The Christ Clone Trilogy 01 - In His Imagery
By
James Beau Seigneur
Plowshares into Swords
Two months later — Tel Aviv
Scott Rosen sat in a small cafe eating a bowl of soup, waiting for his friend
Joel Felsberg. Soon Joel entered and sat down without speaking.
"You look upset," Scott offered, in what seemed to Joel to be a rather
irritating tone.
"I hate these damned Russians — always stopping you on the street and wanting to
see your papers." Joel was exaggerating: most people went days without being
stopped. "They're never going to leave, you know."
"Yeah, I know," Scott answered with uncharacteristic resignation, as he sipped
his soup. "But everything is not so gloomy," he added, with equally
uncharacteristic good cheer. "I heard the resistance hijacked a supply truck,
stole all the supplies, and then loaded it with dynamite and sent it into a
Russian camp by remote control. They say it killed nearly a thousand Russians."
Joel ordered his lunch before responding. "I've heard that story twenty times in
the last three weeks and it gets more full of bullshit with every telling," Joel
responded.
"You don't believe it?"
"Yeah, I believe it. But I believe it the way I heard it the first time: the
resistance hijacked a truck and drove it into a Russian camp where it ran into a
water tower, accomplishing next to nothing."
"Well, at least there is a resistance."
"Yeah, and they're out-gunned and completely disorganized. If Ben Gurion had
used their tactics we'd still be a British protectorate! Damn it, Scott," Joel
continued, after stirring his coffee, "we're still occupied! I don't care how
many water towers we run into or supply trucks we hijack! We were a free,
independent state and now we are not!"
"What do you think the resistance should do differently?" Scott asked, as if
Joel's opinion made a difference.
"Hell, I don't know." Joel shook his head. "Nothing I guess. That's the whole
problem: there's nothing we can do. Even if we got rid of the Russians, as soon
as they were gone we'd be attacked by the Arabs, and we'd have nothing to fight
them with."
"Yes, but. . ."
"Damn it, Scott, you're pissin' me off. Is that why you brought me here: so I
could wallow in my anger and frustration?"
Joel Felsberg and Scott Rosen were zealous in their love for their country.
Either could easily be brought to a fever pitch when it came to Israel, but
strangely, on this occasion only Joel's blood pressure had risen. An unusual
calm accompanied Scott's speech, but Joel didn't notice it. Neither had he
noticed that since his arrival no one had entered or left the cafe, nor that the
cafe owner had turned the sign to read 'CLOSED.' Likewise, the two men standing
watch outside the cafe had escaped Joel's notice entirely.
Suddenly Scott became animated. "We must drive the Russians from Israel and
bloody their noses so badly they'll never come back!" he said.
"Big talk. Big talk," Joel responded. "I suppose you think the resistance will
accomplish that with their puny disruptions to the Russian supply lines. And
just how do you propose we deal with the Arabs when and if the Russians leave?"
Scott studied his soup. "If only we had used our nukes on the Russians instead
of just waving them around as a threat to the Libyans."
"You're a fool, Rosen! By the time we knew we were being invaded, the Russians
were all over the place. The only way we could have nuked them was to launch on
our own soil," Joel said, growing even more angry.
Scott Rosen did not allow his friend's anger to distract him. He had a mission
to accomplish and all was working exactly according to plan. "Yeah, I guess
that's true." Scott's voice seemed resigned to the hopelessness of the
situation, but he continued. "Too bad we can't get control of the nukes now.
With the Russians all concentrated in the hills, we could wipe out ninety
percent of them with just a few well-placed missiles and the resistance could
take out the other ten percent in the cities."
"You really are a fool," Joel said. "What about Moscow? You think they're just
gonna sit back and let that happen without responding? What's to stop them from
striking back against our cities?"
This was the question that Scott had been waiting for. Suddenly his mood grew
much more serious. The gravity of what he was about to say was clear even to
Joel. "Our strategic defense," he whispered finally.
Joel stared coldly at Scott, studying his expression. Twice his mouth was poised
as if he were about to speak; he was going to accuse Rosen again of being a
fool, but he held back. It appeared that Rosen was serious and when it came to
strategic defense, Scott Rosen deserved to be heard. Next to his late father,
Joshua Rosen, Scott knew more about Israeli strategic defense than anyone.
Finally Joel responded, "You're talking impossibilities. Even if a plan like
that could work, there's no way in the world our puny, disorganized resistance
could get control of the Strategic Defense Control Facility."
"We don't need to go anywhere near the Control Facility," Scott said,
confidently.
Suddenly Joel became aware of his surroundings. When he had thought that he and
Rosen were just griping he didn't care who heard them. There was nothing unusual
about two Israeli men complaining about the Russians. Everyone in Israel was
complaining. Indeed, it might have been considered unusual for them to be
talking about anything else. But now they had crossed the line: they were no
longer just complaining. The wrong person listening to their conversation might
easily have mistaken this for a conspiracy. He looked around quickly to make
sure no one had overheard them.
Scott didn't interrupt him to mention that he had nothing to worry about; each
of the seven people in the cafe had been handpicked for the occasion.
"You mean a remote?" Joel asked finally, under his breath. Scott signaled with
his eyes in the affirmative. Joel had heard talk about a remote, an off-site
test facility for the Strategic Defense Control Facility (SDCF), but he had
written it off as speculation by people who didn't know any better. If there was
an Off-Site Test Facility (OSTF) it would have been evident in the
communications configuration needed for such an operation. True, the
communications links could have been intentionally mislabeled to conceal its
existence, but Joel had worked at the SDCF for over five years and had run
numerous configuration scenarios on the facility's computers. If there was an
Off-Site Test Facility, it would have turned up in the simulations.
Joel was intimately familiar with the concept of an OSTF. Early in his career,
before leaving the U.S., he had been a low-level software analyst for Ford
Aerospace, assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). He
remembered those long walks down the cold tunnels in Cheyenne Mountain to test
software upgrades. He had been there in the mountain back in 1979 when for 15
terrifying minutes it appeared that the Soviet Union had launched a full scale
nuclear attack on the United States. American Strategic Air Command (SAC)
bombers were launched and nuclear missiles were put on alert, awaiting the
President's order. As it turned out, the alert was caused by a test scenario
inadvertently being fed into the on-line NORAD computer network. As a result of
that false alarm the U.S. Congress immediately authorized the construction of
the NORAD Off-Site Test Facility in downtown Colorado Springs.
Prior to the establishment of the Colorado Springs OSTF, the standard operating
procedure for testing software upgrades had involved taking NORAD's backup
systems for the critical missile warning computers off-line while the tests were
run. It was risky business, at best. What if there had been a failure in the
primary system? In the fifteen minutes it would take to get the backup system
out of test mode and back on-line, it could be all over. The OSTF was definitely
the way to go. Besides, as far as Joel was concerned, downtown Colorado Springs
was a much easier commute than Cheyenne Mountain in the middle of the night. The
OSTF included a
complete duplicate of all the systems at Cheyenne Mountain. All testing of new
software was performed there. Only after the software passed testing were the
cryptographically check-summed object modules electronically downloaded to the
operational center at NORAD. And there was one other benefit to the OSTF: in the
event of a total failure of the NORAD systems, the OSTF could take over the
actual operation. Computers, communications, and cryptographic equipment were
all in place. All that was needed was loading of the proper cryptographic key
material into the cryptos.
When Joel went to work at the Israeli Strategic Defense Control Facility, he
tried for two years to convince his superiors of the need to develop the same
type of system for Israel, but to no avail. At one point he considered resigning
to protest their refusal to even talk about it, but his wife convinced him to be
patient and wait until those in charge were more sympathetic to the idea.
Actually, that was one of the most irritating parts: the head of the Israeli
SDCF was Dr. Arnold Brown, one of the men who had played a crucial role in
developing the OSTF concept for NORAD. It never made any sense to Joel that
Brown would refuse to consider providing the same capabilities for Israel.
Joel's initial response to Scott Rosen's suggestion that the Strategic Defense
Control Facility had an OSTF was that Scott was simply believing more rumors
like the one about the hijacked supply truck. Still, there were some things to
which Scott, with his compartmentalized clearances, might have had access that
Joel could have been totally unaware of. And the look on Scott's face said he
was serious.
"Scott," Joel said as he leaned across the table, "is this a game? Are you
putting me on?" Scott's eyes answered the question. "But, Scott, I worked at
SDCF for over five years. I ran configuration scenarios on the facility's
computers a thousand times. If there was an Off-Site Test Facility why didn't it
turn up in the simulations?"
"It was there. Its functions were masked to hide its true purpose, but it was
there."
Joel's eyes asked, "Where?"
"SF-14," Scott answered.
There was no way of knowing whether Scott was telling the truth. Sensor Facility
14, as far as Joel had known, was a non-operational and entirely redundant
infrared tracking station for terminal-phase acquisition and discrimination of
ballistic reentry vehicles. Perhaps by coincidence — and then again, perhaps not
— SF-14 was one of only two remote facilities that Joel had never actually
visited. Now that he thought about it, he couldn't remember ever seeing anyone's
name on the duty roster for a site check of SF-14. This would certainly explain
Dr. Brown's lack of interest in considering an Off-Site Test Facility. After
all, why talk about building something that was already folly operational?
If Scott Rosen knew what he was talking about then Joel wanted to know, but if
this was just more wishful thinking then he wanted to be done with it, and the
sooner the better. "Okay," he said, abruptly, "take me there." To Joel's
surprise Scott didn't come back with some flimsy excuse but instead got to his
feet and started to leave the cafe with Joel in tow. "What about the check?"
Joel asked Scott.
"It's on the house," answered the cafe owner.
Scott drove straight into the eastern business section of Tel Aviv and parked in
the basement parking lot of a tall but otherwise nondescript office building
that appeared to have only minor damage from the recent war. Joel followed as
Scott walked toward the elevators and then paused to look up at a security
camera near the ceiling. In a moment a red light on the camera blinked and Scott
pushed the call button for the elevator. As the elevator door closed behind
them, Scott flipped the emergency 'stop' switch, and, on the numbered buttons of
the elevator, punched in a seven digit code. Despite already being in the
basement, the elevator lurched downward, taking them, Joel guessed, several
floors farther beneath the building.
The elevator door opened to a small room about twelve feet square where two
armed guards waited. Badges were out of the question under the circumstances, so
they were operating strictly on a recognition basis. Joel would soon learn this
was not that difficult a task: very few people were involved in this operation.
As Scott introduced him to the guards who were obviously studying every aspect
of his appearance, Joel noticed his photograph laying on the desk beside an
array of security monitors, one of which was focused on the elevator in the
garage where they had entered.
Scott then opened the cipher lock of an armored door that was the only exit from
the room other than the elevator. Before them lay a small sea of computers and
defense tracking equipment on a raised floor, filling a room about 8500 square
feet. An array of symmetric multiprocessors made up the heart of the operation,
with integrated routers/ATM switches feeding real-time input via broadband
fiberlinks. Joel had seen this hardware configuration before, at the Strategic
Defense Control Facility in the mountains near Mizpe Ramon in southern Israel.
There was much less room here than in the mountain, but at first glance this
seemed to be an exact duplicate of the core of the SDCF.
Scattered around the facility were a handful of men and women busily working at
Sun workstations. A few slowed their pace just long enough to look up and
acknowledge Scott's and Joel's presence with friendly smiles before going back
to their work. While Joel looked around in disbelief, a short well-built man
entered from another room and approached them. Scott abruptly ended the brief
tour to greet the man.
"Good afternoon, Colonel," Scott said, formally. "Allow me to introduce Mr. Joel
Felsberg; Joel, this is Colonel White."
"Welcome to the team," White said. "Glad you could join us."
"Uh . . . thank you, sir," he said, unaware that he had.
"You're coming in at a crucial time. Scott has told me all about you and I've
seen your record. I'm sure we can count on you to help us make this thing
happen.
"Scott," he continued, "introduce Joel to the rest of the team and get him
briefed on what his role is. We'll talk later." With that the Colonel left.
"Uh, yeah, that's a good idea, Scott. Get me briefed on what my role is," Joel
repeated. And then more to the point, "What the hell is going on down here?!"
Scott smiled. "Welcome to SF-14," he said.
In the facility's briefing room, Scott poured coffee and proceeded to present an
overview of the project and a discussion of the highly classified maximum
capabilities of each of the four phases of the Israeli strategic defense. After
nearly an hour, he finally got around to explaining where Joel fit into all of
this.
"The reason you're here," Scott explained, "is that two nights ago Dr. Claude
Remey, our software guru, very stupidly got in the way of his neighbors'
domestic quarrel. As a result, he's now lying unconscious in a hospital with a
stab wound three quarters of an inch from his heart. You've been brought on to
finish the project he was working on."
Joel knew Remey. They had worked together on a couple of projects but had never
gotten along well. Still, Joel was sorry to hear of his injury.
"What you see here is a fully operations-capable backup facility to the
Strategic Defense Control Facility. It is not simply a 'test' facility. Dr.
Arnold Brown, who was in charge of its development, determined from the outset
that knowledge of its existence should be limited to as few individuals as
possible. It was felt that, should Israel ever be invaded, this facility should
be maintained at all costs.
"Colonel White, actually, Lieutenant Colonel White, whom you just met, was part
of a chain of officers, decreasing in rank from General to Captain, charged with
operation of the facility in case of an invasion. The purpose of the chain was
to prevent any invading force from disrupting the operation of this facility by
systematically arresting all high-ranking officers. As it turns out, each of
Colonel White's superiors were arrested in the first days after the invasion and
the responsibility fell to him.
"The initial plan for this facility, in an invasion where the SDCF was lost,
included three scenarios. First, should the opportunity present itself, this
facility could be used to launch on the invader's flank, thus cutting off his
supply lines and weakening the forward forces. Second, should there be an
attempt by an invading force to use our own nuclear capabilities against us,
this facility could frustrate that attempt by overriding the controls at the
SDCF. And third, should there be any attempt to remove a warhead from a silo,
this facility has the capability to neutralize the nuclear device. Had either
the second or the third scenario occurred, the established procedure would have
been to initiate the destruction of each threatening, or threatened, missile by
remotely setting off small explosives in the silos that would disable both the
silo and the warhead, without, of course, detonating the nuclear device.
"What actually happened with the Russian invasion was something that had not
even been considered. As I alluded in the cafe — oh, by the way, the cafe is one
of several safe houses around the city — the Russians have presented us with a
totally unexpected opportunity. By concentrating their forces away from
populated areas," Scott paused to point out the Russian troop locations marked
on a large wall map, "they have literally made themselves sitting ducks to the
capabilities of this facility.
"The first phase of our plan, then, is to neutralize the Strategic Defense
Control Facility and launch six neutron-tipped, short-range Gideon missiles —
one against each of the Russians' positions.
"There are three very important reasons we've chosen the neutron-tipped Gideons.
The most obvious is that since we will be launching on targets within our own
borders, it is absolutely imperative that we limit the area of destruction.
We'll come back to that in a minute.
"The second reason is that the Gideon-class warhead produces the most rapidly
dissipating radiation pattern of any of our warheads. Our forces will be able to
reenter the initial kill radius within six to eight hours after impact. Ground
Zero will be entirely habitable in three weeks.
"Third, if the launch is successful, and our strategic defense successfully
defends Israel against a Russian retaliatory nuclear strike — that's phase two
of the plan — we will very quickly face a second threat from both Arab and
Russian conventional forces. We hope to limit the immediate response of the
Arabs by: one, creating a communications blackout, thus maintaining the highest
possible level of confusion for our enemies; and two, by planning the strike
during the Hajj." Scott was referring to the annual pilgrimage of Muslims to
Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The rites of the Hajj include circling the Ka 'bah in
Mecca and going seven times between the mountains of Safa andManva as Abraham's
concubine, Hagar, is believed to have done during her search for water. This can
take several days and is followed by group prayer on the plain ofArafa. During
the Hajj, Muslims are forbidden by the Koran to harm any living being, including
their enemies.
Scott spread out a handful of photographs on the table. "As you can see, our
satellite reconnaissance of the Russian encampments reveals extraordinarily
large caches of weaponry — both Russian-made and captured Israeli weapons."
Joel was surprised by what the photos showed. Dozens of huge temporary
warehouses had been constructed, with tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel
carriers parked nearby in neat rows. It looked like a massive car lot. "What are
they doing out there?!" Joel asked.
"We suspect that the Russians are storing up military equipment for a
conventional attack on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. After that, we have to assume
they will go after each of the other oil-rich countries in the area. We have
only limited intelligence reports to support that assumption, but it's obvious
that they don't need that kind of armament simply to keep Israel under thumb."
"Shit, they're planning on using Israel as home base to go after the Arab oil
fields and the Suez Canal," Joel said.
"That's what it looks like," Scott said without emotion. "As you know," he
continued, getting back to the subject at hand, "the neutron bomb was developed
to destroy personnel, not materiel. It kills primarily by an immediate burst of
radiation, not by heat or the sheer power of the blast, as in the case of other
nuclear weapons. The third reason, then, for selecting the Gideons is to
eliminate the Russian personnel while preserving the weaponry. As you said
earlier, even if we get rid of the Russians we don't have any weapons to defend
ourselves from the Arabs. The Russian stockpiles will provide us with the
weapons we need. To further reduce the damage to materiel, we are actually
targeting a point four hundred meters outside of the perimeter of the Russian
camps. Targeting is being coordinated by Ron Samuel, who will be briefing you on
that part of the project when we're finished. With a little luck, he'll be able
to finish his work in the next few days and then he can help you with your
project.
"Now let's get back to the first reason I mentioned for selecting the Gideon.
The initial kill radius for the Gideon class warhead is only one kilometer, with
a secondary radius extending another three kilometers. In most cases those
limits will allow us to hit the Russians and entirely avoid initial or secondary
kill of our own population. However, there are two places where because of
adjacent villages and kibbutzim, that will not be possible. In those cases, and
in the case of nearby farmers at the other sites, an evacuation team will be
given approximately eight hours to effect evacuation of all civilian residents
before the launch. The plan is for this to occur under cover of darkness; and to
avoid tipping our hand, the evacuation team will not be given the word to begin
evacuation until after we have secured control of operations from the SDCF.
"Neutralizing the Strategic Defense Control Facility and transferring operations
to this facility is the easy part, relatively speaking; that's what this
facility was set up to do. The hard part is to make the Russians believe that
they are still fully in control long enough for us to evacuate our people and
launch the six Gideons.
"That's where you come in. We need you to give us those eight hours. Your job is
to create the illusion, through a software dump to the SDCF computers, that
their systems are operational.
"After we transfer control to this facility, it will take approximately twenty
minutes for us to download the retargeting data into the missiles. If the
Russians realize what's happened, they will first attempt to regain control, and
second, very quickly disperse their troops in the mountains. Should that happen,
we will have no choice but to launch immediately, killing over a thousand
Israeli civilians and evacuation team members."
Joel mulled over what he had been told. It was a lot to digest so quickly. "What
about the Russians in the cities?" he asked.
"Immediately after the launch, teams of Israeli commandos will take over all
radio and television stations from the Russians. Where they are unsuccessful,
other teams will destroy those stations' antennas. It is critical to our success
that the Israeli people be rallied to attack the Russians in the cities, but it
is equally important that we keep the rest of the world, especially the Arabs,
confused about exactly what is going on. If we make things too clear for our own
citizens, it will be equally clear to the Arabs, who — Hajj or not — may seize
the opportunity to strike while we are still disorganized and before we can take
control of the Russian weapons caches. Rather than broadcasting reports that
would be picked up by the Arabs, the radio and television will play a continuous
loop of a single message, the words of the prophet Joel, from Joel 3:10." Scott
paused. He may have been a scientist but, like his father, he was a zealot
first, though for a different religious cause. He was hoping his friend at least
might have studied enough scripture to be familiar with the writings of the
prophet whose name he bore. But, if Joel was familiar with the verse he gave no
indication of it to Scott. Scott gave a sigh of noticeable disappointment and
then continued, "Beat your plowshares into swords and your pruning hooks into
spears."
"That's kind of obscure, don't you think?" asked Joel, unaware that the idea had
been Scott's. Scott started to argue but held back. "I suppose so," he admitted,
"but that's the signal that has been passed to the resistance forces. Hopefully,
others will join in when they see the fighting start in the streets."
Over the next two hours Joel was given concise briefings by each of the eight
people in the operations room concerning their individual parts of the project.
Three weeks later — New York
The phone rang three times before Ambassador Hansen could rouse himself from his
sleep to answer it. "Hello," he said, as he checked his alarm clock. It was just
after eleven.
"Mr. Ambassador," said Decker Hawthorne, "I'm sorry to disturb you, but I've
just heard that about thirty minutes ago, at 5:30 a.m. Israeli time, there were
an undisclosed number of nuclear explosions in Israel." The sleep suddenly
rushed from Hansen's brain as his eyes opened wide.
"The Russians?" Hansen asked.
"The reports are very sketchy so far. It's not clear who's responsible, and
there have been no official statements from the Russians."
"Decker, is there any chance there's been a mistake?"
"No, sir. I don't think so. The detonations were detected by U. S., U.K., and
Chinese satellites."
"Okay, hold on a second while I switch on the telly." A moment later Decker
heard the sound of Ambassador Hansen's television through the phone. "Okay, I'm
back," Hansen said, but he and Decker stayed silent as each listened to the
report just being read.
"CNN has just learned that the United States has scrambled Strategic Air Command
bombers. The State Department has emphasized that this is only a precautionary
measure and that SAC has been ordered to remain in U.S. air space pending
further orders."
"What the hell is going on?!" Hansen asked.
"I don't know, sir," Decker answered, stating the obvious.
"Do you have the Russian Ambassador's phone number?"
"I have Ambassador Kruszkegin's number right here, sir," Decker said and then
relayed it to Hansen.
"Okay," Hansen said. "I'll call Kruszkegin. You call Jackie, Peter and Jack and
have everyone get to the office ASAP."
The phone rang only once at Ambassador Kruszkegin's residence before it was
answered by an official sounding "Hello."
"This is Ambassador Jon Hansen," he said. "I would like to speak with Ambassador
Kruszkegin immediately on a matter of utmost importance."
"I'm sorry, Ambassador Hansen," the voice answered. "Ambassador Kruszkegin is in
a meeting right now and cannot be disturbed."
"I'll take it," Hansen heard Kruszkegin say in the background. Obviously the
person who answered the phone had lied.
Ambassador Kruszkegin stood by the phone wearing a finely woven black and gold
silk dressing gown, his warm Italian slippers protecting his feet from the cold
marble floor. "Good evening, Jon," he began. Jon Hansen liked Kruszkegin as a
person and respected him as an adversary. For his part, Kruszkegin was fond of
referring to Hansen as "a man who has failed to notice that Britain no longer
rules the world." Kruszkegin had found that, when possible, it was more
productive to cooperate with Hansen than not to.
"Jon," he continued, anticipating Hansen's question, "I honestly do not know
what is happening in Israel. I've just spoken with the Foreign Minister in
Moscow and he swears that we have not launched an attack. I believe they are
just as confused as we are."
Hansen was surprised that Kruszkegin had even taken his call; the straight
answer was even more unexpected. Hansen knew the Russian well enough to have a
pretty good idea when he was lying and when he was telling the truth. Right now
he seemed to be telling the truth; at least as far as he knew the truth. "Thank
you, Yuri," Hansen said. Kruszkegin's straightforward answer left little else to
be said.
British Mission, New York (1:57 a.m.)
Ambassador Hansen's senior staff members watched the news reports on television
as they awaited his arrival. "Does anyone know what's going on?" Hansen asked as
he walked in the door just before 2:00 a.m. New York time.
"The Russians claim that they had nothing to do with it," began Jack Redmond,
Hansen's legislative assistant. "They say that the attack was against the
Russian troops in Israel's mountains."
This was a new twist on the story. "How the hell could that happen?" Hansen
asked, incredulously. Redmond shook his head.
In the brief silence, Hansen's attention turned to the reporter on television.
"There is speculation at the State Department," the reporter said, "that the
attack on Israel could be the result of some internal power struggle inside the
Russian government. The battle for power and control of policy has been heated,
to say the least. Hard-liners like Foreign Minister Cherov and Defense Minister
Khromchenkov want to lead Russia back to communism and world power, while others
like President Perelyakin favor a more moderate approach. The Russian invasion
of Israel still has many analysts unsure of who's in charge."
Jack Redmond shrugged his broad shoulders as Hansen looked at him for his
comment. "It's possible," he said. "But it doesn't really answer the big
questions. We know that no cities were hit; apparently the missiles fell in the
wilderness areas of the country. That would seem to support Russia's assertion
that it was their troops that were hit, but I can't imagine any kind of
political situation so bad that one group of Russians would bomb another."
"Okay, let's assume for a moment that the Russians are telling the truth: that
they're not responsible for the bombing," Hansen said. Which country with the
capability to launch a nuclear attack would actually do it?"
No one had an answer.
"Mr. Ambassador," Decker interjected, "whoever launched the attack, the Israelis
have apparently taken advantage of the confusion. There are reports of fighting
between Russians and Israelis in every major city, and Israeli resistance
fighters apparently have taken over all of the television and radio stations."
Hansen ran his hand over his head and thought for a second. "Is it possible," he
asked, "that this whole thing could be the work of the Israelis?"
Tel Aviv (10:30 a.m. Israel, 3:30 a.m. New York)
Deep beneath the streets of Tel Aviv the mood was bright and hopeful. Phase one
of the plan had been a complete success: the Russians had been totally unaware
of the transfer of control from the Strategic Defense Control Facility to the
Off-Site Facility; the evacuation of civilians had taken place with only a few
slight delays; the Gideons had been launched (much to the surprise of Russian
security teams guarding the missile silos); and all of the designated targets
had been hit. It was now five hours since the launch.
In the streets of Israel, citizens were attacking the occupying Russians troops.
In the mountains near Mizpe Ramon, an Israeli squadron had surprised the
security force outside the Strategic Defense Control Facility, and was now
preparing to wait out the surrender of those inside. It would be useless to try
to force them out; the facility, with its three-foot thick steel walls and
doors, was impervious to anything, with the possible exception of a direct hit
by a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. When the Russians invaded four months
earlier, those in control of the facility had surrendered it only after they
were ordered to do so by the Israeli Defense Minister. Though the facility had
been completely overridden by the Off-Site Facility and was therefore useless to
the Russians, it would likely be a long wait before the occupants surrendered.
Any celebration would have to wait, however: phase two required the full
attention of Colonel White and his team at the Off-Site Facility. While the
Israelis would soon be able to secure the weaponry warehoused at the Russian
camps, those in Colonel White's team had the immediate responsibility of
directing Israel's strategic defense against a possible retaliatory nuclear
strike from the Russians.
Scott Rosen estimated that Israel's strategic defense could eliminate
ninety-seven percent or more of anything the Russians might send at them in a
full scale attack. The throw-weight of the Russian nuclear arsenal had been
substantially reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a full scale
attack would still mean that several soft targets — that is, cities — could be
hit. If the attack were of a lesser scale — a "limited" response — the strategic
defense could probably destroy all incoming warheads. The most likely scenario
was that the Russians would choose a strong but limited response in order to
reduce the possibility of a response from the West. What everyone hoped for,
however, was that the Russians — realizing that Israel was once again in control
of its own strategic defense — would see that a nuclear attack would ultimately
prove futile, and therefore they would not launch at all. There was no way to be
certain how the Russians would respond and each person in Colonel White's team
understood that every warhead that got through meant the deaths of tens of
thousands of their countrymen.
This was not a game of siting targets and pulling triggers; the strategic
defense was fully automated. It had to be. Destroying the maximum number of
approaching missiles required a nearly instantaneous response to launch. There
was no room for 'man-in-the-loop.' Once the order was given to place the Battle
Management/Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3) computers on 'threat'
status, the role of humans was reduced to support and repair. Some argued that
it was dangerous to turn the control of the system over to the system itself,
but as Joshua Rosen and his colleagues had successfully countered, it was the
best way to ensure survival.
The strategic defense was now initiated for immediate response to any sign of
launch from Russia, her allies, or from the sea.