would provide him with the opportunity to expand the territory of the USSR at the expense of Poland and the other border states.

1132 Oudendyk, William J. "Stalin's New Policy." *Fortnightly* 152 (November 1939): 509-16.

The central point of this assault on Stalin's peace policy of the 1930s is that the Kremlin's apparent support of "collective security" to thwart the intentions of aggressor nations, and its imposition of the "Popular Front" strategy on foreign communist parties, reflect neither a sincere Soviet desire for peace in Europe nor an abandonment of the cause of socialist revolution but rather are only short-term tactics to enhance Soviet security while, in fact, leading the world into war and positioning the Soviet Union for "the final and decisive struggle for the triumph of Bolshevism."

1133 Paasikivi, Juho. "From *Life's* Correspondents." *Life* 8 (4 March 1940): 10-11.

Paasikivi provides an account of the October-November 1939 series of talks he had with Stalin and Molotov as head of the Finnish delegation sent to Moscow to discuss Soviet demands for reconfiguring the Russian-Finnish border and for the transfer of a military base at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland to Soviet control to enhance the security of Leningrad. Paasikivi comments on

Stalin's demeanor and style at the negotiations, the unreasonableness of the Soviet demands, Stalin's unwillingness to compromise and insistence that matters should be settled quickly, and the Kremlin's decision, despite major territorial concessions made by the Finnish government, to seek a military resolution to the border question.

1134 Palmer, Bryan D. "Rethinking the Historiography of the United States Communism." *American Communist History* 2, no. 2 (2003): 139-73.

Palmer assesses the historiography of communism in the United States with an eye on such questions as how American radicals came to embrace communism, how that communism repudiated so much of itself in the 1920s, and whether or not U.S. communism was a genuine expression of American radicalism. Integral to this assessment is a consideration of the ways in which the history of America's revolutionary Left was transformed by Stalinism in the 1920s, and of how the varied historiographies that map and interpret the Left experience in America have neglected the impact of Stalinism on the American movement in the 1920s and on communism as an international movement as well. Maintaining that Stalinism subverted an American radical movement that had indigenous roots in U.S. soil, Palmer describes the ways in which communism was stifled and suffocated by Stalinism; how the unease caused by the emergence of a brutal authoritarian regime and the reversal of revolutionary programs under Stalin was reproduced in the writing of American communism; and how the important role of Stalinism in "souring the principles of socialism in the mouths of many of its most ardent advocates" has received insufficient interpretative commentary in the various writings on the U.S. Left, including those of the New Left-influenced revisionists and traditionalists such as Theodore Draper. For critiques of Palmer's article, see James R. Barrett, "The History of American Communism and Our Understanding of Stalinism," 175-82; John Earl Haynes, "Poison or Cancer? Stalinism and American Communism," 183-90; and Melvyn Dubofsky, "The Devil Is Not in the Details: He is Stalin," 191-94 in this same issue of *American Communist History*.

1135 Pantsov, Alexander. "Stalin's Policy in China, 1925-27: New Light from Russian Archives." Translated by Steven I. Levine. *Issues and Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 129-60.

Pantsov draws upon newly accessible Russian archival documents to examine Stalin's views of and policy toward the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, arguing that, contrary both to the view which holds that Stalin's policy in China flowed from his desire to secure Soviet interests in the Far East—which he believed would be best served by supporting the Nationalist Party (KMT), even at the expense of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in order to secure a victory for the anti-imperialist revolution in China and to weaken Great Britain—and to the interpretation which sees Stalin's China policy as being dictated by tactical considerations rooted in the intraparty conflict within the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin, in fact, tried his best to lead the Chinese communists to victory. Stalin's policy failed, Pantsov contends, because it was determined by his adherence to the false concept of a so-called multi-class party, in accordance with which the CCP had to make the KMT as "leftist" as possible—a doctrine which handicapped the CCP in its struggle for hegemony and failed to consider that it was impossible to implement Moscow's orders to communize the KMT without risking the breakup with the united front and eliminating any chance of turning the KMT in a leftist direction. In this sense, Pantsov concludes, Stalin himself was, in essence, "trapped in a cul-de-sac," and the CCP turned out to be prisoners of Stalin's paradigm, hostages to a line which "could not but lead to the cruelest defeat of the communist movement in China."

1136 Petrov, Vladimir. "A Missing Page in Soviet Historiography: The Nazi-Soviet Pact." *Orbis* 11, no. 4 (winter 1968): 1113-37.

The first part of this article outlines the circumstances and developments which led Stalin to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Soviet Union to enter into a partnership with Hitler.

Here, Petrov stresses that Stalin's deal with Hitler was not the result of a last-ditch effort to enhance Soviet security in the face of the Kremlin's disenchantment with the policy of collective security it was pursuing with the Western democracies but rather the culmination of several years of secret negotiations between Berlin and Stalin's emissaries—negotiations cultivated by the Kremlin to advance the chances of a deal that would allow it to avoid involvement in a European war from which Moscow might benefit. Petrov also discusses the sincere efforts made by Stalin to sustain the relationship established with Germany; his overestimation of the strength of his position in the haggling the Kremlin engaged in with Berlin during the duration of the pact; and his misreading of Germany's intention in the months leading up to the Nazi invasion of 22 June 1941. The second part of the article deals with the controversy triggered by Soviet diplomatic historian Alexander Nekrich's 1966 book *1941, 22 iyunia*, which criticizes Stalin's statesmanship, judgment, and military leadership during the months preceding and the weeks immediately following the German invasion of Russia.

1137 Posen, Barry R. "Competing Images of the Soviet Union." *World Politics* 39, no. 4 (1987): 579-97.

Stalin by name does not enter directly into this review of *The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938* (1984), by Jiri Hochman, and *The Soviet Union and the Search for Collective Security, 1933-1939* (1984), by Jonathan Haslam, but in contrasting Hochman's image of prewar Soviet foreign policy as a scheming and expansionist one, in which the diplomacy of collective security was merely the means to move Hitler in the direction of an understanding with Moscow, with Haslam's image of a foreign policy in which security took precedence over expansion, and in which the Kremlin's efforts on behalf of collective security, rather than the flirtations with Hitler, are seen as the main line of its policy, Posen considers the circumstances and motivations which helped to shape Stalin's dealings with the Western powers in the 1930s. In highlighting the differences in the two authors' treatments of the leading events of this period, Posen discusses what the two books have to say about Stalin's purge of the higher ranks of the Soviet officers' corps; the impact of geography on the alliance-worthiness of the Soviet Union, and the inadequacy of the Soviet effort to reduce the obstacles to military cooperation that were imposed by geography; and Moscow's behavior during the September 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia. Overall, Posen sees more merit in Haslam's reading of Stalin's foreign policy of the 1930s, although he feels Haslam does not adequately discuss or explain the series of Soviet approaches to Germany between 1934 and 1938.

1138 Raack, R. C. "History As Past and Current Politics: The *Gensek*, Stalin, and the Beginnings of the Cold War." *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1989): 129-44.

Raack opens with a critique of Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to close the discussion of Stalin's role in the beginnings of World War II by maintaining that the signing of the 1939 Nonaggression Pact with Hitler was an act of self-protection forced upon the Soviet Union by the failure of the policy of collective security. He then moves on to show how recent research indicates that Stalin's deceitful diplomatic maneuverings and expansionist program with reference to Eastern Europe were crucial to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 as well as to the onset of the Cold War. Raack calls upon scholars to accept that misinformation has, for a variety of reasons, infected Western historical writing on the origins of the Cold War, and to accept the likelihood of the Cold War being "foreordained once the Soviet expansionist will and the behavior it engendered" came to be fully understood by the Western Allies in the months surrounding the end of the war.

1139 Radosh, Ronald. "'But Today the Struggle': Spain and the Intellectuals." *New Criterion* 5, no. 2 (October 1986): 5-15.

Radosh argues that recent commentaries on the Spanish Civil War indicate that there are still many intellectuals who would choose to believe, as did most Left intellectuals in the 1930s, that

Spain, in the words of George Orwell, “was a state of affairs worth fighting for,” rather than have “their fantasies of a noble past” destroyed by the truth that the Spanish Republic which they so idealized was undermined and betrayed by a Stalin who manipulated developments in Spain in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. Describing the terrible price paid by the Republic for the much-heralded Soviet aid, Radosh presents what he considers to be irrefutable evidence that the once free Republic, in accord with Stalin’s demands and under the impact of the “police-state methods brought to Spain by the Soviets as part of their program of ‘assistance,’” had been transformed into “a prototype of what became the People’s Democracies in the postwar world.” For a critique of Radosh’s essay, see Brian Morton’s “Pathetic Fallacies” in the 29 November 1986 issue of *The Nation*.

1140 Resis, Albert. “The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 1 (2000): 33-56.

Resis conducts a detailed examination of the reasons for Stalin’s dismissal of Maxim Litvinov as Commissar of Foreign Affairs on 3 May 1939, maintaining that neither the standard interpretation of this event nor the revisionist view “has it quite right” with respect to its principal cause, namely, “a fundamental disagreement over foreign policy direction that came to a head precisely at that juncture.” Drawing upon recently released Soviet diplomatic papers relating to 1939, Resis explains that Litvinov’s diplomacy had, at this point in time, strayed from the collective security fundamentalism Stalin championed and gave the appearance that he was yielding to British and French negotiating pressure. Furthermore, Litvinov “was even prepared to preclude separate Soviet negotiations with Hitler,” something Stalin was not prepared to accept. These factors, combined with Britain’s “dilatatory response” to the Soviet counterproposal of 17 April regarding the terms of a collective security agreement and Stalin’s desire to increase his freedom to maneuver between a pact with Britain and France and a rapprochement with Germany sealed Litvinov’s fate, according to Resis.

1141 Roberts, Geoffrey. “The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 4 (October 1992): 639-57.

Roberts takes aim at the orthodox view that Stalin’s dismissal of Maxim Litvinov from his post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs and appointment of Vyacheslav Molotov to this position was intended to signal the end of the Kremlin’s pursuit of the policy of collective security championed by Litvinov and was followed by a Soviet turn to rapprochement with Germany in the spring of 1939. Citing newly available evidence from Soviet archives, Roberts shows that there were no negotiations, secret or otherwise, between Moscow and Berlin until the end of July 1939, and that Litvinov’s departure from office was, in fact, followed by a period characterized by passivity and indecisiveness in the Kremlin’s German policy. The available evidence, Roberts suggests, points to the conclusion that the Litvinov affair may be best understood within the context of Stalin and Molotov’s desire “to take charge of foreign relations in order to pursue their policy of a triple alliance with Britain and France—a policy whose utility Litvinov doubted and may even have opposed or obstructed.”

1142 ———. “From Non-Aggression Treaty to War: Documenting Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41.” *History Review* 40 (December 2001): 14-19.

Roberts surveys the sequence of events from the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty to the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. He touches upon the motivation for the pact, its benefits to both parties, the negotiations and maneuverings between Moscow and Berlin during the lifespan of the pact, and the sources of the pact’s collapse. Excerpts from nine relevant documents are appended to the article.

- 1143** ———. "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany." *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1 (1992): 57-78.

Roberts draws upon a newly available collection of diplomatic documents from Soviet foreign policy archives to determine when Moscow decided to embark on negotiations with Berlin with a view to securing a German-Soviet détente; how, from the Kremlin's point of view, these negotiations progressed from their general inception to the actual nonaggression treaty and spheres of influence embodied in the formal pact; and the nature of the Soviet foreign policy decision represented by the pact with Nazi Germany. He argues that, contrary to the conventional interpretation of the Soviet decision for a pact with Hitler as "a cool and calculated foreign policy maneuver with definite objectives," the pact emerged on the Soviet side "from a process of short-term crisis management in which the Soviet leadership (primarily Stalin and Molotov) responded to the initiatives and actions of others." Explaining how the pact can be seen as a consequence, not a cause, of the August 1939 breakdown of the negotiations for a defensive alliance with Britain and France, Roberts cites evidence indicating that the pact was "more a product of accident than design, a result of policy differences rather than goal-oriented policy direction, the consequences not of strategic calculation but of a series of tactical shifts and adjustments."

- 1144** Roche, John P. "The Great Mafia Wedding." *National Review* 41 (1 September 1989): 23-24.

This article, written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty, describes the Hitler-Stalin pact as a deal signed by two dictators of the same stripe; Marxism-Leninism as "a Mafia operation rather than an effort to liberate the wretched of the earth;" and the political world within which Stalin operated as a "gangster universe" in which deceitful, ruthless, and self-serving behavior prevailed. Emphasizing the territorial ambitions of Stalin in Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states, and Stalin's willingness to align himself with his fellow dictator in Berlin in order to expand the Soviet state, Roche indicts the Soviet leader as an "ideological gangster," a kind of Mafia don, and he cautions against getting caught up in the wave of "euphoria about Gorbachev," maintaining that all the then current leaders in Russia spent their formative years in the gangster world of the Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism.

- 1145** Senn, Alfred Erich. "The Rakovsky Affair: A Crisis in Franco-Soviet Relations, 1927." *Slavic and East European Studies* 10, nos. 3/4 (1965): 102-17.

This account of the crisis triggered in Franco-Soviet relations in 1927 by Soviet envoy to Paris Christian Rakovsky's signing of a 9 August statement made by the Left Opposition, which contained a call for the proletariat in capitalist countries to work for the defeat of their own governments, and of how the declaration epitomized the contradiction inherent in the Soviet attitude toward the capitalist states, includes a discussion of Stalin's use of the incident to the disadvantage of the Trotsky faction, and of how the maneuvers surrounding Rakovsky's recall from Paris were affected by Stalin's struggle with the Trotskyites.

- 1146** Sheng, Michael. "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-37." *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 149-70.

Sheng examines the formation of the anti-Japanese United Front between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), drawing upon newly available CCP documents to illustrate that while Mao wanted the Moscow-backed United Front Policy to serve the purpose of expanding the CCP's armed forces and base area, he remained sensitive and responsive, rather than antagonistic, to Stalin's privileging of the United Front over the Chinese revolutionary struggle, thus enabling Stalin to function as "a balancing mechanism in the CCP's policy-making structure," and ensuring that efforts to maximize revolutionary expansion stopped short of breaking the United Front. For a commentary on Sheng's article, see John W. Garver, "Mao, the Comintern and the Second United Front." *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 171-79. For

Sheng's rejoinder, see "Response: Mao and Stalin: Adversaries or Comrades?" *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 180-83.

1147 ———. "Response: Mao and Stalin: Adversaries or Comrades?" *China Quarterly* 129 (1992): 180-83.

Sheng responds to John Garver's critique of his *China Quarterly* article "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-37." Countering Garver's contention that Stalin regarded Mao as a dissident communist who frustrated his intention to sacrifice the CCP's revolutionary interests to the needs of Soviet security, Sheng maintains that newly released CCP materials show that, in the period 1935-50, Stalin and Mao, while they had their share of disagreements, were revolutionary comrades rather than adversaries, and that Mao's openness to Stalin's advice manifested itself in various ways, allowing Stalin, in effect, to play an important role in the CCP's policymaking throughout the period under review.

1148 Shub, Boris. "Stalin on the Spot." *Current History* 50 (July 1939): 37-39.

Shub places the Kremlin's diplomatic moves of the late 1930s within the framework of long-standing Russian security concerns, describing Stalin as a leader compelled, by the historical circumstances of the day, "to substitute Russian interests for the chimera of world revolution" and challenged by the difficult question of whether siding with the Western democracies or authoritarian Germany would best serve Russian security as well as his own personal power.

1149 Sokolsky, George E. "Stalin and China." *Saturday Review* 39 (8 September 1956): 16-17.

Sokolsky describes the early years of Soviet policy in China within the context of the emerging quarrel between the Trotskyists and Stalinists; the takeover of the Chinese Communist Party by Stalinists through Russian-trained and educated leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai; and the ability of Stalin to exploit Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism for Soviet purposes.

1150 Soloveytkhik, George. "Russia and Europe." *Contemporary Review* 158 (September 1940): 289-97.

Soloveytkhik examines Soviet foreign policy of the 1930s in the light of what he sees as Stalin's main interests, namely, his desire to secure his own power, expand the territory of his domain, and bring about a world socialist revolution. Stalin contemplated that these interests could best be served by promoting the outbreak of a European-wide war in conditions most favorable to the Soviet Union, a goal toward which he worked by capitalizing on the divisions among the nations of Europe as well as on Hitler's desire for Soviet neutrality in the case of war with Britain and France, according to Soloveytkhik.

1151 Solow, Hebert. "Stalin's Great American Hoax: League for Peace and Democracy." *American Mercury* 48 (December 1939): 394-402.

Solow describes the origin, development, and various operations of the American League for Peace and Democracy, set up in 1932 by the Kremlin and run by a handful of Stalin's American agents for the purpose of spreading propaganda in support of Soviet foreign policy. Solow describes how the league, to which a number of prominent Americans lent their names without knowing its true mission, adapted its stance on international issues squarely in accord with the Kremlin's foreign policy shifts, and how only with its vocal support of the Nazi-Soviet Pact did many of the victims of "Stalin's great American hoax" finally come to recognize the organization's true function.

1152 "The Soviet-Nazi Partnership." *New Republic* 104 (20 May 1941): 715-16.

This brief article deflates the argument of those who, in seeing a fundamental conflict between the Soviet and Nazi states, believe that Stalin, having collected his gains from his arrangement with

Hitler, will eventually turn against his new-found ally, contending instead that if Stalin intended to fight Germany he would not collaborate with his future enemy by giving his opponent new military bases, new sources of oil, and potential control over Russia's warm-water outlet in Asia Minor. The ideological differences between the two totalitarian states "are of no real account, while the similarities in behavior make them natural allies who can cooperate for proximate ends," the article concludes.

1153 "Stalin Alone." *New Statesman and Nation* 21 (10 May 1941): 474.

Stalin's assumption of the premiership of the USSR in May 1941, giving him supreme direction of the Soviet state, may be considered as "an act of mobilization" in the face of the growing possibility of a German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941, according to this report. While the merger of the Soviet Union's two most powerful positions in Stalin's hands is likely to be interpreted as a warning in Berlin, Stalin, the report maintains, remains committed to avoiding involvement in the war in Europe, to obtaining the highest price possible for keeping out of the conflict, and to strengthening his position against a future German attack wherever and however possible.

1154 "Stalin Dispenses with the West." *Living Age* 358 (May 1940): 254-56.

Stalin is rapidly divesting himself of all advisers with experience in the chancelleries of Europe and, when seeking counsel at all, looks to men of his own Asiatic turn of thought, according to this article from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. The article sees the "resignation" of Maxim Litvinov, and the reassignment of Vladimir Potemkin from his post of Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the Commissariat of Education—two men who represented the moderating elements by which the policies of Stalin were occasionally Europeanized—as having "the fatal significance that the Asiatic spirit of Stalin alone henceforth will determine Russia's foreign policy."

1155 "Stalin for Peace?" *Time* 34 (11 December 1939): 37-38.

Time cites Stalin's statements in denying the veracity of a report carried by the French Havas News Agency that in a 19 August 1939 address to the Politburo he spoke about the advantages of reaching an accord with Germany, including the opportunity for a neutral Soviet Union to profit territorially and politically from a war that would severely weaken the Western democracies.

1156 "Stalin in Speech Lets Aggressors Down Lightly, Hits the Democracies." *China Weekly Review* 88 (18 March 1939): 74-75.

This article summarizes the speech delivered by Stalin at the opening of the Eighteenth Party Congress on 10 March 1939 in which the international position of the Soviet Union and the alleged machinations of the Western capitalist powers to push Russia into a war with Germany were the main subjects addressed. The article also comments on Stalin's assertion that England and France have abandoned the policy of collective security and have taken, for nefarious reasons, the position of nonintervention with respect to the aggressor nations, and on reaction to Stalin's speech in Western diplomatic circles, particularly with respect to his abstention from any attacks on Nazi Germany.

1157 "Stalin Is Harnessed to Hitler's War Chariots, Declares Trotsky." *China Weekly Review* 90 (4 November 1939): 352-53.

This article cites exiled Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky's analysis of Stalin's motives for concluding the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939. Describing Stalin as man of minimal intellectual capacity and the most outstanding mediocrity of the Soviet bureaucracy, Trotsky sees Stalin as being a political coward who, rather than form an antifascist alliance with Britain and France, chose to come to terms with Hitler as a means of keeping the Soviet Union out of a war

“in which the Russian masses, rearmed, would settle accounts with the Kremlin clique and the privileged class it represents.”

1158 “Stalin’s Bombshell over Asia.” *Literary Digest* 121 (14 March 1936): 14.

Literary Digest reports on world reaction to Stalin’s statements, during his 4 March 1936 interview with Roy W. Howard, Chairman of the Board of Scripps-Howard newspapers, that the Soviet Union was prepared to go to war with Japan in order to save the independence of its political ally, the Mongolian People’s Republic, and that the USSR had no intention of trying to export revolution.

1159 “Stalin’s Designs on Uncle Sam.” *Literary Digest* 101 (27 April 1929): 17.

This report cites an article by Serge de Chessin, Stockholm correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*, which describes Stalin’s efforts to gain diplomatic recognition by the United States and locates this initiative in his need to secure some sort of political or economic achievement as means of “shutting off opposition to him.”

1160 Stein, George H. “Russo-German Military Cooperation: The Last Phase, 1933.” *Political Science Quarterly* 77, no. 1 (1962): 54-71.

Stein draws upon documents of the German Foreign Office to examine the events immediately preceding the September 1933 termination of Russo-German military collaboration, tracing Moscow’s growing resentment over the actions and propaganda of the newly established Hitler government and consequent suspicion of official German statements regarding Berlin’s desire for friendly Russo-German relations. He maintains that, while Soviet and German military leaders favored the continuation of their mutually beneficial military collaboration, Stalin had become so uncertain of where he stood with Germany, and so distrustful of Hitler’s intentions, that he believed a Soviet return to the Rapallo policy was out of the question and that Soviet security interests would best be served by joining the European alliance system and the League of Nations. Stein also discusses how the existing friendly attitude between German and Soviet military leaders allowed for the easing of the difficulties that attended the evacuation of German bases and military personnel in Russia following the abrupt severance of the Red Army’s ties with the Reichswehr.

1161 Swain, Geoffrey. “Stalin’s Foreign Policy 1928-41.” *Modern History Review* 15, no. 3 (2004): 12-16.

This survey of the foreign policy of Stalin during the 1928-41 period centers on the importance of his fear of a war that might destroy the Soviet Union before it was fully prepared to defend itself. Swain traces Stalin’s efforts to provide for Soviet security, first, by seeking collective security arrangements with the Western European democratic powers from 1933 to 1939, and then by negotiating a pact with Germany as he came to lose faith in the prospects for a collective security agreement. He writes that while Stalin believed that Hitler would eventually attack the Soviet Union, and he made use of the time he bought in aligning Moscow with Berlin to improve Soviet military forces and acquire a buffer zone in the Baltic area, he nonetheless managed to be surprised by the war he expected because of his blind refusal to heed the diplomatic and intelligence reports pointing toward the imminence of a German attack. This blindness, in Swain’s view, stemmed from Stalin’s wishful thinking that he had sufficient time to perfect the plans he had recently endorsed to launch a Soviet surprise attack once Germany started preliminary force concentrations for an invasion of the USSR.

1162 “That Russian Riddle.” *Collier’s Weekly* 107 (24 May 1941): 78.

According to this brief article, Stalin is an “old-fashioned imperialist land-grabber” who will do anything, short of offending Hitler, to add territory to Russia, and who is inspired by the hope that “Europe will tear itself into chaos so he and his Reds can step in and take over.”

- 1163** Toepfer, Marcia L. "The Soviet Role in the Munich Crisis: A Historiographical Debate." *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 4 (1977): 341-57.

Toepfer details the argument advanced by both the orthodox and revisionist schools of thought on the Soviet role in the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 and reevaluates Moscow's position during the crisis. In considering such questions as Would Stalin's 1937 purge of the Red Army and the lack of suitable routes from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia have severely hampered actual Soviet assistance? What sort of aid did the Soviets, in fact, offer? and What type of evidence is their to support the claims of Soviet aid? Toepfer contends that the revisionists' arguments for the significance of the diplomatic and military measures taken by the Kremlin in its effort to establish the sincerity and viability of its offer of aid to Czechoslovakia have largely been overlooked or disregarded by orthodox historians, as has the possibility that Soviet aid, despite the Red Army purge, could have been decisive, given Germany's lack of economic preparation for war in 1938. Furthermore, the orthodox camp has failed to respond to claims by Soviet historians that Stalin personally pledged unilateral Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia—an offer confirmed by Czech leader Edvard Beneš and consistent with the Kremlin's movement of troops and artillery to the USSR's western frontier. However, in the absence of a written record of Stalin's alleged offer, Toepfer does not lend full support to this component of the revisionists' case, but she does conclude that, in view of the overall case made by the revisionist camp in favor of Soviet willingness to honor its mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia, the arguments advanced by orthodox historians appear substantially weaker than they were two decades ago.

- 1164** Tucker, Robert C. "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 563-89.

The focal point of a five-author discussion of Stalin's foreign policy up to the outbreak of World War II, this article contends that Soviet diplomacy during the prewar era is best understood in view of Stalin's belief that an imperialist war was inevitable, and that the Soviet Union and the cause of world revolution could profit from such a conflict if Stalin could manage both to steer the gathering clouds of war in a way that would give the Soviet Union time to prepare for such a war and to precipitate the conflict and preserve Soviet neutrality during its early stages. Within this framework, Tucker discusses Stalin's thinking on the encirclement of the Soviet Union by hostile capitalist powers, the danger of war, the relationships between Soviet power and world revolution, and his divisive diplomacy in his dealings with Germany and the Western powers in the 1930s. For responses to Tucker's vision of Stalin's foreign policy, see the articles by George Kennan, Philip Gillette, Alexander Dallin, and Teddy Uldricks in this same *Slavic Review* issue.

- 1165** ———. "On Matters Evidential: A Reply." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 604-7.

Tucker responds to some of the points raised by George Kennan, Philip Gillette, Alexander Dallin, and Teddy Uldricks in their assessment of his article "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy." He devotes most of his attention to a refutation of Uldrick's contention that the article's interpretation of Soviet foreign policy, particularly regarding Hitler's rise to power and Nazi Germany, founders on the lack of evidence.

- 1166** Uldricks, Teddy J. "Stalin and Nazi Germany." *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (1977): 599-603.

Uldricks challenges the argument made by Robert Tucker in his article "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," that Stalin aimed to foster a war among the capitalist powers to the advantage of the Soviet Union by aiding Hitler's rise to power at the expense of the Comintern and German Communist Party. Uldricks sees Stalin's approach to dealing with the Western powers as one of caution and believes Stalin would not have opted to promote a European-wide war which could have had disastrous consequences for the USSR, or that he would have willfully set the Comintern and German Communist Party "on a path which could only lead to the destruction of

the KPD and the consolidation of a thoroughly totalitarian, militarily powerful Nazi regime.” Tucker’s theory of Stalin’s grand design for territorial aggrandizement also fails to account for a number of aspects of Soviet foreign and domestic policies in the 1930s, according to Uldricks.

1167 Volkogonov, D. A. “The Drama of the Decisions of 1939.” *Soviet Studies in History* 29, no. 3 (1990-1991): 10-42. From *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 4 (1989): 3-27.

Volkogonov examines the circumstances, developments, and motivations that led Stalin to abandon his efforts to establish a collective security agreement with Britain and France in 1939 and to embrace instead the idea of an accommodation with Hitler as a means of forestalling Soviet involvement in a European war and gaining time to undertake measures to accelerate the country’s preparations for defense. Volkogonov’s analysis includes a number of criticisms of the policies pursued by Stalin, most notably his weakening of the struggle against fascism by orienting the European communist parties toward a fight with social democracy instead of uniting them against fascism; his disregard of the dangers inherent in aligning the Soviet Union with a Germany led by a wholly untrustworthy and rabidly anti-communist megalomaniac such as Hitler; his underestimation of the moral and political drawbacks of a pact with Hitler; and his refusal to heed the warnings that a German attack on Russia was imminent in June 1941. While incorrect calculations, faulty predictions, and the bad faith of an aggressor contributed to Stalin’s diplomatic mistakes of 1939, Volkogonov contends that the root source of the Soviet leader’s oversights and errors rests in the nature of his autocratic rule, since the necessity of unfailingly approving his decisions “drastically narrowed and ‘debilitated’ any possibilities of dialectical analyses of the actual situation, the search for real alternatives, the taking of genuinely collective decisions.”

1168 Watson, George. “The Eye-Opener of 1939: Or How the World Saw the Nazi-Soviet Pact.” *History Today* 54, no. 8 (August 2004): 448-53.

Stalin does not figure significantly in this account of the response of intellectuals on the Left and the Right to the Soviet Union’s conclusion of a pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939, but in describing how this “political and moral bombshell” was read by nearly a score of the leading representatives of the Western intelligentsia, the article sheds light on the various ways in which Soviet sympathizers and critics alike interpreted Stalin’s motives in aligning himself with Hitler and the significance of the pact for Soviet and German socialism as well. The article includes a dozen or so pact-inspired illustrations, headlines, and political cartoons from the Western press.

1169 Weinberg, Gerhard L. “The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A Half-Century Later.” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 4/5 (fall 1989): 175-89.

Weinberg presents a history of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty of August 1939, describing the diplomatic situation in Europe during the months preceding the signing of the pact; the motives of Hitler and Stalin in concluding the agreement; the terms—both public and secret—of the treaty; and the effect that the pact had upon the fortunes of the signing parties, the East European region, and the early development of World War II. The reasons for Stalin’s failure to realize or believe that Hitler was preparing for an all-out assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941 also receive consideration in Weinberg’s assessment as do the human costs of Stalin’s shortsightedness in aligning himself with Hitler, and the variety of explanations offered by the Soviet Union for signing the pact.

Wartime Diplomacy

1170 “Back to Power Politics.” *New Republic* 111 (25 December 1944): 851-53.

The growing problems in the Big Three's dealings with one another, the differences in the political personalities of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt, and the need for liberals to work together and with like-minded forces in other countries to encourage Western leaders to do more to convince Stalin of the West's friendly intentions toward Russia are the principal subjects addressed in this article. If the Soviet leader's cynicism regarding the prospects for postwar collective security could be eased, then he might come to recognize the groundlessness and needlessness of the "defensive imperialism" which he is presently intent on practicing along Russia's western borders, the article maintains.

1171 Barcella, Ernest. "The American Who Knows Stalin Best." *Collier's Weekly* 129 (3 May 1952): 46+.

This brief account of the government service rendered by W. Averell Harriman centers on his war-time relationship with Stalin as America's number-one lend-lease man abroad and later as American Ambassador to Moscow. Harriman's appraisal of Stalin as a man possessed of extraordinary ability who respected strength and toughness and nothing else in his dealings with foreign leaders, and the ambassador's foresight in urging Washington, during the closing months of the war, to adopt a "get tough" policy toward Moscow in order to curb Soviet postwar aggressiveness receive most attention in the article.

1172 Bates, John L. "The 'Eureka' Conference: A Busy Time in Tehran." *Military Review* 66, no. 10 (1986): 74-82.

Bates describes the atmosphere at the November-December 1943 Tehran meeting of the Big Three; the host of logistical details he attended to in serving as an American liaison officer at the conference; and the impression that Stalin made upon him at the opening session of the meeting. He devotes special attention to the rationale provided by Foreign Affairs Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov for Stalin's invitation to Franklin Roosevelt to stay in the Soviet compound rather than at the U.S. Legation during the Tehran Conference.

1173 Bennett, Todd. "Culture, Power, and *Mission to Moscow*: Film and Soviet-American Relations during World War II." *Journal of American History* 88, no. 2 (2001): 489-518.

This discussion of the film *Mission to Moscow* (Warner Brothers, 1943) as an integral, cinematic component of Roosevelt's "grand design" diplomacy, which aimed to hasten victory in World War II and construct a stable peace by solidifying the Big Three entente, includes an account of the May 1943 showing of the film in Stalin's private theater in the Kremlin; the Soviet leader's favorable reaction to the movie; and the role *Mission to Moscow* may have played in affirming his conviction that Moscow's immediate interests were best served by a temporary and conditional continuation of the Grand Alliance. Bennett also discusses how the film—which included a rationalization of the purges of the 1930s and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and which presented a glamorized version of life in the Soviet Union in an effort to build a popular consensus in America for a pro-Soviet foreign policy and to help convince Stalin that America wanted to cooperate with the Soviet Union in both war and peace—was received by audiences in the United States and the USSR; the role it played in opening the Soviet market to other American-made films; and the various complexities that accompanied the Roosevelt administration's attempt to harness popular culture to statecraft by way of *Mission to Moscow*.

1174 Beschloss, Michael. "Dividing the Spoils." *Smithsonian* 33 (December 2002): 110-17.

In this excerpt from the book *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945* (2002), the author draws upon newly available American and Soviet documents to present an account of President Truman's dealings with Stalin and Clement Attlee at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945. Stalin's position on the postwar borders of Germany and Poland, on the question of German reparations, on the shape of the Allied powers' respective

zones of occupation in Germany, and on the fate of German war criminals all receive consideration in Beschloss's commentary, as does Truman's impression of Stalin as a man and a political leader.

1175 Bezymensky, Lev. "Past and Present: Did Stalin Contemplate Capitulation in 1941?" *New Times International* no. 13 (March 1992): 37-41.

Bezymensky draws upon evidence from German diplomatic sources and from the recollections of high-placed Soviet diplomats and military leaders in 1941 to suggest that Stalin attempted to negotiate an end to the war with Germany during the early months of the conflict. According to Bezymensky, Stalin, acting in accord with his fear that the Soviet Union was facing total defeat at the hands of the German army, and attempting to seek his own salvation at any price, tried on three separate occasions from July through October 1941 to elicit a response from Berlin to a Soviet proposal for an end to the German attack in exchange for vast areas of the western part of the USSR, including the Baltic states, Belorussia, and part of Ukraine. On each occasion, Hitler refused to consider the Soviet feelers because he was convinced that a complete military victory could be achieved before the winter of 1941, according to Bezymensky.

1176 "Big Little Man." *Time* 42 (20 December 1943): 22.

The focus of this brief report is Stalin's demeanor at the Tehran Conference and the general impression he made on those who observed him at that meeting. The article also notes Stalin's response to the gift from King George VI presented to him by Churchill in recognition of the heroism displayed by "the steel-hearted citizens of Stalingrad."

1177 Broun, Heywood. "Between the Lines." *New Republic* 101 (29 November 1939): 166.

Broun critiques the notion that a politically wise Stalin, in November 1939, was adhering to a policy which aims to ensure that the Nazis and Western democracies fight themselves to exhaustion in a long and bloody war from which Russia and the cause of world revolution would eventually profit. He suggests instead that commentators cease to look for deep or sinister meanings in the Soviet leader's every move, and accept the possibility that fissures may lie beneath the so-called hard logic attributed to Stalin.

1178 Browder, Earl. "How Stalin Ruined the American Communist Party." *Harper's Magazine* no. 1318 (1960): 45-51.

The former General Secretary of the American Communist Party describes how Stalin, by way of an April 1945 article in the French journal, *Cahiers du Communisme*, signed by Jacques Duclos, attacked the policy of the American communists, who had advocated and predicted, on the basis of the Tehran accord, a stable peace at the close of the war. The so-called "Duclos letter," Browder writes, which stated that the party's policy was "a notorious revision of Marxism," initiated the purging of the American Communist Party and the placement at its helm William Foster, under whose leadership the politically wise Americanization trend within the party was replaced by one that was openly anti-American, leading to the party's ruination. Browder contends that Stalin's behavior in this episode was motivated by his need to denounce the Tehran agreement in order to foster the Cold War and thus sustain the sharp international tensions which he drew upon to maintain his regime and justify his harsh domestic policies. He also counters the allegations that he was "Stalin's man," chosen by him to head the American party, maintaining that the Soviet leader largely kept his hands off the American organization, had tolerated Browder's "revisionist" Americanization program for over a decade, and had decided to purge him from the party in 1945 primarily as a means of denouncing the Tehran agreement.

1179 Byrns, Ruth. "John Dewey on Russia" *Commonweal* 36 (18 September 1942): 511-13.

Byrns outlines the position advanced by American philosopher John Dewey, in the 15 March 1942 issue of *Frontiers of Democracy*, regarding the proper attitude the United States should assume toward its Soviet wartime ally; the critique of that position by John Childs, in that same issue of *Frontiers of Democracy*; and Dewey's reply to Childs in the April issue of that publication. She lends her support to Dewey's views regarding the question of America's relations with Russia during the war and afterwards, agreeing that the most prudent course to follow is to be realistic about the faults of Stalin and the nature of his dictatorial regime, while at the same providing full support to Russia as the most practical way to work against Hitler at this point in time. Like Dewey, Byrns also recommends that Americans refrain from idealizing Stalin and his regime just because he happens, by the grace of Hitler, to be America's ally for the moment and recognize instead that he has shown himself to be a brutal, cynical, and devious dictator; a contributor to the outbreak of the very war in which he now finds himself enmeshed; a leader who could very well seek a separate peace with Hitler; and an individual whose prestige Americans ought not to enhance, given the important role he will no doubt play in the postwar settlement and postwar world affairs.

1180 Chamberlin, William Henry. "Russia Changes Front." *Christian Science Monitor Magazine* (7 October 1939): 5.

Chamberlin discusses Stalin's abrupt abandonment of his former professed antifascism in favor of coming to terms with Germany and Japan. He maintains that Stalin's elimination of Soviet military leaders who might oppose such a policy shift paved the way for pacts with the two fascist states as did his emergence as an unlimited autocrat, no longer obliged to pay the slightest regard to the theories of Marx and Lenin. Chamberlin also comments on how far German-Soviet cooperation is likely to extend, and on what may have motivated Stalin to turn his back on the Western powers and seek a deal with Hitler instead.

1181 Charlton, Michael. "The Eagle and the Small Birds." *Encounter* 60 (May/June 1983): 7-28; 61 (July/August 1983): 39-57; 61 (September/October 1983): 23-39.

This series of three articles under the general title of "The Eagle and the Small Birds" provides readers with scores of lengthy quotations from the writings of and the author's interviews with a number of individuals with either firsthand knowledge of some of the circumstances and events which determined the fate of postwar Eastern Europe or who have studied the questions of how Eastern Europe fell under Soviet control and what this historical development has meant for the region. In the first article, "the Specter of Yalta," Charlton deals mainly with the political, military, and strategic circumstances surrounding the Yalta Conference; the stance assumed by each of the Big Three at Yalta regarding the status of postwar Eastern Europe; and the reasons why the Yalta agreement failed to include anything to deter Stalin from going ahead with his plan to establish puppet governments throughout Eastern Europe. The second article, "The Triumph of Communism," focuses on the collapse of "the spirit of Yalta" with the confirmation of the most pessimistic forecasts of how Stalin, in his dealings with the nations of postwar Eastern Europe, would interpret the ambiguous accords concluded at the conference. The third, "The Eclipse of Ideology," deals with East European popular discontent with Soviet colonialism, and with how, following the death of Stalin and his denunciation by his successors in the Kremlin, disillusionment with communist ideology and Soviet satellite rule gained tremendous momentum within the ranks of the East European leadership and intelligentsia.

1182 Childs, John L. "Comments by John L. Childs on Dr. Dewey's Letter." *Frontiers of Democracy* 8, no. 68 (15 March 1942): 181-82.

Childs lends his support to the views expressed by American philosopher and educator John Dewey, in a 11 January 1942 letter to the *New York Times*, regarding the dictatorial nature of the Stalin regime but questions Dewey's implication that, inasmuch as "totalitarianism and democracy

will not mix," Soviet-American cooperation should end once Hitler has been defeated. Maintaining that any effort to promote a prosperous, stable, and secure postwar world order requires Russian participation, and suggesting that Stalin's need to work out a domestic program of reconstruction and desire to continue the modernization of the Soviet Union will likely make him a proponent of security and peace for years to come, Childs argues for "an open-eyed policy of sincere cooperation with Russia in both the war and postwar period."

1183 Chong-Sik Lee. "Why Did Stalin Accept the 38th Parallel?" *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 4 (1985): 67-74.

Stalin readily accepted the 15 August 1945 American proposal to divide Korea at the 38th parallel primarily because of the strategic value North Korea had assumed for Moscow following the Kremlin's success in restoring Russian prerogatives in Manchuria and in securing various rights in the ports of Darien and Port Arthur by way of a treaty negotiated with representatives of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and concluded just the day before receiving Washington's proposal, according to this research note. With North Korea being contiguous to Manchuria, and with the West Korea Bay facing the two key ports to which Moscow had recently gained access, a jovial Stalin, the author contends, was more than willing to settle for control over the territory north of the 38th parallel, land which also offered the Soviet Union several warm-water ports, valuable mineral resources, and considerable industry built by Japan during the years in which it had control over this region.

1184 Churchill, Winston. "The War Memoirs of Winston Churchill." *Life* 29 (23 October 1950): 101-4+; 29 (30 October 1950): 88-90+; 31 (22 October 1951): 86-90+.

These installments from the memoirs of Winston Churchill contain the British Prime Minister's account of his dealings with the Soviet government on a host of wartime issues and concerns. In the first, "The Insatiable Russians," Churchill describes his spring 1942 dealings with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and communications with Stalin in concluding a twenty-year Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, which excluded explicit recognition of Soviet territorial gains made at the expense of the Baltic states and Finland, and in negotiating the difficult terrain surrounding both Britain's wartime shipment of aid to the Soviet Union and the plans for opening a second front in Europe in 1942. In the second, "Face to Face with Stalin," Churchill writes about his June 1942 meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin during which the prime minister explained why there would be no second front in Europe in 1942; informed Stalin about the plan for an Anglo-American invasion of German-held French North Africa; and questioned the Kremlin leader about Soviet operations along the southern front of the war with Germany. Churchill relates here two often repeated accounts of how Stalin, in responding to the prime minister's questions about whether the stresses of the war were as trying as those that came with the collective farm policy, admitted to and attempted to justify the awful costs of the forced collectivization of agriculture. The third, "The Controversies of Tehran," supplies Churchill's version of the talks among the Big Three at the Tehran Conference in November-December 1943 over a wide range of war-related issues, including the Allied invasion of Europe; the conduct of the war in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean; Soviet involvement in the war in the Far East; the borders and government of postwar Poland; and the treatment to be accorded to postwar Germany. Collectively, these excerpts from Churchill's war memories shed light on Stalin's demeanor and behavior as well as on his principal military and strategic concerns in his wartime dealings with his Western Allies.

1185 Cienciala, Anna M. "The Activities of the Polish Communists As a Source for Stalin's Policy towards Poland in the Second World War." *International Historical Review* 7, no. 1 (1985): 129-45.

Cienciala draws upon documents on the wartime activities of Polish communists to contend that Stalin had a well-established, clear, and consistent goal with regard to Poland and did not simply

develop his aims as the Red Army surged forward to the west, as some scholars have maintained. Arguing that from the beginning of the war Stalin sought to gain control of all Poland through the imposition of a communist system, Cienciala describes how Stalin worked toward this objective in the closing years of the war through Soviet official diplomacy, in close coordination with the activities of Polish communists, which aimed to foster the establishment of a government in Poland subservient to Moscow yet representative enough to be acceptable to the Western powers. For Cienciala, Stalin displayed consummate skill in adjusting his long-term goals in Poland to the sensibilities of his wartime allies and effectively nurtured the Polish communists and their sympathizers in order to fashion a political group, subservient to him, which he could use at the right time to rule Poland.

1186 "Commander in Excelsis." *Time* 41 (22 February 1943): 22-23.

This article describes Stalin's impressive command of detail about the major aspects of the war with Germany; his commitment to the utter destruction of Germany's military forces and the Nazi regime; and various statements made by him and other Soviet leaders regarding Russia's war aims, particularly with respect to Moscow's lack of interest in seizing foreign territories and its desire to work with its allied partners to preserve peace and resist aggression in the postwar world.

1187 "Comrade Stalin Explains." *Time* 38 (14 July 1941): 22-23.

The contents of Stalin's 3 July 1941 address to the Soviet nation in which, in the immediate aftermath of Germany's invasion of Russia, he defended the decision to conclude a nonaggression pact with Hitler and called upon the people to mobilize themselves and devote all their energy to the patriotic war of liberation against the fascist forces are the main subjects touched upon in this brief article. The article notes that Stalin's speech may have been well received by Russia's politically naive population, but outside of Russia it did not play very well, as Western critics attacked the Soviet leader for willingly plunging Europe into war by aligning himself with Berlin; for foolishly believing he could trust Hitler; and for billing himself as a fervent ally of the peoples of Europe and America in their struggle to preserve national independence and democratic liberties.

1188 Cripps, Sir Stafford. "Twenty Russian Questions." *Life* 12 (9 march 1942): 83+.

In this article, prominent British socialist, Ambassador to Russia, and member of Churchill's war cabinet Sir Stafford Cripps replies to twenty questions about the Soviet Union put to him by the editor of *Life* magazine. Among the Stalin-related questions to which Cripps responds are How has the war affected Stalin's personality? Does Stalin run the war personally? Does he have an accurate picture of England and America? What are his war and peace aims? and Do the Soviet leaders fear an Allied coalition against them after Germany's defeat?

1189 Curran, Charles. "Stalin Merely Smiled." *Spectator* 203, no. 6847 (18 September 1959): 357-70.

Drawing upon an April 1951 report entitled "Soviet Espionage" supplied to the U.S. Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Curran describes how Stalin, in crafting the Kremlin's position on the price of Soviet participation in the war against Japan, managed to deceive his Western Allies and win their approval for acquisitions in the Far East at the expense of both Japan and China. Stalin's maneuverings at the Yalta Conference to exploit Roosevelt's desire to secure Soviet entry into the war with Japan; his success at the Potsdam Conference in leading Truman and Churchill to believe that he knew nothing at all about the atomic bomb America had recently tested; and his openness to the use of the bomb against a Japan that had already informed Moscow of its willingness to surrender unconditionally and had asked the Kremlin to act as an intermediary to bring the war to a quick end all figure into Curran's account of Stalin's Machiavellian behavior during the closing period of the war in the Far East.

1190 Davis, Forrest. "What Really Happened at Teheran?" *Saturday Evening Post* 216 (13 May 1944): 12-13+; (20 May 1944): 22-23+.

Davis describes the efforts made by President Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference to understand Stalin's point of view, to seek common ground with him—particularly with regard to the future of Germany and the small nations of Eastern Europe—and to assure the Soviet leader of his own good faith as a means of encouraging the Kremlin to be a sincere and willing collaborator in post-war settlements, thus enhancing the likelihood of a prolonged period of world peace. Among the other subjects Davis discusses are the backstage maneuverings that went on during the conference, the strained relationship between Stalin and Churchill, and the risks associated in placing trust in Stalin's word regarding Soviet intentions in Europe.

1191 De Gaulle, Charles. "De Gaulle's View of Himself." *Life* 47 (9 November 1959): 110-12+. These excerpts from Charles De Gaulle's book *Salvation* include the French leader's account of the fifteen hours of talks he had with Stalin in December 1944 in Moscow during which the two men agreed on the need to render Germany harmless and to conclude a Franco-Soviet pact to work toward that end and toward the maintenance of a stable Europe. De Gaulle primarily comments on his own success in resisting the pressure exerted on him by Stalin and the Soviet negotiating team to abandon, in conjunction with the signing of the pact, French support for the Polish government in exile in London in favor of the Lublin committee backed by the Kremlin. De Gaulle also notes that the outlines of Stalin's "grandiose policy" for Soviet domination of Eastern Europe were clearly discernible, despite the Soviet leader's "hard work at deception."

1192 Dewey, John. "Can We Work with Russia?" *Frontiers of Democracy* 8, no. 68 (15 March 1942): 179-80.

Dewey criticizes former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies's book *Mission to Moscow* for its sanctioning of the official Soviet view that the trials of veteran Bolshevik leaders and execution of the Red Army High Command were necessary to weed out Hitler's agents in the Soviet Union and for its portrayal of the totalitarian despotism of Stalin in a favorable light. While America certainly should aid the Soviet Union in its struggle against Germany and applaud the Soviets' efforts to counter the German assault, Dewey writes, it is possible to rejoice in Russian victories over the common enemy without idealizing Stalin's regime of terror, and it is important for America's future to recognize, as Stalin surely does, that "totalitarianism and democracy will not mix." For a response to Dewey's article, see "Comments by John L. Childs on Dr. Dewey's Letter," 181-82, in this same issue of *Frontiers of Democracy*.

1193 ———. "Dr. Dewey on Our Relations with Russia." *Frontiers of Democracy* 8, no. 69 (15 April 1942): 197

Dewey replies to the comments made about his views on the framework for Soviet-American co-operation in the postwar world by John Childs in a note in the 15 March 1942 issue of *Frontiers of Democracy*. He agrees with Childs's emphasis on the importance of Russia in the postwar international situation and on the need to establish helpful postwar relations between Moscow and the Western powers, but contends, as he did in his 15 March *Frontiers of Democracy* letter to which Childs responded, that the campaign in America to idealize Stalin and his domestic and international policies for reasons of wartime expediency will surely help to create the conditions of a bad peace. What America needs, Dewey maintains, is a realistic appraisal of "those conditions of both the war and the peace settlement which will eliminate the dangers inhering in Stalinist supremacy," thereby paving the way for the establishment of sound relations between the West and a Russia freed from Stalin's totalitarian control.

1194 Dinardo, Richard S. "Glimpse of an Old World Order? Reconsidering the Trieste Crisis of 1945." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (1997): 365-81.

Dinardo examines the 1945 crisis over the control of Trieste triggered by the attempt of Yugoslav partisans under Marshal Tito to lay claim to the city and the surrounding region, showing how Stalin's intervention in the Trieste affair played a determining role in its peaceful resolution. Contrary to the claim of those who view the Trieste crisis as the first postwar confrontation between Russia and the West and a preview of Cold War containment, and in accord with President Harry Truman's own statements at the time, Stalin, in refusing to underwrite Tito and compelling him to withdraw his forces from Trieste, cooperated with the West, relaxing tensions among the Big Three and encouraging Truman to be optimistic about the future of Allied cooperation, according to Dinardo. Stalin's behavior in the Trieste crisis, in Dinardo's view, is both consistent with the spirit of the "percentages agreement" the Soviet leader endorsed at his October 1944 Moscow meeting with Winston Churchill, and indicative of his willingness to place Soviet security interests ahead of any communist drive toward world revolution.

1195 Dolivet, Louis. "The Three Biggest Men in the World." *Free World* (March 1945): 19-23. Dolivet describes the signs that point toward a real friendship developing among the Big Three at the Yalta Conference and offers an assessment of the political thinking of the three leaders to illustrate why such a friendship has been made possible. In Dolivet's view, each of the three men approached the conference armed with the conviction that their wartime alliance must be continued and strengthened following the defeat of the Axis powers, and each, having come to trust his partners, was prepared to make concessions for the sake of securing "a global agreement as complete as their agreement on military strategy." While Dolivet identifies the opening of the second front in Europe as the key source of Stalin's new trust in Churchill and Roosevelt, he also notes the importance of the Soviet leader's desire for a long period of peace, during which the reconstruction of war-ravaged Russia would be his top priority, and of his firm belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence between socialist Russia and the capitalist states—a belief Dolivet sees as a corollary of the Soviet leader's theory of "socialism in one country."

1196 Eastman, Max. "To Collaborate Successfully, We Must Face the Facts about Russia." *Reader's Digest* 43 (July 1943): 1-14.

Eastman contends that if America is to collaborate successfully with Russia during and after World War II it must discard its wishful thinking about the nature and goals of the Stalin regime and base its policy on the obvious facts that Stalin is an absolute and brutal dictator, and that he is firmly committed to the destruction of capitalism and to the spread of world revolution. Chiding such influential Americans as former Ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies, Vice-President Henry Wallace, and Republican political leader Wendell Willkie for fawning on Stalin and acting as apologists for communism, Eastman calls for an American policy which, in recognizing that the "real Stalin" is the man who hopes to exploit conflicts among capitalist nations to spread Soviet power and world communism, is as committed to defending democracy as Stalin is to engineering its overthrow.

1197 Epstein, Julius. "The Tragedy in Churchill's Relationship to Roosevelt and Stalin." *Central Europe Journal/Sudeten Bulletin* 13, nos. 7/8 (1965): 223-27.

In this brief critique of Franklin Roosevelt's wartime relationship with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, the author faults the American president for his failure to see through Stalin's "propaganda lies" and for the deals he struck with the dictator behind Churchill's back. Chief among the examples Epstein presents in his indictment of Roosevelt's dealings with his two wartime allies are his swallowing "hook, line and sinker" of Stalin's version of the Katyn Forest massacre; his secret dealings with Stalin regarding postwar India; and his failure to accept Churchill's argument for the Balkans as the site of the second front against Germany in order to prevent a Soviet takeover of Central and Eastern Europe. Epstein also faults Harry Truman for not heeding Churchill's

warnings about the dire consequences of trusting Stalin and of withdrawing American forces in accord with the previously agreed-upon lines of occupation.

1198 Feis, Herbert. "The Three Who Led." *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1958): 282-92.

Feis comments on the content and value of the Soviet 1957 publication of the wartime correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. In Feis's view, while the two-volume collection is essentially complete and reputable as a source, it adds little to what is already known by historians and informed officials of the West, other than "some interesting filaments of detail about the turns of relationship within the coalition and some elucidation of the causes of the growth of mutual dissatisfaction," most notably with respect to the opening of a second front on the European mainland. Beyond this judgment, Feis mainly discusses what the letters reveal about the history of Stalin's 1943 proposal for the creation of a military political commission of representatives of the three Allied countries "for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various governments falling away from Germany"; how the letters reflect the respective characters of the three men, and how the flow of their communications confirms the opinion that, in the absence of a definitive understanding with the Soviet Union about war aims, and in view of the prevailing American optimism regarding the possibility of dealing with Stalin on friendly and frank terms, the American government had little chance of exercising a determining influence upon the course of postwar developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

1199 Giffin, Frederick C. "Improving the Image of Stalin's Russia: Joseph Davies's Mission to Moscow." *Social Science* 52, no. 1 (winter 1977): 3-8.

Giffin presents an account of the American response to *Mission to Moscow* (1941), a book in which Joseph E. Davies describes his experiences in Moscow during his 1937-38 tenure as United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Giffin discusses how the book, which claimed to be "a deliberate effort to be fair, judicial, and objective-minded," yet, in fact, presented a highly favorable view of Stalin, his policies, and the Russia he ruled, triggered criticism from some quarters—particularly for its rationalization of Stalin's purges of the mid-1930s—but was generally well received by the American public. However, the movie of the same title released by Warner Brothers in 1943, Giffin explains, was not nearly as well received as the former ambassador had hoped, primarily because it contained an abundance of historical inaccuracies, had an anti-British bias, and displayed a "missionary zeal" to approve Stalin's treason trials. Not surprisingly, Giffin writes, the film was warmly received in Russia, where the efforts of Davies to improve the image of Stalin and Russia as a means of winning American public admiration for the Soviet fight against Hitler and gaining support for Soviet-American wartime cooperation were much appreciated by the Stalin regime and led to Davies and the movie's producer being honored by the Soviet government.

1200 Gillis, J. M. "Stalin Tips the Apple Cart." *Catholic World* 158 (March 1944): 513-20.

Gillis questions the then recent Soviet accusations that Britain is plotting to sign a separate peace with Nazi Germany and that the Vatican is in league with the fascist states. He maintains that Stalin has sought to "tip over the apple cart" by resorting to outlandish charges so as to divert attention from his own maintenance of peace with Axis Japan and to soften opposition to his aggressive designs on territories along the prewar Soviet border in Europe. Gillis also chides diplomats, politicians, and commentators in America for soft-pedaling their comments on Stalin's maneuvers and aggressive behavior and for forgetting that the charges leveled against Britain and the Vatican have been made by the same man who aligned himself with Hitler in 1939 and thereby helped to unleash World War II.

1201 Harrison, John A. "The USSR, Japan, and the End of the Great Pacific War." *Parameters* 14, no. 2 (1984): 76-87.

Harrison examines Tokyo's efforts to encourage Moscow to renew the 1941 Treaty of Neutrality, and, following the Kremlin's 5 April 1945 announcement of its intention to abrogate that treaty, Japan's attempt to have the Soviet Union serve as a mediator in bringing an end to the war in the Far East. While Stalin does not figure prominently in Harrison's account of the dealings between Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Sato Nao-take and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on the matters noted above, Harrison does comment on Sato's insightful assessment of Stalin's most likely course of action once Germany had been defeated, and on the futility of Japanese efforts to make use of Russia to bring an end of the war, given that Stalin clearly intended to join the fight against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated and had already informed his allies that, while Japan was "feverishly anxious to get Russia to mediate with the United States and Great Britain," Russia, in accord with the Potsdam Declaration that Japan's surrender must be unconditional, had no intention of assisting the Japanese with their convulsive peace efforts.

1202 Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War." *Journal of Military History* 69, no. 4 (1997): 785-98.

Haslam critiques the divergent interpretations of Soviet policy toward Nazi Germany advanced by R. C. Raack, in *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (1995), and Geoffrey Roberts, in *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941* (1995). He questions Raack's contention that "Stalin, quite as much as Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese, wanted war," and Roberts's contention that "the Russians consistently pursued a line designed to deter war in Europe," arguing instead for a dualism in Soviet policy, namely, Stalin's pursuit of "what amounted to two entirely contradictory lines simultaneously"; one seeking "collective security" through an alliance with Britain and France; the other exploring the possibility of a rapprochement with Hitler. Haslam also comments briefly on the debate as to whether Stalin planned a preventive war against Germany.

1203 Heller, Joseph. "Roosevelt, Stalin, and the Palestinian Problem at Yalta." *Wiener Library Bulletin* 30, nos. 41-42 (1977): 25-35.

Heller considers the attitude of Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin toward Zionism, the two leaders' discussion of this subject at the Yalta Conference, and the circumstances which led Zionist spokesmen to misinterpret the views held by Roosevelt and Stalin on Zionism and to mistakenly report that at Yalta "The Big Three agreed on handing over Palestine to the Jews." Heller shows that, while Zionist leaders believed that Stalin had consented to the establishment of a Jewish state during his brief discussion of this matter with Roosevelt at Yalta, in fact he merely indicated that he was not opposed in principle to Zionism but added that he believed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine to be a difficult proposition, given Arab opposition to such a venture. At heart, Heller writes, Stalin remained "a consistent anti-Semite and an inveterate opponent of Zionism," yet for pragmatic reasons, at Yalta, he simply did not rule out the possibility of backing the creation of a Jewish state at some time in the future.

1204 "Historic Force." *Time* 45 (5 February 1945): 32+.

This article opens with an account of the tension and distrust that threatened the cohesion of the Big Three's wartime alliance and endangered the prospects for a lasting peace following the defeat of Hitler's Germany, and then moves on to present a political sketch of Stalin in an attempt to shine light on the nature of the man most likely to determine the success or failure of the impending and all-important Big Three conference in Yalta.

1205 Hudson, G. F. "Yalta." *Twentieth Century* 157, no. 939 (1955): 393-404.

Hudson offers a sharp critique of Western diplomacy at Yalta, describing it as shameful by standards of honor and decency, and ill-calculated, gullible, and inept by standards of realpolitik. Only Stalin, Hudson argues, received exactly what he wanted out of Yalta, namely, both an agreement

that convinced all the forces resistant to communism in Eastern Europe that the West had abandoned them, and additional territorial concessions in the Far East in exchange for a promise of Soviet entry into the Pacific War. These concessions were extracted from Western leaders operating under the belief that they could not afford a quarrel with a Russia that was well positioned to shape events and developments along its prewar western borders, and who were keen on maintaining the unity of the Big Three by placating Stalin through concessions. The payment for the concessions made by the Western powers, in Hudson's view, came mainly in the form of "post-dated checks that were never honored" and by way of immediately redeemable counter-concessions made by Stalin which amounted to very little, such as his acceptance of the proposal that the French should have an occupation zone in Germany—but one that would be carved out of the zones already allocated to America and Britain—and his honoring of his commitment to enter the war against Japan, an action which proved superfluous for Japan's surrender and merely provided the leverage for communist revolutions in China and Korea.

1206 Joesten, Joachim. "Why Stalin Acts That Way." *Nation* 158 (1 April 1944): 389-90.

The riddle of Soviet foreign policy, Joesten contends, does not rest in any mystery concerning the things Stalin wants, which clearly are territorial integrity and security, but rather in the puzzling tactics he employs to obtain these goals. Describing Stalin's waging of a war of nerves against his wartime allies as "a needling diplomacy" aimed at securing the dominant position he believes Russia deserves after suffering staggering losses in fighting the forces of Germany, Joesten outlines the new diplomatic techniques the Kremlin's leaders have developed to realize their foreign policy goals, including the "jolting technique" to upset the equilibrium of conventional Western diplomacy; "mystification," which consists of keeping the West guessing about the Kremlin's real purpose; and the use of the "Finnish bath," meaning sudden shifts from protestations of friendship to "an ice-cold shower" of disdain.

1207 Kempner, Robert M. W. "Stalin's 'Separate Peace' in 1943." *United Nations World* 4 (March 1950): 7-9.

Kempner, who was Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, draws upon statements made by German diplomats and upon official documents to offer evidence that Germany, from the end of 1942 through the summer of 1943, pushed for a separate peace with Russia, and that Stalin may have given serious consideration to such an arrangement. Hitler was initially unreceptive to the idea of a separate peace, as advanced by its chief proponent, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, but warmed to the thought with the increased military successes of the Allies, only to abort negotiations on this prospect once he came to suspect that Stalin might be motivated by a desire to strengthen his bargaining position in his dealings with Britain and America, rather than by a sincere interest in peace, according to Kempner. Just how prominently the plans for a separate peace may have figured in the power politics of Allied diplomacy may be judged, in Kempner's view, on the success Stalin enjoyed at the Tehran meeting of the Big Three.

1208 Kimball, Warren F. "The Mythical Yalta Myth." *Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 13, no. 2 (1982): 21-23.

Kimball reexamines the criticisms voiced by scholars regarding President Franklin Roosevelt's performance at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 in handling the question of the postwar relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union. He maintains that Roosevelt was neither duped by Stalin, as conservatives often contend, nor failed to recognize the true nature of Stalin's intentions in Poland, as liberals tend to believe, but rather was operating on the basis of a long-range plan founded on the assumption that cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary for peace and stability in the postwar world. For Roosevelt, recognition of the "special" interests of the USSR in Poland and Eastern Europe—meaning acquiescing to a Soviet military and political sphere of influence in that region—was the best way to win Stalin's support for maintaining the

spirit of the Yalta accords and to persuade him to recognize the advantages to be gained by seeking long-term cooperation with the West rather than immediate gains at the expense of Poland and the other nations of Eastern Europe, according to Kimball.

1209 ———. "Naked Reverse Right: Roosevelt, Churchill and Eastern Europe from TOLSTOY to Yalta—and a Little Beyond." *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 1 (1985): 1-24.

Kimball makes use of British and American official records to document the intricate history of Allied negotiations over the postwar settlement in Europe from the Stalin-Churchill October 1944 meeting (code named "TOLSTOY"), at which Churchill tacitly accepted a Soviet sphere of influence in most of Eastern Europe in exchange for a free hand for Britain in Greece; to the February 1945 Yalta Conference, which, in effect, represented a logical extension of the earlier TOLSTOY agreements; and, lastly, to the sharp change in Churchill's stance toward the territorial arrangement sketched out at TOLSTOY and Yalta, and his assumption of the position that he and Roosevelt had been "deceived" at Yalta. In speculating on why the spheres of influence arrangement negotiated with Stalin proved to be short-lived, Kimball emphasizes the negative reactions of Washington and London to Soviet moves in Eastern Europe that appeared to be in defiance of the Yalta accords—ambiguous as the accords were—the subsequent disappearance of the unity that had characterized the Yalta discussions, particularly with respect to Poland; Churchill's conclusion that he had been wrong in believing he could trust and work with Stalin; the death of Franklin Roosevelt, who persistently sought to minimize the problems caused by the Soviets, and who resisted Churchill's efforts to enlist his cooperation in forestalling Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; and, lastly, FDR's replacement by Truman, who, within just two weeks of Roosevelt's death, assumed a tough stance toward Soviet actions in Eastern Europe in accord with the Cold War ideology that was to become dominant in America's framing of its policy toward the USSR.

1210 Kitchen, Martin. "Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War." *Historical Journal* 30, no. 2 (1987): 415-36.

This examination of Winston Churchill's attitude toward the Soviet Union during World War II includes a discussion of his dealings with Stalin regarding the equipment and supplies sent to the Soviets by the British and the Americans; the opening of a second front in Europe against Nazi Germany; and the details of the postwar settlement, particularly with respect to the question of the Russo-Polish frontier. In Kitchen's estimate, Churchill, being prone to "overestimate the value of personal contacts with other statesmen and to imagine a friendship where none existed," misread Stalin the man and did not recognize the dominant role he played in the Soviet state, but while the British leader may have been seduced by Stalin's assurances of friendship, and did not realize until late in the war that the Soviets were all-powerful in Eastern Europe and would have their way in their sphere of influence, he nonetheless "did exceedingly well in a difficult situation," walking a tightrope between antagonizing and appeasing Stalin.

1211 Kudryashov, Sergei. "Stalin and the Allies: Who Deceived Whom?" Translated by Brian Smith. *History Today* 45, no. 5 (1995): 13-19.

Kudryashov describes the characteristics of Stalin's wartime dealings with Britain and America, showing how the rudeness, suspicion, secrecy, and combative aggressiveness of his diplomacy not only irked Western diplomats and leaders but also cultivated "in itself an image of an enemy" and encouraged the West to incline toward forceful methods in its relations with Stalin, thus contributing to the onset of the Cold War.

1212 "Letter from Stalin." *Newsweek* 25 (28 May 1945): 56.

The subject of this report is Stalin's May 1945 letter to Ralph Baker, Moscow correspondent of the *London Times*, regarding the reconstruction of Poland's postwar government, and concerning Russia's arrest of sixteen Poles—three of whom were suggested by the British at Yalta for inclu-

sion in the new Polish regime—some two months prior to the May letter for violating “the law for safeguarding the rear of the Red Army.”

1213 Lottich, Kenneth V. “Stalin’s Great Blunder.” *Indian Journal of Social Research* 3, no. 1 (January 1962): 109-18.

Lottich examines the fifteen years of efforts by the Kremlin’s leaders to undo “Stalin’s greatest blunder”—his acceptance of the agreement for joint occupation of Berlin, settled upon by the Big Three at the February 1945 Yalta Conference. While Lottich primarily discusses the various forms assumed by the post-Stalin leadership’s attempts to alter the Berlin situation to their advantage, he also comments on what he sees as Stalin’s underestimation of his leverage to gain even more at the Yalta meeting—control of Berlin included—from Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, who, at that time, were “still fearful of Japan and a possible rapprochement between the Island Empire and the Soviets,” and consequently, “overestimated their need to placate Moscow in every detail.”

1214 Lukacs, John. “The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe.” *New York Times Magazine* (5 October 1969): 36-38+.

Lukacs describes Winston Churchill’s proposal to Stalin, at a Kremlin meeting on 9 October 1944, for dividing postwar Eastern Europe into Russian and British spheres of influence as an attempt by the British leader to save from Russian control at least some parts of that region by granting Stalin power over those nations that would most certainly fall under Moscow’s sway in any case. The failure of the Allies to address the shape of postwar frontiers at a time when Stalin was still pressed for help, and America’s unwillingness to respond favorably to London’s urgings that the invasion and liberation of Europe from Nazi domination take place with the postwar balance of power in mind, Lukacs explains, both frustrated and angered Churchill and forms the background to the “percentages” deal which he proposed to Stalin at their Kremlin meeting in 1944, the terms of which, Lukacs adds, were to be temporary but proved to be far more enduring than any of the arrangements worked out at the other wartime conferences, Yalta included.

1215 Lyons, Eugene. “Must Russia Fight Hitler?” *American Mercury* 52 (January 1941): 24-32. Statesmen in Washington, London, and elsewhere who predict the imminent end of the Nazi-Soviet partnership have badly misjudged Stalin’s motivation for entering the pact with Hitler and have failed to recognize the compelling reasons for the continuation of their partnership, according to Lyons. In Lyons’s view, Stalin, having made territorial gains, avoided involvement in a new European War, and enhanced his own political position, is unlikely to renege on the commitments he made in the pact, and, therefore, the attempts of Western diplomats to “woo” Moscow are not only a waste of affection but give Stalin scope for diplomatic maneuvering with both the West and his totalitarian partner.

1216 ———. “The Progress of Stalin Worship.” *American Mercury* 56 (June 1943): 693-97.

Lyons describes April 1943 as “a gala month for Soviet propaganda by Americans for Americans,” singling out the efforts of Wendell Willkie, Joseph Davies, Henry Luce, and the Warner Brothers film version of Davies’s book *Mission to Moscow* for criticism for their attempt to whitewash the record of the Stalin regime and to convince Americans that the Stalinist totalitarian state is somehow democratic. Inasmuch as Stalin and his colleagues, as realists and economic determinists, are neither impressed nor placated by the performance of the American apologists for the Soviet record and will continue to have only contempt for such “transparent flattery and inept propaganda,” Lyons writes, Americans would do well to recognize that the chances of durable cooperation with the Soviets “would be greater if we followed Stalin’s lead and foreswore sentimental make-believe.”

1217 ———. "The Purification of Stalin." *American Mercury* 54 (January 1942): 109-16.

Lyons assails the attempts made by various American writers to whitewash the Soviet dictatorship once America and Russia became allies in the war against Nazi Germany. Targeting the works by Anna Louise Strong, Walter Duranty, Maurice Hindus, and Joseph E. Davies, Lyons describes how these books, as case studies in Stalinist apologetics, either overlook or seek to ameliorate such blots on the Soviet record as the crimes committed by the Stalin regime during the Great Purges; the sentencing of millions of Russians to concentration camps; Stalin's alignment of his nation with the forces of fascism in the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact; and the land grabs perpetrated by Stalin at the expense of his Western neighbors while an ally of Hitler. Lyons calls on American leaders to portray the aid given to the Soviet Union in the war against Germany as a matter of expediency, without attempting the impossible job of purifying the Stalin dictatorship.

1218 MacLean, Elizabeth Kimball. "Joseph E. Davies and Soviet-American Relations, 1941-1943." *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 1 (1980): 73-93.

MacLean describes the service of American diplomat Joseph E. Davies as an unofficial personal liaison between the White House and the Soviet Embassy in Washington during the early years of World War II, particularly Davies's effort, as a special envoy to Moscow in April-May 1943, to relay to Stalin FDR's concern about the deterioration of Soviet-American relations, America's willingness to accept the Soviet position that the Curzon Line should form the new eastern border of postwar Poland, and Roosevelt's fervent desire for a personal meeting with Stalin at which the two leaders could gain a better understanding of one another and address the issues that were troubling relations between their two governments. MacLean also considers the talents and predilections that Davies brought to his work in his role as a liaison; the reasons why he was respected by the Kremlin's leaders and had Roosevelt's trust; the wise counsel that he gave FDR in his effort to sustain wartime cooperation between America and the Soviet Union; and how his 1943 mission to Moscow, while reinforcing Roosevelt's confidence in the personal approach to Soviet-American relations, failed in its purpose to arrange a meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt, largely because of Stalin's critical reaction to the news that the planned Allied cross-channel invasion was to be delayed again.

1219 Maddox, Robert J. "Roosevelt and Stalin: The Final Days." *Continuity* 6 (spring 1983): 113-22.

Maddox contends that, by April 1945, an exasperated Franklin Roosevelt, acting in response to Stalin's unwillingness to carry out in good faith the agreements made at the Yalta Conference, was not optimistic about prospects for sustaining Russian-American collaboration in the postwar period and had already concluded that the United States must adopt a firmer position toward the Soviet Union. Pointing to the friction between Washington and Moscow that was growing steadily during the spring of 1945 over the determination of Poland's boundaries and the formation of her postwar government; over the so-called Berne incident involving the surrender of German forces on the Italian front; and over Russian treatment of liberated prisoners of war, Maddox explains why Roosevelt came to distrust Stalin and was no longer in a conciliatory mood with respect to dealing with the Kremlin. He does not see Roosevelt's efforts to dissuade an angry and frustrated Churchill from issuing an ultimatum to Stalin over the Polish question and to minimize the general Soviet problem in the British leader's eyes as being reflective of the president's own frame of mind toward dealing with the Russians at this point in time but rather as manifestations of his tactical concern that an ultimatum might needlessly provoke Stalin to rashness.

1220 Manning, Clarence A. "The Yalta Conference." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1955): 145-53.

Manning reviews the results of the meeting of the Big Three at Yalta in February 1945 in light of what the American minutes of the meeting, published in the *New York Times* on 17 March 1955,

reveal about the negotiations which took place at that time. Establishing the position assumed by Stalin and his associates on each of the major issues covered at the conference, Manning contends that the minutes of the meeting primarily indicate that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt demonstrated "any appreciation of an understanding of the realities of the Soviet position or of the extent to which Soviet dialectics and Russian chauvinism and pseudo-sensitivity could go in the direction of ruthless and detrimental imperialism." At Yalta, Stalin and company were merely scheming to place the nations they had "liberated" from Nazi control in the same subservient position in which they had placed Ukraine and other Soviet republics, and had no interest in working toward a peaceful coexistence with the capitalist powers, according to Manning.

1221 Mark, Eduard. "'Today Has Been a Historical One': Harry S. Truman's Diary of the Potsdam Conference." *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 3 (1980): 317-26.

Mark introduces the hitherto unpublished diary kept by President Harry S. Truman between 16 July and 30 July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, the text of which follows Marks's comments. As Mark notes, the diary contains the only record of Truman's 17 July talk with Stalin at which the two leaders discussed the agenda for the Potsdam meeting and from which the American president emerged with an impression of his Soviet counterpart as someone with whom he could deal and who "is honest—but smart as hell."

1222 Mastny, Vojtech. "The Beneš-Stalin-Molotov Conversations in December 1943: New Documents." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 20 (September 1972): 367-402.

This introduction to the English-language translation of the first-hand account of the discussions that head of the Czech government-in-exile Edvard Beneš had with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin in December 1943 provided by Janomir Smutný, who attended the Moscow meeting as head of the Czech President's Chancellery, focuses primarily on how Smutný's notes illuminate Beneš's role in the meeting, most notably with regard to the extent to which Beneš's search for intimacy with the Stalin regime as a means of fostering Czech security served to confirm Czechoslovakia's dependence upon the Soviet Union, thus paving the way for the establishment of the satellite regime in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. In addition to commenting on the Soviet leader's reaction to Beneš's conduct and input during the meeting, Mastny also discusses what the Smutný documents reveal about Stalin's thinking on a number of important issues, including his desire to find a Polish leadership less hostile to him than the one then in power in London; his preference for a political solution of the Polish problem; his noncommittal attitude toward key questions about postwar Germany; and his motivation for championing the territorial diminution of postwar Hungary while giving Romania preferential treatment.

1223 ———. "Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943." *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 3 (September 1975): 481-504.

Mastny makes use of British, American, and Soviet diplomatic documents on the Moscow and Tehran Conferences of 1943 to examine the assumptions that the leading participants in these crucial wartime meetings brought to the table; how the Big Three interacted with one another; and the shape assumed by Soviet war aims as the two conferences unfolded. Describing the 18 October-1 November Moscow Conference attended by the Allies' foreign ministers as the only wartime meeting "where issues were clearly defined, systematically discussed, and disposed of through genuine bargaining," Mastny contrasts the relative success of the Moscow meeting with the confusion and discord that dominated the 28 November-1 December Tehran Conference. He particularly shows how Soviet strategic thinking changed between the two conferences in response to the opportunities for the Kremlin to advance its postwar political agenda in the face of Anglo-American discord on key postwar issues, and in accord with Stalin's belief that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt was keen on a postwar settlement in Central and Eastern Europe significantly different from the one he envisioned. According to Mastny, whereas Stalin approached the two con-

ferences seeking Western military commitments which would shorten the war, and only attached secondary importance to securing political concessions conducive to the growth of his power and influence in postwar Europe, following the two meetings he felt he had accomplished less on his first priority and more than he had been aiming at regarding his second, but in reality the situation was reversed, as the promise of the second front was definite, whereas Anglo-American recognition of his freedom of action in Eastern Europe was not. "Stalin's overestimation of the extent of the concessions that had been made to him, sustained by the carelessness of his Western partners, encouraged him to embark upon policies certain eventually to destroy the fragile harmony engendered by Moscow and Teheran," Mastny concludes.

1224 ———. "Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II." *American Historical Review* 77 (1972): 1365-88.

Mastny, in examining the signs pointing toward the possibility that Stalin may have contemplated a separate Soviet-German peace, suggests that there are considerable grounds to believe that, with the establishment of a relative military balance between the two belligerents in the months following Stalingrad, Stalin apparently entertained several courses of action in pursuing a separate peace with Germany: an accommodation with the Hitler regime; a partnership with a conservative German regime dominated by the army and opposed to Hitler; and friendship with a Germany governed by a coalition reminiscent of a "popular front" but extended to include a wide sampling from the Center and the Right. He describes the various Soviet statements and actions that indicate Stalin gave serious consideration to each of the three courses of action outlined above; notes how the Soviet leader may have been encouraged to pursue a separate peace because he saw sinister motives behind the repeated delays in the opening of a second front in Europe; and discusses Stalin's abandonment of any consideration of a separate peace once the Red Army began its steady advance westward, and the second front had finally been opened, and his joining with his Anglo-American allies in calling for Germany's unconditional surrender, the dismantling of the Hitler regime, and a peace settlement that would severely punish Germany and render the nation militarily harmless.

1225 Mayers, David. "Ambassador Joseph Davies Reconsidered." *Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 23, no. 3 (1992): 1-16.

Mayers argues that Joseph E. Davies, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1936-38 and author of the much criticized book *Mission to Moscow*—a work which served to solidify American popular support for the Soviet Union as an ally in the war against Germany by misleading the American public about the true nature of Stalin's dictatorship—far from being a dupe of Stalinist propaganda, an apologist for the Soviet regime, and a disgrace to American diplomacy, was not blindly unrealistic about the USSR and the nature of Stalin's rule but rather was a fairly astute observer of the Soviet political scene who never doubted that Stalin's dictatorship was brutal, and who privately expressed his disgust over the 1936-38 purges, which he had sought to justify in *Mission to Moscow*. He maintains that Davies, acting in accord with his belief that as a representative of the American Foreign Office he was obliged to separate his personal feelings from the demands of his position at that time, did his best to promote Soviet-American friendship and understanding for the sake of checking the power of the fascist states, solidifying wartime cooperation, and ensuring that the Soviet-American alliance should prove durable—all while recognizing the defects of the Soviet regime and reporting to Washington about Stalin's totalitarianism. Davies, in effect, "lied to his countrymen for their own good," a practice "absolutely in keeping with Roosevelt who admitted in 1942: 'I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war,'" according to Mayers.

1226 McCormick, A. O. "Three Men of Destiny." *New York Times Magazine* 21 (November 1943): 5+.

McCormick discusses the question of whether Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt, given how the three men differ from one another, and the fact that they have been driven together only by the danger posed by a common enemy, will be able to create an atmosphere of agreement at the then impending Tehran Conference. He states that inasmuch as the three leaders believe cooperation is a safer policy than isolation and aspire to a large niche in history, they are likely to work hard to reach agreements on the key postwar issues that they must address, but the interplay of their personalities and ideas, the impressions they make upon one another, and the reservations and suspicions that they bring with them to the conference may well affect the outcome of the meeting.

1227 McNeal, Robert H. "Roosevelt through Stalin's Spectacles." *International Journal* 18, no. 2 (1963): 194-206.

This assessment of the way in which Stalin is likely to have interpreted Franklin Roosevelt's friendly gestures toward the Soviet Union during World War II and efforts to establish cordial personal relations with him is grounded on the assumption that Stalin's meager store of information about America, and his tendency to view Roosevelt's gestures through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, essentially doomed the American president's efforts to misinterpretation and failure. Within this framework, McNeal discusses how Stalin's cold reaction to Roosevelt's proffered friendship probably stemmed from the Soviet leader's view of his American counterpart as a bourgeois reformist who sought to use small concessions to workers as a means of winning their support for capitalism and steering them away from revolution. Similarly, Roosevelt's efforts to establish rapport with Stalin by emphasizing both his own detachment from Churchill and opposition to the postwar maintenance of the British Empire most likely harmonized well with Stalin's preconception of America as "an imperialist state striving to oust rival imperialists, especially Britain, from markets over which they held special control." McNeal also describes how Stalin reacted in a similar fashion to Roosevelt's Far East policy, position on the status of postwar Germany, and support for the United Nations.

1228 Newsinger, John. "Churchill, Stalin, and the Greek Revolution." *Monthly Review* 50, no. 11 (April 1999): 48-54.

Newsinger describes how the interests of the communist-led National Liberation Front in Greece were sacrificed in the summer of 1944 to the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, clearing the path for Stalin to reach a secret agreement with Churchill, on 9 October 1944, whereby the Balkans were divided into British and Soviet spheres of influence. With Britain being conceded "a 90 percent interest in Greece" by the Churchill-Stalin Pact, Newsinger explains, Stalin effectively handed over the Greek communists to "the tender mercies of Winston Churchill," giving Britain a free hand in its dealings with the Greek revolutionaries and remaining silent as the British defeated the communist-led forces in the Battle of Athens in January 1945.

1229 Nisbet, Robert. "Roosevelt and Stalin." *Modern Age* 30, no. 2 (1986): 103-12; 30, nos. 3-4 (1986): 205-17.

This two-part article describes what is seen as Franklin Roosevelt's "unequal political courtship" of Stalin during World War II, and how the American president's indulgence of the Soviet leader negatively affected Anglo-American wartime relations, military strategy, and the politics of the peace settlement, and contributed to the onset of the Cold War as well. Pointing to the influence of the glowing report about Stalin and the Soviet war effort given to Roosevelt by Harry Hopkins upon his return from his July 1941 meeting with the Soviet leader as the president's special emissary; Roosevelt's belief that Stalin was a leader with whom he could work closely and "handle"; and his desire to create a kind of "New Deal" for the postwar world in accord with his deep attachment to Wilsonian idealism, Nisbet contends that Roosevelt, in his effort to recruit Stalin as an ally in the making of a new, Wilsonian, order in the postwar world, repeatedly sought to satisfy Soviet demands and desires and consistently refused to recognize the real nature of Stalin, the So-

viet Union, and the Kremlin's outlook and postwar plans. Among the examples of Roosevelt's passion to please Stalin that Nisbet cites are the president's stance on Russian relief; the easy inclusion of the Soviets in the Atlantic Charter; the massive strategic and geopolitical concessions he made to Stalin in the three private meetings he had with him during the Tehran Conference; his acceptance of Stalin's position on the opening of a front in southern France; and his support for the occupation of Berlin by the Russians alone at the close of the war.

1230 Offner, Arnold A. "Uncommon Ground: Anglo-American Soviet Diplomacy, 1941-42." *Soviet Union* 18, nos. 1-3 (1991): 237-57.

Offner discusses how, with Hitler's attack on Russia, an uneasy wartime alliance was formed, one encumbered by two decades of hostility and distrust between the Soviet Union and the West. In considering the impact of prewar Soviet and Western attitudes on wartime relations, Offner mainly discusses how Anglo-American wartime strategy, which privileged the role to be played by Soviet land forces and Western air and mechanized power in the defeat of Germany, fed Stalin's suspicion that his allies were more than willing to assign the Red Army the deadly task of combating the vast majority of Hitler's forces as a means of weakening the Soviet Union and lessening its role at the postwar peace table. This suspicion, Offner explains, was further encouraged by the postponement of the opening of the second front in Europe; American and British evasiveness about the postwar German settlement; and the resistance of London and Washington to an agreement in 1941-42 that would recognize the validity of Stalin's security claims to "tsarist territory" in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.

1231 Omračanin, Ivo, ed. "Ivan Šubašić on His Negotiations with Tito and Stalin during October and November 1944." *Journal of Croatian Studies* 24 (1983): 199-206.

This document, which consists of the report sent to Washington by Bernard Yarrow of the Office of Strategic Services about his 15 December 1944 conversation in London with Ivan Šubašić, who was the last Prime Minister of the royal Yugoslav government in London, and who negotiated the establishment of the regency of King Peter II and of the unified Yugoslav government with Marshal Tito in Belgrade in late October 1944, centers on Šubašić's description of his relationship and dealings with Tito at this time, but it includes a brief account of his 22 November 1944 meeting in Moscow with Stalin, during which the Soviet leader allegedly urged Šubašić to build the new Yugoslav state upon democratic principles with equal representation for all the national groups of Yugoslavia; advised him to seek economic aid from America after World War II was over; and questioned him about the Yugoslav people's feelings toward King Peter II and about accepting a monarchy as their form of government.

1232 Pearlman, Michael D. "The Tehran Allied Summit Conference." *Military Review* 73, no. 12 (1993): 73-75.

Writing fifty years after the Tehran Conference, Pearlman briefly discusses how President Franklin Roosevelt approached the Tehran meeting determined to stack the diplomatic deck against continuing the Mediterranean strategy of Churchill, which called for an Allied invasion of the "soft under belly of Europe" rather than the western coast of France, and to give Stalin an unequivocal pledge that Anglo-American forces would invade Northwest France in 1944 and, in this way, not only hasten the end of World War II but help secure Stalin's cooperation on long-term issues of concern for peace and stability in the postwar world.

1233 Pechatnov, V. O. "Averell Harriman's Mission to Moscow." *Harriman Review* 14, nos. 3-4 (2003): 1-47.

Pechatnov draws upon newly released Russian and American archival documents to detail the twenty-year history of Averell Harriman's special relations with the USSR, including an account of Harriman's various meetings with Stalin, and of how the American ambassador's assessment of

the Soviet leader's political character, strategic interests, and foreign policy decisions affected the Soviet policies of both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Pechatnov, who holds the chair of European and American Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, also discusses why Harriman, while recognizing the cruelty of the Stalin regime and assuming an increasingly tough stance in his negotiations with the Kremlin as Stalin's aggressive designs on postwar Eastern and Central Europe became apparent, was strongly affected by the magnetism of Stalin's personality and continued to hold him in high regard, and why Stalin, though aware of Harriman's growing anti-Soviet orientation as the war neared its end, had special regard for him.

1234 Percival, Mark. "Churchill and Romania: The Myth of the October 1944 'Betrayal.'" *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 3 (1998): 41-61.

In this analysis of the substance and importance of the 9 October 1944 "percentages agreement" proposed by Churchill and endorsed by Stalin, Percival deflates the interpretation advanced in contemporary Romania that the British leader essentially sold out the country to the Soviet dictator, arguing that the Romanian view of the agreement is an oversimplification based on lack of understanding of the limits of British power at the time and on a failure to recognize that, with the Red Army already present in Romania, Stalin was well able to impose his will, making British restraint of the Kremlin's wishes impossible and irrelevant to Romania's fate in the postwar years. In addition to questioning the popular mythology created around the percentages agreement, Percival also points out several uncertainties about the agreement, including the meaning of the small check mark Stalin placed next to the Romanian percentage on the piece of paper Churchill passed to him, and the nature of what was actually agreed upon between the two leaders at that time.

1235 Possony, Stefan T. "The Three Circles of Communism." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1969): 119-31; 25, no. 3 (1969): 262-74; 25, no. 4 (1969): 363-75; 26, no. 1 (1970): 48-68; 26, no. 2 (1970): 176-97.

Possony seeks to unravel some of the mysteries that attend Stalin's actions during the purges and on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, all within the broad framework of what he describes as the "three circles of communism"—the first being the nonsecret circle of ideology and utopian promises; the second encompassing the practice of strategic realism, conducted in secret, in service of communist theory but entailing actions and behaviors contrary to professed communist morality; and the third consisting of nothing but betrayal, with Stalin himself assuming the role of a modern-day Judas. Possony's analysis of the period and subjects under review is both complex and far-ranging and deals extensively with such questions as Stalin's true intentions in ordering the purges of the 1930s; the significance of the type of confessions extracted from the victims of the purges; the connection between the accusations leveled against the defendants and deeds Stalin himself had committed before and during the trials; the link between the purges and Stalin's alleged service as an agent of the tsarist secret police; Stalin's motives for and behavior in courting Hitler in the 1930s and for concluding the 1939 nonaggression pact with Berlin; and the reasons why Stalin did not expect war in June 1941 and failed to defend the Soviet borders once the German invasion was under way. Possony devotes a considerable amount of attention to the last question, arguing that Stalin, operating in accord with the assumption that Hitler would not attack Russia before England had been defeated, evaluated Soviet intelligence reports incorrectly, choosing to believe that the signs of an impending Nazi attack were, in effect, a form of blackmail that would precede an attempt by Hitler to extract economic, territorial, and strategic concessions from Moscow. In reality, Stalin was victimized by a German campaign to cloak the upcoming attack, leading him to refuse to believe that an all-out German invasion was under way even after it had been in operation for a number of hours on the morning of 22 June 1941, according to Possony. For a continuation of this latter argument, see Possony's "The Red Beard and the Red Flag," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (1974): 40-54.

- 1236** Raack, R. C. "Stalin Fixes the Oder-Neisse Line." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (1990): 467-88.

Raack draws upon the memoirs of witnesses to the 1944 meetings which ultimately established what became Poland's postwar borders, showing how the testimony provided by these individuals—Marian Spychalski of Poland in particular—shines light on Stalin's secretive and duplicitous behavior both in the setting of Poland's borders to Moscow's advantage and in forming his own Polish government to help him to secure the new Polish borders and to arrange for the huge covert population transfers that the ceding of German territory to his Polish clients would require. Stalin, in his "mulish determination" to get what he wanted in Eastern Poland and coastal East Prussia, and through the deceit, highhandedness, and cruelty he practiced in securing the borders he wanted, showed "reckless disregard for the amenities of 'grand alliance' politics," and encouraged the West to distrust the Soviet Union, contributing substantially to the political antagonisms that gave birth to the Cold War, in Raack's view.

- 1237** ———. "Stalin Plans His Post-War Germany." *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 1 (1993): 53-73.

Raack describes how records found in the recently opened archives of the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin provide a totally new picture of Stalin's role in bringing about the postwar division of Germany. The documents, Raack explains, show that Stalin, operating through his German agents and the Foreign Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, sought to implement a grandiose plan for postwar Germany that required the initial creation of two Germanys followed by a complex and contradictory course of action that was to lead to the reestablishment of a united Germany under Moscow's control. Instead, however, this ill-considered scheme resulted in the total separation of East and West Germany; the popular collapse of the German Communist Party in the German west; and the forfeiture of all the rewards of influence and prestige in the West that the Soviet victory over Hitler had brought Stalin.

- 1238** ———. "Stalin's Plans for World War II." *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 2 (1991): 215-27.

Raack cites testimony provided by two defectors—Vincas Kreve-Mickievičius, who became Lithuania's vice-premier and foreign minister in 1940, and an unnamed NKVD officer who worked in Estonia in June 1940—to argue that, contrary to the most widely accepted views of the Kremlin's thinking on the coming of war and conduct of wartime diplomacy, Stalin considered the outbreak of World War II as an opportunity to expand Bolshevik influence westward in the aftermath of an anticipated collapse of the bourgeois governments in a war-ravaged Europe. He maintains that the defectors' reports on statements made in June-July 1940 about the expected outcome of the war by high-ranking Soviets, including Vyacheslav Molotov and Andrei Zhdanov, most likely reflect the views expressed by Stalin in foreign policy discussions within the Kremlin, probably dating at least from the first plans to conclude a favorable pact with Germany and amplified by the new situation that came about following the deal made with Germany, according to Raack. If this new evidence on Stalin's wartime goals actually reflects his plans deriving from the situation which came about following the deal made with Hitler, then "much that happened later in wartime diplomacy and many of Stalin's moves in the immediate postwar period become fixed in a light far different from that in which they have usually been seen hitherto," Raack concludes.

- 1239** ———. "With Smersh in Berlin: New Light on the Incomplete Histories of the Führer and the *Vozdh'*." *World Affairs* 154, no. 2 (fall 1991): 47-56.

This article uses newly released Soviet sources to describe how the Kremlin, through "a willful act of Stalinist duplicity," concealed from its Western Allies the body of Adolf Hitler after discovering it in his Berlin bunker in June of 1945, allowing the Stalin regime to seed the Soviet controlled

media with reports suggesting Hitler had actually escaped in a westward direction and that Western leaders were lax in their hunt for Nazi war criminals. Raack links "operation body snatch" and the Kremlin's deception of its wartime allies over Hitler's fate to Stalin himself, and he describes how the whole affair was covered up for years afterward, even in the account of the long-concealed autopsy findings published in 1968 by Soviet journalist and historian Lev Bezymensky.

1240 "Rendezvous in Moscow." *New Republic* 107 (12 October 1942): 452-53.

A correspondent who was "hiding under the table" during Wendell Willkie's September 1942 conversation with Stalin provides a fictitious account of the two men's talk in this brief article. Among the subjects the two men are "reported" to have discussed are the political character of Franklin Roosevelt; the president's plans for opening a second front; the willingness of Winston Churchill to "hide behind" the nonsense of "military experts" in explaining Britain's cautious approach to an Anglo-American invasion of German-occupied France; and the need for Roosevelt and Churchill to "hit the enemy" soon and with whatever forces are at their disposal.

1241 "Rendezvous with Destiny." *Time* 42 (29 November 1943): 17-20.

Time reports on the subjects most likely to be discussed at the soon-to-be announced meeting of the Big Three and on the challenges facing FDR in dealing with Stalin and Churchill at the conference. The article also includes a chart outlining the highlights in the lives of each of the three leaders.

1242 Resis, Albert. "The Churchill-Stalin Secret 'Percentages' Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944." *American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (April 1978): 368-87.

Resis draws upon newly released top-secret British records of the Churchill-Stalin talks in October 1944 in Moscow to describe how the British leader's explanation of the meaning of the so-called percentages agreement he reached with Stalin over the Soviet-British spheres of influence in the Balkans, as described in his monumental six-volume work *The Second World War*, does not correspond with the evidence now available, nor does the Soviet claim that Stalin had tacitly dismissed Churchill's proposal. Where Churchill revealed that the percentages deal was concluded with extreme ease; was not a long-term, spheres-of-influence arrangement; and that all major questions involving the Balkan region were reserved for the postwar peace table at which each of the great powers would sit, the official records of the Moscow meeting reveal that Stalin was very much interested in Churchill's proposal; that the negotiations of the terms of the percentages agreement were complicated, drawn out, and involved considerable compromise on Britain's part; and that the deal finally settled upon was, in fact, a strictly bilateral classic spheres-of-influence agreement of unlimited duration, according to Resis. Furthermore, the deal was concluded without American approval or even full knowledge; was in direct defiance of Roosevelt's 4 October 1944 letter to Stalin stating that no postwar settlement problem could be resolved without American participation; and led the United States to seek a voice equal to that of the Soviet Union in the postwar Balkans as a means of curbing the Soviet expansion sanctioned in the percentages agreement. As the United States inserted itself increasingly into Balkan affairs while denying Moscow a voice in arriving at and executing decisions in Western Europe, Soviet-American understanding over southeastern Europe deteriorated, giving impetus to the development of the Cold War in that region, Resis concludes.

1243 ———. "Spheres of Influence in Soviet Wartime Diplomacy." *Journal of Modern History* 53 (September 1981): 417-39.

Resis traces the development of Soviet spheres of influence policy from its origin in the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 through its manifestation in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 26 May 1942. He deals with Stalin's main territorial and security concerns in pressing such a policy; Stalin's reasons for favoring the establishment of both Soviet and British

spheres of influence in postwar Europe; and the negotiations the Kremlin conducted with London in its effort to provide for the recognition and honoring of the respective core security zones of the USSR and Britain. Resis also discusses Stalin's efforts to block Churchill's attempt to devise a counterweight to postwar Soviet power in Europe, and how the success of Stalin's wartime diplomacy in securing most of the Kremlin's aims heightened fears in the West and served to generate the very anti-Soviet Western political-military alliance that the Kremlin's diplomacy was designed to forestall.

1244 Rieber, Alfred J. "The Crack in the Plaster: Crisis in Romania and the Origins of the Cold War." *Journal of Modern History* 76, no. 1 (2004): 62-106.

On 27 February 1945, in a stormy interview in Bucharest, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky angrily demanded that young King Michael replace his government with a coalition of the communist-dominated National Democratic Front. This incident has been traditionally viewed as a dual symbol of the brutal Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of Romania and of the growing division between the Soviet Union and the West over the future of Eastern Europe. Rieber questions the conventional reading of this incident, arguing that Vyshinsky's demand was not a sign of Stalin's intention to communize Romania but rather was emblematic of his frustration over the failure of his policy of limited intervention to make acceptable progress in the face of the complexities and polarization of Romanian domestic politics. Romanian communists, Rieber explains, knew that, if push came to shove, they could count on Soviet support, and this emboldened them in their conflict with the political leaders of the Rădescu and Sănătescu governments, who, in turn, responded by attempting to win British and American support for their cause by claiming that Moscow intended either to annex Romania or communize the nation. As the tensions between the two sides mounted, the representatives of the Big Three were increasingly drawn into the fray, and local political forces within Romania, in anticipation of the breakdown of the Grand Alliance, "were determined to provoke and exploit the split in their own interests," according to Rieber.

1245 Roberts, Sir Frank and George Urban. "A Diplomat Remembers Stalin." *World Today* 46, no. 11 (November 1990): 208-13; 46, no. 12 (December 1990): 225-30.

The first segment of this two-part interview conducted by George Urban with British diplomat Frank Roberts, who was present at various official meetings with Stalin, including the Yalta Conference, and who served as Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow from 1945 to 1947 and dealt with Stalin as a principal during the 1949 Berlin blockade, concerns Stalin's policy toward the Baltic states and Poland and the events leading up to the Yalta agreement. The concluding segment deals with Britain's negotiations with Stalin regarding the opening of the second front in Europe; the reasons for the lack of popular opposition to the Stalin regime after the war despite the regime's return to the full rigors of police rule and ideological orthodoxy and to an emphasis on heavy industrial production; and the role of the atomic bomb in coloring relations between Russia and the West in the immediate postwar years. Roberts also talks about Stalin's demeanor and behavior as a statesman and as a host at the nocturnal banquets he was fond of giving; the strengths and weaknesses of Stalin's character; and the tendency of Churchill and Roosevelt to take an indulgent view in their wartime dealings with him.

1246 Roberts, Geoffrey. "Litvinov's Lost Peace, 1941-1946." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 23-54.

This analysis of the key role played by former People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov in charting the Kremlin's wartime Grand Alliance strategy includes a discussion of how Litvinov's realist conception of foreign policy offered a moderate alternative to Stalin's commitment to confrontation with the West; why Litvinov's argument for far-reaching, postwar cooperation among the members of the Grand Alliance, including a postwar settlement that would have, as one of its provisions, the division of the world into Great Power security zones, failed to take root

with Stalin; and how the significant downgrading of Litvinov's role at the end of the war "heralded a rapid descent into the Cold War."

1247 ———. "Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 4 (2002): 93-103.

Roberts opens with an account of the justification of the decision to conclude a nonaggression agreement with Germany in August 1939 given by Stalin in a radio broadcast on 3 July 1941 and later elaborated on in an October 1941 Kremlin dinner conversation with Lord Beaverbrook and W. Averell Harriman as well as in an August 1942 meeting with Winston Churchill. He then goes on to discuss how recently released files from the collection of Stalin's papers in the Central Party Archive in Moscow shed light on the leading role he played in the production of the pamphlet *Falsifiers of History*—as the official Soviet response to the documentary collection *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, published by the U.S. Department of State in January 1948. Here, Roberts describes how the Soviet leader made "reams of handwritten amendments and corrections, including whole sections struck out and rewritten," and how *Falsifiers* provides valuable additional evidence on Stalin's view of the prewar crisis and on the talks conducted with the German government in November 1940 regarding Soviet-German differences and the possibility of the USSR becoming an active partner in the Axis coalition as well. Roberts also discusses the 1951 Soviet publication of a complete and uncensored record of Stalin's wartime correspondence with Western leaders, commenting on why the publication of the two-volume collection, which was completed in 1957 under the supervision of Molotov, was delayed for five years, and on the value of the volumes for the study of Soviet foreign policy during World War II.

1248 Roucek, Joseph S. "Beneš-Stalin-Roosevelt-Truman." *Nationalities Papers* 5, no. 2 (fall 1977): 209-28.

Roucek traces the dealings of Edvard Beneš with the Kremlin from the Munich Pact of 1938 through his return to his country, via Moscow, in 1945 as President of Czechoslovakia, detailing his efforts to secure the reestablishment of Czech independence and the steps which led to his 1958 loss of power to the Czech communists aligned with the Kremlin. At the core of the article is an account of how Beneš's faith in the integrity of Stalin and in December 1943 Czech-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation—which included Stalin's support for the restoration of Czechoslovakia's prewar frontiers and for the principle of noninterference in the nation's political life—proved to be misplaced, and of how Beneš, through his well-intentioned efforts to secure Stalin's support for his regime by including Czech communists in his government and by accepting Soviet claims to Subcarpathian Ukraine, ended up being lured into the Soviet net. Roucek also discusses how the agreement Stalin reached with Roosevelt and Churchill at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 to leave the liberation of Prague to the Red Army played a key part in determining Czechoslovakia's fate.

1249 Sanders, Donald B. "Stalin Plotted a Separate Peace." *American Mercury* (November 1947): 519-27.

Sanders makes use of newly available documents in the hands of government agencies of the United States to describe the secret negotiations between Russia and Germany intermittently from January 1943 to May 1944 regarding the possibility of a separate peace. He notes the groups inside the German foreign service and government that favored a separate peace with Russia; describes the evolution of Hitler's attitude toward such an arrangement; and the reasons why Stalin was receptive to separate peace feelers floated by Berlin through various channels. Stalin, Sanders maintains, was willing to suspend hostilities with Germany on the basis of a German withdrawal to the demarcation line provided by the Ribbentop-Molotov agreements of August-September 1939, but while Berlin was receptive to such a proposal, the negotiations faltered over Hitler's

reluctance to agree to Russian demands for control of the Dardanelles, and over Stalin's unwillingness to accept Berlin's demand that Russia provide Germany with raw materials and food and grant Germany special rights in Ukraine and the Middle East. As the course of the war continued to turn in Russia's favor, Sanders explains, Stalin abandoned the idea of a separate peace with Germany but used the threat of such a prospect to extract concessions from his Anglo-American wartime partners, who were well informed about the peace-feelers and proved willing to concede virtually all of Eastern Europe to Stalin to encourage Moscow to pursue the war to the point of Germany's unconditional surrender.

- 1250** Schwarz, Paul and Guy Richards. "A Secret Russian Mission That Almost Changed History." *Liberty* (5 July 1947): 26+.

This article deals with the secret official mission to Stockholm in January 1943 undertaken by A. M. Alexandrov, an expert on Germany in the Soviet foreign office, to submit peace terms to the Germans and to wait for a reply from Berlin. The authors describe how the mission, which was authorized by Stalin in response to the news that his Western Allies would not be opening a second front in Europe in 1943, floundered as Himmler frantically searched for an answer to Hitler's question, "Is Alexandrov a Jew?" Hitler's willingness to stall while Alexandrov's lineage was investigated, the authors maintain, indicates that he was not happy with Stalin's terms for a separate peace, yet it seems likely that if Alexandrov had stayed put, instead of departing from Stockholm before the German emissary was prepared to meet with him, negotiations to reach more mutually satisfactory terms might have been pressed by both sides, and the Russo-German War could have ended then and there.

- 1251** Sharp, Tony. "The Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers." *Journal of Contemporary History* 12, no. 2 (1977): 381-93.

Sharp draws on recently published primary sources and newly opened British records to reveal the details of the competing concepts of compensation advanced by the Polish government in exile (the "Jagellon concept") and by Stalin and his Polish supporters (the "Piast concept"), showing how Russia's Western Allies, in adopting the "Tehran Formula" in December 1943 on Poland's postwar frontiers, moved away from their previous position and toward the Piast concept of compensation, largely because of their belief that, in the face of the then recent Soviet military successes and relative Western military impotence in North Africa, they were in no position to oppose Stalin's territorial demands in a region of Europe where Soviet influence was almost certain to hold sway.

- 1252** Shtromas, Alex. "Soviet Occupation of the Baltic States and Their Incorporation into the U. S.S.R.: Political and Legal Aspects. Part I: Political Aspects." *East European Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (September 1985): 289-301.

This account of the series of political steps taken by Moscow in incorporating each of the Baltic states into the USSR in 1939-40 includes a brief discussion of the role played by the Baltic issue in Stalin's choice of sides in the growing conflict between Nazi Germany and the Western democracies. According to Shtromas, the negotiations with the British and French were conducted by Stalin mainly in order to induce Hitler to raise the stakes to secure the Kremlin's agreement to a pact with Germany, particularly with respect to Berlin's acceptance of Moscow's demands concerning "vital Soviet interests in the Baltic area." Shtromas also discusses how Stalin was able to induce Hitler to revise the first Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union of 23 August 1939, which placed Lithuania in the German "sphere of influence," in favor of conceding Lithuania to the USSR in the second Secret Additional Protocol of 28 September by assigning to Germany the province of Lublin and some parts of the province of Warsaw in Poland, which had been ceded to Moscow by the first Secret Additional Protocol.

- 1253** ———. "Soviet Occupation of the Baltic States and Their Incorporation into the U.S.S.R.: Political and Legal Aspects. Part II: Legal Aspects." *East European Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (January 1986): 459-67.

Shtromas discusses how the steps taken by Moscow in violating the constitutions of the three Baltic states by imposing illegal electoral laws upon them and by conducting bogus elections in converting the three states into union republics of the USSR demonstrate the opportunistic nature of the Soviet Union's attitude toward international law and its own international obligations. In addition to detailing how the incorporation of the Baltic states within the USSR violated both international and constitutional law, Shtromas outlines the efforts of Stalin, in his negotiations with Churchill and Roosevelt, to guarantee that his wartime allies would recognize the Soviet Union's acquisition of the Baltic states. He also explains how the Baltic issue came to be formally unresolved due to London and Washington's unwillingness to bow to the inevitable in allowing Stalin to retain the Baltic states and refusal to reach an agreement with Moscow on this issue, which might compromise the very principles for which the democratic powers were fighting. In this way, the British and American governments managed to avoid recognition of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states, and, at the same time, were able to continue to recognize the three states as sovereign entities, allowing Stalin to keep the territorial prizes he secured in his deal with Hitler, and leaving the Baltic states with a status lacking a legally plausible basis.

- 1254** Siracusa, Joseph M. "The Meaning of TOLSTOY: Churchill, Stalin and the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944." *Diplomatic History* 3, no. 4 (1979): 443-63.

Siracusa provides a brief introduction to the official British record of the Anglo-Soviet talks (code-named TOLSTOY by the British) held in Moscow in October 1944 during which Churchill and Stalin worked out a secret Balkan spheres of influence agreement. Siracusa notes the substance of the so-called percentages agreement concluded by Churchill and Stalin, describes the range of historical opinion on the significance of TOLSTOY, and comments on the value of the official British record as an indicator of the thinking and negotiating style of the two leaders. The record of Churchill's 9 October 1944 conversations with Stalin along with the transcripts of the subsequent TOLSTOY meetings between British and Soviet diplomats on 10, 11, and 13 October are appended to the article.

- 1255** ———. "The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington." *Review of Politics* 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 381-409.

This article opens with a critical review of the historical appraisals of the secret Balkan spheres-of-action agreement worked out by Churchill and Stalin at the Anglo-Soviet conference held in Moscow in October of 1944 and then moves on to discuss a series of questions related to this intriguing episode in the diplomatic history of World War II. Among the questions Siracusa addresses are: What factors prompted Churchill to travel to Moscow in search of a Balkan agreement? What did Stalin hope to achieve by endorsing the territorial arrangement proposed by Churchill? To what extent were Stalin and Churchill influenced by the American government's declared hostility to spheres of influence politics? And, in light of the disintegration of the Grand Alliance, was a legitimate opportunity missed to avert at least one aspect of the Cold War?

- 1256** Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah. "Headlines in a Black Sea Drama: Joseph Stalin, Pavel Skoropadsky, Sirdar Mohamed Hashim Khan, and Reza Shah." *Christian Science Monitor Magazine* (9 August 1941): 6.

This article briefly describes Stalin's efforts to persuade Afghan and Iranian leaders to join the Soviet Union in the struggle against Nazi Germany, and then moves on to outline the thinking of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the ruler of Iran, and Sirdar Mohamed Hashim Khan, the Afghan Prime Minister, in choosing to maintain their neutrality in the war between the Axis and Allied powers. The

author also discusses the role played in the “Black Sea drama” by General Pavel Skoropadsky, a Ukrainian soldier of fortune who, at the time, had aligned himself with Hitler in the hope of being enthroned, with Nazi help, as ruler of Ukraine and who, in this capacity, envisioned assisting the German forces in their thrust toward the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

1257 Soloveytkhik, George. “Stalin and Europe.” *Nineteenth Century* 128 (December 1940): 584-91.

Soloveytkhik maintains that it is wishful thinking on the part of leaders in the West to believe that the Soviet-German agreement reached in August 1939 is showing signs of deterioration and that the Kremlin is on the verge of joining the war against the fascist dictators. He contends that Stalin’s two key interests—maintenance of his dictatorship and staying out of war in Europe—are, from the Soviet leader’s perspective, best served by continuing, if not reinforcing, his ties with Hitler. Stalin’s hope that a prolonged war will sap the strength of his capitalist enemies and open the door for communist expansion further points to the likelihood that he will continue his collaboration with Berlin, in Soloveytkhik’s view.

1258 Sorel, Nancy Caldwell. “Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill.” *Atlantic* 268 (November 1991): 141.

Sorel offers a brief commentary on Churchill’s August 1942 meeting with Stalin in Moscow, noting the Soviet leader’s displeasure with Churchill for refusing to risk opening a second front in Europe that year, and how Stalin, on the last evening of their meeting, softened and invited Churchill to his home for a goodbye dinner during which talk and wine flowed freely and Stalin admitted that “even the stress of war did not compare to the terrible struggle to force the collective-farm policy on the peasantry.”

1259 “The Sphinx of Moscow.” *Christian Century* 60 (10 March 1943): 287-89.

This report discusses whether Stalin is likely to attend the conference proposed by the American government in early March of 1943 to determine of the postwar settlements, and, if he does attend, whether he will be ready to make far-reaching postwar commitments. Stalin’s statement, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army, that once Soviet forces have driven the Germans from Russian soil, Moscow will be under no obligation to anyone else to continue the conflict, indicates a growing tendency on the part of the Soviet dictator to take a nationalistic stance with respect to his Western Allies, a stance reinforced by Moscow’s announcement of its intention to keep control of the Baltic states and to create an extensive buffer zone along its western borders, none of which bodes well for the success of the upcoming international conference, according to the report.

1260 “Stalin and Unity.” *Commonweal* (24 November 1944): 140.

This brief commentary on Stalin’s Moscow address of 6 November 1944 deals with the rhetorical style employed by the Soviet leader in celebrating the blows dealt by the Red Army to the German invaders and in speaking about the question of unity among the nations united in the war against fascism. The article notes the effect achieved by a technique of speaking that is powerful yet controlled, simple yet complex.

1261 “Stalin Speech Tightens Bond of Unity with Fighting Allies.” *Newsweek* 20 (16 December 1942): 34+.

The focus of this report is the Kremlin speech Stalin gave to a gathering of 2,000 Soviet government and party officials on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in which he summed up Russia’s military situation and the program of action of the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition. The report cites the key points of the speech, notes now Stalin’s outline of Soviet war aims points toward a nationalistic trend and away from the promotion of world

revolution, and indicates how Stalin's statements may help to solidify Russia's military alliance with Britain and America.

1262 "Stalin's Holiday Adds Fresh Fuel to Rumors of His Serious Illness." *Newsweek* 26 (22 October 1945): 44.

This article begins with a brief account of the rumors that Stalin was seriously ill, encouraged by the 10 October 1945 announcement that he was leaving the Kremlin for a vacation—his first since the German invasion—and then comments on how the importance of Stalin's health has been highlighted by the deterioration of the Anglo-American-Soviet wartime alliance, particularly with respect to the extent to which defeated Germany was to be deindustrialized under the Potsdam agreement, and why Western diplomats regard Stalin "as a sort of 'bridge to the west'—the man through whom they can offset Russian suspicions"—and a counterweight to Russian isolationism.

1263 Standley, William H. "Stalin and World Unity." *Collier's Weekly* 115 (30 June 1945): 17+. The former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union during World War II describes his experiences in dealing with Stalin and other Soviet leaders on such matters as the Lend-Lease Program, the establishment of a trans-Siberian air route for the delivery of planes to the Soviet Union, and the opening of a second military front in Europe. Standley also comments on the difficulties Stalin faces in rebuilding the Soviet Union and delivering on the promises made to the Soviet people for a better life in the years following the war, and on the likelihood that Stalin will cooperate in attaining a stable peace if he is to meet his nation's domestic needs and satisfy its people's aspirations.

1264 Swain, Geoffrey. "Stalin's Wartime Vision of the Postwar World." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 7, no. 1 (1996): 73-96.

Swain discusses Stalin's foreign policy during the wartime years and the immediate postwar period as a two-pronged and consistent one geared, first, toward using the international balance of forces to gain additional security for the Soviet Union by establishing spheres of influence in the Baltic states and the Balkans, and, second, toward capitalizing on opportunities in war-ravaged Europe to promote the cause of world communism, but only in those countries where the diplomatic consequences would not be such that Soviet security might be jeopardized. Within the context of these two fundamental policy aims, Swain examines Stalin's reasoning in signing the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact; his wartime moves to gain political control in the Baltic states and the Balkans; his adoption of a more aggressive popular front posture, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan, and the exclusion of the communists from the postwar coalition governments of France and Italy in May 1947; and his move against Marshal Tito out of concern that the Yugoslav leader's effort to use the Cominform to try to secure a communist victory in the Greek Civil War could have negative diplomatic consequences for the Soviet Union and could put Soviet security at risk.

1265 Szymaczak, Robert. "Invitation to the Kremlin: The Adventure of Father Stanislaw Orlemanski, April-May 1944." *East European Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (1991): 399-424.

Szymaczak examines the circumstances surrounding and repercussions of the April-May 1944 visit to the Soviet Union by an obscure pro-Soviet Polish-American parish priest from Springfield, Massachusetts, named Stanislaw Orlemanski—a visit which came at the direct request of Stalin and which included two lengthy meetings with the Soviet leader. Noting the stunned reaction of American leaders over Stalin's suggestion that Orlemanski and two other pro-Soviet Polish-Americans should become cabinet ministers in a new Polish government, and that Orlemanski should journey to Moscow to discuss the future of Poland, Szymaczak describes the red-carpet treatment accorded to Orlemanski during his stay in Moscow; the efforts of the American government to distance itself from the Orlemanski mission; and the negative reaction of the Polish-

American community and by Orlemanski's superiors in the Catholic Church to the favorable statements issued by the American priest about Stalin and Soviet intentions toward Poland. In speculating on Soviet intentions in the Orlemanski affair, Szymaczak entertains such possibilities as Stalin's desire to include acceptable noncommunists in the leadership of a type of "national front" government in the new Poland; his hope of appeasing the powerful Catholic clergy in Poland by using the supposed influence of Orlemanski; and his belief that Orlemanski's visit might somehow lay the foundation for a rapprochement with the Vatican.

1266 Táboršký, Eduard. "Beneš and Stalin—Moscow, 1943-1945." *Journal of Central European Affairs* 13 (July 1953): 154-81.

Táboršký defends the policy adopted toward Moscow by Edvard Beneš during the years 1938-45 against critics who have maintained that the Czech president was a misguided idealist who imagined that Soviet-Western cooperation could be lasting and whose trust in Stalin and tactics in appeasing the Soviets resulted in the eclipse of democracy in his own country and the establishment of a communist regime under the Kremlin's control. Táboršký, who, in his capacity as personal secretary to Beneš, accompanied the Czech leader on his 1943 and 1945 visits to Moscow, first describes the cordial treatment accorded to Beneš during his December 1943 stay in Moscow; the encouragement Beneš received from Stalin regarding Allied cooperation; and the assurances the Soviet leader repeatedly gave him that Moscow had absolutely no intention of interfering with the development of Czech domestic affairs and would recognize the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Armed with the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation he signed in Moscow at this time, Beneš left the Kremlin in January 1944 with every reason to be optimistic about the future of Soviet-Western cooperation, Czech-Soviet relations, and the restoration of Czechoslovakia to its prewar state as an independent and democratic state, according to Táboršký. However, Beneš's optimism faded within less than a year, Táboršký explains, in the face of a series of Soviet actions—particularly regarding the status of the Czech province of Ruthenia—that indicated how little Stalin's pledges could be relied upon. As Beneš came to realize that his trust in Stalin had been misplaced and that the Western powers did not want to go beyond mild protests in the face of broken Soviet pledges across the entire span of Eastern Europe, he opted for fighting a retreating battle to salvage what he could of Czech independence. Beneš, having been betrayed by Stalin, was left with no choice but to work with a cabinet dominated by Czech communists, hoping to restore the balance with democracy later on, Táboršký concludes.

1267 ———. "Beneš and the Soviets." *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 2 (January 1949): 302-14.

This favorable portrayal of the action taken by Edvard Beneš in his efforts to secure Czech independence and democracy maintains that the West's betrayal of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference led the Czech statesman and leader to conclude that the best means of safeguarding his people's security was to align his nation with the Soviet Union and to promote understanding and tolerance between the Kremlin and the Western democracies. Táboršký, who served as Beneš's secretary, also discusses how Beneš, in placing his trust in Moscow and concluding the 1943 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, was deeply influenced by the impression Stalin made on him during their Moscow meetings and by the assurances Stalin gave him that the Soviets were firmly committed to noninterference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, only to see his trust betrayed with the Kremlin's later disregard of its treaty obligations.

1268 "Tehran '43." *International Affairs* 50, no. 2 (2004): 148-62.

International Affairs presents here the contributions of seven participants in the discussion devoted to the theme "Tehran '43: A View Sixty Years Later" held by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia. Among the Stalin-related points raised during the discussion are his refusal to attend a summit conference until the military-political situation turned in the favor of the Soviet Union, mainly because he wanted to negotiate with Churchill and Roose-

vult from a position of strength; his initiative in arranging the October 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of setting a clear agenda for the Tehran meeting; the Soviet delegation's firmness at Tehran in insisting that the conference decide on the date of the opening of the second front in West Europe; the tactics followed by Stalin in trying to ensure a favorable outcome at Tehran for the Soviet Union; his distinct taste for dealing with Roosevelt rather than Churchill, largely because he preferred the American president's approach to dealing with international problems; and the role played by the Soviet intelligence service in informing Stalin about the positions to be taken by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Tehran meeting.

1269 Trubnikov, Viacheslav. "The Diplomatic Front of the Battle of Stalingrad." *International Affairs* 49, no. 2 (2003): 168-74.

This account of Soviet diplomatic efforts to promote the opening of a second front in Europe against Nazi Germany and the flow of war materials and foodstuffs to the USSR from abroad includes a discussion of Stalin's dissatisfaction with British and American efforts in this regard, particularly when the Battle of Stalingrad was at its height.

1270 Tsakaloyannis, Panos. "The Moscow Puzzle." *Journal of Contemporary History* 21, no. 1 (1986): 37-55.

Winston Churchill's account of the "percentages deal" he struck with Stalin in October 1944 in Moscow partitioning the Balkans into British and Soviet spheres of influence is, according to this article, farfetched in view of the available evidence on the Moscow meeting. Tsakaloyannis contends that—in view of Roosevelt's stated insistence that all major questions be decided in common with the Big Three, Washington's communication to Moscow expressing concern about the upcoming meeting between the Soviet leader and Churchill, and Stalin's awareness of Roosevelt's position, of the then current strain in British-American relations, and the fact that Churchill was acting on his own—it is very unlikely that Stalin would have viewed or casually endorsed such a deal in the way Churchill described in his memoirs. Furthermore, the alleged Balkans agreement not only makes little sense from a diplomatic perspective, but it seems highly implausible, in light of the way events actually unfolded in the region following the Moscow meeting, that it was instrumental in bringing about the postwar settlement in the Balkans as Churchill suggested, according to Tsakaloyannis. Churchill's tendency to view himself in a dramatic light, combined with the fact that he wrote his memoirs amidst the Cold War climate of the 1950s, may account for why he inflated this affair out of all proportion, Tsakaloyannis suggests.

1271 Ulam, Adam B. "Forty Years after Yalta." *New Republic* 192 (11 February 1985): 18-21. Developing the theme "Stalin outwitted FDR, and the West still pays," Ulam discusses the wartime circumstances and postwar considerations which led President Franklin Roosevelt to abandon the London-sponsored Polish government and recognize the Soviet-sponsored Lublin group as the nucleus of the future government of Poland. He points to the Yalta concessions made by Stalin on the issue closest to Roosevelt's heart—the United Nations—and to the president's belief that the moment was ripe for negotiating with Stalin as the determining factors in his decision to endorse the Soviet position regarding the postwar government and boundaries of Poland. While Stalin may have emerged from Yalta with a smile on his face, Yalta was not the place of the "great betrayal" of Eastern Europe, as many analysts have maintained, but rather "the division of Europe resulted from a whole series of events: Soviet usurpations, Western sins of omission and commission, as well as sheer accidents—all going back to 1943 and continuing through 1947," with Yalta being only one stage in this sequence of occurrences, according to Ulam.

1272 Ullman, Richard H. "The Davies Mission and United States-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941." *World Politics* 9 (1957): 220-39.

This examination of American Ambassador to Moscow Joseph E. Davies's understanding of the Soviet Union, and his role in shaping FDR's decision to send aid to the Russian forces following the Nazi attack in June of 1941, revolves around the argument that, while Davies was correct in his assessment of the Red Army's ability to withstand the German onslaught, he never really understood the country he was assigned to, and his views regarding Soviet behavior were wholly unrealistic. Included in this unflattering assessment of Davies's conception of the USSR is an account of his 1939 two-hour-long Kremlin meeting with Stalin and Molotov, and how the session served to reinforce the high regard the ambassador already had for the two Soviet leaders and further skew his judgment concerning the policies and actions of the Stalin regime, including the purges and the execution of top Red Army officers.

1273 Urban, George. "Was Stalin (the Terrible) Really a 'Great Man'? A Conversation with Averell Harriman." *Encounter* 57, no. 5 (November 1981): 20-38.

In this interview with W. Averell Harriman, who served as President Roosevelt's special ambassador to Churchill and Stalin from 1941 to 1946, Urban raises a number of questions about Stalin as a leader and a statesman and about the dealings of the Western Allies with Stalin during the wartime period. Among the questions to which Harriman responds are: Did Roosevelt's policies and personal attitude appeal more to Stalin than did Churchill's? Why did Roosevelt feel he could handle Stalin better than Churchill could? To what extent could the job of understanding, supporting, and influencing the Soviet war effort be divorced from a historical assessment of Stalin's character and his record as a dictator? What was Stalin like personally—did Stalin's oft-cited suspicious nature and near paranoid behavior surface in his dealings with Roosevelt and Churchill? At what point did Stalin's postwar designs on Central and Eastern Europe become clear, and what could have been done to counter them? What role did the delays in the opening of the second front play in the Allies' relations with Stalin? How much stock can be placed in Churchill's account of the so-called percentages agreement he reached with Stalin over Anglo-Soviet spheres of influence in the Balkans? and Can Stalin, when all his deeds and misdeeds are considered, be described as a "great man"?

1274 Watson, Derek. "Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 1 (2002): 51-85.

Watson draws upon new archival evidence, including the papers of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Russian Foreign Ministry documents, and the recently published correspondence between Stalin and Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, to present a detailed account of the diplomatic negotiations associated with the making of the Grand Alliance. Focusing on how the May-June 1942 negotiations hinged upon the two sides' different priorities with respect to postwar territorial questions and the issue of the second front, Watson traces the diplomatic sparring Molotov engaged in with the British and American leaders, showing how Stalin's concern over establishing postwar borders that would guarantee the security of the USSR eventually gave way, in accord with a deteriorating military situation, to privileging the need to open a second front to relieve Nazi pressure on the Soviet forces and ensure the immediate survival of the Soviet Union. While Molotov did his best to gain a commitment to the early opening of the second front and to win support for a Soviet postwar territorial agreement that would benefit Soviet security, he returned to Moscow without having fully secured either objective, despite his efforts to capitalize on differences between London and Washington and to follow Stalin's instructions to the letter, Watson shows. In discussing Molotov's role in Moscow's negotiations with Britain during the 1939-42 period, Watson discusses how the Soviet Foreign Commissar was able to act with considerable independence before the German attack on Russia but thereafter, when Stalin became more personally involved in the details of the negotiations, he acted in accord with specific and strict instructions regarding the objectives of his mission and how best to serve them.

1275 Weinryb, Bernard D. "Stalin's Zionism." *American Academy for Jewish Research* 46-47 (1979-1980): 555-72.

The dinner conversation about "the Jewish problem" that took place between Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin in Yalta on 10 February 1945, during which the Soviet leader, in response to the president's statement of support for Zionism, stated that "in principle" he too was a Zionist, serves as the launching point of this survey of the Bolshevik attitude toward Zionism before the 1917 Revolution and the "ambiguous and sometimes contradictory" Soviet position on Zionism from 1918 to 14 May 1947, when, on that date, Andrei Gromyko declared, in a speech at the United Nations, that the Soviet Union was in favor of the creation of a Jewish state. In the main, Weinryb describes how the wavering and generally negative official Soviet posture towards Zionists and Zionism changed in accord with Moscow's wartime needs and postwar geopolitical interests in the Middle East. With reference to Stalin's declaration at the dinner in Yalta that he, too, was a Zionist, Weinryb suggests that, in view of indications that during the war Stalin became "more anti-Semitic and more suspicious of Jews," it is unlikely that his "Zionism," as expressed at Yalta, was the first step toward Soviet support for a Jewish state but rather should be considered within the context of his tactics in dealing with Roosevelt at that time; his plans for Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean; and his desire to weaken British influence in the Middle East.

1276 Wernick, Robert. "Yalta: Witness to History." *Smithsonian* 30, no. 10 (January 2000): 100-114.

Wernick provides an overview of the wartime meeting of the Big Three at Yalta, including the choice of Yalta as a site; the behavior of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at the conference; the issues addressed by the Yalta leaders; and the consequences of the agreements they reached.

1277 Willkie, Wendell. "Stalin: Glad to See You, Mr. Willkie." *Life* 13 (5 October 1942): 35.

Franklin Roosevelt's personal envoy to Stalin reports here on his 23 September 1942 Kremlin conversation with the Soviet leader about the war against Germany. Willkie characterizes Stalin as a sagacious individual who showed a "tremendous power of persuasiveness" in speaking about such subjects as Russia's struggle against the military forces of Germany, Russia's need for American material aid in its fight against Hitler, and the urgent necessity of a maximum war effort from all nations opposed to fascist aggression. Willkie also notes that when he told Stalin that he intended to tell Americans about "the great fight Russia was putting up," the Soviet leader recommended that he understate the case rather than give the impression that he was "encouraging Americans to assume a patronizing attitude" toward the USSR.

1278 Xydis, Stephen G. "The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans of October 9, 1944." *Journal of Central European Affairs* 15 (October 1955): 248-71.

Xydis draws upon the postwar writings of eminent participants in the secret Big Three negotiations in 1944 regarding the matter of the disposition of Allied military forces in the Balkan military arena to compare the official American and British accounts of the diplomatic exchanges and arrangements that led up to the "percentages agreement" reached on 9 October 1944 during the Churchill-Stalin meeting in Moscow. He discusses the terms of the percentages agreement; their correlation to the military situation as it existed at that time; what the percentages of predominance actually signified militarily, politically, and territorially; and the American reaction to the percentages deal, an arrangement which established, respectively, British and Soviet wartime "preponderance" not only in Greece and Romania, to which President Franklin Roosevelt had already agreed in June 1944, but also in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which were not included in the American June decision.

1279 Young, John W. "Stalin and de Gaulle," *History Today* 40 (June 1990): 20-26.

This account of the December 1944 meeting of Stalin and Charles de Gaulle revolves around how the French leader engaged in a struggle of wills during his talks with Stalin, particularly over the question of the future of Poland. Young describes how de Gaulle, who went to Moscow to show his independence from America and Britain, to assert his new government's place on the world stage, and, hopefully, to negotiate an anti-German treaty with Russia, repeatedly refused to recognize the Kremlin-backed Lublin committee as the future government of Poland as a precondition for concluding any Franco-Soviet pact and was on the verge of leaving Moscow without an agreement in hand when the stunned Soviets relented and agreed to a treaty promising cooperation with France against Germany during and after the war. Stalin, having been unable to move de Gaulle to recognize the Lublin Poles, ultimately complimented the French leader, remarking, "You played your hand well. Well done."

Post-World War II

1280 Alsop, Stewart. "Stalin's Plans for the U.S.A." *Saturday Evening Post* 224 (14 July 1951): 17+.

This exploration of Stalin's intentions regarding America is based on an account of a 9-10 July 1947 Kremlin meeting between Czech and Soviet leaders provided by Arnhorst Heidrich, who had journeyed to Moscow as a member of the Czech delegation, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing a Czech treaty with France providing for mutual assistance in case of renewed German aggression. According to Heidrich, Stalin opened the meeting by informing the Czechs, who had accepted an invitation to go to Paris to discuss membership in the Marshall Plan, that joining the Marshall Plan was not in the best interests of the Soviet Union or its allies, as the plan was just a device for America to avoid a depression by sending its surplus goods to Europe and to extend Washington's economic and political domination over the region. Stalin then went on to speak at considerable length about his plans for confining American power to the western hemisphere and extending Soviet power throughout Europe and Asia without resorting to war, plans largely based on his assumption that America would soon suffer an economic catastrophe which, in effect, would lead to a reduction of American power in Europe, leaving Britain and France too weak to resist Soviet pressure, according to Heidrich's notes.

1281 "Analyzing the Oracle." *Newsweek* 32 (8 November 1948): 38.

This brief article comments on the statements Stalin made in a November 1948 *Pravda* interview that Britain and America were following "a policy of aggression," and that the Soviet Union would frustrate the efforts of those in the West bent on instigating a new war. Stalin's tempering of his hostile references to the West by stating that he would not allow another major war to start was designed to assure a frightened Soviet public that the Kremlin was following a policy of peace, and that a new world war was not on the immediate horizon, the article suggests.

1282 Andrews, William R. "The Azerbaijan Incident: The Soviet Union in Iran, 1941-46." *Military Review* 54, no. 8 (1974): 74-85.

Andrews develops the argument that the Azerbaijan incident of 1945-46 was an attempt by Stalin to establish a communist state in the Middle East—a move that was thwarted largely because of a resolute stand taken by President Truman. He traces the steps taken by Stalin in trying to secure a communist regime in Azerbaijan; comments on the dismal performance of Secretary of State James Byrnes in responding to Soviet moves in Iran; and considers the circumstances which finally led Truman to issue, on 21 March 1946, a warning to Stalin that if Soviet forces were not withdrawn within six weeks, America would be forced to take military action. Truman's actions in Iran at this time, according to Andrews, established a new relationship between Moscow and

Washington and set in motion a policy of firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union that later evolved into the policy of "containment" followed by America as the Cold War blossomed.

1283 Armstrong, H. T. "Tito and Stalin." *Atlantic Monthly* 184 (October 1949): 30-36.

Armstrong makes use of the correspondence exchanged between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties in the spring of 1948 to examine why Stalin decided to isolate Tito from the world communist movement and attempt to oust him from power. He examines the role played by the clash of national and personal interests, rather than ideology, in the rift between the two leaders, and the ways in which Stalin's misreading of the political situation in Yugoslavia and underestimation of the degree of popular support enjoyed by Tito figured into the sequence of events that led to the rift. He suggests that an understanding of the manner in which Stalin sought to deal with Tito's challenge to the Kremlin's authority might prove to be instructive for Western leaders hoping to gain insight into Stalin's tactics and into the place of Russian national aims in revolutionary communism.

1284 Bajanov, Evgueni. "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (1995-1996): 54, 87-91.

Bajanov draws upon recently declassified Soviet archives to examine the evolution of the political line followed by Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang on the Korean Peninsula from 1949 up to the opening of the Korean War armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951. Dividing his analysis into eleven chronologically arranged sections, Bajanov shows how Stalin, until the end of 1949, worried about the possibility of South Korean aggression against the North, did everything he could to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul, and refused to sanction Kim Il Sung's plan to "liberate" the South by use of military force. With the victory of communism in China, the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb, and the Kremlin's perception of a weakening of Washington's willingness to get involved militarily on the Asian mainland, Bajanov explains, Stalin changed his mind and gave his approval of Kim's plan to invade the South. Following an account of Stalin's active involvement in the preparations for the war and his leading role in determining the strategy to be followed by the North in the initial stages of the conflict, Bajanov describes the steps taken by Stalin, once the tide of battle turned against the North, to pressure a reluctant Mao to enter the war to prevent the total collapse of Kim's forces; the elation on the communist side as the military situation dramatically changed for the better following the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the conflict in late November 1950; Stalin's efforts to buttress the Chinese-Korean position once the communist forces suffered a series of devastating military setbacks; his initial opposition to the armistice-seeking policy proposed by Pyongyang and Beijing; and, lastly, his insistence, once he accepted the need for an armistice, that Mao personally take charge of the negotiation and Moscow remain in the background in an "advisory" capacity.

1285 Baras, Victor. "Stalin's German Policy after Stalin." *Slavic Review* 37, no. 2 (1978): 259-67. The focus of this analysis of the Kremlin's policy toward Germany in the early 1950s is on the question of whether German reunification, as proposed by Stalin in the Soviet diplomatic note of 10 March 1952, would have come to pass were it not for the 17 June 1953 East German uprising. Examining Stalin's German policy in 1952, the terms of Stalin's 1952 reunification proposal, and the link between the Soviet stand on reunification and the 1953 crisis in the GDR that culminated in the June uprising, Baras argues that, irrespective of the uprising, little likelihood of reunification existed in view of Stalin's commitment to both the prevention of West Germany's entry into the Western alliance and to the preservation of the GDR—objectives toward which the Kremlin worked, in part, by proposing eventual German reunification in exchange for the West's immediate rejection of the European Defense Community and recognition of the GDR.

1286 "Barriers to Western Unity." *Collier's Weekly* 131 (7 February 1953): 70.

Despite his occasional cheery messages to the West that capitalism and communism can live peacefully side by side, Stalin is using every nonmilitary weapon at his disposal to exploit the disunity that exists within the Western community of nations, particularly with respect to international trade and the struggle for markets, so as to gain victory over capitalism without resorting to a general war, according to this February 1953 article.

- 1287** Beam, Jacob D. "Our Man at Stalin's Funeral—25 Years Ago." *Foreign Service Journal* 55, no. 5 (1978): 23-24+.

Beam begins with a description of the troubled relationship between George Kennan and top Soviet officials during Kennan's brief tenure as U.S. ambassador to Moscow in 1952 and then turns to an analysis of the scene in Moscow during the days before Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 and of the Eisenhower administration's response to the "spectacular change in atmosphere" that occurred with the dictator's death as Soviet officials turned genial on the spot and quickly declared their willingness to normalize relations with the West. Beam, who served with Kennan in Moscow and acted as interim ambassador when Kennan was banned from Moscow by the Soviets, also describes the visit he made to the Stalin shrine in Gori, Georgia, during the second year of his 1969-73 tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the USSR.

- 1288** Békés, Csaba. "Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from Hungarian Archives." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 135-36.

Békés presents an excerpt from a 17 May 1946 speech of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP), delivered at a meeting of the party's Central Committee, in which he spoke about the Soviet proposal to set up a new communist world organization. According to Békés, since Rákosi had met with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow on 1 April 1946, it is most likely that Rákosi received the information he presented to the HCP's Central Committee from the Soviet leaders themselves. This would suggest that the idea of forming a new communist world organization was not, as many scholars have maintained, a reaction to the Marshall Plan introduced by America in the summer of 1947, but rather part of Stalin's wider plan "aimed at fostering Communist takeover in East Central Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Soviet-Western cooperation as well."

- 1289** Blechman, Barry M. and Douglas M. Hart. "Afghanistan and the 1946 Iran Analogy." *Survival* 22 (November/December 1980): 248-53.

This critique of an American policy that embraces military threats and military operations as simple solutions to international problems takes aim on President Harry Truman's account of the resolution of the Iran crisis of 1946, according to which Stalin was forced to remove Soviet forces from Iran by an American ultimatum threatening the use of military force, including nuclear weapons. In addition to maintaining that there is a total lack of evidence that any such ultimatum was ever sent to the Kremlin, the authors explain why they believe the Soviet withdrawal is best understood within the context of Stalin's desire at that time to allay Western fears about Soviet intentions by stepping back from territorial claims in regions less important to Moscow than Eastern Europe, where consolidation of the gains already made was the order of the day for the Kremlin.

- 1290** Borkenau, Franz. "Chances of a Mao-Stalin Rift: Will China's Communists Take the Tito Road?" Translated by M. J. Goldbloom. *Commentary* 14 (August 1952): 117-23.

In this exploration of the nature of the rift between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, the author's main point is that the conflict stems not from questions of ideology, territorial disputes, or economic interests, but rather from Mao's career-long independence of Moscow's control, evidenced by his assumption of a position alongside Marx and Lenin as a theoretician and by the Chinese Commu-

nist Party advancement of its claim to the dominant role in the leadership of Communist movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Borkenau also discusses Stalin's relations with Mao in the early years of the Chinese communist movement, highlighting the Soviet leader's lack of understanding of Chinese affairs and his indifference to the fate of Mao's band of revolutionaries at the time of the "Long March."

1291 Byrnes, Robert F. "The Climax of Socialism, 1950-1953." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, no. 317 (May 1958): 8-11.

Byrnes describes how Stalin's last years were especially bitter for Eastern Europe as the dictator sought to tighten the Soviet grip on the region; to reshape the cultural values of the conquered people; promote agricultural collectivization and heavy industry in each country; and use the region as a point of pressure against Western Europe and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. Stalin achieved some success in working toward these goals, Byrnes explains, but at the cost of rousing popular resentment and dissatisfaction among East European communists, compelling his successors to modify his policies substantially.

1292 Carlisle, Donald S. "Stalin's Postwar Foreign Policy and the National Liberation Movement." *Review of Politics* 27, no. 3 (1965): 334-63.

This study of the Kremlin's involvement in underdeveloped nations as they emerged after World War II maintains that post-Stalinist policy toward these countries had extensive roots in a foreign policy reevaluation that was well under way before the Soviet dictator died in 1953. In Carlisle's view, the new course taken toward the Afro-Asian world, which favored more emphasis on non-violent tactics in promoting the "national liberation movement," was part of a complex policy re-adjustment linked to the failures of the earlier, militant phase of Soviet foreign policy and to the risk of a direct confrontation with the West which Stalin was reluctant to take. Carlisle also contends that the Soviet evaluation of costs and consequences was "profoundly more rational and realistic than was often granted by Western analysts in gauging foreign political formulation under Stalin's direction."

1293 Cashman, Greg and Arthur N. Gilbert. "Some Analytical Approaches to the Cold War Debate." *History Teacher* 10, no. 2 (February 1977): 263-80.

The authors aim to move the discussion of the Cold War conflict beyond the classification imposed by the "traditionalists" versus "revisionists" debates by suggesting some new ways of looking at the Cold War in the hope of providing guidance to the teacher of Cold War history seeking to aid the student in uncovering basic assumptions about general approaches to history and policy analysis. While Stalin does not directly enter into this exercise in the reclassification of Cold War historical analysis, the degree of Soviet responsibility for the emergence of the Cold War and the path which the conflict took are addressed as Cashman and Gilbert consider such questions as Do the historians involved in the Cold War debate "see foreign policy as determined essentially by state structure, historical experience, and ideology?" Do they "emphasize the role of individuals, nation states, organizations within nations, or the structure of the international system?" And, Do they "apply their implicit criteria on foreign policy formulation in an even-handed manner to the Soviet Union and the United States?"

1294 "Cat in the Kremlin." *Time* 56 (17 July 1950): 23-24+.

This article opens with a summary of the views of Western Kremlinologists regarding the thinking of Stalin and his associates on a number of issues of world concern in the summer of 1950—including the situation in Korea, the status of Formosa, and the future of Berlin—and then moves on to present a brief political sketch of Stalin, emphasizing his lust for power and deceitfulness.

1295 Chen Jian. "Comparing Russian and Chinese Sources: A New Point of Departure for Cold War History." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (1995-1996): 20-21.

The author makes use of the record of the 16 December 1948 and 22 January 1950 meetings between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung and the 20 August and 3 September 1950 meetings between Stalin and Chinese foreign Minister Chou En-lai, newly released documents from the Russian Presidential Archives, and the account of these meetings provided in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, Mao's Russian-language interpreter, to describe the remarkable degree of compatibility among these sources and the light they shed on the making of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1949-50. He also comments on a few ambiguities and mistakes in Shi Zhe's memoirs, and on an important omission in the original Russian documents regarding Mao's response to Stalin's question on what the Chinese leader hoped to achieve through his visit to Moscow.

1296 "China and the Passing of Stalin." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 159 (12 March 1953): 52.

This article, in explaining why significant changes in Sino-Soviet relations are unlikely in the wake of Stalin's death, underplays the doctrinal differences between Moscow and Beijing and argues for the likelihood of China continuing to model itself in accord with the policies and pattern of rule laid down by Stalin and for the reaffirmation of the alignment of the two communist states in the larger sphere of diplomacy. Stalin's death, the article further predicts, is most likely to hinder rather than foster an early solution to the Korean conflict, largely because none of his successors has the authority, as Stalin did, to act decisively and unilaterally in making such an important foreign policy move.

1297 Crankshaw, Edward. "Again the Battle for Lenin's Mantle." *New York Times Magazine* (25 June 1950): 5+.

This commentary on the effort of Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito to use as a weapon in his struggle with the Cominform the charge that Stalin has distorted Lenin's meaning to serve his own ends opens with an account of Stalin's efforts to invoke the authority of Lenin to dispose of his own rivals for power within the Communist Party and to justify his own actions. Crankshaw then moves on to discuss the existence of a sentimental counterlegend in Russia, the hero of which is a Lenin far removed from the Lenin of Stalin's creation, a Lenin who loved his people, was wise, benevolent, and mild, and whose death was Russia's greatest calamity. This counterlegend existed only underground in Russia, Crankshaw explains, but has now received unexpected support outside Russia as Tito has set his publicists and theorists to make clear the nature of the "true Lenin"—all in an effort to expose Stalin's subjugation of the world communist movement to the interests of Russian nationalism and the Soviet state. Crankshaw also discusses how Tito's version of Lenin, as well as the version nourished by the counterlegend of the Bolshevik leader, are nearly as far removed from the truth as Stalin's.

1298 Crozier, Brian. "The West's Best Friend." *National Review* 40 (24 June 1988): 27.

Crozier discusses Stalin as "the West's best friend" in the sense that by alarming his former war-time partners through his imperialistic behavior in Eastern Europe, he gave birth to the Marshall Plan, which returned Western Europe to prosperity, and to NATO, to which the West owes its security and survival. He also cautions Western leaders against viewing Mikhail Gorbachev as a communist leader cut from a different cloth than his Kremlin predecessors, men who employed "the great Soviet deception machine" to advance Soviet security and prosperity and to further the spread of the Kremlin's version of socialism while selling the West on their commitment to such policies as collective security, peaceful coexistence, and détente.

1299 Cumings, Bruce and Kathryn Weathersby. "An Exchange on Korean War Origins." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 120-22.

This exchange of views on the historical insights provided by recently released Russian documents on the Korean War opens with Cumings questioning a number of statements made by Weathersby in her article on the documents in the winter 1995 issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*. With respect to Stalin, Cumings primarily takes issue with Weathersby's interpretation of how the documents shed new light on Stalin's understanding of and strategic thinking about the Korean situation. He also comments on how the documents indicate that Moscow was seeking to restrain hot-headed North Korean leaders from launching an unprovoked attack on the South, just as American archives show that Washington was working to discourage South Korean leaders from deliberately inciting such an attack. Weathersby responds to the attempts of Cumings to downplay the significance of the Russian documents by pointing to what she sees as flaws in his analysis of what the records do and do not reveal, particularly with respect to what the transcript of the first meeting between Kim Il Sung and Stalin indicates about the Soviet leader's familiarity with the Korean situation, his style in dealing with subordinates, and the extent of North Korea's dependence on the Soviet Union.

1300 "Curve." *Newsweek* 33 (7 February 1949): 29-30.

Stalin's support for a Soviet-American joint declaration against war and for a gradual disarmament, lifting of the Berlin blockade, and a personal meeting with President Truman, as stated in his answer to questions submitted to him in writing by Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service, is the subject of this report. The report discusses Stalin's motives for appearing to reach out to America in an effort to ease world tensions and explains how his latest "peace offensive" serves Soviet diplomatic and strategic interests.

1301 Dallin, David J. "Stalin the Infallible." *Partisan Review* 13, no. 1 (winter 1946): 120-37.

The failure of Stalin's predictions that World War II would unleash socialist revolutions in the war-ravaged capitalist states, and that the Red Army would crush the German Wehrmacht in 1942 because the German workers would come to its help by rising up against Hitler, have cast doubt on the concept of the international solidarity of the world proletariat as one of the mainstays of traditional communism and has initiated a profound intellectual crisis in communist circles, according to Dallin. He also discusses the concept of Soviet empire and considers the chief ideological elements of the new Russian communist nationalism that have emerged since the war, noting that while the Stalin regime is officially opposed to the new Russian nationalism, the Kremlin "tolerates and exploits the new trends for its own purposes."

1302 "Dead Center: Question-Answer Dialogue." *Time* 52 (8 November 1948): 27.

This brief report, in citing the remarks made by Stalin about the current diplomatic deadlock on the status of Berlin in a question-answer dialogue with an unnamed correspondent of *Pravda*, notes the Soviet leader's assertion that the recent discussion on Berlin in the UN's Security Council represents a display of Western aggressiveness that could prompt a new war.

1303 Dedijer, Vladimir. "The Battle Stalin Lost." *Dissent* 17, no. 6 (1970): 542-49.

The editors of *Dissent* present here three sections from the 1970 book *The Battle Stalin Lost, Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953*, written by Vladimir Dedijer, who, as Director of Information in the Tito government at the time Yugoslavia broke with Stalin, was a close witness to the events and developments that attended the Yugoslavs' defiance of the Kremlin. The first section deals with both the refusal of the Yugoslav Central Committee to send a delegation to the June 1948 Bucharest meeting of the Cominform out of fear that Stalin intended to use the session as a forum to deal with the "heresy" of Tito and his followers. The second describes the extent and impact of the Stalin purges in Eastern Europe between 1948 and 1953, and Stalin's deployment of high-ranking Soviet officials, including Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, who had been highly respected by Yugoslav partisans, to the nations of Eastern Europe to sing the song of Yugoslav heresy. The

third centers on the opposition of high-ranking Comintern functionary and Bulgarian communist leader Georgi Dimitrov to Stalin's "hegemonistic methods" in dealing not only with Yugoslavia but Bulgaria as well, and on Dimitrov's demonstration of his sympathies for the Yugoslavs during the opening year of the Moscow-Belgrade conflict.

1304 Djilas, Milovan. "Tito and Stalin." Translated by David Floyd. *Survey* 28, no. 3 (1984): 73-83.

This excerpt from former Yugoslav communist leader Milovan Djilas's 1983 book *Vlast (Power)* locates the origin of the conflict between Tito and Stalin in a 27 May 1945 speech by Tito in which he alluded to Soviet collusion with the Western Allies to deprive Yugoslavia of Trieste and expressed his opposition to any "spheres of influence policy" that would impinge upon Yugoslavia's independence. Djilas describes how Stalin, in an effort to seduce the Yugoslav leaders by his "reasonableness," employed his well-known political cunning in dealing with the issues that were troubling Yugoslav-Soviet relations, all while catering to Tito's ego and growing lust for power. Djilas notes that, while Tito was not influenced by the praise and honors which the Soviet leaders showered upon him, neither Tito nor any of the other members of Yugoslavia's leadership had a clear understanding of Stalin's motives, methods, or ultimate goals with respect to Yugoslavia at this stage of his nation's dealings with Moscow.

1305 "Does Stalin Want to Talk Peace?" *U.S. News and World Report* 30 (9 March 1951): 14-15. This report, in touching on the reasons why Stalin, in early 1951, was acting like a man who wanted to talk peace, emphasizes that the Kremlin's new strategy most likely reflects Stalin's desire to stem the rush of the Western powers to rearm in the face of a perceived Soviet threat and need to consolidate the territorial gains he has made in Eastern Europe. The article also speculates that mounting opposition to Soviet control within the satellite nations along with economic troubles in the USSR have encouraged Stalin to attempt to improve relations with the West.

1306 Eastman, Max. "Behind Soviet Foreign Policy." *American Mercury* 63 (September 1946): 261-69.

Eastman criticizes American officials who, in afterglow of the Grand Alliance, continue to regard the Soviet Union as a friend of democracy and as a state willing to join the capitalist nations in a sincere effort to bring peace to the world. The Kremlin may want peace with the great powers for the immediate future, Eastman concedes, but he warns that Stalin remains firmly committed to the cause of communist domination of the world and is willing to use all means, war included, to promote that goal whenever and wherever it is feasible to do so. He maintains that Stalin, in the tradition of Lenin, has followed the principle of expediency in his dealings with the capitalist states, and that the Soviet dictator's belief in the inevitability of armed conflict between the forces of socialism and capitalism and in the future victory of communism worldwide stands out clearly in his writings and speeches to his fellow communists.

1307 Federenko, N. "The Stalin-Mao Summit in Moscow." *Far Eastern Affairs* (USSR) 2 (1989): 134-48.

Federenko describes the atmosphere surrounding the December 1949-January 1950 Moscow meetings between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin; the behavior and demeanor of Mao and Stalin during their talks; and a number of incidents associated with Mao's visit to and stay in Moscow while the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship were being negotiated. Federenko, who was assigned the job of accompanying Mao and acting as his interpreter, also comments on the effects of Stalin's commanding personality on the course of events during the talks, and on how the Kremlin elite who attended the meetings were, on the whole, a shallow and talentless lot, distinguished only by their eagerness to serve Stalin and selected by him because, in being beneath him in every sense, they posed no threat to his authority.

1308 “Finns Dread Stalin’s Death.” *United Nations World* 3 (November 1949): 9-10.

Finnish leaders, according to this report, believe that “Stalin’s long stay in power has been marked by a moderation and comparative magnanimity not to be found elsewhere in the Politburo,” and that his successors, who “will want to prove that they are true Bolsheviks and immune to softness and compromise,” are likely to be less conciliatory than Stalin has been, not only with regard to Finland but with respect to other Western nations as well.

1309 Fischer, Louis. “Stalin Needs a New Line.” *United Nations World* 5 (April 1951): 29-31.

Fischer critiques the statements made by Stalin regarding the Korean War, disarmament, and world peace in a 17 February 1951 interview, linking the Soviet leader’s professed desire for peace and disarmament to both his fear that the war in Korea, far from ending in the hoped-for quick communist victory, was turning in a direction that could seriously threaten Soviet security, and to his realization that Moscow may have little to gain by continuing a policy of “keeping the world in a disturbed state.”

1310 Fogarty, Jonathan Titeslecu. “How to Get Along with Mr. Stalin.” *Commonweal* 46 (3 October 1947): 599-600.

The way to get along with Stalin, Fogarty proposes, is, first, to understand that the motive force behind his political behavior is his desire to make Russians happy—a goal toward which he has worked by proclaiming to his subjects that they will be gay and by using his “Happiness Boys,” who belong to “a club in Russia called the NKVD,” to go around and make Russians happy for Stalin. Secondly, America can improve its relations with the Soviet Union by emulating his happiness program. This can be done by the issuance of a “Happiness Proclamation,” arresting the “gloomsters” who violate that law, and making a deal with Stalin so that he will accept Americans as permanent guests in the camps he has established in Siberia. Stalin will then realize that America believes in “Multi-National Happiness” just as he does, leading him to view kindly our nation’s desire to get along with him, according to Fogarty.

1311 Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (June 1983): 171-90.

Stalin by name does not occupy a prominent place in this account of how postrevisionist archival research on the origins of the Cold War confirms some of the key arguments of New Left revisionism while parting company with the old orthodox position in various respects, but the article does point out how postrevisionism tends to stress the absence of any ideological blueprint for world revolution in the Soviet leader’s mind, viewing him as “a cagey but insecure opportunist” who took advantage of whatever tactical openings arose to expand Soviet influence, but who lacked a long-term strategy for and a driving interest in advancing the spread of communism beyond the Soviet sphere.

1312 ———. “The Tragedy of Cold War History.” *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 1 (1993): 1-16. Also in *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (1994): 142-54.

This call for a truly international approach to American diplomatic history, in considering the post-Cold War relevance of William Appleton Williams’s tragic view of the American experience in world affairs, argues for the need for American historians to reassess Cold War history in view of what the evidence from newly opened Soviet archives reveals about Stalin and the costs of Stalinism, and to regain a clearer sense of what real tragedy is all about by comparing the American “tragedy” with others that surround it. In making his case for an international approach to American diplomatic history, and in developing his vision of the tragedy of Cold War history, Gaddis constructs a psycho-political profile of Stalin as a leader incapable of functioning within the framework of mutual cooperation and coexistence with the West, and describes him as a brutal

dictator whose policies and actions had a catastrophic and tragic impact on the Soviet Union and its neighbors.

- 1313** Gaiduk, Ilya. "Stalin: Three Approaches to One Phenomenon." *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 1 (winter 1999): 115-25.

Gaiduk reviews the interpretations of Stalin's foreign policy put forth in three books published in 1996: Edvard Radzinsky's *Stalin: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives*; Vojtech Mastny's *The Cold War and Soviet Security: The Stalin Years*; and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov's *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. He describes how the three works under review reflect the efforts of their authors to replace a purely speculative approach to the events of the postwar period with a more concrete analysis based upon newly opened Russian and East European communist archives. He takes issue, however, with Radzinsky's emphasis on ideology as the source of Stalin's policy; with Mastny's contention that a quest for security was the motivating impulse behind Stalin's foreign and domestic policies; and with the "revolutionary-imperialism paradigm" Zubok and Pleshakov introduce to explain Soviet policy as a combination of ideology and geopolitics.

- 1314** Gibianskii, Leonid. "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-48." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 112-34.

Gibianskii opens with a general description of the accompanying archival documents on Stalin's 27-28 May 1946 meeting with a visiting Yugoslav delegation headed by Josip Broz Tito and on the Soviet leader's 6 February 1948 Kremlin conference with leading communist officials from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Following an account of how the two meetings came to be held, and of how their agendas were shaped, Gibianskii details the course of the discussion that took place at each meeting, describing how the first revolved primarily around questions of Soviet economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia, Yugoslav-Albanian relations, and a series of general political issues, and how the second dealt with such subjects as Stalin's strong dissatisfaction with certain foreign policy moves of Sofia and Belgrade—"undertaken without Soviet permission or even in defiance of Kremlin directives"—which he believed were the cause of an undesirable deterioration of relations with the West; his opposition to a proposed federation of all Eastern European countries and support for the creation of three smaller federations instead; his doubts concerning the prospects for the ongoing guerrilla war in Greece; and his emphasis of the importance of signing protocols of commitment to mutual consultations between the USSR and both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on foreign policy questions.

- 1315** Glasgow, George. "Mr. Stalin and Peace." *Contemporary Review* 183 (February 1953): 115-22.

Glasgow critiques the statements made by Stalin, in his Christmas Eve 1952 responses to questions put to him in writing by James Reston of the *New York Times*, that he did not believe a Soviet-American war to be inevitable, that the prime source of world tension was Western anti-Soviet policies, and that he was interested in ending the war in Korea. Maintaining that Stalin's words represent another maneuver in the phony Soviet peace offensive, Glasgow argues that Stalin, in fact, is afraid of peace because his tyrannical regime is bolstered by the cultivated fear of a supposed enemy beyond the border whose "threat" to Soviet security necessitates the sacrifices the Soviet people have had to make in order to protect the nation from "imperialist aggression."

- 1316** Glasov, Jamie. "The Apology That Never Came: Revisionists and the Cold War." *Heterodoxy* (January 1998): 6-8.

Glasov draws upon documentary evidence that has surfaced in Russia and the former Soviet bloc to argue that the views of revisionist historians on Soviet behavior and the origins of the Cold War

have now been proven to be wrong. Citing new evidence on such subjects as Stalin's attitude toward American postwar policies; his alleged "conservative" policy with regard to Western Europe; his responsibility for the Katyn executions; his role in the outbreak of the Korean War; and his brutalization of the Soviet people, Glasov challenges the revisionists to admit that they have misassessed Stalin and Stalinism and the behavior of the Soviet government as well.

1317 Goncharov, Sergei N. "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Tse-tung." Translated by Craig Seiber with an introduction by Vladimir Petrov. *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 10, no. 4 (winter 1991-92): 43-76.

This document consists of the English translation of Soviet Sinologist Sergei Goncharov's interview with Ivan Kovalev, Stalin's personal representative in China in the formative period of Sino-Soviet relations. Among the various topics addressed in the interview are Stalin's efforts to shape the strategy of the communist forces in China's civil war; his fear of American nuclear attack; the role he assigned to China in his global strategy; and his December 1949 Moscow negotiations with Mao Tse-tung regarding the status and future of Sino-Soviet relations. The interview is introduced by Vladimir Petrov, who commends Kovalev for his contributions to scholarly understanding of Stalin's strategy in drawing the Chinese communists into the Soviet orbit and of "the efforts of Chinese leaders to assert their independence of action, and their ability, on occasion, to bend Stalin's will."

1318 Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "The Origins of the Cold War: Stalin, Churchill and the Formation of the Grand Alliance." *Russian Review* 47, no. 2 (1988): 145-70.

Gorodetsky draws upon archives and private papers that have recently become available to argue that the breach between the Allies and the subsequent onset of the Cold War are "buried deep in relations between the Soviet Union and West on the eve of the war and particularly during the formative stages of the Grand Alliance" and are not the consequence of either a long-term expansionist plan conceived by Stalin or problems that only surfaced in the closing stages of the war, as many historians have maintained. In support of this interpretation, Gorodetsky primarily discusses how Churchill's wartime rhetoric about Allied cooperation concealed his determination to avoid a genuine association with Moscow and to focus on a Middle East campaign to protect British interests in the region—a strategy which demoted the importance of opening a second front to relieve German military pressure on Russia and served to reinforce Stalin's long-standing suspicions about British intentions toward the Soviet Union and to encourage him to exploit Anglo-American discord to advance Soviet objectives as the tide of war turned against Germany.

1319 Gupta, Surendra K. "Stalin and India: 1946-47: From Cooperation to Hostility." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 33, no. 1 (1987): 78-92.

This study of Soviet-Indian relations during 1946-47 shows that, contrary to the claims made by various Western analysts, Stalin's policy toward India was neither consistently hostile nor based on Moscow's ignorance of Indian affairs, but rather was formulated largely in accord with the Kremlin's view of India's policies, and whether or not they would serve Soviet national interests. Stalin, Gupta writes, studied carefully the foreign policy moves made by Jawaharlal Nehru between September 1946 and August 1947 and reacted favorably when India, at the UN General Assembly session in autumn 1946, voted with the Soviets on several key issues, but he turned bitterly hostile when New Delhi later sided with Washington on such issues as the future of Korea and Moscow's use of its veto power in the UN's Security Council. Starting in the early 1950s, however, when Indian-American relations deteriorated in response to New Delhi's objections to several of Washington's Far Eastern policies, Stalin's attitude toward India softened once again, leading to a favorable Kremlin response to Nehru's policy of neutrality in the Cold War conflict, which had been bitterly condemned by Moscow in 1947.

1320 “Has Stalin Been Stopped?” *U.S. News and World Report* 29 (17 November 1950): 25.

Most European leaders believe that Stalin, out of respect for American strength, does not want a European war at this point in time, and that if America persists in its policy of containment he will be forced to concentrate on the internal peaceful development of Russia itself, according to this report.

1321 Haslam, Jonathan. “Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 12, no. 2 (spring 1997): 217-28.

The first part of this article deals with the materials that have recently become available from Soviet-era party and state archives for investigators of the Cold War, while the second focuses on the archive-based revelations provided about Soviet decision making and policy under Stalin during the early period of the Cold War and during the era of détente as well. According to Haslam, new archival research reveals that, contrary to the long fashionable assumption that Stalin “somehow single handedly decided everything,” the Soviet leader displayed a willingness, out of practical necessity, to tolerate, and, sometimes, even encourage, individual initiative by subordinates, and to allow others to provide ideas for foreign policy and to decide upon tactics, but, by employing a divide and rule methodology to encourage discord among his subordinates, and by being ever vigilant of any hint of defiance of his authority, he managed to ensure that such practices did not prove counterproductive to the maintenance of his dictatorial powers. Haslam also comments on how the new research shows that the Cold War was exacerbated by Stalin’s underestimation of America’s resolve in the face of Soviet aggression, and on how those who maintain that Stalin feared war and that his behavior toward America is best understood as a defensive reaction to Washington’s policies need to reconsider their thinking in view of what Soviet archives and memoir literature are revealing about Stalin’s assumptions and actions in the early years of the Cold War.

1322 Hershberg, James G. “More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia. More on Mao in Moscow, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950.” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8/9 (winter 1996): 220-23.

In this introductory note, editor James Hershberg outlines the contents of Russian Foreign Ministry records of the conversations between Mao Tse-tung and senior Soviet officials on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950 which shed light on Sino-Soviet politics, diplomacy, economics, and military ties, joint strategy in the UN, and on American efforts to sow discord between China and the USSR. While Stalin does not figure directly in any of the three conversations documented here, they bracket in time the 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950 talks between the Soviet leader and Mao, during the latter’s December 1949-February 1950 visit to Moscow, and are an important part of the Chinese-Soviet exchanges that took place during that time. Also included in Hershberg’s note are translations of a series of Chinese communications sent from Mao to members of the Chinese leadership in Beijing while he was in Moscow.

1323 ———. “Stalin’s Conversations with Chinese Leaders. Talks with Mao Tse-tung, December 1949-January 1950, and with Chou En-lai, August-September 1952.” Translated by Danny Rozas with assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 4.

This issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, editor James Hershberg explains, leads off with translations of the transcripts of the conversations between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950 during the Chinese leader’s two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and three conversations between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai in August-September 1952 which dealt with such issues as the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the development of the Cold War. The transcripts of these conversations are followed by commen-

taries on the significance of the documents by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok, four scholars familiar with Sino-Soviet relations and the personalities of Stalin and Mao.

1324 Hua-yu Li. "The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 2 (spring 2001): 28-47.

This article examines the formation of China's political system from 1948 to 1954 within the context of the Kremlin's efforts to establish Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe and to achieve political uniformity throughout the communist world. Practical concerns and ideological commitment, the author writes, played equally important roles on Mao Tse-tung's dealings with Stalin in crafting the design and construction of the new political system in China as well as the timetable for its full establishment. The exchanges between the two communist leaders on China's new political system largely revolved around Stalin's advocacy, for reasons of political expediency, of a gradual approach in establishing a constitutional basis for one-party rule in China, and Mao's eagerness to install one-party rule once the CCP had gained control over the nation. Mao's compliance with Stalin's suggestion that a communist-dominated coalition government be set up and a written constitution promulgated before imposing a full-fledged socialist order, the author suggests, may reflect the Chinese leader's belief that if he could satisfy Stalin on political matters, he would have a free hand in domestic economic affairs, particularly with regard to the policy of land reform which was so important to him.

1325 James, Harold and Marzenna James. "The Origins of the Cold War: Some New Documents." *Historical Journal* 37, no. 3 (1994): 615-22.

The authors draw upon the personal papers of Vyacheslav Molotov, recently made available by the Russian Foreign Ministry, to discuss the reasons for the December 1945 Soviet refusal to subscribe to the articles of the Bretton Woods agreements which were negotiated in July 1944 and aimed at creating a new and universal economic order. They show that Soviet officials were preparing to join the Bretton Woods institutions until the very last moment, when the Kremlin's position changed to postponing the membership decision. They discuss the relationship between this positional shift and Stalin's suspicion that any institution which sought to foster international cooperation could only be a disguised instrument for specific national interests; his conviction that if America was pushing for Soviet membership, the new system had to be bad for Soviet interests; and this belief that the membership decision, if deferred, might represent a valuable bargaining lever to secure greater financial assistance from America. They also discuss how the changing mood in Moscow signaled by the new Soviet stance on Bretton Woods became a key component in the launching of the Cold War. The Molotov papers under consideration here are appended to the article.

1326 Jervis, Robert. "Stalin, an Incompetent Realist." *National Interest* no. 50 (1998): 82-86.

This review of John Lewis Gaddis's *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997), Vojtech Mastny's *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (1996), and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov's *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (1996) centers on how all three books dismantle the conventional image of Stalin as the quintessential realist. The three studies, Jervis writes, show that Stalin's ideological beliefs generated two misfounded hopes that were the pillars of his foreign policy: one being that war between capitalist countries was inevitable; the other that communist rule would be welcomed in Eastern Europe and that the Soviet system would have broad appeal in the West. According to Jervis, these misconceptions, ironically, led Stalin to adopt policies that served to undermine both Soviet security and the appeal of communism in the West. Jervis also comments on what the three books have to say about the question of the extent to which Stalin himself needs to be considered as a central ingredient in the origins of the Cold War.

1327 "Joe to Joe." *Newsweek* 33 (11 February 1949): 53-55.

Newsweek cites Stalin's responses to the questions sent to him by J. Kingsbury Smith, of the International News Service, in which he stated that he was open to a meeting with President Truman to plan a peace pact, if the meeting could take place somewhere in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, and that, under certain conditions, would be willing to lift the Berlin blockade. The article also describes the process followed by Smith in sending his questions to Stalin, and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of Stalin's reply.

1328 Jukić, Ilija. "Tito's Conflict with Stalin and Khrushchev in the West." *Review: Study Center for Yugoslav Affairs* 1 (1960): 18-31.

1329 Kadić, Ante. "The Stalin-Tito Conflict As Reflected in Literature." *Slavic Review* 37, no. 1 (1978): 91-106.

Kadić describes the reaction of Yugoslav writers to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute of 1948, beginning with the first important literary document of the conflict—a December 1948 reply, signed by sixty-seven Yugoslav writers, to a Soviet broadcast which observed the Yugoslav national holiday by broadcasting a message which sharply criticized the Yugoslav Communist Party and its leaders—and ending with the writings of several prominent Yugoslav poets and novelists in the 1960s. In surveying the works of these writers, more than a dozen in all, and in reviewing the writings of political leader Milovan Djilas and General Dragoslav Mihailović, Kadić shows how the image of Stalin, his policies and methods fared poorly amidst the discord in the socialist camp, noting the difficulty that many had, as former staunch Stalinists, in freeing themselves from their idol and accepting the new situation, and how those "who remained loyal to their prewar, utopian ideals, the so-called Cominformists, were severely punished by Yugoslav authorities."

1330 Kampmark, Binoy. "John Lewis Gaddis and Knowing Now: The Origins of the Cold War and the New History." *Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 33 (June 2002): 20-40.

This critique of John L. Gaddis's history of the origins of the Cold War centers on what is seen as Gaddis's use of value-based principles and assumptions that justify the "good" American empire while making Stalin an evil imperialist, and his picture of Stalin as a lone historical agent bearing primary responsibility for the onset of the Cold War. Describing the "unconditional acceptance of the person over the event" as "the most glaring weakness in the Gaddis edifice," Kampmark questions Gaddis's concept of agency; sees him as having ignored factors within the Soviet bureaucracy, power structure, and society which may have inhibited or controlled Stalin; and takes issue with his portrayal of Stalin as a "romantic world revolutionary," an "adventurer with 'unlimited ambitions,'" and a tyrant whose world program and manner of running his empire made the Cold War virtually inevitable. In making Stalin appear as a lone actor, divorcing his conduct from the complex of American-Allied decisions, and abstracting America's own push for hegemony, the new history, in Kampmark's opinion, distorts Stalin's contribution to the Cold War, obscures the underlying reasons why the two empires fought each other, and fails to take into full account the complex origins of the Cold War conflict.

1331 Kennan, George F. "Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy." *Harper's Magazine* 213 (August 1956): 27-33.

The majority of this article is devoted to an analysis of how the changes that have taken place within the Kremlin leadership and in the state of affairs in Russia in the three years since Stalin's death point toward the need for a reorientation of American foreign policy. Its opening segment, however, includes an assessment of Stalin's views on the prospects for a Soviet war with the West and the factors which helped to shape his thinking about how best to deal with the Western world.

In Kennan's estimate, the image of a Stalinist Russian poised and yearning to attack the West, and deterred only by America's possession of nuclear weapons, was largely a creation of Western imagination. Stalin may well have believed that war with the West was inevitable, but, for Kennan, he had no desire to precipitate such a conflict, being far more concerned with securing his own power, and preferring to bide his time, exploit the differences among his enemies, and conspire relentlessly to advance his own position and Soviet power without jeopardizing the security of either. While Stalin's behavior did not stem from a desire for war, it was so malicious and menacing that many in the West were unable to distinguish it from a desire to make war, leading the West to a state of military nervousness and tension, and encouraging it to respond to the Soviet leader's blatant hostility with urgent measures of military defense, according to Kennan.

1332 Kennan, George F. and John Lukacs. "From World War to Cold War." *American Heritage* 46, no. 8 (1995): 42-44+.

This article consists of an interview conducted by Cold War historian John Lukacs with George F. Kennan, who, as a diplomat in Moscow in 1945, formulated the principles that came to serve as the basis for the American policy of containment. The interview, which assumes the form of an exchange of letters between the two men, revolves around the question of American perceptions, or misperceptions, of the Stalin regime and its intentions in postwar Europe. In Kennan's opinion, President Roosevelt viewed Stalin through rose-colored glasses, seeing the Soviet leader as a man with whom he could work cooperatively and productively in dealing with the problems that attended the postwar European settlement if he were attentive to Stalin's sensibilities and made him feel as if he were "one of the club." Roosevelt's failure to understand Stalin's personality and the nature of the Soviet regime, and the president's unwillingness to confront Stalin over postwar issues for fear that such action might weaken the Allied military effort, led to a lack of toughness in dealing with the Soviets, which Stalin, in turn, interpreted as a kind of tacit acceptance of a division of Europe along the lines of the high-water marks of the Soviet military advance to the West, according to Kennan. Describing Stalin as a man wholly lacking in trust or the capacity for loyalty, Kennan outlines a no-nonsense approach to dealing with the Soviet leader which he believes would have been more productive than the line followed by FDR, one that would have recognized the preeminence given by Stalin to the cultivation and protection of his absolute control over the movement and country he headed, and one that would have made clear that the wartime alliance was a temporary marriage of convenience, and that Soviet long-term aims in Europe were incompatible with those of the West.

1333 Kleinman, Mark L. "Revision of 'Revisionism' or Return to Orthodoxy." *Peace and Change* 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 386-98.

This review of John Lewis Gaddis's *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997)—a book which presents an interpretive synthesis of recent scholarship on the Cold War—largely deals with how Gaddis's account of what historians "now know" seems in line with his earliest inclinations as a Cold War historian and with what he has "known" all along, namely, that, given Stalin's paranoid psyche, authoritarian control of the USSR, and unshakable commitment to extending the Bolshevik Revolution throughout the world, the Soviet Union bears prime responsibility for starting the Cold War conflict. Kleinman not only challenges Gaddis's view that "as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable," but also questions his contention that the nature of the conflict, along with America's ultimate victory, were "partly predicated upon the two very different types of 'empire' that the superpowers established after 1945," with the American empire being inadvertent and reactive, and the Soviet being "characterized by a brutal, unhesitating assertion of power." Gaddis's assignment of almost total control of the Cold War to a handful of historical actors; his many small "evasions of specificity" in considering the long-term historical context of American Cold War foreign policy; and his presentation of an image of a relatively benevolent American Cold War empire also come under fire in Kleinman's review, as

does what is seen as Gaddis's concern with justifying American policy rather than understanding it.

- 1334** Kousoulas, D. George. "The Truman Doctrine and the Stalin-Tito Rift: A Reappraisal." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 72, no. 3 (1973): 427-39.

Kousoulas attempts to deflate the interpretation that the communist guerrilla campaign launched in Greece in 1946 was merely part of a Soviet plan to extend Moscow's control to the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, arguing instead that Stalin, in fact, opposed the Greek uprising on the grounds that it had no chance of success and, more importantly, out of concern that the active support given to the campaign by Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito might provoke a determined response by America, in accord with the recently enunciated Truman Doctrine, which could endanger the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin's concern over Yugoslavia's adventurous initiatives in Greece, Kousoulas argues, played a key role in the rift that developed between Moscow and Belgrade and sparked Stalin's efforts to discredit Tito and have him ousted from his leadership position in the Yugoslav Communist Party. Although the Soviet attempt to remove Tito not only failed but added to his popularity in Yugoslavia and deepened the rift between the two communist nations, Stalin's main objective, which was "to end Tito's provocative adventures and avert a more determined intervention in the Balkans and Eastern Europe by the Americans," was accomplished as Tito, in the face of isolation within the communist camp and Soviet hostility, found it imperative "to curtail the very activities that had provoked Stalin's displeasure," according to Kousoulas.

- 1335** Kramer, Mark. "Ideology and the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999): 539-76.

Kramer explores the question of whether the Cold War was primarily a contest of two ideologies—liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism—or was a conflict driven primarily by material interests and considerations of power. Drawing upon documentation from former East-bloc archives and new analyses from historians in the East and the West, Kramer examines five specific cases to see whether an ideology-based explanation can go beyond an interest or power-based explanation in shedding light on Soviet Cold War policy, the cases being Stalin's role in the outbreak of the Korean War; Brezhnev's handling of the crisis with Czechoslovakia in 1968; the nature and purpose of the two opposing military alliances in Europe; American and Soviet foreign economic policies; and the end of the Cold War. In assessing the grounds upon which Stalin based his approval of Kim Il Sung's proposal to reunify Korea by military force, Kramer sees Stalin as having been moved primarily by practical considerations, including Moscow's perception that America would not intervene to prevent a communist takeover of South Korea; the assurances he received from Kim Il Sung that the North Korean army could seize the whole of South Korea in a few days; and the commitment he extracted from Mao Tse-tung to support the North Korean operation. The safeguards the cautious Stalin put in place prior to sanctioning Kim Il Sung's plan, in Kramer's view, suggest that his aim was to expand Soviet power and influence at a relatively low cost and with minimum risk, and that ideology was not a determining factor in his decision to back the communist invasion of South Korea. Inasmuch the newly released documents fail to illuminate clearly Stalin's real thinking and motives in foreign affairs and, at the same time, suggest that Marxism-Leninism guided the Soviet regime and served as a means of codifying and elaborating foreign policy as well, the new evidence has not provided full vindication for either a realism or an ideology-based approach as the best means of explaining Soviet Cold War policy, Kramer concludes.

- 1336** Lawrence, David. "Uncensored Voice from Russia." *U.S. News and World Report* 21 (4 October 1946): 28-29.

Lawrence comments on Stalin's September 1946 statement that he did not believe the atomic bomb to be as serious a threat to world peace as some politicians maintained, suggesting that Stalin's poise regarding America's sole possession of the bomb stems from his belief that America was unlikely to start a war or use an atomic weapon.

1337 Leffler, Melvyn P. "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (1999): 501-24.

Leffler reviews some of the most important new scholarship on the Cold War that has taken advantage of documents and memoirs from the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and European governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain to provide new information, fresh insights, and provocative interpretations about the origins of that conflict. Focusing on John Lewis Gaddis's *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997), Leffler, in maintaining that the new writings do not leave historians with a clear and unambiguous view of the Cold War but rather leave themselves open to diverse conclusions, examines such questions as the relative place of ideology and realpolitik in shaping Stalin's foreign policy; the role of traditional Russian messianism and communist faith in redemption through revolution as impulses motivating the Kremlin's foreign policy; the extent to which Stalin's postwar foreign policy was reactive rather than one following a course of unbridled unilateral expansionism; and the place, if any, of Stalin's own paranoia and insecurity in shaping his ability to separate real from imagined threats from the West. In view of the "new Cold War history," Leffler sees room for an interpretation which explains the outcome of Soviet policies within the confines of the concept known as "the security dilemma," according to which nations frequently take actions that are designed to enhance their security but which end up having the opposite effect because their initiatives endanger the security of others, thereby precipitating reactions that further intensify their own sense of vulnerability. He discusses the merits of this interpretation with respect to Stalin's behavior in Eastern Europe, suggesting that even if Stalin were acting defensively to enhance the security of his own state and power, the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet culture on the unfolding of Soviet foreign policy still needs to be considered.

1338 Levine, Alan J. "The Cold War of John Lukacs." *Modern Age* 29, no. 1 (1985): 20-27.

Levine takes aim on the views advanced by Hungarian-American historian John Lukacs in his writings on the Cold War and Soviet-Western relations, arguing that many of his positions and judgments are unsound, if not in error. In critiquing Lukacs's views on Stalin, Levine primarily takes issue with Lukacs's arguments for the essential continuity between Stalin's regime and the Russian past; for Stalin as a Great Russian nationalist and conservative; and for the nonideological basis of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin.

1339 Lindley, Ernest K. "The Effects of Stalin's Passing." *Newsweek* 41 (16 March 1953): 45.

Lindley sees Stalin's demise as having led to increased uncertainty about the future course of Soviet policy and to a policy of caution by the newly established Eisenhower administration out of concern that the Kremlin's new rulers may be more dangerous than Stalin. The possibility that Stalin's passing may present Western leaders with new opportunities, including the chance to take advantage of any move Mao Tse-tung might take to separate China from the Soviet Union, also receives consideration in Lindley's commentary.

1340 "The Loaded-Answer Man." *Time* 61 (5 January 1953): 9.

Time reports on Stalin's written responses to questions sent to him by James Reston, a diplomatic correspondent for the *New York Times*, regarding the likelihood of a Soviet-American war; the prime sources of world contention; the possibility of a personal meeting with newly elected President Eisenhower; and the negotiation of an end to the Korean War. The article suggests that Sta-

lin's motive in responding to Reston's questions was to dull "the sense of vigor and challenge which followed Ike Eisenhower's election and trip to Korea."

- 1341** Loebel, Eugen. "Moral Values and U.S. Policy: An End to the Age of Hypocrisy?" *Strategic Review* 14, no. 2 (1986): 27-35.

This argument for an American foreign policy based upon moral principles rather than realpolitik includes an attack on Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill for abandoning the principles of self-determination embodied in the Atlantic Charter in deference to Stalin's claim to the share of Poland he had gained through the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, a concession which the author links to the establishment of Soviet control throughout Eastern Europe. For Loebel, Soviet domination of postwar Eastern Europe flowed from an imperialist design crafted by Stalin in the prewar years as he came to realize that the traditional implements of power, rather than proletarian revolution, were to be the most effective means to spread communism. He argues that Stalin's imperial drive can best be countered by way of American leadership of a unified Western strategy in support of a policy which prizes self-determination, democracy, and peace.

- 1342** Loth, Wilfried. "The Origins of Stalin's Note of 10 March 1952." *Cold War History* 4, no. 2 (2004): 66-88.

Loth makes use of the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to argue that the manner in which Stalin's 10 March 1952 note "Fundamentals for a Peace Treaty with Germany" came into being indicates that the Soviet leader had not yet given up hopes for a timely conclusion of a peace treaty between the victorious Allied powers and Germany, and that, contrary to the conventional historical view in the West, "he really wanted what he said: namely, the conclusion of a peace treaty establishing a neutral Germany." Loth describes in some detail the arguments presented in preparing the Soviet initiative, particularly by M. G. Gribanov, head of the branch of the Soviet Foreign Ministry responsible for German-speaking countries, and the textual changes that were made in the proposal throughout the process of editing, most notably those made by Stalin himself. These changes, for Loth, attest not only to the Soviet leader's eagerness to shape the conditions of the note in a manner that would make it more acceptable to the Western Allies and less objectionable to the Germans themselves, but, more fundamentally, to his support for the Foreign Ministry's initiative regarding negotiations on the treaty and a final agreement on peace.

- 1343** Marantz, Paul. "Soviet Foreign Policy under Stalin? A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy." *Soviet Union* 3, no. 1 (1976): 91-107.

Stalin's enumeration and refutation of the contentions of certain unnamed "comrades" that war was not an unavoidable feature of capitalism, in his last major doctrinal pronouncement, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952), serves as the focal point of this exploration of the question of whether there were significant divisions of opinion, perhaps even factionalism, within the Politburo over foreign policy issues during the last years of Stalin's rule. Marantz examines and rejects the hypothesis that the inevitability of war controversy suggests that Stalin's foreign policy was opposed by a coherent factional group within the Soviet leadership, proposing instead that the public statements made by various Soviet spokesmen criticizing the inevitability of war position were not prompted by hostility to Stalin's policies but rather are best understood within the context of both the tactical needs of the Kremlin's world peace movement and Stalin's failure to establish clearly what the correct ideological line was to be on the inevitability of war question. When Stalin finally made his position clear on this issue, it was not because he was on the defensive against a direct challenge to his power, Marantz contends, but rather it was in response to the revisionist views espoused by the prominent economist Eugene Varga, which Stalin feared reflected a mood of complacency and political relaxation that might, following his own death, grow and work to the detriment of the Soviet Union if his colleagues, having been lulled into a false

sense of security by the nation's new-found strength, were to forget the existence of capitalist encirclement and the ever-present danger of war.

1344 Marcus, Anthony J. "Stalin's Blueprint for America." *Vital Speeches of the Day* 18, no. 17 (25 June 1952): 535-37.

This 20 May 1952 speech delivered in New York to a group of retired American army officers by the president of the Institute of Foreign Trade attacks the Soviet policy pursued in Washington for its failure to recognize Stalin's plans for world domination and for its adoption of a "live-and-let-live" attitude toward the brutal regime which he commands. If Stalin's blueprint for gaining control of the free world is to be frustrated, Marcus argues, American leaders must direct their efforts toward dramatizing "the barbarity, inhumanity, and sadism of Communist regimes everywhere" and "wage a psychological war to the finish and inspire the hundreds of millions behind the Iron Curtain to liberate themselves from the Soviet nightmare."

1345 Marmorstein, Emile. "Stalin and the Middle East." *Spectator* 181 (10 December 1948): 757-58.

Marmorstein contends that Stalin's creative interpretation of Marxist doctrine with respect to the problems and opportunities created by the rise of nationalist movements provides the key to understanding Soviet support for nationalist movements in the Middle East which are fundamentally opposed to communist ideals. The distinction drawn by Stalin between the nationalism of "oppressor" and "oppressed" countries, and his belief that communists should ally themselves with non-socialist "revolutionary" national movements that struggle against imperialist control form the ideological basis of Soviet policy with respect to Middle Eastern nationalist movements, including Zionism, according to Marmorstein.

1346 Mastny, Vojtech. "The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 2 (January 1976): 366-76.

Mastny looks at the incidents during the formative period of the Cold War in which Soviet statesman Maxim Litvinov expressed to foreign diplomats and correspondents views which dissented from the Kremlin's official line for insights into both the extent of permissible dissent during the process of foreign policy formulation in Stalin's autocracy and the points of disagreement among those responsible for the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs. Litvinov's dissent, Mastny contends, was prompted by his disagreement with those in Stalin's closer entourage over the ways and means of gaining Western acceptance of a postwar Soviet empire in East-Central Europe. Litvinov regarded Anglo-American support of any settlement Moscow would hope to enforce in the region as indispensable for the Soviet Union's security and openly deplored the Kremlin's drift toward confrontation with the West that came with the shortsighted policies backed by Vyacheslav Molotov and his associates in the Foreign Commissariat. While Stalin temporized in his search for a way "to have the cake of Western cooperation while eating his East Europeans too," he did not discourage Litvinov from formulating his ideas on this subject, but as Litvinov's dissent grew in accord with the materialization of his most dire predictions about the outcome of a Kremlin policy that invited conflict with the West and jeopardized Soviet security, he was finally dismissed from his post and pensioned in September 1946.

1347 ———. "From Consensus to Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance—A Palpable Deterioration." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 21-23.

This article, which draws upon official records of high-level Sino-Soviet conversations, opens with an account of the generally amicable relations between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung during the meetings between the two leaders in December 1949-January 1950 and their remarkable ability to dispose of potentially contentious issues. Mastny then describes the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations evident during Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow in August 1952,

by which time the Korean War had reached a state of impasse, and Stalin had yet to fulfill his promise to provide Soviet air cover for the Chinese intervention force. Here, the focus is on Chou's unsuccessful efforts to secure Stalin's support for the Chinese plan to break the deadlock in armistice negotiations in Korea, and on how Chou managed to secure a promise from Stalin for massive Soviet military and economic assistance for war-ravaged China.

1348 ———. "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War." *International Security* 9, no. 3 (1984-1985): 109-29.

Mastny describes how Stalin moved the Cold War beyond the bounds of political competition to include militarization of the conflict as a consequence of the setbacks his postwar policy suffered in Western Europe in connection with his attempt to discipline the Yugoslav Communist Party under the leadership of the independent-minded Marshal Tito. With Europe moving toward recovery under the Marshall Plan, rather than entering a prolonged period of weakness and disunity that would give the Kremlin the opportunity to manipulate the region to the advantage of its own security interests, as Stalin had imagined would be the case, and with the unified and pliant international communist movement which he had envisioned showing signs of disintegration over the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow, Mastny explains, the Soviet leader, seeing his strategy for resolving the perennial Soviet security problem falling into a state of disarray, and feeling that he had now consolidated his internal power, "upped the ante" in the Cold War by deploying Soviet military assets in a gamble to gain control of Berlin. Western response in kind to Stalin's military challenge set in motion an arms race between East and West and gave the Cold War the military dimension it previously lacked but came to have throughout the remainder of its duration, all to the detriment of the very security Stalin sought to advance, Mastny concludes.

1349 McDermott, Michael J. "Marshal Stalin's Interview Emphasizes Soviet Deception on an International Scale." *US Department of State Bulletin* 24 (5 March 1951): 367-68.

This report contains an account of the steps taken by the Voice of America and the *Wireless Bulletin* of the Department of State to broadcast to the world the reaction of the United States and other democracies engendered by Stalin's February 1951 *Pravda* interview, and a brief statement issued to the press by Michael McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Press Relations, concerning the timing of Stalin's decision to set up an interview with *Pravda* and the true meaning of his statement that war is not inevitable.

1350 Mee, Charles L., Jr., W. A. Harriman, and Elie Abel. "Who Started the Cold War?" *American Heritage* 28 (August 1977): 8-23.

This article consists of an exchange of views between Charles Mee, Jr., former editor of *Horizon* magazine and author of the book *Meeting at Potsdam*, and W. Averell Harriman, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, writing in collaboration with Elie Abel, Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, regarding the events and decisions that led to the breakdown of Allied wartime cooperation and the degree of responsibility borne by Allied leaders for the emergence of the atmosphere of mutual distrust, suspicion, and fear that was to blossom into the Cold War. Mee advances the interpretation that each of the Allied leaders contributed significantly to the origins of the Cold War, a conflict which, in his analysis, served everybody's purposes. Stalin, Mee argues, needed the Cold War to discipline his restless people at home; Churchill favored it in hope of preserving British influence in world affairs by keeping Russian and America at one another's throats; and Truman, the arch villain of the Cold War, in effect, institutionalized the conflict to provide an excuse for the deficit spending needed to sustain American prosperity at home. Harriman and Abel point out how Mee, in imputing to the former wartime Allied leaders a vested interest in maintaining international tension, even at the risk of a third world war, "stands certain durable facts on their heads" and overlooks the complexities with which the leaders had to deal in their negotia-

tions with one another and in arriving at decisions they believed were in the best interests of their respective nations and that would best serve their strategic concerns as well.

1351 "Meeting in Moscow." *Time* 54 (26 December 1949): 13.

This article describes the formalities surrounding the December 1949 Kremlin meeting between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung and notes that, while there was speculation that Mao was on the verge of a break with Moscow, in the West virtually nothing was known about the consequences of the Moscow meeting.

1352 "Men of Power and Politics in 1952." *U.S. News and World Report* 32 (4 January 1952): 38-40.

In this brief commentary on what the main concerns of the world's top leaders are likely to be for the year 1952, Stalin is said to be facing a "testing and frustrating" year because, while he remains "absolute boss of his country," the growth of American power has made it very difficult for him to make further Soviet conquests without risking a war that Russia could not possibly win.

1353 "More Words." *Time* 57 (26 February 1951): 30.

Stalin's February 1951 *Pravda* interview, in which he gave his thoughts about British rearmament, the war in Korea, the UN, and the possibility of a third world war, is the subject of this brief commentary. The Soviet leader's aim in the interview was to discourage British armament, weaken the UN, and "further the worldwide Communist 'peace' propaganda campaign," according to the article.

1354 Mosely, Philip E. "Across the Green Table from Stalin." *Current History* 15 (September 1948): 129-33+.

Mosely describes Soviet negotiating style and the difficulties Western leaders encountered in their efforts to encourage Moscow to honor the compromises agreed upon at the wartime meetings of the Big Three. He contrasts the troublesome behavior of Molotov in his dealings with the West over such matters as the Polish settlement and the evacuation of Soviet forces from Iran with the clear, direct, and occasionally more conciliatory manner of Stalin. Those who believe Stalin to be inherently more moderate and easier to deal with than his subordinates, Mosely argues, fail to recognize that he is the principal source of the hostile and often contradictory Soviet views of the outside world, and that Soviet foreign policy during and after World War II, in its basic approach and in most of its details, has emanated from him and has been consistently guided by "the Bolshevik view of world politics and of Russia's place in it."

1355 "Mr. Truman's Stalin." *Economist* 156 (22 January 1949): 133-35.

President Harry Truman's belief, as stated in a June 1948 speech in Eugene, Oregon, that Stalin is a "good fellow" who would make and keep "certain agreements" if only he weren't "the prisoner of the Politburo" serves as the impetus for this brief discussion of how Stalin's own writings, particularly those declarations of belief intended for the instruction of the faithful, and the record of his career indicate clearly his lack of interest in honest cooperation with the Western democracies and the naiveté of those who imagine him to be a benevolent leader whose goodwill has been thwarted by evildoers within the Politburo. In view of Stalin's recorded opinions, brutal behavior as Soviet dictator, and healthy respect for power and firmness, the prudent policy of America to follow in its dealing with the Kremlin, the article contends, is one of resolute and concerted defense combined with a careful avoidance of provocation.

1356 Murashko, Galina P. and Albina F. Noskova. "Stalin and the National-Territories Controversies in Eastern Europe, 1945-47." *Cold War History* 1, no. 3 (April 2001): 161-73; 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 142-58.

The core of this two-part article consists of an English translation of selections from two collections of documents published in Russian in the late 1990s, one being *Eastern Europe in the Documents from Russian Archives, 1944-53*, the other *The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe, 1944-53*, which include the records of Stalin's conversations with leading Eastern European politicians during the years 1945-47. The two documents presented in Part I deal with interstate border conflicts in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in 1945. The four documents in Part II concern matters dealing with Poland and Hungary in 1946-47. As the editors explain in their introduction, the documents shed light on the national-territorial conflicts that were rooted in the interwar period and in the early stages of World War II and that aggravated the general political tension in Eastern Europe. The documents also show how Stalin "was trying to concentrate the initiative for conflict resolution in the hands of national communists, pushing them towards a compromise" so as to settle disputes and avoid the emergence of new sources of tension that might serve to aggravate the Soviet Union's relations with the Allies.

1357 Naimark, Norman M. "Cold War Studies and New Archival Materials on Stalin." *Russian Review* 61, no. 1 (2002): 1-15.

This account of the exponential growth of Cold War studies since the opening of Soviet-period archives in 1991-92 focuses on the question of Stalin's intentions, motivations, and actions in the foreign policy arena in view of the opening, in the spring of 2000, of part of Stalin's personal papers held in the Russian State Archive. Naimark also presents a series of observations based on his reading of a portion of the Stalin papers, particularly regarding the relationship between Stalin and Molotov, and Stalin's review and editing of the major documents of the state and party.

1358 ———. "Post-Soviet Russian Historiography on the Emergence of the Soviet Bloc." *Kritika* 5, no. 3 (summer 2004): 561-80.

This examination of recent Soviet historiography of postwar Eastern Europe, the establishment of the "Peoples' Democracies," and the emergence of the Soviet Bloc focuses on the work done by and arguments between two schools of thought on the postwar period, one led by T. V. Volokitina, G. P. Murashko, A. F. Noskova, and I. I. Orlik, which holds that the Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazi rule was an act of genuine self-sacrifice and assistance to fellow Slavs suffering from German overlordship, and that Stalin would have been satisfied with countries friendly to the Soviet Union and dominated by left-wing coalitions, and the other led by L. Ia. Gibianskii and V. V. Mar'ina, which maintains that Stalin intended to take over the countries of Eastern Europe that he could from the very beginning and was a master at balancing ends and means and at deceiving his Eastern European and Western opponents and sympathizers alike. In discussing the disagreements between these two schools of thought, Naimark considers the relative merits of the opposing evidence presented regarding such issues as Stalin's intentions in Eastern Europe; the design and pace of the Sovietization of the region; the relation of the collapse of coalition governments in Eastern Europe to the Cold War and the internal dynamics of the Sovietization process; and the emergence of Eastern European Stalinism, particularly with respect to the extent to which the political elites of Western European parties engaged in "self-Stalinization" rather than had Stalinism forced upon them from outside.

1359 ———. "Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945-53: Issues and Problems." *Journal of Modern European History* 2, no. 1 (2004): 28-57.

Naimark attempts to reconstruct Stalin's policies on the European continent in the postwar years and to explore the ways in which these policies evolved as a response to European events, movements, and opinions and to the growing Soviet-American rivalry amidst the budding Cold War as well. He suggests that, while Stalin was absorbed with the meaning and function of Marxism-Leninism, and ideology was "the framework through which he worked and the lenses through which he saw the world," domestic European politics, European reactions to Soviet moves, and

American policies on the continent were at least as decisive as other factors in shaping Moscow's foreign policies in Europe in the postwar period. In attempting to illustrate Stalin's patience and tactical flexibility and the extent to which he was willing to avoid the kind of activity by the Soviet Union or its communist allies in Europe most likely to provoke British and American intervention, Naimark discusses such postwar events and developments as the Soviet occupation of Bornholm, Denmark; the Soviet occupation of Austria; the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49; the Albanian switch from a Yugoslav to Soviet client; the April 1948 Italian elections; and the political struggle between Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and Stalin.

1360 Ostermann, Christian F. "New Evidence on the Iran Crisis 1945-46, from the Baku Archives." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13 (fall/winter 2001): 309-14.

Ostermann provides a brief introduction to documents which "allow unprecedented insight into Stalin's systematic efforts to sponsor a separatist movement in Northern Iran" provided to the *Cold War International History Project* by Jamil Hasanli, who obtained the materials from the State Archive of Political Parties and Social Movements in Baku, Azerbaijan. Ostermann also discusses how the documents fit within the framework of a new initiative on "The Caucasus in the Cold War," co-sponsored by the National Security Archive and the *Cold War International History Project*, the aims of which include unearthing new evidence from archives in the southern Caucasus on such key Cold War issues as Stalin's plans for territorial expansion in 1945-46 with regard to Turkey and Iran, Soviet imperial calculations, and the various flashpoints in the southern Caucasus during de-Stalinization.

1361 Persak, Krzysztof. "Stalin As Editor: The Soviet Dictator's Secret Changes to the Polish Constitution of 1952." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 11 (winter 1998): 149-54.

This introduction to the English-language translation of the Russian-language copy of a draft of the Polish constitution presented to Stalin in the fall of 1951 and containing his handwritten amendments focuses on the kinds of changes he made, most notably his alterations in political phraseology; extension of the political freedoms and social rights nominally granted to the Polish people; replacement of the declaration which stated the Polish People's Republic (PPR) would abolish social relations which were based on exploitation with "the ominous formulation" that the PPR would abolish social classes which lived by exploiting workers and peasants; and amendment of the article concerning the protection of private property of the means of production belonging to craftsmen and peasants. Stalin's amendments, some fifty in all, which remained secret and were officially introduced to the constitution as changes made by Polish Communist leader Boleslaw Bierut himself, are more important as an example of Poland's lack of sovereignty and subjugation to the USSR than they are for any direct impact they had on political developments in Poland, according to Persak.

1362 Petrov, Vladimir. "Mao, Stalin and Kim Il Sung: An Interpretive Essay." *Journal of North-east Asian Studies* 13, no. 2 (1994): 3-30.

Petrov makes use of personal interviews and newly declassified documents to reconstruct the Stalin-Mao Tse-tung-Kim Il Sung relationship during the formative years of the People's Republic of China, tracing the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations from the Yalta agreement to the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (TFAMA) between Moscow and Beijing, and examining how the Korean War strained the Sino-Soviet alliance. According to Petrov's analysis, the TFAMA, far from being a natural union of the two foremost communist leaders or the foundation for genuine Sino-Soviet amity, was driven by a series of external factors—including Stalin's need to secure Soviet interests in the Far East following the triumph of communism in China, and Mao's signals to the Kremlin that he was ready to align China with the Soviet-led "anti-imperialist front"—and was negotiated amidst an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust. In discussing

how the Sino-Soviet alliance was severely tested by the outbreak and course of the Korean War, Petrov examines, among other factors, Stalin's motives for not consulting Mao before sanctioning Kim Il Sung's plan to invade South Korea; the absence of top-level communications between Stalin and Mao until the crushing defeat of the North Korean forces in September 1950; the basis of Mao's decision to provide Chinese military support for the crumbling North Korean army; the details of Stalin's commitment to supply military equipment to China as well as air support outside of enemy-held territory; and how Stalin's maneuverings as the war unfolded worked to the detriment of China's international position and, in effect, led China into a state of dependence on the Kremlin.

1363 Pineo, Ronn. "Recent Cold War Studies." *History Teacher* 37, no. 1 (2003): 79-86.

This account of some of the leading new conclusions from those Cold War studies which have taken advantage of the documentary information that has become available from Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese archives includes, as one of its examples of the ways in which the new evidence undercuts several essential assumptions of the orthodox view of the Cold War, a brief discussion of how the new documents reveal that "Stalin showed almost no practical interest in and gave no effort to fomenting world communist revolution"—a revelation which indicates that his belief in the inevitability of conflict between socialism and capitalism and in the ultimate world victory of socialism, contrary to the view espoused by many Cold War orthodox historians, "did very little to inform his practice of foreign policy."

1364 Piotrowski, Harry. "The Soviet Union and the Renner Government of Austria, April-November 1945." *Central European History* 20, nos. 3/4 (1987): 246-79.

Piotrowski contends that Stalin's actions in supporting the creation of the government of Austrian socialist Karl Renner in April-November 1945 stand in sharp contrast to the interpretation by Cold War historiography, according to which the Kremlin was bent upon communist domination of the entire region through a patchwork of governments controlled by Moscow. Drawing upon the 1945 reports of the American Office of Strategic Studies on conditions and Soviet activity in Austria to show how Stalin's behavior in dealing with Austria in 1945 was governed by practical rather than ideological concerns, Piotrowski argues that the Soviet leader was well aware of the limited appeal of Marxism in Austria and was deeply worried about Western designs to create a Danubian Federation that would include Austria and be hostile to the USSR. Recognizing the realities of the political situation in Austria, he chose to support the establishment of a reasonably minded and hopefully pliant Renner government that would be "Western in its composition and political orientation, yet scrupulously neutral in the Cold War." Those who contend that Stalin expected a strong communist showing in the Austrian national elections in November 1945, and that he was "bitterly disappointed" over the results and faulted the Austrian Communist Party for its dismal performance at the polls, Piotrowski further argues, fail to understand that he had neither miscalculated the outcome of the elections nor had been outmaneuvered by the wily Renner but rather was willing to sacrifice the Austrian communists in order to attain, from the Kremlin's practical perspective, the best possible solution to the Austrian question.

1365 Pons, Silvio. "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 2 (2001): 3-27.

Pons examines Stalin's policy toward the Italian Communist Party (PCI), headed by Palmiro Togliatti, as well as toward other Western European communist parties, maintaining that the policy was neither consistent nor part of a grand strategy to spread communism in Europe but rather was formulated entirely in response to narrow Soviet interests. Most notably, Pons describes the effects of Stalin's encouragement, in the period 1943-47, of Togliatti and other Western European communist leaders to follow a policy of moderation—meaning they were to "pursue political alliances, prevent civil war, and put forth platforms of national unity in the domestic arena and keep Europe

from dividing into blocs in the international arena”—and how this moderate approach collapsed in response to Western containment strategies. He also discusses the various meetings that took place between Stalin and Togliatti; how the demands the Soviet leader placed on the PCI affected its political fortunes and Togliatti's position as the party's leader; and how Stalin's conflicting advice to the PCI revealed his tenuous grasp of the situation in Western Europe.

1366 Price, M. Philips. "After Stalin." *Contemporary Review* 183 (May 1953): 257-61.

This commentary on the prospects for a change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy in post-Stalin Russia includes an analysis of why Stalin, in 1947, chose to abandon his policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world and adopt a more aggressive line. According to Price, by 1947 Stalin concluded that it would be impossible to rely on Russia-friendly governments in Western Europe "unless they were made 100 percent communist," and that the emerging economic crisis in the West seemed to indicate that "the 'tide of revolution' was indeed beginning to flow again"—conclusions that moved him to impose communist rule along the Soviet Union's western border and intensify support for communist movements in Europe and abroad. Price links Moscow's more aggressive foreign policy to the rise in influence of hard-liner Andrei Zhdanov, and he sees the ascendancy of Georgi Malenkov in the late 1940s as marking Stalin's recognition that a revolutionary advance in the West was no longer likely in the near future, and that he should turn toward Asia for the best ground for the success of communism.

1367 Raack, Richard C. "The Cold War Revisionists Kayoed: New Books Dispel More Historical Darkness." *World Affairs* 162, no. 2 (fall 1999): 43-62.

Raack establishes the parameters of some of the key debates regarding Stalin's diplomacy in Europe and Asia in the postwar years, and then he moves on to present an account of the shortcomings of the interpretations of Stalin's foreign policy motives and behavior in the postwar period advanced by Vojtech Mastny in *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (1996), and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov in *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (1996), a work which Raack sees as being heavily populated with misinformation, confusing detail, and factual errors, and far more seriously flawed than Mastny's study. In addition, Raack notes the strides made by a number of European scholars who have taken advantage of newly available Eastern European and Russian archives to shed light on Stalin's plan for a pre-emptive strike against Germany in the summer of 1941 and for a military drive to the West. He also notes the lively historical debate on this subject flourishing in the popular press in Russia and Germany, and comments critically on the refusal of American scholars to engage in this debate.

1368 Raine, Fernande Scheid. "Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran, 1945." *Cold War History* 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 1-38.

Raine takes advantage of newly released documents from the former party archive in Baku to trace the rise and fall of Stalin's attempt to foster the development of an Azeri nationalist movement in Iran as a means of furthering Soviet interests in the region. As stated in the author's abstract, the article "illustrates the importance of the Azeri party chief Bagirov in shaping the course of events, while uncovering a lack of clarity on Stalin's part as to where the project would end" and shows him to be "a flexible power-politician, willing to use whatever instrument would serve his purpose to retain a seat at the table of powers."

1369 "Reply to Stalin." *Nation* 172 (24 February 1951): 167-68.

The Western leaders' reply to the remarks made by Stalin in a February 1951 interview regarding the stalemated Korean War, alleged British plans for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, and the avoidability of war in the near future should come in the form of specific proposals to test the meaning and purpose of the Soviet leader's words, according to this article. The issues with which these proposals should deal, in the article's view, are the creation of a reunited German

state, the wartime treaty provisions concerning the countries in Eastern Europe, and the completion of the peace treaty with Austria.

- 1370** Richter, James. "Re-examining Soviet Policy towards Germany in 1953." *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 4 (1993): 671-92.

Richter makes use of new information emerging from Moscow and Berlin following the end of the Cold War to reexamine Soviet intentions toward Germany in the months after Stalin's death, suggesting that, while the new material shows a fluidity in Soviet decision making after the dictator's death that most Western accounts have not appreciated, no realistic opportunity to reunify Germany existed at this time. Richter's reappraisal includes a brief section on how the new evidence indicates that Stalin's March 1952 note to the three Western powers proposing to reunify Germany as a neutral, democratic country was inspired by his fear of the remilitarization of West Germany, as laid out in the Paris Agreement of May 1952, and was not an initiative intended to pave the way for reunification but rather to revive the debate on the German question in the West, and thereby postpone or possibly prevent the terms of the Paris proposal from becoming a reality.

- 1371** Roberts, Geoffrey. "Stalin and the Cold War: A Review Article." *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 8 (1997): 1526-31.

Roberts reviews Caroline Kennedy-Pipe's *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1945* (1995) and R. C. Raack's *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (1995), describing how the two books offer contrasting accounts of Soviet foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War, with Kennedy-Pipe arguing for national security as the driving force behind a foreign policy marked by ambiguities and contradictions, and with Raack contending that Soviet foreign policy was driven by ideology and sought to promote the revolutionary conquest of Europe in accord with a grand scheme hatched by Stalin before World War II started. Roberts lends his support to Kennedy-Pipe's interpretation, describing her book as a solidly researched and balanced study which makes "an important, innovative contribution to the historiography of the early Cold War years." He criticizes Raack for his "inability critically to assess and deploy documentation and sources" and for failing to present any convincing evidence for the existence of a Stalin-orchestrated scheme for the expansion of Soviet power and the spread of socialist revolution across all of Europe.

- 1372** Rose, Gideon. "The New Cold War Debate." *National Interest* 38 (winter/spring 1994-1995): 89-96.

Rose reviews six books and two articles in outlining a new round in the debate among historians on the American role in the early Cold War. He traces the evolution of the orthodox, revisionist, and postrevisionist schools of thought, and offers his own views on this contentious subject. While Rose's focus is on how the decisions of American policy makers relate to the onset and development of the Cold War, Stalin's part in bringing about the Cold War conflict, including the role played by his desire to advance Soviet security and extend Soviet influence, receives some consideration as does the overall nature of the Soviet threat in the immediate postwar years.

- 1373** Rosenberg, J. Philipp. "The Cheshire Ultimatum: Truman's Message to Stalin in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis." *Journal of Politics* 41, no. 3 (1979): 933-40.

Rosenberg draws upon new data from archival sources to cast doubt on the argument advanced by James Thorpe, in the February 1978 issue of *Journal of Politics*, that President Harry Truman, in fact, never sent an ultimatum to Stalin in March 1946 over the issue of Soviet troops in Iran, and that the president's refusal, despite repeated challenges, to document his assertion that such an ultimatum was issued discloses a lack of candor and integrity on his part and calls into question the reliability of his memoirs as well. Pointing to records showing that Truman relayed a handwritten note to Stalin over the Iran question by way of American Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Walter Bedell Smith, with whom he had an “off the record” meeting the day before Moscow’s announcement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, and that this note can be interpreted as a “tacit ultimatum,” Rosenberg contends that, considering Truman’s conversation with Smith and his general policy of firmness during the Iran crisis, the president did not “lie” about his role in the crisis and that his memoirs, while containing some historical inaccuracies, are far from worthless as a data source.

1374 Rubenstein, Alvin Z. “Stalin’s Postwar Foreign Policy in Perspective: A Review Article.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8, no. 2 (June 1964): 186-94.

Rubenstein reviews four books dealing with Soviet foreign policy, K. P. S. Menon’s *The Flying Troika* (1963), D. F. Fleming’s *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (1961), Frederick L. Schuman’s *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (1962), and Marshall D. Shulman’s *Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised* (1963). Focusing on their treatment of the 1945-53 period of Stalin’s foreign policy, Rubenstein takes issue with Menon’s criticism of Western policy and generally favorable interpretation of Soviet policy, with Fleming’s bipolar picture of the motivations of Soviet and American policies, and with a number of generalizations and sweeping assumptions in Shulman’s book, although he commends Shulman for his thoughtful analysis of Stalin’s understanding of foreign policy problems as well as for the insights his book provides into the recurring syndromes of Soviet behavior.

1375 Samii, Kuross A. “Truman against Stalin in Iran: A Tale of Three Messages.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 1 (1987): 95-107.

Samii challenges the conclusions drawn by James Thorpe, in a February 1978 *Journal of Politics* article, and Berry Blechman and Douglas Hart, in a December 1980 *Survival* article, that Truman never sent a threatening message to Stalin during the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis. He contends that “inadequate research and the failure to consider the appropriate historical context” accounts for the three writers’ misrepresentation of the affair, and for their allegations that Truman’s version of the 1946 crisis is mistaken. Three separate messages were, in fact, sent by Truman to Stalin, the third of which made clear to Stalin the limits of American tolerance and played a crucial role in bringing about the Soviet-Iranian agreement of 4 April and the subsequent Soviet concession to withdraw troops unconditionally, according to Samil.

1376 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. “The Origins of the Cold War.” *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October 1967): 22-52.

This broad overview of the origins of the Cold War opens with a description of the contrast between the “universalist” view championed by American leaders, which assumed that national security would be guaranteed best by an international organization, and the “sphere-of-influence” view adopted by the Soviet leadership, which assumed that national security would be guaranteed best by the balance of power—with each great power being assured by the other of an acknowledged predominance in its own area of special interest—and of how the problems stemming from these two clashing views of world order figure into the background of the Cold War. Schlesinger then goes on to explain why the United States rejected the idea of stabilizing the world by division into spheres of influence, and how, as mutual suspicion began to rise, each side in the budding Cold War conflict felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of peace, triggering defensive measures which furthered the momentum of the emerging conflict. While Schlesinger concedes that “American postwar policy created genuine difficulties for the Russians and even assumed a threatening aspect for them,” he maintains that, in view of the ideological conviction of Stalin and his associates that America, as the leading capitalist power, was “driven by the logic of its system to oppose, encircle and destroy Soviet Russia,” nothing the United States could have done in 1944-45 would have abolished Soviet distrust, or made postwar collaboration between Russia and America possible, or averted the Cold War. Theo-

retically, Stalin alone, with his power to reinterpret Marxism-Leninism as he saw fit, could have made a difference, Schlesinger argues, but, given his pathological sense of suspicion, there is no reason to believe that any conceivable American policy could have satisfied his paranoia and led him to adopt a more conciliatory position.

1377 Sheerin, John B. "Stalin: Madman or Machiavelli?" *Catholic World* 173 (September 1951): 401-5.

Stalin and his cohorts in the Politburo are not adherents to the cynical political philosophy of Machiavelli but rather are mad collectively, the followers of a man, Marx, who, motivated by jealousy and vindictiveness, teetered on the edge of insanity while drafting a furious and irrational assault on capitalism, according to this commentary on the zigzags in the Kremlin's attitude toward the West. Sheerin maintains American policy toward Russia should be founded on the premise that Stalin suffers from "delirious delusions of persecution and personal grandeur," and that America, accordingly, should expect Moscow's foreign policy to be irrational and unpredictable and refuse to lower its guard simply because Stalin chooses to talk peace at a particular moment or appears to be ready to soften the Kremlin line on a given issue.

1378 ———. "Will Stalin Start a War?" *Catholic World* 176 (October 1952): 1-5.

Sheerin takes issue with those commentators who, believing Stalin to be a very practical person who will not risk war to promote the spread of communism, see the then upcoming Soviet Communist Party Congress as no cause for alarm in the West. He argues that the statute to be discussed at the congress calling for strengthening the "active defense" of the country against "aggressive actions of its enemies" suggests that Stalin may be preparing another surprise attack, like the one that came in Korea. Pointing to a series of ill-considered, risky, and, ultimately, counterproductive foreign policy decisions made by Stalin, Sheerin warns Americans to expect the unexpected when considering the behavior of the Kremlin leader, a man whom he describes as "an unpredictable lunatic . . . who would like to see a little excitement before he dies."

1379 Sheng, Michael. "The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949." *Diplomatic History* 21 (winter 1997): 95-104.

Sheng argues for the mythical nature of the belief that there was a chance for the United States to win over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a potential ally against Moscow by exploiting a supposed rift between Mao and Stalin over the Kremlin's self-serving interference in Chinese affairs. He contends that the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was neither the result of the CCP being forced to join hands with Moscow due to America's negative response to the CCP's friendly overtures toward the United States, nor a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two communist nations, but rather was "a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921." Citing a range of examples that illustrate "the intellectual psychological, political-institutional, and military-strategic ties" between the CCP and Moscow in the decades preceding the Sino-Soviet Pact, Sheng describes Stalin's role in the CCP's policy-making process and in shaping the CCP's fortunes over the span of a quarter of a century, and how a grateful Mao sustained his loyalty to Moscow throughout the duration of the Chinese communist revolutionary movement. Pointing to frequent and substantive secret policy consultations between Mao and Stalin in the pre-1950 period, Sheng illustrates the constructive and harmonious nature of the Mao-Stalin consultations, maintaining that, "contrary to the conventional wisdom that Moscow's advice to the CCP was often disastrous in consequence and that Mao's resistance against Stalin's will saved the CCP, new documents suggest Mao was often too radical to be tactful and that Stalin's cautious and tactful advice prevented Mao's ruthlessness from ruining the Party."

1380 ———. "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1950: A Reappraisal." *Pacific Historical Review* 63, no. 4 (1994): 521-36.

Sheng challenges the view popular in the West that Stalin had a damaging influence on the Chinese revolution and that Mao resisted Stalin's intervention, leading to an adversarial relationship between the two leaders. Drawing on newly available Chinese Communist Party (CCP) materials, Sheng argues that Stalin clearly had an intense interest in everything related to the CCP and played a significant role in influencing its foreign policy options in 1948-50; that Mao and Stalin managed to remain close allies throughout this time; and that the CCP willingly took a junior position in its partnership with Moscow, while enjoying a great deal of autonomy in making its own decisions. Sheng also discusses how the secretiveness of CCP-Moscow relations, along with Mao's later discrediting of the Soviet role in the Chinese Revolution after Stalin's death, contributed to the confusion among scholars regarding the nature of his ties with Stalin, and encouraged some analysts to suggest that Mao may have struggled against Stalin more intensely than he did against Washington and may even have tried to gain the latter's support against the former.

1381 Shi Zhe. "I Accompanied Chairman Mao." *Far Eastern Affairs* no. 2 (1989): 125-33.

In the first half of this article, the Chinese diplomat and journalist who served as an interpreter for the delegation from Beijing that met with Stalin in Moscow on five occasions in autumn 1949 presents his version of the substance of the Moscow meetings, noting, among other statements, Stalin's admission that he underestimated the potential of the Chinese revolutionary movement and that, in failing to understand fully the complexities of the situation in China, Soviet policy may have hindered the Chinese revolution. The author also notes Stalin's comments, in response to questions put to him by the Chinese delegation, about the improbability of a third world war in the near future and about the growing strength of the world revolutionary movement, especially in Asia. The second half of the article describes the circumstances surrounding Mao Tse-tung's December 1949-February 1950 visit to Moscow; the negotiation of the 14 February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance; and Stalin's attitude toward and treatment of the Chinese leader.

1382 Shustov, Vladimir, Yuri Dubinin, and Yuri Fokine. "Ambassadors' Stories." *International Affairs* 50, no. 4 (August 2004): 189-192.

Three former Soviet diplomats share some stories reflective of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, one of which is related by Vladimir Shustov and deals with the conversation he had with Harold Stassen in the late 1980s in Washington in which the former Governor of Wisconsin and Republican nominee for president talked about his Kremlin meeting with Stalin on 9 April 1946—noting, in particular, the Soviet leader's remarks on "the rubbish" often printed about the Soviet Union in American newspapers and on the need for international control of atomic energy—and about how, when he and his two traveling companions were detained by a captain of the border guards as their train from Moscow neared the Finnish border, he produced an issue of *Pravda* reporting on his meeting with Stalin, resulting in a brisk salute by the captain, a quick return of three men's passports, and a prompt resumption of the train's movement in the direction of Helsinki.

1383 Siracusa, Joseph M. "The 'New' Cold War History and the Origins of the Cold War." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 47, no. 1 (2001): 149-55.

Siracusa outlines the history of America's Cold War literature, discusses the reevaluation of Cold War historiography prompted by the declassification of Soviet, American, and Chinese documents in the 1990s, and comments on *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (1996), by Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov; *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (1992), by Melvyn Leffler; and *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997), by John Lewis Gaddis. The overwhelming role of

Stalin in defining the strategy and tactics of early Cold War Soviet diplomacy; his commitment to the pursuit of balance of power and spheres of influence diplomacy; and the degree to which his actions and reactions to Western foreign policy initiatives in the postwar period contributed to the origin of the Cold War all receive consideration in Siracusa's account of the changing shape of the continuing debate over who is more responsible for the Cold War, America or the Soviet Union.

1384 "Smears by Stalin." *Newsweek* 30 (27 October 1947): 40.

This article cites reports current among foreign diplomats in Moscow that the attacks against President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall printed in the *Soviet Literary Gazette* were, in fact, ordered by Stalin himself in an interview he gave to Konstantin Simonov and Alexander Fadeyev, leaders of the Union of Soviet Writers, during which he told the writers that the *Literary Gazette* was to replace *Culture and Life* as the shock organ of the Soviet offensive against Western influence.

1385 Smith, Walter Bedell. "What Kind of Man Is Stalin?" *Saturday Evening Post* 222 (12 November 1949): 19-21+.

In this article, America's Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the three years following the close of World War II draws upon his four interviews with Stalin to describe the Soviet leader's character, political principles, and position on a range of postwar issues, including Soviet-Anglo cooperation, Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, Iran, and Turkey, and Soviet support for the UN. In Smith's view, while Stalin works with the Politburo in deciding key issues, he retains the decisive role on all matters, meaning that the aggressive and expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the postwar period must be seen as Stalin's own creation.

1386 "Soso's Lullaby." *Time* 59 (21 April 1952): 31.

This article reports on the "Russian lullabies arranged by Stalin for full propaganda choir and orchestra" in his effort "to create an illusion of relaxed tensions" with the Western powers. Receiving most attention in this description of how "old Soso is just out to make everybody happy" is Stalin's "disingenuous proposal" for a united, rearmed, and independent Germany, with free elections supervised by the Big Four.

1387 "Stalin and the SED Leadership, 7 April 1952: 'You Must Organize Your Own State,'" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (fall 1994): 34-35+.

This editorial note provides a brief outline of an excerpt from a document located in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation which provides the minutes of a 7 April 1952 Kremlin conversation between Stalin and a visiting delegation of East German communist leaders in which the Soviet leader, angry at Western governments for their negative response to his 10 March 1952 note offering German unification and the withdrawal of foreign armies on the condition that the country remain neutral, firmly instructed the East German communists to "organize your own state" on the "dangerous" frontiers dividing Germany and Europe. As the editor notes, it is unclear whether this instruction "simply reaffirmed an already obvious existing state of affairs, or whether it signifies that only now did Stalin understand that unifying Germany on Moscow's terms, seriously intended or not, was a non-negotiable position."

1388 "Stalin Bid, Churchill Visit Launch Ike into New Year." *Newsweek* 41 (5 January 1953): 13-14.

Stalin's Christmas Eve, 1952, message to the *New York Times*, in which he responded to a series of questions sent to him by the paper's correspondent James Reston regarding the prospects for world peace, is the main focus of this article. In his responses, Stalin said he believed that America and the Soviet Union could coexist peacefully; that he was willing to work with America to bring an end to the Korean War; and that he would welcome the chance to meet with President-elect

Eisenhower to discuss how to ease world tensions. The article comments on the significance of Stalin's statements and on the Eisenhower administration's cautious response to them.

1389 "Stalin Courts Iran." *New Republic* 124 (26 February 1951): 7.

This article cites Stalin's gift of diamond-studded flowerpots to the young bride of Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Kremlin's pursuit of a new Soviet-Iranian trade agreement, and the newfound willingness of the Soviets to establish the joint border commission for which Tehran has long been pressing as examples of the enticing overtures Moscow has been directing to the Middle East's biggest oil producer in recent months. The article calls upon Washington to multiply its efforts to provide economic aid to the Shah to bolster his political position and to help assure that Iran and its resources do not succumb to this "newly-found 'friendship.'"

1390 "The Stalin Interview." *New Republic* 124 (26 February 1951): 6.

This article presents some of the commentary offered "in the corridors of the UN headquarters" on the meaning of Stalin's interview in *Pravda* in 16 February 1951. Among the commentators' speculations are that Stalin was trying to frighten the UN out of applying sanctions to Communist China over Chinese aggression in Korea; that he was attempting to counter in advance the arguments that might be brought up by the West if a Big Four conference were to take place later in 1951; that he was hoping to offset, by a "big propaganda effort," recent Soviet setbacks in international affairs; and that he may have been paving the way for the withdrawal of the entire communist bloc from the UN.

1391 "The Stalin Interview." *New World Review* (April 1951): 12-13.

The *New World Review* prints here the interview with Stalin published in *Pravda* on 16 February 1951 in which he responded to questions on the meaning of British Prime Minister Clement Attlee's accusation that the Soviet Union is fostering the arms race; on the course being followed by the war in Korea; on the UN's declaration that the People's Republic of China is an aggressor nation; and on whether a new world war is inevitable.

1392 "Stalin Overture an Old Theme in Dissonant World Symphony." *Newsweek* 41 (5 January 1953): 24.

This commentary on the significance of the December 1952 peace overtures made by Stalin and of his offer to meet with President-elect Eisenhower to discuss how best to ease world tensions revolves around the conclusion reached by Western diplomats that, in proposing bilateral talks with Eisenhower, Stalin "couldn't lose" because if Eisenhower turned down the Soviet offer he would appear to be a "warmonger," and if he agreed to meet with Stalin a wedge would be driven between America and its European allies who were to be excluded from the talks. The test of Stalin's sincerity in proposing a meeting with Eisenhower, the article maintains, will be the Soviet leader's willingness to agree to a mutually acceptable meeting place to both partners.

1393 "Stalin Takes the Stump; Churchill Takes the Challenge." *Time* 47 (25 March 1946): 26-27. *Time* comments on Stalin's radio response, in an interview with *Pravda*, to Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, "iron curtain" speech about Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The report, which quotes liberally from Stalin's counterattack on Churchill, elaborates primarily on the Soviet leader's assertion that Churchill's charge that Russia dominates her neighbors represents "shameless libel," and that Churchill had assumed a "ridiculous position" by decrying the lack of true democracy in Eastern Europe.

1394 "Stalin under Pressure Is Taking a New Line." *Business Week* (11 October 1952): 30-31.

The foreign policy line laid down by Stalin at the 1952 Party Congress in Moscow marks a new phase in the Soviet-American rivalry, one which aims to generate a third camp between Russia

and the United States by using various tactics to split the armed coalition established by America to contain communist expansion, according to *Business Week*. The article links Stalin's change of tactics in the Cold War to his realization that the aggressive approach he has followed in his effort to expand communism and Soviet power since the close of World War II has pushed America into a huge defense program and solidified NATO, making a general war a dangerous gamble for the Soviet bloc.

1395 "Stalinism Redivivus?" *Problems of Communism* 7, no. 4 (1958): 1-21.

This commentary on the Kremlin's return to the spirit and methods of Stalinist politics in response to challenges in Eastern Europe to Soviet control of the region includes articles by Seweryn Bialer, Paul Landy, and Donald Zagoria which collectively provide the background as well as the rationale for the new Soviet line. Bialer's article, "Moscow vs. Belgrade: A Key to Soviet Policy"—the only one of the three that contains a section on Stalin—includes an account of Stalin's campaign against Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito; the failure of the campaign to achieve the aims Stalin intended; and how it was impossible for Stalin to withdraw from the stand he had taken on the Yugoslav situation without infringing on the basic principles of his foreign policy both inside and beyond the Soviet bloc.

1396 "Stalin's Bequest: Shaky Empire." *U.S. News and World Report* 34 (13 March 1953): 19-22.

This account of the problems that Stalin's successors will have to cope with in their efforts to maintain the Soviet empire includes an outline of how Stalin managed to establish such a vast domain and of his inability to stabilize the various extensions of his realm before death overtook him.

1397 "Stalin's Future Empire: Opening Moves Point to a Plan to Change the Satellites into States of the Soviet Union." *Newsweek* 30 (22 September 1947): 38-39.

This article summarizes Stalin's line of thought and tactical steps in creating "democracies of a special nature" in the Eastern European sphere of influence assigned to the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference. The article suggests that the moves made by Stalin in Eastern Europe in eliminating opposition to Soviet power and establishing communist puppet regimes loyal to Moscow point to the conclusion that he intends to incorporate the satellite states into the USSR itself.

1398 "Stalin's Hand in the Free World." *U.S. News and World Report* 31 (31 August 1951): 9-13.

This article, in showing how Stalin, in effect, manages to "run the world," describes his influence on various developments and policies in America, Europe, Latin America, India, and the Far East, and how he has proven to be a master of playing upon discontent wherever found, encouraging communist subversion around the world, and sowing fear and discord among the leaders of the capitalist nations that stand in the way of his reach for global power.

1399 "Stalin's Master Plan." *U.S. News and World Report* 30 (15 June 1951): 11-13.

In pushing for Soviet world domination, Stalin is operating under a "triple threat" master plan which involves the threat of major war, the actual use of small wars, and worldwide political warfare, according to this article. In describing how the master plan operates, the article emphasizes that, while Stalin is willing to push communist expansion in countries contiguous with the Soviet empire and gives the appearance of being ready to commit Russian troops to support communist takeovers in this region, his overriding concern is to avoid war for Russia.

1400 "Stalin's Plan to Assassinate Tito." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 137.

The coeditor of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* presents here an excerpt from a top-secret document, discovered in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow and published by Russian military historian Dmitri Volkogonov, outlining a plan to assassinate Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito with the help of Soviet agent Iosif Grigulovich, alias "Max." According to Volkogonov, while there is no direct evidence that Stalin authorized the operation described in the document—a paper prepared in the Ministry of State Security and addressed to Stalin personally—it is likely that he approved the plan since preliminary preparations to execute the operation were started while he was still alive but were terminated soon after his death in March 1953.

1401 "Stalin's Price for Peace." *United Nations World* 3 (August 1949): 7-9.

This article summarizes the statements made by Andrei Gromyko in a June 1948 conversation with an American businessman during which the Soviet diplomat said that Stalin, since 1939, belonged to a minority group within the party's leadership that favored an understanding with the United States and that his faith in America, and the minority's position, received a shock by the sudden ending of Lend-Lease and by a series of actions by Washington hostile to the continuation of friendly relations between the two nations. Gromyko indicated that Stalin believed the Cold War could yield to a warm peace if America would sign a treaty with the USSR to formalize the commitments set forth in the Yalta and Potsdam documents; agree not to restore Germany; help rebuild war-torn Russia through generous support for "reparations in kind," normalize trade relations with the Soviet Union; and cease support for "fascist elements" within the USSR.

1402 "Stalin's Soft Words and Hard Deeds." *Newsweek* 38 (7 October 1946): 42+.

Stalin's responses to a series of questions which were sent to him by Alexander Werth, a representative of the *London Sunday Times*, are cited in this report. Werth's questions concerned the danger of a new major war, which Stalin discounted; the Kremlin's concern over what it sees as the conscious creation of a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union by Britain and America, which Stalin would not confirm; and the possibility that Soviet politics in Germany will be turned into "a weapon of Russian efforts directed against Western Europe," which Stalin said was contrary to the agreements reached at the Potsdam Conference and was inconsistent with Soviet national interests as well.

1403 "Stalin's Statement." *Nation* 176 (3 January 1953): 1.

American leaders should respond favorably to Stalin's offer to meet with President-elect Dwight Eisenhower, this article suggests, as a means of determining if his offer is genuine or just more diplomatic game-playing on the part of the Kremlin. If he is sincere in proposing such a meeting, the article maintains, and then there may well be a real opportunity here for the two leaders to settle some of the issues that have divided Russia and America, including how to bring an end to the conflict in Korea.

1404 "Stalin's Week." *Time* 49 (3 February 1947): 24.

This brief note cites three published policy statements recently made by Stalin. The first consists of his qualified response to Britain's offer to extend the Anglo-Soviet Treaty from twenty to fifty years; the second, his negative reply to Field Marshal Montgomery's proposal of an Anglo-Russian exchange of officers; and the third, his comment on his interview with Elliott Roosevelt, published in the popular magazine *Look*.

1405 Staritz, Dietrich. "The SED, Stalin and the German Question: Interests and Decision-Making in the Light of New Sources." *German History* 10, no. 3 (1992): 274-89.

Staritz makes use of newly opened East German archives to discuss Stalin's opposition to the push by the leadership of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) for the establishment of the

German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a separate state, for the commencement of the building of socialism in East Germany, and for the integration of the GDR into the communist bloc. The records, Staritz explains, reveal that Stalin preferred that the SED follow a cautious, "zigzag" route toward socialism; that he was set upon keeping open the possibility of a unified Germany and a separate East German communist state; and that the SED's leaders reluctantly followed his orders to agitate for German national unity while at the same time strengthen communist defenses in East Germany. They also indicate that Stalin had little confidence in a favorable Western response to his March 1952 initiative regarding the opening of negotiations on the question of the reunification of Germany, and that with the West's rejection of his proposals he quickly shifted toward the military integration of the GDR into the Soviet bloc and somewhat reluctantly sanctioned the GDR leadership's July 1952 announcement that the GDR, as a "people's democracy," was commencing the transition to the construction of socialism.

1406 Stassen, Harold E. "Stalin at Midnight." *Ladies' Home Journal* 64 (July 1947): 36-37+.

This account of the author's interview with Stalin in April 1947 revolves around the Soviet leader's responses to questions about the long-term implications of the differences between the American and Soviet economic systems; the development, inspection, and control of atomic energy; and the prospects of a press without censorship for a better flow of news between America and the Soviet Union. Stassen, a Republican Party leader, also comments on the significance of Stalin's largely positive replies to the three questions, stating that, while the Soviet leader's belief that war is not inevitable and that cooperation between Moscow and Washington is both possible and desirable give cause for optimism, America must do its best to demonstrate the viability of the capitalist system and the nation's willingness to coexist with the Soviet Union if Stalin's alluring words have any chance of being converted into positive deeds.

1407 Stedry, Vladimir. "Czechoslovakia—Stalin's Last Booty." *Sudeten Bulletin* 12, no. 10 (1964): 289-94.

Stedry criticizes Czech leader Edvard Beneš for sacrificing Carpatho-Ruthenia as well as the prospects for democracy in postwar Czechoslovakia in order to secure Stalin's support for his presidency of the government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks, maintaining that these misdeeds, along with the mistakes Beneš made in his partnership with the Czech Communist Party during his three-year tenure of office, were ultimately responsible for the establishment of communist rule in Czechoslovakia and the death of the Czech Republic. Stedry's assault on Beneš includes an account of the latter's dealings with Stalin before, during, and after World War II, and of Stalin's role in promoting the Sovietization of Czechoslovakia.

1408 Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Second-Guessing Stalin: International Communism and the Origins of the Cold War." *Radical History Review* 37 (1987): 101-15.

The five books under consideration in this review essay are *Rise and Fall* (1985), a memoir by Milovan Djilas; *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (1979), by Vojtech Mastny; *From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany, 1945-46* (1985), by Gregory W. Sanford; *Stalin and the European Communists* (1985), by Paolo Spriano; and *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (1982), by William Taubman. Suny mainly comments on the books—contrary to the then conventional view that Soviet policy was determined and consistent, and, if not evolving from a preconceived blueprint for conquest, at least unfolded from the political program of Stalin himself—convey the overall impression "of a Soviet policy much more hesitant and inconsistent, far more reactive to specific contingencies, than has been appreciated hitherto," with Stalin appearing neither as "the communist revolutionary bent on world conquest who dominated the orthodox writings nor the Great Power conservative of the revisionists."

1409 Swain, Geoffrey. "The Cominform: Tito's International?" *Historical Journal* 35, no. 3 (1992): 641-63.

Swain explores the ideological context of the Tito-Stalin dispute, arguing that the key issue that separated the two leaders was the nature of the popular front. Tito's politics, Swain writes, were based on a vision of winning power through a popular front "from below," a policy pursued by all communist parties until the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. His decision to stick to that policy and attempt to persuade other parties to do the same brought him into conflict with Stalin, who urged communist parties to construct a popular front "from above" and enter coalition governments. When Stalin began to show signs of impatience with coalition politics, endorsed an escalation of the Greek Civil War, and made Tito the de facto leader of the newly created Cominform, Tito mistakenly assumed a shift in Stalin's popular front position and believed he was to head a new international committed to a revolutionary offensive in Eastern Europe and beyond. As Stalin became disgruntled with Tito's handling of the Cominform and with its policy of the popular front "from below," he used the Cominform as an instrument "to smash 'Titoism,' whip the communist parties of Europe into line, and establish there a series of identical dictatorships." But this does not alter the fact that the Cominform, for a brief time, was Tito's international, Swain concludes.

1410 "Talk with Stalin." *Newsweek* 39 (21 April 1952): 44.

The focus of this brief report is Stalin's farewell interview with the retiring Indian Ambassador Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in which he responded to the ambassador's statement that Soviet action in the Balkans had caused other countries to fear Moscow's intentions by saying that the Soviet Union had no plans for aggression against any country but had to have "a belt of friendly countries" on its periphery in order to safeguard the nation's security.

1411 Thorpe, James A. "Truman's Ultimatum to Stalin on the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis: The Making of a Myth." *Journal of Politics* 40, no. 1 (February 1978): 188-95.

Thorpe maintains that the claim, first presented in 1952, that President Harry Truman gave Stalin an ultimatum which forced him to evacuate Soviet troops from Azerbaijan in northern Iran in May of 1946 is a myth created by Truman and perpetrated by various scholars. He traces the evolution of Truman's claim that he had American Ambassador to Moscow W. Averell Harriman personally deliver a note to Stalin threatening military intervention in Iran if there were no Soviet evacuation, and he then offers evidence, gleaned mainly from the writings of the American representatives in Moscow during that time and from U.S. State Department records, casting doubt on Truman's assertion that he had forced Stalin's hand. Thorpe cites scholars who have unknowingly perpetrated the myth of Truman's ultimatum to Stalin, and a few who have even expanded it, as he makes a case for the need to recognize the mythical nature of the ultimatum and to reassess Truman's image of candor and integrity in view of his persistent refusal either to document or retract his assertion on how the crisis in Azerbaijan was resolved.

1412 "Three in the Kremlin Who Are Shaping a More Conciliatory Policy toward the U.S." *U.S. News and World Report* 24 (7 May 1948): 39-40.

This report outlines Stalin's relationship with Vyacheslav Molotov and Andrei Zhdanov, including his delegation of some of his jobs and powers to the two Kremlin leaders, and speculates that the Kremlin's sudden adoption of a more conciliatory policy toward the United States stems from the three men's realization, in the face of the European Recovery Program and American determination to rearm, that the westward advance of Soviet power "can go no further without courting a war for which they are unprepared and from which they can gain little."

1413 "Troubled Nights." *Time* 50 (27 October 1947): 30.

This brief note opens by citing the statements made by Stalin at his seaside villa in Sochi regarding the Soviet Union's willingness to improve political and economic relations with Britain and

America, despite the Western powers' indifference to bettering their ties with the USSR, and closes by asking the question, "Could anyone in the world sleep more easily because of Stalin's message?"

1414 Tucker, Robert C. "The Cold War in Stalin's Time: What the New Sources Reveal." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 2 (1997): 273-81.

Tucker describes the ways in which newly released documents from Soviet archives shed light on how Soviet control was established and administered in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and on the nature of Stalin's personal role in this process and in Soviet foreign policy in general as well. Most notably, Tucker discusses how the new materials attest to Stalin's all-determining voice in setting Soviet foreign policy—as exemplified by his role in such actions as the creation of the Cominform, the launching of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, and the sanctioning of North Korean ruler Kim Il Sung's plan to unify the Korean peninsula by force—and his establishment of its fundamental goal, namely, the creation of Soviet control spheres as a means of expanding Russian imperial power. Stalin was not only "a Russian imperial communist bent on aggrandizing the Soviet empire wherever possible," but also was "this century's supreme cold warrior, a man whose consuming passion in life was a struggle against those marked down in his mind as enemies," and a leader who, near the end of his reign, intensified the Cold War to a dangerous level, according to Tucker's account of what the new Soviet sources reveal.

1415 Ulam, Adam B. "A Few Unresolved Mysteries about Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: A Modest Agenda of Research." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1, no. 1 (1999): 110-16.

In this outline of a few of the most enduring mysteries about Stalin's foreign policy action in Europe in the postwar years, Ulam points out some of the limitations of conventional scholarly wisdom on the subject of Stalin's European policies in the Cold War era, particularly with respect to such questions as the inevitability of the Soviet satellization of Eastern Europe, the attitude of Stalin toward the Allied occupation and division of Germany, and the genuineness of the Soviet leader's March 1952 proposal for a unified Germany. Ulam is hopeful that a clearer idea of Stalin's Cold War policies may yet emerge from Soviet archives, and that scholars now removed from some of the political and ideological preferences that have kept them from understanding or recognizing the complexity of various incidents of the Cold War will be able to take full advantage of Soviet-era archival materials when they become available.

1416 Urschel, Donna. "The Death of Stalin: Contemporaries Take Stock of a Dictator 50 Years Later." *Library of Congress Information Bulletin* 62, no. 4 (2003): 82-85.

Urschel presents a summary of the key points made by a panel that met at the Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress to discuss the topic "The Death of Stalin: A Missed Opportunity to Overcome the Cold War?" The participants—five prominent scholars and eight "historical witnesses" who were involved in the events of the 1950s or close to those who were—discussed Eisenhower's actions following Stalin's death; the cause of the dictator's death; the impact of his death on the Soviet Union; and "the future need to study and decry Stalin's slaughter of twenty-five million Soviets."

1417 Viereck, Peter. "Stalin's Big Mistake." *Commonweal* 53 (9 February 1951): 441-42.

Stalin's big mistake, according to this article, was his decision to try to gain control over parts of Europe by terror, suppression, and the Red Army rather than exploit the prestige he had acquired in leading antifascist Europe as a way of winning Europe's heart ideologically. While Stalin's aggressive moves have enabled him to win control over Eastern Europe, Viereck explains, he has done so at the cost of losing support across the rest of the continent, disillusioning Western Europeans previously sympathetic with communism, and replacing his positive image as an antifascist and liberator with the undesirable one of a new fascist-style despot.

1418 Warth, Robert. "Stalin and the Cold War: A Second Look." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 59 (winter 1960): 1-12.

Warth challenges the conventional opinion about Stalin regarding his role in the onset of the Cold War, according to which he squandered the vast reservoir of goodwill which the Soviet war effort had stored up in the West, and, by his headlong drive to gain control of Eastern Europe, knowingly plunged the world into a new crisis. In Warth's view, Stalin, in accord with the realities of political and military power in Eastern Europe toward the close of the war, and in view of the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference on the establishment of governments along the Soviet border that would be friendly to the USSR, acted as a conservative imperialist eager to consolidate territorial gains he believed were rightly his and adopted an increasingly rigid posture in his dealings with his wartime partners primarily as a consequence of the refusal of the Atlantic powers to acknowledge Soviet preponderance in Eastern Europe. Warth admits that it would have been immoral to permit Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe by negotiated agreement, but asks the question, "Would that not have been preferable, considering the impossibility of establishing any countervailing power, to introducing a policy of 'containment,' which only fed the Kremlin's anxiety neurosis and induced Stalin to weld over the last remaining chinks in the Iron Curtain?"

1419 Weathersby, Kathryn. "Korea, 1949-50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (spring 1995): 1-9.

Weathersby draws upon seven of the 216 previously classified high-level Soviet documents on the Korean War—presented by Boris Yeltsin to President Kim Young-Sam of South Korea during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994—to shed further light on the question of when, how, and by whom the decision was made to launch a military assault on South Korea. The seven documents, which are appended to the article and include notes of Stalin's 5 March 1949 meeting with Kim Il Sung in Moscow and a series of ciphered telegrams exchanged between the Kremlin and the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang from September 1944 through January 1959, show that the initiative for the North Korean attack on South Korea was clearly Kim Il Sung's; that Kim requested Stalin's approval several times in 1949 before the Soviet leader finally agreed in early 1950 to support the attack; and that the North Korean leader was obviously dependent on the Soviet Union but was a prime historical actor in his own right. Weathersby also discusses the changes in the international situation that prompted Stalin's approval of the North Korean offensive, most notably his belief that the statements made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on 13 January 1950 indicating that South Korea was considered to be outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific meant that the United States would not intervene in a Korean war. For a brief discussion of Weathersby's interpretation of the Soviet documents, see Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby, "An Exchange on Korean War Origins." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 120-22.

1420 Werblan, Andrzej. "The Conversation between Wladyslaw Gomulka and Josef Stalin on 14 November 1945." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 11 (winter 1998): 134-40.

In this introduction to the accounts of a 14 November 1945 conversation between Stalin and Polish communist leaders Wladyslaw Gomulka and Hilary Minc provided by a memorandum found in Gomulka's private papers and by Stalin in a letter to Vyacheslav Molotov dated that same day, Werblan comments briefly on the form and attention to detail that characterize the two documents and then outlines the questions about which the two Polish leaders consulted Stalin, most notably the relations between the Polish Peasants' Party and the Polish Socialist Party, plans for parliamentary elections in Poland, and such international questions as reparations from Germany, the dispute with Czechoslovakia over Cieszyn, and the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland. Werblan

also points out that the Polish Communist Party leadership “did not heed all of Stalin’s ‘advice’ and apparently did not treat his suggestions as obligatory.” Verbatim translations of Gomulka’s memo and Stalin’s letter follow Werblan’s introduction.

1421 Westad, Odd Arne. “Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950.” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8/9 (winter 1996): 224-26.

Westad introduces twenty-six translated Russian and Chinese documents on Mao Tse-tung’s December 1949-February 1950 visit to Moscow. He outlines the prehistory of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting and the aims of Stalin and Mao on the eve of the summit, and then describes the course of the conversations that took place between the two leaders. He notes Stalin’s lack of a clear-cut plan in entering the meeting; the reasons for his change of mind in agreeing to negotiate a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance and for scrapping the agreements reached on the Far East in the 1945 Yalta accords; and the damage done to “Chinese faith in the commonality of ideological principles between the two sides” and to the future of Sino-Soviet relations as a whole by Stalin’s use of tactics which made Mao feel like he was forced to part with pieces of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Mongolia to secure the Soviet assistance he needed.

1422 ———. “Rivals and Allies: Stalin and Mao, and the Chinese Civil War, January 1949.” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 7, 27-29.

In this introduction to a series of recently declassified documents from Russian archives dealing with the January 1939 exchange which took place between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung over the merits of diplomatic versus military tactics in the Chinese Civil War, Westad comments on the reasons why Stalin did not want to disregard completely the Kuomintang attempt at a peace settlement through Great Power mediation; on the instructions he gave Mao on how to respond to the Kuomintang’s initiative; Mao’s rejection of Stalin’s “advice” on the need for negotiations; and the suspicion that lingered on the Chinese side that Stalin, even though the Kremlin basically accepted Mao’s reply, had really wanted to stop the offensive of the People’s Liberation Army north of the Yangtze River and thereby create a divided China.

1423 ———. “Unwrapping the Stalin-Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight.” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 23-24.

Westad comments on how the newly released official records of the 1949-50 Stalin-Mao conversations, contrary to the somewhat dramatized image of the talks provided in the memoir literature on the two leaders’ meetings, show the discussions to have been rather businesslike, with Stalin assuming the role of the cautious statesman, whose “experience in international relations and the building of socialism enabled him to dispense ‘advice’ to his Chinese friends,” particularly on the future course of revolution in the East. Westad also discusses Stalin’s reasons for initially turning down Mao’s proposal for a new treaty between the two countries, and why the Soviet leader then changed his mind, sanctioning a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance which included Soviet economic and military aid to China and the relinquishing of former Soviet prerogatives in exchange for new advantages. Westad closes with a brief commentary on Stalin’s conversations with Foreign Minister Chou En-lai in Moscow in the summer of 1952, during which the prime subject of discussion was an armistice in Korea—an arrangement which both of the communist allies wanted but which proved difficult to formulate due to “Stalin’s ceaseless maneuverings on the issue.”

1424 Wettig, Gerhard. “Stalin and the German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in the Spring of 1952.” *Historical Journal* 37, no. 2 (1994): 411-19.

Wettig surveys the schools of thought on whether Stalin was serious when, on 10 March 1952, he proposed to the three Western powers the restoration of Germany as a united state. He then draws upon the files of the foreign archive of the Russian Federation to argue that the initiative, which

was authored by Andrei Gromyko, was not aimed at the Western governments but rather “was meant to mobilize the German ‘masses,’ particularly in the Federal Republic, behind communist cadres under Soviet control in an intense effort to oust Adenauer’s government and force the Western powers out of Germany.” The grounding premise of the divergent Western assessments of this episode—that if Stalin wanted change in Germany he would have to make a substantial offer which would induce the three powers to seek agreement with him—is, therefore, false, according to Wettig.

1425 “What Does It Mean for the Cold War?” *Business Week* (30 August 1952): 74+.

This article speculates on the nature of the domestic and foreign policy changes to be announced at the upcoming Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party scheduled to convene on 5 October 1952 in Moscow. The article suggests that a new Far East policy and a major propaganda drive on the German question are likely to be proclaimed. It links both Stalin’s decision to have Malenkov deliver the principal party report at the congress, and the party directive calling for the creation of a Presidium to replace the Politburo and the Orgburo, to the seventy-two-year-old dictator’s preparations for a stable transfer of authority, either to Malenkov or an all-powerful committee, once he steps down from power.

1426 “What Was Joe Stalin Really Saying?” *Newsweek* 37 (26 February 1951): 28-29.

Western reaction to the answers given by Stalin to the questions put to him in a February 1951 interview by an unnamed and perhaps nonexistent correspondent of *Pravda* are the subject of this brief report. In the “interview,” Stalin attacked British Prime Minister Attlee’s criticism of the Soviet arms program, defended China’s position in the Korean War, and stated that a new world war could best be avoided by exposing “the criminal machinations of the war-mongers” in the West. The consensus view of the press and diplomats in America, Britain, France, and Germany was that Stalin’s statements merely represent “more of the same old stuff.”

1427 Wingrove, Paul. “Who Started Korea?” *History Today* 50, no. 7 (July 2000): 44-46.

In this examination of the roles of Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Kim Il Sung in starting the Korean War, the author makes use of documents released from the archives of former communist bloc countries to show how Stalin, believing that America would be reluctant to get involved in an Asian war, backed Kim’s plan to reunite Korea by force even though he had no intention to support Kim militarily, an “honor” he reserved for Mao. Wingrove concludes that the Korean War was an unnecessary one; that responsibility for the war lies mainly with Stalin; and that Stalin’s miscalculation regarding the conflict “damaged the interests of the USSR and the Communist world in general.”

1428 Wittfogel, Karl A. “How to Checkmate Stalin in Asia.” *Commentary* 10 (October 1950): 334-41.

Wittfogel attempts to dispel the misconception of the Chinese communists as revolutionaries of a simple, national type whose differences with their Soviet counterparts will lead them to break with Moscow and go their own way. He argues for the strength of the basic links that bind Mao to Stalin—including ideological, organizational, institutional, and personal affinities—and he points out the basic flaws in the Titoist and quasi-Titoist arguments which envision a Chinese Communist Party, disenchanted with Stalin’s interference in its affairs, coming to terms with the United States. Wittfogel also outlines a long-range policy he feels America ought to follow to contain Mao’s expansionism and to thwart Stalin’s plans to foment the spread of communism throughout the Asian world—a policy based upon “politically focused and integrated aid to the non-communist countries of Asia” and “flexible firmness” in dealing with China.

1429 Wohlforth, William C. "New Evidence on Moscow's Cold War: Ambiguity in Search of Theory." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 2 (spring 1997): 229-42.

This article deals with the inadequacy of common theories of ambiguity with respect to the evidence regarding Soviet intentions and motivations in the Cold War and with the need to clarify such theories if the new archival evidence concerning Moscow's aims and motives is to have any influence on the distribution of interpretations in the debate on the Cold War. Among the examples Wohlforth cites in how the new documentary evidence relates to the argument at hand are memoranda prepared for Stalin by Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko indicating Soviet expectations concerning the postwar settlement; German and Russian archival information concerning the Kremlin's hierarchy of objectives in East Germany; and documents showing Stalin's initial caution in Asia and his later enthusiasm for revolution in Asia.

1430 Zacharias, Ellis M. "What Stalin Thinks." *United Nations World* 2 (June 1948): 10-13.

In this article, the wartime Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence speculates on Stalin's thoughts on five key subjects occupying the Soviet leader's mind in 1948—his health, his successor(s), Soviet security, the prospects for world revolution, and the likelihood of international cooperation as opposed to war. In dealing with the questions of war and peace, Zacharias also explains why he feels an overall easing of world tensions could only come by way of a Stalin-Truman summit conference, the main goal of which would be the drafting of a long-term, Soviet-American treaty of nonaggression that would include bilateral agreements on Soviet and American spheres of interest, international control of atomic energy, the regulation of armaments, and the establishment of an international police force.

1431 Zeman, Z. A. B. "Czech Uranium and Stalin's Bomb." *Historian* 67 (autumn 2000): 11-17.

This account of the complexities that attended the Soviet Union's efforts to secure control over the uranium-rich Jachymov mines in postwar Czechoslovakia and maximize the mines' output in order to sustain the uranium-starved Soviet atomic bomb project includes a discussion of how Jachymov's position as the sole major producer of uranium within reach of Soviet power drew Stalin's attention to Czechoslovakia. Zeman describes how Moscow negotiated the 23 November 1945 uranium treaty with Prague and included provisions in the agreement that were designed to maximize the exploitation of the uranium ore, and how the less-than-satisfactory performance of the Jachymov National Enterprise—under the influence of the variety of Czech political parties which made themselves felt in the management of the mines and which wrangled over the conduct of Czech foreign policy—helped Stalin to decide to bind the country and its communist party more closely to the Soviet Union.

1432 Zubok, Vladislav. "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952-53." *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 3 (summer 1995): 453-72.

The question of how Soviet intelligence information about Western policies and plans contributed to Cold War behavior, specifically in the case of the "estimative intelligence" provided by the "small" Committee of Information (KI) to the Kremlin leadership during the period immediately following Stalin's death, is the prime focus of this paper. Zubok's exploration of this question includes an account of Stalin's 1947 creation of the committee's predecessor, the large KI, for the purpose of verifying data obtained by all intelligence services and discarding unreliable information, and of how this "intelligence behemoth," which the dictator hoped would better enable him to cope with an explosion of information about the outside world, failed to function to his design for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the habit of intelligence agency chiefs to bypass the KI so that they could report all "scoops" directly and personally to Stalin. As the large KI went into a state of decline, its central analytical staff was preserved by the Soviet leadership and reported to all Politburo members, but Stalin alone continued to insist on defining all crucial direc-

tions of foreign policy personally, bequeathing to his successors “a deadlock in foreign policy, a backlog of vital problems, and a mess in the decision-making mechanism,” according to Zubok.

1433 ———. “Stalin’s Plans and Russian Archives.” *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 2 (spring 1997): 295-305.

Zubok describes how new research conducted on the basis of Soviet archives sheds light on Stalin’s postwar foreign policy, particularly with respect to the extent of his share of responsibility for the Cold War. Among the revelations provided in the various studies of the Soviet documents that Zubov cites are that Stalin’s policy was not one of confusion and defense but of cautious expansionism; that he had no intention to attack to the West but was willing to use the threat of military force or to use such force by proxy, as in the case of Korea, to promote communist expansion; and that he consistently misread American intentions and behavior, particularly in Korea, and followed policies that invited, not eschewed, confrontation with the United States—all of which contributed significantly to the Cold War. Zubov also discusses how the new documents shine light on Soviet domination over Eastern Europe before the Marshall Plan, on Stalin’s control of foreign communist parties, and on the relationship between communist ideology and Soviet foreign policy behavior.

1434 ———. “To Hell with Yalta”—Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo.” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 24-27.

The transcripts of conversations during the Stalin-Mao talks in December 1949-February 1950 serve as the basis for this discussion of the insights these records provide into Stalin’s doubts and change of mind about the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Zubok primarily describes how the unresolved issues and obstacles on the path to the new alliance, including the nationalist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries, American reaction to the creation of the People’s Republic of China and to the Sino-Soviet talks, and Stalin’s commitment to the Yalta arrangements in the Far East, all gave way as Stalin’s concern about giving America a pretext to intervene in the region faded with the Truman administration’s January 1950 announcement of what he perceived as a new American doctrine for the Far East, one which seemed to signify a U.S. retreat from the Asian mainland. Stalin’s efforts to convince Mao that the Soviet Union would risk a conflict with America for the sake of its new Asian ally, and the Soviet leader’s extraction of a proper territorial price for this willingness to defend Communist China also receive attention in the article, as does his ability to secure a secret agreement that allowed the Soviets to transport troops and military equipment and supplies on the Chinese rail system if war threatened to break out in the Far East.

Military Affairs

General

- 1435** Flaherty, Patrick. "Stalinist Power Structure and Militarism." *Socialism and Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1991): 141-56.

Flaherty describes the structural dynamics and political economy of Soviet militarism and the program of reform undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev in his effort to demilitarize the core of the Soviet dominant class and promote the establishment of a market-driven political economy at the expense of the long-standing mechanisms of militarized accelerated growth. In outlining the relationship between Stalinism and the origins of Soviet militarism, Flaherty discusses the factors which compelled Stalin to replace a policy of subordinating military considerations to the forging of a civilian industrial base with one which enrolled the Soviet Union in the European arms race by rapidly increasing Soviet military-industrial potential and mobilizing a mass standing army. He also comments on the structural components and inner workings of the militarized Soviet economy under Stalin; its assumption of the form of "a state within a state"; and the emergence of military demands as "the sole catalyst of micro-economic change and technological innovation" in the Stalinist system.

- 1436** Harrison, Mark. "Soviet Industry and the Red Army under Stalin: A Military Industrial Complex?" *Cahiers du Monde russe* 44, no. 2 (2003): 323-42.

Harrison takes advantage of new archival research on the Soviet defense industry and its relationship with the Red Army in the 1930s and 1940s to suggest that in the Stalin period the military-industrial complex, in the sense of collusion between military and industrial interests in lobbying for resources, was not yet fully developed. Rather than showing that military and industrial agents conspired among themselves in an effort to advance a particular interest or to obtain funding for a specific project, the record of interaction of industrial and defense officials, Harrison writes, indicates that "mutual tensions, frustrations, suspicions and conflicts between army and industry were endemic." Moreover, incentives for the agents of the military and industrial interests to compete rather than collude were very strong under Stalin, who "personally disliked it when agents colluded with each other rather than with him, and took steps to break up and punish collusion when it was identified." "Only after Stalin's death," Harrison concludes, "were conditions created that may have been more favorable to the emergence of a durable military-industrial coalition."

- 1437** Hudson, George E. "Soviet Naval Doctrine under Lenin and Stalin." *Soviet Studies* 28, no. 1 (1976): 42-65.

Hudson opens his analysis of the major trends in Soviet naval doctrine from 1921 to 1953 with an account of the debates on naval doctrine occurring from the end of the Russian Civil War in 1921 to the completion of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932, an eleven-year period during which two schools of thought arose and competed with one another, with the traditionalist outlook, which

favored the development of a large, offensive fleet, losing out to the modernist view, which argued for a small defensive fleet. He then discusses how, under Stalin's rule and direct influence, naval doctrine went through four stages: 1932-37, which saw the further development of the modernist concept of a small fleet; 1938-41, which witnessed a shift to a large oceangoing fleet and the establishment of an independent Naval Commissariat; 1941-45, which marked a return to the notion of a small fleet; and 1946-53, which was characterized by the emergence of a fleet balanced between large and small vessels, or a synthesis between the modernist and traditionalist concepts of the navy. The changes from period to period, Hudson explains, did not appear to reflect the victory of one school over another as a result of debate but rather "represented the consensus view during those periods on the proper doctrinal responses (usually determined by Stalin) to the changing international and domestic environments." The concept of the defensive fleet was, however, a consistent element during most of the Stalin era, Hudson concludes.

1438 Rohwer, Jürgen and Mikhail Monakov. "The Soviet Union's Ocean-Going Fleet, 1935-1956." *International Historical Review* 18, no. 4 (1996): 837-78.

This paper draws upon a number of recent, archive-based writings by Soviet historians to detail Stalin's reappraisal of the role of the navy in the defense of the Soviet Union and to describe his leading role in the drafting of a program to build a great ocean-going fleet, a plan launched at the end of 1935. The decision to build such a fleet, Rohwer and Monakov maintain, not only reflects Stalin's switch to an independent defense policy as he became disillusioned with the policy of collective security but also is in keeping with his long-term goal of seeing the Soviet Union emerge one day as a superpower. The authors also discuss how Stalin's approach to the naval-building program in the second half of the 1930s moved from outdistancing the aspirations of the navy's leaders in this regard to holding them back after the end of World War II, by which time he became "preoccupied with industrial capacity and the need to counter threats of amphibious landings and aerial bombardment."

Pre-World War II (1921-1941)

1439 Bailes, Kendall E. "Technology and Legitimacy: Soviet Aviation and Socialism in the 1930s." *Technology and Culture* 17, no. 1 (1976): 55-81.

Bailes examines the legitimizing function of technology in Soviet society of the 1930s. He describes how Stalin, during this time, used world records in aviation as a means of winning support for his regime at home and abroad, and as a way to counterbalance the damage done to the Kremlin's image by his wholesale use of purges as a political weapon during the thirties. Stalin managed to link his name and reputation with technological achievements—exemplified, in the case at hand, by Soviet performances in international air shows and successes in world record aeronautical competitions—and these impressive showings may have served their intended political purposes, at least temporarily, but the Stalin regime's investment in projects calculated to make the biggest publicity splash came at the expense of Soviet air defenses, specifically the production of up-to-date fighter aircraft, and crippled Soviet military aviation in the early years of World War II, according to Bailes.

1440 Barmine, Alexandre. "Escape from Stalin." *Harper's Magazine* 182 (February 1941): 294-302.

Barmine, who was a Soviet diplomat stationed in Athens in 1937 and a close friend of Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, describes, in the beginning of this article, his shock upon learning that Tukhachevsky and other top leaders of the Red Army had been accused of treason by Stalin and had been arrested and were facing execution. Pointing out the groundlessness of the accusations leveled against the Red Army's leadership, Barmine sees the real motive for the purge as

being Stalin's desire to eliminate all the old Bolsheviks who knew that his role in the revolutionary past was an undistinguished one, contrary to the image then being propagated in accord with the cult of Stalin. The remainder of the article deals with Barmine's efforts to elude the Soviet secret police after his disenchantment with Stalin's actions against the Red Army's High Command became known in Moscow.

1441 Hauner, Milan L. "Stalin's Big-Fleet Program." *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 2 (2004): 87-120.

Hauner discusses Stalin's authorship of and involvement with plans for creating a huge oceangoing Soviet navy in the second half of the 1930s. He describes Stalin's big-fleet program, which included the construction of immense battleships, as a fantastic plan born in the Soviet leader's inordinate fondness for "big things" and fueled by his gloomy assessment of the international situation at that time; by his concern over the possible ill-effects of Russia's nonparticipation in the ongoing international naval arms race; and by his desire to increase the world prestige of the Soviet Union as a great power. Arguing that the big-fleet program was not only launched without a sound strategic foundation but aimed at construction targets that were unattainable in view of the USSR's limited resources, low level of naval construction technology, and lack of much of the basic industrial infrastructure that the program required, Hauner details the steps taken by Stalin to realize a grandiose construction scheme that was doomed to failure, including his huge expansion of the naval budget, attempt to purchase naval technology from America, and efforts to secure naval equipment from Germany, first by way of trade negotiations and later through his 1939 pact with Hitler.

1442 Iakupov, N. M. "Stalin and the Red Army: Archival Findings." *Russian Studies in History* 31, no. 2 (1992): 85-96.

Iakupov draws upon the holdings of the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army to shed light on the character and magnitude of the repressions directed against the command personnel of the Red Army by Stalin during the prewar years. He establishes the number of command and supervisory personnel dismissed and arrested during 1937; the pattern of the repressions within the command structure; the demoralizing effect that the purge had upon the state of the army in that year; and the geographical breakdown and extent of the repressions throughout the Soviet Union. He notes that "one of the most heinous directions in the policy of repressions was the persecution of the families of the arrested officers," many of whom were ardent supporters of Soviet rule and Stalin, and who, being at a loss to understand why they were being treated as traitors, wrote letters to the "Father of the People" to seek redress for the injustices they were suffering, not knowing that "Stalin himself gave the orders to arrest innocent people and he and his associates made the decisions as to whether to shoot eminent military figures."

1443 Jukes, G. "The Red Army and the Munich Crisis." *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 2 (1991): 195-214.

A book written in 1969 (published in 1989) by Marshal of the Soviet Union Matvei Zakharov about the Soviet General Staff in the prewar years serves as the basis of this account of the steps taken in September 1938 by the Red Army in preparing to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis. Zakharov, who, at the time of Munich, was an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov, claims that the Soviet government had replied on 20 September to an inquiry from Czech President Edvard Beneš by stating that it would come to Czechoslovakia's aid even if France chose not to do so and had ordered Soviet forces to be mobilized for this purpose. Jukes presents a summary of the details provided by Zakharov about Soviet military deployments; points out that there is no way to establish factually the basis of Stalin's actions during the Munich affair because of his secretive style of leadership; and explains why he

considers Zakharov's account of the Red Army's preparations for war in September 1938 to be a credible one.

1444 Keyes, Gene. "Stalin's Finland Fiasco: The Kuusinen Government Reconsidered." *Cross-roads* no. 17 (1985): 27-58.

Keyes examines the Soviet Union's attempted conquest of Finland in the 1939-40 Winter War in terms of whether Stalin's aim in the conflict was primarily military—the extension of Russia's defense perimeter to the north—or political—the creation of a Soviet satellite in the form of a communist Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen, leader of Finland's Social Democratic Party in its early years and a prominent figure in the Comintern residing in Russia at the time of the Finnish conflict. He suggests that while Stalin clearly acted on "a defense-of-Leningrad" motive and anticipated a quick Soviet military victory over Finland, his support for the so-called Democratic Republic of Finland, contrary to the conventional view, was not just a propaganda tactic designed to sway the Finns to accept the territorial demands Moscow was then making but rather was a strategy adopted to promote the overthrow of the government and the creation of a people's republic akin to those the Kremlin would later help to install in the Baltic states and the nations of Eastern Europe. According to Keyes, only the looming danger of Anglo-French intervention in the Winter War—"however asinine that intervention would have been"—caused Stalin, at the last minute and on the verge of victory, "to drop the People's Government *as if* it had been a mere propaganda tactic all along" and to settle for a negotiated end to the war with Finland, one which provided Moscow with most of the territory it sought but left the democratic government and national integrity of Finland intact.

1445 Krivitsky, W. G. "Why Stalin Shot His Generals." *Saturday Evening Post* 211 (22 April 1939): 16-17+.

This article, the second of three written about Stalin by a leading figure in Soviet military intelligence who defected to the West in 1937, speculates on the motives behind Stalin's 1937 purge of the Red Army command and outlines the lengths to which the Soviet dictator went in fabricating the story of a conspiracy against his leadership. Krivitsky locates the origin of the purge in Stalin's practice of deeming his critics to be "traitors" and any opposition to his rule to be a "conspiracy." This practice, Krivitsky contends, led Stalin to hatch a scheme that would allow him to settle accounts with the Red Army leaders who had questioned some of his policies, particularly his forced collectivization of agriculture which had largely demoralized the peasant base of the army. Stalin's conviction that he would soon come to terms with Hitler, Krivitsky continues, encouraged him to believe that, with the possibility of an imminent war with Germany having been all but eliminated by a pact with Berlin, he could afford to decimate the ranks of the Red Army's leadership without fear of how such an action would affect the nation's military capability.

1446 Laqueur, Walter. "The Strange Lives of Nikolai Skoblin. Some Origins of World War II." *Encounter* 72, no. 3 (1989): 11-20.

Laqueur examines the complexities and confusion surrounding the espionage-related activities of White Russian General Nikolai Skoblin in Paris in 1937 and Skoblin's connection with the so-called Eitington case. He also discusses how the machinations in which Skoblin played a bit part figure into Stalin's purge of the Red Army in 1937-38, and how the dictator's decapitation of the army's leadership may have encouraged the appeasement of Hitler by British and French leaders, who believed the purge made the Soviets less reliable as a potential ally, and made Hitler and his generals "more willing in 1941 to take risks which otherwise might have appeared unacceptable."

1447 Large, David Clay. "White Queen in the Kremlin." *MHQ: The Quarterly of Military History* 2, no. 1 (1989): 68-75.

Large mainly describes the extent of Stalin's purge of the Red Army officer corps and outlines the possible motives for this action. In Large's opinion, Stalin's belief that his generals had the potential to challenge his dictatorship and his concern that they represented a possible obstacle to his freedom of action in trying to arrange a rapprochement with Hitler's Germany were the main factors fueling the purge decision. The devastating consequences of Stalin's elimination of the seasoned core of the Red Army's leadership, including the encouragement of Hitler to launch an attack on the USSR because of the weakened condition of the Soviet army, and the staggering loss of men and materials suffered by poorly led Soviet military forces in the early months of the war with Germany, also receive consideration in Large's examination of the 1937 purge and its ramifications.

1448 Lukes, Igor. "The Tukhachevsky Affair and President Edvard Beneš: Solutions and Open Questions." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 7, no. 3 (1996): 505-29.

Lukes draws upon Czech and Soviet diplomatic archives to examine the connection between the Tukhachevsky affair of 1937 and the diplomatic activities of the Czech government at that time. Showing how archival evidence disproves Czech leader Edvard Beneš's claim that, having learned in Berlin about secret contacts between Soviet and German generals and an imminent military takeover in Moscow involving Soviet General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, he warned Stalin and thus helped unmask a dangerous scheme, Luke argues that Beneš was, in fact, an unwitting middleman in a complex scheme hatched by Stalin that involved the sowing of disinformation about the alleged military plot; the duping of members of the German Gestapo and SS into taking part in a scheme they believed would weaken the Stalin regime; and the use of Beneš and French Minister of War Édouard Daladier as conduits through which the disinformation disseminated by the Kremlin would be returned to Moscow as "evidence" of the nonexistent Tukhachevsky conspiracy. Beneš, in informing Moscow of the Soviet-German military conspiracy some twenty-one days after Tukhachevsky's arrest, failed to behave as Stalin had hoped, but Daladier played his part in accord with Stalin's designs, providing the Kremlin with a timely warning against Tukhachevsky's alleged dealings and treasonous plans along with "evidence" that was to be used in the purge trials of the Red Army's high command, according to Lukes.

1449 Mil'bakh, V. S. "Repression in the Red Army in the Far East, 1936-1939." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 16, no. 4 (2003): 58-130.

Stalin by name does not enter into this account of the origin, nature, extent, and impact of the repression in the Red Army in the Far East in the years 1936-39, but as a study which draws heavily upon Russian archival sources to detail how the relatively limited and mild acts of repression against both military commanders and servicemen in the Far East in the mid-1930s gave way to a widespread wave of political repression in accord with the general purge of the Red Army's leadership in 1937-38, it sheds considerable light on the inner workings, scale, and consequences of Stalin's devastating purge of the Red Army across the whole Far East. Mil'bakh devotes special attention to the role played in the purge by Marshal V. K. Bliukher—the region's top commander—upon whose authority Stalin relied, having in June 1937 made him his accomplice in the campaign unleashed to destroy Red Army commanders and officers, and who himself was later arrested and died in November 1938 while undergoing interrogation for counterrevolutionary activity.

1450 Monk, Paul. "Meriwether and Strange Weather." *Quadrant* 48, no. 4 (April 2004): 8-14.

Monk uses the example of the partnership calling itself Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)—a Wall Street firm whose dazzling success on the market during the years 1994-97 was followed by a spectacular collapse of its fortunes in 1998—as the starting point of a commentary on how errors in perception and judgment have impacted intelligence analyses and risk management practices in the world of geopolitics. Using Stalin's failure to heed the signs, in the spring of

1941, that Hitler was preparing an all-out attack on the Soviet Union as one of his case studies of the kinds of errors that contributed to the LTCM debacle, Monk examines Stalin's behavior in terms of the Soviet leader's assumption that he understood how Hitler's mind worked and that Hitler saw the Soviet Union the way he himself did, showing how Stalin's misreading of Berlin's intentions led him to discard Soviet intelligence reports pointing to an impending Nazi attack in favor of his own alternative interpretation of the mobilization of German forces—one predicated on the belief that "Hitler was engaging in a gigantic game of bluff" which would be followed by a demand for concessions over which the Kremlin could then negotiate. In analyzing the sources of Stalin's myopia in dealing with the German military build-up along the Soviet border, Monk gives credence to the possibility that Stalin was engaging in what cognitive scientists call "belief preservation," a form of behavior in which an individual "clings to an opinion, ignoring or devaluating evidence which conflicts with it and grasping at straws to defend it."

1451 Muir, Malcolm, Jr. "American Warship Construction for Stalin's Navy Prior to World War II: A Study in Paralysis of Policy." *Diplomatic History* 5, no. 4 (1981): 337-51.

This account of the changing fortunes of Soviet attempts from 1936 through 1938 to buy American battleship components and detailed warship plans and to negotiate the construction of Soviet battleships in American yards includes a brief discussion of Stalin's mid-1930s decision to build a Russian battle fleet of the highest technical order and of his personal effort, in a 5 June 1938 unscheduled Kremlin meeting with American Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, to advance the stalled negotiations on the battleship question. While Stalin's initiative spurred President Roosevelt to order the Department of the Navy to assist the architects, shipbuilders, and Soviet officers involved in the battleship project, Muir explains, American naval officials nonetheless engaged in a series of stalling tactics that delayed the project to the point where the disenchanted Soviets decided to construct the battleships in their own yards. Muir suggests that the indecisive and inconsistent American behavior throughout the battleship episode may have contributed to Stalin's disillusionment with and distrust of the Western democracies and therefore may have played a role in his decision to seek a nonaggression pact with Hitler.

1452 Myers, Albert C. "Khalkin Gol: Stalin's Battle to Stabilize the Soviet Far East." *Military Review* 63, no. 4 (1983): 60-65.

Myers analyzes the Soviet and Japanese strategies in the battle fought near the Khalkin Gol River in a contested region separating Outer Mongolia and the Japanese puppet state of Manchuko toward the end of August 1939. In discussing the strategic and diplomatic framework of the Soviet offensive against Japanese forces, he suggests that Stalin was fully aware of the profound political implications for the Soviet Union should the frustrating border conflicts with the Japanese continue, and that he was the source of the plan for a decisive blow against the Japanese in order to prove Soviet military strength and to terminate an annoying distraction from the ominous events brewing to Russia's west. Myers also comments on Stalin's selection of General Georgi Zhukov to command the Soviet First Army Group in the Far East—a choice that "was to prove brilliant and prophetic for the Soviet army"—and on the importance of the battle in proving the decisive nature of a powerful armor-oriented offense which rapidly exploits initial gains.

1453 Reese, Roger R. "The Impact of the Great Purge on the Red Army: Wrestling with Hard Numbers." *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 19, nos. 1-3 (1992): 71-90.

The 1990 Soviet publication of the reports originally compiled in 1940 by E. A. Shchadenko, the Chief Officer of Personnel of the People's Commissariat of Defense, indicating the number of men discharged from the Red Army during 1937-39; the number reinstated by May 1940; the number of new officers in the army in the second half of the 1930s; and the number of officers reassigned by promotion or given first duty assignments from 1935 to 1940 suggest that the effects

of Stalin's purge on military leadership was not the primary source of the catastrophic defeats the Red Army suffered at the hands of the Wehrmacht in 1941, according to this article.

1454 Romerstein, Herbert. "Stalin's Day of Infamy." *Policy Review* 49 (summer 1989): 58-61.

Stalin comes under fire in this article, written on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, for concluding a deal with Hitler that opened the door for World War II. Romerstein also faults Stalin for providing Soviet material aid and propaganda support for the Nazi cause during the twenty-two-month life span of the agreement; for his seizure of the Baltic states, in accord with the pact's secret protocols; for the mass killings that took place in the territories acquired by the USSR through the pact; and for the incredible suffering the Soviet people experienced as a direct consequence of the war he helped to unleash.

1455 Schauff, Frank. "Company Choir of Terror: The Military Council of the 1930s—The Red Army between the XVIIth and XVIIIth Party Congresses." Translated by Stephanie McGinn. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12, no. 2 (1999): 123-63.

Schauff makes use of transcripts of the proceedings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense during 1934-39 and of other Red Army documents to describe the concerns and issues which occupied the Soviet military leadership's attention during this period, and to examine how the Red Army terror of 1937-38 unfolded and affected the battle readiness of Soviet military forces. Stalin enters into the essay through his appearance at a special conference of the Military Council which took place during 1-4 June 1937 and at which he gave a long talk on the reasons for the arrest of Mikhail Tukhachevsky and other high military officials known to the members of the Council. Schauff also summarizes the case presented by Stalin at the special conference for the steps to be taken against the Red Army's High Command; describes the disruptive effects that Stalin's chaotic purge had upon the Soviet military, as revealed in the deliberations of the Military Council's conferences in November 1937 and November 1938; and presents a status report on the condition of the Red Army on the eve of World War II. He concludes that, separate from the execution of the Red Army's leadership elite, the chaos of the process of Stalin's Red Army purge; the removal of officers from the middle and lower levels of the army on a mass scale; the wholesale destruction of staffs of individual units; and the failure of the party's leadership to deal effectively with problems within the Red Army that had been pointed out repeatedly at the conferences of the Military Council during the years under study seriously limited the Red Army's capacity to fight back the well-trained and effectively led German army without suffering catastrophic losses.

1456 "Stalin's Foe at Home." *Literary Digest* 103 (2 November 1929): 18.

According to this 2 November 1929 report, the greatest threat to Stalin's rule is a Red Army populated by peasant soldiers hostile to Soviet agricultural policy and led by People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs Kliment Voroshilov, who is immensely popular with the soldiers and is one of the few prominent figures Stalin has been afraid to remove from power. The report also notes that "the shadow of Napoleon still haunts the Kremlin," meaning Stalin hopes to avoid any use of the army because he realizes that "victory or defeat alike threaten the march of an army on Moscow" and the possible overthrow of his government by his own disgruntled subjects.

1457 Watt, Donald C. "Stalin's First Bid for Sea Power, 1933-1941." *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* 90, no. 6 (June 1964): 88-96.

Watt discusses the shift in Soviet naval doctrine during the second half of the 1930s from one which called for the navy to remain a force principally concerned with the defense of the Soviet seaboard, and which viewed the submarine as the navy's main weapon, to one which proposed the construction of a large ocean-going fleet, eclipsing in size that of the British navy. Tagging the big navy concept as "a monument to Stalin's megalomania and Soviet pride," Watt describes Stalin's

big ship program as being devoid of any constructive theory of sea power; shorn of “any new way of evading the traps which geography has closed around the Soviet coast line”; and founded essentially on the idea of “having big ships for the sake of big ships, and the prestige and status they conferred.” It was left to World War II to show that, for lack of thought and lack of doctrine, Soviet sea power was, in fact, powerless, and that “the magnificent construction program Stalin had dreamed of was simply wasted,” Watt concludes.

1458 ———. “Who Plotted against Whom? Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet High Command Revisited.” *Journal of Soviet Military Studies* 3, no. 1 (1990): 46-65.

Watt draws upon newly available British, French, and American records and the testimony of two crucial German witnesses—Colonel Karl Spalcke, who was head of the Russian section of the Foreign Armies division of the German War Ministry, and General Ernst Koestring, who was the German military attaché in Moscow—to reexamine the events of 1936-38 surrounding Stalin’s purge of the Red Army’s leadership. Reestablishing the contemporary scene through the eyes of the diplomatic observers of Moscow politics of 1936-37, and describing the confusion of reports and rumors that circulated among the diplomatic, military, and intelligence authorities of the major powers at that time, Watt traces the path followed by hints of a Red Army plan to oust Stalin; the history of the “dossier” on the alleged Red Army plot prepared by the head of the German military intelligence organization, Reinhold Heydrich; and the role played by Czech leader Edvard Beneš as a dupe who attempted to lend credibility to the forged dossier, and who saw that it came to the attention of the Stalin leadership. The ups and downs of NKVD’s efforts to take action against the Red Army leadership during the year preceding the June 1937 purge; the rumors of German-Soviet rapprochement during 1936-37; and the possibility of a link between the Red Army purge and Stalin’s desire to reach an accord with Hitler all enter into Watt’s analysis, as do Stalin’s most likely motives for decimating the ranks of the Soviet High Command, chief among which, in Watt’s estimate, was his desire “to weaken any sense of army independence, of being part of a parallel elite separate from party dominance and control.”

1459 Weeks, Albert L. “Sixty Years after the Nazi-Soviet Pact.” *Modern Age* 41, no. 3 (1999): 220-29.

Weeks examines the debate over Stalin’s military aims and policies from 1939 until the German assault on the Soviet Union in 1941, surveying the main points advanced by the defensive interpretation, according to which Stalin’s goal was to keep the USSR out of a world war for as long as possible, and the offensive position, which holds that Stalin all along was plotting an offensive war against Germany and ultimately all of “capitalist-imperialist” Europe. The policy of collective security, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Soviet military planning in 1941, and the question of Stalin’s commitment to the long-term goal of advancing the cause of world revolution all receive consideration in Weeks’s analysis.

Wartime

1460 Ainsztein, Rueben. “Stalin and June 22, 1941: Some New Soviet Views.” *International Affairs* 42, no. 2 (1966): 662-72.

This review essay on Soviet diplomat Valentin Berezhkov’s *Na rubezhe mira i voiny* (*Between War and Peace*) and Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov’s *Pered voynoi* (*Before the War*), both published in 1965, revolves around the insights the two memoirs provide into German-Russian relations in the months preceding the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union and into the question of why Stalin failed to heed the warnings of an impending German invasion. Ainsztein primarily describes how the memoirs show that Moscow was repeatedly warned about German military preparations in the east and about the likelihood of a massive Nazi assault

on the USSR, but that Stalin chose not to take even the simplest of precautionary measures, perhaps because he wanted to show that he had no intention of going to war with Germany and, in this way, delay the attack which he knew was coming until the Red Army was better prepared to counter it. While neither book directly answers the basic question of why the Nazi-Soviet war opened as it did, they indicate that "had Stalin's power not been so all-pervasive and terrifying, many Red Army commanders would have adopted elementary counter-measures against a possible German attack long before it came," according to Ainsztein.

1461 Armour, Richard. "Recognition: Poem." *Nation* 154 (28 February 1942): 255.

Armour pens a humorous poem attributing the nine words added to the "Stalin" entry in the 1942 edition of the British *Who's Who* to the Soviet dictator's accomplishments in sustaining the Soviet war effort against Nazi Germany.

1462 "Battle of Russia: How Many Rivers to Cross?" *Time* (22 February 1943): 20-23.

Time reviews two schools of thought existing in 1943 regarding how far the Red Army's advance to the West against the retreating German forces might progress, one which sees Stalin as an isolationist intent on expelling the German army from the Soviet Union but not planning to pursue it all the way to Berlin; the other which holds that the Red advance would sweep to and perhaps beyond the Rhine, communizing all of Europe. The article weighs the merits of these two mutually exclusive positions against the statements made by the Kremlin's leaders regarding the Soviet Union's wartime and postwar goals, and it urges Western statesmen to shun "vague and fearful clichés" in favor of attempting to find out what Stalin actually wants.

1463 Birt, Raymond. "Personality and Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin." *Political Psychology* 14, no. 4 (December 1993): 607-25.

This argument for the value of using psychopathological personality variables in explaining the causes of political events uses Stalin's behavior during the period immediately following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 as its main example of how a leader's personality attributes can interact with and affect key foreign policy decisions. Maintaining that the details of Stalin's early life "fit as nearly perfectly as possible into the developmental pattern of the paranoid personality type," and that his adult political behavior largely conforms to the behavior expected of a paranoid individual, Birt discusses how, in the episode of the German surprise assault, the cycles of the paranoid process can be seen in Stalin's responses, and how his psychological needs and ego defenses may have been accountable for Soviet policies at the time of the invasion. Given the possibility that the Soviet state, in effect, responded to the Nazi invasion as an extension of Stalin himself, proponents of the mainstream school of political realism and crisis response theory might profit by considering the link between personality needs and political outcomes as a viable component of political science research, Birt suggests.

1464 Chamberlin, William Henry. "Stalin in the War." *Yale Review* 30, no. 3 (March 1941): 483-98.

Chamberlin looks at the background of Bolshevik revolutionary history and psychology, the character of the Soviet regime under Stalin's dictatorial rule, and the relative measure of Soviet military and economic strength in arguing for Stalin's pursuit of a long-range policy which envisions the belligerents in World War II wearing themselves out in a struggle of mutual devastation and exhaustion, and which sees the Soviet Union and the cause of world communism being the ultimate winners in such a conflict. In his effort to realize his dreams of world domination through cunning exploitation of a European-wide war, Stalin, Chamberlin argues, managed to exploit Anglo-French overtures to Moscow for a political-military understanding as a means of encouraging Germany to consider a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, hoping that such an agreement would precipitate a second world war.

1465 "Comrade Stalin Explains." *Time* 38 (14 July 1941): 22-23

The radio address given by Stalin, a month after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, urging the Soviet people to give themselves fully to the "patriotic war of liberation" and thanking Britain and America for their offers of aid is the subject of this brief report.

1466 Dallin, Alexander. "Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Stalin." *Survey* 21, nos. 1/2 (winter/spring 1975): 11-19.

Dallin assesses Stalin's wartime performance in leading the Soviet struggle against the Nazi invasion, evaluating how well he functioned in his roles as a symbol of national leadership, a military commander, the head of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and a member of the Big Three. He contends that Stalin as the symbol of wartime leadership was a functional and perhaps essential image, contrived as it was, in the Soviet war effort; that Stalin's record as the nation's supreme military commander was dismal in the early period of the war but improved with time, with his greatest contribution resting in his direction of the mobilization of resources and manpower in the war effort; that Stalin, in his capacity as head of the government and the party, continued his pre-role behavior, displaying brutal firmness and calculated relaxation, persisting in "the familiar techniques of intimidation, intrigue, ridicule and dismissal," and acting in accord with his own personal needs rather than "the demands of system rationality"; and that, in dealing with the Allies, Stalin was adept at manipulating his partners, playing them against one another, and extracting concessions from them, according to Dallin. On balance, "it would be as erroneous to argue that the Soviet Union was victorious because of Stalin's leadership as it would be to maintain that Russia won *despite* Stalin's role," Dallin concludes.

1467 ———. "Stalin and the German Invasion." *Soviet Union* 18 (1991): 19-37.

Dallin examines the various schools of thought regarding the assumptions and beliefs that guided Stalin's behavior in the face of intelligence reports in April-June 1941 that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union, lending his support to an approach that privileges the role played by the dictator's "idiosyncratic pathologies" and by the institutional consequences of his style of rule in explaining why he failed to heed a wealth of signs and hints of Berlin's intentions. For Dallin, Stalin's disregard for and misreading of the intelligence data that pointed toward the near certainty of a Nazi assault may have stemmed, in part, from his unwillingness to accept the possibility that his German policy of 1939-41 had been misfounded, and that he—the infallible leader—had, in fact, made an error. This blindness, which reflects his penchant for restructuring reality to justify his policy choices, may have been furthered by the failure of men like Molotov, Beria, and Golokov—who processed and analyzed intelligence information—to give Stalin a clear picture of what the data indicated out of fear of incurring his wrath, given his posture toward Germany at this time, according to Dallin.

1468 "Die, But Do Not Retreat." *Time* 41 (4 January 1943): 21-24.

This article includes an account of Stalin's leadership during 1942 in taking the Soviet Union from the dark days that followed the German invasion of June 1941 to the hopefulness that came with the defeat of the Nazi forces at Stalingrad and the launching of a highly effective 1942-43 winter offensive in the Don basin. The article describes Stalin's efforts to use the Red Army to the nation's fullest advantage and to encourage the Soviet people to make the sacrifices required by the war effort. It also links Russia's world-surprising strength in withstanding the Nazi onslaught to Stalin's success in industrializing the nation.

1469 Douglas, James. "Stalin in the Second World War." *Survey* 17, no. 4 (1971): 179-87.

Douglas comments on how the picture of Stalin as a war leader has been revised from the negative image presented during the Khrushchev years and in Alexander Nekrich's celebrated and contro-

versial 1965 study *1942 22 iyunya* to one far more favorable, in part through officially sanctioned works which curtail or completely omit a number of the earlier criticisms of his wartime leadership, and also through the memoirs of his leading generals, which, contrary to the allegations put forth by Khrushchev, show that Stalin, as Supreme Commander, knew more about Soviet military operations than anyone else and “was firmly in command of the Soviet war-machine.” While attempts to cover up “the embarrassing situation which prevailed at the beginning of the war” have not been wholly successful, most of the interested parties—meaning the wartime generals and the current party leadership—seem to be satisfied with the new view of Stalin, according to Douglas.

1470 Drabkin, Ia. S. “‘Hitler’s War’ or ‘Stalin’s War’?” *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology* 40, no. 5 (2002): 5-30.

Drabkin discusses the continuing debates among historians regarding three issues central to the era of World War II: the circumstances surrounding the onset of the war, particularly the degree of responsibility borne by Hitler and Stalin for its outbreak; the sources of the German-Soviet war; and the comparative characteristics of Hitler and Stalin as the representatives of two types of totalitarian regimes.

1471 Erickson, John. “Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?” *History Today* 51, no. 7 (2001): 11-17.

Erickson reviews the controversy sparked in Russia and in the West by Viktor Suvorov’s book *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (1990) which argues that Stalin was planning an offensive war against Hitler in 1941. Contrary to Suvorov’s view, Erickson contends that “Stalin had neither the intention nor the capability to embark on ‘preventive war’” in 1941 but rather followed a “war avoidance strategy” and therefore ruled out mobilization and even increased military readiness in the face of Germany’s military buildup in the east—a policy which led inevitably to disaster.

1472 Förster, Jürgen. “The Russo-German Conflict As Part of the Second World War.” *Contemporary European History* 6, no. 1 (9 March 1997): 145-48.

The books considered in this review article are: Alan Clark, *Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945* (1995); Walter S. Dunn, Jr., *Hitler’s Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930-1943* (1994); Joachim Hoffmann, *Stalin’s Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945* (1995); Walter Post, *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und sowjetische Angriffspläne 1940/41* (1996); R. C. Raack, *Stalin’s Drive to the West: The Origins of the Cold War* (1995); and Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941* (1995). Förster devotes most of his attention to the shortcomings of the interpretation of revisionist authors Hoffmann and Post, who, in arguing that the showdown between German National Socialism and Russian Bolshevism was unavoidable, stress that Stalin intended to attack Germany in the summer of 1941 and that Hitler’s order of the German assault of 22 June was a preventive strike against a war-ready Soviet Union. He also comments critically on Raack’s case for both Stalin’s expansionist plans in Europe and their determining role in the outbreak of the Cold War, and on Roberts’s reading of Stalin’s motivation in concluding the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.

1473 Förster, Jürgen and Evan Mawdsley. “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa.” *War in History* 11, no. 1 (2004): 61-103.

The first half of this article is devoted to a discussion of Hitler’s 30 March 1941 address to the leaders of the German forces deployed in the east about the military situation and the nature of the planned campaign against the Soviet Union; the second centers on Stalin’s speech at the Red Army military academy graduation ceremony on 5 May 1941 on the war in Europe and the military situation that the Soviet Union was facing at that time. The article includes the notes on Hit-

ler's speech made by Colonel General Franz Halder and by Colonel General Hermann Hoth, and three sets of notes on Stalin's speech: the text deposited in the Communist Party archive in Moscow in 1948, and the notes recorded by two senior officials, Georgi Dimitrov and V. A. Malyshev, who sat on the stage with Stalin. In assessing the meaning of Stalin's address, Förster and Mawdsley question those who interpret the speech as a bellicose statement, contending instead that Stalin's remarks were meant to embolden the graduates of the military academies, and that it is implausible that he would use a semi-public speech to a large audience to make a proclamation of aggressive war at a time when he was doing everything possible to avoid provoking Hitler. They suggest that some senior party leaders and commanders, however, believed that the speech signaled an impending shift in Soviet policy—a belief which led to a draft of propaganda directives for mass political mobilization against Germany, and to a 15 May proposal, by Defense Minister Semen Timoshenko and Chief of Staff Georgi Zhukov, for a preemptive attack against Germany, neither of which won Stalin's favor. The authors close with a comparative analysis of the Hitler and Stalin speeches with respect to the two men's military understanding, assessment of the international strategic situation, and incorporation of ideology into the message they each attempted to deliver.

1474 Golovanov, A. E. "Long-Range Bombing Aviation." *Soviet Studies in History* 23, no. 3 (1984-1985): 34-82.

This excerpt from the memoirs of Alexander Golovanov, who served as Commander of Long-Range Aviation during World War II, includes an account of Golovanov's Kremlin meeting with Stalin in response to a letter he sent to the Soviet leader in January 1941 proposing a program to create a cadre of pilots capable of using radio communications to fly deep behind enemy lines under any meteorological conditions; of Stalin's support for the creation for the 212th Detached Long-Range Bombing Regiment under Golovanov's command; and of the dictator's recruitment of Golovanov for the dangerous task of obtaining reliable aerial intelligence information about the status of the front in the early weeks of the German assault on the Soviet Union. The image of Stalin that emerges from this segment of Golovanov's memoirs is that of a well-informed military leader highly attentive to details who was willing to entertain proposals from below and to move decisively to promote the realization of any plan of action he deemed worthy of support.

1475 Gor'kov, Iu. A. "Was Stalin Preparing a Preventive Strike against Hitler in 1941?" *Russian Studies in History* 36, no. 3 (1997): 22-46.

Gor'kov examines the war plan drafted by the Red Army General Staff on 15 May 1941, arguing that, contrary to the interpretation put forth by some analysts that the USSR was preparing for a preventive war against Germany by formulating a strategy for a preemptive strike against the German army then concentrated along the Soviet western border, the overall strategic idea of this plan was not aggressive in character but rather called for offensive combat only if circumstances within a Soviet defensive campaign warranted such an action. Gor'kov finds confirmation for this reading of the Soviet war plan's intent in the lack of any evidence of a decision on the part of Stalin for launching a war, and in the absence of any sign that orders had been given to mobilize, concentrate, and deploy Soviet troops in the sections most advantageous for offensive action. While all signs point to Stalin having been well aware of the concentration of German forces in a strike posture along key sectors of the Soviet border, he apparently could not bring himself to make the decision to launch a Soviet offensive to soften the brunt of the impending Nazi attack, Gor'kov concludes. The Soviet plan of 15 May 1941 is appended in its entirety to Gor'kov's article.

1476 Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "Churchill's Warning to Stalin: A Reappraisal." *Historical Journal* 29, no. 4 (1986): 979-90.

Gorodetsky documents the political background of Winston Churchill's warning to Stalin about the impending German invasion of Russia, relating it to Churchill's clash with Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow, and placing it within the larger framework of the continuous debate in England over the course of Anglo-Soviet relations. While Gorodetsky's focus is on why Cripps resisted transmitting Churchill's warning to Stalin, he does discuss the Soviet reaction to the warning once it was finally delivered by Cripps, placing the Kremlin's response within the context of Stalin's determination to avoid any dealings with Churchill and the British government out of concern over alarming Hitler and providing a pretext for a German attack on Russia.

1477 ———. "Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?" *RUSI Journal* 131, no. 2 (June 1986): 69-72.

Gorodetsky counters the suggestion made by Viktor Suvorov, in a June 1985 *RUSI Journal* article, that the sudden and concealed massive movement of the Red Army to the nation's western frontiers indicates that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler in the summer of 1941. Arguing for the merits of the commonly held view that the deployment of the Red Army in the days preceding the 22 June 1941 German invasion was a last-ditch effort to thwart a German attack—a move supposedly prompted by Churchill's release to Stalin of British intelligence reports revealing Hitler's plans—Gorodetsky maintains that Suvorov's reading of Stalin's intentions, including the rationale behind the 13 June TASS communiqué denying rumors of a forthcoming Soviet-German clash of arms, overlooks the extremely intricate international scene at that time and misconstrues as an offensive maneuver Stalin's attempt to implement defensive measures in a way that would avoid any action that might trigger a premature attack if the intelligence provided by London proved to be misleading.

1478 Groth, Alexander J. and John Drew Froeliger. "Unheeded Warnings: Some Intelligence Lessons of the 1930s and 1940s." *Comparative Strategy* 10, no. 4 (1991): 331-46.

Stalin's apparent trust of Hitler during the years of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact serves as one of the examples in this argument that uncertainty, particularly with respect to the issue of unheeded warnings, is a characteristic and permanent feature of political and military decision making. Constructing a three-fold model of built-in uncertainty applicable to all political and military transactions which features "diffuseness or ambiguity of language, and, most critically, intellectually 'unneutral' predispositions of monitors and decision makers called on to evaluate the information they receive," Groth and Froeliger describe how Stalin, acting in accord with his belief that Germany would not risk war with Russia as long as Britain remained undefeated, and unwilling to face the possibility that his pact with Hitler was itself a great error, processed the intelligence, rumors, and other information he received in a manner which allowed him to cling to wishful thinking about the unlikelihood of an imminent German attack on the Soviet Union.

1479 Harvey, A. D. "The Soviet Air Force and the Luftwaffe." *History Today* 52, no. 1 (2002): 48-53.

This appraisal of the technical capabilities and military/strategic uses of the Soviet and German air forces during the 1941-45 Nazi-Soviet conflict includes a brief discussion of how the Soviet air service was crippled by Stalin's purge of the Soviet military leadership and was ill-prepared for combat when Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 because of his misguided faith in the longevity of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939 and his lack of support for the development of long-range bombers.

1480 Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State?" *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January 2000): 133-39.

Haslam reviews Gabriel Gorodetsky's *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (1999), a book which argues against the thesis advanced by Viktor Suvorov that Stalin was prepar-

ing a preemptive strike on Germany in the summer of 1941, and which maintains that in matters of foreign policy Stalin was rational, level-headed, and little affected by ideology. Haslam primarily takes issue with the image of Stalin and Soviet foreign policy Gorodetsky presents, suggesting that Stalin may well have had aggressive foreign policy aims during the time under study—aims reflective of Bolshevik ideology—and that his approach to and conduct of foreign policy was far from “rational and level-headed” in many respects.

- 1481** ———. “Stalin’s Fear of a Separate Peace, 1942.” *Intelligence and National Security* 8, no. 4 (1993): 97-99.

Haslam discusses the context in which Stalin, in the fall of 1942, drew the dire conclusion that Churchill was seeking a separate peace with Germany. Pointing to a *Pravda* editorial on 19 October 1942, and the mirroring of the editorial in a telegram that arrived at the Soviet Embassy in London that same day direct from Stalin, Haslam establishes that Stalin—on the basis of Churchill’s conduct on the question of the second front in Europe; Britain’s 18 July suspension of convoys bearing aid to Russia; and the RAF’s failure to carry out the systematic bombing of Berlin which Churchill had proposed during his August visit to Moscow—suspected that the British leader was aiming to come to terms with Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union. Haslam also comments on how Stalin’s fear of British treachery calls into question either the Soviet leader’s interpretation of intelligence assessments or the quality of those assessments, and on how Stalin’s belief that Britain might conclude a separate peace in 1942 suggests that he could never believe in the viability of collective security in the postwar world and helps to explain the kind of policies he came to adopt at the end of the war.

- 1482** Haupt, George. “An Iconoclast Muzzled: The Nekrich Affair.” *Critique* 7 (winter 1976-77): 5-18.

Haupt examines the debate in the Soviet Union triggered by the publication of Alexander Nekrich’s 1965 book on the first stages of the Nazi invasion of the USSR, a study which criticizes the official historical account of the first months of the war and denounces Stalin and those who followed his lead for committing political and strategic errors that allowed the German assault to be so successful and Soviet human and material losses so terrible. In tracing the course of the so-called Nekrich affair, Haupt describes the book’s demolition of the official account of the early months of the Great Patriotic War; the assault on the book and on Nekrich by Soviet conservatives; the rebuttal of Nekrich’s detractors by Soviet progressives and dissenters; and the hardening of the Kremlin’s ideological stance and launching of a series of repressive measures aimed at the liberal intelligentsia.

- 1483** Holloway, David. “Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb.” *Social Studies of Science* 2, no. 2 (May 1981): 159-97.

Holloway draws upon biographies of leading figures in Soviet atomic energy work, memoirs of those who took part in the early years of the atomic bomb program, and historical surveys of nuclear physics and atomic energy in the Soviet Union to trace the atomic decision through its stages of development between 1939 and 1945. He discusses the interplay of individuals and institutions in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, how the “uranium problem” was brought to the attention of the Soviet leadership, and why American possession and use of the atomic bomb, in light of the leadership’s worldview, evoked an aggressive Soviet response. With respect to Stalin, Holloway shows that, while the Soviet leader knew of the bomb before the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, he did not appreciate the significance of the weapon until after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, at which time he drew the conclusion that the bomb had destroyed the Soviet-American power and therefore threatened the gains made by Moscow during World War II, and necessitated a crash program by Soviet scientists to develop an atomic bomb in order to end America’s monopoly on what was seen as a weapon posing “a great danger” to the USSR.

1484 Hopkins, Harry. "Inside Story of My Mystery Meeting with Stalin." *American Magazine* 132 (December 1941): 14-15+.

The author, a confidante of President Franklin Roosevelt and administrator of the lend-lease program, presents an account of his three-day mission to Moscow in July 1941 as FDR's special emissary to the Kremlin charged with the duty of meeting with Stalin in order to judge the military situation at that time and the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward the war. Hopkins primarily comments on Stalin's appearance and mannerisms, intense hatred of Hitler, request for American material aid for the Russian war effort, and absolute confidence that Russia would withstand the onslaught of the German army.

1485 Karpov, Vladimir V. "A Conversation with Stalin." *New Perspectives Quarterly* 5 (spring 1988): 51-53.

In this interview, Vladimir Karpov, a historical novelist concerned primarily with the Soviet military, comments briefly on Stalin's military role during World War II, emphasizing the staggering wartime losses that stemmed from the dictator's "terrible mistakes," and pointing out that Stalin, in his purge of the Red Army's leadership, "killed more officers than were killed during the entire war."

1486 Kennan, George F. "Comment." *Survey* 21, nos. 1/2 (winter/spring 1975): 29-36.

Kennan comments on the assessment of Stalin's wartime leadership and diplomacy put forth by Alexander Dallin, in this same issue of *Survey*, lending his support to Dallin's fundamental conclusion that the Soviet Union emerged victorious from World War II neither because of nor despite Stalin's leadership and actions, but adding that, while Stalin's political skill, ruthless will, and command of detail, combined with his ability to capitalize on the outraged patriotic feelings of the Soviet population, contributed to the Russian victory, the victory under Stalin, like all other successes under his rule, "was vastly more costly than it needed to be." Kennan supports this latter judgment by citing the ill effects of Stalin's purge of the Red Army's leadership; his failure to authorize defensive preparations against the German attack about which he was repeatedly forewarned; and his pursuit of the war "with a wholly unnecessary wastage of life and cruelty against his own people." Commenting on Stalin's diplomacy, Kennan disagrees with the allegation that the Soviet leader deceived his Allied partners, maintaining instead that it was the Western leaders who deceived themselves about the true meaning of the military events that had placed Russia in control of half of Europe, and it was the realist Stalin who, in recognizing what had changed as a result of the war, worked openly to secure his nation's western frontier amidst the reconfigured political situation and new balance of power in Eastern and Central Europe that emerged by the war's end.

1487 "Khrushchev: The Illusions of War." *Time* 96 (7 December 1970): 38+.

This commentary on the second installment of Khrushchev's reminiscences in *Life*, excerpted from his book *Khrushchev Remembers*, includes an account of the former Soviet leader's revelations about Stalin's private statements regarding the 1939 nonaggression accord with Hitler, the 1939-40 Winter War with Finland, the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the disastrous Kharkov offensive of 1942. Khrushchev's comments on Stalin's unwillingness to recognize the contributions made by the Western Allies to the Soviet Union's victory over Germany and on his attitude toward his fellow wartime leaders are also noted in the article.

1488 Kumanyev, Georgiy. "Some Issues in Soviet Historiography Concerning World War II." *Yad Vashem Studies* 21 (1991): 251-62.

Kumanyev traces the stages of Soviet historiography of World War II, describes what recent Soviet research has revealed about Stalin's wartime leadership, and points out some of the "blank

spots” in the history of the war that Soviet historians need to address. With respect to Stalin, he discusses the grievous impact on Soviet defense capabilities of the purge unleashed in 1937 against the officer corps of the Soviet armed forces; Stalin’s stubborn adherence to the belief that Germany, despite credible evidence to the contrary, would never dare attack the USSR before it had finished with England, and his consequent refusal to allow any commanders to increase military readiness in expectation of the commencement of hostilities; the military incompetence he displayed in the early stages of the war; the need to give him credit for promoting morale, organizing and seeing to the administration of the Soviet war economy, and gaining military competence as the war progressed; and, lastly, his responsibility for the high cost of the victory in the war achieved by the heroic stance of the Soviet army and the tireless efforts of the Soviet people in the rear. In discussing the subject of gaps in the history of the war, Kumaneyev focuses on the need for the study of the contributions to the war effort made by each individual Soviet nationality in the war; the genocide targeting Jewish people in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union; and the total human costs of the war for the USSR, including the loss of fighting men who died needlessly because of the tendency of some military leaders, Stalin included, to treat them as “cannon fodder.”

1489 Kuznetsov, Nikolai. “Appointment in Moscow; Stalin in Command; Stalin and Leningrad; Epilogue.” *Atlas* 11 (May 1966): 266-73, 288-89.

These translated excerpts from four articles written by the Soviet admiral who served as the People’s Commissar of the Navy during World War II form part of a collection entitled “As the Russians Saw It” which contains selections from the writings of several Russian commanders on the subject of Stalin’s wartime leadership and on what it was like to serve under him. In the first article, Kuznetsov describes how he came to be appointed as First Deputy People’s Commissar of the Navy, and notes Stalin’s willingness to take into account the opinion of naval specialists on military questions under deliberation. The second article points out some of the qualities of Stalin’s military leadership—including his concentration of military decisions in his own hands, impressive command of detail, and understanding of the nature of military operations—and speculates about why he failed to take even the simplest of precautionary measures as signs of the impending Nazi attack mounted. The third describes the circumstances surrounding Stalin’s calculation, in the dark months of 1941-42, that the besieged city of Leningrad might have to be abandoned and the Northern Fleet scuttled. The last article gives an account of the 24 June 1945 celebration of the Soviet victory over Germany, including the praise showered upon Stalin’s wartime command by the speakers at the Kremlin banquet following the Red Square military parade, and the speech given by Stalin thanking those present for their support and announcing that he planned to retire sometime in the next two or three years.

1490 Leontieff, Wasily. “Why Stalin Dropped His Army Pilot.” *Christian Science Monitor Magazine* (20 July 1940): 6.

The first half of this article deals with what is seen as an attempt by Stalin to ease popular discontent with the policies of his regime and encourage the development of Soviet patriotism by returning to official favor aspects of prerevolutionary Russian history and by glorifying military leaders and progressive tsars of the Russian past. The second half focuses on the meaning of the then recent removal of Marshal Kliment Voroshilov from his post as Commissar of Defense and appointment of him to the position of Vice-Premiership, a move which, in the author’s view, suggests that Stalin, in assigning Voroshilov to an insignificant office, might be concerned about him as a possible competitor.

1491 Lisann, Maury. “Stalin the Appeaser: Before 22 June, 1941.” *Survey* 76 (summer 1970): 53-63.

Lisann argues that the popular impression that Stalin ignored the warnings he received about an impending German attack and was essentially paralyzed into inaction by his misassessment of the diplomatic and military situation on the eve of the Nazi assault are incorrect. He agrees that Stalin can be faulted for acting as if he expected his pact with Hitler to be lasting and for the leisurely pace of the buildup of Soviet military strength, but he contends that, by the end of 1940, Stalin recognized that war with Germany was likely and did all he could to increase Soviet arms production well in advance of receiving any intelligence reports about Hitler's plans to attack Russia. As Germany's military intentions became clear, Lisann maintains, Stalin persisted in following a passive policy of playing for time and pretending nothing was wrong in the hope that he might forestall the German attack until 1942, when Soviet forces would be better equipped to repel it, but his appeasement policy succeeded only in stifling initiative, instilling a paralyzing fear at all levels of the Soviet military establishment, and fostering what amounted to "a psychological disarmament" of the Soviet armed forces which contributed to the military disasters the Soviets suffered in the early weeks of the war.

1492 Lyons, Eugene. "End of Joseph Stalin." *American Mercury* 53 (August 1941): 135-43.

This article, written during the height of the German onslaught against Russia, predicts, with some relish, the demise of Stalin because he stands nearly alone against the world's greatest military machine, is hated by neighboring nations, is dependent on military forces which "he decapitated with his own hand," and is caught between the murderous treachery of Hitler, "for whom he acted as a stooge," and the no less murderous resentment of his own subjects, who have suffered for years through his brutal dictatorship and bankrupt policies.

1493 ———. "Some Plain Talk about Russia." *American Mercury* 53 (November 1941): 583-89.

Lyons attempts to counter the "silly illusion" being nurtured in America that Stalin is a friend of democracy and a trustworthy ally in the war against Hitler. Three facts, in Lyons's view, need to be recognized by the American people: 1) Stalin deliberately triggered World War II by signing a neutrality pact with Hitler; 2) he fed and fueled the German war effort for twenty-two months; and 3) having been forced into an alliance with the democracies, he will "wriggle out of it at the first opportunity" in order to save his own personal dictatorship. Lyons also predicts that, "while a decisive Russian victory over Germany is not even a remote possibility," the Red Army may be able to at least maintain an eastern front to the war until victory over Hitler is achieved.

1494 Main, Steven J. "Stalin in June 1941: A Comment on Cynthia Roberts." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 5 (July 1996): 837-39.

The author questions the remark made by Cynthia Roberts, in her article "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941," which appeared in the December 1995 issue of *Europe-Asia Studies*, that Stalin "went into self-imposed seclusion" during the first week of the Soviet-German war. The entries in Stalin's diary of appointments, along with statements by those who saw him at that time and the number of important measures adopted by both the party and the state during the first few days of the war, according to Main, indicate that, during the period in question, Stalin maintained his usual rigorous work schedule and did not lose control of himself, all of which calls into question the merits of the view that a stunned Stalin locked himself away during the critical opening period of the conflict.

1495 Malashenko, Yevgeny Ivanovich. "Wartime Strategic Direction of Soviet Armed Forces: Historical Lessons." *Military Thought* 12, no. 4 (2003): 183-93.

In this paper, a Soviet military officer who served in the Great Patriotic War and went on to hold a number of high positions in the postwar Soviet military establishment discusses the successes and failures of the strategic direction of Soviet armed forces during the war with Germany. Malashenko emphasizes the extremely difficult tasks the directors of the Soviet war effort faced in

their attempts to bring strategic direction to a huge front stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea and to maintain effective communication between commanders at the front and Supreme Command Headquarters chaired by Stalin. "Stalin's constant interference in the work of the General Staff, sector high commanders and front commanders, his overestimation of his knowledge of wartime direction of forces, as well as his disdain for human fates and lives often led to grave consequences" and served to complicate further an already difficult military situation in the early years of the war, according to Malashenko. Counterbalancing his criticism of Stalin's style of command and failure to heed the advice given to him by military strategists and frontline commanders, Malashenko concedes that the concentration of state and political power in Stalin's hands, his indomitable will, and tireless efforts to mobilize Soviet national resources in order to defeat the German invaders were critical to Soviet success in the war.

1496 "Man of Steel." *Time* 38 (22 September 1941): 18.

Stalin's worry as German forces continued to advance on Leningrad, Kiev, and Odessa, and his public statements that, despite the dismal military situation, Russia would eventually win the war are the main subjects of this brief report. The report also states that Stalin believed the spirit of Soviet soldiers fighting on their own soil in defense of their homes would be the determining factor in the nation's victory over Nazi Germany.

1497 Markwick, Roger D. "Stalinism at War." *Kritika* 3, no. 3 (2002): 509-20.

This review essay on Robert W. Thurston and Bernd Bontwetsch's anthology *The People's War: Response to World War II in the Soviet Union* (2002) and Amir Weiner's *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (2002) revolves around the contrast between how *The People's War*, on the one hand, in its attempt to make sense of how the Soviet populace experienced the war, focuses on the role of the people themselves in the initiatives that helped the Soviet Union to mobilize, endure, and emerge victorious in the Great Patriotic War, and how *Making Sense of War*, on the other, emphasizes the role played by the party-state in forging support for the Soviet polity at war. Markwick describes how the empirical richness of the two books helps to fill the gap in scholarly understanding of Soviet state-society relations during the war and of how Soviet society viewed itself, but he takes issue with Weiner's interpretation that the Soviet project, since 1917, was "an ideologically driven, utopian millenarianism" and with how he foists this millenarian perspective on the Great Patriotic War. While both books show that Stalinist coercion was not key to the Soviet war effort, they also demonstrate "the difficulty of articulating the dynamics of the Great Patriotic War . . . through simple binary oppositions of 'people' and 'state,'" Markwick concludes.

1498 Maslov, A. A. "Forgiven by Stalin: Soviet Generals Who Returned from German Prison in 1941-45 and Who Were Rehabilitated." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12, no. 2 (1999): 173-219.

The vast majority of this article deals with the bravery and circumstances surrounding the capture of several dozen Soviet generals by German forces during World War II; their lives as prisoners in German camps; their liberation by advancing Allied forces; and the efforts of security chief Lavrenti Beria and his assistants to obtain compromising material in the biographies of the generals and to prove that these men had betrayed the Soviet Union by divulging state and military secrets. Stalin's extreme hostility toward the Red Army servicemen who had been prisoners of the Germans, and the harsh treatment that most of these servicemen received at the hands of the Stalin regime upon their return from captivity in German concentration camps are briefly noted in the article as is Stalin's decision, in view of Beria's failure to obtain appropriate compromising material, to spare, rehabilitate, return to the armed forces, or allow to retire the military leaders in the group that Maslov examines.

1499 Mawdsley, Evan. "Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War 1940-1941." *International History Review* 25, no. 4 (2003): 818-65.

Mawdsley discusses Red Army war planning from 1938 through spring of 1941; the extent to which these plans were supported by Stalin and the Soviet political leadership; and how such plans relate to the historical debate between "traditionalists," who accept the long-held view that Moscow's diplomacy and strategy throughout this period was "defensive, pragmatic, and essentially passive in the face of the German danger," and "revisionists," who hold that there were "significant offensive and active elements—military, diplomatic, or even ideological—in Russian policy at this time." He shows how the war plans drafted in September 1940 and in March and May of 1941 each included plans for offensive operations in southern Poland, and how the May plan, put forth by Marshals Timoshenko and Zhukov, proposed the beginning of mobilization and the implementation of covering maneuvers to cloak Red Army deployment but did not indicate clearly that these measures were to be followed by a sudden attack on Germany in July 1941, as revisionist historians generally claim. Turning to the key question of Stalin's involvement in the war planning process and to whether he sanctioned the May 1941 plan, Mawdsley argues that, while the Soviet leader seems to have been an advocate of the strategy of the offensive, referred to the doctrine of the offensive in his speeches in the Kremlin on 5 May to graduates of various Red Army academies, and indirectly encouraged Zhukov and Timoshenko to work out a directive involving a preemptive strike against Germany, memoir evidence indicates that he responded with shock and anger when he received a report from the two marshals about the preemptive blow being proposed, accusing them of being war mongers whose plan might well provoke a German attack. Mawdsley does not see Stalin as having feared war with Germany in the summer of 1941 but rather as not wanting a war at that time because he believed Soviet armed forces were not yet fully ready for it, and that Hitler, unless provoked by Moscow, would not risk war with Russia until after Britain had been defeated or forced to make peace. For Mawdsley, Stalin's reasoning and behavior in May-June 1941 seems understandable, whereas the behavior of the Soviet generals who proposed the use of the May 1941 plan in a preemptive way reflects poorly on their understanding of Soviet and German military capabilities at that time and on their professional competence as well.

1500 Meehan, Mary Ellen. "Welcome, German Soldiers!" *MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History* 9, no. 2 (1997): 22-25.

Meehan presents examples of Nazi propaganda art distributed in Ukraine during World War II that attempted to exploit Ukrainian hatred of Stalin and urge Ukrainians to join the fight against Bolshevism by depicting the Soviet leader as a demonic executioner hiding behind angelic props. Among the examples that Meehan offers are posters portraying "Stalin's blood-thirsty program" for destroying Ukrainian farms and factories; life in an NKVD (secret police) prison under the brutish Stalin; and Stalin's responsibility for the execution of thousands of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest in 1940 by the NKVD.

1501 Menning, Bruce W. "Stalin's Dangerous Game." *Military Review* 80, no. 3 (2000): 94-97.

Menning reviews *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (1999), by Gabriel Gorodetsky. He commends Gorodetsky for the richness and value of his portrait of Stalin as a single-minded practitioner of realpolitik engaged in an increasingly desperate game in his dealings with Hitler, knowing full well that the Red Army was not yet prepared for war with Germany, but still playing with skill the diplomatic cards at his disposal to buy time and protect Russia's interests. He argues for the credibility of the book's assertions that Stalin repeatedly discarded the notion of a preemptive war against Germany; never believed the situation with Berlin would come to war; and placed the Red Army in a precarious position by rejecting, out of concern over provoking Hitler, all initiatives that would have raised frontier defenses to full readiness in the spring of 1941. He also points out, in the light of Gorodetsky's analysis, several areas worthy of further examination, including the strategic understanding behind Stalin's emphasis on strengthening de-

fenses in Ukraine, and the possibility that Stalin, while believing that he could strike a deal with Hitler to avoid war, was of the mind that the Red Army could withstand an initial German offensive, and then deliver a suitable reply, and therefore may have elected to receive the first blow.

1502 Minor, Robert. "Joseph Stalin's War Leadership." *Political Affairs* 24 (November 1945): 985-96.

1503 Moley, Raymond. "Three Messages." *Newsweek* 19 (11 May 1942): 80.

Moley comments briefly on the early May 1942 addresses given by Roosevelt, Hitler, and Stalin, describing the three speeches as "instruments of war." He reads Stalin's speech as saying that the Red Army's goal is to destroy the fascist forces in the Soviet Union, meaning to clear them from Russian soil rather than invade Germany, and to leave the toppling of Hitler to the German people once the Nazis have been forced back across the border. In not threatening the German people themselves, Stalin hopes to drive a wedge between them and the Nazi Party and to hasten the fall of Hitler's regime, according to Moley.

1504 Nevezhin, V. A. "Stalin's 5 May 1941 Addresses: The Experience of Interpretation." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11, no. 1 (1998): 116-46.

Nevezhin opens with a review of the body of sources dealing with the content of Stalin's 5 May 1941 speech to Red Army military academy graduates and his address at the banquet held on this occasion. He then places what Stalin said within the context of the events which were taking place at that time in both the political and military arenas of European affairs, and offers his own version of what occurred at the 5 May Kremlin ceremonies. Drawing upon official records of the speeches and the eyewitness memoirs of a number of Soviet military officers, Nevezhin contends that Stalin, in understanding the necessity of an adequate reaction to the German military buildup along the Soviet Union's western borders and to rumors of an impending Nazi invasion, attempted to show in public that the situation was under his control by presenting a thorough assessment of the existing international state of affairs; by commenting favorably on the level of strength and preparedness of Soviet military forces; and by making it clear that the strength and power of the German army should not be exaggerated. The key moment of the whole grandiose affair of 5 May, Nevezhin maintains, came at the conclusion of the ceremonial reception for the Red Army military academy graduates when Stalin, in rebuttal to a speech given by a high-ranking Soviet officer, called for a shift to a military policy of offensive operations and a restructuring of all Soviet propaganda in an offensive spirit. While some historians have suggested that Stalin's statements were mere bravado, or that he used the word "offensive" in the sense of countering a German attack, Nevezhin suggests that what Stalin said at that time should not be viewed as empty declarations but rather as a signal to the military leadership and the party's propaganda organs that the time had come to undertake "a 'mobilization' task in the spirit of a 'slogan of offensive war.'"

1505 Nordling, Carl O. "In the Shade of Overlord." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 15, no. 4 (2002): 68-78.

Nordling argues that Stalin, despite the promise he made to his Western Allies at the Tehran Conference in November 1943 that the Red Army would support the coming Normandy invasion with a powerful offensive on the eastern front synchronized with the Allied landings in France, called a halt to all offensive activity along the main eastern front from mid-April until two weeks after D-Day and limited Soviet military action to an attack on a non-German enemy (Finland) for the purpose of making it possible for Germany to repel the invading Allied army. In Nordling's view, Stalin hoped that if the Normandy attack failed he would be able to win command over most of Europe before the Western powers had time to organize a new and more effective invasion. Stalin launched the promised grand offensive only when it became clear that Hitler had not taken advantage of the Red Army's temporary passivity to move German troops from east to west, but even

then he did not abandon his strategy of encouraging the capitalist powers to destroy each other but rather conveyed a secret offer of peace to Hitler in the hope that, with peace in the East, and with the fight in France being more evenly matched, the Germans and the Western Allies would exhaust themselves in bloody battles, enabling him eventually to grab a considerable part of Europe for himself. While Stalin's strategic disposition with respect to the Normandy invasion "was tantamount to a breach of faith" and gave Churchill and Roosevelt ample reason "to cease complying with Stalin's every wish," both leaders proved to be "gullible enough to trust 'Uncle Joe' even after this flagrant deceit" and persisted in adhering to a military strategy that permitted the Red Army to march across Eastern Europe all the way to Berlin, thus allowing Stalin to win control of half of Europe and enhance his prestige, according to Nordling.

1506 O'Leary, Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: Towards a Clearer Understanding." *Airpower Journal* 8, no. 1 (1994): 34-50.

This argument in favor of the proposition that military strategic surprise is difficult to prevent, even in the face of accurate and timely intelligence, includes, as one of its historical case studies, a brief account of how Germany was able to achieve a strategic surprise in its 22 June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, despite a flood of intelligence to the Kremlin regarding the imminence of the Nazi assault. In O'Leary's opinion, the key elements in the success of this strategic surprise centered around Stalin, namely, the Soviet leader's investment of political prestige in averting a war with Germany, and his consequent wishful thinking and reality denial in the face of unpleasant intelligence in the days preceding the attack—weaknesses a resourceful enemy proved well able to exploit, much to the detriment of the Red Army and Soviet national security.

1507 Parker, Ralph. "Master of Russia's Fate." *New York Times Magazine* (23 April 1942): 7+. Parker reviews favorably Stalin's leadership of the USSR during the first year of the nation's struggle against the forces of Nazi Germany, describing how his policies toward Soviet nationalities, industry, education, and the Red Army, along with his public addresses, have benefited the Soviet war effort. Parker also praises Stalin's military strategy, particularly his decision to follow a scorched-earth policy in retreating before the advancing enemy and then to make a stand before Moscow, followed by a winter counteroffensive to roll back the German army.

1508 Pegov, N. M. "Stalin on War with Japan, October 1941." *Soviet Studies in History* 24, no. 3 (1985-1986): 26-38.

This excerpt from the memoirs of Nikolai Pegov, who served as First Secretary of the Maritime Territory Committee from 1938 to 1947, includes, as part of a description of Soviet policy toward Japan during the years 1937-43, a recollection of an October 1941 Kremlin meeting called by Stalin with Pegov and three top Soviet military leaders in the Far East at which the Soviet leader gave a detailed account of the dire military situation just outside Moscow; "requested" that 150 antitank guns be transferred from the Far East to strengthen Moscow's defenses against the German invaders; and stressed the need to prepare for a possible Japanese invasion, "yet without giving Japan the slightest pretext for entering the war."

1509 Possony, Stefan T. "The Red Beard and the Red Flag." *Ukrainian Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (1974): 40-54.

Possony investigates the question of why Stalin, on 22 June 1941, in effect, opened the gates to the USSR to the Germany army. He develops the hypothesis that Stalin was well aware that a German attack was coming but, under the influence of a highly effective disinformation campaign conducted by Berlin to cloak its impending assault, believed that any attack would be preceded by an ultimatum to Moscow and that an invasion would only come if the Kremlin did not meet Hitler's demands. In succumbing to Hitler's cunning "ultimatum" stratagem, Possony argues, Stalin acted with certitude and decisiveness upon being informed that the German army had crossed the

Soviet border in force on the morning of 22 June, giving orders initially to Soviet troops not to return German fire and anticipating demands from Hitler for economic and territorial concessions, transit agreements, and perhaps even Soviet entrance into the Axis Alliance. According to Possony, in view of the unprepared state of readiness of the Red Army at the time of the German attack, and the failure of the Soviet forces to offer firm resistance from the start of the invasion, the strategy followed by Stalin at this crucial time suggests that he had already decided to accept without question the anticipated Nazi ultimatum—an act “tantamount to accepting subjugation and dismemberment” and constituting an act of treason.

1510 Raack, R. C. “Clearing up the History of World War II.” *Newsletter of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations* 22, no. 4 (1991): 41-48; 23, no. 1 (1992): 27-40.

This two-part article primarily deals with the new insights into the coming of the German-Soviet phase of World War II and other key events of the war and its diplomacy provided by the discussions at a series of international historical conferences in Europe and by Soviet historians reporting out of Soviet archival holdings. In part I, Raack primarily describes how the proceedings and showings at the International Association for Audio-Visual Media in Historical Research and Education Conference, held in Gottingen, Germany, in 1991, shed light on the grim nature of East Bloc Cold War propaganda. He also comments on the debate at the conference over when the Cold War actually started and ended. In part II, he reports on three international conferences on the Soviet-German War, attended by historians from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, and on a major photographic exhibition held to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the coming of the Soviet-German conflict. The issues to which Raack devotes most attention are the two that proved to be the liveliest and most controversial at the conferences: the question of whether Stalin was about to launch an attack against Hitler in 1941—which Hitler attempted to thwart with a preemptive strike against the Soviets—and the matter of Stalin’s war aims, particularly whether he planned to launch a Soviet military drive into Western Europe if the Soviet Union were able to stay out of the war until the Western powers had exhausted themselves in a deadly, protracted struggle. In summarizing the proceedings of the various conferences, Raack lends his support to the interpretations and new information which suggest that Stalin’s war aims and plans for 1939 to 1941 were far more aggressive and offense-oriented than many historians in the West have, to date, been willing to admit.

1511 ———. “Did Stalin Plan a *Drang nach Westen*?” *World Affairs* 155, no. 1 (summer 1992): 13-22.

Raack draws upon newly opened Russian archives and previously unavailable sources inside the Soviet bloc to argue that private statements made by Stalin and several of his confidants, both before and during World War II, point to the existence of a plan for Soviet expansion westward, according to which the Red Army would be used as a means of spreading communism across a Europe ravaged by war and beset by social revolution at the hands of the disillusioned masses. As additional Soviet archival sources are made available, Raack maintains, the fact that Stalin always wanted a war between the Western powers and welcomed the European-wide crisis he believed would develop in its wake will become even more apparent and will lead to the abandonment of the conventional historical interpretation that the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact was a defensive move by Stalin, and that Soviet expansion to the West during and after the war was protective in nature.

1512 ———. “Preventive Wars?” *Russian Review* 63, no. 1 (January 2004): 134-37.

This review article centers on the question of Stalin’s alleged plans for launching an offensive war against Germany in mid-1941, with the author lending his support to the interpretation, first advanced by Viktor Suvorov in the mid-1980s, that Stalin intended to attack Germany. The three books reviewed are Bianka Pietrow-Ennker’s anthology *Praventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (2000); Mikhail Mel’tiukhov’s *Upushchennyi shans Stalina* (2000); and Heinz

Magenheimer's *Entscheidungskampf 1941* (2000), the last two studies reinforcing the argument that "Stalin had a role in deliberately bringing on the war and that he planned to attack Germany."

1513 ———. "Stalin's Plans for World War II Told by a High Comintern Source." *The Historical Journal* 38, no. 4 (1995): 1031-36.

Raack discusses the significance of a newly released February 1941 report given by German Communist Party leader Walter Ulbricht to German party exiles in Moscow in which Ulbricht, in sharing with his comrades what he had recently learned at the highest level of the Soviet leadership, described, as one of the anticipated scenarios for the future course of the war, the outbreak of proletarian revolution in the disillusioned and war-weary countries of Europe, with the Soviet Union playing a key supporting role in the success of these anticipated revolutions. The support Stalin could offer, in Raack's reading of Ulbricht's report, "was no less than the Red Army's projected *Drang nach Westen*."

1514 ———. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History." *World Affairs* 158, no. 4 (spring 1996): 198-211.

This analysis of Stalin's role in bringing about World War II takes place within the framework of the argument put forth by Viktor Suvorov, in his book *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (1989), that Stalin had sinister motives for concluding the 1939 German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, and that, in 1941, he had in mind a plan for an attack westward which was nipped in the bud by a German attack preemptive strike against the USSR. Drawing upon recently released documents from party archives in the former East Bloc and from Soviet military archives, Raack argues for the merits of Suvorov's claim that there was a general scheme for a Red Army thrust westward—although he questions Suvorov's belief that the attack was to come in the summer of 1941—and speculates on the reasons why scholars in the West have largely ignored the thesis advanced by Suvorov. He also comments on the writings of Gabriel Gorodetsky, Joachim Hoffman, and Iu. A. Gor'kov dealing with the question of Stalin's plans for an attack to the West.

1515 ———. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On." *World Affairs* 159, no. 2 (fall 1996): 47-54.

Raack continues the argument which he advanced in the spring issue of *World Affairs* in support of Russian historian Viktor Suvorov's contention that Stalin planned to attack Germany, not just to thwart a Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union but to carry out a full-fledged assault to the west. Raack again calls attention to the neglect of the Suvorov thesis by Western critics, questions the attack on Suvorov's interpretation by Rudolf Augstein (*Der Spiegel*, June 1996, 100-125), and points out the existence of three recently discovered documents "proving Stalin's secret plan to use the war Hitler brought for the sovietization of all Europe." He concludes by urging historians and the broad reading public in America to join the growing debate over "Stalin's bloody wartime adventure."

1516 Rancour-Laferriere, Daniel. "The Mind of Stalin on the Eve of Hitler's Invasion of the Soviet Union." *Journal of Psychohistory* 15, no. 4 (1988): 481-500.

The dual purpose of this paper is to discover whether Stalin was imitating Hitler before the Nazi forces invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, and to determine what unconscious psychological purpose such imitation might have served in the context of other observable psychological processes in Stalin's mind on the eve of the German invasion. Using the theoretical notion of "identification with the aggressor," according to which victims may deal with the anxiety provoked by acts of aggression by pretending not to be in danger of being the victim and by "mentally changing into a sort of facsimile of the aggressor," Rancour-Laferriere points out instances from Stalin's early life which indicate a predisposition to identify with the aggressor. He then develops the argument that the Soviet leader, "made anxious by the threat of aggression from Hitler

during the 1930s, began to identify with him and, consequently, developed a dangerously positive attitude toward him," adopting some of Hitler's behavioral characteristics and political practices, and, ultimately, leading him to believe, despite numerous warnings to the contrary, that Hitler would not attack him, thus failing to prepare Russia for war with Germany.

1517 Roberts, Cynthia. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941." *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 8 (1995): 1293-1326.

Roberts draws upon newly opened Russian archives to examine the puzzle of why the best-trained and best-equipped forces of the Red Army, on the eve of war with Germany, were, contrary to Stalin's policy of appeasement, forward deployed in an offensive posture along the nation's western border, leaving them dangerously exposed to German attack and encirclement. The Soviet General staff, Roberts argues, was wedded to this self-defeating posture and failed to press for a strategic defense because of "a deeply flawed conception of the initial period of war which seriously underestimated the military potential Germany could concentrate in an assault on the USSR while greatly overestimating the Red Army's own possibilities." Roberts does not deny the significance of Stalin's disastrous intervention in military affairs, but she believes that the traditional explanations of the causes of the disaster of June 1941, which focus overwhelmingly on Stalin and the Soviet totalitarian system, need to be reconsidered in view of the "recklessly ambitious war plans of the Red Army," as does the conventional characterization of the Soviet military as "simply the arm of the party or political leadership." For a commentary on Roberts's article, see Steven J. Main, "Stalin in June 1941," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (July 1996): 837-39.

1518 Roberts, Geoffrey. "Military Disaster As a Function of Rational Political Calculation: Stalin and 22 June 1941." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 4, no. 2 (1993): 313-30.

This paper examines the question of why Stalin persisted in his belief that a German assault on Russia was not imminent and allowed himself to be caught off-guard by Hitler's 22 June 1941 attack despite mounting evidence from Soviet diplomatic, military, and intelligence sources that a Nazi invasion had been prepared and was about to be launched. Roberts proposes that Stalin's catastrophic misreading of the situation in June 1941, contrary to conventional wisdom, was the result of "a perfectly reasonable and understandable set of views and beliefs" held by the Soviet leader at that time. He describes the reasoning behind Stalin's beliefs that the German attack, which he recognized was coming, would not take place until 1942; that if the attack did come in 1941 Soviet military forces would be prepared to repulse it; that any German assault would not come unannounced but would be preceded by demands for political and economic concessions; and that the warnings of an attack he was receiving were "the result of a combination of German bluff tactics and a British plot to precipitate an immediate crisis in Soviet-German relations"—an assessment which he was encouraged to regard as sound because his views were echoed by his associates and subordinates. Stalin, Roberts suggests, also "desperately wanted to believe that his assessment was right because that opened up possibilities for Soviet pre-emptive actions when the time was ripe."

1519 Rotundo, Louis. "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941." *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 2 (1989): 277-99.

Rotundo analyzes the substance of three interrelated charges that are usually directed at Stalin's actions in the months preceding the 22 June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union: first, that he neglected numerous war warnings, and this error led to the Soviet military debacle in the early stages of the war; second, that he did not sufficiently prepare the USSR for war; and third, that he lacked a realistic view of Soviet preparations and readiness. He maintains that Stalin, in fact, was convinced that a German attack was inevitable and had a detailed plan to counter it, but he erred in assuming that war could be avoided until 1942; in believing that his intelligence service would inform him of the approach of German mobile units; in anticipating that once German troops ar-

rived at the Soviet border an ultimatum would be issued which would give him time to order last-minute troop deployments; and in estimating that once combat broke out he would be able to stop a German attack on the border and launch a massive counteroffensive. Acting in accord with these beliefs and assumptions, and being anxious to avoid provoking Hitler in any way, Stalin, Rotundo writes, adopted an overly conservative approach in deploying Soviet forces in the weeks preceding the German attack, failed to adopt adequate preparatory measures in the face of signs that an invasion was imminent, and left the Red Army highly vulnerable to the Nazi blitzkrieg.

1520 ———. “War Plans and the 1941 Kremlin War Games.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 84-97.

Rotundo challenges the interpretation of Soviet war plans of 1941 advanced by Bryan Fugate, in his book *Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941* (1984), according to which the Soviet military, in response to the lessons learned in the January 1941 war games, discarded the then existing operational plans, which called for the forward deployment of the Red Army, and adopted instead a planned defense in-depth strategy designed to sap the anticipated deep offensive thrusts of the German army while preserving significant elements of the Red Army in order to launch a massive counterattack that would repel the Nazi invaders and carry the war westward to German soil. Rotundo’s reading of the December-January study conferences attended by the leadership of the Soviet Union and of the January war games yields a different conclusion, namely, that the plan championed by the top leaders, Stalin and Marshal Georgi Zhukov in particular, favored neither a belated defense in depth nor a sacrifice of the forward echelon but rather a massive increase in the commitment of forces to the forward echelon, a redoubling of efforts to finish fortifying forward zones, extensive efforts to increase the readiness of western district airfields, and the conduct of maneuvers toward, not away from, the western borders—all as a means of situating and preparing Soviet forces to hold their forward position and to launch a devastating counterstrike shortly after the initial German assault. By 22 June, Rotundo explains, a cautious Stalin believed that the necessary steps had been taken to ensure the success of the war plan he had sanctioned, yet his failure to anticipate the tremendous size of the Nazi invasion, the speed with which the German forces would move, and the ability of German airpower to wreak havoc with Soviet lines of communication and disrupt the schedule the Soviet plan was to follow not only undermined the viability of the plan itself but set the stage for the disastrous Soviet defeats in the early days of the war.

1521 Shepardson, Donald E. “The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth.” *Journal of Military History* 62, no. 1 (1998): 135-53.

This dismantling of the “myth” that the forces of the Western Allies could have taken Berlin before the Red Army but declined to do so because General Eisenhower was “overly cautious and failed to perceive the coming Cold War with the Soviet Union” includes a discussion of the agreements reached by the Big Three at Yalta regarding the temporary zones of occupation in Germany as a means of forestalling a last-minute land grab by any one of the great powers, and of Stalin’s decision to launch a massive and costly offensive against Berlin in the closing weeks of the war to thwart any plans his allies might have to deprive him of Berlin by either seizing it before Soviet forces could do so or negotiating with the Germans to secure its surrender.

1522 Shtemenko, S. M. “Stalin the Taskmaster.” *Atlas* 11 (May 1966): 273-75.

An account of Stalin’s wartime work habits and of the incredible demands he placed upon the Soviet high command is contained in this memoir published in *Voyenno Istoricheskii Zhurnal* (*Military Historical Journal*) by Sergei Shtemenko, who served as the Chief of the Operational Department of the General Staff during World War II. Shtemenko describes the procedures followed by Stalin at military briefings on the situations on various fronts, his careful attention to detail, and

the fierce work schedule he established, including its excessively long hours and the kind of pressure it imposed on those who served on the General Staff.

1523 Sixsmith, E. K. G. "Stalin's War with Germany." *RUSI Journal* 120, no. 3 (1975): 80-81.

This favorable assessment of *The Road to Stalingrad* (1975), by John Erickson, mainly deals with the ways in which the book sheds light on Stalin's actions as both the architect of the military disaster that the Red Army suffered in 1941 and as the author of the recovery which stemmed the German initiative and turned the tide of battle at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942. In addition to describing the book's account of Stalin's miscalculations in the months prior to the German attack, his efforts to stir the Soviet people to resist the German assault, and the steps he took to reorganize the command structure of the Soviet military, Sixsmith also discusses Erickson's contrast between how Stalin and Hitler handled their military experts.

1524 "Stalin at War." *Newsweek* 68 (26 September 1966): 58.

The portrayal of Stalin as a military leader by Marshal Georgi Zhukov, in the first installment of his memoirs, published by the Soviet Defense Ministry's *Military Historical Journal*, is the subject of this report. Zhukov, the report notes, describes Stalin as a tireless and intelligent supreme commander—an image which stands in stark contrast to the one presented during the Khrushchev years and which lends support to the efforts of the then current leaders of the Kremlin to refurbish Stalin's reputation.

1525 "Stalin Forces the Showdown." *Business Week* (20 November 1943): 15-16.

Stalin, in raising the question of how long and how far the current Soviet offensive against Germany can continue, has compelled Churchill and Roosevelt to speed up the timetable for a cross-channel invasion of Nazi-held Western Europe out of fear that a slackening of the fighting on the eastern front would free one hundred divisions of the German army to defend the western edge of Hitler's empire, according to this report. Stalin's dramatic dictation of military strategy, the report adds, has been matched on the diplomatic front by the Kremlin's assumption of a more active role in dealing with a host of questions associated with postwar planning, including how to proceed in rebuilding postwar Europe, and what role, if any, the former kings of Italy and Greece are to play in the reestablishment of independent governments in their respective countries.

1526 "Stalin the Marshal." *Newsweek* 22 (15 November 1943): 25-26.

Newsweek notes the statements made by Stalin, in his 6 November 1943 speech to Moscow workers on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, regarding Soviet military successes over the past year and prospects for the opening of the long-awaited second front in Europe.

1527 "Stalin's Speech." *Newsweek* 20 (16 November 1942): 26+.

This article cites the statements made by Stalin, in his speech to a gathering of party and government officials on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, regarding the military situation in the Soviet Union. The article notes how the address can be read as a plea for a second front in Europe against the German army, and it critiques Stalin's account of Germany's failure to achieve its military objectives in Russia in 1941.

1528 Stephanson, Anders. "Stalin's Hyper-Realism." *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (2001): 129-39.

Stephanson reviews Gabriel Gorodetsky's *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (1999), a book which contends that Stalin, while pursuing a rational policy toward Germany, was profoundly deluded by his own "hyper-realism," leading him to dismiss the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union by reasoning that Hitler would not commit Germany to a two-front war. In commenting on the key elements of Gorodetsky's analysis of the events preced-

ing the Nazi attack of June 1941, Stephanson discusses what the book has to say about Stalin's pursuit of Moscow's geopolitical interests within the context of the Soviet leader's assumption that Germany would not engage in a two-front war; about his sense that there was room to maneuver in negotiating with Hitler; and about his belief that he could use Germany's need for Soviet raw materials and trade as leverage. Stephanson also comments on Gorodetsky's analysis of the question of what Stalin knew and when regarding German preparations for an attack; of the implausibility of the argument that Stalin was a revolutionary expansionist who was preparing to attack Germany in 1941; and of Stalin's efforts to appease Hitler and deter a possible German attack. Stephanson closes with a brief discussion of the place of ideology in shaping Stalin's prewar foreign policy, and of how Stalin's hyper-realism and preoccupation with tactics worked against his efforts to maximize Soviet security and to minimize Soviet risks.

1529 Suvorov, Viktor. "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?" *RUSI Journal* 130, no. 2 (June 1985): 50-55.

Suvorov draws upon previously unpublished documents on Soviet military dispositions in the weeks preceding the 22 June 1941 German attack to argue that, had not Hitler struck first, Stalin would have launched an attack on Germany in July 1941. Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), who was a member of the Soviet General Staff in the post-Khrushchev years, and who defected to Britain in 1978, supports this claim by detailing the massive movement of Soviet forces and military equipment to the edge of the nation's western frontier ordered on 12-15 June; the extensive efforts made to conceal this huge deployment of Soviet forces; the failure of these repositioned forces to attempt to erect defensive works; and the impossibility of moving these troops back without creating an "economic catastrophe." Also figuring into Suvorov's argument is the TASS report, authored by Stalin, which aired on Moscow radio on 13 June and discounted rumors of an impending German attack, labeling them as "propaganda by forces hostile to the USSR and Germany and interested in an extension of the war." Where historians have usually cited the TASS communiqué as proof of Stalin's desire not to provoke Berlin in anyway, Suvorov contends that the report, by describing as an annual training exercise the "biggest troop movement by a single state in the history of civilisation," sought to deflate rumors that the USSR was preparing for war with Germany and thus help conceal Stalin's real intentions in this regard.

1530 ———. "Yes, Stalin Was Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941." *RUSI Journal* 131, no. 2 (June 1986): 73-74.

Suvorov responds to the criticisms voiced against his interpretation of Stalin's military intentions in June 1941 by Gabriel Gorodetsky in an article appearing in the June 1986 issue of *RUSI Journal*. Suvorov reiterates and provides additional support for the case he made, in the June 1985 issue of *RUSI Journal*, that the massive and concealed movement of Soviet forces to the edge of the nation's western borders constitutes proof that Stalin was planning to attack Germany in the summer of 1941 and that the real intent of the oft-cited 13 June 1941 TASS report, which denied rumors of a forthcoming Soviet-German military clash, was to dull Hitler's vigilance and prevent any conflict with Berlin until the secret mobilization and deployment of Soviet troops were complete.

1531 Szamuely, Tibor. "Soviet Generals and Number One." *National Review* 21 (26 August 1969): 861-62.

This favorable commentary on Seweryn Bialer's anthology *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (1969) focuses on the image of Stalin as a wartime leader that emerges from his generals' memoirs. Most notably, Szamuely describes how Soviet military leaders, while blaming Stalin freely for the early defeats suffered by the Red Army, write of him with genuine awe and respect, portraying him as a commander whose "supreme asset was his ability to handle men," and who listened to his generals' advice and was ready to give them considerable

freedom of action whenever he was convinced of the soundness of their judgments. Szamuely also describes Stalin's relationship with Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the most prominent Soviet military leader of World War II, noting Stalin's removal of Zhukov from all positions of authority following the war, and the extraordinary vicissitudes of the marshal's postwar fortunes, including his repeated spells as "an official unperson."

1532 "Three Speeches." *New Republic* 106 (11 May 1942): 622-23.

This article examines the May 1942 speeches of Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin concerning the status of the war and what their respective nations must do in order to prevail in the conflict. With respect to Stalin's speech, the article mainly summarizes his 1 May address to the Red Army in which he derides the myth of German invincibility; tells his soldiers that they have been too casual and placid toward the enemy; and calls upon them to replace this attitude with implacable determination to rid the nation of a hated enemy. The article suggests that, while Stalin's order is "full of clichés and stereotypes" and is "extremely rhetorical," his emphasis on the need to replace a casual attitude with an implacable determination should be instructive to an America impeded by appeasers and reactionaries in Congress in its efforts to destroy its external enemies, and should inspire Roosevelt to exert his leadership more militantly in directing the national war effort.

1533 Tumarkin, Nina. "The Great Patriotic War As Myth and Memory." *Atlantic Monthly* 267, no. 6 (June 1991): 26+.

This account of how, in the eyes of the Soviet people, the enshrined idealized saga of the Great Patriotic War underwent a transformation during the Gorbachev years includes a number of references to the criticisms raised against Stalin for leaving the nation vulnerable to the German attack and for his wartime leadership. Drawing primarily on two articles that appeared in the Soviet press at the time of the forty-fifth anniversary of Victory Day—Alexander Afanasiev's "Stolen Victory," published in the newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda*, and an article by Ales Adamovich about Stalinism and the war, published in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Tumarkin discusses how Stalin has been faulted for much of the war's destructiveness for the Soviet Union because he had bled the people white in the decade before the war through his five-year plans; decimated the leadership core of the nation, including the upper ranks of the Red Army's officer corps, through his purges and practice of terror; and left the Red Army totally unprepared for war out of fear of arousing Hitler's wrath by mobilizing Soviet defenses. Stalin's complicity in the loss of tens of millions of Soviet lives; his role in propagating the legend of the wartime unity of the Soviet people; and the extent to which during the war he was no less an enemy to the Soviet nation than Hitler also receive consideration in Tumarkin's commentary, as does the blow to national pride struck by the erosion of the idealized memory of the Great Patriotic War. For an updated version of this article, see *European Review* 11, no. 4 (October 2003): 595-611.

1534 Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?" *Slavic Review* 58, no. 3 (fall 1999): 626-43.

Uldricks discusses the response by historians to Viktor Suvorov's *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (1990), a book which claims Stalin had sought a war between Germany and the Western democracies since 1922; saw the Nazi assault on the Western powers as the "icebreaker" that would open up the path to revolution throughout Europe; and was preparing to launch an attack on German forces in the summer of 1941 that he hoped would reach all the way to Western Europe and would be supported by the war-weary proletariat in the Western nations. The main force of Uldrick's review is directed toward the intense criticism the "icebreaker" thesis has drawn from much of the Western scholarly community, particularly the devastating critique of Suvorov's evidence, assertions, and logic presented by Gabriel Gorodetsky, in his book *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (1999). Whatever the attractions of the icebreaker theory, Uldricks maintains, evidence clearly indicates that Hitler did not fear a Soviet at-

tack and that Operation Barbarossa was in no way a preemptive strike; that Stalin did not engineer World War II in order to spread communist revolution or Soviet power; and that he was not preparing to launch a war of conquest in the summer of 1941. Uldricks also notes that some of Stalin's generals, in fact, favored a limited preemptive strike against the ominous buildup of German forces along the Soviet border, and that it is possible that Stalin, once Soviet military preparations had been completed, may have sanctioned such a strike against Germany for material security and out of concern for the balance of power in Europe rather than to spread communist revolution.

1535 Vasilevski, A. M. "On the Question of the Leadership of the Armed Struggle in the Great Patriotic War." *Soviet Studies in History* 10, no. 1 (1971): 3-44.

Vasilevski, who served as Chief of Operations Administration of the General Staff until June 1942, presents a favorable account of the role played by the State Committee for Defense, headed by Stalin after 10 July 1941, in transferring the nation's economy to a wartime footing, mobilizing Soviet forces, and establishing an effective command structure to prosecute the war effort. In discussing Stalin's personal involvement in the successful Soviet war effort, Vasilevski points out that Stalin, while ruthlessly pressing and severe to the point of cruelty in his demands upon subordinates, was heavily involved in the operational conduct of the war; had an excellent command of detail about many aspects of the military situation; was willing to delegate authority and to make use of all that was valuable in the proposals put before him; and was able to generate an enormous upsurge of patriotism in the country, most notably in the addresses he gave, on 6-7 November 1941, on the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, when the German army was nearing Moscow.

1536 Voronov, M. N. "Getting on with It." *Atlas* 11 (May 1966): 275-77.

In this translation of a memoir that appeared in the journal *Istoriya SSSR*, the Commander in Chief of Soviet Artillery during World War II recounts his dealings with Stalin during the 1944 Soviet offensive along the Baltic fronts, describing the overcentralization of military decision making that was a consequence of Stalin's refusal to have even minor matters settled without his knowledge, and some of the problems that came with Stalin's repeated demands for military success and outright victories. Voronov also relates Stalin's response upon being informed by him about signs of a German counteroffensive within the First Baltic Front, noting the dictator's nervousness about being told of an enemy threat that had not yet been reported to him by the Commander of the Baltic Front.

1537 Yekelchuk, Serhy. "Stalinist Patriotism As Imperial Discourse: Reconciling the Ukrainian and Russian 'Heroic Pasts' 1939-45." *Kritika* 3, no. 1 (winter 2002): 51-80.

This paper makes use of declassified archives and propaganda materials generated in the Ukrainian republic to examine the genesis and development of wartime Stalinist patriotism, showing how the interaction of local bureaucrats and intellectuals with the Kremlin, rather than simply Moscow's totalizing designs, produced the official line on non-Russian identities and national patrimonies. Yekelchuk also draws upon certain aspects of postcolonial theory to interpret Stalinist patriotism and to show how sense can be made of the hierarchy of national pasts in the Stalinist historical imagination by treating it as "a subspecies of imperial discourse" which allowed for an articulation of ethnic difference and for the republic's ideologues and intellectuals to play an active role "first in developing new Ukrainian patriotism and then in harmonizing the Ukrainian historical mythology with the Russian."

1538 Ziemke, Earl F. "Stalin As a Strategist, 1940-1941." *Military Affairs* 47, no. 4 (1983): 173-80.

Ziemke draws upon Soviet writings on World War II in the post-Khrushchev years to offer a reappraisal of Stalin's performance as a military strategist during the year preceding the German attack

of 21 June 1941. According to Ziemke, Stalin, rather than being indifferent to the danger of a German attack, enamored with a military doctrine of dubious merit, and unmindful of the need to prepare the army for war, as maintained in the official history of the war commissioned by Khrushchev, was clearly aware that a German assault was coming but hoped to delay it because a detailed military review had shown him how much work still had to be done to prepare the Red Army to counter the attack, according to Ziemke. Furthermore, Stalin, "a practical military strategist probably at least the equal of any on the scene in the Soviet Union at the time," played an active role in the process of retooling and reorganizing Soviet military forces following the exposure of the Red Army's shortcomings in the Winter War with Finland; made a logical choice, in September 1940, to deploy the Soviet main force where the main German thrust was expected to take place; and gave the Soviet military leadership "all that, by their own reckoning, they believed they needed, perhaps more." While Stalin may have gone into shock for a time after the German invasion, it was probably not because he feared the consequences of his own mistakes, as Khrushchev asserted, but rather because of "the arrival of a disaster he had long, with good reason, anticipated," Ziemke concludes.

Post-World War II

1539 Adelman, Jonathan R. "The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine, 1945-84." *Air University Review* 36 (March/April 1985): 24-35.

This exploration of postwar Soviet military doctrine regarding the question of the nature of a future major war and how to fight it includes a discussion of how Stalin cast a war of the future in the mold of World War II and elevated to doctrinal status those features he believed were responsible for the Soviet victory in World War II. Adelman also comments on Stalin's neglect of new developments in military technology, disregard for the importance of a surprise attack, and failure to consider fully the reasons for the Soviet military defeats of 1941-42. While Stalinist military doctrine generally emphasized conventional land war over possible nuclear air war, Stalin, Adelman writes, nonetheless promoted a major nuclear program as insurance against future developments.

1540 Burr, William. "Soviet Cold War Strategy: Using Declassified History." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (fall 1994): 1, 9-13.

This commentary on the 1980 study *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972*, by Ernest May, John Steinbruner, and Thomas Wolfe, focuses on some of the questions raised in the book's chapters on Soviet defense planning and decision making, strategic nuclear policy, and force deployments, particularly during the 1940s and 1950s. With respect to Stalin, Burr discusses how the study indicates that the Soviet leader's postwar military decisions provided "little provocation for a stepped up competition in armaments"; that Stalin's motivation for the 1949-52 Soviet military buildup most likely was not planned long in advance but was a reaction to the war in Korea and to fears aroused by Yugoslavia's defection and the concurrent buildup of American and NATO forces; and that he responded with "sangfroid" to the American nuclear buildup of the early 1950s because he was satisfied that relatively small nuclear forces were enough to deter attack and believed it was more important to invest in the technological basis for producing a modern powerful arsenal than to manufacture deliverable weapons—a belief consistent with his conviction that "nuclear weapons were relevant to supporting Soviet foreign policy rather than for actual military use."

1541 Dexter, Byron. "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 29 (October 1950): 41-55. Dexter looks at the letter Stalin wrote to the Soviet military historian, Colonel Razin, in February 1946, in which he attempted to define the communist line toward the theory of warfare advanced

by German General Karl von Clausewitz in his classic early-nineteenth-century book, *On War*. Stalin, Dexter shows, considered von Clausewitz's strictly military precepts to be out of date but believed that his theory of the relation of war and politics and his views on the place of the counteroffensive in warfare were worthy of close attention. Stalin's self-professed attraction to the core teachings of von Clausewitz, along with the von Clausewitz-like characteristics attributed to Stalin by General Isayev, in his recent article "Stalin's Military Genius," Dexter suggests, should be taken into account by Western leaders hoping to understand the foundation of Soviet strategic theory and to adopt effective measures to counter the Kremlin's efforts to extend Soviet power and promote communism around the world.

1542 Evangelista, Matthew A. "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised." *International Security* 7, no. 3 (1982): 110-38.

Evangelista argues that Soviet military capability during the years immediately after World War II was considerably exaggerated in the West, and that fears about Stalin's exploitation of a presumed Soviet military advantage to stage an invasion of Western Europe were, in fact, unfounded in view of the nature and the condition of Soviet forces at that time and their preoccupation with various nonmilitary tasks rather than with training for offensive operations.

1543 Gaddis, John Lewis. "Who Really Started the Korean War?" *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 5 (May 1994): 138-44.

Gaddis discusses the main revelations provided about the origins of the Korean War by *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, a 1993 book based on newly released Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean sources and authored by Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. Gaddis devotes most of his attention to the book's disclosures that Kim Il Sung was the source of the idea of attacking South Korea, and that the North Korean leader's plan was eventually sanctioned by a cautious Stalin acting in accord with both his shifting assessment of the prospects for international revolution and his mistaken belief that America, as implied by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in "a well-intentioned but carelessly worded speech in January of 1950," would not come to the defense of South Korea. In addition to discussing how *Uncertain Partners* proves that the North Korean attack was not, as has been widely believed in the West, the first step in a coordinated communist offensive controlled by the Kremlin, Gaddis also comments on the book's illustration of Stalin's willingness to entertain a few risks in supporting revolutions in Asia, as long as they did not involve the Soviet Union directly, and on how the book delineates the personalities of Stalin, Mao, and Kim in describing the three leaders' political behavior and how they regarded and responded to one another.

1544 Garthoff, Raymond L. "The Death of Stalin and the Birth of Mutual Deterrence." *Survey* 25, no. 2 (summer 1980): 10-16.

Garthoff contends that "the recognition by Stalin's successors of the inexpediency and non-inevitability of war, and the corollary concept of mutual deterrence, had its origins in Stalin's own Politburo where, despite his opposition, there was a dawning awareness of the threat posed by nuclear war to world socialism, and indeed to world civilization." Citing Stalin's reference in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952) to "some comrades" who mistakenly considered wars between capitalist countries no longer to be inevitable, and noting his optimism about the outcome of a nuclear world war, Garthoff speculates that the case that the anonymous comrades referred to by Stalin were probably Presidium members Malenkov, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Perukhin, and he suggests that other leading figures in the Kremlin, Molotov most notably, argued against the "dissenting" views of these individuals as part of factional politics engaged in by the party's leadership in the 1952-56 period. Garthoff goes on to discuss the post-Stalin doctrinal view of war and its formal incorporation into the new party program adopted at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961.

- 1545** Grove, J. W. "Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956." *Minerva* 34, no. 4 (winter 1996): 381-92.

The majority of this review of David Holloway's *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956* (1994) deals with how Soviet physicists, through information gained through espionage and their own painstaking research, succeeded in testing an atomic bomb, on 29 August 1949, and a hydrogen bomb, on 22 November 1955, much to the shock of the American intelligence community which had believed the Soviets were years from being able to create such devices. In commenting on what Holloway's book reveals about Stalin's attitude toward and involvement in the Soviet nuclear weapons project, Grove discusses, among other subjects, Stalin's ability to employ Soviet intelligence to penetrate America's "Manhattan Project"; his efforts, in view of the destructiveness of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, to make the development of a Soviet bomb a top priority; and his decision, out of concern for the integrity of the bomb project, to abort a planned attack on Soviet physics as part of the renewed attempt of party zealots to control the sciences in the immediate postwar years. Grove also comments on Holloway's contentions that nothing could have been done by President Truman to dissuade Stalin from pressing ahead with the Soviet thermonuclear weapons program, and that the bomb did not have a major effect on Stalin's postwar foreign policy, other than possibly making the Soviet Union "more restrained in its use of force out of fear of precipitating war," and making it "less cooperative and less willing to compromise for fear of seeming weak."

- 1546** Heinzig, Dieter. "Stalin, Mao, Kim and Korean War Origins, 1950: A Russian Documentary Discrepancy." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8/9 (winter 1996): 240.

Heinzig presents the text of an excerpt from a document found in the Russian Presidential Archive on Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin's 31 March 1956 conversation with Mao Tse-tung in which the Chinese leader stated that during his stay in Moscow between December 1949 and February 1950 Stalin failed to tell him about the 30 January 1950 approval given by the Kremlin to Korean leader Kim Il Sung's plan for an attack on South Korea but rather only discussed the question of strengthening North Korea's military capability. Heinzig notes how this portion of Yudin's original record of the conversation adds to our knowledge about the decision-making process during the preparatory phase of the Korean War, and that it was omitted from the version published in the winter 1995 issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7, showing that "Russian censors are still active—not only by withholding documents, but also by offering incomplete documents."

- 1547** Hershberg, James G. "New Evidence on Cold War Crisis: Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53. Translated by Vladislav Zubok. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 14/15 (winter 2003-spring 2004): 369-83.

Hershberg outlines the contents and significance of nine Korean War documents from the Russian Presidential Archives, describing how the documents shed light on such subjects as the secret coordination between Pyongyang and Moscow in the weeks leading up to the North Korean attack on South Korea; Stalin's displeasure over Soviet Ambassador Terenti Shtykov's promise to provide Pyongyang with Soviet advisors without first gaining permission from Moscow; the consultations and maneuverings between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung in October 1950 that ultimately led to China's decision to enter the war; Stalin's concern over the progress of the fighting in the war as the conflict dragged on and the North Koreans began to tire of the fighting; his interest in the combat qualities of the American soldiers; his desire to see the war continue, despite massive Chinese and North Korean losses; and, lastly, the Kremlin's decision to seek an immediate end to the Korean conflict following Stalin's death in March 1953.

- 1548** Holloway, David. "Soviet Nuclear History: Sources for *Stalin and the Bomb*." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (1994): 1-9.

Holloway comments on some of the main sources he used for his 1994 book *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956*, describing in particular the significant body of new material that has become available since 1980 on the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, on the relationship between scientists and the political leadership, and on the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet foreign and military policies. Holloway also discusses how nuclear weapons policy, like foreign policy, was highly centralized under Stalin, and how the dictator closely guarded nuclear weapons decisions, allowing very little discussion of nuclear weapons issues in the Soviet press or even within government and military circles.

1549 Kim, Ilpyong. "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Korean War: The Decision Making of Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung." *Korea and World Affairs* 19, no. 2 (1995): 337-48.

Kim outlines the traditional, revisionist, and postrevisionist approaches to explaining the outbreak of the Korean War, lending his support to the interpretation advanced by Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai in their 1993 study *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, a work based on archival materials and interviews with some of the individuals involved in the decision-making process in Moscow and Beijing. Kim points out some of the key revelations provided by *Uncertain Partners*, including the fact that Stalin, far from masterminding the Korean War as many Western scholars have long maintained, was not the driving force behind the war's outbreak but rather cautiously approved a plan hatched by Kim Il Sung to reunify the divided Korea by military force and accepted Kim's scheme on the condition that Mao Tse-tung would agree to send Chinese troops to Korea if the United States became involved in the war. Stalin, the book shows, was most concerned with Soviet national security at this time and was afraid of the consequences of confronting the United States in Asia.

1550 Leitenberg, Milton. "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 11 (winter 1998): 185-99.

Leitenberg provides a brief history of the allegations made against the United States by the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union regarding the use of biological weapons in the Korean War, and a summary of the major disclosures provided by twelve 1952-53 documents from former Soviet archives which show conclusively that the charges were fraudulent. Stalin does not figure prominently in Leitenberg's analysis of the documents (all but one of which are dated after the dictator's death), but his essay sheds light on the origin and evolution of a risky propaganda campaign that Stalin most certainly sanctioned, and raises the question about the extent of the Kremlin's involvement in inciting the false allegations, and about the degree of consultation and cooperation in the area of propaganda between China and the Soviet Union in the period not covered by the documents.

1551 Mansourov, Alexandre Y. "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 94-107.

Mansourov introduces and provides a detailed analysis of a selection of newly declassified documents from Russian archives related to the period after American and UN troops landed at Inch'on on 16 September 1950 and up to mid-October 1950, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) decided to send its troops to Korea in an effort to prevent the collapse of Kim Il Sung's regime. Mansourov's analysis deals with what the new archival materials show about such key questions as how Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Kim Il Sung and their close associates and representatives viewed and assessed the strategic and military significance of the Inch'on landing, the recapture of Seoul, and the drive to the Yalu River; the internal dynamics and politics of alliance relationships among the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from the aftermath of the Inch'on landing until the Chinese crossing of the Yalu, including the bargain-

ing between Stalin and Mao regarding the terms of China's entry into the war; Stalin's decision to abandon North Korea and evacuate Kim Il Sung and his forces to northeast China and the Soviet Far East; and the Soviet leader's dramatic reversal of that decision less than twenty-four hours later upon learning of the Chinese decision to enter the war. Mansourov also discusses how the new documentary evidence shows that Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Kim Il Sung were personally and intimately involved in the prosecution of the war but, nonetheless, their will often did not prevail, for the war policies of these states "were also shaped by the pressures of intra-alliance bargaining, domestic politics, bureaucratic outposts, and personal preferences of people in charge of implementing the leaders' decisions, not to mention circumstances created by enemy and external forces."

1552 Matray, James I. "Korea's Partition: Soviet-American Pursuit of Reunification, 1945-1948." *Parameters* 28, no. 1 (1998): 150-62.

Matray surveys several decades of historical writings on the partition of Korea and the origins of the Korean War and describes how the debate on the Korean conflict has been affected by four studies: *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume I. Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes* (1981-90), by Bruce Cumings; *Korea: The Unknown War* (1988), by John Halliday and Bruce Cumings; *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (1993), by Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai; and *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (1989), by Erik Van Ree. With respect to Stalin, Matray discusses the ways in which the new findings indicate that the Soviet leader was not responsible for the failure of postwar talks between Moscow and Washington to end the division of Korea; that he initially followed a cautious policy toward Korea with limited aims; and that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, not Stalin, was the primary instigator of the attack on South Korea. He calls upon Korean War scholars to abandon the outdated analytical dichotomy of traditionalism versus revisionism and to take advantage of newly available archival materials "to provide a better understanding of the reasons for Korea's division and why two Koreas still exist today."

1553 Medvedev, Zhores A. "Stalin and the Atomic Bomb." *Spokesman* no. 67 (2000): 50-64.

Medvedev details the evolution of the Soviet atomic bomb project from the September 1941 outset of Soviet intelligence gathering regarding British and American research on the atomic bomb to the successful explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb on 29 August 1949. While the work of Soviet scientists under the supervision of Lavrenti Beria receives most consideration in Medvedev's description of how a Soviet atomic bomb came to be produced, he also discusses Stalin's involvement in the bomb project, including his screening of all intelligence communications about atomic bomb research and development under way in the West; his involvement in the selection of the scientist—Igor Kurchatov—to head the Soviet project; the extraordinary powers he gave to Kurchatov to mobilize human and material resources to ensure the success of the project; his acceleration of the Soviet atomic effort following America's use of the bomb against Japan; and an account of Kurchatov's 25 January 1946 meeting with Stalin during which the Soviet leader questioned him about the work of the other leading Soviet scientists engaged in the project, expressed interest in improving the material living conditions of the Soviet scientific team, and urged him to accelerate work on the project. Medvedev also notes that the Kremlin did not formally announce the testing of the Soviet bomb because "Stalin feared an attempt by the United States to make a preventive strike against the Soviet atomic units," and that when the leading participants in the atomic bomb project were decorated by the state, Beria received only secondary mention so as to indicate that credit for the organization of the project belonged not to him but rather to Stalin.

1554 ———. "Stalin and the Hydrogen Bomb." *Spokesman* no. 68 (2000): 48-65.

The vast majority of this article deals with the efforts of Soviet scientists to solve the various problems they encountered during the race to build the USSR's hydrogen bomb. Stalin enters into

Medvedev's examination of the Soviet nuclear fusion project primarily by way of his active support for mobilizing scientists to solve these problems. In addition to noting the directives issued by Stalin in this regard, Medvedev comments on the correspondence carried on between the Soviet leader and Peter Kapitsa, the director of the Institute of Physical Problems; the circumstances surrounding Kapitsa's resignation from the military atomic projects following the failure of Stalin to act on the scientist's letter of 25 November 1945 complaining about the attitude of Lavrenti Beria—head of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy—and making a number of recommendations to overhaul the work on the atomic bomb; and Stalin's 17 August 1946 sanctioning of a decision to relieve Kapitsa of all state and scientific posts. Medvedev also notes that Stalin, upon receiving a report about the testing of the American hydrogen bomb in November 1952, "interpreted this as a confirmation of his conviction that the United States was seriously preparing for war with the Soviet Union."

1555 Miller, Jerry. "50 Years Later: How Korea's Web Got So Tangled." *Naval History* 17, no. 2 (April 2003): 20-24.

Miller argues that the war that broke out in Korea and the instability that still exists on the Korean peninsula can be traced to a woeful neglect of Korea as an issue at the Big Three wartime conferences and to the ill-conceived and last-minute U.S. State Department proposal to divide Korea at the 28th parallel into Soviet and American spheres of control, a proposal which Stalin readily accepted. Compounding this situation, Miller writes, was U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement, in a January 1950 speech, which gave the impression that America did not consider Korea to be a factor in its strategic plans. Stalin, in interpreting this statement to mean that military action could be taken to unify Korea under communist rule without risking American intervention, sanctioned the North Korean attack against the South.

1556 O'Neill, Mark. "Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives." *Magazine of History* 14, no. 3 (2000): 20-24.

O'Neill discusses how recent research in Soviet-era archives in Russia sheds light on Stalin's policy of selective use of Soviet air power in the Korean War and on his adoption of a policy designed to ensure that the Chinese army would come to Korea's aid against the American-led UN forces. According to O'Neill, while Stalin may have secured Chinese involvement by promising Soviet air support, the documents thus far available from the Russian archives indicate that he never intended to supply complete air support for the Chinese forces, opting instead to defend just the air space over northwest Korea where American bombers were attempting to cut off the supply lines to Chinese and North Korean ground forces. O'Neill also comments on the extent to which the Soviet-American aerial combat in "Mig Alley" and the pilot training the Soviets conducted throughout northeast China were important to the development of the Cold War.

1557 Pais, Abraham. "Stalin, Fuchs and the Soviet Bomb." *Physics Today* 43, Part 1 (August 1990): 13+.

This summary of two publications in the Soviet press in the late 1980s about the history of the USSR's plutonium bomb centers on the circumstances surrounding Stalin's November 1942 decision to start the Soviet Union's atom bomb project, and on Stalin's meeting with the project's director, Igor Kurchatov, on the eve of the 29 August 1949 successful testing of the bomb, during which the plutonium charge for the weapon was shown to him.

1558 "Premature Reunification." *Wilson Quarterly* 15 (autumn 1991): 136-37.

This brief article summarizes the interpretation of Stalin's 10 March 1952 note to the American, British, and French governments—in which he proposed the creation of a unified, neutral Germany—put forth by Jacob Heilbrunn, in the summer of 1991 issue of *Global Affairs*, according to which West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer acted wisely in persuading the Western powers

to rebuff Stalin's proposal, even if the Soviet leader's offer were genuine, because "Adenauer understood that the German problem could not be solved in isolation from a solution for Eastern Europe, and because he foresaw circumstances in which German unification would come about in a manner much more advantageous for Germany and Europe."

- 1559** Shen Zhihua. "The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply." Translated by Chen Jian. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8/9 (winter 1996): 237-42.

In this analysis of the recent emergence of two sharply different versions of Mao Tse-tung's 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin, in which the Chinese leader gave his response to Stalin and Kim Il Sung's request that he dispatch Chinese troops to Korea, the author contends that the version of the telegram found among Mao's documents at Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Archives in Beijing—a version which shows that the CCP Chairman informed Stalin of Beijing's decision to commit Chinese "volunteers" to fight in Korea and discussed the conditions under which these troops would be used and the need for Soviet weapons and military supplies for the Chinese forces—was, in fact, a draft of a message he did not send to Moscow, choosing instead to send the "preliminary telegram," found in Russian archives, which stated that China was not prepared to enter the Korean conflict at this point in time, and which requested that Stalin meet with Chou En-lai and Lin Biao to discuss the matter further. According to Shen, Mao wanted China to enter the Korean War and drafted the message to inform Stalin of his plan to do so but did not dispatch the telegram because the Chinese leadership had not yet arrived at a consensus on sending troops to Korea. He therefore opted to send a more indirect and ambiguous response to Moscow so that "he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication . . . with Stalin open" and giving himself some leverage to pressure Stalin on the key issues of Soviet military supplies and air cover for Chinese forces.

- 1560** ———. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2, no. 2 (spring 2000): 44-68.

Shen considers the reasons behind Stalin's decision to drop his initial opposition to Kim Il Sung's plan to reunify Korea by force of arms and give his approval, in late January 1950, to an invasion of the South. He contends that, while the Soviet dictator's attitude toward Korea was affected by public statements made by senior American officials suggesting the United States would not intervene if war were to break out in Korea, the two main stimuli to his new Korean policy were his need to resecure the privileges in the Far East that the Soviet Union had gained at the Yalta Conference—which had become threatened by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty signed in February 1950—and his desire to limit both the growing power of the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) and the PRC's ability to challenge the Soviet Union's dominant position in the international communist movement. Shen also discusses the sources of Stalin's distrust of Mao Tse-tung, and how the Soviet leader manipulated Beijing in securing Chinese military intervention in the Korean conflict.

- 1561** "Stalin's Secret Order: Build the Bomb 'On a Russian Scale.'" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (fall 1994): 5.

These excerpts from two previously secret Russian archival documents illustrate the evolution of the efforts of Soviet scientists to convince Stalin and the Soviet leadership to throw their full weight behind an atomic weapons program. The first document is a 29 September 1949 letter from physicist Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project, to police chief

Lavrenti Beria, to whom Stalin had given principal responsibility for the bomb project, reporting on the unsatisfactory rate of progress on “the uranium problem” and urging Beria to order an effort to accelerate work on the project. The second consists of excerpts from Kurchatov’s notes from a 25 January 1946 conversation with Stalin, showing that by this time, Stalin, in view of the success of America’s Manhattan Project, was ready to move more decisively to ensure that work on the atomic bomb project proceeded broadly and with maximum support.

1562 Strobel, Warren P. “Why Stalin Thought the U.S. Would Stay Out.” *U.S. News and World Report* 128, no. 24 (19 June 2000): 34-35.

Strobel summarizes the revelations provided by documents from Moscow’s Presidential Archive about Stalin’s January 1950 decision to sanction North Korean President Kim Il Sung’s plan to attack South Korea, the most notable of which is that Stalin’s approval of the assault was primarily based on his belief that America would not resist the communist thrust into South Korea—a belief derived from information about Washington’s Asia policy gained through espionage and reinforced by the Soviet Union’s successful atomic bomb test the previous August and by the Chinese communist victory over the Nationalists.

1563 Summers, Harry G., Jr. “The Korean War: A Fresh Perspective.” *Military History* 13, no. 1 (1 April 1996): 22-28.

This account of American military involvement in the Korean War includes a restatement of the revelations about the war’s origins provided by Valeri Denissov, the deputy director of the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, at a July 1995 conference held at Georgetown University. Citing hitherto secret documents of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to show that Stalin, far from being the instigator of the Korean War or acting in accord with a strategy of armed invasion to foster the spread of world communism, as President Harry Truman maintained in his 27 June 1950 war message, Denissov describes Stalin as a reluctant partner in a war unleashed by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. In September 1949, Stalin rejected Kim’s appeal for Soviet aid for an invasion of the South, Denissov explains, but later changed his mind and sanctioned the North Korean plan, in part because of Kim’s ability to convince him that the invasion was a low-risk operation that could be successfully concluded before America could intervene, but also because he came to believe that the United States would not risk a participation in a war between North and South Korea—a belief founded in his perception that Washington had already shown its lack of resolve in Asian military affairs through its abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, and further encouraged by Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s January 1950 public statement that Korea was outside the American defense perimeter in Asia.

1564 Wada, Haruki. “The Korean War, Stalin’s Policy and Japan.” *Social Science Japan Journal* 1, no. 1 (1998): 5-29.

Wada begins by characterizing Stalin’s view of Japan and his policy toward northeast Asia in the early postwar years as a prudent one exemplified by his endorsement of the strategy of peaceful revolution advocated by Nozaka Sanzō, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ). He then examines how, in the aftermath of the successful Chinese Revolution, Stalin, feeling the need to compete with Mao for leadership in the Asian communist movement, changed both his stance on the military reunification of Korea—finally agreeing to support North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s plan for a communist invasion of South Korea—and his policy toward Japan, goading CPJ leaders to solidify their party and to pursue a Japanese revolution in earnest. Wada draws primarily upon newly released Russian archival materials and documents of the CPJ to trace the complexities of intercommunist relations and exchanges as the Korean War moved through its various phases, explaining the development of Stalin’s positions on both the war and armistice talks in Korea; his refusal to take part in an Anglo-American peace treaty with Japan; his increasingly hostile attitude toward the United States; and his belief that if the CPJ were to conduct its

revolutionary struggle in a more aggressive and violent manner, he could limit the effectiveness of America's use of Japan as a key rear base for the war in Korea and, in effect, attack U.S. forces from behind. When the Soviet strategy in Korea and Japan failed, and in order to wind up the two dismal enterprises, Stalin, Wada writes, "let the North Korean and Japanese parties expose 'traitors,' and put the blame for the failures on them."

1565 Weathersby, Kathryn. "Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea." *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 11 (winter 1998): 176-84.

In January 1998, the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* published a collection of twelve documents, purportedly obtained from the Russian Presidential Archive, that provide explicit and detailed evidence that the charges of American use of biological warfare in the Korean conflict by the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and the Soviet Union were contrived and fraudulent. Weathersby primarily examines the context in which these documents originated, and what they reveal about the communist campaign to charge the United States with using bacteriological weapons in Korea; about the power struggle within the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death; and about the determination of the new leadership to distance itself from Stalin's foreign policy. She suggests that Stalin most likely approved of the propaganda campaign, which had been initiated by the Chinese and endorsed by the North Koreans, and that he probably felt by charging America with war crimes he could only add to what he perceived to be America's mounting difficulties in coping with the material and diplomatic strains caused by the stalemated Korean War. These assumptions, Weathersby states, were misfounded and attest to Stalin's shortsighted reasoning in assessing the overall situation in Korea and in determining the Korean policy the Kremlin should pursue.

1566 ———. "The Korean War Revisited." *Wilson Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (1999): 91-95.

Weathersby describes how the history of the Korean War has been rewritten with the post-Cold War opening of important archives in the former Soviet Union and China. Among the revelations provided by the new documents, Weathersby explains, are that Stalin did not initiate the invasion of South Korea as a test of Western resolve or as part of a global strategic plan, but rather approved an invasion plan authored by Kim Il Sung within the context of Moscow's regional strategy, and did so only after he came to believe that the United States would not intervene in the conflict. The records also show that the Truman administration was wrong to assume Chinese complicity in Stalin's decision to sanction the attack and Chinese eagerness to enter the fray, and that Stalin, in the face of MacArthur's rapid advance, actually ordered the North Korean army to withdraw to Chinese and Soviet territory, only to rescind that order once a reluctant Mao agreed to commit Chinese forces to save the North Korean communist state. As the war settled into a stalemate, Stalin himself, the documents show, encouraged the North Koreans to take a hard line in the armistice negotiations, for he reasoned that keeping the Americans bogged down in a costly war in Asia was to the Soviet Union's advantage, even though such a stance cost his Chinese and North Korean allies dearly.

1567 ———. "New Findings on the Korean War." Translated by Kathryn Weathersby. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (fall 1993): 1, 14-18.

Weathersby provides a translation of and commentary on excerpts from a document entitled "On the Korean War 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations," which was compiled in 1966 by unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archive. She explains how the document indicates that the war was a planned, full-scale attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), rather than a defensive response by North Korea to provocation by the South, with the goal of unifying the country through military force, and that Kim Il Sung, not Stalin, was the author of the invasion plan, contrary to the Truman administration's assumption in

June 1950, and to the thinking of many scholars writing since then, that the initiative for the Korean War came from the Kremlin. The document also suggests that Kim's plan gained Stalin's reluctant approval because he calculated that it would not directly involve the Soviet Union in a military conflict with America, a move that may also have been influenced, in Weathersby's estimate, by Stalin's fear that Mao Tse-tung, having won power in China, might pose a challenge to his own position as leader of the international communist movement. The conclusion that it was the death of Stalin rather than American threats to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War that finally brought a breakthrough in the negotiations for an armistice to end the conflict also finds support in the document.

1568 ———. "New Russian Documents on the Korean War." Translated by Kathryn Weathersby. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (winter 1995): 30-40.

This article presents translations of a commentary on a portion of the recently released collection on the Korean War from the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), beginning with the documents covering February 1950 through January 1951 regarding the Soviet role in Korea during the early months of the conflict, and ending with a more selective sample of documents from spring 1951 through the end of the war dealing primarily with Stalin's approach to the armistice negotiations. Among the revelations provided by the documents, Weathersby shows, are the closeness of Stalin's supervision of events in Korea; his nervousness about the situation in Korea following America's entry into the war and his consequent prodding of the Chinese leadership to prepare to enter the conflict if the tide of battle turned against North Korea; his worry that America might use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearming Japan and that a resurgent Japan could become a threat to the Soviet Union; his decision to provide Soviet air cover for Chinese ground forces crossing into Korea; his assumption of a more aggressive stance on the war following the success of Chinese forces in turning back the American advance in November 1950; his adoption of a "hard line" toward negotiations for an armistice once the war turned into a stalemate; and his pivotal role in the prolongation of the war, a fact made evident by how quickly the three communist allies took steps to reach an armistice agreement after Stalin's death.

1569 ———. "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence." *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 (winter 1993): 425-58.

Weathersby draws upon documents from newly opened Soviet archives to examine the Soviet role in the planning of the Korean War and in the conduct of the war during its first critical months. She establishes that, while the documents show that the American perception that North Korea could not have undertaken a full-scale invasion of the South without Stalin's approval and support was correct, Washington erred in regarding the attack on South Korea as essentially a Soviet military action and a test of America's resolve to counter Soviet aggression. In fact, Stalin did not initiate the plan to attack the South but rather approved the strategy that the leaders of North Korea had formulated to accomplish their own, not Moscow's, goals. Furthermore, he was extremely reluctant to engage the United States in a military conflict and approved the North Korea reunification plan only after having been persuaded by Kim Il Sung that the conflict would be a brief and successful one. The documents also show that American fears that the Soviet Union would enter the Korean conflict as the tide of the battle turned against the North were misplaced, for Stalin repeatedly demonstrated his reluctance to involve Soviet forces in frontline action, limiting Soviet military involvement to minimum fulfillment of his obligations under the Sino-Soviet defensive alliance. With respect to Stalin's motives for departing from the cautiousness he had displayed toward northeast Asia since 1945, Weathersby suggests that, in addition to his belief that America would not intervene in the event of war in Korea, it was his concern about his relations with Mao Tse-tung and about the Soviet Alliance with the People's Republic of China that led him to support Kim Il Sung's reunification plan.

1570 Westad, Odd Arne. "The Book, the Bomb, and Stalin." *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 3 (1996): 491-97.

This favorable review of David Holloway's *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (1994) centers on the book's revelations about the scientific and technical developments of Soviet nuclear weapons; the relationship between science and politics in the Soviet Union during the years under consideration; and the effect of the USSR's development of nuclear weapons on international relations. With respect to Stalin, Westad describes how the book shows the Soviet leader to have been slow to grasp the political significance of the bomb "until it literally exploded next door in August 1945," but to have then made the production of the bomb a top priority, only to turn the gains the Soviet Union made in the nuclear arms race into a liability for Soviet national security and the international image of the USSR through a series of disastrous foreign policy moves which led to the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance and which contributed strongly to the American turn to interventionism and to Soviet isolation. Westad also discusses how *Stalin and the Bomb* demonstrates that top Soviet scientists made use of their privileged positions to protect colleagues threatened by the Stalin regime, to argue for openness in scientific debate, and to organize their "closed cities" along more humane lines than the party would generally allow.

De-Stalinization

1571 Achminow, Herman. "A Decade of De-Stalinization." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 5, no. 2 (1966): 11-19.

Achminow discusses the de-Stalinization effort as a large-scale maneuver by the Soviet Communist Party set in motion by the need to "sacrifice Stalin in order to save Stalinism." He does not discount the role played by de-Stalinization as an issue in the intraparty struggle for leadership following the dictator's 1953 death, but he believes that the restricted scope of Khrushchev's criticism of the abuses of the Stalin era, the disconnection between the changes in Soviet social, economic, and foreign policy and what can be termed "de-Stalinization," and the fitful nature of the party's approach to denouncing its former leader all point toward the conclusion that Stalinism—defined in the form of the principal policies and achievements of Soviet communism when Stalin was in power—is exactly what the new leadership has sought to justify and continue by blaming the mistakes of the Stalin era solely on the personality of the dictator himself and by assigning to the party and the Soviet state and people credit for the achievements of the Stalin period.

1572 ———. "From Stalin to Trotsky." *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR* 3, no. 8 (1956): 33-15.

In 1956, issue nine of the journal *Kommunist*, an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, published several of Lenin's papers which previously had been withheld from the Soviet population and which reflect poorly on Stalin and favorably on Leon Trotsky. Achminow discusses the publication of these papers—one of which is Lenin's so-called testament—and Khrushchev's "secret" speech at the 1956 Party Congress exposing Stalin's crimes and leadership failures in terms of the struggle between the radical and moderate wings within the Communist Party's leadership at that time. He argues that radicals within the leadership headed by Khrushchev had hoped to reestablish Stalin's authority but, in recognizing that anti-Stalinism within the party and Soviet government was building to a critical level, attempted to lead the anti-Stalinist movement as a means of strengthening their own position. He also maintains that the new official anti-Stalinism, in practice, implies a rehabilitation of Trotskyism to a considerable degree, particularly with respect to shifting the party's efforts from building socialism in one country (as Stalin demanded) to advancing the struggle for the spread of communism beyond the USSR—a move which Achminow sees as an extension of Stalin's late-in-life attempt to respond to domestic problems by shifting the focus of communist interest to foreign policy.

1573 Arfe, Guetano, et al. "Stalinism and De-Stalinization: An Investigation." *Review* 4 (1962): 45-68.

1574 Bailey, Gerald. "Stalin: The Chinese Verdict." *Contemporary Review* 189 (1956): 330-33. Bailey examines the official view of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, as set forth in the editorial "On Historical Experi-

ence Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” published in the 4 April 1956 issue of the *People's Daily*. He describes how the CCP, while faithfully echoing the Kremlin's criticisms of Stalin, credits the former Soviet leader with far greater accomplishments than the Kremlin has so far attributed to him, and how it represents his “errors” as later aberrations which must not be allowed to dim the luster of “a great Marxist-Leninist.” Bailey also discusses how the CCP, in its effort to support the leadership position of Mao Tse-tung, has emphasized the people's need for outstanding personalities to guide them in the revolutionary struggle and the building of socialism, and, at the same time, has pointed out Stalin's errors in isolating himself from collective leadership and the Soviet people and in allowing the cult of the individual to develop around him.

1575 Barnathan, Joyce and Steven Strasser. “Exorcising a Soviet Ghost.” *Newsweek* 111 (27 June 1988): 32-34.

This commentary on the upcoming conference of the CPSU at which the main subject to be addressed was the future role of the party in the day-to-day business of governing the Soviet Union includes some discussion of how Stalin's authoritarian legacy has been at least as strong as any living enemy of the sweeping economic and political reforms proposed by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his effort to renounce the dead dictator's methods and dismantle the political command structure he established.

1576 “Behind Russia's Mask.” *Newsweek* 47 (2 April 1956): 39-41+.

Newsweek outlines the dimensions of the Kremlin's decision to denounce Stalin, describing the signs of the intraparty debate that began following the dictator's death on whether to continue or move away from Stalinism, the key role played by Anastas Mikoyan as the established anti-Stalin leader, and the degree to which the party's denunciation of Stalin represents a break with the Stalinist past. The article also presents the responses of government leaders and Soviet experts in twelve Western capitals to a series of questions put to them by *Newsweek* regarding the anti-Stalin campaign. The questions address such subjects as the Soviet people's reaction to the new doctrine on Stalin, the response in the USSR's satellites, the extent to which the anti-Stalin campaign represents “a change of Russian heart,” and how the new party line on Stalin might affect Western policy toward the Soviet Union.

1577 “Beware the Georgian Corpse.” *Collier's* 137 (8 June 1956): 102.

Economic progress at home and diplomatic successes abroad gave Khrushchev and his colleagues the political courage to risk the drastic move of denouncing Stalin in hope of dissolving the identity that had been created between the leadership of Russia and one-man rule and thus strengthen their own position as the new rulers of Russia, according to this report. The report also maintains that new leaders of the Kremlin needed to distance themselves from certain aspects of Stalinist dogma, particularly his preaching of the virtues of armed revolution and of the inevitability of a worldwide clash between capitalism and communism, if they were to succeed in persuading Western governments that “they are full of nothing but good will and good intentions toward all.”

1578 “Body Snatchers.” *Time* 78 (10 November 1961): 30-31.

This article deals with the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum and its reburial behind the mausoleum in a cemetery reserved for “faintly dubious or dimly famous Red heroes.” The article also relates some of the comments about Stalin's new disgrace overheard by *Time* correspondent Edmund Stevens as he mingled with the crowd in Red Square a few days after Stalin's reburial.

1579 Campbell, Kurt M. “The Ghost of Stalin.” *New Leader* 70 (2 November 1987): 9-14.

Campbell sees the legacy of Stalin, particularly the dictator's achievements in leading the Soviet Union to victory in World War II and in expanding Soviet power in the postwar world, and the

record of the Stalin era, distorted by official legend and long shrouded in state-sanctioned silence, as constituting a formidable obstacle to the efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev to shine light into the darkest recesses of the Soviet past. He describes the ways in which Gorbachev has attempted to exorcise the ghost of Stalin in the USSR, including his sanctioning of a new and more accurate history of the Soviet Communist Party, encouragement of academic explorations into the scope of the human toll of Stalin's atrocities, and enlistment of the arts to hold a torch to Stalin's crimes. He also discusses Anatoli Rybakov's novel *Children of the Arbat* and Tengiz Abuladze's film *Repentance* as milestones in the campaign to expose Stalin's evil, noting that the two works have been both praised and criticized by a Soviet population that still regards the Stalin era with mix of horror and nostalgia.

1580 Central Committee of the CPSU. "On the Cult of the Individual." *Political Affairs* (August 1956): 32-47.

This statement issued on 6 June 1956 by the CPSU's Central Committee aims to "set the facts straight" regarding the origin, nature, and consequences of the cult of the individual of Stalin and the denouncement of the cult at the CPSU's Twentieth Congress earlier that year. The first part of the statement deals with what are seen as Western misinterpretations of the meaning of the party's denunciation of Stalin. The second section describes the cult's origin amidst an international and internal situation that called for stringent centralization of leadership and iron discipline, and explains how the cult was fostered by subjective factors arising from Stalin's personality which encouraged him to misassess his role in the success enjoyed by the young Soviet Union and misuse the authority entrusted to him. The closing section deals with Stalin's violation of Leninist principles of leadership and Soviet law; his responsibility for the slandering and suffering of innocent people within and beyond the party; and why it was necessary for the party to speak out against the consequences of the cult of the individual and the mistakes Stalin made during the latter half of his rule.

1581 Chakrabarti, Sreemati. "De-Stalinization and De-Maoization." *China Report* 16, no. 5 (1980): 41-48.

Chakrabarti outlines the main features of the de-Stalinization and de-Maoization campaigns and then comments on some of their differences and similarities. A comparative study of the processes of de-Stalinization and de-Maoization, Chakrabarti writes, reveals a series of differences more glaring than the similarities between the two campaigns, most of which derive from the starkly different personalities and leadership styles of the two men. Where Stalin was a tyrant who antagonized the majority of the Soviet people and unleashed a reign of terror against his opponents within and beyond the party and the government, Mao was closer to a benevolent dictator who showed considerable restraint in dealing with his adversaries, and, as the father of the Chinese revolution and architect of the socioeconomic changes that came in its wake, was a leader who enjoyed genuine mass support. Consequently, the need for an ostentatious de-Maoization, unlike the case of de-Stalinization, has been "neither necessary nor urgent," and the goal of Mao's successors, unlike that of Khrushchev, has been to keep alive Mao's name and coddle his legacy while gradually doing away with the more radical features of his policies, both within and beyond the People's Republic of China. Chakrabarti also comments on the likelihood of a leftist backlash in China against de-Maoization that might parallel the conservative reaction to de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union.

1582 Chamberlin, William Henry. "Khrushchev's War with Stalin's Ghost." *Russian Review* 21, no. 1 (1962): 3-10.

Chamberlin speculates on the reasons for the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum and discusses Khrushchev's complicity in the crimes of the Stalin era. The rift between the Soviet Union and China, Khrushchev's desire to stigmatize his opponents within the party as Sta-

linists, and his desire to win popular support by creating the impression that he was completely divorcing himself from Stalin's policies all receive consideration as factors in the decision to downgrade Stalin. Chamberlin also comments on how the belated condemnation of Stalin poses some awkward questions for the Khrushchev government and on why Khrushchev, despite the political strength he revealed in evicting Stalin from the shrine that had housed his body, may not have finally banished Stalin's ghost.

1583 ———. "The Stalin Era or Stalin's Heirs." *Russian Review* 15, no. 4 (1956): 237-44.

Chamberlin considers the sources of the indictment of Stalin and his regime at the Twentieth Party Congress, maintaining that Khrushchev not only sought to win the favor of the Soviet managerial bureaucracy, the Red Army leadership, and the Soviet intelligentsia by deflating the Stalin myth but also to free Soviet foreign policy from the impasse into which Stalin had steered it. He points out that a number of Stalin's greatest crimes were not even mentioned by Khrushchev, and he suggests that the new course chosen by the Soviet leadership may unleash forces the regime may not be able to control.

1584 Chambre, Henri. "Exit Joseph Stalin." *America* 95 (30 June 1956): 320-22.

The harm that came to the Soviet Union as a result of the "cult of personality" created by Stalin, according to a 28 March 1956 *Pravda* article, was both widespread and deep-seated and led to such abuses as contempt for socialist legality, unjustified use of force, concealment of mistakes or shortcomings in almost every field, and the stagnation of research in philosophy, economics, and the social sciences. Chambre objects to the assertions made in the *Pravda* article, and he argues that what is being overlooked here is how the cult of the individual which grew up in the Soviet Union during the last twenty years of Stalin's life contradicts the Marxist view of the subordinate role of the individual in history by attributing various errors and assorted failures in Soviet history to one man, Stalin. He also criticizes the detractors of Stalin for exaggerating the subjective factors and minimizing the objective ones which help to explain the dead dictator's excesses and his fostering of the cult of personality.

1585 Church, George J. "Haunted by History's Horrors." *Time* 133 (10 April 1989): 71-72.

Church discusses the relationship between Mikhail Gorbachev's discrediting of Stalin's policies, particularly the collectivization of agriculture, centralized control of industry, and rigid controls on independent thinking, and the twin policies of glasnost and perestroika of the late 1980s. Gorbachev's ability to support the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims and the full exposure of all his crimes, Church notes, may be limited by the Kremlin's fears that such actions might call into question the legitimacy of the Soviet regime itself.

1586 Cohen, Stephen F. "Stalin's Afterlife." *New Republic* 181 (29 December 1979): 15-19.

On the hundredth anniversary of Stalin's birth, Cohen reviews the quarter-century-old debate in Soviet society over the nature of the dictator's rule and comments on the sources of the enduring legacy of Stalinism. He discusses the thrust and limitations of the official anti-Stalinism campaign launched by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, and reintensified at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, and the form and extent of the unofficial criticism of the dead tyrant's rule, including the horrors of the Stalinist terror, the forcible collectivization of 125 million peasants, and the costly errors the dictator made during the era of World War II. He also describes the official and public reaction that surged up against the intensification of the assault on Stalin and his legacy, focusing here on the post-Khrushchev leadership's efforts to censor further criticism of Stalin; the restoration of the dictator's image as an effective wartime leader, a wise statesman, and a benefactor to his people; and the resurgence of popular post-Stalin sentiment. Cohen closes with a commentary on popular pro-Stalin sentiment of 1979—a phenomenon which

he links to a resurgence of Russian nationalism and to a range of contemporary problems in Soviet society.

1587 Cohen, Stephen F. and Katrina vanden Heuvel. "De-Stalinizing the Soviet Past." *Harper's Magazine* 270 (October 1989): 32+.

This interview with Yuri Afanasiev, an outspoken anti-Stalinist historian and member of the Congress of People's Deputies, is from the anthology *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers*, edited by Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, and centers on the harm done to Soviet society by the lies and omissions of Stalinist historiography and on the importance of telling the whole truth about the events of the Stalin era, particularly with respect to the deformations Stalinism introduced into the lives of the Soviet people and the true nature of the Stalinist totalitarian system. Afanasiev also explains why he believes Stalinism was not inevitable, necessary, or even socialist, and why its vestiges must be completely uprooted if perestroika is to succeed. The interview closes with Afanasiev commenting on the aspects of Stalinism which remain most deeply entrenched in the Soviet Union and on the phenomenon of folk Stalinism rooted in the popular admiration for the strong leadership Stalin is perceived to have provided.

1588 "Communism's Changing Mask." *Commonweal* 64 (4 May 1956): 114.

This article comments briefly on the leading Soviet law review's denunciation of the Stalinist practice of trial by confession and on how this move paves the way for the rehabilitation of those who were purged by Stalin in the trials of the 1930s. The article also notes that, while new freedoms have come with the de-Stalinization campaign, Georgians gathering on 9 March 1956 in Tiflis to commemorate the third anniversary of Stalin's death were brutalized by soldiers of the new regime, indicating that, while Stalin continues to be saddled with the crimes of past decades, Stalinist practices are alive and well under the rule of the new regime.

1589 "Comrade Ozymandias: The Anathema on Stalin." *Round Table* 46 (September 1956): 312-22.

The motivation behind the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, the inconsistencies and cynicism in Khrushchev's speech, and the response to the dethronement of Stalin in the Soviet satellite states, Tito's Yugoslavia, and the communist parties of the West are the focal points of this article. The author maintains that the new leaders of the Kremlin, who fear comparison to the mighty Stalin, have opted for a moderate scaling down of the Stalin myth to swing all those who had revered the former Kremlin leader around to the new group by telling them that, besides committing various crimes against the party and Soviet people, he was not responsible for the achievements and gains made during his rule. Yet Khrushchev's assault on his former boss, the author continues, is founded on a basic contradiction. On the one hand, Khrushchev maintains that "Stalin dictated policy and no one dared to challenge him," while on the other, he contends that the advance of socialism and Soviet power during the Stalin years was due to the policy and guidance of the party, not Stalin. Furthermore, the individuals who criticized Stalin for being a despot, for promoting the "cult of personality," and for persecuting innocent party leaders are the same ones who worked hand-in-hand with the dead tyrant to make all of these evils possible. In view of this sorry fact, Khrushchev and his colleagues must be viewed as "vulgar self-seekers," or at best political cowards, who have lost the right to call themselves revolutionaries, and who have no legitimate claim to lead the Soviet Union, the author concludes.

1590 Conner, Cliff. "Stalin's Heirs." *International Socialist Review* 34, no. 3 (1973): 24-33.

This critique of the 21 December 1972 speech given by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to the CPSU's Central Committee commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the USSR includes a brief account of how Stalin, in solidifying his rule by developing an apparatus of unquestioning subordinates, not only failed to groom a successor but bequeathed to the nation a

group of high-level nonentities who lacked independent standing or authority and who, therefore, could not legitimately lay claim to the position he held. Conner also comments on the de-Stalinization campaigns during the Khrushchev years, particularly the leading role played by domestic political needs in Khrushchev's decision to conduct a partial exposé of Stalin's crimes.

1591 Conquest, Robert. "Stalin's Successors." *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 3 (1970): 509-24.

This political profile of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime includes an account of the careers its leading members enjoyed under Stalin and the extent to which re-Stalinization took place in the Soviet Union during the first five years following Khrushchev's ouster as the party's leader. For Conquest, the new rulers of the Soviet Union are a timid, shortsighted and thoroughly mediocre lot, interested in consolidating Stalinist institutions, restoring the rigors of his doctrines, halting the exposure of the abuses of his regime, and tightening up the ideological and political discipline required by Stalin's system. He sees the neo-Stalinists as a group of rulers faced by a society bending in every respect away from their concepts, and yet who remain committed to blocking social and political change in the nation, even at the risk of contributing to the kind of popular disillusionment that could one day topple the regime.

1592 ———. "The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin." *Problems of Communism* 11, no. 1 (1962): 15-20.

Khrushchev's revival of the anti-Stalinist line at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 serves as a prompt for this look at criticism of Stalinism by Soviet leaders during the first nine years following the dictator's death. The struggle against Stalinism during this time, in Conquest's view, was not so much a struggle against Stalin's principles as a struggle of one section of his followers against another, with the attack on the past being a tactic employed by one faction in its efforts to eliminate the other, and with neither group willing to criticize the general line of Stalin's policies but rather only the excesses of the terror and the cult of personality. Khrushchev may have turned up the anti-Stalinist rhetoric at the Twenty-second Congress, but a full repudiation of the Stalinist past remains problematic, given the fact that the new leadership's only title to rule was as Stalin's heirs and that all of them clearly bear a significant degree of responsibility for the horrors of his rule, Conquest concludes.

1593 Cooper, Nancy, Anne Underwood, and Steven Shabad. "The Ghost of an Old Bolshevik." *Newsweek* 110 (16 November 1987): 76.

Mikhail Gorbachev's use of a quote from Lenin to praise Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin, who was among the most prominent victims of Stalin's purge trials, was an attempt by the General Secretary to draw a line from Lenin to Bukharin, and implicitly to himself, as a means of further repudiating Stalin and legitimizing his own program of reforms, according to this article. The authors also discuss how the Bukharin case was linked inextricably to the Stalin question, and why Gorbachev stopped short of saying that Bukharin was a victim of a gross violation of the norms of Soviet justice and failed to announce the full rehabilitation of the veteran Bolshevik leader.

1594 Cousins, Norman. "Listening to Ivan Denisovich." *Saturday Review* 46 (9 February 1963): 18+.

Cousins presents an account of his Moscow conversation with Nikita Khrushchev about why it was necessary, at the Twenty-second Party Congress, to return to the attack on Stalin. According to Cousins, Khrushchev explained that Stalinist methods, habits, and attitudes were so deeply rooted in the Soviet Union under the dictator's rule that they have been difficult to eradicate, and that without a clear definition of the nature of Stalinism and full accounting of his reign of terror the Soviet nation could not become fully functional. Cousins commends Khrushchev for unmasking the Stalin myth, and he calls upon the American people, who seem unwilling to believe, out of fear that "it is somehow unpatriotic to recognize an internal improvement in a nation juxtaposed

against us,” the reports of a relaxation of the Soviet system under the influence of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign.

1595 ———. “Political Burial of Joseph Stalin.” *Saturday Review* 39 (31 March 1956): 24.

Cousins summarizes the main charges leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, discusses their significance for the Communist Party and the Soviet people, and speculates as to what Khrushchev’s revelations and the reforms he has championed might mean for the ideological differences between the USSR and the United States and for the prospect for world peace as well.

1596 Critchlaw, James. “Ins and Outs of de-Stalinization.” *Commonweal* 90 (2 May 1969): 191-92.

This discussion of the signs indicating that the forces of political moderation still have some influence within the Kremlin, despite the then recent use of military force to subdue liberals in Eastern Europe and a fresh campaign within the Soviet Union “to rekindle Cold War neuroses,” includes a brief commentary on how *Pravda*’s publication of passages from Mikhail Sholokhov’s new novel critical of Stalin’s wartime role represents “a break in the moratorium on de-Stalinization,” and of how some “top-ranking party leaders have chosen to re-open the enumeration of Stalin’s shortcomings and in a context that hints at a softer line toward West Germany, whose ‘threat’ has been a major talking-point of Kremlin ‘hawks.’”

1597 D., J. “Anatomy of Tyranny: Khrushchev’s Attack on Stalin.” *World Today* 12 (July 1956): 265-71.

This article opens with a critique of the assertions made by Khrushchev, in his 25 February 1956 “secret speech” attacking Stalin, that the former dictator alone was responsible for the crimes committed during his reign, that the party’s leadership was ignorant of many of the tyrant’s abuses, and that those closest to him were all powerless victims trapped in a situation in which “one could not express one’s own will.” The article then goes on to speculate on why the conspiracy of silence about Stalin’s crimes was broken, suggesting that the speech of Anastas Mikoyan attacking Stalin—the only such one in the published records of the Twentieth Congress—came as a surprise and led Khrushchev to conclude that a further and more general assault on Stalin was necessary lest he be outmaneuvered in the jockeying for position within the party’s leadership. A discussion of why Khrushchev, in dating Stalin’s degeneration from 1934, chose to endorse the policies of collectivization and forced industrialization, whose victims numbered in the millions, closes out the article.

1598 “Dead Men Tell a Tale.” *Time* 67 (23 April 1956): 36.

This report deals with Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin for the purge of the Red Army’s officer corps, an action which many believe contributed to the costly defeats suffered by Soviet forces in 1941-1942. The article also presents the credentials of the nine prominent Soviet military leaders condemned by Stalin who were rehabilitated by the Kremlin to the posthumous status of “comrades.”

1599 Dean, Vera Micheles. “Has Moscow Repudiated All of Stalin?” *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 35 (15 April 1956): 118-20.

Dean contends that the attack on Stalin’s arbitrary rule of the Soviet Union and the move toward establishing the theory and practice of “collective leadership” by Khrushchev and his associates launched at the Twentieth Party Congress were due primarily, if not solely, to domestic considerations, most notably the growing popular opposition to arbitrary authoritarianism. In addition to placing the assault on Stalin as the symbol of absolute power within the context of a growing unwillingness on the part of the Soviet people to accept dictation by a single leader, Dean also dis-

cusses the possibility that the criticism of Stalin by his former associates may have been motivated by their desire to reorient Soviet foreign policy in the direction of “peaceful coexistence” with the Western powers.

1600 “Debunking of Joseph Stalin.” *America* 94 (31 March 1956): 710-11.

This report briefly describes the challenges facing Soviet propagandists who, following the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, must “debunk twenty-five years of sycophantic hogwash about Stalin.” Not only Chinese communist leaders and Stalin’s protégés in Eastern Europe may find the new Kremlin line hard to accept, but so will the Western world in view of both the complicity of Khrushchev and his colleagues in the very crimes of Stalin they have chosen to denounce and the unlikelihood that the new Kremlin leadership will actually come to grips with all the injustices of the Stalin regime, according to the report.

1601 De Gras, Jane. “The Fruits of De-Stalinization: Moscow in Ferment.” *Problems of Communism* 11, no. 2 (March/April 1962): 1-7.

This commentary on the renewal of the de-Stalinization campaign at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress mainly deals with the repercussions felt in the Soviet Union among writers, scientists, and intellectuals in general. De Gras also discusses the changes in political geography that came with the second round of de-Stalinization—most notably the circumstances surrounding and the impact of the changing of the name of the city Stalingrad to Volgograd—and the delicate nature of the campaign to dismantle Stalin’s image in the eyes of the Soviet population.

1602 “Demythologization of a Dictator.” *Christian Century* 73 (4 April 1956): 412.

The various educated guesses put forth regarding the strategy behind the Soviet leadership’s defamation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress are the subject of this brief report. The report also comments on the likelihood that the extent of the de-Stalinization campaign will be decided ultimately by the Soviet people, “for whose benefit the minimizing process was begun,” rather than by Khrushchev and his cohorts, who were responsible for initiating the campaign.

1603 Deutscher, Isaac. “Communist Party Congress: The Break with Stalinism.” *Reporter* 14 (22 March 1956): 31-36.

Deutscher outlines the ways in which the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU represents a repudiation of Stalinism, including how the denunciation of Stalin’s autocracy and the idea of a single leader have affected higher-level management of the party, and how the new directions announced at the congress reflect changes in the Kremlin’s attitude toward an overall settlement with the West, in Moscow’s relations with communist parties in other countries, and in the regime’s thinking on the prospects for the further expansion of communism. He sees the break with Stalinism as being particularly pronounced in the field of social policy, where the regime’s actions in dealing with labor issues and education, in his estimate, constitute “a truly sensational reversal of Stalin’s social policy.” The debate within the party between those who sided with Mikoyan, “the mouthpiece of militant anti-Stalinism,” and Khrushchev, who favored caution in renouncing Stalinism, is also discussed by Deutscher.

1604 ———. “Since Stalin Died.” *American Socialist* (June 1956): 8-12.

Deutscher considers the circumstances which prompted Khrushchev to assume such a staunch anti-Stalinist position at the Twentieth Party Congress—even though he apparently had not at first intended to attack Stalin’s political record. Pointing out that “it is the old leaders of the Stalinist faction who are in revolt against Stalin’s ghost,” Deutscher explains why he feels that Khrushchev and company will face a difficult task in defining “what exactly had been ‘defaced’ by Stalinism, and what should be restored”; in determining who should be rehabilitated and who should not; and in establishing a political alibi to free themselves from any responsibility for both Stalin’s success

in placing himself above the party and for the “gross violations of the law” that he committed. Deutscher suggests that the scrutiny of the Stalin era which is going on at various levels of the party and which aims at discovering the facts and fixing the responsibilities may turn from Stalin himself to his disciples, accomplices, and successors, and may compel a reconsideration of the old intraparty controversies of the 1920s and 1930s, including the views and positions of such prominent Bolshevik leaders as Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, and Grigori Zinoviev.

1605 ———. “Stalinists’ Case against Stalin.” *Reporter* 15 (12 July 1956): 22-26.

Deutscher critiques Khrushchev’s “secret speech” at the Twentieth Party Congress exposing the abuses and crimes committed by Stalin. He outlines the main charges levied against Stalin; points out significant omissions in Khrushchev’s indictment; speculates on the reasons why Khrushchev was so selective in denouncing the dead dictator, particularly with respect to the purge trials of 1936-1938; and notes the illogic in attributing all major decisions on policy and strategy to the dictatorial Stalin but denying him credit for any of the positive results of those same decisions. Deutscher also considers the factors and circumstances that help explain why Stalin was able to establish a monopoly of power in the Bolshevik Party, and he describes how the tensions generated by years of war, revolution, and civil war, by forced industrialization and collectivization, and by an unstable international situation helped to provide Stalin with a justification and pretext for the ways in which he used the unlimited power he amassed.

1606 “Downgrading Stalin—This Is the Story.” *U.S. News and World Report* 51 (27 November 1961): 58-60.

The views of commentators in Paris, London, Bonn, and Rome regarding the motives behind the campaign launched by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second Party Congress to erase all memory of Stalin are presented in this article. The consensus opinion of the analysts cited is that Khrushchev believes that by vilifying the dead dictator he can smear the chosen heirs of Stalin who oppose his own policies and leadership, and who are trying to use what remains of the Stalin legend to their political advantage. The article includes an inset, “Khrushchev’s Case against Stalin,” in which American diplomat Francis B. Stevens connects Khrushchev’s compulsion to defile the memory of Stalin to the struggle between Moscow and Beijing and discusses the risks Khrushchev is taking by removing his rivals from power rather than eliminating them as Stalin would have done.

1607 Dulles, Allen W. “Purge of Stalinism.” *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 34 (7 May 1956): 758-65.

Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles offers an analysis of the motives for the de-Stalinization campaign initiated at the Twentieth Party Congress. According to Dulles, the real reasons for the denunciation of Stalin are to be found in the new Kremlin leadership’s attempt to deal with the problems created by the international and domestic policies followed by Stalin during the last six or seven years of his rule. Stalin’s often bellicose policy in the international field, Dulles explains, not only had been a failure but also had tended to unite the free world against the Soviet Union and international communism. Furthermore, his repressive domestic policies, particularly his police-state tactics and stifling of the Soviet educational system and scientific community had worked to the detriment of Soviet economic growth and efficiency and had compromised the nation’s ability to compete with the West, technologically and militarily—all of which tended to build up pressures on the Soviet rulers to create an impression that a dictatorship of the Stalin type was dead forever and that the post-Stalin “collective leadership” of the party was adopting a policy that would promote peace in the world and prosperity and individual freedom at home. Dulles also comments on the position and character of Stalin’s accusers; their intention to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system; and the problems they will most likely encounter in giving lip service in the direction of individual freedom while, in effect, offering only to replace Stalin’s personal dictatorship with their own collective dictatorial rule.

1608 “Echoes of the Terror.” *Time* 67 (18 June 1956): 29-30.

Time outlines Khrushchev’s account of Stalin’s crimes and describes the demoralizing effect the official downgrading of Stalin has had on communist parties outside the Soviet Union. The article also comments on what was missing from the shortened version of the speech delivered by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin—a version circulated among Soviet district organizers and some foreign leaders—particularly its omission of the statements regarding Stalin’s anti-Semitism and purge of Red Army leaders and the impact of Stalin’s terror on Soviet foreign policy.

1609 “Erasing the Past.” *Newsweek* 58 (20 November 1961): 40+.

Khrushchev’s new campaign against Stalin and Stalinism, including his moves against such Stalin heirs as Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment Voroshilov, is the focus of this brief report.

1610 “Fallen Idol.” *United Nations World* 7 (July 1953): 6.

This brief column notes the Kremlin’s squelching of the projects under consideration by French communists to perpetuate the memory of Stalin in their communes.

1611 Falls, Cyril. “How to Dethrone a National Idol.” *Illustrated London News* 228 (7 April 1956): 242.

Falls considers the possible motives for the abrupt dethronement of Stalin. He favors the explanation that the Stalin cult may have become a danger to the Khrushchev regime because the Russian public, in its anxiety over the future of the nation and in the absence of Stalin, “the father of his people,” had not yet recognized the legitimacy of the new regime or its ability to protect the Soviet nation as successfully as the all-powerful Stalin had been able to do. Whatever the motives may be for the rejection of Stalinism, Falls concludes, there is little reason to expect any fundamental change in Soviet policy or behavior, meaning that the West will have to continue to rely on the defensive strategy of containment in order to keep the expansive tendencies of the Kremlin in check.

1612 ———. “Signor Togliatti Intervenes,” *Illustrated London News* 228 (30 June 1956): 820.

Falls comments briefly on the reaction of the communist world to the denunciation of Stalin, noting in particular the response of Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti who, while acknowledging the necessity of bringing to light the errors of Stalin, questioned why the Twentieth Party Congress remained silent about the dead leader’s merits and accomplishments.

1613 Gaev, A. “The Boomerang of de-Stalinization.” *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR* 9 (October 1962): 50-55.

1614 Gayn, Mark. “Purge of Stalin’s Ghost.” *Nation* 182 (28 April 1956): 354-56.

The real explanation behind the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, according to this article, lies in his successors’ realization that, while he had helped to make the Soviet Union great, he had also been a powerful brake on its maximal progress—a reality that became increasingly stark as stagnation overcame Soviet culture and the Soviet economy and political system in the years immediately following his death. Gayn describes the ways in which Stalin’s ever tightening grip on the political, economic, and cultural life of the nation fostered a ruinous paralysis and decay, and he comments on the reasons why the leadership’s campaign to debunk Stalin most likely will be carried out slowly and with great caution.

1615 Gellner, Ernest. “Stalin Takes the Stand.” *New Republic* 200 (20 March 1989): 20+.

Gellner discusses the pros and cons of holding a trial in the Soviet Union to establish the legal guilt of Stalin and his henchmen for the crimes committed during the span of the Soviet dictator’s

rule. In Gellner's estimate, while a legal inquiry that would "place Stalin on the stand" would not be without moral and historiographical value, a number of factors point to the inadvisability of such an action, including the difficulty in distinguishing culprits and victims under Stalinism, and the possibility that the legitimacy of the reform-oriented Gorbachev government might crumble if the ideas and institutions that made the Stalin terror possible were called into question. This last factor is the most important one for liberals to consider in wondering if a public trial of Stalinism is desirable, for if the Soviet people lose all confidence in the current governing institution, they may place their faith in a far worse alternative, chauvinistic Russian nationalism, according to Gellner.

1616 "Georgia on Their Minds." *Time* 88 (11 November 1966): 38.

This article briefly comments on the favored status of Georgia during the Stalin years, the loss of that status with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, and the November 1966 visit to Georgia by party leader Leonid Brezhnev, during which he praised Georgia for its successes in building socialism and commended Stalin for his "distinguished role in the course of the revolutionary struggle." The rehabilitation of Georgia and Brezhnev's praise for Stalin do not signify a revival of Stalinism but rather the party's concern for "keeping peace in the Soviet family," according to the article.

1617 "Ghost of Stalin: Protests against Refurbishing Image." *Newsweek* 67 (28 March 1966): 48.

The three-page letter sent to party leader Leonid Brezhnev by a group of twenty-five prominent Soviet scientists, writers, and artists convinced that a move was afoot to grant at least a partial rehabilitation of Stalin during the forthcoming congress of the Communist Party is the subject of this brief report.

1618 "Ghosts in the Kremlin." *Economist* 205 (27 October 1962): 373-75.

The author writes about the partial, posthumous rehabilitation of some of the Bolshevik old guard, Nikolai Bukharin in particular, sentenced at the Moscow trials of the 1930s, and about how Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist supporters, by pressing the case for both the elimination of the vestiges of Stalinism and for the full rehabilitation of those who were unjustly convicted in the trials, have allowed the ghosts of the dead tyrant's victims to haunt his living heirs, forcing their hand and threatening the party structure.

1619 Gorlizki, Yoram. "Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin." *Slavic Review* 54, no. 1 (spring 1995): 1-22.

Gorlizki proposes that "a fresh relationship between the leader and the major bureaucracies—a cardinal element of early de-Stalinization—had already formed during the very last stage of Stalin's life." He contends that this relationship was closely linked, in terms of ideology and personnel, to a campaign for party revivalism, launched just prior to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, and that the demands for more party-based "collective leadership" which marked the post-Stalin period "were significantly bolstered at the Congress," several months before the dictator's death. Describing how the 1952 pre-congress campaign "was shot through with revisionist rhetoric" and how the impact of party revivalism figured into the debates among the chief pretenders to Stalin's throne and left "a durable mark" on the early post-Stalin emphasis on collective decision making, Gorlizki maintains that the call for more responsiveness and accountability from officials within state agencies and the party apparatus and for "the revitalization of party-based modes of participation" suggests that there was, in effect, "de-stalinization under Stalin."

1620 "Gradual Resurrection." *Economist* 193 (26 December 1959): 1233.

The 21 December 1959 issue of *Pravda* included an article, written on the eightieth anniversary of Stalin's birth, referring to the deceased Soviet leader as "a staunch fighter for socialism" who had

struggled successfully against the enemies of Leninism, and who should be counted among the most prominent figures of the Soviet Communist Party and the world communist movement. The *Pravda* article, according to *The Economist*, indicates that official Soviet hagiographers want to keep a tight rein on criticism of Stalin, and that the Khrushchev regime desires a more lenient line on Stalin.

1621 Groth, A. J. "Khrushchev on Stalin." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 1 (1963): 66-70.

Groth discusses the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress within the context of Khrushchev's effort to win support within the party and throughout Soviet society in his struggle against his rivals for party leadership. He describes how Khrushchev, in "exposing" Stalin, did not really eliminate falsehoods in his effort to "expose" Stalin but added to them by distorting the record of the dead dictator. Groth also considers the global effects of Khrushchev's sudden and drastic move against the legacy of Stalin, particularly within the communist parties of the world.

1622 Harris, Jerry. "First Reaction: Communist Leaders Confront the Khrushchev Revelations." *Science and Society* 61, no. 4 (1997-98): 505-12.

Harris examines the reaction of the Communist Party of the USA to Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU denouncing Stalin. He shows that American communist leaders tended to give only secondary attention to the exposure of Stalin's crimes and errors and to focus instead on Khrushchev's statements regarding both the need for peaceful coexistence between America and the Soviet Union and the role of revolution in the advancement of socialism. Overall, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin served to democratize an already fractured American Communist Party and left its leaders, who had placed blind faith in Stalin, in no position to stem the party's disintegration, according to Harris.

1623 "The Heart of the Matter." *Time* 68 (9 July 1956): 21.

Time attempts to deflate the statement made by Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Party Congress, regarding the inability of the party's leaders to curb the Stalinist terror. The gradual propagation of Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin and his crimes is also outlined in the article.

1624 Herminghouse, Patricia. "Confronting the 'Blank Spots of History': GDR Culture and the Legacy of Stalinism." *German Studies Review* 14, no. 2 (1991): 345-65.

This examination of the German Democratic Republic's confrontation with the legacy of Stalinism centers on how the GDR, after many years of holding up the Soviet Union as the model socialist society, was placed in the awkward position of trying to protect the itself from the pernicious effects of Mikhail Gorbachev's extension of his policy of glasnost to include "the blank spots of history" regarding the Stalin era. Herminghouse discusses the counterproductive attempt of the GDR to ban the German-language editions of several Soviet journals critical of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact, including its secret provisions for the partition of Eastern Europe, and how the Soviet revelations about Stalin's ordering of a ban on the Comintern's anti-fascist propaganda, and his directives to the Comintern regarding peaceful coexistence with Hitler, "threatened to vitiate the East German regime's self-legitimation as the antifascist state." Further complicating the attempts of the GDR "to defend Soviet history against the Soviets," Herminghouse explains, was the powerful critique of Stalinism by German writers and artists, the exodus of citizens from a state considered to be clinging to Stalinism, and the critical popular reaction to the heavy-handed propaganda campaign conducted by the GDR television in favorably portraying the Chinese government's view of the Tiananmen Square protests. It was not until the end of 1989 that GDR historians ceased to cling to the party line on the Stalinist past, and not until 1990, when the party authorized the publication of a number of long-standing works dealing with the abuses and crimes of Stalin as a means of demonstrating its new posture on Stalinism, that the "blank spots of his-

tory” were finally addressed, albeit haltingly and with continued gaps in the treatment of what went wrong under the influence of Stalinism.

1625 “How Dead Is Stalin?” *Life* 39 (31 October 1955): 44.

This article, in noting the signs of the Kremlin leadership’s realization that “Stalin’s memory is not their strongest political asset, at home and abroad,” suggests that the American government use Stalin as its own weapon in the Cold War by attaching the dead dictator’s name “to all acts and policies which keep the war going, thus making it harder for Khrushchev and Company to defend what they retain of Stalinist policies, and easier for them to abandon positions that still endanger peace.”

1626 Hudson, G. F. “The Courtiers’ Revolt: A British View of the Turn against Stalin.” *New Leader* (April 1956): 7-9.

This critical review of the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress locates the party’s criticism of Stalin in a “courtiers’ revolt” aimed at replacing the insecure and anxious political atmosphere under which Stalin’s closest colleagues suffered with rule by a small circle of leaders who will distribute power and influence among themselves in regulated peaceful competition with one another. Hudson also discusses why the new leadership’s denunciation of Stalin failed to include some of the darkest chapters in the dead tyrant’s rule—such as the purge of the Red Army, the Katyn Forest massacre, and the failure to support the Warsaw Uprising against Hitler that broke out with the approach of the Red Army—and endorsed his policies of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization. Decrying the tendency of leaders in the West to view Khrushchev’s revelations as part of a great moral reformation in the Soviet Union and to accept them as “a full settlement of accounts past,” Hudson calls on Western politicians and publicists to make good use of the opportunity Khrushchev has placed in their hands by calling attention to aspects of Stalin’s tyranny which seemed to have escaped the new leadership’s memory, and by joining in “the glad task of pulling down not only his [Stalin’s] statues, but also the house that he built.”

1627 ———. “Why Did Khrushchev Do It? De-Stalinization and the Manner of Stalin’s Death.” *Commentary* 23 (May 1957): 439-46.

Hudson surveys the main theories on why Stalin came under criticism at the Twentieth Party Congress, arguing that the most plausible explanation is that Khrushchev and his associates, out of a need “to protect themselves against a suspicion that they were responsible for their late master’s death,” felt compelled to attempt to persuade the politically important sections of Soviet society that Stalin had “in reality been a blundering, bloodthirsty, and capricious tyrant . . . who was ruining the state and whose premature elimination would have been a public service.” Hudson speculates that the so-called doctors’ plot presaged a new purge that was to have eliminated the old guard of the Politburo, including Khrushchev, and that Khrushchev, having learned of this plan from Minister of State Security Ignatiev, conspired with Politburo members to kill Stalin. While there is no proof that Stalin was murdered by a Kremlin cabal acting in self-defense, the fact that he died precisely at the moment he was about to destroy the very men who took power from and denounced him suggests, to Hudson, that Khrushchev’s speech might have been titled, “Why we would have been right to kill Stalin if we had done so.”

1628 “I Was Just Passing . . .” *Economist* 206 (16 March 1963): 985.

This article provides a brief account of Khrushchev’s partial rehabilitation of Stalin in an 8 March 1963 speech to leaders of the Communist Party and Russian intellectual life. According to the article, Khrushchev’s praise of Stalin as “a Marxist, devoted to the communist cause” and as a leader who transformed Russia into a modern state and rightfully put down opposition to his rule in the prewar years reflects the fear of party leaders that the mounting tide of bitterness about the Stalin

period, prompted in part by the works of such writers as Ilya Ehrenburg, Andrei Voznesensky, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was undermining the party leadership's authority and therefore had to be stemmed, in part by presenting a more balanced image of the deceased dictator's reign; by branding as "deviationists" those writers whose attacks on Stalin had become unacceptable; and by imposing restrictions on the intellectual community to dampen further criticism of Stalin and his policies.

1629 "In Russia, Promotions and Demotions." *Life* 51 (10 November 1961): 32-33.

A photograph of the simple stone tablet marking Stalin's new Kremlin grave accompanies this brief account of the Communist Party leadership's 1956 denunciation of Stalin and the furthering of the de-Stalinization campaign in the form of Khrushchev's November 1961 ordering of the removal of the dictator's body from Lenin's mausoleum.

1630 Izmailov, Lion. "What Would Stalin Say?" *World Press Review* 37 (July 1990): 40.

Stalin's reaction to the manifestations of the de-Stalinization campaign and to the deliberations about perestroika under way in a session of the Congress of People's Deputies are projected in this satirical piece from the liberal Moscow weekly *Ogonyok*.

1631 Johnson, Priscilla. "Notes on the Khrushchev-Stalin Feud." *Nation* 193 (9 December 1961): 469-71.

Johnson, in citing signs that the Khrushchev regime is preparing the Soviet people for a further exposure of Stalin's crimes, points to the subdued manner in which the dead dictator's eightieth birthday was treated in the official Soviet press, and the regime's sanctioning of the publication of two artistic works highly critical of the "cult of the individual" and the terror it wrought upon Russia: Alexander Tvardovsky's poem *Distance Beyond Distance* and Victor Nekrasov's novella *Kira Georgievna*. She also discusses what she sees as an effort to encourage Khrushchev to consent to the creation of a cult of his own personality by those "who yearn for Stalinism without Stalin" and "who view 'the cult of the individual,' with its accompanying terror and inertia," as an "easier way of ruling than Khrushchev's erratic unleashing from below and his constant keeping of the bureaucracy on the *qui vive*."

1632 ———. "Old Terror and New Doubts." *Reporter* 27 (6 December 1962): 22-26.

Johnson discusses popular reaction to the revelations of the Twenty-second Party Congress regarding Stalin's crimes, describing how the Soviet people's disbelief and confusion gave way to feelings of outrage over having been taught to worship Stalin only to find out that their idol was a cruel, bloodthirsty villain. While describing how the heart-searching brought about by de-Stalinization has given rise to a feeling that the nation's sacrifices and suffering under Stalin were for nothing, she notes that many Russians are still having difficulty with painful questions of the past, particularly the scale of Stalin's terror, and that fear of a reversion to Stalinist practices remains a major concern for many.

1633 Jones, Polly. "From Stalinism to Post-Stalinism: De-Mythologizing Stalin." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 1 (2003): 127-49.

Jones examines the efforts of Soviet leaders to negotiate the transition from the system embodied by Stalin to post-Stalinism, showing how the Soviet elite repeatedly failed "to provide a consistent image of Stalin and a coherent narration of Stalinism to replace the tropes of Stalin's personality cult." She also discusses how the leadership's failure to manage this transition "left its discourse of de-Stalinization vulnerable to other interpretations and narratives about Stalin and Stalinism," a failure addressed, ultimately, at the end of 1956 by "a partial reversion to Stalinism and by the partial preservation of the cult's symbolism" rather than by explicit confrontation of the Stalin question.

1634 Kenney, Charles D. "The Twentieth CPSU Congress: A Study in Calculated Moderation." *American Political Science Review* 50 (1956): 764-86.

Kenney outlines the major developments at the Twentieth Party Congress, describes the motivation for each of the initiatives announced, and comments on what has not changed in the Kremlin's behavior, policies, and world outlook in view of the general pronouncements made during the Congress and in light of Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin at a closed session of the meeting. The new leaders' reaction to the excesses of Stalin, Kenney believes, are not those of "shocked and sensitive humanitarians" but rather of pragmatists seeking to secure their own positions by a selective denunciation of Stalinism, by stressing the establishment of collective leadership, by announcing the pursuit of a policy of calculated moderation in domestic and international affairs, and by realigning the party in accord with the teachings of Leninism. Beneath the "new" domestic policies, however, many of the essential components of the dictatorial regime and practices established by Stalin still remain operative, and behind the "new" foreign policy there remains the Kremlin's commitment to promoting a world dictatorship of the proletariat, Kenney concludes.

1635 ———. "The Twentieth CPSU Congress and the 'New' Soviet Union." *Western Political Quarterly* 9 (September 1956): 570-606.

Kenney describes the procedure followed at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the principal domestic and foreign policy initiatives announced at the Moscow meeting, and the logic behind the Kremlin leadership's denunciation of Stalin and Stalinism. With respect to the latter subject, Kenney privileges the role played by the "compulsive utilitarian orientation" of the Soviet regime in prompting both the proclamation of "collective leadership" as the party's governing principle and the downgrading of Stalin, maintaining that many of "the malpractices heaped upon Stalin's corpse involved either those areas of policy in which Stalin had failed to realize measurable successes or others in which the present leaders are concentrating unusual effort." Among the charges against Stalin which fit neatly into the utilitarian mode, in Kenney's view, are the "grave errors" Stalin made during the collectivization drive, his expulsion of Yugoslavia's communist leaders from the Cominform in 1948, his purge of the Red Army's leadership in the late 1930s, and his blind faith in his nonaggression pact with Hitler, a miscalculation that cost the Soviet Union dearly in the early stage of World War II. The new domestic policies of moderation, including an increased tolerance of dissent and more allowance for individual initiative, along with the Kremlin's push for peaceful coexistence with the West do not, in Kenney's estimate, suggest a mellowing of the dictatorship inherited from Stalin but rather tactical shifts akin to those practiced by both Lenin and Stalin in their efforts to promote Soviet security and the cause of world communism.

1636 Kerry, Tom. "Maoism and the Neo-Stalin Cult." *International Socialist Review* 25 (spring 1964): 55-59.

Kerry criticizes the Chinese Communist Party leadership for attempting "to revive, regenerate, and reconstitute the 'Stalin cult' on a world scale" by assaulting the policies and practices of the Khrushchev regime. Arguing that the "revisionist" views being advocated by Khrushchev were in the past promoted and advocated by Stalin himself, and accusing the Chinese leaders of employing a "back-to-Stalin gambit" in order to channel opposition to Kremlin "revisionism" in a way that suits the needs and interests of the Maoist bureaucracy and attempts to substitute a Mao cult of infallibility for the defunct Stalin cult, Kerry describes what he sees as the fundamental flaws in the Chinese position, and how the American Progressive Labor Movement, under compulsion to settle accounts of its own Stalinist past, has supported Beijing's position in the Sino-Soviet debate, particularly with reference to the downgrading of Stalin, much to the detriment of the cause of the American workers' movement.

1637 Khokhlov, N. E. "Exposé of Mass Murder That Rocked the World." *U.S. News and World Report* 40 (15 June 1956): 34-38+.

This article consists of a document released by the U.S. State Department purporting to be a version of the speech given by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in which he denounced Stalin for, among other transgressions, violating the principles of Leninism, fabricating charges against his political opponents and other party members, betraying the Soviet people through flawed military policies and leadership, and developing "the cult of the individual" glorifying his own person.

1638 Khrushchev, Nikita S. "Khrushchev's Second Secret Speech." Translated by Leo W. Gluchowski. *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 44-49.

The document presented here consists of the previously hidden Polish archival record of the 20 March 1956 speech delivered by Nikita Khrushchev at the sixth plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw, during which he explained why he denounced Stalin in a secret speech to a closed session of the Twentieth CPSU Congress on the evening of 24-25 February 1956. The Warsaw speech, as translator Leo Gluchowski points out in his introduction to the document, was largely extemporaneous and touched upon such subjects as the disastrous legacy of Stalin's foreign policy; his responsibility for the tremendous losses the Soviet Union suffered in World War II; the possibility that if he had lived longer he would have started another war; the paranoia and persecution complex from which he suffered; and the harmful consequences of the cult of personality which he fostered. Following his address, Khrushchev fielded several questions from his audience about the secret speech, the most notable of which dealt with the apparent contradiction between his condemnation of Stalin for a host of abuses and his reference to the dead dictator as "the strongest, the best type of Marxist-Leninist."

1639 "Khrushchev's Sharpened Dilemma." *Life* 42 (14 January 1957): 37.

This report comments on Khrushchev's remarks to foreign diplomats at a 1956 New Year's Eve party at the Kremlin praising Stalin as "a great Marxist" and a tireless warrior against imperialism. Suggesting that the Soviet leader's statements point toward "another switch in the Communist line, from the controlled relaxation of the past two years to another hard period," the report comments on why Khrushchev is likely to find it a lot easier to rehabilitate Stalin than to revitalize the Soviet economy or to deal with the growing independence of the Soviet Union's satellite states.

1640 "Kremlin Has Opened Pandora's Box." *U.S. News and World Report* 40 (30 March 1956): 36-38+.

This interview with an anonymous American government official regarding the denunciation of Stalin by Kremlin leaders covers such subjects as the motivation for the party leadership's attack on Stalin; the involvement of Stalin's denigrators in the very crimes they attributed to him; the possibility that de-Stalinization will lead to a softening of the Soviet dictatorship; and the risks, both within the USSR and the Soviet bloc, taken by Stalin's successors in denouncing him.

1641 Kulski, W. W. "Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party." *Russian Review* 15, no. 3 (1956): 149-64.

Kulski reviews the actions of the party's leaders at the Twentieth Party Congress, stating that the party's moves indicate neither a rejection of Stalin's guiding ideas nor a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet regime but rather a selective assault on his legacy. He comments on the efforts of the Kremlin's leaders to rewrite Stalin's legacy by engaging in Stalinist distortions of party history; their highly selective rehabilitation of Stalin's victims of the thirties and their own complicity in the purges; and their reaffirmation of Stalinist policies with respect to social equality, education, and the leading role to be played by the party's political elite in ruling the country.

Kulski suggests that the leaders' anti-Stalinist performance at the congress stemmed from "long repressed feelings of resentment . . . against their dead master," and that they may find it difficult to continue Stalinist policies now that they have denounced the policies' author.

1642 L., L. "Stalinism in the Post-Stalin Regime. 'The Ministry of Truth' without 'Big Brother.'" *World Today* 10 (July 1954): 300-9.

This article compares the account of Stalin's role in Bolshevik and Soviet history provided by *A Short History of the CPSU (Bolshevik)* to that of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia (GSE)* written the year following his death, showing that, while many of the myths about Stalin are preserved in the *GSE*, the number of references to Stalin by name and his overall role in party affairs have been sharply reduced. The *GSE*'s abandonment of adulation of Stalin and reduction of his legend does not indicate that the new rulers of the Kremlin are adopting an anti-Stalinism line but rather signifies their desire to disconnect Stalin's name from the accomplishments that took place during his rule and to replace his name with that of "the collective wisdom of the Party," allowing the new leadership to claim a share in the achievements of the Stalin era and to legitimize their own right to rule as the dead leader's successors, according to the article. The article also notes that the recently executed Lavrenti Beria does not figure in the new text at all, suggesting that the new leadership will continue to commit "undesirables" to the "memory hole" in the grand tradition of Stalin.

1643 Labeledz, Leopold. "Resurrection—and Perdition." *Problems of Communism* 12, no. 2 (March-April 1963): 48-59.

Labeledz describes the general pattern as well as the character and limitations of the posthumous rehabilitation of Stalin's victims by the dictator's successors. Explaining how rehabilitations in the USSR are a pragmatic affair in which truth is a matter of convenience, and innocence or guilt a utilitarian consideration rather than a moral or legal one, Labeledz examines the politics involved in the rehabilitation of various military and political leaders, and the logic behind the refusal to rehabilitate the prominent old Bolsheviks who were involved in the intraparty struggle against Stalin and were liquidated in the purges of the 1930s. Labeledz also discusses how the complicity of Stalin's political heirs in the crimes and abuses being attributed to the dead dictator along with their need to promote their own legitimacy as the new rulers of the Soviet Union have shaped the erratic character of the rehabilitation process.

1644 Larson, Thomas B. "Dismantling the Cults of Stalin and Khrushchev." *Western Political Quarterly* 21 (September 1968): 383-90.

Larson discusses the ways in which the cults of Stalin and Khrushchev were alike and dissimilar and describes the tactics of deflation employed by the Kremlin leadership in dismantling the two leaders' cults of personality. He maintains that the differences in the cult-styles of Stalin and Khrushchev largely stemmed from the dissimilar personalities of the two leaders and the differing degrees of power they enjoyed. Where Stalin was associated with the transition to socialism and the permanent features of the Soviet Union, Larson writes, Khrushchev was associated with only the current policies of the Kremlin; and where Stalin, especially in his later years, tended to remain in the background as a god-like figure detached from specific policy pronouncements, Khrushchev staked his prestige on programs and policies attached to his own name. The dismantling of the two leaders' cults, Larson shows, proceeded, for the most part, along different lines, with the downgrading of Stalin being fitful, selective, and incomplete compared to the relatively abrupt and nearly total disposal of the Khrushchev cult after 1965. Larson also discusses the post-Khrushchev leadership's reaffirmation of the general line worked out at the Twentieth Party Congress regarding the criticism of Stalin's personality cult, a move he believes was prompted by their desire to quell rumors that the toppling of Khrushchev signals a resurgence of Stalinism.

- 1645** ———. "What Happened to Stalin?" *Problems of Communism* 16, no. 2 (March 1967): 82-90.

Larson examines the de-Stalinization process during the fourteen years since Stalin's death, explaining why the party chose not to preserve the Stalin myth and how the official treatment of Stalin has failed to follow a consistent pattern. Looking at the first hints of de-Stalinization in the 1953-55 period, the substance and impact of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in the closed session of the 1956 party congress, the partial restoration of Stalin's image by Khrushchev during the last eighteen months of his leadership, and the soft-pedaling of de-Stalinization by the regime following Khrushchev's fall from power in October of 1964, Larson sees only slight shifts in the basic line of de-Stalinization worked out over the years since 1953, according to which Stalin was "a figure of minor consequence whose errors and faults outweigh his contributions and services," and he does not believe objectivity will become the criterion for evaluating Stalin any time soon. Larson closes with an assessment of the extent to which de-Stalinization can be considered a success for the Soviet regime.

- 1646** Lawrence, David. "You Can't Bury the Facts, Mr. Khrushchev." *U.S. News and World Report* 51 (20 November 1961): 120.

Khrushchev's ordering of the removal of Stalin's body from its place of honor in the mausoleum in Red Square housing that of Lenin cannot obscure the fact that he and his comrades were key members of Stalin's supporting cast during the worst years of the dictator's reign or that they remain "Stalinists in action as well as thought," according to this brief commentary.

- 1647** Leonhard, Wolfgang. "Russia Re-Stalinizes." *Atlas* 10 (July 1965): 20-21.

Leonhard points out a series of signs indicating that, under Khrushchev's successors, criticism of Stalin is waning, including such signals as the opening of a film which presents Stalin in a positive light in several instances; the regime's efforts to ban further discussion of Stalin and the Stalinist past; and the failure of Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev to question Stalin's wartime leadership in his speech on the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Hitler. He also discusses the domestic political importance of the Kremlin's apparent reevaluation of Stalin, and the bearing that re-Salinization might have on Soviet foreign policy.

- 1648** Levitsky, Serge L. "Stalin—Purged by His Creatures." *America* 94 (31 March 1956): 712-13.

Levitsky places the retreat from Stalin initiated at the Twentieth Party Congress, along with the Kremlin's espousal of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, within the context of the long-standing Bolshevik practice of making practical compromises when circumstances require the party to do so. He maintains that those who believe Khrushchev and his colleagues will lead Russia back to the "true democratic principles inherent in communism" fail to recognize that the "stunning announcements" made at the party congress represent merely a tactical shift on the Kremlin's part rather than a radical departure from previous policies or a fundamental revision of Soviet ideology.

- 1649** Little, Robert. "Conversations about Stalin." *New Leader* 48 (28 April 1965): 14-15.

Little cites conversations he had in Moscow with a number of Soviet citizens in illustrating that, despite the downgrading of Stalin by his successors in the Kremlin, the dead dictator's tarnished image is viewed by many in the USSR with "a Peter the Great-like respect." The accomplishments made in the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule, including the industrialization of the economy, the victory over Nazi Germany, and the emergence of the nation as a dominant world power, account for much of the renewed respect for him, Little explains, as does the selective and somewhat muted nature of the post-Stalin regime's exposure and criticism of the dead dictator's crimes.

1650 "Living with the Ghost of Stalin." *Newsweek* 73 (24 February 1969): 40-42.

Newsweek reports on evidence of neo-Stalinism in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, including the resurgence of some figures who were powerful during the Stalin era and, more notably, the rehabilitation of Stalin himself. The article also speculates on why the Brezhnev/Kosygin regime opted to soften the official line on Stalin's crimes, emphasizing the two leaders' need, as Stalin's heirs and accomplices, to play up the accomplishments of the Stalin era as a way of legitimizing "the position of those who served their apprenticeship to power during that period."

1651 London, Ivan D. and Miriam B. London. "Soviet Reaction to the Downgrading of Stalin and Some Suggestions for American Broadcasts to the Soviet Union." *Psychological Reports* 2, monograph supplement 7 (1956): 341-56.

The Londons discuss the range of popular reactions to the denunciation of Stalin, including renewed hope for better times, blame of the Soviet system for the evils of Stalinism, and criticism of the then current Soviet leaders for allowing a man like Stalin to come to power and abuse his authority. Contending that the Soviet people's restlessness, dissatisfaction with the communist regime, and yearning for a better way of life compelled the Kremlin to denounce Stalin, the Londons suggest that American broadcasters to the USSR should take full advantage of the fact that the Soviet people, at this moment, are likely to listen openly to what they hear from the West.

1652 Lorince, Gabriel. "Stalin Rehabilitated?" *New Statesman* 71 (25 March 1966): 420.

Lorince comments briefly on the possibility of a partial rehabilitation of Stalin at the upcoming Twenty-third Party Congress, pointing to signs of an ideological tightening at the regional and republic levels of the party, and to statements made by "powerful voices" in the Soviet Union against the "indiscriminate" denunciation of Stalin. He also remarks on a letter sent to the Communist Party's First Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, by twenty-five prominent Soviet intellectuals warning the Kremlin of the dire consequences of a Stalinist revival.

1653 Martin, Robert P. "New Image of Stalin on His 100th Birthday." *U.S. News and World Report* 87 (17 December 1979): 45.

Martin describes the revival of the Stalin mystique; cites examples of the restoration of Stalin's stature and honor; speculates on how far the deceased dictator might be rehabilitated; and comments on the threat posed to the West as well as to the interests of the Soviet people by a new Stalinism.

1654 Meany, George. "Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." *American Federationist* 63 (1956): 4-6.

Meany outlines the changes in the international policies of communism and the modifications in the methods of the Soviet Communist Party regime announced at the party's 1956 congress. In discussing the party's condemnation of the "cult of the individual" and proclamation of the principle of "collective leadership," Meany challenges the Kremlin's leaders to go beyond attacking Stalin for his illegal actions against leaders in the party, the government, and the military to condemn the whole range of the dictator's "anti-human criminal deeds," including forced collectivization, the exploitation of the workers, the introduction of slave labor, and the persecution of national minorities. He suggests that the half-hearted and incomplete denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress and Khrushchev's deplorable tactics in dealing with his rivals within the party point toward "collective leadership" being only a hollow slogan for a regime that calls for a return to Leninism but behaves toward the party in the tradition of Stalin.

1655 "The Mess in Moscow Deepens." *Life* 40 (25 June 1956): 31.

This article considers Khrushchev's speech denouncing the crimes of Stalin to be a devastating indictment of the Soviet system, and one which reveals that Stalin's closest colleagues, Khrush-

chev included, are cowards who did not dare to resist Stalin in any way, choosing instead to be agents of the crimes and tyranny for which they now solely blame their former boss. The efforts of the new leaders to give themselves an air of respectability in the eyes of the Russian people and to establish their right to rule by distancing themselves from some of the worst abuses of the Stalin era serve to reveal that "Communism is incapable of real legitimacy, or continuity without falsification and force," according to the article.

1656 "The Middle Way." *Newsweek* 75 (5 January 1970): 22-23.

Newsweek describes the efforts of the Kremlin to remove some of the tarnish from Stalin's image since Khrushchev's fall from power, including the toning down of critical references to Stalin in the party's official history and the launching of a campaign against those who have attacked the dead dictator. In commenting on why the Brezhnev/Kosygin regime has moved toward rehabilitating Stalin, the article suggests that the Kremlin's leaders have come to fear that the process of de-Stalinization might eventually undermine the authority of the Communist Party itself.

1657 Mohanty, Manoranjan. "Mao's Portrait of Stalin." *China Report* 11, no. 4 (1975): 19-29.

This assessment of Mao Tse-tung's appraisal of Stalin centers on how the Chinese leader, while repeatedly acknowledging his Soviet counterpart's contribution to the development of the USSR and the promotion of world communism, pointed out Stalin's departures from dialectical materialism, his one-sidedness in economic planning, the "overlord flavor" of Stalin's work style, and the airs of superiority he projected in his dealings with others. Mohanty also comments on Mao's analysis of the conditions and forces which led to the centralization of power in the CPSU, the enforcement of political terror, and deviations in economic development in the USSR under Stalin. He contrasts Mao's effort to distinguish Stalin's merits from his mistakes with Khrushchev's 1956 wholesale denunciation of Stalin, and he shows how Mao's writings attempt "to link up Stalin's errors with Khrushchev's revisionism by saying that both were departures from dialectical materialism and both arose out of metaphysical premises."

1658 "More on Correction of Stalin Era." *New World Review* (June 1956): 42-45.

This article lists the main steps taken by the Kremlin's leaders in the months following the Twentieth Party Congress to correct some of the abuses of the Stalin era, including a reduction of the special powers which Soviet security organs had under Stalin, the elimination of the practice of "trial by confessions," the release of people wrongly imprisoned during Stalin's rule, and the phasing out of Stalin's internment camps.

1659 Murarka, Dev. "Disloyal Opposition." *World Press Review* 35 (June 1988): 12-13.

Murarka comments on the political campaign being waged against perestroika by Stalinists and Brezhnevites, and on how their struggle to halt the reform process launched by Mikhail Gorbachev revolves around the central issue of de-Stalinization. He also remarks on the efforts of the Stalinists to suppress the showing of Mikhail Shatrov's *Onward, Onward, Onward*, a play which suggests that Stalin's assumption of power occurred because Lenin's last testament—in which he urged that Stalin be removed from his post as the Communist Party's General Secretary—was not heeded.

1660 ———. "A New Revolution in Consciousness." *Nation* 245 (31 October 1987): 486-88+.

The second of a two-part commentary on the growing movement among Soviet historians for discerning the truth about the Stalin and Brezhnev years, this article describes the deluge of Stalin criticism from all quarters of the Soviet intelligentsia, including critiques of the dead tyrant's purge of the Soviet officer corps and his wartime leadership, and the efforts of Stalinists and Brezhnevites to counter the new movement by way of an assault on its chief spokesman, Yuri Afanasiev. Murarka also discusses the close connection between the destruction of the Stalin leg-

end and Gorbachev's efforts to regenerate Soviet society, emphasizing the importance of the need to either destroy or drastically modify the value systems in ideology, economics, history, and philosophy Stalin imposed on the Soviet Union if lasting reconstruction of the Soviet system is to take place.

1661 ———. "Recovering the Buried Stalin Years." *Nation* 245 (24 October 1987): 433+.

The efforts of various prominent figures in Soviet academic circles to give shape to Mikhail Gorbachev's 10 July 1987 call for a balanced view of the development of the Soviet Union over the previous seventy years are the focus of this account of the intensification of the de-Stalinization campaign under the twin policies of glasnost and perestroika. Among the key components of the revitalized de-Stalinization campaign, Murarka writes, are the rejection of the core of Stalinist economic policy, with its bias in favor of centralization; a radical reinterpretation of the basis of Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s, a subject beyond public discussion previously; and a call for the restructuring of historical studies, including a proper study of the Stalin period, a reevaluation of Stalin's works, and a new history of the Communist Party, one free of all Stalinist distortions. Murarka also discusses the critical response to Afanasiev's initiatives by Stalinists and Brezhnevites in the academic community, who felt that their careers and reputations were being threatened by the disparagement of the standards of Soviet historical studies.

1662 "Murder Will Out." *Time* 67 (26 March 1956): 30-1.

Time summarizes the charges made against Stalin by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress and speculates that his exposure of Stalin's crimes against the party and the Soviet people was motivated by his desire to absolve himself and his colleagues from the charge of complicity in Stalin's guilt. The article also describes the confusion Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin has generated within the Soviet Union and other communist states.

1663 Murphy, R. D. "The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin." *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 34 (30 April 1956): 719-22.

In this 19 April 1956 address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the speaker, a Deputy Under Secretary of State, discusses the manner in which the devaluation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU has been handled by the Soviet press during the seven weeks since Khrushchev's "secret speech" and the motives of the Kremlin's leaders in denigrating and downgrading the man who for twenty-five years had been accorded god-like status in the communist world. Murphy also comments on the implications of the assault on Stalin's leadership for American policy, emphasizing here the State Department's belief that the Soviets have not changed their basic objectives but rather have opted to reduce their emphasis on military strength and threat of force as major instruments of policy in favor of more diverse and peaceful methods to achieve their long-term goals while they make the transition from one-man rule to group dictatorship.

1664 Myers, James T. "De-Stalinization and the Hero Cult of Mao Tse-tung." *Orbis* 9 (summer 1965): 472-93.

This examination of the deterioration of relations between China and the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev years and of the blossoming of the cult of Mao includes an account of Chinese reaction to Khrushchev's 1956 attack and of Beijing's efforts to limit the attack to Stalin himself and explain how such a state of affairs could have arisen in the Soviet Union. Myers also describes how the Mao regime managed to turn adversity to advantage by pointing out the errors of Stalin's policy toward the Chinese Revolution and by filling the ideological vacuum left by de-Stalinization—all while advancing Mao's personal claim to legitimacy.

1665 Niebuhr, Reinhold. "Stalin: Deity to Demon." *Christianity and Crisis* 16 (April 1956): 42-43.

Niebuhr comments on the motives for and consequence of the revelation at the Twentieth Party Congress that Stalin, "who was worshipped so long as a god, was a beast of diabolical portions, who ruled by fear and terror." He speculates that the "de-divinization" of Stalin was the price of winning the military oligarchy's support of the new government, and that the denigration of the dead tyrant was "a collective decision, designed to prevent a new dictator from arising" and to distance the new leadership from "the odium of Stalin's tyranny." Niebuhr suggests that while the new Soviet communism "may no longer be pure tyranny . . . it is still collectivism, which denies human freedom," and that because this collectivism remains attractive to the peoples of Asia and Africa, the communist movement may well remain a "formidable opponent and foe for decades to come."

1666 Nordenstam, Gunnar. "Destalinization in Soviet Political Science." *Acta Sociologica* 7 (1964): 131-50.

Nordenstam discusses the development of the journal *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (*Soviet State and Law*) in the decade following Stalin's death as a case study in how changes which occurred in Soviet ideology after 1953 affected the social sciences. Dividing his analysis into sections entitled "The First Signs of Anti-Stalinism (1953-55)," "Destalinization and New Checks (1956-58)," and "The New Outlook (1959-63)," Nordenstam examines three main aspects of the journal's development: renewals of the editorial staff, which are presumed to have had a political basis; changes in party directives to the community of political scientists, as expressed in editorial articles in the journal; and changes in the character of a selection of the articles published in the journal during the years under review. He concludes that changes in Soviet political science after 1953, as reflected by the development of *Soviet State and Law*, seem to coincide with a change between periods of reform and consolidation in the overall pattern of Soviet development and with peaks and valleys in official anti-Stalinism, a conclusion which he supports by tallying the frequency, or lack, of references to Stalin in the sources cited in the footnotes of the articles from *Soviet State and Law* selected for analysis.

1667 Novak, Derry. "The Cult of Personality in Soviet Policy: Stalin, De-Stalinization, and Khrushchevization." *Queen's Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (1962): 407-15.

Novak opens with an account of the origins and leading manifestations of the cult of Stalin, and then focuses on the various aspects of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev's leadership, including the Kremlin's curtailment of the powers of the political police, increased emphasis on the production of consumer goods, loosening of restraints on intellectual pursuits, propagation of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, and assault on the evils of Stalinism that directly flowed from the cult of personality. Novak also notes the very un-Marxist approach taken by the Khrushchev regime in attributing many of the ills of the Stalin era to the dictator's own personal mistakes, and that some evils of Stalinism persist under Khrushchev, though in a limited way.

1668 "... Of the Twelve Days That Shook Communism." *Newsweek* 47 (26 March 1956): 46-47. The charges leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress and the efforts under way in the Soviet Union to remove the symbols of Stalin and Stalinism are the main subjects of this brief article. In denouncing Stalin, the article maintains, the "Soviet leaders were responding to their people's revulsion from one-man rule—and to their own fears of rival ambitions."

1669 "On Overcoming the Soviet Cult: Resolution by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party." *New World Review* (August 1956): 55-60.

The *New World Review* publishes here a summary of the resolution by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences," the text of which was carried by the *New York Times* on 3 July 1956. The resolution includes statements on the necessity to speak out against the cult; the conditions under which the emergence of the cult became possible in the Soviet socialist regime; the negative personality traits of Stalin which contributed to the cult; the grave consequences of the cult for the party, the Soviet people, and the socialist cause; and the measures to be taken to eliminate the personality cult and its various ill-effects. The resolution also deplores the efforts of "reactionary circles in capitalist countries" to utilize the party's condemnation of the Stalin cult to undermine confidence in the USSR and to conceal the fact that "the question at issue is a past stage in the life of the Soviet Union."

1670 "On the Anniversary." *Time* 81 (15 March 1963): 43.

This article deals with Albania's glorification of Stalin's memory, on the tenth anniversary of his death and in defiance of the Kremlin's de-Stalinization campaign, as well as with why the Chinese Communist Party chose to mark the occasion with a new blast at the Khrushchev regime for its advocacy of peaceful coexistence with the West rather than by celebrating Stalin's contributions to the communist cause.

1671 Parry, Albert. "The Twentieth Congress: Stalin's 'Second Funeral.'" *American Slavic and East European Review* 15 (December 1956): 463-76.

Parry analyzes the motives, substance, and meaning of Khrushchev's speech attacking Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress. In examining the plausible theories for Khrushchev's actions, Parry discusses the "sheer accident theory," which holds that Khrushchev did not mean to launch his anti-Stalin campaign but was compelled to do so by events and developments that took place once the congress was under way; the "murder theory," which maintains that Khrushchev and his associates killed Stalin, and, in blackening Stalin's character, sought to protect themselves against those who would use Stalin's murder as a pretext to overthrow them; the "pressure from the new elite theory," which sees Khrushchev's speech and the ensuing campaign denigrating Stalin as emanating from a shift of socioeconomic and political forces within the party and the country at large; and the "carrot-for-the-masses theory," which contends that Khrushchev offered the promise of social and economic reforms to win popular support for the new regime and revitalize the common man's work ethic and commitment to socialism. The question of motives put aside, Khrushchev's attack on the dead tyrant, Parry writes, not only fell far short of condemning Stalinism, but also offered a wholly unconvincing rationale as to why the party's leaders failed to assert themselves against the cult of the individual during Stalin's lifetime. What Khrushchev calls "the tragedy of Stalin is actually the tragedy of the Soviet system itself," a system begun by Lenin and developed to its full potential by Stalin, and which, with slight modifications, remains intact under Khrushchev, Parry concludes.

1672 Picht, Ulrich. "Rehabilitations after Stalin's death." *Studies on the Soviet Union* 2 (1963): 23-34.

Picht describes the different stages of the process of the rehabilitation of various victims of Stalinism from the time of Stalin's death in 1953 through the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, explaining how the logic behind the selection of those who were and were not rehabilitated, and the methods employed to publicize the rehabilitation of a given person, relate to the political needs of Khrushchev, who exploited fully the rehabilitation issue "to increase his own prestige and to consolidate his own position." Picht also discusses how, even though Stalin's public degradation had been accomplished by the end of the Twenty-second Party Congress and Khrushchev had secured his own position as the party's leader, the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalin's purges remains far from complete, and "socialist legality" still bows to political power, with many of the

party's most outstanding leaders still remaining its "enemies," and those who had themselves been the chief organizers of Stalinist persecutions being counted among the party's faithful.

1673 Pizhikov, Aleksandr. "Sources of Dissidence: Soviet Youth after the Twentieth Party Congress." *Russian Politics and Law* 42, no. 5 (September-October 2004): 64-77.

Pizhikov describes the ways in which the political liberalization of domestic life in the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin caused significant shifts in the public awareness of Soviet youth, leading them to assume an active, independent public life and to develop a more questioning attitude toward the Soviet government and the Stalinist past. With reference to Stalin, Pizhikov mainly discusses how Khrushchev's failure to tell the whole truth about his former boss encouraged young people to conduct their own search for answers to various questions that troubled them about Stalin and the Stalin era, including How was the cult of personality able to take root in a socialist society? How was a criminal figure such as Stalin able to hold power for so long? and Why did the party's leaders allow political democracy and basic human freedoms to be sacrificed in the Soviet socialist state under Stalin's rule?

1674 Ploss, Sidney I. "The Bolshevik Party As the First Secretary Likes It." *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 77-98.

Ploss discusses the points of likeness and convergence between the 1959 version of the Bolshevik record offered by the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* and its 1938 counterpart, the *Short Course*. He points out how the most recent account of the party's history, in comparison to the *Short Course*, downgrades Stalin in a number of respects, particularly with regard to his role in the 1917 Revolution and the Russian Civil War, the originality of his discourse on the nationality question, and his stature alongside Lenin. The new text also adheres to the "go-soft-on-Stalin" line propounded by Khrushchev after the East European upheavals of 1956—a line which disregards Stalin's role in the atrocities of the 1930s, and which applauds his defense of Leninism against Trotskyism and other "anti-Party groupings" as well as his championing of the cause of party unity. Ploss also describes how the new text attempts to distance Khrushchev and his associates from the terrorism of Stalin and to legitimize their rule and the leading role of the party by drawing upon suitable quotations from Lenin.

1675 "Politics in the Tomb." *U.S. News and World Report* 51 (13 November 1961): 4.

This article reports on the 31 October 1961 removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square, speculating that the decision to evict Stalin may represent a calculated reply to the wave of "Stalinism" cropping up in the People's Republic of China and some Soviet satellite states in defiance of the Khrushchev regime.

1676 Pospelovsky, Dmitry. "Re-Stalinization or De-Stalinization?" *Russian Review* 27, no. 1 (1968): 307-20.

Pospelovsky considers the supposition, put forth by various members of the Soviet intelligentsia in the mid-1960s, that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's gradual silencing of criticism of Stalin may end with Stalin's complete rehabilitation and the re-Stalinization of Soviet rule. According to Pospelovsky, neither a return to one-person Stalinism nor a "collective Stalinism" is likely, given the regime's implementation of "deeper de-Stalinization processes in the sphere of economics" and its fear that any re-Stalinization at the upper levels of the party could, in the long run, cost them dearly. Fear of the adverse effects of allowing further overt attacks on Stalinism, particularly with respect to how such criticism might expose the shortcomings of the Soviet system itself, is most likely the key source of the suppression of verbal assaults on Stalin rather than any desire to return to Stalinist political practices, in Pospelovsky's view.

1677 Pries, Anne. "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech': Confusion of Tongues." *Journal of Communist Studies* 6, no. 1 (1990): 81-85.

Pries examines the history of the dissemination of the "secret speech" delivered by Khrushchev on 25 February 1956 during a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress, comparing three early versions of the speech to the official Russian text that appeared in the third issue of *Izvestia TsK KPSS*, 1989. Pries's main findings are that there is no difference between the four versions with respect to broad content; that the version that circulated in Poland during the month following the speech, published officially in 1988, is "a proper and close translation" of the original text; that the American text, released by the U.S. State Department on 4 June 1956, is a translation of the Polish version; and that a Russian-language version that appeared in booklet form in 1959, and was supposedly published in Moscow, is a forgery printed somewhere in the West, the intent of which was to make the speech more accessible to the Soviet people.

1678 Pryce-Jones, David. "God's Commie." *National Review* 54, no. 24 (23 December 2002): 24-26.

The focus of this brief article is the work done in exposing the record of Stalin's crimes by Alexander Yakolev, a former member of the Politburo and head of the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression. Yakolev's view of Lenin as a primitive mass murderer, and of Stalin as Lenin's "worthy pupil" and the instigator of horrific crimes against the nation's cultural elite, also receive consideration in the article.

1679 "The Quick and the Dead" *Time* 67 (2 April 1956): 34+.

This article presents a brief account of Khrushchev's rehabilitation of some of the victims of Stalin's purges and the response of communist leaders in France, Italy, and East Germany to the Kremlin's downgrading of Stalin.

1680 Rinehart, Dianne. "Denouncing Stalin and 'Stagnation.'" *Maclean's* 101 (11 July 1988): 27. This account of the statements made by Mikhail Gorbachev, at a special Communist Party Conference in Moscow in July 1988, regarding the sins of the Stalin and Brezhnev eras, includes a brief commentary on the denunciation of the two former Soviet leaders by speaker after speaker at the meeting once the gates of criticism were firmly opened by the General Secretary. Rinehart also notes the support given by Gorbachev, in his closing speech, for the proposal for the construction of a memorial in Moscow honoring the victims of Stalinism.

1681 Ritvo, Herbert. "The Dynamics of De-Stalinization." *Survey* 47 (1963): 13-23.

Ritvo analyzes the dynamics of the denunciation of Stalin, developing the theme that the major elements of de-Stalinization can be traced to the initiative of Khrushchev himself, and that the limitations of the planned reforms have been determined primarily by him as well. Within this framework, Ritvo discusses the administrative, judicial, and economic reforms that accompanied Khrushchev's limited assault on the crimes of Stalin; the dependence of the reforms on the party and its leader; the ease with which the new Soviet leader was able to increase party control over the state and military bureaucracies; and the fact that Khrushchev, in setting the goals and policies of the "new" de-Stalinized Russia, is no more dependent on the institutional bureaucracies or the social forces within Soviet society than was his now condemned predecessor.

1682 Roberts, Daniel. "Developments in the Soviet Union." *International Socialist Review* 17 (1956): 84-89.

Roberts describes the "new course" taken by the Kremlin leadership that began with Stalin's death and came to a climax at the Twentieth Party Congress, including the reforms in education, the economy, the bureaucracy, and judicial procedures, the thaw in the arts and sciences, and the termination of the cult of Stalin. According to Roberts, the post-Stalin leaders of the party adopted a

reformist posture not because of any sincere desire to bring an end to the Stalinist system but rather in response to mounting pressure from a Soviet populace tired of years of economic sacrifice and political repression, and they moved slowly and fitfully in exposing Stalin's crimes and in publicly liquidating the Stalin cult in an effort to ensure that criticism of Stalinism did not get out of hand and threaten their own totalitarian rule of the Soviet people.

1683 Salisbury, Harrison E. "Dilemma That Haunts the Kremlin." *New York Times Magazine* (27 January 1957): 11+.

Khrushchev's praise of Stalin as a fighter against imperialism and as a staunch warrior in the cause of communism, less than a year after denouncing the deceased tyrant at the Twentieth Party Congress, is the starting point of this account of the dilemma the Kremlin leadership faces in trying to maintain its grip on Soviet society and the satellite nations while easing many of the repressive features of the Stalinist system. Salisbury discusses this dilemma within the context of the Khrushchev regime's recognition of the fact that Stalin had pressed the use of force and dictatorial methods beyond the point of diminishing returns, and that the shackling of Russian creative, technical, and scientific forces under Stalin had to be countered if the Soviet Union were to compete economically and strategically with America.

1684 ———. "Stalin Makes a Comeback." *New York Times Magazine* (23 December 1979): 19-20+.

Salisbury discusses the probable reasons for the popular nostalgia for Stalin that emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, emphasizing the role played by the economic stagnation and failed hopes that characterized the seventies along with the growing public disillusionment with the "tired old oligarchy" then running the country and which looked feeble in comparison to "the glory days" of the powerful and goal-oriented Stalin regime. The failure of the post-Stalin leadership to provide a full revelation of the dead dictator's crimes so as to discourage any resurgence of his image, Salisbury explains, also contributed to Stalin being transformed by ordinary Russians into a folk idol.

1685 Schwartz, Harry. "A Year Later—Russia's View of Stalin." *New York Times Magazine* (7 March 1954): 17.

Writing a year after Stalin's death, Schwartz outlines the principal signs that a deflation of the dead leader's reputation in the Soviet Union is under way, including a sharp decline in images and mention of Stalin in the Soviet press; the omission of his name in the section of the new version of the official history of the Soviet Communist Party describing how the Bolshevik Revolution was accomplished; and the Soviet press's repudiation of a basic tenet he had set down regarding the means by which Russia would move to pure communism. Schwartz also discusses the possible motives behind this calculated effort to reduce Stalin's stature, speculating that the campaign may not go any further for quite some time because the Kremlin's new leaders cannot dispense with the Stalin myth entirely without calling into question their own right to rule the party and the nation.

1686 "Selective Objectivity." *Newsweek* 65 (25 May 1965): 54-55.

Newsweek notes the impact made by the inclusion of Stalin in several sequences of a World War II documentary called *The Great Patriotic War* and links his appearance in the film and various references to him in speeches, articles, and interviews recorded in the Soviet press to a new official line on Stalin's rule, one which represents a move away from his vilification by Khrushchev toward a somewhat more objective portrayal of his role in Soviet history.

1687 Service, R. J. "Road to the Twentieth Party Congress: An Analysis of the Events Surrounding the Central Committee Plenum of July 1953." *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 2 (April 1981): 232-45.

Service discusses the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU as “a milestone on the road to de-Stalinization.” Characterizing the plenum’s decisions as an embryo of alterations in official policy that marked the rest of the decade, Service discusses how the decree produced at the July meeting not only marked the first official step toward the disavowal of Stalin’s crimes and abuses but also mapped out a course of economic reorientation in reaction to the shortcomings of his industrial and agricultural policies. He also notes the halting nature of the decree adopted by the plenum, the short life span of the agreement it arrived at, and the fears of the party’s leaders that open criticism of the abuses of Stalin might touch off ferment which they could not fully control.

1688 “Settling Scores.” *Newsweek* 58 (4 December 1961): 39.

This article briefly describes the intensification of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign in the weeks following the removal of the deceased leader’s body from the Lenin Mausoleum, and how the campaign has reverberated throughout the communist bloc.

1689 Shapiro, Jane P. “The Soviet Press and the Problem of Stalin.” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 4, nos. 3-4 (1971): 179-209.

Shapiro traces the treatment accorded Stalin in the mass-circulation Soviet press during the years since his death through the early post-Khrushchev period, showing how this body of published materials reflects the party’s inability to maintain a clear-cut position on the Stalin issue. Drawing from four CPSU Central Committee journals, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, each of the major Russian-language journals of the fifteen republics, and books concerned primarily with party and general Soviet history which have been published in large quantities, Shapiro describes the party’s adoption of a series of policies regarding the late dictator, with four distinct periods emerging: March 1953-February 1956, when reference to Stalin’s name and deeds appeared less and less frequently, but overt criticism of him was not tolerated; February 1956-October 1961, when frequent criticism of Stalin’s “cult of personality” and occasional references to some of the victims of his repressive policies were permitted, and favorable mention of him was largely absent; November 1961-May 1965, when Stalin was criticized frequently and very rarely praised, and his errors and miscalculations were often referred to; and May 1965 to 1971, when criticism of Stalin moderated, and recognition of his achievements was permitted and occasionally encouraged. She presents a number of examples of how editors and authors, in accord with the party leadership’s failure to establish a clear policy and insist on conformity to it in all materials approved for publication, often failed to adhere to the general policy line, with regional periodicals sometimes being out of step with the shifting party line on Stalin or, out of caution, remaining completely silent about the subject of Stalin, and with treatment not only varying between the regional press and organs of the Central Committee periodicals but even among those organs themselves.

1690 “Shattering a False God.” *America* 95 (16 June 1956): 275.

This brief report commends Khrushchev for criticizing Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress and entertains the hypothesis that Stalin did not die a natural death but rather was liquidated by the present ruling clique, a deed for which Khrushchev’s speech provides ample apologia.

1691 Smith, Jessica. “The Khrushchev Report.” *New World Review* (July 1956): 49-53.

Smith opens with a restatement of the principal charges leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev in the secret report delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress and with a brief examination of the question of why Stalin was able to rule in such a monstrous fashion for two decades without the party’s leadership taking any action against him. She then argues for the value of the social, economic, and cultural advances made by the Soviet Union in the Stalin era; points out the contradiction between the gains made during this era and the imposition of an all-powerful police system which negated their basic purpose; and calls for the eradication of all vestiges of the system Stalin

created to sustain his dictatorial and abusive rule. Smith finds hope in the process of reevaluation and correction under way in the Soviet Union, and she commends the Kremlin's leaders for reaching out to the West in the name of peaceful coexistence.

1692 ———. "On the Reappraisal of Stalin's Role." *New World Review* (April 1956): 48-52.

Smith offers a few preliminary observations on the reappraisal of the role of Stalin by party leaders at the Twentieth Party Congress and explains why she feels that she should refrain from further comment on the party's reevaluation of Stalin until the full text of Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin is made public. While the direct attacks on Stalin's leadership have shocked the world, Smith writes, the speeches and discussions at the congress "show a frank facing up to mistakes of the past, and record vigorous measures already taken to correct them and a determination to avoid their repetition." For Smith, the courage shown by the party's leaders in initiating a sharp reevaluation of Stalin's leadership "is in itself a tremendous testimonial to the health and strength of Soviet socialist society."

1693 ———. "A Statement to Our Readers: Re-Evaluation and Correction." *New World Review* (May 1956): 46-58.

Smith offers an apology, in her capacity as the editor of the *New World Review*, for having misled her readers over the years about Stalin's crimes and abuses because of her "own unquestioning faith" in the Soviet system. She then goes on to comment on the harm done by the cult of the individual, with "its violation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism," and on the fate that befell Jewish cultural and political leaders in the Soviet Union as a result of Stalin's "pathological suspicions" that there were plots afoot against himself and the Soviet state. She also points out some of the steps undertaken by the Kremlin's leaders to redress the sins of Stalinism, including the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims among the old Bolsheviks and efforts to correct "the stifling effects of dogmatism" in all branches of Soviet science.

1694 Souvarine, Boris. "Stalin's Accomplices." *Problems of Communism* 5 (September-October 1956): 47-50.

Souvarine challenges the judgment pronounced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress that Stalin, by himself, usurped power and was responsible for the crimes committed during his twenty-five years as the party's leader. He outlines the complicity of various party figures in the crimes of the Stalin era, including Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan along with three protégés of Kaganovich—Bulganin, Malenkov, and Khrushchev himself.

1695 "Stalin and Stalinism." *Problems of Communism* 18, (July/September 1969): 102-5.

The editors publish two documents as a sample of the hundreds of writings circulating clandestinely in the USSR in 1969 in response to the Soviet regime's efforts to recast Stalin in an increasingly flattering and heroic mold. The first was written by Peter Yakir, a noted historian and critic of Soviet totalitarianism whose father was a victim of Stalin's purges of the Red Army's officer corps, and calls for the posthumous trial of Stalin for a range of violations of the Soviet penal code, including abuse of power, illegal arrests and imprisonments during the mass purges, the use of torture against "enemies of the people," illegal deportations of various Soviet people from their native lands, and sabotage against Soviet industry and agriculture by way of his liquidation of administrators, scientists, and technicians vital to the nation's economy. The second is a petition, addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights, signed by a body calling itself "The Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the USSR," citing a series of political persecutions which represent a return to the Stalin era and asking the committee to come to the defense of human rights in the Soviet Union.

1696 "Stalin Evicted." *America* 106 (11 November 1961): 173.

The removal of Stalin's body from the tomb of Lenin in Red Square is a clear sign of final victory over the political elements that opposed the post-Stalin reforms of Khrushchev, but Khrushchev's bid to extend the rejection of Stalinism will most likely widen the breach with Red China and Albania, and the radical change in the official attitude toward the Stalin regime will take some time for the Russian people to digest, according to this brief commentary written soon after the eviction of Stalin from the Lenin Mausoleum.

1697 "Stalin Purge: A Cartoon Roundup." *New York Times Magazine* (1 April 1956): 12-13.

This collage includes cartoons from eight Western newspapers portraying the Kremlin's 1956 devaluation of Stalin.

1698 "Stalin the Mild." *Newsweek* 76 (6 July 1970): 49.

Newsweek interprets the installation of a bust atop Stalin's Kremlin grave depicting him as "a gentle, fatherly looking man" as a further sign of the party's desire to restore Stalin's reputation. The article also comments on the motives of the Kremlin's leaders in refurbishing his image, including their fear that the vilification of the deceased leader serves to discredit the party and undercut their own authority, and on the response of Soviet dissidents to the regime's latest step in rehabilitating Stalin.

1699 "Stalin, the Myth." *Commonweal* 63 (30 March 1956): 655-56.

This article summarizes the criticism reportedly voiced by Khrushchev against Stalin in a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress; notes the varied reaction within the Soviet Union, Europe, and America to the charges leveled against the late dictator; and comments on how the new leaders of Russia, having underestimated the difficulty inherent in destroying a myth, have opened a Pandora's box and, in so doing, have presented the West with an opportunity to take advantage of the deep disruption within the communist world that the assault on Stalin will undoubtedly generate.

1700 "Stalin Told to the Children." *Economist* 179 (2 June 1956): 909-10.

The Economist notes how the communist youth journal, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, in seeking to answer the queries posed by young Russians puzzled over the debunking of Stalin, has carried an article highlighting the evils of the "cult of the individual" which anchors its accusations in a citation from Lenin's December 1922 memo on the future prospects of the party in which he pointed out the negative features of Stalin's character and suggested that Stalin's tendency toward abusing power could lead to a violation of collective leadership. The campaign against Stalin is not likely to lead to a full disclosure of the contents of Lenin's "testament" since it contains too many flattering references to Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin, "who still lie in the official black book," the note concludes.

1701 "Stalinism Redivivus?" *Problems of Communism* 17, no. 5 (1968): 24-36.

This collection of documents attesting to the evils and sufferings that came with Stalinism consists of writings by leading representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia and was compiled as a representation of the efforts then under way to promote a more humane political and social order in the USSR by speaking out against the regime's tightening of controls over dissident voices in Soviet society. Among the Stalin-related subjects addressed by the collection are the rise and development of the Stalin cult, the criminal actions undertaken by Stalin and his cohorts, the similarities between fascism and Stalinism, the possibility of the rehabilitation of Stalin, and why any exculpation of Stalin would be tantamount to the defamation of socialism.

1702 "Stalin's Feet of Clay." *Economist* 178 (24 May 1956): 639.

This brief note describes how news of the denunciation of Stalin at the then recent secret session of the CPSU Congress in Moscow managed to “spread like lightning” throughout the USSR and Soviet bloc, leading to considerable discussion, argument, and speculation about the appropriateness and meaning of “Khrushchev’s bombshell.” Those who have come to the defense of Stalin are unlikely to find much popular support for their position, nor is the Khrushchev regime likely to suffer any harm from its assault on the dead tyrant’s image, the note predicts.

1703 “Stalin’s Former Friends.” *New Republic* 134 (26 March 1956): 5.

The Stalin myth has been deflated by his former henchmen mainly because the national paranoia which the late dictator generated “prevents the closer relationship that the collective leadership desires between the regime and the people and between the Soviet state and the outside world,” according to this brief article written a month following Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress.

1704 “Stalin’s Ghost Is a Lively One.” *U.S. News and World Report* 40 (15 June 1956): 51-52.

The wealth of pictures, statues, and other images of Stalin across the Soviet Union, along with his entombment at Lenin’s side in the Red Square mausoleum, clearly indicates that the visible downgrading of the late dictator still has a long way to go, according to this report. The report also describes some of the problems triggered by the party leadership’s sudden attempt to destroy the Stalin legend.

1705 “Stalin’s Mini-Comeback.” *Newsweek* 81 (12 March 1973): 41.

The occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Stalin’s death serves as a cue for this account of the nostalgia felt among some older Russians for the iron-fisted rule of the Stalin era and how Stalin’s reputation has made a slow comeback. The article also notes that officially Stalin remains a “historical unperson” and the anniversary of his death a Soviet nonevent.

1706 “Stalin’s Return.” *Time* 96 (6 July 1970): 31.

This report, in commenting on the unannounced installation of a life-sized bust of Stalin atop his grave, describes this first public display of the dictator in the Kremlin since the 1961 removal of his body from the Lenin Mausoleum as “another step in the creeping rehabilitation” of his image as leader of the Soviet Union. The article also notes several other signs of the Brezhnev/Kosygin regime’s softening of the official portrayal of Stalin, including the failure of the recently published fourth edition of Lenin’s biography to mention Stalin’s cult of personality, his role in the terror of the 1930s, or his disputes with Lenin.

1707 “Stalin’s Role.” *Atlantic Monthly* 200 (August 1957): 18+.

This article notes that while Stalin is still given full credit for the consolidation of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and for the liquidation of the “opposition,” and although he was the architect and executor of the Soviet industrial revolution, no definitive work has appeared in the Soviet Union since his death endeavoring to assess his exact role in the nation’s history. The article also points out that there is no apparent abatement to the process of de-Stalinization and liberalization launched by Nikita Khrushchev, though the pace has slackened over the past year.

1708 Stein, M. “The End of the Stalin Cult.” *Fourth International* 17 (spring 1956): 39-44+.

Stein offers a Trotskyist reading of the source of the Kremlin leadership’s 1956 repudiation of the Stalin cult, debunking the widely varying theories on why Stalin’s successors have downgraded their former leader and suggesting instead that the leadership began exposing Stalin’s crimes not out of a sense of remorse or because of any external pressures to do so but rather as an extension of the concessions made to the Soviet workers that began soon after Stalin’s death in response to the growing dissatisfaction of the masses with Stalinist practices and policies. Stein also com-

ments on why Khrushchev and company have tempered their criticism of Stalin, and why the political concessions the post-Stalin leadership has begrudgingly made to the Soviet workers represent the beginning of the end of a Stalinist bureaucracy which for nearly three decades has immobilized the working class as a political force and substituted its own interests for those of the workers.

1709 “Still Stalin.” *Time* 78 (24 November 1961): 21-22.

Time gives a brief account of the progress of Khrushchev’s 1961 intensification of the de-Stalinization campaign and of how “Stalin’s second death” has produced debate and confusion within the Italian Communist Party.

1710 “Throwing Mud.” *Time* 78 (17 November 1961): 25-26.

This report includes a brief commentary on the disinterment of Stalin’s body from the Lenin Mausoleum and on the removal of the wealth of statues and images of Stalin from parks, museums, railway stations, airports, factories, and other sites across the Soviet Union.

1711 “Toppling Colossus for a New Regime.” *Business Week* (31 March 1956): 27-29.

The various explanations offered by Western experts on Russia as to why Stalin’s heirs chose to denounce him as a murderous tyrant at the Twentieth Party Congress are the prime focus of this article. Receiving secondary consideration are the tentative steps taken to downgrade Stalin soon after his death, the risks taken by Khrushchev’s group in pitting itself against Stalin’s ghost, and the probability that Khrushchev will not venture very far from Stalinism but rather limit himself to making a deft and flexible adaptation of the Stalin line.

1712 Tucker, Robert C. “Giving up the Ghost.” *New Republic* 199 (17 October 1988): 20+.

Tucker opens with a description of Stalin as a Bolshevik of the radical right, Stalinism as “an amalgam of aggressive Russian nationalism with the harshly repressive Bolshevism of the War Communism period,” and Stalin’s rule as one that ushered in a bureaucratically administered totalitarian state, with a command economy operating through huge state monopolies, a hierarchical order with a privileged class of officials at the apex, and a subordinate and exploited working class. He then goes on to discuss how the efforts of the Gorbachev regime to cut down the Stalinist “Total State” has encountered opposition from those who prefer to believe that Stalin, despite his shortcomings, built the foundations of socialism, led the nation to victory in World War II, and was largely unaware of the lawless acts committed by his underlings. Turning to the “manifesto of anti-perestroika forces” put out in a 13 March 1988 article by Nina Andreeva in *Soviet Russia*, and the editorial reply by Gorbachev published in *Pravda*, Tucker discusses how the debate between the reformist and conservative elements in both Soviet society and the Communist Party is connected with deep differences about Stalin and Stalinism as well as the death agony of the Stalinist system.

1713 ———. “Metamorphosis of the Stalin Myth.” *World Politics* 7 (October 1954): 338-62.

Tucker draws upon the public pronouncements of the controlled and official Soviet press in the year following Stalin’s death to discuss how the changing manner in which official propaganda has presented the image of the former Soviet leader reflects the Malenkov regime’s attitude toward Stalin and his heritage as well. Tucker first describes the official anti-Stalin reaction during the period from late March until early June 1953, when the name of Stalin was rarely mentioned, the cult of the individual was first criticized, and aspects of his last “great work of genius”—*Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*—fell under criticism. He then shows how, starting in June 1953, Stalin came to be portrayed as the great disciple, rather than the equal, of Lenin, and much of what was accomplished under his rule was beginning to be attributed to the efforts of the Soviet people and the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This phase in

the metamorphosis of the Stalin myth, Tucker explains, was followed by a further reduction in the dead leader's status, with his role in the Bolshevik revolutionary movement and early postrevolutionary years being downplayed significantly; his authorship of the industrialization and collectivization policies being reassigned to the party; his theoretical contributions being largely billed as elaborations on postulates already put forth by Lenin; and the anonymous leadership and inspiration of the party being substituted for his personal role in the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Tucker sees the new Stalin myth as being nearly as fictional as the old myth, and as having been crafted in a way "so that the official image of him would correspond with the political values and practices of a regime whose keynote is 'collective leadership,'" With the deflation of Stalin's role in Soviet history being matched by a corresponding inflation of the role of the party, the "cult of the party" has taken the place of the abandoned cult of Stalin, serving as the folklore of the oligarchy that has replaced Stalin's autocracy, Tucker concludes.

1714 ———. "Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization." *World Politics* 9 (July 1957): 550-78.

The first half of this article provides a sketch of the course of Stalinization, showing how the early phase of this process brought society under the total command and control of the party and the state, and the later phase brought the state and the party under the total command and control of Stalin. The second half describes the origins, process, and limits of de-Stalinization. Here, Tucker locates the roots of de-Stalinization in such factors as the inability of Stalin's successors to maintain a political order founded on a one-person system; the desire of his subordinates to free themselves from the oppressiveness and universal insecurity associated with his rule; and the need to readjust the apex of the Soviet regime in accord with the principle of "collective leadership" if the super-control system of the Stalinist autocracy were to be eliminated. While the post-Stalin leadership was bent on repudiating the later phase of Stalinism, they remain committed to the preservation of the basic institutional order which evolved during the early years of Stalin's rule. This same commitment, Tucker writes, governs a new falsification of Soviet history, one which attributes the first phase of Stalinization, including the elimination of the opposition in the name of party unity and the design and implementation of the policies of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture, not to Stalin primarily but to Lenin and the Communist Party. Tucker also discusses the movement to decentralize and rationalize the Stalinist administrative system and the role played by factional conflict within the party's new "collective leadership" in shaping the direction and pace of de-Stalinization.

1715 "Two Views of Stalin." *East Europe* 11 (1962): 30-32.

This article presents excerpts from Nikita Khrushchev's address to the Twenty-second Party Congress on 27 October 1961 and Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha's speech in Tirana on 7 November 1961 to illustrate how communists throughout the world were, at that time, being presented with widely conflicting appraisals of Stalin, his leadership of the Soviet Union, and his impact on the world communist movement. The selections from Khrushchev's speech deal mainly with his assault on Stalin for "violating Leninist principles of leadership" and committing arbitrary actions and abuses of power, as exemplified by his order of the arrest and execution of distinguished Soviet military leaders in the late 1930s. The excerpts from Hoxha's address primarily attempt to show how Khrushchev exaggerated Stalin's mistakes "in a one-sided and tendentious manner," and to point out Stalin's leading role in building socialism in the USSR, guiding the Soviet Union in the war against fascism, strengthening the socialist camp and the international communist movement, and defending Marxism-Leninism against revisionism as "embodied in Tito's treasonous revisionist group."

1716 Ulam, Adam B. "Moscow Congress: Prudence and Semantics." *Reporter* 34 (5 May 1966): 25-27.

Ulam discusses how the plans for a partial rehabilitation of Stalin at the Twenty-third Party Congress in April 1966—prompted by concern over the damaging effects of Khrushchev's "constant harping on the terror and sufferings of the Stalin era"—gave way, in the face of both opposition by a number of prominent Soviet intellectuals and a division of opinion among party leaders as to what degree "the Stalin era should receive a new varnish of respectability," to the decision simply to refrain from any criticism of Stalin, or even mention of his name, and to settle for a mere restoration of the names of two Soviet institutions—the Politburo and Secretary General of the Communist Party—that have Stalinist associations.

1717 "Unhappy Birthday." *Time* 95 (5 January 1970): 29.

Time briefly describes the apprehensions and fears voiced by Soviet dissidents regarding the possibility that the Kremlin's leaders might take the occasion of Stalin's ninetieth birthday to launch a full-scale rehabilitation of his historical image and move closer to a restoration of Stalinist practices. The article notes that the dissidents' concerns, for the most part, proved to be unfounded, and that the only place in the Soviet Union where Stalin's birthday was openly and enthusiastically celebrated was at his birthplace, in the town of Gori, Georgia.

1718 "Unpublished Documents Distributed among Delegates to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party." *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 35 (1956): 153-61.

The U.S. Department of State publishes here the eighteen documents dealing with Soviet political affairs in 1922-23 which were distributed to the delegates at the Twentieth Party Congress on 25 February 1956 as supplements to Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin. The documents include Lenin's 23 December 1922 letter to the Thirteenth Party Congress regarding the enlargement of the Central Committee (CC) to prevent conflicts between small CC groupings which Lenin believed could gravely affect the fate of the party; Lenin's additions to the letter of 23 December 1922 (popularly known as his "testament") in which he wrote about the danger of a split in the party and about the personal qualities of the Politburo's leading members; and his 30-31 December 1922 article on the nationalities question, in which he criticized Stalin's handling of the so-called Georgia incident.

1719 Urban, Pavel K. "Soviet Attitudes to Stalin Display Ambiguity." *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union* 28 (1966-1967): 1-6.

Urban cites a number of writings in the Soviet press during the mid-1960s which reassessed the Stalinist past to illustrate that, while the reports about Stalin and his era are disjointed, fragmentary, and sometimes contradictory, the general trend is to whitewash Stalin and to refute the "undeserved" accusations leveled against him during the Khrushchev years. Urban does not see the softening of Stalin's image as being part of a coordinated official campaign to rehabilitate the dead leader but rather merely an attempt to take some of the sting out of Khrushchev's shattering revelations at the Twentieth Party Congress and to forestall accusations that the party was either Stalin's willing accomplice or cowed into submission, neither of which, he points out, tie in with the then recent claims that the party remains the infallible repository of all Marxist-Leninist truth and wisdom.

1720 Weiss, Murry. "Stalinism and the Twenty-Second Congress." *International Socialist Review* 23 (1962): 10-14.

Weiss argues that the fresh assault on the image of Stalin launched by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second Party Congress may have enhanced Khrushchev's position at the expense of his rivals who have been branded as accomplices in Stalin's purges but has served to obscure the true nature of Stalinism as a sociological phenomenon, one which emanated from the development and rise to power of "a parasitic bureaucratic caste." Citing various figures in the communist world who have called for an explanation of the Soviet bureaucracy and of the source of the "cult of the individ-

ual,” and lauding the interpretations of the Stalin phenomenon advanced by Leon Trotsky and Isaac Deutscher, Weiss calls for an approach to explaining Stalinism that goes beyond reference to Stalin alone and recognizes the Stalinist bureaucracy as the polar opposite of proletarian democracy.

1721 ———. “The Vindicator of Trotskyism.” *International Socialist Review* 17 (1956): 79-83. Weiss describes how each of the crimes of Stalin revealed by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress was exposed by Trotskyists decades ago, and he rejects Khrushchev’s explanation of Stalin’s sins in favor of Trotsky’s assertion that the Stalin regime’s behavior, including its propagation of the “cult of the individual,” is best understood within the context of the triumph of bureaucratic reaction, in the form of the Stalinist oligarchy, over the proletarian Left Opposition. The theories of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful road to socialism, for Weiss, are a continuation of Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country” and are simply reformulations of the question of class collaboration versus class struggle which lies at the core of the chasm separating Stalinism and Trotskyism.

1722 “What’s in a Birthday?” *Economist* 233 (20 December 1969): 34.

On the eve of the ninetieth anniversary of Stalin’s birth, this article, in noting how the manner in which the birthdays of famous men are celebrated in Russia has often had a symbolic significance, comments on how the treatment of Stalin’s anniversary may provide an interesting indication of the then current balance between liberal and conservative forces in the Soviet Union.

1723 “Which Stalin Did You Know, Comrade?” *New Statesman and Nation* 51 (7 April 1956): 328+.

This article briefly outlines the contradictory reactions of a number of European communist party leaders to the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, relating their differing responses to their knowledge or direct experience with the Stalinist terror.

1724 “Why Top Reds Turn on Stalin.” *U.S. News and World Report* 40 (30 March 1956): 21-25. The views offered by Soviet analysts in the world’s major capitals regarding why top Kremlin leaders, including Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov chose to denounce Stalin as a murderer, traitor, and tyrant are presented in this article. While the analysts’ opinions vary, there is general agreement that the downgrading of Stalin is linked to the desire of the new Soviet leaders to curry favor abroad by appearing as “reasonable men” and to offer Stalin to the Russian people as a scapegoat for the nation’s troubles, according to the article.

1725 Willetts, H. T. “Death and Damnation of a Hero.” *Survey* 47 (April 1963): 3-12.

Willetts discusses the benchmarks in the process of the official Soviet reevaluation of Stalin during the decade following the dictator’s 1953 death. Identifying three phases through which this process passed—deflation, dismantling, and destruction—Willetts shows how Stalin’s image as the “wise leader and teacher of the Soviet people” was first deflated during the years 1953-55 by demoting him to the rank of “one of Lenin’s closest assistants” and by attributing the various gains made during his reign primarily to the efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet state and people; then dismantled at the Twentieth Party Congress by exposing the criminal and abusive nature of his rule and the harm done by the cult of personality which grew up around him; and finally destroyed with the publication of the 1959 and 1962 editions of the *History of the CPSU*, in which the negative components of his leadership are shown to have far outweighed the positive ones. Willetts also discusses the various motives that came into play in the process of demythologizing Stalin, and how Soviet scholars have not replaced the Stalin myth through an objective historical analysis but rather have elaborated a new myth, according to which the party managed to

preserve its ideals, advance the nation along the path of socialism, and remain faithful to the ideals of Leninism despite “the hampering and distorting influence of Stalin.”

1726 Wolfe, Bertram D. “Stalinism versus Stalin: Exorcising a Stubborn Ghost.” *Commentary* 21 (June 1956): 522-31.

Wolfe critiques the motivation and actions of Soviet leaders in their 1956 assault on the legacy of Stalin, contending that they are “exploiting for propagandist ends the universal expectation of change on the death of a tyrant,” and that they will no doubt continue Stalinism minus “its obsolete features and paranoiac excesses.” The effort to assure their succession by way of “a gradual deflation of Stalin’s ghost,” Wolfe argues, is a difficult maneuver for the Kremlin’s leaders to execute, particularly with regard to the separation of Stalin’s crimes from their own since, after all, the exorcists are the accomplices of the very ghost they are trying to exorcise. Moreover, hiding their responsibility for the abuses of the Stalin era behind their “limited pleas that they were but the intimidated minions of a madman” raises the question about the viability of “any system which puts absolute power in the hands of a madman. . . .”

1727 ———. “Stalin’s Ghost at the Party Congress.” *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 4 (July 1956): 554-68.

This account of the preparations for and consequences of the CPSU’s Twentieth Congress centers on how the Kremlin’s leaders, despite their efforts to orchestrate every detail of the 1956 party meeting, proved unable to control the planned desanctification of Stalin. In describing the unexpected difficulties that Stalin’s heirs experienced in their attempt to dethrone the man they had long served as active and willing accomplices, Wolfe comments on the impossibility of controlling an operation that seeks to rehabilitate some of Stalin’s victims while reaffirming that others, such as Trotsky and Bukharin, were indeed “enemies of the people”; that tries to draw a dividing line between the crimes of Stalin and his “great achievements,” such as the forced collectivization of agriculture or the conquest of the Baltic states; and that attempts to exonerate the party from any responsibility for a reign of terror orchestrated by the man it raised to power and proved powerless to restrain.

1728 Wood, Harrington, Jr. “Last Look.” *American Heritage* 50, no. 2 (April 1999): 48+.

Wood gives a brief account of his 29 October 1961 visit to the tomb of Lenin and Stalin and of the security measures in Red Square that accompanied the closing of the tomb the next day following the removal of Stalin’s body from the mausoleum as part of Khrushchev’s renewal of his campaign to deflate the image of the dead dictator.

1729 Yakir, Peter. “Stalin: A Plea for a Criminal Investigation.” *Survey* 70/71 (winter/spring 1969): 261-69.

Survey reproduces here the complete text of the letter which Soviet historian Peter Yakir sent to *Kommunist*, the theoretical organ of the CPSU, on 2 March 1969 after the journal had praised Stalin for his military talents. Yakir, whose father, General Yon Yakir, was shot in 1937 as one of the accused in the Tukhachevsky affair, opens by criticizing the journal for publishing articles that aim to “whitewash and extol Stalin” despite having previously printed articles citing numerous examples of Stalin’s scandalous misconduct, voluntarism, and arbitrary approach to economics, politics, science, and the arts. He then goes on to argue that, in view of the resolution unanimously adopted at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in 1961 regarding Stalin’s abuse of his authority, mass repressions against honest Soviet citizens, and commitment of various other illegal acts, Stalin must be considered guilty of having violated a number of articles in the Soviet penal code and, in accord with Soviet criminal law, deserving of “four sentences of death and a total of 68 years in prison with the strictest deprivation of freedom.” Yakir closes by asking the editors of

Kommunist and the authors of the articles he has criticized to defend their attempt to “rehabilitate the greatest criminal our country has ever known in its recent history.”

1730 Yurovsky, Andrew. “Russia: Builder of Ruins.” *World Press Review* 50, no. 5 (May 2003): 31.

Yurovsky cites several articles from the Soviet press noting that the fiftieth anniversary of Stalin’s death witnessed a remarkable spike in the former dictator’s popularity. Among the reasons cited for this phenomenon are the longing for the stability and predictability that some Russians imagine existed under Stalin’s rule; dissatisfaction with the nation’s reduced international stature; and the loss of a belief system from which many Russians have not yet recovered.

1731 Zinner, Paul. “The Vacancy in the Mausoleum.” *East Europe* 11 (1962): 3-7.

Zinner outlines the principal developments at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961. He comments on Khrushchev’s motives for further criticizing Stalin and ordering the eviction of his body from what had been the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum; the meaning of Khrushchev’s public denigration of the late dictator; and the repercussions of his renewed attack on Stalin, within both the Soviet Union and the nations of the communist bloc. For Zinner, Khrushchev, in announcing the new party program, the first since 1919, and in billing it as a new Communist Manifesto, sought to establish himself as the immediate successor of Lenin, a claim which he attempted to buttress by carrying the assault upon Stalin to a new level and by assuming the role of a staunch fighter for communist ideals and a dauntless defender of the Soviet people against the nefarious schemes of Stalinist scoundrels.

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