

# Secrets of Practical Chess

# John Nunn

A Chess Olympic Gold Medal winner explains how you can dramatically improve your chess results!



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### Introduction

This book is armed at players who are primarily interested in improving their results. If you are prepared to lose nine games in order to score one brilliant victory, then it is probably not for you. However, most players are motivated at least partly by over-the-board success – the thrill of winning is one of the attractions of chess, and most players feel very satisfied when their rating improves.

The level at which one plays is governed by a number of vague and poorly understood factors. The first is what one might term' natural talent'. By this I mean that combination of factors which sets an upper bound to the level one can achieve by training and practice. One cannot list precisely which factors are relevant, but one may divide the possible factors into two classes. The first class consists of non-chess-specific elements such as general intelligence and memory. The second class involves a mesh of inter-related chess factors such as the age at which one learnt the earne, early whose seducation and so on.

By the time anyone gets around to reading this book, the 'natural talent' factor will probably be immutable, which brings us to other factors which are more under one's control. These determine how closely one approaches the ceiling imposed by one's 'natural talent'. It is my belief that most players never get anywhere near their natural ceiling, and that considerable improvement is possible with appropriate education, training and practice. Most chess books aim to help readers improve their chess. An opening book, for example, will give general plans and concrete analysis, both to help the reader prepare his chosen openings and, after a game, to compare the course of the game with established theory. Clearly, concrete knowledge is an important factor in establishing chess strength; someone who has a detailed knowledge of rook and pawn endings will have an advantage over someone who does not. An assiduous program of selftraining is bound to have a positive effect. In 1977, Jon Tisdall explained to me his plan for becoming a grandmaster. He had estimated how many hours of study were required to advance by one rating point. Multiplying this by the difference between his current rating and the grandmaster level gave the total number of hours of study required. I laughed, and pointed out that with each advance, the number of hours required to gain the next point would probably increase, and so he might never make it. However, his plan proved justified, because in 1995 he did indeed gain the grandmaster title.

There are few players who can conduct a training program stretching over decades, and indeed time limitations apply to virtually all players. In practice this restricts the amount of improvement possible on the 'chess knowledge' front. In this book I will give advice on how to use the time available for chess study most efficiently, for example by distinguishing essential knowledge from optional knowledge, and advising on the construction of an opening repertoire.

The third factor, which is the main focus of this book, is the efficiency with whiten one applies the first two factors while actually sitting at the board. A detailed knowledge of rook and pawn endings won't help a bit if one has an attack of blind panic; an encyclopaedic memory is valueless if one is regularly seized by an uncontrollable impulse to sacrifice a piece unsoundly. Chaotic and muddled calculation; misjudgements; oversights, lack of confidence (or overconfidence!); lack of determination — these and many other negative influences all serve to whittle away one's playing strength. Such problems are not at all easy to solve, firstly because players very often do not realize what they are doing wrong and secondly because they imagine that there is nothing they can do to improve matters.

This book includes a description of various common failings at the board. I think that many readers will reach a particular section and suddenly thin Kes, that's exactly the mistake I always make "Recognizing the problem is already the first step towards solving it. An awareness of when one is most likely to go wrong enables one to take special care in these 'danger stutations' Eventually, by concentrating on a particular weakness, it is often possible to eradicate it completely.

Since many of the matters dealt with in this book are psychological in nature, there will be quite a few examples from my own games - I can personally testify that muddled thinking occurs at grandmaster level 'Where I have covered a familiar topic, I have made an effort to replace, whenever possible, the standard time-wom examples with excepts from contemporary play.

Of course, this book, while containing much useful advice and information, cannot hope to go into detail about every aspect of the game. My aim has been merely to start the reader along the upward path of self-improvement. I hope that Secrets of Practical Chess will help readers to improve their results and produce more satisfying games.

John Nunn Chertsey, 1997

# 1 At the Board

#### Decision-making

#### The Tree of Analysis revisited

The so-called 'Tree of Analysis' was popularized in Kotov's famous book Think Like a Grandmaster. The analysis of any chess position has a tree-like structure. There are various alternatives in the current position, which form the main branches. Each alternative permits a range of replies, which form slightly smaller branches, and so on. Since there are, typically, dozens of legal moves in an average chess nosition, a tree including every legal move rapidly becomes too dense for human beings to handle. Of course, it isn't necessary to consider every legal move, since a considerable percentage of these legal moves are nonsensical, and this tends to thin the tree somewhat Nevertheless even if there are only five reasonable possibilities at each ply (we will borrow a term from the computer chess world and call half a move a ply), after three whole moves there are 15,625 'leaves'. It follows that analysing solely by means of an analytical tree is only possible when the number of reasonable possibilities for the two players is limited - in practice this means tactical positions and certain types of endgame. However, one constructs some sort of analytical tree in thinking about almost any posttion; in less tactical situations, where the opponent's replies are much less predictable, one would not rely solely on the 'tree' but also take other factors into consideration.

It follows that the 'Tree of Analysis' is a very important method of chess thinking; computers have shown that it is possible to play very strongly using practically nothing else. Kotov's book described in detail the mental processes involved in concrete analysis. If we assume that White is to move then Kotov recommended that White form a list of 'candidate moves' which he is trying to decide between, making sure that the list is complete. For each of these. White creates a list of possible replies by Black and so on, following each branch in turn until a definite evaluation can be given. Kotov specifically warned against jumping from branch to branch; he thought that you should analyse each candidate move until it can be definitely evaluated, and only then move on to the next one.

The following example, which I have taken from Colin Crouch's interesting book Attacking Technique, is given as an exercise. It can be solved by Kotov's method, although this does

not mean to say that you will find it simple.



L. Psakhis - D. King London (Lloyds Bank) 1994

Black actually blundered a pace away with 31...\(\text{Les}\)? 32 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc5} + \text{We6} 33 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc5}, but 31...\(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc5} is better. Crouch then remarks "The attempt at a tactical refutation ... with 32 \(\text{Ler}\)? 4 does not quite succeed: 32...\(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 24 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 43 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 43 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 43 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 43 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 36 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 36 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 36 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 38 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 38 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 39 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 30 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 38 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 38 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 39 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 38 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 39 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 37 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 39 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \text{Mc2} 30 \(\frac{1}\) \text{Mc2} 30 \(\frac{

It is interesting to see how Kotov's method for, as he put it, teaching human beings to analyse with the accuracy of a machine' compares with the way machines actually calculate.

In Figure 1 we see a stage in the computer's analysis of a position, with




L. Psakhis - D. King (analysis)



many branches removed for the sake of clarity. The computer analyses by a process of 'iterative deenening'. Let us suppose it is analysing a position in which it has to choose between 40 legal moves. It will analyse all legal sequences of moves to a particular denth, taking some branches deener. especially those with forcing sequences involving checks or captures. This will allow it to attach a numerical evaluation to all the 40 possibilities Based on its evaluation, it will reorder the 40 moves to put the most promising ones (i.e. those with the highest evaluation) first. Then it will go one nly deener, again analysing all possible legal sequences, and devoting more time to those moves early in the list.



Figure 2 shows a human being analysing according to Kotov's recipe. He has listed three candidate moves and is in the process of analysing the first of these. He has not started analysing the other two.



ally thinks. He has started analysing move A and discovered line A1. He wasn't especially impressed by it, so switched to analysing move B. He didn't like that move either, so he returned to his analysis of A, adding line A2 to his earlier efforts. He has either not got around to move C, or has simply forgotten about it.

More recent authors, such as Tisdall (see the Introduction!) in Improve Your Chess Now, have discussed the pros and cons of Kotov's recommendations, but my concern is to give practical advice and not to get in-

volved in an academic discussion. There are several problems which can arise as a result of Kotov's method The most obvious is that it can be extremely inefficient. Let us suppose that you are analysing a possible combination 1 &xh7+ &xh7 2 2g5+. There are two defences, 2... \$26 and it is very complicated, but after twenty minutes you decide that White has the advantage. Then you start looking at 2... \$\preceq g8. After a couple of minutes it becomes obvious that this refutes the sacrifice. The upshot of Kotov's inflexible approach is that you have lost twenty minutes' thinking time, solely on account of the had luck of having chosen the wrong move to analyse first. A more rational approach would be to spend a couple of minutes looking at each of the two alternatives. It is possible that this will reveal one of them to refute the sacrifice, at which point &xh7+ can be abandoned. It is also possible that the preliminary analysis will show one of them to be a clear-cut loss, in which case you can switch attention to the other one in the confidence that it is definitely the critical line. If both are unresolvable within a short time, then this is in itself useful information. It shows that the task of determining whether the sacrifice is sound or not will require a

substantial time investment. Then the decision is really whether it is worth-while putting in the effort to analyse deeper. We will revisit this question of whether or not to analyse in the next section.

A second problem with Kotov's method is that it fails to take into account the synergistic effect of analysing several lines. The analysis of move A and that of move B are very often not independent of one another. Suppose you have rejected move A, but when analysing move B you suddenly notice a tactical possibility. It makes sense to return to move A to see if the same possibility is applicable there.

Here is a simple example:



J. Gunst Das Illustrierte Blatt, 1922

Clearly White has to move his bishop, so there are three possibilities. You look at 1 2xd7, and note that 1...xc7 wins one of the two minor pieces by a fork. The next move is 1

\$67, but this leads to the same result after 1 .. \$c7. Finally, there is 1 \$a6, which avoids the king fork, but after 1 \pm c7 White nevertheless must lose a piece, as the knight is now trapped. Thus is all in accordance with Kotov's method While looking at this last line. however, you notice a surprising pomt: after 1 2a6 dec7 White can try 2 \$c5"?. with the idea that 2...\$xb8 3 dd6 da8 4 dc7 leads to mate by 5 &b7# Having spotted this, it is certainly worth noting that it might be possible to utilize it in the previously analysed lines. This jumping back is not in accordance with Kotov's method. Sure enough, after 1 \$b7 \$c7 White can play 2 2a6, and again Black cannot take the knight

So which line is correct? The answer is that 1 2 a6 \(^2 \) 2 \(^2 \) 5 fails to 2...(6+3 \(^2 \) d \(^2 \) b 3 dd \(^2 \) xbcs, and now 4 \(^2 \) xd 6 \(^2 \) a8 5 \(^2 \) c7 is stalemate. White must prevent Black giving up his d-pawn, and so 1 \(^2 \) b7 \(^2 \) c7 2 \(^2 \) a6! is the right line (2 \(^2 \) d6 allows the knight out).

Spotting a new idea may even cause you to change your list of candidate moves. Here is an example (D):

White has just played 19 Æg1-g5. Black was threatening 19... Pol3+ followed by 20 €x5+, but now this threat is multified, because on the discovered check White can take on f5. Moreover, 20 Œxf5 gxf5 21 Æg1 is a serious threat.

My initial thought was the safetyfirst 19 e6, but after 20 hxg6 fxg6 21 adg1 the position is just unclear, so I



A. Kuligowski – J. Nunn Wijk aan Zee 1983

started looking for alternatives. My eye was suddenly caught by a tactical idea. After 19... 2h6 the most obvious reply is 20 £xf5, but then 1 wondered if some combination of ... £xc3 and ... £xc3 and ... £xc3 2h £xc3 21... £xc3 2xc3 21... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ £xc3 2xc3 21... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ £xc3 2xc3 21... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ £xf6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for Black, and concluded that after 19... \$\frac{x}{2}\$ h6 \$\frac{w}{x}{2}\$ wins for

19... å h6! 20 Edg1 å xg5 21 Exg5 e6 22 hxg6 fxg6 23 h5?!

After 23 **2 2 5** 6 24 h5 White would have had better chances of counterplay, although Black retains a large advantage with 24... 2c2.

23...重b7 24 管g2 重g7 25 h6 重b7 26 重xf5 exf5 27 管xg6+ 全h8 28 管g2 After 28 全g5 管xd4 Black defends. 28...f4 29 全g1 重g8 0-1 However, having noticed the possibility of ... @xx2+in the variation with ... &h f. I should have gone back to see if this affected my list of candidate moves. The key point is that the capture on a 2 becomes possible once the white queen no longer guards b2, and so the move 19... &c2!! (D) springs to mind:



White is now completely helpless, for example:

1) 20 ②xd5 ②xa2+ 21 ⊈xc2 饗xb3+ 22 ⊈b1 囂b7 23 hxg6 f5 wins for Black.

2) 20萬dgl ②xa2+21 ②xa2 響xb3 22 響xc2 響xa2 is also decisive. 3) 20 hxg6 ②xa2+ 21 暈xc2 (21

3) 20 mgb 包xa2+ 21 wxc2 (21 ②xa2 兔xb3) 21... wxb3+ 22 如d3 ②xc3 23 bxc3 wc4+ 24 如c2 wa2+ 25 如d3 戛b2 wins the queen.

There are also some types of chess calculation which have nothing to do with the 'Tree of Analysis'. One of these is the 'goal-secking' approach. Here is an example:



G. Kuzmin – E. Sveshnikov USSR Ch. Moscow 1973

The position seems tailor-made for a double bishop sacrifice on h7 and 97, the only problem being that it doesn't work: 16 \$\(\frac{1}{2}\)\text{MY} + \(\frac{1}{2}\)\text{MY} + \(\frac{1}\)\text{MY} + \(\frac{1}{2}\)\text{MY} + \(\frac{

#### 16 Ab6! Axb6

It does not help if Black moves his rook, for example 16... 量8 17 全xd5 cxd5 18 金xh7+ 金xh7 19 電h5+ 金g8 20 金xg7 響xc5+ 21 齿h1 金xg7 22 響g4+ 由8 23 置x 362 24 f51 電xf5 25 星xf5 exf5 26 電h3+ (hd Black played 16... ⊑a7, White would now have 26 電d4+) followed by 電g3+ and the rook on 86 falls.

17 全xh7+ \$xh7 18 \$\boldsymbol{w}\$h5+ \$\boldsymbol{w}\$g8 19 全xg7 \$\boldsymbol{w}\$xg7 20 \$\boldsymbol{w}\$g4+ \$\boldsymbol{w}\$h7 21 \$\boldsymbol{E}\$f3

You can never find a move like 16 Deb't by using the tree of analysis (unless you are a computer) because it makes absolutely no sense except as part of the whole tactical operation, and therefore will not make it onto your list of 'candidate moves."

Here is a more sophisticated examnle



V. Anand - J. Lautier

There are so many pieces hanging that it takes a few moments to grasp what is going on in this position! White is set to lose the exchange on it looks as if the most likely outcome is a position with. for example, two bishops against a rook and two pawns. However, Anand had an imaginative tactical idea, namely to scarifice his

queen with the astomshing move 20 \$\frac{1}{26}\$G. Unfortunately, after 20 \$\frac{1}{26}\$G6 \$\frac{1}{27}\$MI = 21 \$\frac{1}{28}\$Xe6+ Black can just run with his king by 21...\$\frac{1}{27}\$Z \$\frac{1}{28}\$Xe7+ \$\frac{1}{29}\$B8 32...\$\frac{1}{27}\$Z \$\frac{1}{28}\$Xe7+ \$\frac{1}{29}\$B8 31 \$\frac{1}{29}\$MI = 30 \$\frac{1}{21}\$MI = 30

#### 20 h6!! gxh6?

Black apparently hadn't seen Anand's idea at all, or he would have tried 20...£\text{Nxe3}, although White retains the advantage after 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\text{xe3}\) \(\frac{3}{2}\text{cos}\) \$22 \text{hxg7}\) \(\frac{2}{2}\text{ge}\) 23 \(\frac{3}{2}\text{cos}\) 12. Of course, the variation 20...g6 21 \(\frac{2}{2}\text{xe5}\) represents the fulfilment of White's idea.

#### 21 ≜g6‼ **Ðe**7

Now that h6 is available for White's bishop, the line 21... 費xd1 22 基xe6+ 全f8 23 皇xh6+ 全g8 24 皇xf7# ends in mate.

#### 22 Wxd4 Exd4 23 Ed3! Ed8 24 Exd8+ wxd8 25 @d3! 1-0

The tree of analysis is certainly a useful technique in tactical positions, but it should be used flexibly and supplemented by other types of chess thinking. One has to strike a balance between the rigid application of Kotov's principles and jumping from one variation to another too much. In particular, I favour the 'quick scan' approach, looking breefly at all the major lines to see if any can be quickly resolved. With any luck, this will be enough to settle the analysis; if not, at

least you know where the tricky areas lie.

The most common errors in 'tree' analysis are:

- Forgetting to analyse a move completely. This is surprisingly east to do. After spending twenty minutes analysing defences A and B to your intended sacrifice, you decide that it is sound and play it. The instant your hand has left the piece you remember defence C, which you had noticed but not analysed.
- 2) Confusing similar lines. If you are jumping about a lot between rather similar variations, then it is easy to get mixed up as to which position came from which line. In other words, although you have the positions clear in your mind, the links between them which form the branches of the 'tree' have become muddled. You may not ostart rebuilding the 'tree' in your mind from scratch when this happens.

While a certain amount of mental discipline can greatly increase the efficiency of your tactical analysis, a great deal still depends on 'natural talent'. It would be quite easy to overlook the whole idea of \$\frac{2}{2}\text{gf}\$ in the Anand-Lauter position above, and in this case a wonderfully organized tree of variations will not help you. But then, Lauter missed it too, so at least you would not be alone.

Now we return to the exercise on page 8. Here is the diagram again:



L. Psakhis - D. King (analysis)

Crouch's 34... The is actually the weakest of the three king moves, and leads to a draw, as in his analysis.

Initially I thought that 34...\ph has was winning, since any check on the eighth rank is met by ...\(\frac{\pm \frac{\pm \text{since any check on the eighth rank is met by ...\(\frac{\pm \frac{\pm \frac{\pm \frac{\pm \text{since any check on the eighth rank is met by ...\(\frac{\pm \frac{\pm \fr

The final move, 34. \$\ppsi 878\$, is actually the strongest and leads to a forced win for Black, although it appears the least likely move because it self-pins the f2-rook. White can only 93 \$\pm 2\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\pm 67\$ \$\pm 86\$ \$\pm 18\$ \$\pm 18

39. .\$\phif5 40 \$\pif7+ (40 \$\pid7+ \$\pig5)\$
40...\$\phif5 41 \$\pixe7+ \$\pihf5 \text{ winning.}

#### Evaluation functions

When computers analyse a position, they create a tree of analysis, and then use a rather crude evaluation function to assess the position at the end of every branch Then, by working backwards, they can evaluate the current nosition and establish what they consider to be the optimal line of play. If a computer had a perfectly accurate evaluation function, then it would not need to analyse the position more than one ply ahead - it could simply evaluate the position after each legal move and choose the one with the highest evaluation. The effect of analysis is to increase the accuracy of the fairly nrimitive evaluation function.

Humans tend to analyse in a different way, but they still use an evaluation function. While they may not think they have an advantage of 0.32 pawns, it is quite normal to think 'Well, at the end of this line I have a slight/fair/clear/crushing advantage.' After looking at various lines the human decides on the best. This process is rather similar to that performed by the computer.

However, the human also typically uses an evaluation function in a different way. If you think that you have an awantage in the current position, then you automatically reject moves which allow your opponent total equality.

This type of reasoning is very common and is extremely useful in rapidly cutting down the number of moves that you have to consider, but it also has its dangers. It is almost the reverse of the computer's logic; instead of using the analysis to evaluate the position, the 'evaluation' is used to prune the analysis tree. However, because the initial 'evaluation' is not based on concrete analysis of the current position, it is inherently unreliable. Typically, players simply carry over their evaluation from the preceding move and use it as a starting point for the next one. If the evaluation is inaccurate, then all kinds of odd things can start to happen. Suppose you have three possible moves. A. B and C. and believe that you have the advantage. You analyse A and decide that it leads to equality: B the same. You then conclude that C must be the correct move with very little analysis. If the position is in fact equal, then C may actually lead to a disadvantage, although you do not realize this immediately. Then, because you tend to carry over evaluations from one move to the next, you repeat this exercise in defective logic the next move. The upshot is a whole string of inaccurate moves: this is in fact, what is commonly known as 'losing the thread of the game'. If you experience 'losing the thread' try afterwards to trace the problem back to its root cause; surprisingly often, the source of the error was a faulty evaluation.

Y. Seirawan - J. Nunn Brussels World Cup 1988 King's Indian Defence

1 d4 \( \tilde{Q}\) f62 c4 g6 3 \( \tilde{Q}\) c3 \( \tilde{Q}\) g7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 \( \tilde{Q}\) e3 \( \tilde{Q}\) c6 7 \( \tilde{Q}\) g2 a6 8 d5 \( \tilde{Q}\) e5 9 \( \tilde{Q}\) g3 c6 10 a4 cxd5 11 cxd5 e6 12 \( \tilde{Q}\) e2 exd5 13 exd5 \( \tilde{B}\) e8 (D)



I was very happy with the result of the oneming. It seemed to me that g d5 was premature, giving Black a target to aim at with c6 and c6. In the diagram position. I felt that the move f3 was not only a loss of time, but even served to weaken White's dark squares. especially e3. It is thanks to this that White cannot castle (allowing the e3bishop to be exchanged by ... Dc4 and ... De3 would really be bad for White). Therefore I assessed the position as slightly better for Black, but this was just wrong. Perhaps White has not played the opening in optimal style, but a small inaccuracy by White is not enough to hand Black the advantage: he has equalized, but no more.

#### 14 学42

Not unexpected, since 14 0-0 ②c4 is bad (as mentioned above) and 14 金行 響行 15 響均3 (preventing ...②c4) 15... 響行! creates unpleasant pressure along the e-file.

#### 14....**当e**7

My first thought was to continue 4...@c7 15 0-0 2c4 16 &xc4 @xc4, but then I saw that White could more or less force a draw by 17 €pe4 €xc4 (17...@b4 18 €xxf6 + &xf6 19 €c4 @xxb2.20 且ab1 @c5 21 &xf4 @d4+22 &h1 even favours butje) 18 €xc4 @b3! 19 &d41 @xd5 20 Exfd | @xd4+ 21 @xd4 &xd4+ 22 Exd4 Ec7 23 €xd6.

I could also have simply developed by 14...2d7 15 0-0 Ec8, but once again this hardly promises Black more than equality.

#### 15 **⊈**f2

Of course 15 0-0? ♠c4! and 15 ♣d4?! ♠d4 are fine for Black, but the fact that White had to play this artificial-looking king move seemed to justify my earlier assessment. I was now quite excited about various factical possibilities involving a bishop or knight moving to g4, but at the moment no such idea is effective.

#### 15...h5

Continuing my plan to 'punish' White for his opening play. Since there was no immediate tactical blow, the only way to keep the momentum going seemed to be by pushing the h-pawn.

16 The1 (D)



The rook emerges so that it will not be blocked in when the knight has to retreat.

#### 16...h4 17 2/1

After 17 Qe4 Qh7 (17...Qeg4+!? 18 fxg4 Qxe4+ 19 Qxe4 Wxe4 20 \$13 Wc4 is also possible) 18 \$21 f5 White has to retreat with loss of time,

#### 17...•2\h5? (D)

Up to this point Black has not made any real error, but now his desire to play for the advantage leads him badly astray. Originally 1 intended 17...h3, tunking that after 18 g4 there would be some combination based on taking the g4-pawn. Now 1 discovered that there was no such combination. I became frustrated by my mability to find a continuation consistent with my earlier active play. The result was the very weak text-move, based on a trap which doesn't even work.

 ending, but of course this was not acceptable to me.



#### 18 🕸 g1

After 18 £g5, I intended the pawn sacrifice 18... ge7 19 £xh4 ge65+20 £e1 £h6 21 £c2 txg4 £xx4. but after 23 £f3 £d4 24 ge63 Black is struggling to find any compensation for the pawn. Perhaps 19... ge65+20 £d5 £h6 is better, but even so 21 £cd1 is unclear. In fact the mundane 18... £f6 19 £xf6 ge76 20 £e4 ge7 is probably best.

#### 18...h3

Now 18... 2d7?! is bad after 19 2g5! 2f6 20 f4 2xg5 2J fxg5 2g7 22 2e4, heading for f6 so, to avoid losing the h4-pawn to 2g5, the pawn has to advance.

#### 19 g4

Cutting off the h3-pawn.

The sacrifice 19...①xg4 20 fxg4 axc3 21 bxc3 費e4 is refuted by 22 全f3! 要xf3 23 gxh5, so the knight has to retreat with loss of time.

#### 20 &d4 Threatening 21 f4.

20... \$\forall ft8 21 \Omega\_g\$ \Omega\_h\$7 22 g5 Sealing the h7-knight out of play. 22... f6 23 f4 \Omega\_g\$4 24 \Omega\_ce4 \omega\_d\$7



White now made the very weak move 25 gxf6?, which allowed the dead knight on h7 back into the game; after many complications the game ended in a draw.

Had Serrawan continued 25 '@41 f5 26 \$xg7 '@xg7 27 \$xg4 fxg4 28 '@42 then Black would have been in trouble. The 46-pawn is under fire and the h7-kinght can only emerge in the distant future. Even the solid 25 '\( \frac{1}{2} \)ff in would have given White a clear advantage.

In this example the chain of events was: a bad assessment of the position, resulting in over-ambitious play by Black; then avoidance of drawing lines, leading to the awful 17...@th5?. Black only got back on track after his position had severely deteriorated.

#### When to analyse

One question which Kotov did not really cover is whether to analyse at all, or how much to analyse. Yet this is of great practical importance. One might end up playing better moves if one could analyse for an unlimited time, but games played before the introduction of chess clocks (and some nostal games) show that this is not necessarily the case. Too much analysis can easily lead to fatigue and confusion. These days the tendency is towards faster and faster time-limits and this means that apportioning one's thinking time becomes ever more crucial.

When analysing a given position, at is fair to say that one almost always sees more in the first five minutes than in the next five minutes. The five minutes after that is even less productive, and so on. I have observed that if a player spends more than 20 minutes over a move, the result is almost always a mistake. The normal decisionmaking process should not take longer than this, even in fairly complex situations. There will, of course, always be exceptions to any such empirical law. but in this case they are fairly rare. If a player takes a long time over a move. the reason is usually either indecision or inability to find a satisfactory continuation. It is very unusual for the position to be so complicated that it really demands more than 20 minutes' thought.

If you have thought about a nosition for some time and are still unsure what to play, then it is essential to be ruthlessly pragmatic. You have to ask vourself whether further thought is really going to help you make a better decision. Suppose your lengthy cogitation is the result of indecision: for example, say there are two moves, both of which have roughly equal ment. If you have not been able to decide between them up to now, it is reasonable to suppose that there is in fact little to choose between them. Considerable further thought might eventually reveal some tiny difference, but it is rare that this expenditure of time is worthwhile First of all, it is easy to be wrong when dealing with such fine distinctions and secondly, gaining an infinitesimal advantage is of little value if the result is that you run into timetrouble and blunder away a piece. Games are decided by very small advantages far less often than is usually supposed. There are players, such as Capablanca and Karpov, with the abitity to convert a small advantage into a win on a regular basis, but this talent is rare even amongst grandmasters. Games in which the players make errors and the advantage swings back and forth are far more common in the end the decision comes about as a result of a serious mistake. My advice is to obey your instinctive feeling as to which of the two moves is better or, if you don't have any preference, just choose at random. I have occasionally

been tempted to toss a coin at the board, but despite the undoubted psychological impact on the opponent, this does seem rather unsporting.

If you are unable to find a satisfactory continuation, then once again it esually does not help to think on and on boping for a miracle. Of course, if it is a question of coming up with something or resigning, then you may as well continue, but this is uncommon. Usually, you are better off playing what appears to be the least unfavourable continuation and saving the time for accurate defence and possible counterplay later on. It is worth noting that if you are generally unhappy with your position, then this might well be colouring your assessments. Before choosing a move, it is probably worth having a quick review of the alternatives and the reasons why you deemed them unsatisfactory, to see if they are really as bad as you imagine. It is not unusual suddenly to find that your intended equal continuation is slightly worse for you; you then look at more and more unfavourable possibilities. become deeply depressed about your position, and forget that the first line you looked at wasn't actually all that had.

Another common time-waster is instinctively to want to play a certain move and then to spend a long time trying to back up this intuitive feeling with concrete analysis. Don't do this. If your intuition is telling you strongly to play move X, then you will probably

play it in the end anyway and further thought is only going to waste time. The situation which represents the worst of all worlds is when you want to play X, but can't find any objective reason for doing so; then you analyse and analyse until you find some halfbaked and dubious reason why X is a good move. Then you end up playing a dubious move and spending a lot of time. However, it is usually worthwhile spending a few minutes trying to find something concrete wrong with your intuitive choice, because positional intuition doesn't insure against the possibility that it might be bad for tactical reasons. If, during these few minutes you don't find anything wrong, then you should just play the move

The following game is a successful example of playing (almost!) without calculation.

#### J. Nunn – P, van der Sterren Bundesliga 1995/6 Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 Qf3 Qc6 3 &b5 a6 4 &a4 Qf6 5 0-0 &e7 6 Ee1 b5 7 &b3 d6 8 e3 0-0 9 d3 Qa5 10 &c2 e5 11 Qbd2 E2 Qf1 h6 13 Qg3 &f8 14 d4 exd4 15 cxd4 cxd4 16 Qxd4 &b7 17 b3 d5 18 e5 Qe4 (D)

Black's inferior handling of the opening has left him with an offside knight on a5. The idea of ...d5 and ... De4 is to offer a pawn in order to free his position.



19 âh2 I did consider taking the pawn by 19 € xe4 dxe4 20 € xe4 € xe4 21 Exe4 對d5 22 對e2 (but not 22 對g4 里xe5 23 Exe5 對xe5 24 @xh6 f5 25 對f4 @d6 26 響xe5 axe5 27 ae3 f4 and Black wins) but I instructively didn't like it. White's pieces are badly tangled up, while Black's development problems are solved. It seemed to me that it would be very hard to put the extra pawn to good use in such a position. Looking back on it, I think this line would also have been somewhat better for White, since Black still has trouble using his knight effectively. The more dynamic game continuation is at least as good, and presents Black with difficult decisions.

In general, White would be quite happy for Black to exchange knights on g3, as then he would have an automatic attack by #d3 (meeting ...g6 by e6). However, I was not prepared to spend a tempo on forcing it by playing 19 f3. Moreover, this move both weakens the a7-g1 diagonal and blocks the

d1-h5 diagonal, along which White might like to move his queen.

#### 19...₩b8

After 19... Exe5 20 f3 &b4 21 fxe4 £xel 22 ∰xel ∰b6 23 \$h1 White has a large advantage since an assault on g7 is not far away.

The text-move was unexpected, but the point is clear; if White takes three times on e4, then Black just plays Exe5

20 e6 A key moment. I thought for a few minutes about the direct 20 Wg4. when Black has almost no choice but to play 20... #xe5 Then it looks as though there must be a tactical possibility using the long diagonal, but I could only see one idea: 21 2 df5 #xb2 22 9xh6+ \$h7 23 9xf7 #xc2 24 Exe4 dxe4 25 @g5+, followed by Th5. However, even a quick glance is enough to show that the analysis of this line will be very complicated; in the middle Black can try 24... Exe4 or he may decline the second piece and play, for example, 23... #f6.

Here is a case in which a quick scan of the other possibilities is much berter than the twenty minutes or so which would have been required to assess this double piece sacrifice. I first looked at 20 @gf5 Exe5 21 22 26. but there seemed to be nothing clear. Then the text-move occurred to me and I was at once attracted to it. After 20...fxe6 21 €xe4 dxe4 22 €xe4 position; the e6-pawn is weak, the

a5-knight remains offside and White can step up his pressure with natural moves such as #g4 and Lae1. Best of all, it is simple and risk-free.

Home analysis shows that the double piece sacrifice leads to a draw: after 25 2g5+ \$28 26 \$h5 in the above line, Black can respond 26 ... e3! and White has nothing more than nemetmal check

#### 20 #f4

Another rather unexpected move, 21 @xe4 dxe4 22 g3

Again a simple choice. In order to avoid losing the pawn on e4, Black's queen must move onto the long diagomal, but then White has various factical ideas based on moving the d4-knight. 22...₩e5

After 22...費f6 23 費d2 b4 24 毫xe4 Black will be lucky to escape with only the loss of a nawn.

#### 23 ₩24

It is important to take into account any finesse which might make the win easier. Here White has the choice between 23 曾e2 and 23 曾g4 h5 24 曾e2. The latter is clearly superior for two reasons. Firstly the protruding pawn on h5 is a weakness, as it will be undefended; secondly, the weakening of the g5-square may allow White to occupy it later with his knight, creating a permanent danger to Black's king. This is an example of the method of comparison (page 44).

#### 23...h5

There is nothing better, 23... \$b424 Te2 is no different, while 23, fxe6 24

@xe4 @xe4 25 Exe4 ₩f6 26 Ef4! @g5 27 @xg5 hxg5 28 Ze4 is similar to the game, but with Black's kingside nawns even weaker.

#### 24 ∰e2 fxe6 25 ≜xe4 ∰xe4 26 ₩xe4 \(\hat{\omega}\) xe4 27 \(\hat{\omega}\) xe4

An ideal outcome. Black will mevitably lose the e6-pawn within a couple of moves (e.g. 27... \$67 28 Lae | \$b4 29 Ef4+) and he remains with an offside knight.

#### 27 Hac8

If White takes on e6 immediately, then this rook will penetrate to c2. However, there is no rush.

#### 28 Eac1

Threatening to take twice on e6 with the rooks, thereby leaving the d4-knight to cover c2.

#### 28. &b4 29 E1e2 &c3 30 &xc3 Exc3 31 Exe6 1-0

This may appear a little premature, but Black will lose the a6-pawn as well, and there is no point continuing with two pawns less.

#### DAUT

This acronym means: if in doubt, 'Don't Analyse Unnecessary Tactics'.

Tactical analysis is an error-prone activity. Overlooking one important finesse can completely change the result of the analysis. If it is possible to decide on your move on purely positional considerations then you should do so: it is quicker and more reliable. There are, of course, many positions in which concrete analysis is essential, but even in these cases you should not analyse specific variations more than necessary.

The following example is a margual case.

> J. Nunn – M. Přibyl Bundesliga 1995/6 Giuoco Piano

#### 1 e4 e5 2 0f3 0c6 3 &c4 0f6 4 d3 &c5 5 0-0 d6 6 c3 0-0 7 0hd2 a6 8 &b3 &a7 9 h3 0d7 10 &c2 f5 11 exf5 Uxf5 12 d4 Uf8

Black has played the opening in a rather provocative manner, aiming to open the f-file and create counterplay by attacking f2. However, the cost has been retarded development.

#### 13 De4

After 13 d5 ©e7 14 ©g5 ©f6 15 Qo64 Qf5 White has secure control over e4, which would warm the heart of anyone who plays against the King's Indian. Unfortunately for White, the black bishop is on a7 rather than g7, and the pressure on 72 gives Black reasonable counterplay.

#### 13...exd4 (D)

With quite a few of White's pieces pointing at Black's naked kingside, there is clearly potential for a forcing continuation, but which move should he choose? 14 Deg5, 14 Deg5, 14 Deg5, 14 Deg5, 14 Deg5 and 14 Ag5 are all reasonable continuations. I would regard this as a borderline case for deciding whether to spend the time to analyse everything thoroughly. The position does



indeed look promising on purely strategic grounds, but the wide range of moves at White's disposal indicates that a complete analysis will be very time-consuming.

In the end I decided on a straightforward forcing continuation which gives White a slight positional advantage. In fact White could have secured a larger advantage by another line, but that is the risk one takes in making a decision not to look too deeply into a position. However, I would certainly have taken my time had there not been an advantageous alternative.

#### 14 4)ee5

Here is an analysis of the other possibilities:

- 1) 14 &g5 @e8 15 Ie1 Ode5 16 Oxd4 &xh3! 17 gxh3 &xd4 18 cxd4 Of3+ 19 &g2 Oxe1+ 20 @xe1 Oxd4 and Black is slightly better.
- 2) 14 ₩d3 ᡚce5 15 ᡚxe5 ᡚxe5 16 ᡚf6+ ₩xf6 17 ₩xh7+ �f7 defends.
- 3) 14 ♣b3+ �h8 15 ♠fg5 ₩e7 (not 15...♠de5 16 ♠xh7!) 16 ♠e6 (16

4) 14 2 fg5! and now:

4a) 14...d5 15 ♠e6 (15 ₩h5 h6 16 ♠e6 is also good) 15...₩e7 16 ♠4g5 ♠f6 17 ♠xf8 wins the exchange.

4b) 14... 2de5 15 2xxh?! \$\( \) \$\( \

4c) 14...dxc3 15 ∰h5 (15 €x6 ∰c7 16 €xf8 cxb2 17 ≜xb2 €xf8 is unclear) 15...h6 16 ∰g6 with a decisive attack.

4d) 14...h6 15 €e6 ₩e7 16 €xf8 €xf8 17 Xe1 &e6 and Black has a pawn and a slight lead in development for the exchange, but this does not provide sufficient compensation.

#### 14.,, €\f6 15 \d3 g6

After 15...h6 16 Ph7 Ie8 17 Weg6
White has a winning attack, so this
move is forced. However, the weakenmg of the dark squares around Black's
king is serious when his dark-squared
bishop is far away on the queenside.

#### 16 @xd4 @xd4 17 cxd4 d5

This is almost forced, or else Black cannot complete his development, for example 17...\$f5 fails to 18 \$\displays b3+ and 19 \$\displays f5. Now, however, 18...\$f5 is a threat

#### 18 (Dxh7! (D)

Definitely best. The net effect of this is to exchange the h7- and d4pawns, further eroding the defences of the black king.



#### 18,...&f5

# 19 ②xf6+ 掌xf6 Forced as 19. 異xf6 20 掌b3 &xc2

21 Txc2 Axd4 22 Ag5 costs the exchange.

# 20 \$\varphi b3 \( \times xc2 \) 21 \$\varphi xc2 \( \times xd4 \) 22 \$\times h6 \( \times f7 \) 23 \$\times ad1 \$\varphi xc2 \( \times xd4 \) 22

This position is the almost forced consequence of White's decision at move 14. The immediate threat is 24 Exd4, and the d4-bishop is pinned against the d5-pawn.

23... Eh7? (D)

A serious error, which costs Black the game immediately. Other moves:

- 1) 23...\ph7 24 \( \hat{2} \) \( \hat{2} \) \( \hat{2} \) \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \hat{2} \) \( \hat{2}
- 2) 23...5 24 âc3 âxe3 25 fxe3 \$\text{we6 26 Ext7 \text{ bxf7 27 e4! d4 (White wins a pawn after 27...dxe4 28 \text{ Eft } \text{dy 7 29 \text{ we6 3 0 \text{ Eft } \text{ we6 } \text{ bdg 7 32 \text{ Ec6 } \text{ we6 d7 33 } \text{ we6 } \$\text{ de4 + 34 } \text{ w.4d + cxd4 35 } \text{ \text{ Ed6 } \text{ 28 } \text{ we6 + dg7 29 b4! with strong pressure.}
- 3) 23 ...\$\text{\$x\$} xb2 24 \$\text{\$x\$} xd5 \$\text{\$x\$} e8 25 \$\text{\$x\$} fd1 \$\text{\$x\$} e5 is Black's best line. However, I still prefer White because his king is completely safe, while Black's has only one pawn for protection.



Here is a case in which it most definitely is worthwhile looking for a forced win! After the sacrifice on d4 Black will have no pawns at all defending his king. White only needs to switch his bishop to the long diagonal, or bring his rook into the attack, and the game will be over. The lines are quite straightforward and forcing, so there is little possibility of error.

24 Ixd4! ₩xd4 25 ₩xg6+ Φh8 26 Ie1

Black is helpless against the threat of 27 Te8+

#### 26. Ed7

The only way to lump on. Now White can win two pawns by 27 ≡68+ ≡xe8 ₹ ±xe8+ pawn 729 ≡xd+ ±xhe 30 ≡xc7, but Black has a passed d-pawn and in a queen ending a strong passed pawn can counter-balance the loss of several pawns. At any rate, White would have to take care, so it is worth looking for a killer move.

#### 27 Th5! Wd3

There are simply too many threats.

27...\$\pm\$28 28 \$\mathbb{E}28\$ is hopeless, and after

27.. \$\mathbb{E}24 28 \$\mathbb{E}44 \pm\$28 29 \$\mathbb{E}28 \mathbb{E}4 \mathbb{W}\$ hite

wins the black rook for nothing.

#### 28 **L**e6

Once the rook enters the attack it is all over.

28... 互g8 29 全g7+! 全xg7 30 響h6+ 1-0

It is mate next move

Quite apart from the possibility of miscalculation, there are psychological traps lying in wart for the avid calculator. Suppose that, in a slightly favourable position, you see a sharp and complicated line; it takes you half an hour to investigate all the variations which may arise, but you discover that the upshot is at best 'unclear'. It is then incredibly hard to write your analysis off as a waste of time and start thinking about alternative ideas. Eventually you convince yourself to play the tactical line with an argument like well, he probably won't find his way through all the complications, and even then he doesn't have any advantage. Thus you end up playing a move which is objectively not the best, and it is a mazing how often one's opponent does indeed find his way through the complications once they have been forced on him.



V. Anand – G. Kamsky Linares 1994

In this position a great deal depends on White's mobile e- and f-pawns. If he can set them moving by f4 and e5, gaining tempi with both moves, then Black will be dead lost. At the moment, however, Black threatens a fork on f3.

Anand decided that forcing through f4 and e5 was so important that he was

prepared to sacrifice the rook on g1 to achieve it. The game continued with the complex tactical variation 19 f4! Df3 20 @g2 Dxg1 21 c5 0-0 22 &d3! 2xe5! 23 fxe5 ₩xh4 24 Exg1 ₩f4+ 25 db1! gxe5. Even for a grandmaster, working one's way through this line is far from easy, but that is not the end of it. In the resulting position Black has a rook and three nawns for a bishop and a knight, on paper a considerable material advantage. However. Anand showed that after 26 \$\infty\$ 51 White's initiative prevents Black from co-ordinating his pieces. He went on to win very meely.

One can hardly criticize Anand's choice, as it did give him the advantage in a very forcing way, but for ordinary mortals (and normal GMs such as myself) this continuation would be a distinct leap in the dark. If faced with the diagram position it would be reasonable to spot 19 f4 and think "Well. that may be good, but it's very complicated. I'll analyse it if I have to, but is there another line which gives me the advantage and involves less risk?" The move 19 &e2 is natural; it threatens f4 and e5 without any sacrifice at all. Black cannot blockade White's pawns with 19...g5 because 20 hxg5 hxg5 21 wxb4 (or 20 wxb4 gxb4 21 axd4) is very good for White. Anand did not play this move because of 19...d3. which is indeed the only reasonable reply. However, White can then continue 20 @e3! and Black is in big trouhte. The threat of f4 and e5 is renewed.

and the pawn on d3 is hanging. The continuation might be 20... 2xh4 21 \$xd3 #c7 22 9)h6 9)xd3+ 23 #xd3 Id8 24 Ixd8+ Wxd8 25 €\d5 and Black is losing. He cannot castle owing to 26 wxh6, the g7-pawn is hanging, White threatens #c5 and the bishop is dominated by the powerful centralized knight. This variation is fairly straightforward to calculate, and probably not really necessary as after 22 5 b6 it is already clear that White stands very well. Thus White could have gained at least as much advantage as in the game with the simple move 19 &e2. It is easy to imagine that having calculated the difficult and attractive line with 19 f4. White was not eager to find an equally good simple alternative, even though moves like 19 &e2 and 20 me3 are child's play to someone such as Anand.

#### Safety-nets

When you are thinking about a complex and lengthy tactical line, especially one involving sacrifices, it helps to have a safety-net, i.e. an alternative line which you can adopt if, half-way through your intended continuation, you discover that it doesn't work.

The simplest type of safety-net is when you have a perpetual check in hand (D).

This looks like a fairly normal Najdorf Sicilian, but Shirov found an imaginative tactical idea.

17 Ef5! &c8



A. Shirov - B. Gelfand Dos Hermanas 1996

This does provoke the following combination, but Gelfand probably did not realize how dangerous the coming sacrifice would prove to be. 17 b4 would have been a safer alternative

#### 18 Exe5!

This involves the sacrifice of a whole rook

#### 18...âd6 19 åf4 g5?!

After 19... \(\frac{1}{2}\)xe5 \(\frac{3}{2}\)0 \(\frac{3}{2}\)xe5 \(\frac{3}{2}\)d xe5 \(\frac{3}{2}\)d xe5 \(\frac{3}{2}\)d xe would come under very strong pressure, for which he has only a minute material advantage as consolation

Shirov did not analyse 19...♠c41; a but perhaps this would have been a way for Black to reach a reasonable position. The main line runs 20 Cc 20 &xe4 bxc4 21 €2d4 g5! is much better for Black than the game, as without the bishop on d3 White's threats are far less dangerous) 20...&xf4 21 Zxcr &xg3 22 hxg3 2xb2 and White

has an active rook, but his pawns are shattered. The position should be at heast equal for Black.

20 Ic5!

The stunning point of White's comlination.

20...gxf4 21 \$\mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}\text{14 }\mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}\text{15 }\text{\$\delta\$}\text{\$\delta\$}\text{15 }\text{\$\delta\$}\text{\$\delta\$}\text{15} \text{\$\delta\$}\text{\$\delt



The first critical moment. White has no grouble forcing a draw, for example by 23 with 6, when Black has no reasonable way to prevent perpetual check (23...wd6 24 wg5+ wg6 25 wxc5 is yery good for White).

Shirov now thought carefully about the varrous options for playing on. This raises the question as to why be embarked on the combination if he had no idea how he was going to continue at this stage. The answer is that even a leading grandmaster such as Shirov is human. We are already six moves away from the start of the combination, and it is not possible to calculate complex tactics accurately an indefinite distance ahead. Very forcing

variations can indeed be carried much further, but in this position there are numerous options for both players, and this increases the complexity by a laree factor.

large factor.

Shirov based his sacrifice largely on intuition. In this position, with Black's king seriously exposed, he must have felt that there would very likely be a way to play for a win. Moreover, at the back of his mind there was the comorting knowledge that if in fact there was no winning attempt, he had the safety-net of perpetual check to fall back on.

#### 23 0xc5 #xc5 24 e5!

A risk-free method of playing for a win. This introduces the d3-bishop into the attack, and possibly the c3knight as well, while all the time retaining the option of perpetual check.

24,...≜b7?!

Gelfand slips up and now gets into serious trouble. The critical line was 24...公d7! 25 實行 and now:

- 1) 25... \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 26 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 7+ \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 827 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 844 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 829 \( \Dar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 64 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 830 \( \Dar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 64 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 831 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 841 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}}\) 831 \( \bar{\pmathbf{E}
- 2) 25... In e8! 26 Th + 4r8 27 4e4 (once again, White has a draw by 27 mgkh6 + 4r6 7.2 Mgf4 + 4r8, but can play on without risk) 27... 4b6 (it is essential to cover d5; 27... In 8l loses to 28 Åd51) 28 €h6+ 4r6 7.9 Idl (29 €k66 %xb6 30 €hd5+ 4r6 31 €xb6 In section on the section of the sec

2a) 29... ■b8 30 ■f6+ Φf8 31 ■d5! ■67 (31... €xd5 32 €xd5 wins) 32 e6! ■xe6 33 ■d8+ ■xd8 34 ■xd8+ Φg7 35 ■g5+ Φf8 36 ■xf4 with a clear advantage for White.

2b) 29...\$\times 61 30 \times fi6+ \times k18 31 h
and it is still possible for Black to go
wrong, for example 31...\$\times 8.32 h5
\times 15 \times 62 \times 7 \times 62 \times 7 \times 62 \times 7 \times 62 \times

Although he could have reached a draw, the task confronting Geltand was enormous. He had to defend very accurately for a long time against an opponent who has taking absolutely no risk, since he always had a perpetual check in reserve.

#### 25 ₩xh6 f5 26 exf6 2f7

The only defence, as 26... \$\vec{\pi}\$c7 27 \$\vec{\pi}\$g5+! \$\phi\$h8 28 \$\vec{\pi}\$e1 would be hopeless

27 衛g6+ 全f8 28 衛h6+ 全g8 29 直f1! 直e8 30 衛g6+ 全f8 31 衛h6+ 全g8

Now Shirov could have played 32 魚打十里太打733 響度6+ 全招34 響太打 金取24-35 齿來2 學6+ 36 尾江寧太f6 37 紀4. After 37... 響g/+ 38 竇xg/+ 金xg/ 39 星x4 纪c4 40 纪c5! Black would have been two pawns down in the ending.

Shirov chose a different continuation and won after further complications.

#### When the tactics have to work

If you inmate tactics which involve a large commitment and have no safetynet, then you have no margin for error at all. Thus you have to be absolutely sure that your idea works, and it is probably worth double-checking everything before you commit yourself.



A. Yusupov - L. Portisch Tunis Interzonal 1985

In this position Black has already moved his king and so cannot castle kingside. White has just attacked the c-pawn with \$\Omega\$b and \$18...\$\Dmathbb{\text{d}}\$6 would be a normal reply Yusupov certainly has some compensation for the pawn as Portisch's king is stuck in the center, but Black's pieces are fairly well placed and he is, at any rate, not worse. However, Portisch now decided to play a combination

#### 18....96?

The idea is that if White takes on c7 then his knight will be trapped.

#### 19 @xc7+! \$\d7

There is no way back; after 19...\$\psi 7\)
20 \$\mathbb{I}\$f1 \$\mathbb{L}\$g8 21 \$\mathre{L}\$d4 \$\mathre{L}\$e5 22 \$\mathre{L}\$cxc6\$
White wins a pawn and Black's h8rook is blocked in.

#### 20 €\xa6 **X**a8

The immediate acceptance of the piece is bad too Black after 20..bad after 30..bad 21 \$\mathbb{T}\_{A}\$ and \$1 = \mathbb{Z}\_{A}\$ \$\mathbb{D}\_{A}\$ \$1 = \mathbb{D}\_{A}\$ \$2 = \mathbb{D}\_{A}\$ \$1 = \mathbb{D}\_{A}\$ \$2 = \mathb

1) 22... 全c7 23 国ac1 全c5 (23... 互b6 24 蜀a7+ 亘b7 25 国xc6+ 全xc6 26 2d4+全c7 27 国c1+) 24 Qd4 国b6 25 蜀a4 全xd4 26 蜀a7+ 亘b7 27 賓xd4 and wins

Portisch was certainly aware that taking the kinghi with the b-pawn would expose his king too much, and the text-move was the point of his diea. He aims to take the knight with a piece, leaving the b7-pawn to defend his knight and provide his king with adequate defence.

#### 21 Hed1+ \perp cg (D)

The critical moment, Portisch has staked the game on his ability to take the knight with a piece. If he fails, then he will inevitably lose because the concessions he has made in order to trap the knight are so large. He has been prepared to go a pawn down (two pawns have been sacrificed, but he



was a pawn up in the diagram posiiion) and, just as important, he has been prepared to expose his own king scriously. In view of the total lack of any safety-nei, Portisch should have made absolutely sure that there was no hole in his calculations.

#### 22 b4!

Yusupov pinpoints the flaw in the whole concept. Black does not now win a piece and his position has been irreparably damaged.

#### 22...Exa6

After 22...bxa6 White wins by 23 ■ac1 \Delta b7 24 \Delta xc6 \Delta xc6 25 \Delta d4+.

#### 23 b5 Ha3 24 bxc6 b6

Trying to keep some lines closed. 24...bxc6 loses to 25 \( \frac{1}{2} \) act \( \frac{1}{2} \) c5 26 \( \frac{1}{2} \) d4 \( \frac{1}{2} \) c5 27 \( \frac{1}{2} \) c4! and the attack breaks through.

#### 25 Hab1 &c5

国xd5+exd5 35 管e7+ 全xc6 36 管xe3) 30 管xa2 全c7 31 国d7+ 生xc6 32 管a4+ 全c5 33 ②d2 1-0

#### Implicit commitments

Almost every move in chess involves some sort of commitment. A nawn move cannot be reversed and with each advance the pawn permanently loses the ability to control certain squares. Even a piece move is a commitment; if the niece turns out to be badly placed on its new square, it may have to go into reverse, with consequent loss of time. However, the degree of commitment is important. A niece sacrifice involves a greater degree of commitment than a natural developing move. We have already discussed the more obvious types of commitment earlier. However, there is a more subtle type of commitment, which we call implicit commitment. Very often, a certain type of commitment is bound up in a player's choice of opening. A player as White adopting the Velimirović Attack in the Sicilian (one of the main lines of which runs 1 e4 c5 2 9 f3 5063 d4 cxd4 4 50xd4 50f6 5 50c3 d6 6 &c4 e6 7 &e3 &e7 8 me2 a6 9 0-0-0 ₩c7 10 ♣b3 0-0 11 g4) is committing himself to an all-out kingside attack, which may involve sacrifices, and if he is hesitant about giving up material then he has simply chosen the wrong opening. Of course, this is an extreme example - there are few opening variations as one-sided as the Velimirović Attack, but the same general principle applies in many openings. For example, it is not unusual for a player to seize a long-term strategic advantage in return for piece activity or a lead in development. In this case the player with the better development has taken on an implicit commitment to undertake rapid action. Advantages such as a lead in development are inherently temporary, because when the opponent has brought out all his pieces the advantage disappears. A common mistake is to take on such a position, but not to appreciate that the long-term chances he with the opponent. The result is a fatal lack of urgency. Here is an example

> J. Nunn – J. Meilado Leon 1997 French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3 \$66 5 Qf3 \$d7 6 \$e2 \$b5 7 c4 \$xc4 8 \$xc4 dxc4

I had noticed in my database a game won by my opponent with this rather offbeat inne (instead of the usual 8...\$\dagger b4+). Players are often unduly affected by the result of a game. If a player has won a game with a particular line, he will very often repeat exactly the same line, even if it is rather dubious. Affect looking at 8...dx4 before the game, I quite liked the resulting positions for White, so I decided to go down the same variation.

9 d5 @e7

Black does not completely equalize after 9...exd5 10 ∰xd5 ②e7 11 ∰xc4.

#### 10 d6

This is the critical continuation. In Mellado's earlier game White had played 10 Dc3, which allows Black to swap everything on d5, with a more or less equal position.

10... Dec6 11 0-0 (D)



This is a typical case of implicit commitment. The extra pawn is not relevant, as White will win back the c4-pawn in a few moves. The key facfor is that Black has allowed White to drive a wedge into the middle of his position. The protected passed pawn is not going to promote in the near future - there are simply too many pieces on the board for that - but it is an asset both in the middlegame and in the endgame. In the middlegame it stifles the activity of Black's pieces and cuts communication between the queenside and kingside. This could help White to mount a kingside attack, for Black's queenside pieces would have trouble feeding across to the other side of the board. In the endgame the pawn is more likely to promote, as there are fewer pieces available to keep it under control. Black would probably have to assign one piece to keep a watchful yee on the pawn, leaving him a man short elsewhere. The only caveat here is that White should not exchange too many pieces in an endgame, since then Black could use his king as the blockadure piece

In return for White's long-term asset. Black's minor nieces can converge to attack the e5-nawn and for some time White will be tied down to its defence. Moreover, Black's development is quite good, especially as White will have to invest some time in regaining the pawn on c4. However, these compensating factors are all temporary, and given time White will complete his development and reorganize his forces to defend e5 efficiently. Black has therefore taken on a heavy implicit commitment either to keep White offbalance or to convert his temporary advantages into something more permanent before White puts his house in order. If Black has not achieved something concrete within the next halfdozen moves, then we can sately predict that he will be in trouble.

White, on the other hand, can content himself with more modest play. All he need do is consolidate his position and bring all his pieces into play and Black will 'automatically' be worse. Of course, this might have been quite difficult if Black had continued accurately, but nevertheless White's position is easier to play. He has a very clear-cut aim, while Black must try to generate counterplay 'somehow', 1.e. he has to formulate a plan from scratch, whereas White's plan is handed to him on a plate. This is a typical situation in such 'long-term advantage vs piece play' situations. The piece-play side has much more work to do, at least to begin with, to find the best plan. If he succeeds, then the other side may also have to think carefully about how to contain his opponent's counterplay, but if he does not succeed the game can be quite easy.

To my surprise, Black spent very lttle time over the next few moves and only started to think when he was already in considerable difficulties. Evdently he did not appreciate that this is the critical phase of the game and ordinary developing moves will not be enough.

From all this we can learn an important lesson. At the end of the opening, spend a few minutes deciding
whether one player has the better
long-term chances. This may be obvious simply from the opening variation
chosen (for example, in the Exchange
Ruy Lopez it is obviously White who
has the better long-term chances), but
if it is at all unclear then it is worth
spending time on this question. The
strategy for the two players may then
be quite clear: one side must aim to
consolidate and contain his opponent;

the other must play to star up trouble quickly.

#### 11... 2d7 12 Zel g6 13 2a3

The first task is to regain the pawn on c4.

#### 13...åg7

Black cannot hang on to the pawn by 13... \$\mathbb{\epsilon} a6 14 \$\mathbb{\epsilon} e2 b5 because 15 b3 breaks up the queenside pawn structure and regains the pawn in a more advantageous way.

#### 14 9 xc4 #a6 15 #e2 (D)



#### 15...0-0?

A natural move, but one which allows White to consolidate his central
pawns. Black should have continued
15...50 16 2a3 (relatively best, as
white must not block in his bishop)
16...258 (after 16...2cxe5 17 2xe5
2xe5 18 2xb5 0-019 a4 White has
some advantage; Black cannot take on
d6 because of the d-file skewer, so
White manages to support his dangerous passed pawn) 17 2f4 0-0 and
White has more difficulties than in the
game because his kinght is offside at

a3. After 18 Hadl, for instance, Black can continue 18...c4 and try to plant a knight on d3 (for which White will probably have to give up the exchange).

#### 16 2f4 9\b6

If now 16...b5, then White replies 17 ©cd2; thanks to Black's inaccurate 15th move, the knight can retreat to the centre rather than to a3.

#### 17 h3

White must not allow the exchange of queens. His own queen is well placed in the centre of the board, while Black's is marooned on the queenside, so such an exchange would clearly favour Black.

#### 17...**€**]d5

The transfer of the knight to d5 has blocked the d-file and prevented White backing up his pawn with a rook at d1, but it has also relieved the pressure on the e5-pawn.

## 18 £ g3

Now the defects of Black's earlier play start to become apparent. Certainly he has developed his pieces, but he has done nothing to prevent White doing the same. All other things being equal, the position will favour White because of his superior structure. More and more, Black struggles to find constructive moves. He can only under mine White's pawns by ...16, but then White would swap on 16, leaving the 6-nawn honelessiv weak.

#### 18...h6

Black wants to prevent White supporting his d-pawn by a later 2h4, covering the queening square, but we can already see that Black is running out of ideas.

#### 19 **₩**e4

A typical move from the player who has time on his side. It does not create any immediate threat, but tidies up White's position by unpinning the c4-knight. Black also has the worry that the white queen might now switch to the kingside and form the basis of a direct attack.

#### 19...Eac8 20 h4

Both relieving White's back rank (his king would be very safe on h2) and making another threatening gesture against Black's king.

#### 20...b5 21 @e3 (D)

White aims to open the d-file by removing Black's best-placed piece, the blockading knight on d5.



#### 21...Øcb4?

The correct plan is indeed to use the second kmght to restore the d-file blockade, but this move is a tactical error which leads to the loss of material.

21...⊕xe3 22 實xe3 ᡚb4 was the nght way to put the plan into action. Alor 23 量acl ②dx5 24 管c2 c4 25 hxc4 fer 26 ②dx2 管xe2 27 置xc4, for example, Black has avoided any immediate disaster, but White's long-term advantages remain intact. As the pieces are exchanged, the d-pawn poses a more and more serious danger, while Black's bishop on g 75 is practically dead.

22 a3! ©c3 23 axb4 @xa1 24 @c2

Winning two knights for a rook and a pawn. This might not be decisive except for the fact that the structure of the position very much favours minor pieces over rooks.



24...曾a3 25 管xc3 cxb4 26 管d3 互c3 27 管xb5 互xb3 28 包c4 管a2 29

29... 正b2 30 ①d4 星d2 31 ②ab3 星b2 32 實xb4 響a6 33 管c3 星a2 34 ②c5 管c8 35 星c1 響a8 36 響b3 星d2 37 晉b4 星a2 38 管b7 星d2 39 質xa8 星xa8 40 ②cb3 1-0

#### Positional thinking

Although precise analysis plays some part in most chess situations, positional thinking is just as important. Even in sharp situations, positional factors can still play a major part, for example, there is little point in playing a combination winning the exchange if the result is a position riddled with weaknesses (see Sax-Stean on page 105)

Unfortunately, if you have little natural talent for it, positional thinking is one of the most difficult aspects of chess to learn. One often hears of how a certain player has a 'natural feel' for the pieces and instinctively puts them on the right squares. This is either an innate ability or something which is learn by experience. If you have played over and studied thousands of games, and seen all the different patterns and plans which can arise from the main openings, then you already have a good start when it comes to residing a later.

Most players do not have the time for this sort of study and must focus their efforts where they will do the most good. This really means concentrating on the types of middlegame position which can arise from your opening repertoire. Most openings give rise to certain distinctive central pawn structures. Some pawn structures are particular to just one opening. Look, for example, at the following diagram:



You don't need to see the position of the pieces to know that it's almost certainly a Winawer French. On the other hand, look at the following diagram:



It could be virtually anything: Caro-Kann, 2 c3 Sicilian, Queen's Gambit Accepted, Nimzo-Indian, etc. If such pawn structures arise in your report torice, it pays to look not only at games with 'your' opening, but at others which give rise to identual central pawn structures. If you have a database program with a 'position search facility, then you can use this to find which openings result in a particular nawn structures.

Once you have identified the main

pawn structures relevant to your openings, then try to find games resulting in these structures. Once again, a database program makes this easy. If there are too many games to play over, then restrict yourself to games by grandmasters - there is no point playing over games in which the players adopt quite mappropriate plans. It is much better if the games are annotated, preferably with words rather than symbols. Languageless annotations are fine for displaying tactical analysis, but when it comes to explaining the plans for both sides, there is no substitute for a clear explanation in words by someone who really understands the opening. Opening books which emphasize general ideas and plans may also be of help.

For each pawn structure, try to play about fifty games. This should be enough to give you an idea both of the typical plans adopted by both players, and of which plans tend to succeed. The idea is not really to learn what to play in specific positions, but to see what the two players are trying to do,

and how each side tries to frostrate the other's plans. By looking at all these games in quick succession, you will notice connections and similarities between them which would not be apparent if you looked at them over a period of months. When these positions arise in your games, you will then have a much better idea of what you should be trying to do.

Even grandmasters depend on this type of knowledge, and if they are thrown into unfamiliar territory, then they immediately start to play much less strongly. The following game is an illustration of this, but it also demonstrates a second valuable lesson: the importance of sticking consistently to a plan.

#### M, Adams – A. Onishchuk Tilburg 1997

Two Knights Defence

#### 1 e4 e5 2 Af3 Ac6 3 &c4 Af6 4 d3 &e7 5 0-0 0-0 6 a4 d6 7 Abd2

Adams is playing this quict system in a slightly unusual way. White normally plays c3 at some stage, so as to preserve his c4-bishop from exchange (he can meer. "Da5 by &b5, and then drop it back to a4 and c2 if Black chases it with his pawns). Adams has countered the threat of ... "Da5 in a different way, by playing a4. This not only enables him to maintain the bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal, but may also form the basis of a space-ganing operation on the queenside. A third

point, which comes into play later in the game, is that White's al-rook may emerge via a3.

Of course, this slightly unusual idea is hardly enough to win the game by itself, but it put. Onishebuk off his stride. Instead of the normal patterns in this system, he has to work out a plan for himself. As we shall see, Adams has a much better grasp of the requirements of the position.

# urrements of the position. 7...2e6 8 Ze1 2xc4 9 dxc4!

Once again taking the chance to stoer the game along original paths. The mechanical reply would be 9 \( \frac{2}{2} \) Acknowledge the high result of \$\frac{2}{2} \). When the kinght could later drop back to \$\frac{2}{2} \). However, Adams chooses a different move, which greatly strengthens his grip on d5. He has already formulated his plan for the next phase of the game: to increase his control of the light squares as much as possible, with particular reference to d5 and f5. Raber unusually, this is the only plan he needs to win the game! The first step is to transfer his knight from d2 to \$\frac{2}{3} \).

#### = 9...≣e8 10 ∜\f1

Preparing De3, taking aim at both critical squares.

#### 10...£f8?

A definite error. One of White? problems is that the immediate \$\frac{1}{2}\$ is impossible because the e4-pawn would be hanging. Thus White would have to spend some time preparing \$\frac{1}{2}\$\in 3\$. Allowing White to play \$\frac{1}{2}\$\in 5\$ and \$\frac{1}{2}\$\times 1\$\in 1\$ fill have been been discovered by the problem of developing has bishop.

but also allows \$\oldsymbol{\Omega}\$e3 without loss of time. Already one can see the outlines of a good knight vs bad bishop position shaping up.

Black should have played 10...h6. He need not worry about 11 2g3 2£18 12 2f5, because the knight can be expelled by 12... 2h7 followed by ...g6.

#### 11 a g5 h6

Having played ... £f8, it would have been psychologically very difficult to return to e7, although that might have been the best choice. The move played ultimately turns out to weaken Black's kingside.

12 ≜xf6 ∰xf6 (D)



#### 13 **⊉e3** ₩e6

White has now completed the first step of his plan.

#### 14 a5

In this static position, it is possible to create plans stretching over a relatively long time, since the pawn structure is likely to remain unchanged. The text is a typical positional move. White would be hard-pressed to come up with a concrete line in which a5 turned out to be a useful move, but he must look to the long term. Given that he is aiming for light-squared control, the possibility of a6, forcing ...b6, would be helpful. Black can, of course, prevent this by playing ...a6 himself, but this would not be without possible defects. White will at some stage play 2dd5, and Black would like to be able to expet the knight with ...6. If he has already played ...a6, then the knight can settle on the control of the control of the last already played ...a6, then the knight can settle on the control of the control of the last already played ...a6, then the knight can settle on the control of the last settle of the last control of the last c

Thus Black is presented with a choice of evils, which never makes for an easy decision.

#### 14 6 e7 15 Ha3

Another useful move. Once again, White is looking forward to the day when Black will have to play ...c6, leaving his d6-pawn weak. Now the rook can come to d3, stepping up the pressure against d6 without loss of time. The firepower could even be increased by III-11 e.2-d2. Note that when one is lining up the heavy artillery along an open or half-open file, it is usually better to have the rooks in front of the queen. Here White can achieve this ideal formation very efficiently.

Both these ideas (gaining a queenside space advantage and developing the rook via a3) were already inherent in White's 6th move, so Adams's play has been very consistent.

#### 15...g6?!

Black would like to improve the position of his bishop, but he is being unrealistically optimistic. He will almost certainly have to play ...65 at some stage, and then the bishop will be needed on f8 to protect the pawn on d6. If Black could force through ...15 he would gain some counterplay and thereby justify ...g6, but against Adams's accurate play it proves impossible to realize this plan.

It would have been better to play 15...c6 at once; after 16 Id3 Id8 I7 Ic2 2g6 everything would be defended and White would have to find a further 'mni-plan' to improve his position

#### 16 h4t

In n41
An excellent and unexpected move.
Unlike the advance of the a-pawn, the
aim is not so much to gain space as to
weaken Black's kingside pawns. If he
rephes 16...h5, then 17 Dg5 Win 54
MSJ S2AS 19 exd5 leaves White with
the advantage. Black cannot expel the
knight by ...f5 because it would just
hop into e6; the best he could do would
be to exchange it off with ...\$h6, but
White would retain the advantage because of his queenside space advantage.

#### 16...£g7

Black ignores the h-pawn, but after h5 and hxg6 White has achieved two notable objectives: preventing Black's possible counterplay by ...f5, and creating a new weak pawn at g6.

#### 17 h5 #ad8

Again a difficult choice. 17...gxh5 18 ©h4 is clearly bad, and now it is rather late for 17...c6, as 18 ≣d3 ≣ad8 19 Ec2 b6 20 axb6 axb6 21 hxg6 fxg6 22 Ec2 2c8 23 b4, followed by b5, gives White control of the central d5square.

18 a6

Forcing a further slight weakening of the light squares.

18...b6 19 @d5 IId7 20 hxg6 fxg6 21 @b4!

Planting Eg3, when the weakness of g6 will force ...g5, giving White the f5-square. There is little Black can do to counteract this plan.

21...c6 22 \( \times \) xe7+ \( \times \) exe7 23 \( \times \) g5 24 \( \times \) f5 (D)



An ideal position for White. Six of Black's seven pawns are positioned on dark squares, and the knight occupies a beautiful outpost; in addition the pawn on d6 is weak. Black is lost.

24...Ef7 25 Ed3 £f8 26 b3 d5
This desperate bid for counterplay
costs material, but in any case White
could step up the pressure easily
enough, for example by Ec2-d2.

27 曾g4 當h7

27...dxe4 28 €xh6+ wins the exchange.

28 cxd5 cxd5 29 €xh6! ∰xg4 Or 29...∰xh6 30 ⊈h3 winning the

queen. 30 @xg4 &c5 31 Ze2 1-0

Black will be two pawns down for nothing.

There comes a point in the vast majority of games when your acquired knowledge will be exhausted and you will have to rely on your own resources. This point normally arises in the early middlegame. The next step is to formulate a plan. You may already have some idea of the ontions available from your opening study; this will help you to narrow your search. In any case, it is time for some serious thought; the plan you choose now will go a long way towards defining the whole shape of the struggle to come. In some positions, for example, those with a blocked centre, it may be appropriate to construct a long-term plan which may require ten or twenty moves to execute. More likely, your plan will be much shorter-range, lasting perbaps five moves. This applies particularly in relatively open positions.

- Here are some tips on making a plan:
- Make sure your plan is beneficial. There is no point aiming for a target which does not actually enhance your position. Typical misguided plans are: attacking on the wrong part of the board; aiming for the exchange of the

wrong pieces; committing yourself to weakening pawn advances.

- 2) Make sure your plan is realistic. There is no point in embarking on a five-move plan if your opponent can wait for the first four moves, and then stop your plan by playing one move himself
- 3) Make sure your plan is not tactically flawed. Even if what you are arming for is worthwhile, this will not help if your opponent can mate you while you are executing it.

Having decided on a particular plan, you have to strike a balance between consistency and flexibility. On the one hand, pointless changes of plan are very damaging. If you play two moves of one plan, then three moves of another, then four moves of a third, you will probably be back more or less where you started! The ideal situation occurs when you formulate a plan and, while you are executing it, your opponent does little either to prevent it or to develop counterplay. Then you can produce an elegant positional game which is dominated by a single strategic thread. However, games like this normally only arise between players of very different strengths (the Adams-Onishchuk game above is an excention in this respect). More often your nlan will be blown off course because your opponent will interfere with it in some way. While consistency is a virtue, sometimes you have to be as pragmatic as a politician in changing your plan. If your opponent has blocked Plan A, but at the cost of creating a weakness elsewhere on the board, it would be foolish to stick to your original intention, ignoring the new situation. Instead you should rethink your strategy. Most games are like this: the players formulate a series of miniplans and strike a balance between forwarding their own plans and interfering with those of the opponent. Eventually the balance is upset, either you ne player's plan succeeding decisively, or by the game dissolving into tacties.

> J. Nunn – V. Hort Wijk aan Zee 1982 Giuoco Piano

1 e4 e5 2 \$c4 \times 6 3 \times 13 \$c5 4 c3 \times 6 6 0.0 d6 7 \times 6 20 0 6 11 \times 6 10 \times 6 16 11 a4

White has adopted a quiet opertung system which avoids an early 44 in the hope of playing it at a more effective moment later. While this system is very solid, it has the defect that if Black plays in equally solid style, the game may simply peter out to a draw.

White's last move aims for a5, gaining a more favourable moment for the thematic move \$\oldsymbol{\infty} 23 (aiming a three squares 45 and f5). Readers will already be familiar with this type of strategy from the Adams-Onishchuk game given above.

#### 11...b5?!

Weakening the queenside like this appears rather dubious. 11... Le8 is a more solid alternative, which has been played in a number of games.

12 De3 ₩d7 (D)



The game has now deviated from known theory, so it is time for White to think about his long-term plan and immediate 'mini-nlan'. Since the position is still fairly fluid, it is difficult to create any long-term plans; trying to anticinate what will happen more than a few moves ahead is fruitless, as too many things might happen to throw a plan off course. However, the miniplan is much easier; as mentioned earlier, one of White's ideas in this opening is to play d4 in the middlegame, when it may be more awkward for Black. White cannot play d4 immediately, as Black could take on b3 and then on d4, so 13 &c2 is indicated, Then d4 will be a real inconvenience. as Black must meet the threatened fork by d4-d5.

#### 13 a.c2 Efe8 14 d4 exd4

A major concession by Black, giving up his strong-point in the centre. 15 2 vd4.

White could perhaps have played the could perhap have played the defending the first of the country of the coun

#### 15... 2xd4?!

After this White's advantage is safe.

Black would have preferred not to
make this exchange, but he was probably worried about the pressure on b5.

However, he could have made a bid for
counterplay by 15...b4!?.

### 16 cxd4 c6

The first mini-plan is over and has achieved a definite success, but now it s time for the next. White has a permanent advantage in his greater central control if only he can maintain his 'two abreast' centre intact. Thus his next mini-plan should consist of consolidation. The immediate problem is the e4-pawn; Black need only move his e6-bishop to attack it awkwardly. White cannot defend it by #f3, because the queen must defend the dpawn. One solution is to play f3, but the weakening on the a7-g1 diagonal is ugly, especially in view of the lurking bishop on a7 - Black would have good chances for counterplay by means of a timely ...c5.

#### 17 h3!

The start of an alternative plan for supporting e4, based on 2f1-g3. White first of all rules out the possibility of ... 2g4, which might be annoying once the e3-knight has moved away.

#### 17...費c7 18 公和 &d7 (D)



Now e4 is defended, and at first sight a natural continuation would be 19 \( \hat{2}\)g3, further covering the central pawn and making a move towards Black's king. However, one should always take into account the opponent's intentions and see if there is a possibility to frustrate them. Black's recent moves, removing the bishop from e6, suggest that he intends to play ...c5.
After 19 \( \hat{2}\)g3 c5 20 d5 c4, for example, Black activates his queenside majority while White, thanks to the bishop on a7, has trouble getting his own central majority moving.

### 19 b4!

A very ambitious move, which is only justified because White's central structure is already secure. Now if Black ever plays ...c5, White will reply bxc5 and d5, gaining a massive central majority. Moreover, the c1bshop can now move to b2, setting up further latent threats against Black's kingsude. In a sense, this move falls under the heading of 'consolidation', because it is mainly directed against the possibility of Black breaking up White's centre by ...c5.

#### 19 hva4

Black now threatens to attack the b4-pawn along the half-open file, and White's first priority is to defend it. The pawn on a4 can be recaptured later.

### 20 åb2 ₩b6 21 åc3 ≣e7

After 21...c5 White would ignore the hanging piece since 22 dxc5 dxc5 23 <u>a</u>xf6 <sup>8</sup> Kg 24 <sup>8</sup> Kgd Cxk4 is rather messy. Instead he would continue with the thematic reply 22 bxc5 dxc5 23 d5, when the possible counterplay against f2 is not a serious worry, e.g. 23...c4 <sup>2</sup> Mgd (24 <u>Mc2</u>? <u>Qxc4</u>! draws) 24. <u>Mate 35</u> Mgd Vibra is ready for c5.

After the text-move, White must create his next mini-plan. The centre is secured and Black cannot attack it with ...e5 or ...d5, the latter because the reply e5 would give White an automatic kineside attack.

Black evidently intends to restrain White's centre by doubling rooks on the e-file, which leaves open the question as to how White should make progress. My eye was naturally attracted to Black's kingside; there is only a single knight defending it.

while all the white minor pieces are well placed to create threats on that side of the board. I decided simply to move my pieces towards Black's king by £g3 and ¥g13. At this point White could think about a breakthrough by d5 or e5, or simply play £15, gaining the two bishops.

### 22 @g3 Hae8 23 Wf3 @h7

Black could have tried the tricky 23...a3, hoping for 24 Exa3 215!, but White would just play 24 215.

The text-move takes the sting out of d5 or e5, so White goes for ②f5.

24 ♀15 ♣xf5 25 ₩xf5 (D)



Black's next move anticipates e5 by White.

#### 25...•Df8

White now has the two bishops to show for his efforts, but the knight on 18 is an effective defender of the knigside and direct attacking attempts do not appear promising. White must take care, or else Black's latent pressure along the lines a7-g1 and e8-e1 might be unleashed. I therefore decided to switch to the queenside, and build up against the a6-pawn. Note that this plan would not have been effective before as Black could simply have played ... \$\tilde{\ell}\_{\tilde{8}} \tilde{8}.

### 26 Exa4 De6 27 Ed1 Dc7?!

Black decides to pre-empt White's attack on the a-pawn and hopes to occupy a good square at b5, but now the knight is dangerously far away from the kingside. It would have been better to leave the knight on e6, ready to move to c7 or f8 as necessary.

#### 28 & b2

The immediate 28 e5 g6 is ineffective as 29 ¥74 is met by 29...2d5. Now, however, 29 e5 is a threat. Note bow White has again changed his plan to utilize the circumstance that Black's knight has gone to the queenside.

#### 28...₩b5

Black does not want to be mated and, now that a6 is defended by the knight, he switches his queen to the kingside.

### 29 曾f3 曾g5

While in positional terms Black's plan is quite reasonable, it has a concrete defect: the queen is short of squares.

### 30 Ha5! (D)

... **E**e2, would give Black a crush attack.

30...d5



After 30... #g6 31 #c3 2.b6 32 Eaa1 Black would not have a good answer to the threats of 33 #xc6 and 33 e5

#### 31 e5

Now White has more advantages to point to: the e-pawn is no longer under pressure, and White can create threats along the bl-h7 diagonal. The immediate threat is 32 全 日 實 h4 33 g3 實 h3 4 全 f5.

### 31....**⊡e**6?

Alarmed by the growing danger to his king, Hort, who was in severe time-trouble, deedes to pettison his apawn in order to bring the knight over to the kingside. In many case, if your pieces are tied down to defending a weak pawn, then letting the pawn gis a way to activate the pieces and develop counterplay (see page 136). In this case, however, it makes little difference; the position remains more or less the same except that Black is a pawn down.

31...g6 would have been a more resilient defence; after 32 g3 **E**e6 33 對d3 對h5 34 全g2 重b8 35 全c3, threatening f4-f5, White would be much better but not yet winning.

32 Exa6 Ec8 33 g3 Eb7 34 ₩d3 g6 35 &c3 &b6

White has taken the pawn and met Black's attack on the b-pawn. Now he must turn to a mini-plan for exploiting his advantage. The natural plan is the one which has been in the position ever since White played e4-e5, viz. the advance of the f-pawn.

36 \$h2 \$d8 (D)



#### 37 Ett

Ultra-cautious in time-trouble. 37 f4 全xt4 38 gxf4 管xf4+ is of course unsound after 39 查h1, but I wanted to make really sure there were no complications!

37...曾e7 38 曾e3 曾f8 39 f4 ①g7 40 f5 皇g5 41 曾e2 ②xf5 42 皇xf5 gxf5 43 h4 皇e7 44 星xf5 曾g7

Black is quite lost. In addition to the minus pawn, three of his four remaining pawns are weak and his king is exposed. The rest is easy and consists of making one threat after another until Black collapses.

45 If4 2b8 46 Wf3 2f8 47 If6 Ibc7 48 Ia2

After Eaf2 followed by e6 there will be no defence.

48... 實h7 49 e6 皇g7 50 星xf7 星xf7 51 exf7 實g6 52 星f2 皇f8 53 皇d2 皇b7 54 b5 exb5 55 實xd5 質d3 56 皇h3 皇g7 57 皇b4 1-0

#### The method of comparison

Sometimes it is possible to avoid precisely evaluating the consequences of the various options available. The reason is that you are really interested in relative assessments and not absolute ones. If, for example, you know that move A is '0.2 pawns' better than move B, then you would prefer A to B – it doesn't matter whether A is 0.3 pawns better for you or 0.1 pawns worse for you, it is only the relative evaluation which matters.

In practice, of course, this type of logic is hard to apply if there are many different continuations. If you have alternatives A, B, C, D and E then comparing A with B, C with E, D with A and so on is going to lead to a logical conundrum rather than a decision. It is much simplet to make an absolute assessment that A is a bit better for White, B is equal, and so on, and then pick the move with highest value.

It follows that the method of comparison, as we call it, works best when there are very few options (three at most) and the types of position resulting from these options are rather similar, and so are more easily compared with each other than evaluated absolutely.

The most common case arises when you have the possibility of an intermediary check which forces some kind of concession.

#### A. Meszaros – Y. Zimmerman Balatonberenv 1994

Nimzowitsch-Larsen Attack

1 b3 e5 2 **&**b2 **€**c6 3 e3 d5 4 **&**b5 **&**d6 5 f4 (D)



This is a known theoretical position. White's opening is designed to exert pressure on the e5-square. Black cannot play 5..exf4 owing to 6 £xg7, and defending the pawn with 5...f6 is rather ugly – after 6 m5+ g6 7 m4 Black's kingside is weakened and his development is impeded.

Therefore Black should defend the e5-pawn by ... #e7, but he has the option of playing ... "Bh4+ first. The only difference between these two lones is that in one White's g-pawn is on g2 and in the other on g3. There is no question that the additional move g3 helps Black. If White exchanges his b5-bishop on c6, then he will have less control of the light squares in any case; the weaknesses created by playing g3 would then be quite serious. If may well happen that White will change his mind and play the bishop back from b5, but in this case Black has eained time.

#### 5... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{m}} \text{4+ 6 g3 \mathbb{m}} e7 7 fxe5 \mathbb{\mathbb{k}} xe5 8 \text{Qc3 \text{Qf6}}

8...d4!? 9 €d5 #c5 is an interesting alternative.

### 9 �f3 ₤g4 10 ₤e2 ₤d6 11 �b5 0-0 12 �xd6 ₩xd6

White has the two bishops, but Black's development is very comfortable. The position is equal.

# 13 add axd4 14 axd4 ah3 Black starts to take advantage of the

weakened light squares on the kingside.

### 15 &f1 &d7 16 &g2 c5 17 &xf6?

Too ambitious. White plays to win a pawn, but his lack of development and weakened kingside make it a risky endeavour. 17 &b2 would have maintained the balance.

#### 17... #xf6 18 &xd5 &g4! 19 #c1 Lad8 20 &xb7 (D)

#### 20...Exd2! 21 dexd2?

Now Black gains a clear advantage. White could still have held on by 21 實xd2 實xal+ 22 全f2 實f6+ 23 全g2



且d8 24 管a5! (24 管c) 管c3!) 24...管e7 (after 24...管b6 25 管b6 且d2+ 26 管f1 axb6 Black will regam his pawn, but in the meantime White can extract his rook and the result should be a draw 25 全f3 毫xf3+ 26 毫xf3 是e8 27 量c1 管e4+ 28 管f2 管xc2+29 星e2 with a near-certain draw.

21,...重d8+ 22 wel 安c3+ 23 如f1 重d2/D)



#### 24 賞~1?

Losing by force. The last chance was 24 管xd2 管xd2 25 h3 全e2+ 26 安g1 管xc2 27 全g2 (27 單h2 管c3!) 27...實b2 28 重ei 實xa2 29 壹b2 重f3 30 重hgi 並xg2 31 重xg2 實xb3, when Black has the advantage, but White might be able to draw since Black's queenside pawns are disconnected.

24. 总h3+ 25 全g1 管xc2 A vivid exploitation of the weak-

ness induced by 5... #h4+. 26 #c1 0-1

White resigned without waiting for 26... \$\mu g2+\$.

Whilst occasions in which one can consciously use the method of comparison are not all that common, in some sense; it is being used all the time. When one is thinking 'does that knight belong on e4 or g3?', this is really a comparison. There is no attempt to evaluate the consequences of these two alternatives in absolute terms; one is simply asking which is better. In this wider sense comparison is an important part of chess thinking.

### Making your opponent think

Sometimes it is better to pass the responsibility for a difficult decision on to your opponent. You may be contemplating, for example, the move ...h6 which allows a piece sacrifice &xh6!? You look at the sacrifice a little; it is a complete mess, extremely hard to evaluate. However, the alternatives to ...h6 are about equal. You may decide to play ...h6 without further thought, and put the responsibility of evaluating the sacrifice onto your opponent - he will have to spend time coming to a definite conclusion instead of you. There 1s nothing more frustrating than thinking for half an hour, deciding that the sacrifice is not sound, playing .... h6 and meeting with the reply Zad1 within 30 seconds. Indeed, there are many opponents who would use the logic that if you thought about the sacrifice for so long and still allowed it, then it must be unsound. Playing your move fairly quickly short-circuits this logic. Indeed, your opponent may wonder if you have even seen the sacrifice. Obviously, this type of logic can be overdone; it would be ridiculous to allow a sacrifice leading to a clear-cut win. Moreover, if you were playing a dangerous attacking player, then provoking him to make a sacrifice is probably not a good idea.

A 'making your opponent think' move usually works beat if you are in a slightly inferior position. Then your opponent will be undecided about whether to continue positionally, in which case his advantage might prove insufficient for a wm, or to enter the tactics, when, at the cost of some risk, he might end up with a larger advantage. If your opponent has a large advantage to start with, then he will probably avoid tactics since he has good winning chances in any case. Here is an example (D).

Black stands badly, mainly because of the miserable position of his bishop on g6. White intends to swap bishops on d6 and then play \$\tilde{\Omega}\$14. This will



J. Nunn – S. Conquest Hastings 1996/7

increase the pressure on e6 to such as extent that ...f6 will never be possible, and it also removes any possibility of Black playing ...@16 and ...&15. He might, of course, play ...@16-e4, but the knight could be pushed away again by f3 and he would be left with the same problems.

The only way Black can improve his position is to play ...f6, intending ... £17, or, if White is careless enough to allow it, ...e5.

#### 17...f6

Conquest played this very quickly, which is a good practical 'make your opponent think' decision. White can take the pawn by 18 & xe6, but this involves pinning the bishop, which might have dire consequences. He can also take the pawn by 18 & x66 \( \frac{18}{3} \) x64 \( \f

case Black can play ... \$17 and his prospects will have improved as a result of releasing the bishop from the trap on g6.

I was faced with a difficult decision and it took me just over twenty minutes to make up my mind to go for the immediate capture of the pawn. I also considered continuing positionally, but it seemed to me that although White would hold an undoubted advantage, making progress would be far from straightforward. I had plenty of time on the clock, and so I decided to analyse the pawn capture thoroughly. Finally I concluded that White would emerge with a clear advantage, but I still felt a little nervous as I took the nawn†

18 & xe6! The other capture, 18 2xd6 #xd6 19 €164 £17 20 €1xe6, is less accurate in view of 20...4b6 (20...4xe6 21 © xe6 €)f8 22 d5 cxd5 23 \$xd5 \$xd5 24 @xd5 Exe2 25 Exe2 Exd5 26 Ee8+ &c7 27 Exf8 wins for White) 21 單d3 引d5 22 &xd5 賞xd5 23 星e3 **■xe6 24 ■xe6 &xe6 25 管xe6 管xd4** 26 ₩e3 with only a slight advantage for White

#### 18...47f8

After 18... 全f7 19 賞c4 公b6 20 賞b3 White keeps his material more easily.

#### 19 ∰c4 ≜h5

The main alternative is 19...4)xe6 20 里xe6 &xf4+ (20...實f7 21 里xd6 and 20... 2f7 21 Exd6 Exd6 22 8b4 win for White) 21 (1)xf4 (2)f7 22 d5 2 xe6 23 4)xe6 \delta d6 24 4)xd8 \delta xd8 25 實d3 實xd5 26 實xd5 cxd5 27 其d4 and the weak black pawns give White a winning rook and pawn ending.

20 Ed3! (D)

Not 20 axd6 ₩xd6 21 af7 Exel 22 Exel &xf7 23 實xf7 實xd4 and Black even has the advantage.



#### 28...4 xe6

There is nothing better, e.g.:

- 1) 20 h5 21 實h3 4)xe6 22 算xe6 Exe6 23 @xe6 &xf4+ 24 @xf4 Ee8 25 實b3 罩e1+ 26 空d2 罩d1+ 27 空c3 £17 28 ₩b4 and White consolidates his extra pawn, while retaining a positional advantage.
- 2) 20... 2)xe6 21 Exe6 2xf4+ 22 Øxf4 @ f7 23 d5 @ xe6 24 Ø xe6 ₩e5 25 4)xd8 xd8 26 d6 we1+ 27 xd1 ₩xf2 2g #e6 and the powerful passed nawn is decisive.

#### 21 Exe6 Exe6 22 Wxe6 2 xf4+ 23 ⑤xf4 Ie8 24 資xf5

There is no reason why White should not take a second pawn. Black gets a couple of checks, but his counterplay is soon quashed.

24...里e1+ 25 学d2 星d1+ 26 学c3 鱼g4 27 学c5

Applying DAUT. 27 grag4 gra5+ 28 b4 gra1+ 29 grc4 gra2+ 30 grc5 grc2+ 31 grd6 may also win, but there is no point in analysing such a line when a safe alternative exists.

27... Ea1 28 Ee3 (D)



Black's counterplay has dried up, and it is White's turn to go on the offensive

28... 2c8 29 Xe7 ₩d8 30 De6

Doubtless there were other ways to

Doubtless there were other ways to win, but forcing exchanges is a riskfree approach.

30...⊈xe6 31 Exe6 Exa2 32 ₩d6+ 1-0

While Black is retrieving his rook from a2, White will make a meal of his kingside pawns.

### Oversights and blunders

Oversights and blunders are merely two aspects of the same thing. If you miss something, and by good fortune the consequences are not too serious, then you have an oversight; if the upshot is catastrophic, then you have a blunder

Why do chess players blunder? Human fallibility is obviously one resson, but the majority of blunders arnot purely the result of chance. There are several factors that can greatly increase the probability of a blunder and if one is aware of these factors, then one can take particular care during these 'high-risk' periods.

The most common cause of blundering is a previous oversight. Let us suppose that your opponent suddenly sacrifices a piece and that this sacrifice comes as a complete surprise to you. A typical train of thought starts: "Oh. \*\*\*\*! I completely overlooked that. It looks strong; perhaps I will even have to resign. How could I have overlooked such a simple idea? How sninid. And I had such a winning position." Not very constructive. Making a serious oversight is a huge blow to one's self-confidence, it sends the mind into a whirl and turns the stomach upside down. Nobody's brain can function properly in such a state. The only real solution is to take the time necessary until one's mind and stomach have quietened down. The length of time this takes depends on one's personality and will-power, and of course how strong the opponent's move actually 1s! What is quite useless is to have a major bout of selfrecrimination at the board - if your personality tends towards this, try to save it until the end of the game (by which time, hopefully, it may not be necessary). This is another reason why running short of time is a bad idea. If something unexpected happens, you do not have the possibility of a short time-out to recover your composure.

Here is an example of precisely the wrong reaction, taken from one of my own games.

#### J. Nunn – D. Cox Norwich Junior International 1974 Sicilian, Pelikan

1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 Qxd4 Qf6 5 Qc3 Qc6 6 Qdb5 d6 7 &f4 e5 8 &g5 a6 9 Qa3 &c6 10 Qc4 &c7? 11 &xf6 gxf6 12 Qc3 &c8 13 Qcd5 55?! 14 exf5 &xd5 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd5 (\(\frac{1}{2}\))



Black's handling of the opening has left a great deal to be desired and White has a large advantage. One more tempo and White would play c3, leaving Black with no compensation for his minus pawn and crippling lightsquared weaknesses.

#### 15...9)b4

Black not surprisingly tries to force through ...d5 before White tightens his

### grap.

16 **衛c4?** 16 **衛b3** was much simpler. After 16...d5 17 a3 d4 18 axb4 dxe3 19 fxe3 Black has very little to show for his

#### two pawns.

16...d5!

I hadn't realized that this move was possible, although in retrospect it is hard to imagine any other follow-up to black's previous move. At once I saw that the position had become rather more murky than was really necessary and the knowledge that I had made a bit of a mess of it was the trigger for what followed:

#### 17 賞xe5 f6 18 賞d4 (D)



At this point I was getting slightly worried, not about 18... \( \Delta xc2 + 19 \) \( \Delta xc2 \) \( \Bar xc2 \) \( \Bar xc2 \) \( \Bar xc3 \) \( \Bar xc3 \) \( \Bar xc4 \) \( \Bar xc3 \) \( \Bar xc5 \) \( \Bar xc4 \) \( \Bar xc5 \) \( \Bar xc

a clear two-pawn advantage, but about 18...\$c5. After 19 \*\*d2 \*\*e7 Black has some nasty threats, while White has fallen somewhat behind in development. In fact White should be able retain the better position by 20 0-0-01, but of course White no longer has the same clear-cut advantage as at move 15

#### 18...Exc2!?

This is not a particularly good move, but it had a devastating effect on me because I had completely missed it. Having now overlooked two of my opponent's moves, I went into a panic. I saw horrible threats such as 19 #a5 or 19... 2c6 followed by ... 2b4+ and quickly decided that I had to get my kingside pieces out as rapidly as possible. I saw that after 19 &d3 @xd3+20 #xd3 ₩a5+ (or 20... \$b4+) I would have to play \$\forall fl, but the resulting position did not look too bad. My king could find safety after e3 and \$22. freeing the other rook: in addition Black's d-pawn would be very weak. Unfortunately my brain had stopped functioning.

#### 19 &d3?? &c5 0-1

I am sure almoss all players have bad this experience at one time or another—disorientation caused by one mistake immediately leading to a second, much more serious, error. A calm look at the position after 18. Exc2 would have shown that White is still clearly better after 19 &c2 (threatening 20 £6.5+ followed by 0-0), for example 19...Eg8 20 £6.5+ 47 21 0-0

&c5 22 ₩h4 or 19...&c5 20 ₩g4 ₩a5 21 0-0.

### Warning signals

One of the most common reasons for bundering is failure to take warning signs into account. Tacties very rarely strike out of a blue sky. There is normally some underlying weakness, visible beforehand, which the tactic seeks to exploit. When you see such a potential vulnerability, it pays to look very carefully for a possible tactic by the onnonent exploiting this weakness.

Once I played 100 games against Mike Cook at 10 minutes (for him) vs 5 minutes (for me). At that time Mike was about 2300 strength. About half-way through the series (which I eventually won 88-12) he explained his disappointment:

"I thought that I would see lots of advanced strategic concepts in these games but actually all I have learnt is LPDO."

"LPDO?"

"Loose Pieces Drop Off."

During the remaining games I saw what he meant. Most of the games were decided by relatively simple tactics involving undefended pieces, when the LP would duly DO.

Now, whenever I see such a combination (they occur quite often), I think 'LPDO'.

Looking at the diagram overleaf, the LP on h8 should have been a



M. Chandler – W. Beckemeyer Bundesliga 1987

warning sign to Black that he should look for tactics especially carefully. 16...@b6?

Walking right into it. 17 ②dxb5! axb5 18 ₩d4 and White won easily.

What is surprising about this example is that the initial move of the combination is one of the most familiar tactical blows in the Sicilian. It seems that the idea of it being followed up by anything other than  $\frac{2}{8}xb5+or \frac{2}{8}xb5$  just didn't occur to Black.

Even ex-world champions (or current ones, depending on your perspective) can fall victum to LPDO (D):

Black already has an LP on h5. He added a second one by ...

11....2d6
Christiansen looked amazed.
12 \(\poldsymbol{\psi}\) d1 1-0
LPDO!



L. Christiansen – A. Karpov Wiik aan Zee 1993

Whate's queen had earlier moved from d1 to c2, so this is also an example of overlooking a switchback (see page 57).

We will consider two other warning signals, but virtually any tactucal weakness can give the opponent a chance for a combination. Note that by 'tactcal weakness' I do not mean solated pawns, bad bishops and other such long-term weaknesses; A tactical weakness is a short-term vulnerability such as an undefended piece, a potential pm or fork, or a trapped piece. Tactical weaknesses may exist only for a single move, so if your opponent creates one, you should look for a way to exploit it straight away.

One of the most common errors amongst beginners is to allow an e-file pin of the queen, but even GMs can underestimate the significance of a queen + king line-up.



B. Spassky - Y. Seirawan Montpellier Candidates 1985

The diagram position arose after 1 et e5 214 ext 4 3 673 29-7 44 dt 5 5 2c3 dx-4 6 2xe4 2g6 7 h4 (D), when Seirawan faced the problem of dealing with the threat 8 h5, which would regain the sacrificed pawn on f4. Since Black had hased the whole strategy on maintaining this pawn, it would be a bitter blow to be forced simply to give it up.

### 7...**₩**e7?

This is an example of a major commitment. Black's arm is to inconvenience White's knight; indeed, one's instant reaction is that White must play 8 We'2 to avoid losing the knight to ...f5. However, if it turns out that White is not seriously inconvenienced by the pin, then Black has done quite a lot of damage to his own position: the queen obstructs the development of Black's kingside, takes away the last light square from the knight on g6 and sets Black up for an e-file pin.

Indeed, these defects are so serious that this move falls into the 'has twork' category (see page 28). The potential e-file line-up and the fact that Black has committed himself so heavily are clear warning signals to which Seriawan did not pay sufficient attention.

#### 8 chf2!

It suddenly turns out that 8... \*\* xe4 is impossible because of 9 £0+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ was 10 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ El and the black queen is prinned against a mate on e8. Black is forced to change his plan completely, and all the defects of the move ... \*\*e7 are exposed.

8...\$\preceq\$ 9 h5 \( \tilde{\rm h}\$\) 41 0 \( \preceq\$ xc6 11 \) \$\preceq\$ b5 0-0-0 12 \( \preceq\$ xc6 bxc6 13 \) \$\preceq\$ 83 \) \$\preceq\$ xc73 14 gx73 \$\preceq\$ \$\preceq\$ \$\preceq\$ 17 \) \$\preceq\$ xc6 18 \) \$\preceq\$ 84 18 \) \$\preceq\$ acc 18 \) \$\preceq\$ xc7#\$ 19 \( \preceq\$ xc7#\$ ) 19 \) \$\preceq\$ xc7#\$ 19 \( \preceq\$ xc7 \) and \$\preceq\$ white won easily.

Of course 8 \$\precept2 is a very unusual move and one can easily imagine how Seirawan came to overlook it. In Open Games, White does not normally voluntarily deprive himself of the right to castle, and in most positions it would he a waste of time for Black to start analysing king moves to the second rank. How, then, can one expect to spot moves such as \$\prip f2\$ in advance? This really is the point of the warning signs - they tell you when to take time out to look for unusual tactical motifs. which might only be justified because you have a potential vulnerability in your position.

Our final warning sign is the weak diagonal. Here is a vivid example:



Ye Rongguang - L. van Wely Antwern Crown Group 1997

The diagram position arose after 1 d4 Qf6 2 Qf3 g6 3 &g5 &g7 4 Qbd2 0-0 5 e3 d6 6 ac4 e5 7 c3 (D). Now Van Wely decided to develop his c8bishop at h7, and played 7...b6??. The weakness along the h1-a8 diagonal is quite apparent, but Van Wely had overlooked the simple continuation 8 2xf6 2xf6 9 2d5, winning a piece. The game ended 9... 2a6 10 2 xa8 d5 11 c4 dxc4 12 0-0 cxd4 13 exd4 &xd4 14 6 xc4 1-0 This horrible disaster was the direct result of not taking account of the danger sign 'trapped rook on ag'. Had he looked a little longer. Van Welv would surely have seen £xf6. The problem here is psychological: White would never normally play an anti-positional move such as £xf6, giving up the two bishops for no good reason, so Van Wely did not consider it a possibility for his opponent. However, an extra piece provides pretty good compensation for the two bishops!

Curiously, a similar 'diagonal disaster' occurred in another game from the Open Group of the same event.



A. Stefanova - S. Giddins Antwerp Open 1997

After 1 d4 d5 2 9 f3 9 f6 3 2 f4 c5 4 e3 @ f5 5 c3 Black decided to continue his development with the natural move 5...e6? (D). This ignored the danger of leaving the light squares on the queenside exposed by developing the c8-bishop to f5, and then preventing it from returning by ...e6. Black doubtless took into account lines such as 6 &h5+ \$\c6 7 \$\c6 \mathbb{Z} e5 \$\mathbb{Z} e8 \$\mathbb{Z} a4 \$b6, when there are no more pieces White can bring to bear on c6. However, he failed to take into account that the hg-knight is really the only piece that can interpose on the b5-e8 diagonal. Therefore 6 2xb8! put him in an awkward situation. After the check on 56 Black will have to move his king, as 7... 2d7 loses to 8 2e5. In the game Black chose 6... 2xb8 7 2b5+ 4xf8 8 dxc5 and soon lost. Perhaps 6... 2xb8 7 2b5+ 4xf8 8 7 2b5+ 4xf8 was slightly better, but in any case Black's position is hardly enviable. Here there were three factors that led to Black's oversight: failure to take into account the warning sign weakness along the 55-68 diagonal', the anti-positional nature of 2xb8 and the soportific effect of White's unambitious opening.

A similar motif occurred in the following diagram after the moves 1 d4 2/16 2 2/25 2/24 3 2/14 d5 4 e3 2/15 5 13 2/16 6 c4 c5?! 7 cxd5 2/xd5 (D).



M. Adams – L. Van Wely Tilburg 1996

#### 8 2 xb8!

Black is obliged to surrender a piece, as e3-e4 is coming. The consequences were less catastrophic this time as after 8. © xe3.9 2 h5+ 2 d7.10 2 xd7+

wxd7 11 we2 ⊕xg2 ±xb8 13 dxc5 g6 14 ⊕c3 £g7 Black had some compensation for the piece and managed to draw in the end.

We deal with the question of how to continue after you have made an oversight under 'Defence' (see page 97).

#### 'Hard-to-see' moves

Another type of oversight is the simple 'hind sport'. In this case it is not a question of a misjudgement, but of a move, either for oneself or for the opponent, simply not entering one's mind at all. This is usually because there is something odd about the move, so that it doesn't fit into any of the standard patterns. Here is a clear example.



U. Andersson – A. J. Mestet London (Philips & Drew) 1982

It is Black to play; Mestel continued 29... Ed5 and White's material advantage eventually proved sufficient to win. However, Black could have forced instant resignation by 29... Ed21, which either wins a rook or mates. Admittedly, Mestel was somewhat short of time, but even so it is not hard to calculate this simple combination, provided that the idea crosses one's mind in the first place.

When two line-moving pieces are facing each other, the options are usually limited to exchanging, allowing the opponent to exchange, or moving the attacked piece away. It is very unusual for the piece to move part of the way towards the enemy piece. The exception is when there is a very juicy outpost somewhere on an open file, practically begging a piece to land on it. That was not the case here, so the winning move was a little hard to see. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Mestel did in fact play a move along the file, so he must have noticed that it was impossible for White to take the rook after such a move. Evidently the fact that the rook was undefended on d2 formed just enough of a mental block to cause the oversight.



M. Tal – R. Fischer Curação Candidates 1962

In this position White is aiming for the exchange of light-squared hishops. Then he will have certain potential advantages; pressure against the isolated a-pawn on an open file and the possibility of an eventual good knight vs bad bishop position with White's knight occurving d5 (for example, if White plays Ha2, then 2d2-c4-e3d5). Fischer found a simple and elegant solution to Black's problems; 16... 2b5!. This collinear move leaves White with three options: to leave the hishop on h5, to play 2xh5, or to play 2xb5. If White ignores the hishop. then Black's next move will be ... 2c6. both attacking the weak e4-pawn and supporting the thrust ...d5. To meet these threats White will be forced to play \$13, but this is hardly the most active square for the hishon; Black would obtain good counterplay by ...a5-a4, when the b2-pawn is vulnerable. The second option, 17 4\xh5.

swaps off the knight which White was hoping to put on d5 later, and moves the weak a-pawn off the open file. The result would be a near-certain draw in view of the opposite-coloured hishops, but this might be White's best opnon

Fischer played 16... \$b5 in two games; both opponents chose the third option and the games continued 17 \$xh5 axh5 18 \$\tilde{\tilde{A}} \d5 \$\tilde{A} \tilde{x} \d5 19 \$\tilde{\tilde{W}} \tilde{x} \d5 **Za4!** (a second collinear move, nutting pressure on e4: if White takes, then his b-pawn will be in trouble) 20 c3 Wa6 (D).



Not only does White have no advantage, but he is even slightly worse. His queen looks impressive on d5, but actually it is the knight which should be there instead. The knight has no route to reach d5, and indeed after ... 2 e5 it will be virtually immobilized. Black can improve his position by ...h6 and ... Ec8-c4, for example.

The Tal game continued 21 Zad1 Ec8 22 Oct b4 23 Od3 bxe3 24 bxe3. and now 24... Exc3 would have left Black a pawn up with a good position. In the later game Unzicker-Fischer Varna Olympiad 1962, the German grandmaster chose 21 h3 but lost in only five more moves: 21... Ic8 22 Efel h6 23 wh2 eg5 24 g3? ₩a7 25 #g2 Ha2 26 #f1 Hxc3 0-1.

Fischer's handling of this game was very impressive.

Switchbacks are another potential blind spot. If you have just moved a niece from A to B, the idea of moving it back from B to A can be hard to spot.

The third type of move which is hard to spot is the 'hesitation move'. This arises when a piece can move from A to either B or C. You decide that it is had to move it to C and play it to B instead. Next move it would be good to play it from B to C, but you don't consider it because this is precisely the move that you rejected a few moments ago.

Here is an example (D):

Black has a fairly miserable position. He is a pawn down, his king is somewhat exposed and White has a passed d-pawn which bears constant observation. However, the oppositecoloured bishops make it very hard for White to win, and in addition Black came up with an excellent defensive idea:

1...h4!

Now 2 &xh4 ₩f4+ 3 &g3 ₩h6+ leads to perpetual check, so I tried ... 2 d7 2 xd7



J. Nunn - R. Filguth

World Student Team Championship,

Mexico City 1977

Not, of course, 2...hxg3+ 3 ₩xg3+ followed by 4 d8₩.

### 3 ₩g8+ �h6

After the text-move, 4 2xh4 2e6 allows Black to defend comfortably. 4 2d6 (D)



Based on these lines, Black concluded that there was no defence and

#### 1-0

Filguth had overlooked the simple 4...\$\Ph\$1, after which White has no wanning chances at all. The reason: he had rejected playing the king to h5 the previous move, but under the changed circumstances it had become the only saving possibility.

As an aside, I am one of those players who gets up from the board after
almost every move (but even when
walking around, I am still thinking
hard about the position). However, after playing 2d6 I stayed at the board.
When players are completely winning, they often remain at the board in
order to accept their opponent's resignation, and I suspect that Filiguit thus
interpreted my unusual immobility. In
fact, of course, I was frantically trying
to find a good reply to ... 2M5.

I seem to be especially prone to overlooking 'hesitation' moves.



J. Nunn - J. de la Vilta Szirak Interzonal 1987

In this position White is a pawn up but has yet to develop his queenside pieces. Here I rejected 18 ® 934 because after 18... \$\pm\$h8 19 \text{@xis} xb6 axb6 if is quite hard for White to contune his development. 20 d3 is impossible because of the pressure on c3. and 20 c4 sis met by 20... d3! 21 \$\text{@xd3}\$ & 24 42 \$\text{@xf1}\$ & \$\text{@xf2}\$ & \$\text{which}\$ leaves White totally paralysed. Black could just continue with ... \$\text{@xss}\$ and ... \$\text{@c2}\$ eventually winning the pawn on f2 and setting up possible mating threats along the helie.

 simple 19 \$\ \mathbb{m}\$54+ would have been enormously strong. After 19...\$\mathbb{m}\$x50 cor else White swaps queens and takes on d3) 20 axb3 \$\mathbb{m}\$d8 21 \$\mathbb{m}\$e3 White wins the pawn, after which Black doesn't have much to show for his two-pawn deficit.

I didn't even consider 19 \$\mathbb{T} \text{34} for the simple reason that I had rejected it the previous move. It didn't occur to me that the 'extra' tempo ...d3 is actually very helpful to White, hecause severely weakens Black's d-pawn and, unlike the line after 18 \$\mathbb{T} \text{34}, White has not weakened the d4-square by playing c3-c4.

It is worth trying to pinpoint repetitive errors in one's own play. These days, with the availability of strong computer programs, finding tactical errors is quite easy. I always quickly run my games past Fritz – it is often quite shocking what nurns up!

### Time-trouble

The advice here is quite simple: don't get into time-trouble in the first place. This immediately raises the question: what constitutes time-trouble? Some people panic when they have ten minutes left for ten moves, while others appear quite calm even when down to their last thirty seconds.

I will propose a definition: timetrouble arises if you have less than one minute left per move. In my opinion this is the lower limit for guaranteeing an acceptable standard of play. It is of course possible to play well even with less time than this, but you are really putting yourself in the hands of fate. If no unexpected problems arise, no shocks, no really tricky decisions, then you will probably survive more or less unscathed, but how can you be sure this is going to happen? Those who are addicted to time-trouble will show you the remarkable games they won despite extreme time shortage; they probably won't show you the much larger number which they lost because of the same time shortage.

If you regularly run into timetrouble, according to this definition, then you are doing something wrong and it is almost certainly costing you points.

The reasons for running short of time are many. Here is a selection of the most common:

- 1) Indecision. Probably the most common reason. If you spend a long time agonizing over decisions, then you will inevitably run short of time. The pragmatic approach I recommend in this book should belp. If you find that, after lengthy thought, you usually end up playing the move that you wanted to play straight away, then learn to trust your innition more.
- 2) Worrying too much about very minor matters. There is no point thinking for half an hour about a possible advantage or disadvantage of what a computer would call '0.1 of a pawn. This almost certainly is not going to

cost you a half-point. The piece you hang later during time-trouble probably is.

3) Providing yourself with an excuse. To those who do not suffer from this particular ailment, it probably sounds ridiculous, but it is surprisingly common. In these cases there is a (possibly subconscious) reluctance to admit that a loss is due to had play; problems with the clock provide an alternative explanation. If you find yourself saying to people after a game 'I had a perfectly reasonable position until I ran into time-trouble' then you probably have this disease to some extent. It really is an absurd attitude. The clock is just as much a part of the game as the board and pieces, and losing because of time-trouble is no different to losing because of weak play it's still a zero on the score-sheet. The only difference is that if you run very short of time you will almost certainly lose; if you play more quickly, you may lose because of weak play, but then again you may not. The best way to improve is to gain over-the-board experience and if your games just become a time-trouble mess, then you are probably not learning very much

If you have time-trouble problems, then in addition to the points mentioned above, bear in mind the following tips:

from them.

 Arrive for the game on time.
 The most obvious and simplest way of saving time!

- Don't spend a long time considering which opening to play. If you have the luxury of knowing more than one opening, then you should think about this before the game.
- 3) Don't think about theoretical moves. Some players spend an inordinate length of time reaching a position with which they are already familiar. An extreme case was a game I played as White against Stohl in the Poisoned Pawn, an opening with which we were both very familiar. I played a line which was believed to lead to equality He was so worried about the improvement he felt sure was coming that he thought carefully about each move trying to spot the 'improvement' in advance. By the time the improvement arrived, well into the ending, he had used 90 of his 120 minutes reaching a position he knew perfectly well. The 'improvement', when it finally came. was actually a rather modest affair, but thanks to Stohl's lack of time I won the game.
- 4) Don't use up time thinking about obviously forced moves. Your opponent takes a pjece; you suddenly notice that after your recapture he has a possibility that you hadn't noticed before. Don't think just take back. Thinking not only wastes time, it also alerts your opponent to the fact that there is something you are worried about. It he hasn't noticed it before, he probably will now! Of course, you should be sure that the recapture really is the only possibility, otherwise you

- might overlook a powerful zwischenzug.
- 5) Chess is all about making decisions. Postponing a decision doesn't necessarily improve it. Try to get into the habit of asking yourself: is further thought actually going to beneficial?

I won't give any advice about what to do if you are in time-trouble, since this situation shouldn't arise.

If your opponent is in time-trouble. the main piece of advice is to stay calm. It is quite easy to become so excited that you start bashing out moves as quickly as your opponent and thus make no use of your time advantage. You should also avoid thinking "I must try to win the game during his time-trouble" and then embark on some risky vennire which you would never play under normal circumstances. This is only justified if you have a very bad or losing position, and the time-trouble really is your only hope. Given a choice between a quiet continuation and an equally good sharp continuation, then by all means choose the sharp continuation, but an opponent in time-trouble is no justification for knowingly playing an inferior move.

Players in time-trouble tend to spend most of their time analysing forcing, tactical continuations, so be especially careful not to allow a tactical trick. Where strategy is concemed, they will probably decide on a 'default move' to play if your move carries no special threat. Very often this 'default move' will be part of a plan for transferring a badiy-placed piece to a better square. If they are deprived of any such obvious plan, then the result is usually confusion or a 'nothing' move. With any luck, you can use the moves before the time-control to gain a positional advantage which will set you up nicely for next phase of the game.

### Laziness

Laziness at the chessboard manifests itself in two ways. The first is when you have a complicated possibility, but decide not to analyse it on the grounds that it would be too much work. Note that is not the same as the 'DAUT' principle mentioned on page 21. That represents a conscious weighing of the balance between the time spent and the possibility of finding a berter move. It comes into play most often when there is a perfectly adequate alternative which can be played with little calculation. Laziness, on the other hand, is a deliberate turning away from a move which may turn out to be very strong indeed. Losing a game because you have overlooked a move is one thing, but losing because you have snotted the correct move and could not be bothered to analyse it is ouite another!

A second, more understandable, form of laziness is when your opponent has an irritating possibility. You have to consider this same possibility every move until you become fed up with it and spend a tempo ruling it out completely. The most common manifestation of this form of laziness is preventing a possible check by the opponent. You have to calculate the check in every single line, and in the end you just pre-empt the check by moving your king. There are, of course, many situations in which such a move is perfectly reasonable, but there are also many in which the loss of time is important. Playing \$\prime h1 after 0-0 (or dbl after 0-0-0) may be just such a waste of time. When such a move is justifiable, it is normally because of a concrete reason rather than because it is annoying to have to do a bit more calculation

Here is an unusual example of laziness:



J. Nunn - Xie Jun Hastings 1996/7

In this position, it suddenly occurred to me that Black might play

#### 21 Ha3?

My reasoning was that since the rook is blocked in by both bishops and unlikely to move along the first rank, it mught as well perform a useful task (preventing ...a3). Deep down I was aware that this move looks highly artificial; my 'logic' was really just a rationalization for an outbreak of laziness

A more sensible piece of reasoning would have been to note that Black queenside pawn majority will be very good in an ending, and so White must play for a decision in the middlegame. For the moment White need not worry about ...a3, since the bI-bishop will prevent the b-pawn promoting for several moves.

Thus 21 f5 is correct, aiming to play 2g4 or 2h5 to eliminate the defensive knight. Since White's position in the diagram is not especially good, he should probably be happy with a sacrifice on h6 leading to perpetual check.

#### 21...全d7 22 全d3 單b6 23 中h1 exf4 24 全xf4 至xd3 25 單xd3 單f2 26 實d2 圖xd2 27 全xd2 互fe8

Things have not gone very well for White. His rook is still on the radiculous square a3, Black has the two bishops and White's e-pawn is weak. All this adds up to a clear plus for Black and the main cause was the lazy move 21 Ea3

#### Determination

Of all the personal qualities which are important at the board, determination is probably the most significant. Some players, when confronted with an onerous defensive task, such as defending an inferior and long-drawn-out ending, suffer a crisis of will-power. They see the gloom ahead of them, with only the thistant prospect of at most half a point, and become despondent. The result is either a feeble resistance, or a decision to stake everything on a half-hearted swindle. When this is brushed aside, they feel that they can resign with good grace. Not surprisingly, this behaviour no recipe for success

Even very strong players can become so resigned to the prospect of mevitable defeat that they do not notice when a saving opportunity is presented to them.

Here are a couple of notable recent examples.

The position overleaf is a simple technical win for White, and it is hard



G. Kasparov - N. Short London PCA World Championship (9) 1993

to imagine Kasparov going so far wrong as to reach a drawn position, yet that is what happened.

#### 45 Es1

Not a particularly accurate move, although it does not throw away the win. White should simply put his rook on the fourth rank and march his king to b4. Thus 45 Ed1+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$\$\text{c}\$\$ 46 Ed4 or 45 Eh6+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$\$\text{c}\$\$\$ 46 Ed4 would have won easily.

### 45...\$e5 46 e4??

An amazing blunder. One way to win is by 46 \$\text{ \$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\

#### 46...**⊈e**6??

An equally serious error. Black can draw by 46... \( \mathbb{L} \)c5! 47 a5 (after 47 \( \mathbb{L} \)a3 \( \mathbb{L} \)c4 48 a5 \( \mathbb{L} \)xe4 49 a6 \( \mathbb{L} \)f4+ and 50... \( \mathbb{L} \)f8 Black's rook makes it back) 47... Ic3+48 Dg4 Dxe449 a6 Ic8 50 a7 Ig8+51 Dh5 Ia8 and Black simply marches his king over and takes the nawn.

47 \$\pmu e3 \$\pmu d6 48 \$\pmu d4 \$\pmu d7 49 \$\pmu e4\$ \$\pmu c6 50 \$\pmu b4 \$\mu e5 51 \$\mu c1 + \$\pmu b6 52\$ \$\mu c4 1-0\$

In order to understand this double blunder, you have to take into account the course of the game. Short had been losing from an early stage, and Kasparov had been exchanging down to a simplified endgame. Both sides were simply acting out the final stages of a drama which had been decided in the opening, and they knew full well what he result of the game would be. In this frame of mind it is possible to let one's attention wander away from the position on the board. Nevertheless, it is an astonishing error to occur at such a high level.



A. Shirov – J. Tiruman Wiik aan Zee 1996

Black had been under pressure for some time and ended up in this rook ending a clear pawn down.

### 45 g4?!

Both players seemed to believe that this position should be a clear-cut win for White, but in fact it is not so simple. The move played is probably already an inaccuracy. After 45 \$\psi f3\$ Le6 46 Ld8+ (Shirov comments that 46 #c3 should win but White's rook is tied to the defence of c6 more or less. permanently and the win does not look at all simple to me) 46... \$17 47 \$17+ He7 48 Hxe7+ Oxe7 White can force a winning queen and nawn ending by 49 deg4 ded6 50 deg5 dexc6 51 deh6 \$\psi\$b7 52 \$\psi\$xh7 c5 53 \$\psi\$xg6 c4 54 f5 c3 55 f6 c2 56 f7 c1 57 f8 wc2+ 58 ₩f5 ₩xh2 (after 58... ₩c6+ 59 \$h5 ₩c8+ 60 \$24 ₩g8+ 61 \$f4 White remains two pawns up) 59 g4. The evaluation of endings with #+4 vs # is a simple matter at home, because one only has to consult a computergenerated database. The oracle informs us that this one is indeed winning, but of course it is not so easy at the board. The general feeling amongst GMs is that endings with #+gA vs # (and the defending king cut off from the pawn) are almost impossible to defend in practice, even if some of them are drawn with perfect play (see page 150 for more details). Thus even without consulting the database. Shirov would have been aware that this ending offers White excellent winning prospects. In the specific position

above it is quite easy to see that Black only has a few checks and then White can advance his pawn to the fifth rank (59...#66+ 60 drg? #64+ 61 dr? Foc4+ 62 drß #64+ 63 drg8), which would provide further evidence in favour of assessing it as winning for White

#### 45...Ee6

Black must try to force White's rook into a defensive position.

#### 46 Ed8+

White could still play 46 **E**c3. 46...\$17 47 Ed7+ Ee7 48 Exe7+?? This more throws away the win. White could still have retreated his rook and defended the c-pawn along the c-fille

### 46,...\$xe7 49 g5 1-0??

Resigning is an even more astonishing blunder than Shirov's mistaken rook exchange. After 49...\$\d6 Black draws without undue difficulty:

- 1) 50 f5 gxf5 51 h4 \$\dot e5 52 \dot f3 f4 53 h5 \$\dot f5 54 g6 hxg6 55 h6 \$\dot f6 56 \dot xf4 g5+ draws.
- 2) 50 ht three 51 f5 thd6 52 f6 thd7 53 thr3 the 54 th 4 thr7 55 the 58 thr3 the 54 th 4 thr7 55 the 58 the 58 th 48 thr7 55 the 58 the 58 th 48 thr3 the 54 the 58 the 58 the 58 thr5 the 58 t

What makes Timman's decision to resign so surprising is that he could have quite easily taken the pawn on c6 and waited to see Shirov's intention. Giving up so early is an indication of defeatism—he felt that the rook ending was dead lost and, since the king and pawn ending was a natural consequence of the rook ending, the that the rooms the lost.

In these examples, both Short and Timman were paying scant attention to the position on the board and were heavily influenced by the preceding play.

The lesson to be learnt from this is that while the game is in progress, you should be concentrating on the current nosition, regardless of what has hapnened before. There are very few players who have the technical skill to convert advantageous positions into a win without at some stage allowing the opponent a chance for counterplay. The defender's task is to maintain his concentration, so that when a possible saving opportunity arises, he does not overlook it. There is no point in playing on if all you are doing is going through the motions, waiting for the right moment at which to resign.

# 2 The Opening

## Building a repertoire

It would be nice to start the construction of an opening repertoire from scratch, so that everything fits together neatly, and all transpositions are taken care of. However, most players don't have an elegant opening repertoire. They play a motley collection of openngs which they have accumulated, more or less by chance, over the years. However, we will take the idealized situation of someone starting from square one (al. presumably).

The first step is to think about your personal style. Do you prefer open, actical positions or closed, strategac positions? Does an attack on your king make you nervous, or are you happy so long as you have a counter-attack? Do you prefer main lines, or something slightly offbeat? Next, look at the various openings available, and see which ones fit in with your personal style. For example, when choosing an opening with Black against 1 e4, you might make some notes along the following lines:

1...c5: Open positions, tactical, attack and counter-attack. Scheveningen and Taimanov systems safer and less tactical than the Dragon, Najdorf and Pelikan.

- 1...c6: Solid positions, strategic,
- 1...e6: Closed positions, strategic.
- 1...e5: Fairly solid, but can lead to almost any type of position, depending on the follow-up. Petroff the most solid option.
- 1...d6: Sharp positions. Attack and counter-attack. However, White does have solid options.
- d5: Slightly off-beat, fairly solid but a little passive.
- Off: Sharp positions. These days considered slightly off-beat.
- 1... Dc6: Slightly off-beat. Need to consider what to play after 2 Df3.

Do the same with openings against l d4, flank openings and with White. Then you have to consider how all these fit together. If you choose the Pirc against 1 e4, it makes sense to consider the King's Indian against 1 d4. This is more flexable and will give you additional options later. For example, you may decide later that you would prefer not to allow the Sämisch against the King's Indian. To this end you decide to meet 1 d4 with 1...d6 and against 2 c4 you will play 2...e5. Many players who would oute like to play this system with Black are put off by two things: firstly, White can play 2 e4 and secondly White can play 2 1/3

(it is true that Black can meet 2 2/33 by 2...2 g.4, but many regard this as somewhat better for White). However, because your openings have been chosen to fit together, neither of these problems will bother you. The Pirc is already in your repertoire, and after 2 2/13 you can play 2...2/16 and enter a King's Indian, but with the Sámisch havine been nuled out.

Likewise, the Caro-Kann and the Slav fit together, and then you can answer 1 c4 by 1...c6, without having to undertake any additional learning to cope with 2 c4.

There is a temptation to choose some really unusual openings, because the amount of study required is much less However, I would advise against this. Rarely played openings are usually rare precisely because they have some defect. Sooner or later your opponents will start to exploit this defect and then you will have to switch openings. If you choose another very unusual opening, the process will repeat itself. After a few years, you will have spent just as much effort as if you had chosen a mainstream opening in the first place, and you will have little to show for your efforts.

This problem doesn't arise with a repertoire based on main lines. First of all, such lines, which have been tried and tested in thousands of grandmaster games, are unlikely to be 'busted' in the first place. The worst that usually happens is that a small finesse leads to a minor reassessment of one line. Secondly, even if the worst happens and a hlockbuster novelty finishes off a line, it is usually relatively easy to switch to another line within the same opening. Mainstream openings such as the Ruy Lopez or the Orthodox Queen's Gambit are not merely single lines; they are massive complexes of theferent systems for both colours. Suppose, for example, you play the following line of the Chigorin Defence in the Closed Ruy Lopez: 1 e4 e5 2 9 f3 4 c6 3 & b5 a6 4 & a4 4 f6 50-0 \$e76 #e1 b57 \$b3 d68 c30-0 9 h3 Pa5 10 &c2 c5 11 d4 Wc7 12 4)hd2 cxd4 13 cxd4 &d7 14 4)f1 Bac8 15 Pe3 Pc6 16 d5 Pb4 17 &b1 a5 18 a3 2a6. Suddenly you see a game in this line which seems to cast doubt on Black's play. You need a replacement line, quickly. There is a wide range of possibilities to choose from; you could try 15... Ife8 or, slightly earlier. 13 .. Dc6. Perhaps delaying the exchange on d4 and playing 12... 2d7 or 12...Dc6 might be an idea. All these are viable lines, so there is no need to panic. They all lead to the same general type of position, so that the experience you have gained with your former line will not be wasted The general principles governing play with these Chigorin Defence nawn strucnires will be still be valid in your new line. Moreover, all the effort you have put into learning how to combat earher deviations by White (Exchange Spanish, Lines with We2, etc.) will remain valid. Instead of facing a major

overhaul, only a minor modification will be necessary.

Once you have chosen your openings, how best to study them? There is nothing better than a good book, which brings us on to our next topic.

### Using opening books

These days there are books on virtually every opening under the sun. Some are good, some are competent and some are bad. Unfortunately, it is often not easy to decide which is which. In choosing a good book, reviews are an obvious guide, but these are often not very helnful in the chess world. This is not necessarily the fault of the reviewers: I can testify from personal experience that reviewing openings books is a difficult and thankless task. In order to assess an opening book properly, you really have to be an expert in that particular opening. Of course, you can check to see if it is up-to-date and well-written, but a really good openings book will contain all those finesses which only a practitioner of the opening will know. Cunning move-orders designed to avoid particular lines, moves which caused a narticular variation to be abandoned, but which were never actually played in a game - only a specialist will know whether such things are in the book or not. If one adds that chess book reviewers are normally unpaid (apart from receiving a free copy of the book), it is scarcely surprising

that reviews of opening books tend towards a certain blandness. Major publishers are perhaps slightly safer than smaller operations, since they normally have some sort of quality control; having said that, they are also under far more commercial pressure to bring a book out on time, which can lead to a rushed job. The saving 'Don't judge a book by its cover' is especially valid for chess books. The covers are normally made by designers rather than chess-players; of course they should be checked, but even so howlers occasionally slip through. In the end, the reputation of the author is probably the best guide to the quality of a book.

Having chosen a book, it is best first of all to gain an overview of the opening. Look first at just the main lines to create a mental picture of the general structure of the opening. If the book contains illustrative games, it is worth playing these over first; you will probably already notice certain typical themes repeating themselves. In most major openings you will have a choice against each of the opponent's possibilities. As with the choice of the main openings, make a list of the various options and see which ones suit your style. Keep transpositional possibilities and move-orders in mind, to make sure that your opponent cannot circumvent your proposed repertoire by a simple variation in move-order. Sunpose, for example, that you are going to play a line of the Sicilian with 1 e4

c 5 2 €/f3 e6, and are thinking about how to meet the 2 c3 Sicilian. You notice that the defence 1 c 4 c5 2 c3 d5 3 exd5 ₩xd5 4 d4 €/f6 5 €/f3 ♣g4 is currently popular, and decade to plant. It would be easy to overlook the fact that White can play 1 c 4 c5 2 €/f3 e6 3 c3 instead. Of course you can stall play 3...d5. but now the line with

... 2g4 is impossible. There are ways round this particular problem, but it is important to have something ready in advance, and not to be caught out over the board.

Notice that so far there has been no detailed study. Everything has been careful planning – good groundwork and thoroughness is the secret of successful opening preparation. Once you have your repertoire mapped out, then you can study each line in detail. To begin with, only study the main lines—that will cope with 90% of your games, and you can easily fill in the unisual lines later.

One important question is whether it is better to study an opening book that offers a pre-selected repertoure (often called "Winning With ...", or a similar title), or one that offers a complete coverage of an opening. Certainly both books have their place and the ideal situation is to have one of each type for a given opening. It is certainly useful to have someone do much of the above-mentioned work for you, but nevertheless some lines in the proposed repertoire may not surjou, or developments since the book

was published may throw doubt on some recommendations. In this case it is essential to have a source of alternative nossibilities.

More serious players who have a chess database (see also page 166) may like to check this for recent developments before playing a particular line. A database is also useful for seeing which lines are currently popular, and therefore where one should be focusing one's efforts.

At first you may find that your results with a new opening are disappointing. This is more likely with strategic openings than ones based on precise analysis. When I started playing the Sicilian Najdorf, my results were very good. This is an opening in which concrete knowledge of specific lines is very important. I had just studjed the opening in great detail, and so my knowledge was often better and more up-to-date than that of my opponents. On the other hand, playing a strategic opening requires a positional understanding which is better learnt by experience than from books. It may be several games before you get up to speed with such an opening, but be persistent - your efforts will be rewarded in the end.

### Books on offbeat openings

A particular genre of books which deserves special attention is that dealing with dubious and rarely-played openings. As in all categories of opening books, there are good and bad examples. Typically, such a book will claim that opening X is unjustly neglected, that recent games have shown X to be playable after all and that all sorts of hidden resources and novelties are revealed for the first time in the book

Unfortunately, 99% of the time the reasons X is rarely played are entirely justified, the 'recent games' turn out to be encounters of little value between unknown players, and the resources and novelties will only stand a few seconds' close examination. The tricks which authors can use to make openings such as X appear playable are many and varied, and are, of course, revealed for the first time in his book!

It is hard to give details without concrete examples, so that means I will have to choose a counle of victims. In this particular genre there is a depressingly high proportion of noor books. and it would be easy to choose one of the really bad ones and have some fun. In fact I have chosen one of the better examples. Tony Kosten's The Latvian Gambit (B.T. Batsford, 1995). This book is unusual in that a strong grandmaster has taken a look at a rarely played opening with a poor reputation. Tony was certainly taking on a real challenge with this title! When it arrived. I was quite baffled as to how the author had managed to fill up 144 nages: I had thought a detailed refutation would take 10 pages at most.

I decided to use the book as a basis for a couple of hours' analysis on the Latvian (pages 72-76 are based on this analysis). It is, of course, very rarely played and I would not expect a GM to dare it, but this enhances its surprise value. It would certainly be embarrassing to face it and plunge into deep thought on move three! Moreover, when a new book appears on an opening, it always encourages a few people to take it up, so the chances of meeting it were high enough to warrant devotins a little turn to it.

When I was a teenager, there were a couple of junior players who used the Latvian which, if you don't know already, is characterized by the moves 1 e4 e5 2 Df3 f5. For many players this opening offers a huge advantage: if provides a more or less complete defence to 1 e4. If you play a line of the Spamsh, then you have to worry about various white systems in the Spanish, such as the Exchange Variation and early d3 lines, plus the Scotch and 3 £c4 - quite a body of theory to study. Adopting the Latyran short-circuits all that; apart from the King's Gambit and a few other openings, you don't have to study anything else to meet 1 e4. The question is: can the Latvian be considered playable?

The move 2...f5 has a dubious appearance; it doesn't develop a picepan at weakens the dragonals h5-e8 and c4-g8, the latter being important if Black intends to castle kingside later. I always viewed 3 £2xe5 as the most logical reply — Black should be punished for not defending his e-pawn

with 2... 2c6. I had scored well with this reply in my youth, so I decided to concentrate on it.

My first surprise came when I examined the list of contents. Chapter 6 dealt with (after  $3 \, \text{\'e}_{\text{LN}} \text{c.S})$  "3...  $\text{\'e}_{\text{LO}} \text{6}$  and other third move alternatives for Black". I was stunned - I hadn't realized that 3... $\text{\'e}_{\text{LO}} \text{6}$  and -I hadn't realized that 3...  $\text{\'e}_{\text{LO}} \text{6}$  was even vaguely possible. In fact Tony justifiably dismisses the "other thard move alternatives" but devotes over nine pages to 3...  $\text{\'e}_{\text{LO}} \text{6}$  (D). My first reaction on seeing an unfamiliar move in a book is not to look at the author's analysis, but to set the position up on a board and decide what would be the most natural response.



I noticed that White could win the exchange by 4 ms.+ g6 5 €xg6 €16 6 ms.4 kg6 (6. II g8!?) 7 ms.hs ms.- In return Black has a substantial lead in development. An assessment of this relatively complicated position would take some time, so bearing in mind DAUT I decided to look for something simpler.

4 Øxc6 is another obvious move. but after 4 dxc6 I felt that this was rather playing into Black's hands. All Black's minor pieces can immediately come into play, while White still has to move his d-pawn to bring his c1bishon out. Moreover, White has no minor pieces on the kingside, and if White intends to castle on that side the deficiency might allow Black to work up an attack. Neither of these lines is particularly clear, but the point of this initial evaluation is not to assess each possibility rigorously, but simply to decide which move looks best based on general principles. If I had not found a possibility that really struck me as the most promising, then I would have gone round again for a second look at 4 Wh5+ and 4 0xc6.

However, at this moment I noticed a very tempting move: 4 d4!. This seemed to me to fit in best with the principle of rapid piece development in the opening. White creates a 'twoabreast' pawn centre and allows the cl-bishop to be developed without making any concession. The most obvious reply is 4...fxe4, but this just loses after 5 4)xc6 dxc6 6 Wh5+ and 6...g6 costs a rook, so Black must move his king. Nor is 4... af6 possible, as 5 axc6 followed by 6 e5 gives White an extra pawn and a good position. Black can of course, play 4... 2xe5 but after 5 dxe5 the nawn on e5 prevents ... 2f6 and Black's development is correspondingly awkward. If he tries to get the pawn back by 5... #e7, then 6 #d4

looks very unpleasant, threatening 6)c3-d5 After five minutes I was still unable to see any playable line for Black against 4 d4, so I decided see what Kosten gave. His main lines are 4 2xc6 and 4 Wh5+, with 4 d4 being relegated to a small note, which con-7 \$xe4 Df6" and ends up as "fine" for Black. Well, 4... Th4 was certainly a surprise! However, I remained unconvinced. Black has violated virtually every principle of opening play, making weakening pawn moves, giving up a pawn and now developing his queen before the other pieces - surely there had to be a way to gain a clear advantage at the very least? Suddenly, I had an idea. How about 5 af3 #xe4+ 6 2e2 (D)?



The more I looked at this the more it appealed to me. White threatens simply 0-0 and Ie1. Black has insufficient time to develop his kingside minor pieces and get castled, for example 6... £167 0-0 £27 8 Ie1 and

8...0-0 loses to 9 &c4+. At the very least Black will have to make several more moves with his queen and fall hopelessly behind in development. In addition one must also take into account:

 a) the dreadful positioning of the pawn on f5, which has no positive features at all and only weakens Black's position;

 b) the possibility of d5, forcing the c6-knight to retreat; and

c) the plan of attacking c? by &c3-d5 (or b5), possibly coupled with £(4. Summing up, Black's position is probably just lost. There remained only one more point to be checked, vz. that Black could not exploit the temporarily active position of his queen by 6... 2bd. However, it would be a miracle if Black could get away with breaking the one remaining unroken rule of opening play, that one should not repeatedly move the same pieces while leaving the rest of the army at home.

The analysis, however, is fauty simple: 6... 2047 0-0 \$\foxed xc2 8 \$\tilde{\tilde{a}} \tilde{c} \foxed (8... \$\tilde{a} \tilde{b} \tilde{d} \tilde{c} \foxed (8... \$\tilde{a} \tilde{c} \tilde{d} \tilde \tilde{d} \tilde{d} \tilde{d} \tilde{d} \tilde{d} \tilde{d} \til

condemn his position without concrete analysis.

Having done away with 3... \omegac6. 1 turned my attention to the main line, 3... #f6, again focusing my efforts on the line I had played decades earlier. namely 4 ac4 fxe4 5 ac3. In those far-off days the main continuation was 5... g6, after which I racked up quite a few wins with 6 d3 2 b4 7 dxe4 ₩xe4+ 8 De3. Kosten considers this very good for White, and his main line is 5... #f7, a move which was practically unknown in 1970. I was aware of this move, and indeed had faced it once quite recently against Fritz in a man vs computer tournament. I won that game, but my handling of the opening was rather cautious due to lack of knowledge.

Kosten's main line is 6 De3 c6! (D) (his exclamation mark).



His principal variation runs 7 d3 exd3 8 2xd3 d5. Of course, White has a substantial lead in development, but Black has some strategic assets. He has an extra central pawn, and the position of his queen will turn out to be quite useful if he castles kingside, as he will have instant pressure along the f-file. Indeed, it quickly becomes apparent that Black will have a fine game If he has a few tempi to complete his development. After ... 2d6, ... 2c7 and ...0-0 his king is safe, and the white knights are poorly placed. Black's central pawns prevent the knights from moving forwards and the knight on e3 blocks in the c1-bishop. A quick look at Kosten's analysis bears this out: in most lines White feels obliged to sacrifice a piece by Dexd5 or Dc4 to disturb Black before he can castle. All these lines are very complicated so, invoking DAUT again, I decided to retum to the diagram position. I immediately wondered why White should not take the pawn on e4. After 7 2xe4 d5 8 Qg5 ₩f6 9 Qf3 I was again feeling confident about White's position. White has admittedly moved his kmghts several times, but Black cannot really boast about this, as so far the only piece he has moved is his queen. In terms of development, the two sides are roughly equal and White's position is without weaknesses - in fact, Black's compensation for the pawn is simply invisible. Kosten gives two lines: 9... 2e6, aiming to castle queenside, and 9....2d6. Taking 9....2.e6 first. Kosten's continuation is "10 d4 Dd7 11 &d3 0-0-0 (D) 12 c3 g5 13 0-0 h5, not fearing 14 @xd5?! 2xd5 15 @xg5 ₩g7."



This line shows a typical ploy used by those attempting to make a very dubious line playable: the totally irrelevant move. Nobody could enticize the natural developing moves 10 d4 and 11 ad3, but what on earth is 12 c3 for? The d4-pawn isn't attacked, it isn't likely to be attacked and White isn't freeing his f3-knight to move anywhere. If White does nothing, then of course Black will eventually work up a serious attack on the kingside, but in opposite-side castling positions speed is of the essence. The correct plan for White is to play c2-c4 to develop counterplay in the centre and on the queenside

Suppose White starts with the most obvious move, 12 0-0, and Black plays as in Kosten's line with 12...g5. White plays 13 c4 (D) and Black is already in a very bad way:

1) 13....2d6 14 ₩a4 Φb8 15 c5 2c7 16 b4 with an extra pawn and a very strong attack. If Black plays 16...a6, White can either sacrifice on a6 immediately or prepare it by 17 Ibl.



2) 13...g4 14 cxd5 cxd5 15 De5.

3) 13. dxx4 (relatively the best) 14 Dxx4 h6 (14...g4 15 ℃ fc5 £xx4 16 € Dxx7 ₹x47 ₹x47 17 £xx4 is also very bad, for example 17. ₹x44 18 ₹x5 € C7 19 £x3 15 £x3, to be followed by some combination of ₹x4, ₹x1 and € fc5. Black is a pawn down for nothing.

If Black plays some other 12th move, for example 12.... 2d6, White again plays 13 c4 and in this case matters are even worse as €1xc4 comes with gain of tempo.

Kosten's other line is 9...&d6, and here he gives 10 d4 \( \frac{1}{2}\)e7 11 c41, which is indeed White's strongest line. The continuation is 11...0-0 12 \( \frac{1}{2}\) 3 \( \frac{1}{2}\)e7 dx 64 \( \frac{1}{2}\) 3 \( \frac{1}{2}\)e7 dx 64 \( \frac{1}{2}\) 4 \( \frac{1}{2}\)e7 dx 64 \( \frac{1}2\)e7 dx 6

The point of 13 \( \textit{ \textit{ \textit{ 2d}}} \) 2 is to prevent a check on b4, and therefore to threaten to win a pawn on d5. It is also possible to play 13 \( \textit{ \textit{ 2e2}} \) followed by 0-0, when White would also threaten the



d5-pawn, and would have achieved this purpose using only natural developing moves. Therefore this line may be slightly more accurate. Once again, Black's compensation cannot be detected. The position resembles one from a normal opening such as the Petroff, except that Black's f-pawn for unaccountably dropped off the board.

When looking through 'dubious opening' analysis, look out for the following:

- Nothing moves' by the opponent (i.e. the one facing the dubious opening), which only waste time.
- Lines in which the opponent pretends he is in the nineteenth century, co-operatively grabs all the material on offer and allows a brilliant finish.
- Lines which are given without any assessment.
  - 4) Secret code words.

The fourth point perhaps requires some explanation. An author who is both honest and a strong player will have some doubts about the lines he is giving, and this often manifests itself in phrases which are the chess equivalent of a disclaimer in a contract.

After "6 c6!" in the above line Kosten writes "Calmly leaving the e4-pawn to its fate; what exactly does Black obtain in return? Objectively, very little: just a slight lead in development and a lot of fun." Not exactly confidence-inspiring for Black, but of course having taken on the book he can hardly admit that the whole opening is just unsound. The publisher would doubtless not be amused by a manuscrint consisting of a ten-page refutation! Similar key phrases are 'might appeal to a tactically-minded player', 'offers practical chances' and 'Black's position is no worse than in main-line openings such as the Ruy Lopez'. Depends which variation, I suppose!

Less honest authors are entirely shameless about such matters. They recommend the most outrageously unsound lines without blushing even slightly. They would never play such lines themselves, of course.

My second example is also a relatively high-quality product from a reliable GM author, Winning With the Giuoco Piano and the Max Lange Attack by Andrew Soltis (Chess Digest, 1992).

Books with 'Winning With' in the title confer an extra responsibility on the author, in that the result of the author's research is pre-determined. If the author reaches page 100 and discovers that the opening he is recommending is unsound, then he is unlikely to abandon the whole project. Of course, this probably won't happen if the opening chosen is a popular, main-line system, 'Winning With the Ruy Lopez' is an uncontroversial title; many top GMs regularly play the Ruy Lopez hoping to win. The problems start to arise when 'Winning With...' 16 combined with an offheat and unpopular opening, such as the Giuoco Piano You can be sure that if the established theory of the Giuoco Piano favoured White, then lots of GMs would play it, but of course it does not. The author is therefore undertaking to discover something new which overturns the prevailing opimon. Then the crucial question is how convincing these new ideas are.

The line of the Ginoco Piano recommended in the above book runs I e4 e5 2 0f3 0c6 3 &c4 &c5 4 c3 0f6 5 d4 exd4 6 cxd4 &b4+ 7 Qc3 Qxe4 8 0-0 &xc3 9 d5 (this is called the Møller Attack) 9....2.f6 10 Iel De7 11 Exe4 d6 12 &g5 &xg5 13 @xg5 and now there are basically two variations. The old continuation is 13...0-0. when White replies 14 @xh7. The more modern option, and the one which has really put people off the Møller Attack, is 13...h6!, which leapt to prominence following Barczay-Portisch. Hungarian Ch 1968/9. Let's take these two lines in turn.

After 13...0-0 14 \( \Delta \text{xh7} \) (D) Black can, of course, accept the sacrifice.



Traditional theory has it that this is a forced draw Soltis offers some new ideas in the extremely complex positions which result but, taking DAUT into account, we will not look at these. In any case, I think many players would prefer to avoid 14... \$\preprint \text{xh7} if at all possible; it has the defect that White can force perpetual check virtually at will, and of course a difficult defence in which a slight slip might be fatal is not to the taste of many players. The reasonable alternative to taking the knight is 14 ... 2.f5, when the following moves are virtually forced: 15 1h4 (15 Exe7 wxe7 16 axf8 Exf8 is entirely comfortable for Black) 15... Le8 16 gh5 gh6 17 里d4 (D).



The Harding and Botterill book quoted is The Italian Game (B.T. Bar Gnd, 1977). However, in the later book Open Gambits (B.T. Battsford, 1986), Botterill gives: "20 @fG &hr7 21 &d3 &xd3 22 @xd3 + &g8 ... it is questionable whether White has enough for the pawn. However White can hold the balance with 20 @hf \$@68 (Vuković) 21 &Qf6 + gxf6 and now:

"a) 22 Wh4 f5 (intending ... Wd8) retains tension, though I think Black is better

"b) Simply 22 ₩xc8+ Exc8 23 Exf6 is equal."

What is the poor reader to make of all this? Soltis and Botterill give completely different lines and offer different evaluations. I will try to clarify the After 22...\$\psi\_8 (D) it is quite impossible to see how White can even equalize.



 'Winning With' authors display great ingenuity in finding resources for 'their' side, but often overlook even quite simple tactical defences for the 'other' side.

Botterill's other line for White, 20 ₩h3, can be met by 20... #c8, although I would feel a bit queasy about allowing my kingside nawns to be broken up by 2f6+ and then blocking in my bishon by ...f5. I would prefer to play 20... h5!, which again depends on a small tactical point: 21 2f6+ #xf6! (avoiding any damage to the kingside pawns) 22 \$\mathbb{\pi}xf6 \$\mathbb{\pi}xh3 23 \$\mathbb{\pi}xg6 \$\mathbb{\pi}h4!\$ and Black reaches a four-rook ending with a clear extra pawn. White should prefer 21 費b3 雪xh7 22 賣xb7, when 22... \$\dagger\$b8 reaches a more or less equal ending, while 22... Ib8 23 \*xa7 Ixb2 is unclear. Black's more active pieces balancing the long-term danger posed by the passed a-pawn.

The point of this is quite simple. Black clears the fifth rank for his rook and threatens (amongst other things) 18... **18**:5 19 **%h 3%**-7, followed by 18... **18**:6, with a winning position since White is completely hamstrung by the trapped knight on h? and can hardly move a piece.

The alternatives are:

1) 18 Id2 loses to 18... Df4 19 ₩g4
 2xh7 20 ₩xf4 Ie4.



- 18 Icl Ie5 19 Wh3 2 f5 20 g4
   26 and again White loses material.
- 18 f4 ₩e7 with a nasty check on e3 to come.
   18 Qg5 (relatively the best
- move) 18... \$\pi 6 19 \$\pi h7 + \$\pi 8 20 \$\Omega f3\$ \$\textit{2}\$ &e4 with advantage to Black.

Now we return to 13...h6!, which most players cite as the reason for rejecting the Møller Attack.

Soltis recognizes the importance of the line by devoting 16 pages of analysis to the position after 13...h6. The critical position arises after 14 We2 hxg5 15 Ile 1 2e6 16 dxe6 f6 17 Ile 3 (D).

Soltis boldly states "This move, attributed to the Finnish correspondence player Juhani Sorri, rehabilitates the new Møller." We will take a look at two possibilities for Black, 17...c6 and 17...\$48.

After 17...c6 play proceeds 18 Ih3 Ixh3 19 gxh3 g6. Soltis surveys the



moves which have been tried in practice and concludes that they favour Black. His suggestion is 20 \$\vec{w}\$d2 (D).



White prevents ... 增a5, and threatnes 21 響c3. Soltis analyses 20... d5, but he doesn't consider the reply 20... 位8, intending ... 位g7 followed by gradual consolidation with ... d5 and ... 閏d6, when White will be a pawn down in a bad position. White's only active move is 21 th, but after 21... gxh 42 2 曾h6+ 位g8 23 響xh4 (23 星c4 fails to 23... 實f8 24 響xh4 d5, while 23 竇xg6+ 仓xg6 24 e7+ d5 25 ext/營寧士 至成8 26 全 f1 ➡f7 wins for Black) 23...♣g7 Black cannot be prevented from consolidating with ...♣a5 followed by ...♣h8, or ...♣b8 for ...♣b8

After 17...\$\psi(8), Soltis's main line runs 18 \(\triangle 43\) \$\psi(8)\$ \$\psi(8)\$ \$\psi(2)\$ \$\psi(2)\$ \$\psi(8)\$ \$

This brings us to our next warning:

6) Do not trust lines which are not based on practical examples. The more examples there are, and the higher the standard of the players, the more trust you can place in the line.

The above analysis shows up the weakness of the 'Winning With 'approach applied to offbeat openings. Theory in the Gruoco Piano gives a unanimous thurnbs up to Black; an author claims to have discovered something new which rehabilitates one line. You build your entire repertoire on the basis of this claim. With the Soltis book, this involves learning something against the Two Knights

Defence and against the various other systems Black might employ in the Giucco Piano. In fact your whole repertoire is founded on one move, 20 \$\vec{w}02\$, which has never been tested in practice and which is analysed for just over half a page. Then it suddenly turns out that there is something wrong with 20 \$\frac{1}{2}\$\text{.}\$ What do you do? It is no good switching to another line in the Giucoo Ptano, as these have long been dismissed as offering White nothing. In fact, you may as well dust off your books on the Ruy Lopez.

# 3 The Middlegame

This is the part of the game in which it is hardest to set down rules and give good advice. For every rule one proposes, there will be so many exceptions that the rule may be more misleading than helpful. Accordingly, we are going to deal more with the psychological side of the middlegame than with technical issues.

# Good positions

Congratulations, you have the advantage! But what do you do next? The first step is to judge whether your advantage is of a short-term or long-term nature. If it consists of better development or attacking chances, then it is probably short-term; if it is based on better pawn structure or superior minor pieces, then it is probably long-term. Many advantages, such as control of an open file, may be either short- or long-term depending on whether the opponent has a means of challenging the asset. This step will provide you with a clue as to whether you should be thinking of quick action to exploit your advantage before it disappears, or whether you can afford to manoeuvre slowly, tidying up your position ready for further action.

It is also important to take into account your opponent's possibilities for counterplay. It is no good starting some lessurely manoeuvres if your opponent has a passed pawn thundering down the board. Only if both conditions are satisfied – a long-term advantage and a fack of counterplay – can you afford to indulge in luxuries such as improving your king position. However, in this case you not only can take your time, you should do so. You may not be able to see a concerte reason why a particular 'tidying-up' move might be useful, but you lose nothing by olaving it.



T. Petrosian – W. Unzicker USSR – West Germany match, Hamburg 1960

White's absolute domination of the c-file and pressure against the vulnerable a5-pawn give him a long-term advantage, and Black is so tied up as to have no realistic prospects of counterplay. Nevertheless, White still has to come up with a plan for improving his position. He decides that a kingside pawn advance is the best way to proceed, but if played immediately this would expose his king. Petrosian therefore decides to play his king to the secure refuge on a 2 before proceeding with his kingside plan. Only a complete lack of counterplay could justify such an extravagant manoeuvre, but in this particular position White has absolutely no need to hurry.

### 29 \$(1 \$\psi\_28

After 29... ab8, White would make prugress by 30 ab6 ad8 31 acc6 ac7 32 ac6

#### 30 h4 h5

A very unpleasant decision. This gives White the chance of eventually opening up the kingside with g4, but meeting h4-h5 with ...g5 would have a similar effect, since White could later play f4.

# 31 E1c2 \$b7 32 \$e1 \$g8 33 \$d1 \$b7 34 \$c1 \$g8 35 \$b1 \$b7 36 \$e2 \$b7 37 Ec1 \$g7 38 \$b5!

Petrosian observes that 38 g4 hxg4 39 wxg4 aa6 40 axa6 wxa6 41 h5 dd3+ allows Black to develop some activity, so he arranges to play 14 before starting his kingside play with g4.

### 38...₩a8

Or 38... \$\pixb5 39 axb5 a4 40 b6 \$\piad7 41 \Quad \pia 8 42 \$\pixd6! \pixd6 43 b7 \$\pib 8 44 \$\pic 8 \pid 45 \pixd8 \pixd8 45 \$\pixd8 \pixd8 46 \Quad \Quad \quad \quad \pixd6 and White wins.

# 39 f4 \$\psi h7 40 \$\psi e2 \$\psi h7 41 g4! hxg4 42 \$\psi xg4 \$\psi e7 (D)\$

Now 42... a6 may be met by 43 acc2! and, thanks to f4, White can swing both rooks to the kingside, giving a winning attack.



# 43 h5 ₩f6 44 \$\dot a2 \$\dot g7 45 hxg6 \$\dot xg6 46 \$\dot h4\$

The open files on the kingside, coupled with all Black's other problems,

# 46...≗e7 47 ¥f2 ±f8 48 €d2 ≝b7 49 €b3 ≣a7 50 ¥b2 £f6

pruve too much.

After 50...2d6 White wins by 51 Exd6! Exd6 52 f5 exf5 53 Ec8+ 2e7
54 Wh8

# 51 Ec8 Ead7 52 Oc5! b3+ 53 \$\psi\$xb3 Ed6 54 f5! Eb6+ 55 \$\psi\$a2 1-0

One common error in prosecuting an advantage is to indulge in tactics for the sake of it. There is a general feeling that the ideal game is one in which you positionally outplay your opponent and then finish with a burst of scintillating tactics. In fact, the

ideal game is one in which you win without allowing any unnecessary counter-chances. If you can win with a clear-cut combination, then that is the best way to eliminate counterplay. because the game is over! However, you should be really sure that your combination does work; it is quite easy to miscalculate complex tactics, and if there is an element of doubt then a purely strategic approach is probably better. Even if your combination 'works' (i.e. is not tactically unsound) then you should also be sure that your advantage in the resulting position is greater than it is in the position beforehand. A common error is to play an elaborate tactical line gaining, for example, the exchange for a pawn, only to discover that there are fewer winning chances after the combination than before

In the following example White, with a strategically winning position, spotted a seductively beautiful combination (D):

This position is a Benoni gone horribly wrong for Black. White's pieces are all actively placed and he has the two bishops, while Black's a8-rook is useless and his knights poorly placed.

19 e5! This is the thematic Benoni break-

### through, so it came as no surprise. 19...dxe5 20 d6

But this was unexpected. I had anticipated the natural 20 f5 when Black is probably just lost. White threatens to complete his blockade by ©e4.



J. Bellon - J. Nunn Zurich 1984

when a list of the threats shows just how awful Black's position 1s: d6, fxg6, gc4, de2, de5, Sc. Onsequently, Black would have to try 20. -20fs (20...e. 21 fxg6 hxg6 22 d6 and 23 åc4 wins), but 21 fxg6 hxg6 22 åg5 e4 23 licel is crushing. One possible continuation would be 23...e. 42 å åce4 dc5 25 ligs 20.h5 26 ligs 2 år6 27 åxf6 dxf6 28 ligs 4 dcd7 29 dxe4 dxe4 30 ddf and Black's position is torn to shreds.

Bellon's move gave me a momentary glimmer of hope, but then I realized he intended 20.. \$\vec{\text{\text{\$\grace}}}\) 40.2 \$\vec{\text{\$\sigma}}\) 22 \$L\$ with the same type of position as after 20 f5. White, it is true, has given up a second pawn, but his knight has arrived on et with gain of tempo. A quick look convinced me that there was no real answer to the threats to f7 arising after fxg. \$\vec{\text{\$\grace}}\) 4n, fnecessary, \$\vec{\text{\$\grace}}\) 5. However, there was obviously nothing better than to take the pawn.

# 20..., wxd6 21 wxf7+? (D)



I hadn't seen this queen sacrifice at all, and when he touched his queen I couldn't imagine where it was going. A second later I found out! It is of course desirable to avoid revealing to your opponent that you have overlooked something, but in this case my body language must have broadcast the message far and wide.

The question mark attached to this move is perhaps a little harsh, because White retains a winning position even after it. Yet from the practical point of view it is undoubtedly a mistake. 21 Ded would have led to a position in which White's win would require only straightforward, obvious moves – he just has to take aim at l? and Black will soon collapse. The move played alters the character of the position completely and presents both players with new problems to solve.

White had noticed an attractive combination without tactical flaws and leading to a won position. He then made the mistake of not asking the question 'Is my advantage after the combination greater or smaller than my current advantage?'

# 21...⊈xf7 22 fxe5+ ⊈g8

# 23 exd6 De5 24 De4

White's two active bishops, better development and dangerous d-pawn are undoubtedly enough to win, but although there are many very promising continuations, there is no way to finish Black off instantly. After 24 Xan6 bxa6 25 Exc5 (25 Exc5 263) 25. Exc5 26 Xan6 bxa6 25 Exc5 (25 Exc5 263) 25. Exc5 26 Xan6 bxa6 27 b47 20 Xan6 28 bxc5 26 44+). In view of the doubled a-pawns, White would be effectively almost a pawn up, but the win would not be guaranteed.

#### 24...c4

Keeping the pawn for the moment. 25 25 (D)

25...936

When you are desperate, it is sometimes necessary to play ugly moves. The threat of 26 d7 can only be met by



moving the a6-knight, but 25... De5 loses to 26 &xc4+ \( \Delta xc4 \) 27 \( \mathbb{Z} xc4 \) 28 \( \mathbb{Z} xc5 \) \( \mathbb{Z} xc5 \) 29 \( \mathbb{Z} xc5 \) 31 \( \mathbb{Z} \) \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 632 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 and 32 \( \mathbb{Z} \) 1 a

If your position is objectively lost, the most important rule is 'Keep the game going'. This doesn't mean that you should play on for a long time in a resignable position; it means 'do not allow your opponent a simple forced win'. The longer you can force your onponent to work, the greater the chances he will eventually go wrong. In the diagram position, White would be looking for a knock-out blow and would probably reject lines in which he is 'only' a pawn up. Denying him a quick win will eventually cause frustration, a loss of objectivity and a possible error.

# 26 40f6+?!

Once again this does not throw away the win, but a pragmatic player would have contented himself with the gain of a pawn by 26 b3. After 26... Dbd7 27 bxc4 a6 28 &xd7 Dxd7 29 c5! &d4+ 30 ⊈h1 &xc5 31 Dxc5 Exc5 (31... Dxc5 32 Efd1) 32 Exc5 Dxc5 Black can regain the pawn, but White wins by 33 Ect Dd7 (33...b6 34 Exc5) 34 Ec7.

It is clear from this variation that White's queen sacrifice made the win considerably more difficult; instead of a clear-cut and straightforward positional win, White now needs to calculate oute lengthy lines.

#### 26 9 xf6 27 9 xf6 a6!

Again presenting White with the maximum difficulty. After 27... ©bd7 28 \( \frac{1}{2}\text{Ect} \) a \( \frac{1}{2}\text{M} \) \( \frac{1}\text{M} \) \( \frac{1}{2}\text{M} \) \( \frac{1}{2}\text{M} \) \( \frac{1}\text{M} \) \( \frac{1}\

#### 28 இa4 €\bd7

At last Black has managed to set up some sort of blockade for the d-pawn, but it is not permanent because the knights lack any pawn support.

# 29 Ecel Dc6 (D)

Possible thanks to the interpolation of ...a6 and ≜a4.



#### 30 Ac3

White decides to keep his bishops. Once again there was a tempting alternative in 30 £xc6 £xc6 31 £e7 £xt6 23 £xf6 £d8 33 £f7 £cxd6 34 £g7+ £d8 35 £xb7 (35 £ef7+ £e8 36 £xb7) £d7 ff847 offers Black fair drawing prospects), but after 35...h5 it is hard to say whether White's advantage will necessarily lead to a win.

#### 30...65

The queenside pawn majority is Black's only hope of counterplay.

# 31 ≜d1!

The correct plan; if the bishop can reach the b3-g8 diagonal (via f3 or g4) then Black will be mated.

# 31...b4 32 ≜g4

The simple move 32 &d2 would also have been very awkward. Black's queenside pawns aren't going anywhere because pushing them would open the diagonals leading to Black's king. Thus White has time to play &f3-d5 or &a4 and exploit his great piece activity.

### 32...bxc3 33 &xd7 cxb2 (D)

Black's first real glimmer of counterplay, and the decisive moment of the game.

#### 34 Ae6+?

The earlier complications, coupled with White's fruitless search for a knock-out, had left him short of time. Just at the moment when he could have really used a few extra minutes, he was forced to move quickly and threw the win away. The complexity of the position is such that in my



original notes (published, for example, in Informator) I gave two possible wins for White, only one of which works. I suppose I should be thankful that I got 50% correct!

The first 'win' was 34 \$\frac{2}\times \times 0 \text{Mxco} \text{Mxco} \frac{3}\times 4 \text{draw} 37 \text{Arc 8} 36 \text{draw} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 1} \text{draws after} 36 \text{Arc 8} 36 \text{draws after} \text{arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 9} 37 \text{Arc 8} 37 \text{Arc 9} 37 \

My second line does indeed lead to a win:  $34 \stackrel{\bullet}{\triangle} xc8! \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} xc8 35 d7 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} d8 (35... \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} c7 36 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} c8 + \stackrel{\bullet}{\triangle} p7 37 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} c7 + \stackrel{\bullet}{\triangle} h6 38 d8 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} \stackrel{\bullet}{\triangle} xd8 39 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} xc7) 36 \stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} c6! (this is the tricky move to see) and there is no defence to the threat of <math>\stackrel{\bullet}{\Xi} xc6$ .

# 34.... ±g7 35 ±xc4

It is now too late to take on c8: 35 \$xc8 \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} \) xc8 \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} \) xc6 \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} \) xc7 \( \frac{\pi}{\pi} \) xc8 \ Black a rook ending with excellent winning chances. Besides, having refused to take on c8 the move before, it would be surprising if White changed his mind now.

# 35...ᡚd4

Suddenly everything starts to go wrong for White. The bishop has to retreat along the a6-f1 diagonal, since 36 &d5 (36 &d3 loses at once after 36...Ec1) 36...Eab8, threatening to play 37...Ec1, is very bad for White.

### 36 2d3 Ec3 37 2b1 Ed8

Black can force a draw by 37. £cl (intending 38...£d8) 38 £d3 (covering c2 and so threatening 39 £xcl) 38...£d3, but now that things are urning his way he decides to play for a win. If Black can take the d-pawn, then his own passed b-pawn will decide the zame.

### 38 He7+?

There are very few players who defend well when they have slipped from a winning position into an inferior one. It requires exceptional self-control to forget about what has gone before and just to concentrate on the current situation. Whate could still have held the game by 38 Ef2! Ecl 39 Eef1 with a dead draw after the exchange of b-and d-pawns. The move played is a reflex action to preserve the d-pawn, but White should never have abandoned the first rank, except to attack the nawn on the contract of the strength of the contract of th

## 38...¢b6 39 d7

In my Informator notes I gave 39 **E**b7 as drawing, but in fact Black wins by 39... 40 a4 Ec1! 41 axb5 Ef8 and the f1-rook is caught in a pincer-movement

39... Ec1 (D)



40 0 43

White is almost without a reasonthis is Black's main threat) 41 Heet (41 Het 2x6 42 Hes Hf? wins the dpawn) 41...2x2 + 42 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ Hes H 248 43 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d3 Hard 44 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ xxe2 Hze1 45 Hze1 Hes rook and pawn ending.

# 

After 41... Exc2 42 Ebl Ec1+ 43
Eel Exe1+ 44 Exe1 Exd7, followed
by ... Eb7, White's rook becomes immobilized on bl and Black has an easy
win

# **Bad positions**

The first piece of advice is simple: don't give up hope. The history of chess is littered with won positions thrown away. Even world champions have been known to do this, and it is much more common at lower levels. However, you should not just hope that your opponent is going to make a mistake – you have to help him to do so. Being determined to make the win as difficult as possible is the first step in the right direction. A stiff resistance is almost always unnerving for the side with the advantage – he may well have over-estimated the strength of his own position and be anticipating a quick finish.

There are two basic strategies when confronted with a bad position. The first is to find some way to hang on, often by liquidating to an endgame. The attacker may not fancy wanning a long endgame a pawn up and so may unwisely continue to seek a middlegame win. Even if he does go for the endgame, a sudden switch from tactical middlegame play to technical endgame play can often prove disorientating. We call this the 'grim defence' ressonse.

The second strategy is to seek to gain the initiative, even at material cost, hoping to stir up complications and cause the opponent to go wrong. We call this the 'create confusion' response.

The choice between these alternatives depends manly on the position on the board, but other factors can enter the calculation. For example, if your opponent is short of time he may welcome simplification to an endgame, so in this case the 'create confusion' approach may be better. If you are aware of your opponent's style, then this might also affect your decision. One important point is that you should not change plans in midstream. If you have decided on 'grim defence' then you should not lose patience and switch plans later unless your opponent carelessly allows you a chance to break out, 'Grim defences' most often fail because the defender creates unnecessary additional weaknesses, opening the door to the opponent's pieces. The whole point of 'grim defence' is to set up a solid position which your opponent has to work hard to break down; such positions do not lend themselves to the creation of active counterplay.

If you decide to go for 'create confusion' then you should press the panic button sufficiently early to give yourself a reasonable chance of success. However, you should be sure that your position is really bad enough to warrant such drastic measures. In my experience, it is far more common to panic too early than too late.

Here is an example of each type of strategy, in both cases in response to a stunming opening novelty.

# J. Nunn – W. Browne Gjøvik 1983 Sicilian, Najdorf

1 e4 c5 2  $\bigcirc$ t3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4  $\bigcirc$ xd4  $\bigcirc$ t6 5  $\bigcirc$ c3 a6 6  $\bigcirc$ g5 e6 7 f4  $\bigcirc$ c7 8  $\bigcirc$ f7  $\bigcirc$ f7 0 0-0-0  $\bigcirc$ bd7 10 g4 b5 11

### ±xf6 @xf6 12 g5 @d7 13 f5 @c5 14 h4 h4 15 @cc2

In retrospect, one can say that White should choose something else round about here, for example the sacrifice 15 fxe6!?.

15...e5 16 €b3 (D)



I was feeling quite happy with the opening. In previous games Black had invariably continued 16...金为7, and I had analysed the resulting positions and concluded that they favoured White

#### 16...4\xe4!!

I was dumbfounded when this move appeared on the board and for several minutes I just couldn't see the point of it. After 17 %xe4 &b7 18 &d5, followed by &g2 in encessary, everything seemed to be fine for White. Sooner or later Black would have to take on d5 when White would have complete domination of the light squares. Then I suddenly saw the idea (which will be revealed in the game continuation) and realized I was in trouble. Even

though Browne failed to win the game, his novelty was voted the most important of the second half of 1983. As the similar vote in the first half of 1983 gave a lower score to the winner, it would be fair to say that the most stunning novelty played anywhere in the world during 1983 had just landed on my board.

After 1 had recovered from the shock. I settled down to decide on the best reply. I saw that I could take the knight, which leads ultimately to a better ending for Black, or I could try 17 22, which sacrifices a pawn for not very impressive compensation. My choice was determined largely by practical factors. I realized that Browne would have analysed both these lines carefully at home, so this was certainly a crucial decision. I had spent a great deal of time sitting at the board calculating these alternatives and so, unusually when facing Browne, I was far behind on the clock. In view of the time situation, I doubted my ability to find my way through continuing complications which Browne would have analysed at home. I therefore decided to go for the 'grim defence' option, when the many possibilities for both sides would inevitably mean leaving Browne's analysis within a few moves of entering the ending. Moreover, my lack of time would be a less relevant factor as the complications would be less intense.

As an aside, there is very little you can do to prevent the occasional

shocking opening novelty – if you play sharp openings then it is an occupational hazard.

#### 17 ₩xe4

In a later game Wedberg-de Firmian, Oslo 1984, White did indeed ty 17 ♣g2 ♣b7 18 ₩e3 d5 19 ♣xe4 dxe4 20 €lg3 a5, but lost after great complications.

#### 17... 2 b7 18 Ed5 Ec8 19 c3!

The only move, since 19 th 2 xd5 20 to xd5 to xc2+ 21 tha 10-0! leaves White completely tangled up. He can try 22 f6 gxf6 23 gxf6 xf6 24 that the xb8 25 that after the simple 25....2g7 White has not solved any of his problems.

# 19...∰c4 20 ∰xc4

Not 20 ≜g2 ≜xd5 21 ₩xd5 ₩xe2 and Black wins.

# 20... Exc4 21 2g2 2xd5!

Black must take straight away, because 21... **Exh4**? 22 **Exh4 2xd5** (or 22... **2xg5**+ 23 **Ed2!**) 23 **Eg4** gives White an extra piece.

### 22 &xd5 Exh4! (D)



This move as the key point which it took me several minutes to see at move 16. The upshot is that Black gains a rook and two pawns for two knights. In an ending, a rook and two pawns worth more than two minor pieces at least 90% of the time. Two bishops may sometimes hold the balance, but two knights have almost no chance.

#### 23 Eg1!

White must try to keep Black's bishop passive. The material situation would be the same after 23 氫xh4 âxg5+ 24 卷c2 âxh4 25 cxb4, but Black would have a far easier time. His bishop can emerge via 12, his hpawn 18 already passed and his king can obstruct White's queenside pawns by ... 命句7-C7.

### 23...bxc3

After 23... In 2? 24 2c4! White gains time by attacking the a-pawn.

24 5 xc3 If 4!

Black fastens onto the weak kingside pawns.

### 25 ≜c6+!

# 25...⊈18

After 25... 2d8? 26 €a5! Black's king becomes exposed, for example 26... 2xf5 27 €b7+ 2xf5 28 €d5 €xg5+29 €b1 and Black is obliged to play 29... 2d8 in order to avoid a worse fate. Therefore Black has to

move his king the other way, but this blocks in the rook on h8.

#### 26 @ e4 h5!

After 26...d5 27 &d3! Black has rather a lot of pawns attacked. The move played is best; White cannot afford to let the pawn race down the board, so he has to exchange on h6, but then Black has activated the h8-rook.

# 27 gxh6 Exh6 28 @d2! Eh2 29 @d5!

Utilizing a tactical point to occupy the kelzizing a tactical point to occupy then 30 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 30 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 30 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 30 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 30 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 32 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 32 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 31 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 32 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 33 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 34 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 34 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}}\) | 35 \(\frac{\pmathbf{E}}{\pmathbf{E}

'Grim defence' doesn't necessarily mean that you should ignore tactics completely. Tactics are not the sole preserve of the attacker.

# 29...Eff2 30 Df3! Eh3 31 Dd2 Ehh2 (D)



White has made considerable progress since the last diagram in setting up a light-squared blockade; of course, he is quite happy to repeat moves. His main problem is the insecure position of the bishop on e4.

#### 32 Ø/f3 Eh3 33 Ø/d2 Eh4!

Black finds a way to play on. He both prevents 34 Df3 and threatens

### 34 6 1-3!

This only apparently allows the black bishop to emerge via d8 and b6. In fact, 34...\$\text{\text{\node}}\ d8 could be met by 35

#### 34...d5!

A combination liquidating to a rook ending favourable for Black. However, there is saying that 'all rook endings are drawn'. While this is clearly not intended literally, it contains a large element of truth. Rook endings are often tricky to judge, because in one position an extra nawn may be insufficient to win, while in another, one player may have a decisive advantage despite material equality. The reason for this is that piece activity is very imnortant in rook endings and can often prevent the exploitation of a material advantage. Likewise, if material is equal a difference in piece activity may decide the game.

# may decide the game. 35 ♠xd5 Exd2 36 \$\psi xd2 \textbf{Exc4} 37 ♠xe7 \$\psi xe7 38 \textbf{Exc7} \textbf{Ef4?}

This wins a pawn, but allows White to activate his king and rook. By now Browne had become short of time himself, and so missed the stronger continuation 38... \$\precep\$ 639 \$\leftilde{\text{Eh}} 7 a5, aiming to push the pawn to a4 before going after the f-pawn with ... \$\leftilde{\text{Ef}} 4. In this case Black would have preserved good winning chances.

39 **Eg**8!

White's first chance to play actively since the opening!

39...Exf5 40 Ea8 Ef2+ 41 &c3 Ef6

The only way to keep the extra
pawn, but now Black's king is driven
back.

42 Ea7+ \$f8 43 \$d3 Ee6 44 \$e4 \$g7 45 \$f5 (D)

Countering Black's threat of ...\$16, ...\$26, ...\$26 and finally ...f5+.



# 45...e4

The only chance is to push the epawn, but White can round it up once it has become disconnected from the rest of Black's forces.

46 Ec7 e3 47 Ec1 Ed6

The only try, since after 47...e2 48 Ee1, followed by \$\polength{\phi}\$f4-f3, White draws easily.

48 Eg1+!

A counterpart to the check on move 25. White serzes his chance to force the black king into a more passive position

48...\$18 49 He1 Hd2 50 Exe3 Hf2+ 51 \$e5 Exb2 52 Ex3 Hb6 53 \$f5 (D)



The exchange of another pair of pawns brings White closer to the draw. In view of the active position of White's king and rook, Black's winning prospects are minimal, and now it only requires moderate care to steer the game safely home.

53... dg7 54 Eg3+ Eg6 55 Ea3 Ef6+ 56 de5 El66 57 Eg3+ Eg6 58 Ea3 Ee6+ 59 dr5 Ef6+ 60 de5 El6 61 dr5 Ee6 62 Eg3+ dr8 63 El6+ 62 64 Ea3 Ee5+ 65 dr6 El6+ 66 dr5 de7 67 El8+ dr7 68 Ed3+ de7 60 Ef3 dd7 70 Ed3+ de7 17 El3+ Ee6 72 Eb3 de6 73 Eb7 Ee5+ 74 dr4 Ea5 75 Exf7 Exa2 76 de4 de5 ½-½-%

This was a good example of 'grim defence'. Faced with a choice of evils.

White decided to go for the inferior ending. After placing as many difficulties as possible in Black's way, he was eventually rewarded with a slip allowing the half-point to be saved.

The next game provides a real contrast.

> J. Plaskett - J. Nunn Lambeth Open 1979 Sicilian, Najdorf

1 e4 c5 2 Df3 d6 3 d4 Df6 4 De3 cxd4 5 @xd4 a6 6 &e2 @bd7 7 &e3 4x5

After the present game 1 gave up this line. The idea of playing the knight to c5 is to exert pressure on e4, but once White has played f3 this pressure is irrelevant and then it is hard to see what the knight is doing on c5.

8 f3 e6 9 省d2 省c7 10 0-0 e7 11 94.0-0.12.85 d5 (D)



At this stage I was feeling quite confident, because in an earlier game Jansa-Nunn, Budapest 1978 White had continued 13 exd5 exd5 14 &f4 agreed. After 15... 2xa4 16 Exa4 Ee8 Black's pieces are quite active and the rook on a4 is misplaced, factors that balance the slight weakness of the isolated d-pawn.

13 e5!! A complete shock for me. Objectively speaking, this move simply refutes Black's opening strategy. I saw at once that after 13... #xe5 14 &f4 my queen would be in trouble, so I looked to see where I could move my knight. Unfortunately, Black's natural retreat 13... Ofd7 loses a piece after 14 b4, so Black would have to play 13... De8. However, then 14 f4 f5 15 exf6 (best; if White tries to play on the kingside with h3 and g4, then the knight on e8 might actually become useful with ...g6 and ... 2g7) 15... 2xf6 16 2f3 gives White a clear positional advantage - the e6-pawn is weak and it is hard for Black to bring his c8-bishop into play. However, Black is by no means lost and this would be a reasonable attempt at a 'grim defence' strat-

egy. In the late 1970s Plaskett was prone to time-trouble, and he had already thought a long time before playing 13 e5. Given the choice between a messy, complicated position and one in which he could increase the positional pressure by straightforward moves. I would certainly have preferred the former. I therefore decided to look again at the capture on e5 and in the end I found the continuation played in the game.

# 13... wxe5 14 2f4 wh5 15 g4 wg6 1 didn't spend long on the moves

15... Th4 and 15... Th3. It is quite easy to refute the former: 15... #h4 16 223 ₩h3 17 Ifel De8 (17... Wh6 18 g5) 18 鼻f1 實h6 19 實xh6 exh6 20 包xd5 and Black's position is disgusting. Although it is quite hard to find a clearcut refutation of 15 ... 8h3, there is little point in thinking about such moves. White can regain his pawn immediately, and there is almost no chance that Black can survive with his queen stuck on h3 and none of his other pieces co-operating with it. Home analysis shows that 15... #h3 16 #f2 ©c8 17 b4 @d7 18 @xd5 &d8 19 @c3! is very strong; e.g. 19... £f6 loses to 20 全自 對h4 21 皇g3 對g5 22 f4.

# 

This was the point of White's pawn sacrifice. The knight has to move, and then 2d3 traps the queen.

#### 16... Dce4!

Except, of course, if it moves to e4! Black can avoid immediate material loss by 16...c5 17 兔xe5 ᡚc6, but after 18 兔d3 彎g5 19 彎g5 ᡚxg5 20 th 42c6 21 包分 he has a very bad ending, for example 21...兔xb4 22 兔xf6 gxf6 23 ᡚxd5 兔c5+24 每h1. This doesn't even qualify as a "grim defence"—it is just very bad without any redeeming features.

### 17 fxe4 dxe4 (D)

This continuation is Black's best practical chance, once he has decided



on the 'create confusion' method. He has two pawns for the piece and, owing to the attacks on b4 and g4, he is sure to gain a third pawn. This is not a coincidence, but results from the fact that White's tactical operation depended on the weakening pawn stabs b4 and g4. Given that Black obtains a material equivalent for the piece, you may wonder why he is worse. The answer is simply development. All the white pieces are in active play, while Black's queenside is still sitting at home.

#### 18 \$h1

White decides to jettison the b4pawn, preferring to keep the pawn on g4 which shields his king. After 18 2g5 Id8 (18...2xb4 is also possible) Black has sufficient play.

# 18...≗xb4

Not 18... Dxg4 19 全xg4 管xg4 20 国g1 管h4 21 Dxe4 b5 (the only hope is to get the bishop to the long dagonation of the long dagodagolong dago-

19 Ae5!

An excellent move. The bishop serves several useful functions on e5; it supports the knights on d4 and c3, threatens £xf6 in some lines and rules out any possibility of Black activating the c8-bishop by ...e5. At first sight black can reply 19...e3 20 @sec 2 £xc3 21 響xc3 響e4+ regaining the piece, but White continues 22 €13 %xc2 23 ∑f16 ∰\$6 (23...%)27 24 £xf6 gxf6 25 營xf6 %60 €2 €8 bf6 27 €5 with a decisive stack.

Up to here, White has handled the game well. He has not simply been content to keep his material, which might have allowed Black to complete his development and create strong counterplay. Instead, he has kept his pieces active and not been afraid to calculate tactical lines.

#### 19...b6!?

Following the confusion policy. White's last move demolished Black's hopes of activating his light-squared bishop on the c8-g4 diagonal, so now the idea is to develop it on the long diagonal. The choice of ...b6 rather than

...b5 was based on two factors: firstly, in some lines Black plays ... 2c5 and then it is useful to have the bishop defended (see the game); secondly, the possibilities of axb6 and ...bxa5 give White more to think about.

### 20 賞e3

Both unpinning the c3-knight and preventing the c4-pawn's advance.

### 20... 2 b7 21 4 f5?

An incredibly ingenious idea, which aims once more to exploit the poor position of Black's queen. However, the resulting complications are not in White's favour.

This was the moment to switch from tactics to calmer play. After 21 \$\tilde{x}\$16 gx16 22 axb6 \$\tilde{x}\$23 \$\tilde{x}\$16 gx16 22 axb6 \$\tilde{x}\$24 \$\tilde{x}\$23 \$\tilde{x}\$16 \$\tilde{x}\$25 c3 White's pieces may appear scattered and poorly co-ordinated, but Black does not seem able to exploit thus. One possible line is 25. \$\tilde{x}\$x23 (25...24+26 \$\tilde{x}\$13) 26 \$\tilde{x}\$x25 \$\tilde{x}\$25. \$\tilde{x}\$x26 and now 27. \$\tilde{x}\$x46 28 \$\tilde{x}\$x46 and now 27. \$\tilde{x}\$x46 28 \$\tilde{x}\$x46 \$\tilde{x}\$18 is to 29 b7.

A common error in wild games is to overlook a positional continuation. With the adrenaline pumping, and mates all around, it is easy to develop 'tunnel vision' that only sees tactical possibilities; then a calm liquidating line can easily be missed.

# 21...exf5 22 gxf5 &c5! (D)

Black makes use of the protection of c5. After 22...eg4 23 皇xg4 管xg4 24 星g1 管f3+ 25 管xf3 exf3 White forces mate by 26 Exg7+ 全h8 27 星g8+全xg8 28 星g1#.



#### 23 賞xc5

Forced, as after 23 fxg6 &xe3 Black is material up.

23...e3+! 24 @f3

Black wins after 24 置f3 毫xf3+25 毫xf3 營xf5 26 營xe3 置ae8.

26... Dg4 (D)

The unexpected point of Black's play. After the queen moves, Black takes on e5, regaining his piece.



# 27 @d5??

A horrible blunder in extreme timetrouble - White plays for a mate which does not exist. Despite the downtum in his fortunes, if White had kept a clear head then he would probably have saved the game. The correct continuation was 27 置引! 党xe5 (not 27... ②xe3? allowing mate in five) 28 置复3 (28 置4 f6 29 axb6 is unclear; the passed b-pawn is an asset, but White's king is exposed and the e5-knight is impossible to disoldey 28... 增好5 29 盖xg7+ 全物 30 管h6 (30 axb6 ②g6 31 管h6 管f3+ 32 基22 is also a draw) 30... 管f3+ with perpetual check.

Defending well after having made an oversight requires especially cool nerves. We have previously discussed the possible causes of oversights and the warning signs which can indicate when danger is near. Suppose, despite this advice, you nevertheless overlook a surprising and strong move by your opponent. The first piece of advice is 10 stay calm. It is all too easy to bash out an instinctive response, either through uncontrollable nervous agitation or in an attempt to persuade your opponent that you had foreseen his move and had a reply ready. This is a mistake. The correct approach is to spend a few minutes just calming your nerves. Don't get caught up a mental loop of self-recrimination - you don't have time for this while you are at the board. Try to forget about the history of the position, and just consider the current state of affairs on the board. A calm look will very often show that your opponent's move is not nearly as strong as you feared at first and that there are still fighting chances. Then

you can choose one of the defensive techniques outlined above and continue the struggle.

#### Attack

# Inviting everyone to the party

Most books dealing with attacks on the king discuss the various typical methods of breakthrough; sacrifice on h7, sacrifice on g7, double bishop sacrifice, and so on. I will not deal with these, partly because they are discussed at length in many other places, but also because they represent only the final stages of an attack. Most players can manage a double bishop sacrifice, provided that they first arrive at a position in which such a sacrifice is nossible.

The main factor governing the success of an attack on the enemy king is whether you can bring more attacking pieces to bear on his king position than he can muster for the defence. If you have a large local superiority of force, then a sacrificial breakthrough will often arise as a matter of course. You still have to calculate that the sacrifice works, but the odds will be heavily in your favour if you have enough wood in the vicinity.

This title of this section is Yasser Seirawan's catchy phrase for an important attacking principle. Incorporating every possible piece into an attack greatly increases its chance of success. If you have staked everything on your attack, there is no point holding pieces in reserve, since the game will be decided before reserve pieces will be of any use.

The following position is a classic example:



A. Nimzowitsch – S. Tarrasch St Petersburg 1914

Black already has a local superiority on the kingside, because White has no defensive pieces there at all. However, 18... #hd is ineffective owing to 19 \$\text{Q15}\$ and the kingside is shored up. Tarrasch's next move brings the c6bishop into the attack as well.

#### 18...d4!

Not only unveiling the bishop, but also ruling out both the defensive 公3 and counterplay by 當c3.

#### 19 exd4

There is nothing better as White is unable to feed any pieces across for the defence. Now, however, 19... ∰h4 20 g3 ∰h3 gets nowhere after 21 De4.

19....2xh2+!

The moment is ripe for the double bishop sacrifice.

20 \$\psixh2 \$\psih4+ 21 \$\psig1 \$\prixxg2 22\$
f3

Forced. After 22 常xg2 實g4+ 23 常h2 置d5 24 實xc5 置h5+ 25 實xh5 實xh5+ 26 常g2 實g5+ Black picks up the knight on d2, while 22 f4 實g3 is deadly.

### 22...Ife8

With the pawn on f3, 22... ₩g3 may be met by 23 €)c4.

23 ∕De4

A desperate bid for counterplay based on the long diagonal and weakness of f6. After 23 Efe! Exc! + 24
Exc! @xc! + 25 &xc2 @c2 + 26 &xd]
Ed5 Black wins easily, for example 27
f4 Eh5 (threatening 28. Eh2) 28 @c1
Wh2+ 29 &r3 Eh3+ 30 &xc4 @g2+ 31
&xc5 Ec3+ 32 &xd6 Exc+ 33 &xc5
EC6+ picking up the queen.
23. Wh1+ 24 &rf2 &xf1 25 d5

25 三xf1 当h2+ wins the queen. 25 三xf2 当g2+ 27 字e3 三xe4+

28 fxe4 f4+
Overlooking a quicker mate after
28... \(\begin{array}{c} \perp 3+ 29 \\ \perp d2 \\ \begin{array}{c} \perp 2+ 30 \\ \perp d1 \end{array}

₩e2#, but Black wins easily anyway.
 29 \$\psix\$14 \$\mathbb{E}\$18+ 30 \$\psi\$6 \$\mathbb{E}\$6\$
 \$\psi\$6 \$\mathbb{E}\$68+ 32 \$\psi\$47 \$\mathbb{E}\$15# (0-1)

Many familiar attacking manoeuvres are designed to gain the local superiority which is usually necessary for a successful attack. When you play \$\frac{1}{2} = 1.8 \text{-} g\$ or \$\frac{1}{2} \text{d} = 1.1 \text{-} h4\$, you are creating the preconditions for the attack to break through. The opponent must

counter these manoeuvres either defensively or by generating counterplay in another part of the board.

In addition to bringing your own pieces to bear on the enemy king, it is also important to block the passage of enemy pieces to the threatened area. Sometimes a sacrifice is necessary.



S. Dvoiris - A. Khalifman Russian Championship, Elista 1997

# 15...h6 16 h4!?

A brave decision, but it was probably made easier by the fact that 16 £h4 \( \frac{a}{2}h \) + \( \frac{a}{2}h \) = \( \frac{a}{2}h \) + \( \frac{a}{2}h \) = \( \frac{a}{2}h \)

#### 16...₩c5

Black can accept the piece at virtually any stage over the next few moves; in each case the verdict would be unclear.

# 17 賞g3 心h5

Svidler suggests 17... \$\pi 8!?, intending to take on g5 and then retreat the knight to g8.

### 18 Wh2 hxg5?!

Khalifman finally decides to grab the bishop, but it turns out to be the wrong moment to do so. Having said this, it would be a far-sighted player who anticipated White's 21st move. The safest continuation was 18... #f2 19 鱼xe7 里xe7 20 里f1 響g3, heading for the exchange of queens and a roughly equal position.

19 hxg5 g6 20 g4 2xf4 (D)



Now Black appears to have everything under control. After 21 Hh I Black can play 21... e5, using his queen like a Dragon bishon, 21 #xf4 is also inferior after 21... 2xg5, followed by ... #e5, when Black has an extra pawn

and a large positional advantage.

# 21 9\45!!

An amazing move, Black's defence is based almost entirely on switching his queen to the kingside. White is prepared to offer another piece to prevent this. The result is that White is able to operate with his queen and two rooks on the kingside, whereas Black is defending with very limited material

#### 21 exd5

Other moves are hopeless, for example 21... 2xd5 22 \$\hat{\mathbb{L}}\text{thl } 2\hat{\mathbb{C}}\text{c3+ 23} bxc3 實xc3 24 實h7+ 全f8 25 基df1 實g7 26 罩xf7+ 實xf7 27 實h8+ 實g8 28 星f1+ 皇f6 29 賞xf6+ and mate. or 21... xg5 22 Hhl 2h5 23 gxh5 &g7 24 hxg6 Lh8 25 實g3 exd5 26 實xg5 dxe4 27 #g4 &d7 28 #xe4 &f5 29 gxb7 axe6 30 Zhg1, followed by Edfl. with equal material and a crushing attack for White.

#### 22 IIh1 @h5

Again a forced move: 22...f6 allows 23 \$67+ \$68 24 exd5 \$xd5 25 \$xd5 2xd5 26 ₩xg6, while after 22...f5 23 實h7+ 由f8 24 exf5 the kingside nawn-mass is immediately decisive.

# 23 gxh5 &g7 24 exd5

The key feature of the rest of the game is the way White's blockade on d5 prevents Black's queen from taking part in the defence.

#### 24...\@d7

#f4, but perhaps Black could have nut up slightly more resistance with 24... 2b5. However, even in this case I think White should win by 25 hxg6 其h8 26 賞f4 fxe6 (26...f6 27 賞e4 賞c7 28 對e6 wins) 27 其he1 對c7 28 其e6 (intending We4) 28... Eh7 (28... Eh5 29 #e4 #f8 30 c4 gains access to f1, while after 28... Edg8 29 Edc1 &d8 30 #d4+ \$f8 31 \$a4! a rook will land on either e8 or f1) 29 Edel and now Black can try:

2) 29... **E**e8 30 c4 **£**a6 31 **B**d4+ wins.

3) 29... £ (8 30 c. 4 £ a6 (30... £ a7 ) 1 Exg6+ \$\phi\$ N3 2 £ c2 £ g7 33 \( \text{End} \) 63 \( \text{End} \) 82 \$\text{End} \) 23 \( \text{End} \) 63 \( \text{End} \) 64 \( \text{End} \) 67 \( \text{End} \) 63 \( \text{End} \) 67 \( \text{End}

25 hxg6 Zh8 26 ¥f4 f5

26...fxg6 27 The1 is dead lost.
27 Th6!

A nice collinear move (see page 56). The threat is simply \$\mathbb{E}\$ h2 and \$\mathbb{E}\$h1, and thanks to Black's mability to feed pieces to the threatened sector, there is not much he can do to stop it.

27...**⊑d**e8

Alternatively, 27.. Laxh6 28 gxh6eh8 (28... \$\phi\_{x6} 6.2 \text{ fig} 3+ \text{ \frac{1}{2}} \text{ g} 5 30 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ [1] 29 \text{ 23} \text{ cf} (62) \text{ ... }\text{ g} 8 30 \text{ g} 7+ \text{ ch} 7 31 \text{ \frac{1}{2}} \text{ cg} 8 32 \text{ El 1} \text{ \frac{1}{2}} \text{ fo} 33 \text{ El 1} \text{ gf} 6 33 \text{ El 2} \text{ fo} 53 \text{ El 2} \text{ for 3 2} \text{ for 3 1} \text{ g} 8 \text{ for 3 3 }\text{ El 2} \text{ cg} 3 3 \text{ Eg 2} \text{ for 3 3 }\text{ Eg 2} \text{ for 3 3 }\text{ Eg 2} \text{ for 3 5 }\text{ for 3 5 }\text{ for 3 7 3 }\text{ Fig 3 5 3 }\text{ for 3 6 }\text{ for 3 7 3 }\text{ for

28 当h2 Decisive.

28...東xg5 29 至h7+ 至xh7 30 管xh7+ 全f6 31 管f7+ 全e5 32 管xd7 Ee7 33 Ee1+ \$f4 34 Ef1+ \$g3 35 \$xf5 \$e3 36 a3 Ee5 37 \$f8 1-0

A common method of excluding defensive pieces from the critical sector is the pawn-wedge. A chain of pawns extending deep into enemy teritory has the effect of cutting his position in half, and may in itself prove sufficient to prevent any pieces coming to the rescue of the beleaguered king. Then it is a matter of whittling away the defensive pieces on the side of the wedge near the king, by sacrificial means if necessary. It is important to watch out for a counter-ascrifice breaking up the wedge, but otherwise such attacks are usually plain suling.



J. Nunn – A. Vydeslaver Leeuwarden Open 1995

I had earlier sacrificed my h-pawn in order to gain time for my attack. This had the positive effect of opening the h-file and allowing the f-pawn to advance, but on the other hand Black's bishop has occupied a post on g5 that is invulnerable to pawn attack.

20 f6!

White establishes his pawn-wedge. 20...b4

The tactical justification for White's last move lies in the line 20...gxf6 21 exf6 e5 (21...으xf6 22 星xh6 全xh6 23 全xf6 管で7 24 星h1 wins) 22 星xh6!! 金xh6 23 管g3+ 全h8 24 管h4 管xf6 25 全xe5 and wins.

Since Black cannot remove the intruding pawn, he decides to continue on the queenside. Now White's task is to remove the only piece left defending Black's kingside, the g5-bishop.

### 21 Hh5!

Getting rid of the bishop by the most direct method possible. The material loss involved is irrelevant. Not 21 &2:2. &5:1, when the exchange of the d3-bishop greatly weakens White's attack.

# 21...Dxf6

After 21...bxc3 22 Exg5 hxg5 23 mate is inevitable within a few moves, and is only delayed by one move after 23...Exp5 24 b3.21...gxf0 22 exf6 bxc3 23 Exg5+ hxg5 24 mg3 and 21...2 xf0 22 exf6 0xf6 23 Exh6 bxc3 24 2xf6 are no better, so Black decides to offer a piece to break up the deadly nawn-wedge.

### 22 exf6 2 xf6 23 Exh6!

White should win in the end after 23 \$\times x16 \mathbb{\text{g}}\text{xf6 gx f6 24 \mathbb{\text{m}}\text{xf6 gx f6 25 \$\times 26 \text{\$\text{g}}\text{7 26 \$\times x46\$, but I decided to calculate a tactical kill out to the end. The next few moves are all forced.

23... 2xd4 24 2h7+ 2h8 25 4xd4 e5

Or 25...bxc3 (25...f6 26 置h3) 26 全f5+ 全g8 27 置dh1 gxh6 28 置xh6 f6 29 實e4+全f7 30 置h7+ mating.

26 wes f6 27 wh2 gxh6 28 wxh6 Black is helpless against the many threats.

28...響e7 29 皇f5+ 皇g8 30 皇e6+! 星f7 31 星h1 1-0

In the following example, all the above three elements (inviting everyone to the party, excluding defensive pieces and the pawn-wedge) come together.



N. Short - A. Chernin European Team Championship, Pula 1997

In this position White clearly has a very strong attack, but Black has certain counterchances based on White's weak back rank and the possibility of ... \$\overline{O}\_{12} + \overline{O}\_{12} + \overline{O}

### 29 @xh5!

... Short played it in any case. The point is that after 29 ... exh5 White does not continue 30 wxh5, which allows 30... 2f2+, but 30 e5!. This includes the d4-rook in the attack, excludes the c5-rook from the defence and cements the e5-f6 pawn-wedge. White would then threaten the devastating 31 Exe4. and Black wouldn't be able to do much: 30... #d5 (30... #xe5 31 #xe4 #e1+ 32 #xe1 hxe4 33 #xh8+ \$xh8 34 Wh4+ dg8 35 Ah6 mates) 31 2e3! (the simplest, covering f2 and so threatening to take on h5: after 31 2xd5? exd5 Black would defend g4, when the attack would be stopped) 31... 2xe5 (31... 2xe3 32 2g5+ 2f8 33 Exh5 mates) 32 Exh5 2xf6 33 異xd5 exd5 34 質h7+ 会f8 35 单c5+ winning Black's queen.

### 29...Exg5 30 #xg5

White could have won instantly by 30 型g7! 置h5 (30... 迎f2+ 31 管xf2 全xg7 32 fxg7 觉xg7 3xg3 管d2 wins a piece) 31 包xh5 gxh5 32 管g5+ 型f8 3 e5 ②f2+ 34 管g1 ①xh3+ 35 gxh3 and Black has no defence to the threats of 36 管xh4 and 36 置h4 followed by 显h5.

However, even after the move actually played White retains a clear advantage.

30... £1f2+ 31 \$\pm\$g1 £1xh3+ 32 gxh3

30...,4/12+ 31 ⊈g1 4/xh3+ 32 gxh. âc6?

Black collapses. This move fatally weakens e6.

33 ᡚf4 ⊈h7 34 e5 ₤f3 35 ⊈f2 ₩c6 36 Ec4 1-0

# Over-sacrificing

Most chess players love to attack. Pressing home an assault against the enemy king, sacrificing a couple of pieces and finally delivering mate is a great thrill ... provided it works.

One of the great dangers of even a correct sacrificial attack is over-sacrificing. It very often happens that the first sacrifice is sound, but then the player gets overwhelmed with the desire to finish 'brilliantly' and instead of just bringing up all his pieces and mating his opponent, he goes on a quite unnecessary sacrificial spree, endangering the win. As the material deficit increases, the opponent gains more and more chances to return some or all of the material in order to fend off the attack. Sometimes some quite unlikely-looking moves become nossible if there is enough snare wood to iettison.



M. Botvinnik – V. Chekhover

Mascaw 1935

Whate's minor pieces are ideally placed to attack Black's king, except for the knight on h3. The ugly cluster of black pieces on the queenside is not doing much and is certainly of little help in defending the kingside. White therefore decides, quite correctly, to sacrifice his one poorly placed piece in the interests of opening up Black's king nosition.

# 22 Dg5! hxg5

Black must accept, since otherwise he cannot defend f7.

# 23 fxs5 5 8d7 (D)

After 23... 26d7 24 全xf7, followed by 豐h5, White has a crushing attack, so Black offers to return the piece.



### 24 Dxf7?

This second sacrifice is not only unnecessary, it even endangers the win. After 24  $\Theta$ xd7  $\Xi$ xd7 (or 24.  $\Theta$ xd7 25  $\Xi$ xf7  $\Theta$ xf7 26  $\Xi$ xf6 forces mate) 52 gxf6  $\Phi$ xf6 26  $\Xi$ xf6 forces mate) 52 gxf6  $\Phi$ xf6 26  $\Xi$ xf6 (27  $\Xi$ gxf6 27  $\Xi$ gxf7  $\Xi$ gx7  $\Xi$ gx7 winning line is mundane, but it is efficient.

### 24...\$xf7 25 g6+ \$g8?? (D)

After this Black gets mated. He should have played 25...\$\text{mate} 8.6 \text{ & we6} \text{ & 62.65}! (Black's two extra pieces justify this odd-looking move) 27 \text{ & xf6} \text{ & 62.65}! (Black's two extra pieces justify this odd-looking move) 27 \text{ & xf6} \text{ & 62.65}! (Black's two extra pieces justify and now either 28...\$\text{ & 62.65}! or 28...\$\text{ & 62.65}



After the move played, White finished nicely:

26 %xe6+ dx8 27 %h3+ dx8 28 25 6218 29 &xe6+ 0xxe6 30 %xe6+ dx8 31 %h3+ dx8 34 %xe1 &xe5 35 %h8+ dx8 34 %xe1 &xe5 35 %h8+ dx6 33 %xe5+ dx6 33 %xe5+ dx6 39 d5+ dx6 34 %xe4 41 %xe4+ dx6 34 &xe4 41 %xe5 42 &xe4 42 %xe5 42 &xe5 44 &xe5 45 &xe

# Defence

The principles for defending against an attack on the king are to some extent the converse of those given above in the section on attack. The defender should try to move his own pieces across to help the endangered king while, if possible, obstructing the free passage of the opposing pieces to the critical sector.

One particular motif which often arises in practice is that of the defensive sacrifice. The idea of the attacker sacrificing material is a familiar one, but it happens almost as often that the defender gives up material. Here I am not talking about the situation in which the attacker has sacrificed, and the defender is returning material, but about cases in which the defender is prepared to accept a genuine material deficit.

The basis for such sacrifices very often lies in the positional concessions made by the attacker. In a Sicilian it may be very useful for attacking purposes if White pushes his kingside pawns to g5 and f6, but if the attack collapses the white king may not appreciate having had his defensive pawn wall sent into the other half of the board. Launching an attack usually involves a concession of some sort: it may be the creation of weaknesses as in the case of a nawn advance, or it may be sending pieces offside. If White plays his rook to h3 and queen to h4, then mate on h7 will end the game, but if there is no mate then queen and rook may have to grovel back to the centre, with great loss of time.

The defender can often exploit the negative side of an attack by a suitable sacrifice to take the sting out of the onslaught.

G, Sax – M. Stean
European Team Championship
Final, Moscow 1977
Sicilian, Schevemngen

1 e4 c5 2 243 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 2xd4 246 5 2c3 d6 6 2e2 a6 7 0-0 2e7 8 2e3 %c7 9 f4 0-0 10 g4 2c6 11 g5 2d7 12 f5 2de5 13 f6 2d8 (D)



A typical Sicilian position. The white kingside pawns have launched themselves forward, but in return Black has undisputed control of the square e5.

# 14 fxg7?!

This looks like a mistake as there is no need for White to commit himself to this canture so early. Recently this After 20 實h6+ 生g8 21 星xf7 生xf7 22 星f1+ 生e8 23 實g7 皇e7 Black detends easily.

20...\$\psig7 21 \De2 \De2 \Dec b7 22 \Dec b64 \Dec b6+ 23 \Dec b1 \Dec b8

All Black's pieces are in attacking positions; White is obviously in trouble

# 24 管g2 管d7 25 里ae1 管e7 26 管g3 管h4 27 全g2 (D)

The exchange of queens would be no help to White. One line is 27 m/sh4 Esh4 28 Est 2 leg4 29 Es 3 led4 30 h3 g5 31 leh5 f6 32 Esj 3 h4 33 Est 2 leh6, and now that Black has everything prepared, he is ready for the deadly breakthrough ...f5.



# 27...g5 28 @h3 f6

White has no active play at all, so Black has plenty of time to tidy up his position before making further progress.

# 29 Le2 2g6 30 Lee1 2d4 The changing of the guard. Now the

bishop comes to occupy e5.

31 c3 2e5 32 2xh4 2xh4

Material loss is inevitable.

33 Eh1 Exh3 34 \$\Pix\text{4}3 \frac{1}{2}\text{6}4+ 35 \$\Pix\text{6}4 \Pi\text{7}x\text{4}3 36 \text{E}e2 f5+ 0-1

A defensive sacrifice can also prove effective for psychological reasons. The attacker is mentally geared up for a possible sacrificial assault on the enemy king, and then suddenly he is defending and trying to nurse his material advantage to an ending. This requires a complete shift of mental gears which can more difficult to achieve.

L. Ljubojević – A. Miles European Team Championship Final, Skara 1980 Sicilian, Dragon



A fairly typical position for the 6 f4 Naidorf (the game started as a Dragon, but later transposed into a Najdorf). White has attacking chances on the kingside, while Black can organize counterplay against the isolated c4-pawn. The long-term chances are with Black, because of his superior pawn structure, so the burden of proof lies with White.

The normal plan of attack is based on \$\times h6\$ and \$\times 95\$, but this is not very effective here because White would be losing a tempo with his bishop and so Black would be able to meet \$17 \times h6\$ by \$17\$. What

#### 17 De5

This appears very dangerous, since 18 Exf6 is threatened, and 17..h6 18 Exf6! &xf6 19 Wxh6 &xg5 20 &xg5 e6.21 &c4 Ed6 22 Ad5 &xd5 23 &xd5 gives White a crushing attack.

# 17...ᡚed7

Therefore this move is forced. If White's hishop were on h6 instead of e3, then he would have a standard attacking plan of g4 (preventing ...Qh5), followed by doubling rooks on the file, but as it is White always has to take ...h6 into account.

# 18 Ef3 h6 19 Dh3 Dh5!

Not 19...g5 20 全xg5 hxg5 21 全xg5 with a tremendous attack for White. One line is 21...重66 22 位约 管线6 23 置eff 全xd5 24 exd5 重g6 23 置h5 15 26 管h7+ 含r7 27 全xf5 置xg5 28 全g6+ 仓e7 29 管xg7+ 全d8 30 置xf8+ 至xf8 31 置h8, and wins.

The text-move shields the pawn on h6 and prepares the following pawn sacrifice.

### 20 g4?!

White was wrong to take the pawn.
20 ■cf1 would have been better, when
20...f5 21 ∈xf51 ≗xf3 22 ■xf3 is a
very dangerous exchange sacrifice.
Therefore Black would have to continue more slowly, for example by
20... ■c5, but White would have an

# edge. 20... 14 21 1xf4 exf4 22 2xf4

White will be forced to take on e5 in any case, and it seems odd to put the rook offside. 23 \( \frac{1}{2} \) ff1 was better.

# 23...g5 24 & xe5

The rook would only be useful on h3 if White could play 24 鱼xg5 here, but then 24...分g6 25 實h5 星e5 wins a niece.

24...Exe5 25 @g3 (D)



Again, there has been a remarkable transformation in the position. The only trace remaining of White's attack is the misplaced rook on h3. In return for the pawn, Black completely dominates the dark squares, while White's

pieces are doing little apart from defending the pawn on e4. Moreover, the advance g4 has seriously weakened White's kingside, and if Black manages to play ...15 under favourable circumstances then White will be in real trouble.

An additional point is that Ljuhojević is an attacking player who does not adapt well to positions requiring careful defence; this game is a case in point.

#### 25... #c5 26 #g1

White should be thinking about how he can draw, and his pieces are so passive that the only realistic chance is to play \$\Phi d \tilde{s}\$ at some stage, returning the pawn to reach the haven of opposite-coloured bishops. However, the immediate 26 \$\Phi d \tilde{s}\$ is impossible because 026...\$\frac{1}{2}\$ x61 \$27\$ exd \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x62 \$28\$ exd \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x61 \$29\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x61 \$29\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x61 \$29\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ x61 \$\frac{1

#### 26...費b4 27 里b1?

White has failed to adjust to the changed situation. He tries to hang on to his pawn, but putting another piece on a bad square allows Black's initiative to increase decisively. After 27 231 Wab 2 28 Qd5 he would still have had good drawing chances.

27,...f5! An excellent move. Black gets rid

of his backward f-pawn and activates the f8-rook without actually moving it!

# 28 gxf5 ∐exf5

The additional threats which result from the penetration of the black rook put White's position under intolerable

#### 29 響e1 響c5 30 星e3

The tricky 30 âxa6 leads only to self-destruction: 30... âxa6 31 exf5 âb7+ 32 9e4 管xf5 33 星e3 âd4.

# 30...Ef2 31 Eg3

31 Ec2 2d4 32 Exf2 Exf2 33 Ød1 Exc2 34 2xc2 Wxc2 wins for Black. 31... 2d4 32 Ød5 Wd6

Threatening 33... Exh2+.

33 De3 ₩g6

Avoiding the trap 33... 2e5? 34 Dc4 Zxh2+ 35 \$\prec{x}\text{h2} \text{ 2xg3+ 36 \$\prec{x}\text{g2!} and}

White survives.

34 Dg2 (D)



# 34...₩h5?

A pity. Black could have finished the game immediately with the pretty stroke 34...2xe4! 35 2xe4 2xe4, for example 36 h3 2xe1 37 2xe1 2f1+ 38 2h2 2xe1 39 2xe1 2e5.

# 35 ₩d1

After 35 實 g1 兔e5 36 星e3 星d2, followed by ...星ff2, White would be totally paralysed.

35...₩xd1+36 Exd1 £xe4 37 h4?

Loses at once. The only chance was 37 &c4+ \$\psi\_2\$7 38 \$\psi\_4\$ \pmu 39 \$\psi\_2\$xd4 \$\psi\_3\$7 39 \$\psi\_3\$xd5 \$\psi\_4\$xd5 \$\ps

37...\$e5 38 \$xe4 \$xg3 39 \$De3 \$\mathref{E}\$h2+40 \$\psign g1\$ \$\mathref{E}\$xh441 \$\mathref{E}\$d5+ \$\mathref{E}\$g7 42 \$\mathref{E}\$g2 \$\mathref{E}\$f2 0-1

It goes without saying that the attacker should strive to prevent such a defensive sacrifice, although this often involves being quite far-sighted.

1 e4 c5 2 全f3 全c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 全xd4 全f6 5 全e3 d6 6 整c7 10 2b3 0c0 11 g4 全d7 12 至fg1 分c5 13 g5 b5 14 全xc6 2xb3+15 axb3 響xc6 16 管b5 b4 17 2d4 2b7 (D)



This is a theoretical position from the Velimirović Attack in the Sicilian. White's aim is to transfer a rook to the h-file in order to deliver mate on h?. However, White must be careful because Black threatens to defend h? by ...bxc3 followed by ...@xc4. The solution appears simple: White must play his gl-rook to b4, so as to both defend h? and cover c4.

That is indeed what happened in one of the first games to reach this position, Chandler-Yudasın, Minsk 1982, but after the further moves 18 Eg4 bxc3 19 Eh4 cxb2+ 20 &xb2 White was shocked by 20... #xe4! 21 Exe4 &xe4/D.



Once again, if we compare the diagrams then we can see the change that has taken place. Black's light-squared bishop is absolutely secure on the cyg 6d diagonal and while it is there White has no attacking chances on the kingside. Indeed, it is now White who has to think about defence, since 2 is very by advancing his a-pawn. The position is in fact favourable for Black and White was soon in trouble: 22 & a3 董[68 23 董[42 董]48 24 录》 董]55 25 15 基[64 26 全] 章 65 27 警員 董]55 25 18 管[xe4 董]xa3 29 章[4]. Now, if Black had played 29. 董]63, it is doubful that White could have survived. In the game Black played the less forceful 29...g6 and White eventually escaped with a draw.

However, that is not the end of the story. James Howell realized that the sacrifice on e4 is Black's only method of preventing mate on h7, and so drastic measures to prevent it are justified. Howell-Wahls, World Jumo Championship, Gausdal 1986 continued 18 2dd5! (to block the queen's path to e4) 818.excls 19 2ds 3 (Dl.).

Now Black has no reasonable answer to the threat of Bh3. The finish was 20...dxe4 21 Eh3 &F8 22 ge! fxg6 23 @sh1 dxe8 24 Exg6 bxc3 25 @g8+ dxf2 26 @e6+ dxf8 27 bxc3 &f8 28 @f7 &e7 29 @xe7+ dxe7 30 Exp7+1-0.



# 4 The Endgame

Many games are decided in the endgame, especially between players of comparable strength. Mastery of the endgame is just as important as proficiency in the opening and middlegame. Even though this truth has been repeated over and over again, the endgame still remains a neglected area of chess study, especially amongst club players.

In the past they had some excuse, as many club games were decided by adjudication before the endgame was reached, but onickplay finishes are now the rule rather than the exception. In tournaments, too, the quickplay finish is the most common method of deciding long games. The practical effect is that players can no longer rely on an 'if I get an endgame, I'll work it out over the board' attitude. The fast time-limit implies that you have to know the correct method beforehand. Moreover, familiarity is very important. If you have to ransack your memory for some half-forgotten but vital sninnet of information, the chances are that you will have lost on time before your memory cells release the necessary information.

This chapter is therefore designed as a quick guide to what it is absolutely essential to know about the endgame.

# King and Pawn endings

King and pawn endings very often represent the final phase of a game. Of course, both sides may promote, in which case the players can look forward to a lot more fun, but the majority of \$+8 endings are decided in the nawn ending itself. Unlike most other types of position, the concept of an 'inaccuracy' is almost unknown in and skill, most positions are capable of being analysed to a definite conclusion. This means that errors can only occur in half-noint jumps. Also, unlike other types of position, in which you may recover from a mistake and gradually fight your way back into the game, a slip in a \$+\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}} ending usually means the certain loss of half a point.

This means that accuracy is at a special premium in this type of ending, so it is essential to be familiar with the main principles.

There are three fundamental concepts in  $\Phi + \Delta$  endings. Surprisingly, however, not even all GMs are familiar with their correct application.

## Opposition

This is the most basic principle and has the widest application. The following position provides us with a clear-cut example.



The two kings face ('oppose') each other with the minimum possible gap of one empty square between them. White has the advantage because his king is one square further advanced. This advantage is sufficient to win if Black is to move, because the black king has to move to one side or the other. This allows White's king to advance to the fifth and run to one or other of the enemy pawns. In this situation we say that 'White has the opposition'.

- i) If White now heads for the gpawn, he has gained a vital tempo: 4 &c \$\frac{1}{2}\$\$ for \$\frac{1}{2}\$\$ 65 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 65 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 65 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 65 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 65 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 67 \frac{1}{2}\$\$ 6
- 2) 4 \$c5 (White mops up the apawn before heading for the kingside) 4...\$a6 5 \$c6 \$a7 6 \$b5 \$c1 7 \$xa5 \$c6 8 \$b4 \$b6 9 \$c4 \$with an easy win.

If the black king heads the other way with 2...\$\pi\text{d6}\$, then White heads for the a-pawn, having gained an extra tempo because his king is one square nearer the queenside: 3 \phi\text{d6}\$ des 4 \pm\text{dxa5}\$ \pm\text{df}\$ 4 \pm\text{dxb4}\$ \pm\text{dxg4}\$ 6 a5 \pm\text{dh}\$ 3 7 g3 9 a8\pm\text{df}\$. This position is a depth and in the process, here it is: 9...\$\pm\text{d}\$ 1 \pm\text{df}\$ 2 he \text{df}\$ 1 \pm\text{df}\$ 2 model in \$\pm\text{df}\$ 2

The situation after 1...\$\dot\$6 is virtually symmetrical. Once again White must avoid the immediate dash for the pawn with 2\$\dot\$65?. The correct method is 2\$\dot\$6 (2...\$\dot\$6 3\$\dot\$75 and White promotes first: Black's a-pawn

does not reach the seventh rank) 3 \$\preceq\$ \$

While the details of this position include one or two subtle points, the basic principle is clear enough: when White has the opposition, Black must give way with his king and permit White's own king to advance. It is worth noting that if White is to move in the diagram, then Black has the opposition, but because of White's initially more favourable king position. he can hold the draw: 1 \$c4 (1 \$e4 also draws, but any king retreat to the third rank loses, as Black can transpose into the above analysis with reversed colours) 1...\$c6 (after 1...\$e5 hoth sides promote simultaneously) 2 #d4 and Black has nothing better than to return to d6.

The situation becomes only a little more complicated when the kings are further back:



With White to play, one's first impulse is to rush forward with the king by 1 &c.3? but this is a mistake: Black replies 1... &c.71 and after 2 &c.4 &c.6 tened or 2 &c.4 &c.6 Black gains the opposition and White cannot make progress. The basic principle governing such cases of what is called the 'distant opposition' is that when the kings face each other with an odd number of squares in between, then the player to move loses the opposition. The situation when there is just one square in between the kings (discussed above) is then ust a special case of this rule.

In the above position, it follows that 1 \( \frac{1}{2}\) etc. It is the correct move (1 \( \frac{1}{2}\) etc. It is the correct move (1 \( \frac{1}{2}\) etc. If is diso bad, since after 1...\( \frac{1}{2}\) etc. In \( \frac{1}\) etc. In \( \frac{1}{2}\) etc. In \( \frac

However, White can make progress by carrying out what is called a 'by-pass'. This involves moving in the opposite direction to Black's king and at the same time advancing. If it works, then the result will be to regain the opposition, but with the kings two squares closer together. White can repeat the manoeuvre until there is just

one square between the kings and then we have the situation discussed in the previous diagram. Here White executes a by-pass with 3 \$e3!. Now there is a direct threat to play 4 \$c4 and 5 \$65, so Black has to head for c6 by 3... 2d7. White continues 4 2d3 and he has achieved his objective. Now the situation is simpler, 4... \$€c7 and 4... r1 lose because White just heads for the g-pawn or the a-pawn respectively, so Black's king must advance to third rank. White just opposes the enemy king and gains the 'close' opposition, winning as in the previous diagram. Had Black played 2... \$c8. White would have by-passed on the other side by 3 &e3.

When I first saw this idea as a very young player, one point really confused me. On most files White was content simply to maintain the opnosition but then, suddenly, on one narticular file White would abandon the opposition and perform a by-pass. How do you know on which file to execute the by-pass? Eventually I was able to answer my own question and in doing so gained a deener understanding of king and pawn endings. In posttions dominated by the opposition, the attacker has two targets. In the above diagrams these are the pawns on a5 and g5. This is perfectly natural: the nature of the opposition is that if Black's king goes to the queenside, then White's king slips through to the kingside and vice versa. If there were no kingside target, then Black would

lose nothing by allowing White's king to penetrate in that direction. Simularly there must be a queenside target or Black could safely move his king to the other side of the board. The by-pass manoeuvre is almost always performed on the file which is equidistant between the two targets. In the above case this is the d-file.



In this position, which is superficially similar to the above. White to play cannot win because there is no by-pass. White does win if he takes the opposition with his king on the fourth rank, but he cannot force this from the diagram. The critical position arises after 1 \$\psi d2 \$\psi d7 2 \$\psi d3 and now Black must take care 2 \$267.3 \$c4 and 2...\$d6? 3 \$d4 allow White to gain the 'close' opposition, and in addition Black's king must also be ready to stop White lunging for the anawn. It follows that 2 ... \$c7! is the only drawing move. This would be the ideal time for a by-pass, except that the e4-square, which White needs for the operation, is controlled by a black pawn.

In the above examples, the 'two-target' situation was quite obvious, because the targets were far apart. Cases in which the targets are closer together are governed by the same principles, even if their nature is less transparent.



H. Neustadtl. 1890

In this position the target squares for Black are (obviously) f3 and (less obviously) f1. The latter is a target because if Black's king reaches 11 then White is losing no matter where his king is (within reason) or who is to play. For example, if White's king is on g3, then, with White to play, 1 \$h3 \$\psi\_12 2 \$\psi\_24 \$\psi\_22\$ wins easily. If Black is to play then 1 ... &g1 forces the same line. It follows that the opposition manoeuvres will take place along the ranks (because the ranks are at right angles to the line joining the two targets) and that any by-passing will take place on the second rank.

White to play can draw, but only if he starts with the paradoxical move 1 wb1. Other moves fail, for example 1 wf1? (this loses because White cannot maintain the close opposition 1...wd2 2 wf2 wd3 (White would like play 3 wf3, but his pawn is in the way) 3 wf2, but his pawn is in the way) 3 wf3, we will be well and Black reaches a target. Other first moves fail similarly: 1 wh2 wf2 (preparing the by-pass) 2 wf2 (2 wf2 we2) 2...w63 (by-pass executed) 3 wf2 w62 and will be well as well as well as well as wf2 wf2 wf2.

After 1 %hl! Black cannot make progress, as White can always maintain the opposition:

1) 1...we2 2 wg2 wd3 3 wh3!
 se3 4 wg3, etc.

2) 1...\$c1 2 \$\pig1!\$ (the only move) 2...\$c2 (2...g4 is met by 3 \$\pig2!\$, but not 3 frg4? e4 4 \$\pif2\$ \$\pid2\$ and Black wins) 3 \$\pig2\$ \$\pic3\$ 4 \$\pig3\$ \$\pid3\$ 5 \$\pih3\$ and so on

We end this section on the opposition with the usual warning that while general principles can provide excellent guidance, in the end it is the specific position on the board that matters and a forced win overrides any other considerations.

The following diagram is very simulations to the Neustadil position given above. On this basis one might assume the position to be a draw, because after 1.26% db or 1.26% da Black gains the distant opposition. However, there is a slight difference because the kings are further apart than in the Neustadil



A. Mandler Prager Presse 1929

position and this operates in White's favour. After 1 \$6? \$6 play proceeds exactly as before, but with the kings on the g- and a-files a second factor enters the position: the possibility of a breakthrough by c5. This only works if Black's king is on the back rank, so that White will promote with check. Moreover, Black's king must be on a8, because otherwise c5 can be met by ... \$c7 (we saw this in line 2 of the previous diagram). Thus White can win by 1 &g6! &a6 (Black must maintain the opposition; if he deviates, then White gains the opposition himself and wins by reaching d6 or d8 with his king) 2 \$\pi\_27! \$\pi\_27 3 \$\pi\_28! (3 \$\pi\_18? \$b8 4 c5 \$c7!) 3...\$a8 (Black is dragged to his doom; 3... \$b8 4 \$f8, 3...\$\psib7 4 \psirf7 and 3...\$\psib6 4 \psirf8 all win for White, the last line being a by-pass) 4 c5 dxc5 5 e5 and promotes with check. In this case the logic of the opposition broke down past a certain

point, because a new factor entered the equation.

### The Réti manoeuvre

There is no better way to explain this idea than to give Réti's original example, even though it is one of the most famous endgame positions in chess history.



R. Réti Kagan's Neueste Schachnachrichten 1921

White appears to be two temps short of catching the h-pawn, but he nevertheless manages to overhaul it by simultaneously threatening to promote the e-pawn. The analysis runs 1 Wg7! h4 (1...406 2 Wf6 h4 3 We5 transposes to the main line) 2 Wf6 Wh6 (2...h3 3 We7 Wh6 4 Wd6 and both sides promote at the same time) 3 We5! Wax6 (3...h3 4 Wd6 and again both sides promote) 4 Wf4 and the impossible has been achieved.

If you have not seen this position before, it is worth playing over the solution several times to see exactly why it works. Once again, the 'two-threat' concept is important, but this time it is not a question of tempo play, but the exploitation of the fact that a diagonal king move, if measured with a ruler, is longer than an equivalent horizontal or vertical one. In terms of catching the h-pawn, the routes \$h7-h6-h5 and \$27-f6-e5 are identical. The advantage of the latter is that it activates a second threat, that of promoting the c-pawn. It takes Black two tempi to deal with this threat, by taking the cpawn with his king, and this is exactly the time White needs to catch up with the h-pawn.

Despite this coldly logical explanation, it is a remarkable idea and there still seems to be a whiff of magic about the position.




L. Prokeš Šachové Uměni 1947

The use of a second threat as a kind of warp-drive for White's king occurs in qutte a wide range of situations. The above diagram is a second example in which White's king goes on a lengthy detour before catching the enemy nawn.

In this case the white king is one tempo short of eatching the h-pawn, for example 1 a6? dw6 2 dw8 dw6 3 dw8 dw6 4 dwc7 h5 and White is too late. However, by correctly exploiting the threat of promoting the a-pawn White can make up the times 1 dwc8 dw6 2 dw8 dw5 3 dw7 (this is the key move; the white king just makes it into the square of the pawn) 3...dxa5 4 dw6 and White is in time.

# Triangulation



If it were Black to play in the diagram then he would lose immediately, as White's king penetrates to b6 and takes the a-pawn. If it is White to move then his task is considerably harder. The key is a king manoeurre which, by losing a tempo, transfers the move from White to Black. However before starting this manoeuvre White has to play what is, in any case, a forced move: 1 \$245. Now 1 ... \$248.2 \$246 is a win even without the a-pawns, so 1... \$\psic c 8\$ is forced. White cannot then win with the direct 2 \$\psi d6 \$\psi d8 3 c7+ \$c8 because 4 \$c6 is stalemate - he must be more subtle. While the white king remains adjacent to c5 Black's king cannot occupy c7, and so is restricted to shuffiing back and forth along the first rank. If the white king moves around the triangle c4-d4-d5 the effect will be to transfer the move to Black: 2 \$c4 \$d8 3 \$d4 \$c8 4 \$\d5 and now we have the position after the first move, but with Black to play. White wins after 4... \$d\$ 5 \$d6 or 4 \$0c7.5 \$0c5

White's triangulation worked because of Black's lack of space; he could not emulate White's manoeuvre without stepping off the edge of the hoard.

If you have looked at an advanced book on king and pawn endungs, you will probably have noticed something called 'the theory of corresponding squares'. This is normally accompanied by diagrams with lots of little numbers (or letters, or sometimes both) on the squares. While this is an interesting subject from the theoretical point of view, to be quite honest it is of almost no practical value (not to mention that your opponent might object when you start adorning the board

with mystic numbers). The opposition, triangulation and a little hit of brain-power are all that are needed for the types of position that arise in over-the-board play. Of course there a few esoteric positions which cannot be solved by such straightforward techniques, but in all my career I have never seen such a position arise in practical play. The following position represents about the limit of complexity that one can anticipate over the heard



N. Grigoriev K novoi armii, 1920

A position such as thas would be an easy win for White if his king were on, say, 44, but here the win is difficult because of Black's active king position. The first point to note is that after I d47 ŵe4 2 ŵe3 Black does not play ... ŵd5?, when 3 ŵd3 forces the enemy king back, but 2... ŵd5!. If White moves anywhere except to d3, then Black just returns to e4, but after 3

\$\dd{\psi}d3 \$\dip f4\$ White cannot make progress, e.g. 4 \$\dip d2 \$\dip e45 \$\dip c3 \$\dip f5!, etc.

It becomes apparent that White would be much better off in the diagram position if it were Black to play. If Black's king goes anywhere except to f4, then White wins by 2 de3 or 2 d4. while after 1... \$£f4 White plays 2 De2 and the black king is gradually forced back. In fact the win is still not too easy but we will return to this point later as the first step is to work out how to lose a tempo. If White plays 1 \$2, then Black must reply 1 90f4 (since 1 90e3 2 90c3 loses at once, and after other moves White wins by either \$c3-d4 or 2 d4). Readers may now recognize a pattern emerging; the situation is basically the same as in the previous diagram rotated through 90 degrees, with c3-e3 taking the place of c5-c7 and c2-f4 the place of d5-c8. Now the solution should be apparent. While the white king remains adjacent to c3. Black's king must remain adjacent to e3; in other words Black can only oscillate between f3 and f4 (e2 and f2 are out because the d-pawn advances). White only has to triangulate c2-h2-h3-c2, all the time staying adjacent to c3, and he will lose a tempo. The solution rons 1 \$c2 \$f4 2 \$b2 \$f3 (2...\$e5 3 \$c3 \$d5 4 \$c2 \$e5 5 \$d1 transposes) 3 \$b3 \$14.4 \$c2 (unlike the previous diagram, there is still quite a lot of play left in the position) 4... \$e5 (the most resilient defence: 4...@e3 5 @c3 and 4...\$f3 5 \$d2 lose more quickly) 5

\$d1! (5 \$d2 \$d4 forces White to retrace his steps with 6 &c2) 5... \$15 6 \$\psi\_e 2 \psi 64 7 \psi 62 \psi e5 (after 7...\$65 8 \$e3 \$e5 9 d4+ \$d5 10 \$d3 White wins by driving Black's king back) 8 \$e3 \$d5 (the critical moment; if White is to make progress he must give up the b4-pawn) 9 d4! \$c4 10 \$e4 \$xb4 11 d5 \$c5 (forced, or else White promotes before Black) 12 we5 (White must spend a tempo supporting his pawn, so now both sides promote at the same time: however ...) 12...b4 13 d6 b3 (interposing 13...\$2c6 14 we6 doesn't change the situation) 14 d7 b2 15 d8費 b1費 16 費c8+ and 17 #b8+ winning Black's queen.

# Expect the unexpected

Readers will have noticed several odd king manoeuvres in the preceding positions. This is no coincidence; paradoxical king moves are quite common in king and pawn endings. It is very important to take into account the possibility of 'unnatural' king moves, both for you and for your opponent. It is impossable to give rules for finding such moves, precisely because they are often 'one-off' events which only work in that precise position. However, this won't prevent me from given a few entertainine examples.

Shirov had headed for the position in the following diagram because it seems an obvious draw after, for example 1 \$\psi\_2 5 \$\psi\_2 2 14 \$\psi\_3 3 15 \$\psi\_2 4\$.




I, Rogers - A, Shirov Groningen 1990

In Hebden-Flear, Black had been a pawn up for most of the game, but here he abandoned his winning attempts and played 1... IdS71, at which point he players agreed to a draw. Indeed, after 2 Ixd5+ &xd5 3 &xf4 &e6 there is clearly no point in continuing. However, as soon as the draw was



M. Hebden - G. Flear British Championship, Brighton 1980

agreed the players suddenly noticed that White could play 3 \$\forall f5! (D) instead of 3 \$\forall xf4.



Suddenly Black is in trouble. After 3... \$\pm 44 \ \pm 44 \ \pm 44 \ \pm 43 \ \pm 44 \ \pm 47 \ \pm 25 \ \pm 47 \ \pm 27 \ \pm 58 \ \pm 44 \ \pm 474 \ \pm 47 \ \pm 57 \ \pm 58 \ \pm 44 \ \pm 474 \ \pm 47 \ \pm 57 \ \pm 57 \ \pm 57 \ \pm 47 \ \mathred{47} \\ \pm 47 \ \mathred{47} \\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\ \pm 47 \\\mathred{47} \\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\\mathred{47} \\\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\\\ \pm 47 \\\ \pm 47 \\\mm 47 \\\\mm 47 \\\\mm 47 \\\\mm 47 \\\\mm 47 \\\mm 47 \\m

play his king to g2 at move 8) 5 \$xg7\$\$\text{\$\pi\$ 6 \$\pi\$ kin\$ dif6 is hopeless because White can extract his king by using up his one remaining tempo with the h-pawn: 7 \$\pi\$ h7 \$\pi\$ 78 16 \$\pi\$ f8] 0 \$\pi\$ 5 \$\pi\$ h7 11 \$\pi\$ 5 followed by 12 \$\pi\$ f4!

Having analysed both 3... \$\d4 and 3...\$\d6 to a loss, one might be tempted to assess the position as a win for White, but remember: 'Expect the Unexpected'. What does Black need to achieve in order to draw? First of all he must be able to defend his g7-pawn if White plays \$xf4 followed by \$15-e6. That means that his king must stay within three squares of f8. If White adopts his alternative plan of heading straight for g7 without bothering about the f4-pawn, then Black has to be able to answer \$xh6 with ... \$xf3: one move slower and White will win as in the bracket given above. Since it takes three moves for White to reach h6 at follows that Black's king must stay within three squares of f3. The first criterion implies that Black must move to c5, c6 or d6 and the secand implies that he must move to c4. d4 or c5. Luckily for Black, there is one square common to both these sets, namely c5. Thus 3... \$c5!! draws, e.g. 4 \$26 \$d4. 4 \$xf4 \$d6 or 4 \$e5 coc6

It is quite hard to describe exactly what this motif depends on – it certainly has nothing to do with the opposition. Perhaps it is closest to the Réti manoeuvre, in that Black's king is trying to fulfil two tasks at the same time.

# Chess is more than counting

One technique applicable in king and pawn endings, which is often recommended in textbooks, is that of 'counting'. This name refers to the method of working out how many moves bois idea will take to promote a pawn. Of course, this is only useful in 'race' situations, where each king marches into the opposing pawn-mass with the aim of creating a passed pawn as quickly as possible.


I strongly advise against using the technique of 'counting'.

There are several flaws with this method, and its unrestricted application can result in dreadful blunders. The main problem is that this method cannot detect any of the finesses which make king and pawn endings so interesting and which arise quite often in practice.

The first cause of confusion is that you have to take account of who moves first. If White takes seven moves to promote and Black eight, when White promotes does Black reply by promoting or by pushing his pawn to the seventh? The answer is that it depends on who moves first. In the heat of battle it is quite easy to get this wrong and be 'out by one' (computer programmers know all about being 'out by one').

The second cause is that the counting method gives you no clue as to the relative whereabouts of the pieces at the end of the race. White may promote and give check, or promote on h8 and stop Black's promotion on al. These things are obvious if you run the variation through in your head, but are not obvious if you are just counting. The simple fact is that you actually have to calculate the variation to make sure that one of these special situations doesn't arise at the end of the race and if you are going to do that, then you may as well not waste time on counting.

I will quote a position taken from Chess: The Complete Self-Tutor by Edward Lasker (it appears in all editions before 1997), a popular chess primer which advocates the use of the counting method.



Lasker writes "In the position reached, the sequence 1 b4+ axb4+ 2 \$\displaystyle{1}\text{b4}\$ forces Black to leave his pawn unprotected, giving White a passed pawn. After 2...\$\displaystyle{1}\text{c4}\$ 3 \$\displaystyle{1}\text{c4}\$ b4 \$\displaystyle{1}\text{b6}\$ 4

\$\pmc4\$ ct it is all over. White captures the black pawns on f4, h4, and g3 while Black takes the a4-pawn and walks back to the kingside."

Lasker does not consider what happens if Black plays 2... &d-4. By counting (carefully) one quickly finds that Black's g-pawn is still on the sixth when White queens and, moreover, it is White's turn to move – enough reason to abandon the position as lost, if one does not take the trouble to visualize the resulting position.

If we actually play over the moves 2...\$\psi 4 \, 3 \, 5 \, \pi 2 \, 3 \, 4 \, 6 \, \psi 1 \, 5 \, 3 \, \psi \, \psi 2 \, 2 \, 6 \, 8 \$\psi \, \psi 1 \, 2 \, (D), then we arrive at the following diagram:



It only takes a few moments to realize that thus is a special situation. The congested mass of kingside pawns prevents White from pinning the gpawn diagonally and from giving check on the h-file. In fact the g-pawn is unstoppable and the best White can do is to grab as many kingside pawns as he can, honing for a favourable queen ending. However, even this hope is in vain: after 7 #b8 (7 #b8 g2 8 #xh4 g1 # 9 #xx4+ #g3 10 #xx5 #xh3 11 #g44? #g3 and 12... #g2 is also a draw) 7...g2 8 #xx4+ #xh1 9 #xx5 g1 # the ending is a sure draw.

Finally, if you don't calculate the whole variation, how can you be sure that the moves you are intending to play are actually possible? Here is a simple example.



W. Schlage - C. Ahues Berlin 1921

It takes White five moves to take on a7 and it takes Black five moves to reach c7, so Black can meet \$\prec\$xa7 by ...\$\prec\$c7 and the position is a draw. This was borne out by the game, which duly finshed 1 \$\prec\$c6 \$\prec\$c3 \$\prec\$c46 \$\prec\$c47 \$\

2... \$\Pb4 3 \$\Pc6 \$\Pa5 4 \$\Pb7\$ he cannot move to b6.

There is far more to king and pawn endings than counting, and if you use this method you are asking for trouble.

# Rook endings

Rook endings are the most common type of ending to occur in practical play. The reason is that if there are no open files, a relatively frequent occurrence, then exchanges of rooks are rather unlikely. Minor pieces and queens can be exchanged far more readily. The ability to play rook and pawn endings well is a great distinguishing feature between a master player and a club player. In simultaneous displays, it is noticeable how the club players routinely lose completely equal rook endings, and how easily the master manages to escape with a draw from lost rook endings.

trom lost rook endings.

Part of the reason for this is that rook and pawn endings are genunnely complicated, with a great deal of theory. Experience is perhaps even more important; the master will probably have encountered many rook endings in the course of his career, the club player far fewer. However, the situation for club players is certainly far from hopeless; indeed, this is one of those areas in which a few hours' study can provide great dividends. We start with the ending of rook + pawn against rook, which is fundamental to all rook endings.

### Rook and Pawn vs Rook

This ending is sufficiently complex that your author was able write a 320page book solely about this material balance (and even then several interesting positions had to be omitted!). However, many average tournament players have not studied even the fundamentals of this ending. In fact, a few basic principles can be quite effective in improving one's rook endgame technique.

If the defender's king can occupy the pawn's queening square, then the ending is almost always a draw. The only exception is when the pawn is already far advanced and the defender's pieces are badly placed. The general drawing technique is quite simple and is called the 'third-rank defence'.



Here is a typical position. White appears to have made quite a lot of progress. His rook is cutting the enemy king off on the back rank and his king and pawn have advanced as far as the

fifth rank. Nevertheless, the position is completely drawn because Black has nositioned his rook on his third rank. thereby preventing the immediate advance of the white king. The only way in which White can get his king to the sixth is to play 1 e6, but then Black switches plans and plays 1... ab1, preparing to bombard the white king with checks from behind Now that the nawn is on e6, there is no hiding place for the king, and after 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ ff \$\frac{1}{4}\$ ff 1+ 3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e1+4\frac{1}{2}\$d6\frac{1}{2}\$d1+, etc., the position is clearly drawn. If, in the diagram position. Whate waits with 1 \$\mathbb{Z}a7 then Black does likewise by either 1... Ec6 or 1 Th6



The second important principle is that of 'checking distance'. If the white king has no way to hide from a checking black rook, then the factor determining whether the checks are a minor nussance or a serious problem is the distance between the king and the rook. The further apart they are, the better it is for the side with the rook.

The above example makes this clear. If it is White to play then he should continue 1 ½66, which creates the most awkward problems for Black. If White waits, then Black sets up the third-rank defence by. 256.1 ½165. 1 ½165 alb6+1 leads to the same thing, while 1 fo £gl+ is an immediate draw (note the larce checking distance).

After 1 \$26 it is easy for Black to go wrong, for example the passive line 1... \Bb8 2 f6 \De8 fails to 3 \Be7+ \Def8 (or 3... \$\phi h8 4 \box h7+ \phi g8 5 f7+) 4 \box h7 and White's plan of 'switching to the other side' leaves Black defenceless. Note that this line would be a draw if White's pawn were on g6 and his king on h6, because there would be no room to switch to the other side. This leads us to the important conclusion that in the type of position in which Black has been forced to defend passively with his rook on the first rank, the result is a draw with an a-, b-, g- or h-pawn, but lost with a pawn on one of the other four files

Here we have an f-pawn so this defensive plan is not good enough for Black. Instead, he should play 1...Ef1. This ensures that after 2 Ea8+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$e7 White cannot play 3 f6+. White cannot nly make progress by playing 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6, which threatens mate. Black has to choose between 2...\$\frac{1}{2}\$e8 and 2 ...\$\frac{1}{2}\$g8. One move loses and the other draws.

The correct choice depends on ensuring that Black has sufficient checking distance in the subsequent play.

After 2... \$\phi\_{88}\$! \$\frac{\pi}{3}\$\$\frac{\pi}{3}\$\$\frac{\pi}{4}\$\$\text{Ph}\$T White can


try 4 Ef8 (4 \$\perperceq\$ 6 \$\perperceq\$ 7! and 4 Ea5 \$\perperceq\$ 8 do not help White) intending 5 \$207. followed by 6 f6. If Black keeps his rook in its current position then he will eventually lose, but Black can change direction by 4... Hall. If White now plays a king move to free his pawn, then Black starts checking from the side. There is no shelter so in view of the large checking distance White cannot effectively meet the barrage of checks. White can, of course, play other moves but they do not help, for example after 5 Heg (to meet 5... Ha6+ by 6 He6) the simplest draw is to return to f1 with the rook

On the other hand, 2... \(\frac{1}{2}\)colored 87 loses.
After 3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)set \(\frac{1}{2}\)colored 42 \(\frac{1}{2}\)colored 88, there is nothing Black can do to prevent White playing 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)gamma 7 (or \(\frac{1}{2}\)ft. if the rook leaves the f-file), followed by f6, and there is no way to stop the pawn.
Black's problem is that he lacks the lateral checks which saved him after 2... \(\frac{1}{2}\)gamma 88. There is no space for his rook on the kingside, and he cannot give checks from the queenside because his own king sets in the way.

This principle is usually formulated as 'move the king to the short side' in order to leave the other side free for long-range rook checks, but in the end it all comes down to ensuring adequate checking distance.

Here is another example (D):

Black is to play, and he faces the threat of \$\frac{1}{2}\$c4 followed by b5. If he plays 1...\$\frac{1}{2}\$h5, then White advances his pawn by 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$a4. The only possibility



to defend is to retreat the rook along the b-file, so then when the white king moves to a4 or c4. Black can start checking. In order for this to work. Black needs to have the maximum possible checking distance and in fact 1... Xb8! is the only move to draw. After 2 Hd4 (2 \$\psic4 Hc8+ 3 \$\psic5 Hb8+ 4 \$\perp c5 \$\perp c8 + 5 \$\perp b6 \$\perp b8 + is pointless - the white king has to retreat; after the text-move, however, this line is a threat since White could play \$27 at the end) 2... \$\phi e5\$ (dislodging the rook) from the defence of the b-pawn) 3 2d7 2e6 (Black cannot wait; 3... 2e4? loses to 4 \$c4 \$c8+ 5 \$b5 \$b8+ 6 \$c5 ■c8+7 \(\psi\)b6 \(\pm\)b8+8 \(\pm\)b7, followed by b5; in this line White's rook effectively reduced Black's checking distance by being able to interpose on the seventh rank) 4 Ha7 \$\psi d6 5 \$\psi a4 \$\psi e6\$ and Black is in time to prevent the nawn's advance. If the checking distance had been even one square less Black would have lost, for example 1... Eb7? 2 \perc4 \quad Ec7+3 \perc4 b5 \quad Ec8 (trving to regain his checking distance;

3... \( \bar{\Pm} b7 + 4 \( \bar{\Pm} c5 \) \( \bar{\Pm} c7 + 5 \) \( \bar{\Pm} b6 \) is hopeless) 4 \( \bar{\Pm} a6 \) \( \bar{\Pm} a8 + 5 \) \( \bar{\Pm} b7 \), followed by b5, and White wins.

We already saw in the analysis on page 126 how the defender must be prepared to use his rook flexibly and operate from different directions according to changing circumstances. Here is another, very important, example of this:



Black cannot move his king to the queenside because after ... Pe7 White replies a7 and the king is caught between two stools. After either ... \$\pid d7\$ or ... \$17 White replies \$18, winning the enemy rook. It follows that Black's king is trapped in an invisible box on the kingside, consisting of the marked squares in the above diagram (plus g7, the square the king is currently standing on). Black can only use his rook to defend, and he must counter White's threat of playing his king over to defend the nawn, releasing his rook and clearing the way for the pawn. If Black checks from behind, the white king

hides on a7 (this is why White must not push his pawn to a7 prematurely) and again his rook is freed.

Black to play draws by being flexible with his rook: 1... If 1+2 De4 If6!. This change of direction is the key: a7 is no hiding place when Black is checking from the side. Play might continue 3 \$\d5 \beloe b6 4 \$\doc{1}{2} c5 (4 \beloe a7+ \$\psi\_g6 5 \$\psi\_c5 \$\psi\_f6\$ is the same) 4...\$\psi\_f6 5\$ \$h5 (now White threatens to move his rook so Black must start checking) 5 #f5+ 6 \$c4 #f4+ 7 \$d5 #f6 and White cannot make progress. If White plays a7 at any stage, Black replies ... Za6 followed by ... Zal, and if the white king then approaches the pawn, Black draws by checking the king from behind (the nook on a7 is no longer available). This double change of direction (a1 to f6 and then back to a1) is quite hard to see, and in fact it was not discovered until 1924 by Vancura.

Several years ago I was asked to check some rook ending analysis, but I couldn't understand any of it. White, who had the advantage, seemed to be forcing Black to reach a drawn position, which Black then avoided! Finally, I looked at the date of the analysis – 1912 – and realized that because the Vancura draw wasn't known at that time, all positions of the type shown in the previous diagram were thought to be wimming for White. Not surprisingly, this led to some odd moves.

I should add that if White's king is nearer to the a-pawn in the above diagram, then Black has no time to set up the Vancura draw. The precise details of how close White has to be to win are rather complicated and may be found in specialized endgame books.

### The extra Pawn

One of the most common endgame situations in practical play is a rook and pawn ending with an extra pawn on one side of the board, and the position otherwise symmetrical.

Here is a typical situation:



An ability to win positions such as this is fundamental to successful che such that white may have won a pawn with a combination, or perhaps Black had an isolated e-pawn which White picked up with subtle strategic play — whatever your chess style, situations in which you win a pawn for essentially no compensation are very common. The question then arises: how often do you convert the resultung positions into a full point?

I showed this position to some of the world's leading grandmasters, including Karpov, Kramnik and Anderson, and asked them to estimate their winning chances as White, assuming an opponent of equal strength. The answers were all in the range 80-90%. The general feeling was that such a position should objectively be a win, and the 'missing' 10-20% represented the probability of making a mistake one-self rather than the probability of ranning into exceptionally evod defence.

Å search of 500,000 games revealed 94 clear-cut examples of this type of structure (3 vs 3 on one side, 3 vs 2 on the other, no doubled pawns and pawns not blocked). The result was 72 wins, 19 draws and 3 losses(f). The 77% success rate was slightly lower than the GMs thought, but at their level technique is better and so, assuming that the position is objectively won, they would be more likely to round up the point. They probably also wouldn't lose a rook ending with a clear extra nawn!

Unfortunately, such situations are poorly cowered in endgame theory books, which tend to concentrate on more simplified positions. While they devote a lot of attention to the situation with 3 vs 3 on one side and an outside passed pawn on the other wing, the situation in which there is a majority rather than a passed pawn is hardly covered at all. The massive Encyclopaedia of Chess Endings, with 1727 positions, doesn't contain anything

like it, nor do standard works on the endgame such as Levenfish and Smyslov's famous Rook Endings.

Fine's old Basic Chess Endings contains perhaps the most helpful advice. He recommended that if the defender's king is on the side where the pawns are balanced then you should adopt the following plan:

- place the king and rook on the best possible squares;
- advance the pawns on the other wing as far as convenient, without actually setting up a passed pawn;
- tually setting up a passed pawn;

  3) transpose to a won ending with an outside nassed nawn.

What he means is that you should not necessarily create the passed pawn as quickly as possible, as some positions with an extra outside passed pawn are drawn. Instead, you should continue to manoeuvre until the passed pawn can be created under favourable circumstances, for example with your rook behind it.

If the defender's king is on the side with the potential passed pawn, then the decisive manoeuvre is the penetration of the attacking king on the opposite wing.

Having played over all the 94 examples mentioned above, I failed to find any clear-cut examples of this winning plan. Either the ending was misplayed by one side or the other, the the defender seemed to assume that he would lose in the long run and embarked on a desperate bid for counterplay. Thus readers will have to make do with Nunn vs Fritz5 from the diagram on page 128:

### 1 h4

We are in the second of Fine's cases mentioned above, so White's long-term aim will be to penetrate amongst the queenside pawns with his king. However, at the moment this pawn structure offers no avenues of approach for the king, so White must find a way to induce the pawns to advance. One plan would be to play wel and then attack the pawns by \$\frac{3}{2} = 3.4\$, etc., foreing them to move forwards. Then White could play \$\frac{1}{2} \text{d} 4 \text{d} 3 \text{d} 4 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 4 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 4 \text{d} 4 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 5 \text{d} 6 \text{d} 6 \text{d} 1 \text{d} 1 \text{d} 1 \text{d} 1 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 2 \text{d} 1 \

Perhaps this plan is the most systematic, but I decided on another idea, that of advancing the kingside pawns. If Black remains passive, White will gain a great deal of space on the kingside and should eventually be able to create a passed pawn there under favourable circumstances. If Black tres to generate counterplay by advancing his queenside pawns, then White will again have the possibility of switching his king to the other side of the board.

### 1...b5

I doubt that a human would defend in such forthright style! Fritz decides to gain space on the queenside, but it is creating precisely the sort of openings that will help White later on.

## 2 g4 a5 3 dg3 a4 4 a3

It is a good idea not to let the queenside pawns advance too far. Later on the black rook may switch behind the pawns, and this could prove very awkward if Black has pawns on a4 and b4. Now that Black has advanced a pawn to a4. White can conveniently halt the pawns by a3 and c3, which also makes his queensde safe against an attack by Black's mok

# 

In rook endings it is quite often a good idea to have such a chain of pawns. If the white rook defends the base of the chain, then all the pawns are secure against enemy rook attack.

# 5...**Eb1** 6 c3 e5

An attempt to obstruct White on the kingside.

## 7 hxg6+ hxg6 8 \$f4 \$\mathbb{I}d1 (D)



### 9 dbe3

This is where Fine's advice came in helpful. The immediate attempt to advance with the king leads nowhere, since after 9 \$25 c6 Black is ready to drive the king back with ... \$45 \times 1. Instead, White intends \$\frac{1}{2} d2\$, followed by \$\frac{1}{2} d4 \times 5\$. In fact Black can prevent this

plan, but White loses nothing by trying it before considering other ideas.

### 9...**⊈**f6?

The correct move was 9...\$\pec\$e61, when 10 \$\mathbb{I}d2 \$\mathbb{Z}e1+11 \$\pec\$d4 \$\mathbb{U}d6\$ prevents the king reaching c5. Instead 10 \$\pec\$e4 is probably best, followed by f4 and the possible creation of a kingside passed pawn.

### 10 Ed2 Eft

10... Ie1+11 Ied4 If1 12 Ie5 Ixf3 13 Iexb5 is hopeless - Black's queenside pawns are too weak.

### 11 Ed5

Now White can exploit the queenside pawns with the rook instead of the king.

## 11...e6 12 Ec5 Eb1 13 Exe6+ \$f7 14 \$f4 Exb2 15 \$g5

This more or less forced sequence has left White very well placed. He will nievitably win the g-pawn, thereby gaining two connected passed pawns on the kingside, whereas Black cannot create two passed pawns on the queenside.

# 15...**Zb**3 16 **f**4!

A small finesse avoiding Fritz's trap. After 16 \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \frac{1}{2} \)

### 16... Exa3 17 Ec7+ \$\psie e6 18 \$\psi xg6\$ \$\psi d6 19 Ec8 \$\psi d7 20 Ec5

Black cannot continue his attack on the rook as the b5-pawn is hanging.

20... Eb3 21 f5 a3 22 f6 Eb1 23 f7 Ef1 24 Exb5 a2 25 Ea5 \$\psi e7 26 Exa2 Ef6+ 27 \$\psi e5 1-0

This, incidentally, provides an example of using computer programs for training purposes. It is possible to set up simplified, idealized positions and play them out against the computer. The best method is to play the same position several times for both colours, trying different ideas to see what works and what doesn't. This kind of experience cannot be gained in overthe-board play. We will return to this subject in Chapter 5.

Many endings with an extra pawn eventually reduce to the situation in which the pawns are equal on one side and one player has an outside passed pawn on the opposite wing. The remainder of the section deals with this common occurrence. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that White possesses an extra pawn on the queenside. White's rook will need to defend the nawn, and there are three possible positions for the rook: behind the nawn, to the side of the nawn, and in front of the pawn. This list is arranged in descending order of desirability from White's point of view.

The situation in which White's rook is behind the pawn is a familiar one. The pawn is continually threatening to advance, so Black has to block the nawn with his rook. Not only does the rook become tied down, but Black is left open to the possibility of zugzwang. The classic example of this situation is also one of the best:



### A. Alekhine - J. Capablanca **Buenos Aires World**

Championship (34) 1927

# 54 Ha4

In accordance with the above principle, the rook is better behind the pawn than to the side of it.

# 

White's immediate threat is to run his king to b5 and lift the blockade of the pawn. Black can prevent this using his own king, but he quickly runs into zugzwanę.

# 55 dr3 de5 56 de3 b5 57 dd3 Фd5 58 Фc3 Фc5 59 Дa2

This is the reason why having the rook behind the pawn is so favourable. Since Black cannot move his rook, the situation is just as if he had lost the opposition in a king and pawn ending. After ... \$\Pid5. White plays \$\Pib4\$ and supports his pawn with the king; after ... \$\P\$b5. White can head for the kingside nawns with his king. Black can only avoid these lines by playing pawn moves on the kingside, but White can always move his rook up and down, so that Black is sure to fall into zugzwang sooner or later

### 59... \$\psi 60 \$\psi 13

Black is helpless, so White can afford to gain time on the clock by repeating moves.

### 60...\$r.5

After 60 Tya5 61 Tya5+ 40xa5 White wins by 62 \$\pic4 \$\pib6 63 \$\pid5\$ \$\$c7 64 \$Pe5 \$Pd7 65 \$Pf6 \$Pe8 66 f4 \$\psi f8 67 f5 gxf5 68 \$\psi xf5 and 69 \$\psi g5.

# 61 cbc3 cbh5 62 cbd4

Now the king heads for the vulnerable enemy pawns. Black's king is too far away to prevent this, so Capablanca decides to use his king to blockade the a-pawn and his rook to fight against the penetration of the white king. This is indeed the best defence, but however Black plays he cannot overcome the fatal handican of having one or other of his nieces fully occupied blockading the a-pawn.

## 62. IId6+

If Black tries to arrange a perpetual attack on White's rook by 62... \$2b4 63 #al 42h3 then 64 42c5 42h2 65 42h5 wins.

63 \$e5 \$e6+ 64 \$pf4 \$pa6 65 \$pg5 He5+ 66 4h6 Hf5 (D)

The alternative is to defend the f7pawn along the second rank by 66.. Ec? 67 \( \preceq g \) Ed7 68 \( \preceq f \) Ec7, but White wins after 69 \( \preceq e \) Ec2 \( \preceq x \) S 70 \( \preceq f \) Ec7 \( \preceq z \) \( \preceq x \) Ec7 \( \preceq z \) \( \preceq x \) S \( \preceq z \) \( \prec



67 f4?!

By exposing the pawn on g3, Alekhine makes the win more difficult After 67 \pm 27 \mathbb{\textit{\textit{B}}} 368 \pm 98 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 55 (the only chance, as 68...\mathbb{\textit{B}} 16 69 f4 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 15 70 \pm 92 wins immediately) 69 \pm 27 41 70 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 23 73 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 33 71 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 3\mathbb{\textit{B}} 13 11 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 3\mathbb{\textit{B}} 13 3 73 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 33 3 73 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 34 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 5 74 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 4 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 25 75 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 55 \mathbb{\textit{B}} 15 \mathbb{\t

As Speelman points out, White can even avoid the mimmal counterplay of ...f5-f4 by continuing 67 \$\Delta P17\$ \$\text{If}\$ 3 (67...\text{\text{Lf}}\$6 68 \$\Delta 8\$ \$\text{Lf}\$5 69 f4) 68 \$\Delta 97\$ \$\text{\text{Lf}}\$ 4, winning straight away.

67...Ec5 68 Ea3 Ec7 69 &g7 Ed7 70 f5?!

Once again introducing unnecessary complications. 70 \( \Phi \) \( \mathbb{Z} \) c7 71 f5 (the \( \mathbb{Z} \) e3-e7 plan is less effective now, since Black can target the g3-pawn) 71...gxf5 72 \$\psixf5 \boxed{\textbf{E}}c5+ 73 \$\psif6 \boxed{\textbf{E}}c7 74 \$\boxed{\textbf{E}}f3 \psixxa5 75 \$\boxed{\textbf{E}}f5+ wins easily.

70...gxf5 71 \$\psi h6 f4 72 gxf4 \$\pm d5 73 \$\pm g7 \$\pm f5 74 \$\pm a4 \$\pm b5 75 \$\pm e4 \$\pm a6 \$\pm h6 \$\pm xa5\$

Black could have put up more resistance by 76... $\mathbf{\dot{w}}$ b7, but White can still win with 77  $\mathbf{\Xi}$ c5  $\mathbf{\Xi}$ xf4 78  $\mathbf{\dot{w}}$ g5  $\mathbf{\Xi}$ f1 79  $\mathbf{\Xi}$ f5!  $\mathbf{\Xi}$ 81 + 80  $\mathbf{\dot{w}}$ xh5  $\mathbf{\dot{w}}$ a6 81  $\mathbf{\dot{w}}$ h6, and so on

77 He5 Ha1 78 \$\pixh5 \text{Hg1 79 Hg5} \text{Hh1 80 Hf5 \$\pixh6 81 Hxf7 \$\pix6 82 \text{He7 1-0}

If you have an extra outside passed pawn and your rook is behind the pawn, then you should have very good winning chances. As with any proposed rule, there are exceptions (for example, a position with rook on al and pawn on a2 aganst rook on a3 would be far less favourable!), but in ourmal situations such positions are extremely favourable for White. The further away from the kingside the pawn is, the better for White, but even with a c-pawn his winning prospects would be zood.

When the rook defends the pawn from the side (we will assume the rook is to the raght of the pawn, Black will place his rook behind the pawn. Then much depends on the kingside pawn strucnure. The white rook is vulnerable to attack by Black's king, and the best situation arises when the rook can occupy an invulnerable square on the kingside where it is defended by a nawn.



B. Spassky - Zhu Chen Veterans vs Women, Copenhagen 1997

Here White has an ideal position on the kingside. His rook can settle at f5, creating a cosy little cluster of pieces defending each other. Black can only break this up by playing. A5 at a moment when both her rook is attacking the pawn on f3 and the white king in defending it. However, it turns out that this possibility is of little value to Black.

White can win by simply playing in king to c1. If the black rook stays on the second rank, White pushes the b-pawn. Otherwise the king has to be released and it can then advance. The analysis runs 49 &FI IEC3 (49...\$\frac{1}{2}\text{C}\$ 50 \text{Weil} IEC3 (49...\$\frac{1}{2}\text{C}\$ 50 \text{Weil} IEC3 (49...\$\frac{1}{2}\text{C}\$ 50 \text{Weil} IEC3 (49...\$\frac{1}{2}\text{C}\$ 50 \text{Weil} IEC3 (49...\$\text{Meil}\$ 60 \text{Weil} wins a pawn) 50 \text{Weil} IEC3 IEC3 \text{S} 15 \text{S} 53 \text{Weil} 52 \text{ ded 1} 5 (the only moment when this is playable, but it is too slow) 53 \text{Weil} 2 \text{E} 3 (53...\text{hcg4} 54 \text{Chc3} \text{Meil} 55 \text{F} \text{Kc3} 5 \text{T} 55 5 (xg4+ wins) 54 \text{E} xh3 55 \text{S} 15 5 \text{D} 6 \text{E} 3 5 5 \text{T} 6 5 5 5 \text{T} 6 5 \text{T} 6 5 5

#d3 with an easy win as the king advances to support the b-pawn.

The course of the game is a warning against trying to be too clever in technical positions. If you see a systematic and safe winning procedure, don't worry about the fact that there may be a quicker win; just play it.

## 49 Xh2??

The idea is that Black has to check, or else White switches his rook behind the pawn, but then White's rook can return to h5 and he has released his kine from the back rank immediately.

## 49... Ic1+ 50 @e2 f5!

The point Spassky had overlooked. Black breaks up White's favourable pawn structure on the kingside and draws.

# 51 Ah1

After 51 gxf5 Eb1 52 Eh5 &Pf 53 Exh6 Exb5 54 f6 White has no winning chances as his rook is completely immobilized. 51 Eh5 fxg4 52 fxg4 Eh1 53 &Pf 3 Eb4 is no better because White's king cannot move to the queenside without immediately abandoning the 5-pawn.

# 51...Ec2+ 52 @g3 Eb2 1/2-1/2

The final case, when the white rook is in front of the pawn, offers the few set winning chances. Indeed, most positions are drawn. Even in the most favourable case (that of a b-pawn) is unclear whether White can win unless he has an additional advantage, such as a weak enemy pawn structure on the kingside.

The situation with an extra pawn and all the pawns on the same side also occurs quite often in practice. Here is a typical position:



Black's ideal defensive pawn strucnire is 77-g6-h5. White's only chance is ultimately to create a passed pawn, and this pawn formation means that White can only make one at the cost of several pawn exchanges. First he must play g4, when Black can swap his hpawn. Then White will aim for f5, but another pair of pawns disappears. It follows that once Black has achieved this optimal set-up, White's winning chances are minimal. Thus if Black is to play in the diagram, 1...h5! is the right move.

If White moves first, then of course he plays 1 g4!. While the resulting position is still theoretically drawn, there is no doubt that in practice Black's task is rather difficult. Black cannot prevent White from gaining a lot of space on the kingside (%g2-g3, h4-h5, etc.) and his defence is not easy.

Endings with 3 vs 2 (and no passed pawns) on one side are also drawn; again the same principles apply. If you remove the pawns on e3 and 17 from the above diagram, Black's safest first move is again 1...h5!. White to play could try 1 g4, but here his winning chances would only be very small.

### Positional advantage

We have already mentioned that piece activity is extremely important in rook and pawn endings (see page 92). A rook on the seventh usually ties the opponent's pieces down to defensive positions, while a king penetrating into the opposing pawn-mass can make mincement of them. Another point is that a passive rook is very often permanently passive. Here is an example, taken from Levenfish and Smyslov's classic book Rook Endings.



St Petersburg - London Telegraph match, 1886-7

At this point London conceded the game. Chigorin gave analysis indicating that White could win and the position has been subject to considerable debate ever since. Levenfish and Smyslov gave the verdict that Black could draw, but only with very precise play.

The white rook can range freely across the fifth rank, while Black's is restricted to just three squares. First of all, defending passively is no good. White can move his king towards the vulnerable a-pawn and the defence eventually breaks down: 1... 2a7 2 2e4 Aa6 3 \$\d4 \aa7 4 f4 \aa6 (or 4...\$\d6 5 ■b6+ \$e7 6 \$c5 ■c7+ 7 \$b5 ■c1 8 g5 f5 9 Exg6 Ef1 10 \$xa5 Exf4 11 #f6#f1 12 \$b6 f4 13 a5 #g1 14 #xf4 #xe5 15 a6 #e6+ 16 \$b7 #e1 17 #b4 and wins) 5 2b7+ \$\delta d6 6 f5 gxf5 7 gxf5 Ia8 8 Ib6+ we7 9 wc5 Id8 10 ■b5 and White wins the a-pawn while retaining both his pawns. With his pieces so actively placed, this means a sure win.

Very often in such satuations, it is better to jettison the weak pawn afty to activate the rook, and here this plan just about draws for Black. Note that Black must not delay; if he allows White's pieces to become any more active before giving up the pawn, then te game will be past saving. The best line is I...Ecs! 2 Mass Mc4+3 the 3 the 1 March 1 March 2 Mass Mc4+3 the king has the option to moving to hid and g5 for a counter-attack against White's pawns, while being protected from rook checks by his own f. and

g-pawns) 4 Ha8 (4 Ha7+ \$\psic\$65 a5 Ha4 6 a6 \$\psic\$57 if 4 \$\psic\$d\$ \$\$ \$\psic\$a\$ \$\p



U. Andersson – R. Hübner Johannesburg 1981

In this position White has a permanent positional advantage in the shape of Black's backward c-pawn. Nevertheless, it requires a high standard of endgame technique to convert this single positive factor into a win.

### 23 24

It is moves like this that are the key to successful endgame play. It is not just a random pawn advance but part of a well-thought-out plan for putting White's central pawn majority to use. The obvious plan is to play e4 at some stage, but for this White needs the support of the king (note that the rook should stay on the c-file to prevent.-c.) White could trye 3, 48e-243 and then e4, but Black could counter this plan by playing ...f5 at some point. The move played not only makes it much harder for Black to play ...f5, but also opens up a second possibility for activating the white king, based on \$A22 and \$42-54.

# 23...a5 24 h4 g6 25 Ec2 h6

After 25...f5 26 8xf5 gxf5 27 \$\tilde{x}\$g3, followed by \$\tilde{x}\$f4. White ties Black down to the defence of f5, and then plays e3 and \$\tilde{x}\$g2, when his rook can nenetrate along the \$\tilde{x}\$-file.

# 26 ⊈g3 g5

This is Black's counter-plan. He prevents White's king occupying f4.

### 2/ B:

It would be wrong to exchange on g5 as Black's rook would be in a position to occupy the h-file.

# 27...f6 28 🕸 f2

White now returns to the original plan of playing his king to 43, because the change in the kingside pawn structure has made ...f5 virtually impossible (if Black trees to prepare it with ...#18, then White plays 64 immediately).

28...\$c7 29 e3 \$b6 30 \$e2 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c8 31 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c5

Of course White prevents ...c5. 32... Ze8 32 \$\prevent d3 Ze7 33 e4 (D)



White finally achieves e3-e4, and gives Black a difficult choice. If he exchanges on e4, then White's rook gams access to f5 to attack the backward f-pawn, while otherwise Black has to defend the d5-pawn.

# 33...**≣d**7

# 34 a3 Ed8 35 Ec1

White's intention is to play b4 so as to provide further support for the rook, but for the moment he simply waits until the game is adjourned at move 40.

35... \( \bar{A}\)d7 36 \( \bar{B}\)c2 \( \bar{B}\)d8 37 \( \bar{B}\)c3 \( \bar{B}\)d7 38 \( \bar{B}\)c2 \( \bar{B}\)d8 39 \( \bar{B}\)c1 \( \bar{B}\)d7 40 \( \bar{B}\)c5 \( \bar{B}\)d8 41 b4

Now White undertakes positive ac-

tion.

41...axb4 42 axb4

# Black is in zugzwang.

# 

After 42...dxe4+ 43 fxe4, activating the rook by 43... La8 is too slow, as Black's kingside pawns are vulnerable and White would just play 44 \$15. Otherwise a rook move along the file is the only possibility.

### 43 evd5

Exploiting the absence of the rook from the first rank. Now 43...cxd5 loses to 44 Ac8, for example 44...f5 45 gxf5 If7 46 Ih8 If6 47 Ih7! \$c6 48 фe3 фd6 49 ጀb7 фc6 50 ጀa7 фb6 51 Ig7, followed by Ig6.

# 43. Axd5 44 \$e4

Making use of the extra support for the rook provided by b4.

44... Ad8 45 d5 (D)



White cannot penetrate to f5 as his d-pawn is hanging, but once it has been exchanged Black will be unable to defend his kingside pawns.

### 45... He8+

45...cxd5+ 46 Xxd5 Xe8+ 47 &f5 He3 transposes to the game.

### 46 \$65 cxd5 47 Xxd5 Ze3

Black's only chance is to counterattack, but Andersson has everything worked out.

## 48 \$xf6 \$xf3+49 \$g7!

This is the crucial finesse. Black draws after 49 \$26 \$14 50 \$xh6 Exe4 51 \$27 Exb4 52 h6 Eh4 53 h7 фя5.

# 49... #f4 50 #d6+

The point behind White's last move. He takes the h6-pawn with his rook, and at the same time cuts the black king off along the third rank.

### 50...\$c7 51 Exh6 1-0

White wins after 51... Exb4 52 Eg6 Exg4 53 h6 He4 (however Black plays, he has to give his rook up for the pawn within a few moves, for example after 53 Th4 54 h7 White threatens Ahh, so Black has to take the pawn immediately) 54 h7 He7+ 55 4h6 Hel 56 h8 # Ih1+ 57 &g7 Ixh8 58 &xh8 g4 (58...b4 59 \$g7 b3 60 \$xg5 \$c6 61 Hg3 wins) 59 Wg7 g3 60 Wf7 g2 (60...b4 61 Axg3 \$c6 62 Ag5) 61 Ixg2 \$b6 62 Ig5 \$a5 63 \$e6 and the white king is easily in time.

# Minor-piece endings

This is really four endings rolled up in one: knight endings, bishop vs knight endings and bishop endings, with either same- or opposite-coloured bishons. A detailed coverage of each of these endings is not possible here, so I will concentrate on the most useful information.

### Knight endings



Here is a common situation – the knight is single-handedly holding back a passed pawn. There are three possible outcomes to such a struggle: either the knight loses the battle against the white king and pawn, and the pawn pronotes. Then White wins. Alternatively, the white king cannot achieve more than a perpetual attack on the knight, then the result is a draw. Finally, it may be that the knight can not only restrain the pawn, but can do so while providing a continuous supply of spare tempi. Then Black has time to advance his hnawn and win.

The diagram position is a draw. The knight can prevent the pawn's promotion but without providing any spare tempi: 1 \psi b 7 \times 52 \psi b 6 \times 64. 3 \psi c 6 \times 64 \psi c 7 \times 27 \times 27 and so on.

If the pawn is on a7 and the knight on a8, then of course White wins by 1 \$\psi\$b7.

Moving the other way, with the pawn on a5 and knight on a6, the position is a draw since 1 \$\displays \text{ again gives a perpetual attack on the knight. If the pawn is on a4 and knight on a5 then White loses even if he can attack the knight with 1 \$\displays \text{ the tirst move;} Black just plays 1...\$\displays 3 and when he promotes on h1, White is prevented from promoting on a8.

Now suppose that the pawn is on b7 and knight on b8, with Black to play. The position is drawn by repetition neither side can deviate from the sequence 1...\$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ as \$\delta \cdot 2\dot \text{\$\text{\$w}\$}\$ b6 \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ b8 3 \$\dot \text{\$\phi\$}\$ c7 \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are 79 \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ d7 would win for Black) 3. \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ as \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ and \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ and \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ and \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ and \$\overline{Q}\_{0}\$ are the sequence of \$\overline

Now move the pawn to b6 and the knight to b7. Black to plays wins by 1.—2a5, because the white king takes far too long to make it round to attack he knight (note that even 1 40d is impossible because of 1.—2c4+). However, White's loss here was due to the poor initial position of his king on c7. If the king starts on c6, then the position is a draw since 1.—2a5+ 2 4b5 and 1.—2d8+ 2 4d7 both lead to repetitions.

With the pawn on b5 and knight on b6, it doesn't matter where the white king is; Black always wins since he can generate an unlimited supply of tempi. If White attacks the knight by 1 ⊕c6, then 1...€2a4 wins as before, while 1 ⊕c5 is met by 1...€2c8, and 2 ⊕c6 fails to 2...€2n?+.

With a c-pawn, Black wins even with the pawn on the seventh rank. If Black's knight is on c8, he can meet \$\pm\$d7 by ...\$\pm\$a7 and \$\pm\$b7 by ...\$\pm\$0e7, and the white king has to take the long way round to attack the knight again.

Moving on to knight vs knight endings, the most important point to note is the devastating effect of an outside passed pawn. The knight is such short-range piece that if it is preventing the advance of a passed pawn on the queenside, then it cannot exert any influence on the knigside. Thus the side with the outside passed pawn be effectively a piece up on the other side of the board. Knights are particularly ineffective against rook's pawns:



S. Dolmatov – A. Beliavsky USSR Championship, Odessa 1989

Here Black is fighting against two rook's pawns. Despite material equality and the small number of pawns, White has a winning position.

### 57 Ød4 Øa6

White is normally happy to swap his h-pawn for Black's f-pawn, since his king will then be faster to reach the queenside. Thus after 57...\$\psi\$.5 8 \psi 2.5
2\text{a6} 59 \text{Af5} \psi \psi 1.5
2\text{Af5} \psi \psi 1.5
2\text{Af5} \psi \psi 1.5
2\text{Af5} \psi 2\text{Af5} \psi 2.5
2\text{Af5} \psi 2\text{Af5} \psi 4.2\text{Did \$\psi 6.6
2\text{Af6} \psi 6.6
2\text{Af6} \psi 6.6
2\text{Af6} \psi 2\t

### 58 \$e3 \$c5 59 \$f4 \$d3+60 \$e3 \$h4

If Black repeats by 60...\( \in\)c5, then
White continues 61 \( \in\)f3 \( \phi\)f6 (61...\( \phi\)f5

2 \( \phi\)f4 \( \phi\)f6 63 \( \phi\)f5 (62 \( \phi\)f4

4 \( \phi\)f6 (63...\( \phi\)f6 64 h6 \( \phi\)f6 65

2 \( \phi\)f3 (64 \( \phi\)f4 \( \phi\)f5 (55 \( \phi\)f5 (55 \( \phi\)f5)

as in the previous note.

61 \$14 \( \times \) d3+62 \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \Delta \) d4 63 \( \Delta \) 2 \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \Delta \) d4 65 \( \Delta \) 2 \( \Delta \) \( \Delta \) \( \Delta \) d65...\( \Delta \) 5 66 \( \Delta \) d3+.

66 \$\psi d1 \$\psi 67 \$\psi d2 (D)



Black is in zugzwang and must go back with his king.

67...\$17 68 ∆e2

Now the d-pawn is lost.

# 68...\$g6 69 £xd4 f4 70 \$e2 \$h5 71 \$f3 \$xh4 72 \$xf4

This ⊕+A vs ⊕ ending is a simple win.

72...\$\psi 573 \$\psi 5 \$\psi 674 \$\psi 46 \$\psi 17 5 \$\psi 5 \$\psi 64 \$\psi 6 \$\psi 64 \$\psi

White avoids the trap 83 \pm xa8?? \pm c8 drawing.

83.... 2c7 84 \$c6 1-0

## Bishop vs Knight endings

The relative value of the bishop and the knight is a familiar topic in every phase of the game, and the basic principles are the same in an ending.

On average, a bishop is worth a little more than a knight. A bishop is at its best in an open position with a fluid pawn structure. Pawns fixed on the same colour as the squares on which be bishop moves are an obstruction; the more such pawns exist, the more restricted the bishop is and the weaker the squares of the opposite colour.

Knights favour blocked pawn structures and like stable, invulnerable squares on which they can settle without being disturbed by encmy pawns. A typical such situation arises when a knight occupies the square in front of an isolated pawn, as in the following diagram.

We will not discuss this very complicated endgame in detail here. Capablanca, who was one of the greatest



S. Flohr - J. Capablanca

Moscow 1935

endgame players of all time, just about managed to save the game, but I would doubt my ability to do likewise! He adopted what is undoubtedly the correct plan, namely to avoid allowing any more pawns to be fixed on light squares. He therefore played ...b6, ...a5, ...&d7 and ...f6, and watted to see if White could make progress if White could make progress if White could make progress.

It is worth noting that if Black had a dark-squared bishop, then the position would be a comfortable draw. If, on the other hand, Black had a further pawn weakness, for example the pawn on b7 were on b5 (so that White could fix the queenside pawns by playing b4), then he would be lost.

It is worth adding one point which applies particularly to the endgame. Bishops prefer positions with unbalanced pawn structures. If both sides create a passed pawn, a bishop can support the friendly passed pawn while at the same time holding up the enemy passed pawn. Knights, being shortrange pieces, have to be committed to one or the other task.

Players often underestimate the advantage which is conferred by having a bishop against a knight, even in positions with symmetrical pawn structures.



Z. Ilinčić – G. Čabrilo Cetinje 1992

I suspect that many players would abandon the position as a draw, but in the game White won. Ilinčté annotated his game in both Informator and the Encyclopaedia of Chess Endings, claiming that the diagram position is actually winning for White. As we shall see, this claim is rather farfetched, but it is true that White's advantage is sufficient to justify playing on

# 26...\$g8 27 \$d2 \$17 28 \$e3 \$e6 29 \$c3 g6 30 \$e4

White has two very slight advantages: his bishop is better than the knight in this open position, and his king is slightly more active.

### 30...h5

There is nothing wrong with this move. It allows a possible penetration by the white king via f4 to g5, but in itself this is not dangerous as the simple reply ... \(\phi f7\) secures the kingside pawn structure.

## 31 &e1 4)e5 32 &f2 (D)

White aims to provoke a pawn move on the queenside, so as to provide a possible entry route for White's king on that side also.



## 32...Dc4?

This leads to an exchange of pawns, which helps the defender, but allows the white king to occupy the fifth rank, which is a far more important factor. Illinicife gives 32...a6 33 2444 Q47 34 § 35 but stops here with the claim that White is winning. However, Black can just move his knight, meeting 35 \$\tilde{\phi}\$C\$ by 35...\$\tilde{\pmathrm{Q}}\$The during the progress is not easy.

33 @xa7 @xb2 34 @d4 @d6

Certainly not 34...\$\Pi57 35 \$\pic3, \text{winning after 35...}\Pid1+ 36 \$\pic2\$ or 35...\Pid1+ 36 \$\pic4\$ to 2 or 35...\Pid4+ 36 \$\pic4\$ to 37 \$\pic4\$ to 4.

# 35 **£b8**+ **⊈e**6

One of the problems facing the side with the knight is that a 'race' situation normally strongly favours the bishop. Here 35...\$\text{cf} 36 \$\text{de} \text{cf} 20c4 + 37 \$\text{df} 6 \text{Q} \text{ks} 2 \text{de} 24 3 \$\text{de} \text{ks} 5 \text{de} 4 3 \$\text{de} \text{ks} 6 \text{de} 24 3 \$\text{de} \text{ks} 6 \text{de} 24 3 \$\text{de} \text{ks} 6 \text{de} 24 4 4 \$\text{de} \text{mins for White.}

# 36 ⊈c5 ⊈d7

Black also cannot afford to let the white king get at the b-pawn, e.g. 36...\(\text{mft} 5.7\) \(\text{mft} 5.7\) \(\text{mft} 5.1\) \(\text{mft} 5.4\) \(\text{mft} 5.3\) \(\text{mft}

# 37 ⊈d5

By now Black is in serious trouble. White's main plan is to cover e7 with his bishop and then play \$\dot{\phi}\$e5-f6.

37... ②d3 38 2g3 ②b2 39 2e1 ②d3 40 2d2 ②b2 41 b3 (D)



41... 2d3 After 41... 2e7 42 2g5+ 2d7 White wins by 43 2e5 2c4+ 44 2f6 2xa3

45 \$\pixg6 \$\pic6 (45...\)\( 54 \$\pix\)\( 55 \)\( 45 \pix\)\( 55 \)\( 45 \pix\)\( 55 \pi\)\( 65 \pi

### 42 a4 h6?

This loses straight away, although the position was in any case very difficult for Black. After 42... ₱10.2 43 a5 ₱2d3 44 ♣c3 ₱2e1 45 g3 ₱2d3, White continues 46 ₱2d4 ₹₱3d ₱2d6 47 ₱25 ₱27 48 ♣g5+ ₱3r 7 49 ₱2d6 47 ₱26 and Black cannot play 47... ₱2r 7.

# 43 ≜e3 €b2

43...⊈c7 44 ⊈e6 is also an easy win.

# 44 ≗xb6 ⊕xa4 45 ≗d4

The knight is trapped and can only be rescued at the cost of both Black's kingside pawns.

45...h4 46 \$\text{ \$\psi = 7 \ 47 \ \$\psi 14 \ \$\psi 6 \ 48 \ \$\psi 5 \ \$\psi 45 \ 49 \ \$\psi 12 \ \$\psi 15 \ \$\psi x h 4 \ \$\psi 15 \ \$\psi x h 4 \ \$\psi 15 \ \$\psi x h 6 \ \$\psi 6 \ \$\psi 5 \ \$\psi 5 \ \$\psi 6 \ \$\

# Bishop endings

Considering the case of same-coloured bishops first, the outside passed pawn is again a very powerful force, even if not quite so effective as in knight endngs. I would therefore normally expect endings with 3 vs 3 on one side and an extra outside passed pawn on the other side to be winning, although if the passed pawn is not too far away

from the remaining pawns there is a small chance of a blockade.

With all the pawns on the same side, a 3 vs 2 or 4 vs 3 ending with fluid pawns should normally be a draw. Since bishops are heavily influenced by fixed nawns, one of the most important questions is how many pawns are fixed on the same-coloured squares as one's hishon. The more there are, the worse it is all the more so in that the opponent's bishop will automatically be a 'good' bishop. Two pawns fixed on the same colour as one's bishop may be a fatal weakness, especially if they can both be attacked simultaneously by the opposing bishop. This completely immobilizes one's own bishop, and zugzwang may not be far away.

Opposite-coloured bishop endings are often quite tricky because many of the principles that apply in a wide range of endings break down in this case. Here are some of the main differences:

- Material advantage is less important than usual. Endings with one extra pawn are usually drawn. Even two extra pawns may not be sufficient town. For this reason reduction to an opposite-coloured bishop ending is often a useful drawing resource in a desperate struation.
- What is important is the ability to create passed pawns. If you can create two passed pawns, then you have good winning chances. Connected

passed pawns are better than passed pawns with only one file between them, but two widely-separated passed pawns are best of all.

pawns are best of all.

3) If you are trying to draw an opposite-coloured bishop ending, then it is better to have your pawns on the same-coloured squares as your bishop. This is practically the only type of position in which this reversal of the normal principle applies. The reason is that your drawing chances depend on setting up an unbreakable fortress. Everything has to be defended, and a pawn which is capable of being attacked by the enemy bishop will just drop off.

Here are a couple of examples illustrating these principles:



Y, Piskov – J. Nunn Bundesliga 1992

Black is in a difficult position because his king is more exposed. While there are still heavy pieces on the board, the opposite-coloured bishops pose a particular danger for Black.

## 37 Af6

Threatening mate in two. 37...里xb8 is no defence because of 38 營h8+ 全f7 39 營g7+ 全e8 40 營e7#.

## 37...₩h5!

This is the safest move. Even though Black loses two pawns, the resulting opposite-coloured bishop ending is a clear draw. It is possible that Black might have got away with 37...24738 ED 18WT69 JE AT/1 He T. but the advantage of opposite-coloured bishop positions is that if they are drawn, they are usually completely drawn.

# 38 ₩xh5 gxh5 39 Exe8+ £xe8 40 £e7 £g6 41 £xc5 £f7!

Not 41....2d3? 42 d6 2f5 43 2xa7 and White obtains three passed pawns.

# 42 🔍 xd4

After 42 \( \Delta xa7 \( \Delta b \) | 43 a4 d3 44 \( \Delta f Z \( \Delta a Z \) Black wins one of the white pawns, again with an easy draw.

# 42...a6

Threatening to win a pawn by means of ... 2d3 followed by ... 2c4.

## 43 a3

White has two extra connected passed pawns, and if he could support them with his king then he would be winning. However, his king is too far away and by attacking the pawns with his bishop, Black can force them to advance to dark squares, when it is easy to blockade them. The defender must keep his pawns on the same-coloured squares as his bishop, but the opposite holds true for the attacker. He must rev to avoid the blockade of the pawns, and so they should occupy squares of the opposite colour to his bishop. This usually means that they must be defended by the king.

### 43... 2 d3 44 c5 2 c4 45 d6 2 e6 46 2 d6 2 d6 d7

The blockade is set up. The a- and hpawns can be defended by the bishop, and the passed pawns are totally immobile.

### 



This is a slight modification of a game I played in a simultaneous display during 1977.

Black defended the g-pawn in the only way possible, by heading for h4.

### 1...**≗e**1

At first sight this is a dead draw, if white's king attacks the g5-pawn, then Black plays ... 2n4 and wants with his king, white if White's king approaches the c-pawn, then Black's bishop is freed and so he can just keep his king on c7. This is in accordance with the principle that you need two

passed pawns to have a chance of winning an opposite-coloured bishop ending.

### 2 chr6!

White's plan is to force the bishop to h4 and then play g3. If Black replies ... 2xg3, White continues 2xg5 and has his second passed pawn. If Black replies ...fxg3, White plays 2g2 and the black bishop is imprisoned. When the white king approaches the c-pawn, Black will be forced to release his bishop by ...g4, again giving White another passed pawn.

However, this plan must be implemented accurately. After 2 \$\precepter 15 \hfrac{1}{2} \hfrac{1}{2} h4 3 g3 fxg3 4 2g2 2d6 White experiences certain difficulties. He cannot move his king to f6 or e4 and after 5 \$\preceq\$g4 \$\preceq\$c7 he is not making progress. In fact, this is very much like a king and pawn ending, since both sides can only move their kings (if White moves his bishop, then ... g2 draws at once). White can try to exploit the fact that d7 is not available for Black's king by 5 \$\preceq\$g6 \$\preceq\$e6 6 \$\preceq\$h7, but his subtlety is to no avail: after 6... \$2e7 1 \$29 \$2 \$2e8 White cannot 'by-pass' by 8 \$6.

The key is to lose a tempo before the bishop arrives on h4.

# 2... \$ h4 3 \$f5 \$d6

White has lost a tempo and now the g3 plan works.

# 4 23 (D)

### 4...fxg3

After 4... 2xg3 5 \$xe5, the win is still not straightforward as Black has a possible drawing plan of covering c7



with his bishop and running to h8 with his king. Then it will not matter if Black has to surrender his bishop for the c-pawn, as he has a 'rook's pawn and wrong bishop' draw. However, White can win by 5... 2e1 6 h4 42e7 7 h5 and now

 7... 2c3 (using the bishop to hold back the h-pawn, but the passed nawns are too far apart for this to work) 8 h6 \$\d69 h7 &e5 10 \$\def5 &h8 11 \$\defxf4\$ åb2 12 \$£f5 åc3 13 \$£g6 \$£e7 14 åd1 åb2 15 åa4 (threatening 16 c7) 15... \$\pm\$d6 16 \$\pm\$f7 winning the bishop for the h-pawn.

2) 7... 2a5 8 42g6 42f8 9 2d5 (of course White must prevent ... \$208 at all costs) 9...f3 10 h6 f2 11 h7 f1 12 h8@+ \$e7 13 @e5+ \$f8 14 \$d6+ 空e8 15 管d7+ 空f8 16 管g7+ 空e8 17 全f7+ 全d8 18 c7+! 全xc7 19 資f8+ \$\doldright d7 20 \$\doldright e8+ winning the queen.

# 5 🚊 g2

Black is in zugzwang and must go back with his king.

### 5 doc7 Or 5...\$e7 6 \$e5

### 6 ⊈e5 g4

Otherwise the king reaches d6 and that would really be Black's last chance to play ...g4 before White promotes his pawn.

# 7 hxg4

White wins easily by supporting the passed g-pawn with his king. It is worth noting that Black only

lt is worth worting that black only loses in the diagram as he cannot defend the g5-pawn from d8 or e7. If his king were on the apparently inferior square b8, then 1...\$a5 would draw.

I must emphasize that the special

principles mentioned above apply only to pure opposite-coloured bishop situations. As soon as extra pieces are added to the equation, normal service is resumed. Many players assume that endings with rooks and oppositecoloured bishops are almost as drawn as pure opposite-bishop positions, but this is not so. An extra pawn in an ending with rooks and opposite-coloured bishops normally confers good winning chances; adding a pair of knights is similar. If even more pieces are added then the attacking potential of opposite-coloured bishops starts to come into play, and then one cannot talk about a drawish influence at all.

# Queen endings

# Queen and Pawn vs Queen

Of all the fundamental endings with piece + pawn vs piece, this is the second most common in practice (the most common being rook and pawn vs rook). It is also by far the most complicated, so much so that it has proved too daunting for the majority of authors and very little has been written about it. Before the advent of the computer database, Averbakh provided the best coverage. However, the complexity of the ending was only emphasized by the fact that his sevently pages of analysis dealt almost exclusively with certain simple cases of the pawn on the seventh rank.

Now that the oracle of a perfect database has been constructed, one would have expected someone to provide a far more detailed explanation of the principles behind the ending. However, the database has revealed that Averbakh's efforts only scratched the vencer of this ending and most of the real work remains to be done.

I suppose I could stop here with the comment 'nobody understands \widetharpoonup +\Delta\
vs \widetharpoonup', but this does seem a little cowardly.

The first point to make is that if the defending king is in front of the pawn then the position is almost always drawn. There are exceptions in which a winning exchange of queens can be forced, but they are very few indeed.

Thus the only interesting case is when the defending king cannot move in front of the pawn. Dealing firstly with the a-pawn, this not surprisingly offers the fewest winning chances of any pawn. The diagram below shows a typical situation with the pawn on the sixth.



We will display several diagrams of this type, the aim being to convey a great deal of information in a visual form. The various stars indicate the result when the black king stands on that square. A white star indicates that the position is a win with White to move, but a draw with Black to move. A black star indicates that it is a win whoever moves first. Unmarked squares are drawn whoever moves first.

In the case of squares that are under attack by White, then the position is only legal with Black to move and a black star indicates that it is a win; no star indicates that it is drawn.

A few positions are illegal because the kings stand next to each other; these are also unmarked.

Readers should note that we take no account of the 50-move rule in our discussion. With optimal play, some of the positions are drawn only because of this rule, but who is going to play optimally over the board? Our objective is only to establish some general principles helpful in practical play and for this the 50-move rule is not especially relevant.

This diagram already reveals many of the important principles governing #+A vs . We can ignore the 'special case' squares a7 and a8, which are only marked because White to play can mate in one. There are basically two drawing zones. One lies near to the pawn and these squares are drawn because with the enemy king so close to the nawn. Black can very often exchange queens and catch the pawn with his king. Virtually all #+A vs # positions (except those with the pawn on the seventh) have such a zone, which we call the proximity zone. When the black king lies in the proximity zone, White is restricted in his attempts to avoid perpetual check, as he can only interpose his queen in favourable circumstances. There is a popular myth that when defending #+ A vs #, it is always best to have your king as far away from the pawn as possible; as we shall see, this is true only in certain circiimstances

The second drawing zone is in the lower right-hand corner, i.e. diagonally opposite the pawn. White's main weapon in preventing perpetual check is to interpose his queen in such a way as to force the exchange of queens, either by checking or by pinning the enemy queen. When the black king is poorly placed, for example on 17, then there are many chances to achieve this and Black's options are consequently restricted. White can set up a position with his king on b7 and queen on c6. Then 1... #e7+ is answered by 2 #c7, 1... 對b4+2 全c8 對f8+3 全c7 ends the checks 1 學h3+2 全c8 and 1...學b1+ 2 2a8 likewise. The toughest check to meet is 1... #b2+. but even in this case White can manoeuvre so as eventually to force Black to give one of the inferior checks mentioned above. In the end Black's checks dry up, and White can push his pawn. This problem afflicts Black whenever his king is in the ton right-hand corner. The lower lefthand corner is also not ideal, but this largely depends on Black's queen position. If Black can occupy a good square with his queen, then this is sufficient to draw. The bottom right-hand corner is the best of the distant areas; White has very few chances to interpose with check and so Black has few problems drawing.

While much of the play is governed by general principles, there are a few anomalies. The ssolated loss with the black king on h3 (when 1 \overline{a}d4! is the only winning move) is hard to explain, as is the loss with Black to move when his king is on c2.

The point about the two drawing zones is emphasized if we imagine the black king starting somewhere on Black's fifth rank. With the king on d4, the only drawing move is 1...\$rd\$1, entering the proximity zone. When the king is on h4, the only move is

1...\$\text{rg3}! (although it would be amazing if anyone realized over the board
that 1...\$\text{rh3}! is losing). If the king
starts on e4, there is a choice between
1...\$\text{rd5} and 1...\$\text{rf3}, but I would always go for the proximity zone if possible, as the draw is far simpler.

Summing up, the proximity zone is the best location for the black king, then the bottom-right corner, then the bottom-left corner. The top right corner is by far the worst.

If we move the pawn back to a5, the drawing zones expand enormously:



The lower-left squares are marked only because White has the possibility of 營3+, forcing an immediate exchange of queens, so we can fairly say that Black is only in danger if his king is in the upper-right corner.

We can summarize by saying that with an a-pawn, the pawn needs to be on at least the sixth rank in order to have decent winning chances.

Not surprisingly, the b-pawn offers far more winning chances. There are two main reasons. First of all, the white king has the squares on the a-file to aid him in his efforts to avoid perpetual check. Secondly, an exchange of queens is much less likely to lead to a draw, even when Black's king is quite close to the pawn, so the proximity zone is much reduced in size. Here is a vityical case with the pawn no b6 (D):



We can see how vastly different this situation is. If White is to move then he wins no matter where Black's king is located. With Black to play there is a small drawing zone in front of the pawn, and a slightly larger one in the bottom right-hand corner.

With the pawn on b5 White's winning chances are of course less than with the pawn on b6, but still greater than with the pawn on a6 (D):

Here we see the familiar pattern emerging, but with some differences. The proximity zone is much smaller than with the a-pawn; it includes all the squares in front of the pawn, but little else. Black can draw with his



king on certain d-file squares, but only if it is his turn to move, and even then the draw requires great accuracy. With the king on d8, Black's unique drawing move is 1...@gl!, with the king on d7 agan there is only one move, 1...@hl!, and with the king on d6, 1...@d5! is the only saving possibility.

The drawing zone in the bottomright corner is relatively large, and it is clear that against a b-pawn, if you cannot bring your king in front of the pawn, then this is the area to head for. We do not give the details in the case of the pawn on b4; the situation is somewhat similar to that of the pawn on a5, i.e. White can only win if the black king is near to the top-right corper.

To summarize, with a b-pawn the pawn should be on at least the fifth rank to provide good winning chances.

The c-pawn provides the greatest winning chances of any pawn. One reason is that the drawing zone in the bottom-right corner disappears when the pawn is on at least the fourth rank, so in this case Black is left only with the proximity zone.

The situation with the pawn on c6 needs no diagram, because Black is losing except if his king is in front of the pawn. When the pawn is on c5, the drawing chances are still very slim, except if the king is in front of the pawn:





Even with a pawn on c4, White's winning prospects are surprisingly good:



It follows that if you have various methods of liquidating to "#+\Delta vs #+\Delta vs #+\

Central pawns offer significantly fewer chances than with the c-pawn. Once again, there is no distant drawing zone and the defender should have his king somewhere near the enemy nawn. Here are two twoical diagrams.





In the second diagram the drawing zone has expanded considerably and encompasses quite a large part of the board. The square a4 is rather anomalous (White to play wins only with 1 \$\phi\$c\$1).

Just as with the c-pawn, the defending king should be as near to the pawn as possible. It is worth noting that it is much better for the defender to have his king on the short side of the pawn than the lone side.

#### The extra Pawn

Just as in the case of rook endings, queen endings with an extra outside passed pawn are relatively common. It is hard to say whether the winning chances are greater or less than in the case of rooks. Objectively speaking, I suspect that they should be greater, but there are far more chances for things to go wrong with queens on the board! The main danger is that of perpetual check, so king safety is an important factor.

Unlike the corresponding situation with a rook, a queen is capable of shepherding a pawn to the promotion square all on its own. Suppose, for example, White has a passed pawn on b4 supported by a queen on b1, and that Black has blockaded the pawn with his queen on b5. If the queens were replaced by rooks, then the pawn could not advance without either zugzwang or the approach of White's king. With queens, however, White can ontinue

\$\vec{\text{\$\psi}}\$b3-c3-c5 and drive the enemy queen away. The pawn can then be advanced and, if necessary, the manoeuvre can be repeated all the way down the board.

This would be the winning techmque in the case that the kings are on the kingside and White's king is safe from perpetual check. Note that we are assuming that Black cannot exchange queens. This is normally a safe assumption, but there might be cases in which Black could swap on c5, take the c-pawn with his king and return to the kingside in time to save the game. In that case White might do better to play \$63-a3-a5 in order to advance the nawn. The problem with this is that it badly decentralizes the white queen, and while the queen is away, Black's own queen can take up an active post, increasing his chances of perpetual check.

If the white king is not safe from perpetual check, then the win is much more complicated, if indeed it is possible at all. The plan is again to try to push the pawn using the above manoeuvre, and when the black queen starts checking, the white king will run to the queenside, where his nawn and queen stand ready to provide shelter. It is important to bear in mind that a hairage of random checks from the enemy queen very rarely amounts to a perpetual, provided that one's own queen occupies a central position and there is at least one pawn for shelter. Therefore White should have no hesitation about running with his king to the queenside. Here is an example:



G. Kieninger – E. Eliskases German Championship, Bad Oevnhausen 1938

It is Black to move and he first of all brings his queen nearer the centre with gain of time.

Black has achieved all he can with checks and now takes the opportunity to push his passed pawn. This allows White to start his own barrage of checks, but Black's king can eventually evade the checks by moving to the queenside. One unusual feature of the position is that Black is prepared to leave his hf-pawn undefended. Normally, every pawn has to be protected to avoid being gobbled up by the enemy queen, but in this special case the possibility of ... \$\mathbb{w}^2 -3 + \text{provides an indirect defence.}\$

55 #g8+ @f3 56 #g3+

Black wins after 56 \( \psi f8 + \psi e4 57 \)
\( \psi xh6 \)
\( \psi c3 + 58 \)
\( \psi xe3 + \psi xe3 \)

56... \$\div 457 \div g6+ \div d458 \div d6+\$
Once again the h6-pawn is invulnerable.

58...фc3

With a slightly different version of the same idea: 59 \psixh6 \psid1+60 \psig2

# 59 ₩a3+ \$d2 60 ₩a2+

Or 60 \$\mathbb{P}\text{2}\+\text{ and the checks run out after 60...\$\mathbb{\text{d}}\text{ 61 }\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{ 62 }\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{ 62 }\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{ 64 }\text{ 62 }\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{ 64 }\text{ 65 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 65 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 65 }\text{ 62 }\text{ 65 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 65 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 67 }\text{ 62 }\text{ 63 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 64 }\text{ 67 }\text{ 62 }\text{ 63 }\text{ 64 }

60..,\$\d3 61 \$\daggeraps{\pi}\a6

Realizing that there is no perpetual check, White decides to halt the pawn's advance by pinning the pawn: this is also a typical motif in queen and pawn endings.


# 61...h5

As a matter of fact, this position would be a win even without the hammers, but their presence certainly makes Black's task simpler. White has no threat, so Black simpler. White has no threat, so Black simpler which have ward with his h-pawn. When it arrives on h3, White will have mating threats to contend with in addition to the passed c-pawn.

#### 62 Wb5 &c2! (D)

The immediate 62...h4 would be a mistake because of 63 \( \mathbb{\pi} 61 + \( \mathbb{\ph} 2d 4 64 \) \( \mathbb{\pi} 66 + \( \mathbb{\ph} 2d 66 \) \( \mathbb{\pi} 64 + \)

and the h4-pawn is vulnerable. It is true that Black's position is so strong that he might win even after losing his h-pawn, but understandably he does not wish to test this theory.



#### 63 ₩a4+

White must start checking, as Black threatened to check on 84 and then play ...c3.

# 63...\$d2 64 ₩a2+ \$d3 65 ₩a6?

This makes life easy for Black as his h-pawn is able to advance another square. 65 \$\mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$m\$}}\$1+ would have offered more resistance, but Black would escape from the checks in the end: 65...\$\mathbb{\text{\$w\$}\$26 \$\mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$w\$}\$31+}\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$40 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$37.0 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$1.5 \$\mathbb{\text{\$w\$}\$61.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$37.0 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$1.5 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$41.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$31.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$41.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$61.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$m\$}\$41.4 \$\mathbb{\text{\$

#### 65...b4 66 #b5

After 66 #d6+ Black wins as in the previous note: 66...\$\phic2 67 #g6+ \$\phid2 68 #d6+ #d3.

#### 66...\#e3+

Black decides to improve his queen position before advancing the c-pawn further. If Black plays ...h3, he must start to take care about possible stale-

mates. 67 \$ef1 \$ef1 \$ef3+ 68 \$eg1 \$efg4+ 69 \$ef2

Or 69 \$\pi\$1 \$\pheas 70 \$\pi\$c5+ \$\pi\$d4 71 \$\pi\$c7+ \$\pi\$e4 72 \$\pi\$c5+ \$\phi\$f4 73 \$\pi\$d6+ (73 \$\pi\$c7+ \$\pheas 474 \$\pi\$g7+ \$\phi\$h3) 73...\$\pi\$g4 and the checks run out.

69... ₩d4+ 70 かf1 かd2 (D)
70... \$\pi\_{e3}\$ 71 ₩e8+ ₩e4 would have
been a little quicker.



# 71 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b4+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$c3 72 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d3+ 73 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c3+ 74 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f3+ 75 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g1 c3 Although the process is rather slow,

the pawn gradually advances. White can give several checks between each pawn move, but there is no perpetual.

The alternative pin 76 \$\displays 4 \text{ loses}
after 76...\$\displays 23 + 77 \$\displays 1\$ \$\displays 24 + 78 \$\displays 81\$
h3 79 \$\displays 44 + (79 \$\displays 46 + \displays 3) 79...\$\displays 2
80 \$\displays 44 \$\displays 18 \$\displays 54 + (81 \$\displays 5)\$

₩b2) 81...₩b2 82 ₩e4+ �a1 83 ₩a4+ ₩a2.

76... we3+ 77 空f1 we2+ 78 空g1 h3 79 wd5+ 空c1 80 wg5+ 空b2 0-1

Where the pawns are on one side of the board, the winning chances with an extra pawn are probably greater than with rooks. An ending with 4 vs 3 offers fair winning chances, and even 3 vs 2 is sometimes won in practice, although I have no doubt that theoretically it should be a draw.

# Common endings without Pawns

#### Rook vs minor piece

The ending rook vs bishop (without pawns) arises occasionally. There are three important things to know about this ending. First of all, in a general initial position this ending is totally drawn. Secondly, if the defender's king is trapped in the corner then he can draw if his bishop moves on squares of opposite colour to the corner square; otherwise it is lost. The reason is quite simple (D).

Here White can try 1 **Za8+**, but after 1... **28** the must lift the stalemate. This involves either letting the black king out of the corner, or unpinning the bischop. The only other reasonable winning attempt is 1 **Zh7+ 28** 8 2 **Zb7**, attacking the bishop and threatening mate on b8, but Black has the saving move 2... **2c2+**, However, it is



worth noting that after 1 **I** a8+ \( \hat{2} g8 2 \) **I** a7, for example, 2...\( \hat{2} e6? \) would allow 3 \( \hat{I} h7+ \hat{2} g8 4 \) \( \hat{I} e7 \) and White wins (checking distance again).

If we move the bishop from b3 to b4, then White wins even if Black moves first, for example 1... \$\dot\288 2\$ \$\pi\88 \dot\288 3\$ \$\dot\88 and mate next move.

The third important point is the following position.




In this case Black's king is near the 'wrong' corner and in fact the position is lost whoever moves first. The important point is that the result is the same no matter where Black's bishop is positioned, so long as it is on a dark square.

The winning method runs 1 III abid 1... had 2 II.3 Left 3 III.4 forces the bishop to a bad square, wanning after 3... Left 4 III.4 car 3... Left 4 III.4 car 5 III.4 III.2 III.2 Left 5 III.4 Car 5 III.4 III.2 II

Rook vs knight is another ending which occasionally arises in practice. It can even result from some endings of rook vs pawn in which the pawn has to underpromote to avord mane. While the details of the ending are significantly more complicated than with rook vs bishop, the one base principle is clear enough: if the king and knight are not separated, then this ending is almost always a draw. Even if the dending king is on the edge of the board (this situation arises automatically in the underpromotion cases), then the position is usually drawn.

Black's king is in a relatively unfavourable position near the corner of the board, but there is just enough space to hold the draw. However, accurate defence is required. Play might continue 1 \$\Psi f \tilde{2} \text{h} 7 + 2 \$\Psi 6 \tilde{2} \text{h} 8 + 3 \$\Psi 6 \tilde{2} \text{h} 8 4 \$\Psi 7 (4 \$\Psi 7 \tilde{2} \text{h} 7 \tilde{2} \text{h} 6 \tilde{2} \text{h} 8 \tilde{2}




\$\psi\_88!\$ is also a draw) 4...\(\psi\_88!\) 5 \$\psi\_97+\$
\$\psi\_86 \quad \textbf{Ig1}\$ (this is the key moment; Black must play carefully) and now:

- 1) 6...\(\Delta\)h7?7\(\phi\)g8!\(\phi\)g8 (7...\(\Delta\)h8\(\phi\)f7\) 8\(\pm\)g2 (purely a waiting move)
  8...\(\Delta\)k3 9\(\phi\)f6+!\(\phi\)h8 10\(\phi\)f7 wins.
  2) 6...\(\Delta\)e6? 7\(\phi\)g6!\(\Delta\)f4+ (after 7...\(\Delta\)f8+\(\lambda\)f8 wins.
  8\(\phi\)f7 wins.
  8\(\phi\)f7 wins.
- 3) 6...\(\Delta\)d7! (the drawing move, because it allows Black to meet \(\Delta\)g6 by ...\(\Delta\)g8! 7 \(\Delta\)g6 (7 \(\Delta\)d1 \(\Delta\)l8! 7 ...\(\Delta\)g8! 8 \(\Delta\)f8! 9 \(\Delta\)f8 \(\Delta\)f8! 9 \(\Delta\)f8! 10 \(\Delta\)c7 \(\Delta\)g7! and Black draws.

Whilst this marginal position requires accurate play, the general situation (king and knight next to each other and away from the edge of the hearth is a comfortable draw.

Lost positions of the type that arise in over-the-board play generally fall into two categories. The first arises when the king and knight are next to each other, but are poorly placed. One obvious case is when Black's king is trapped in a corner. A less obvious possibility is when Black's king is on the edge of the board and the knight occupies g<sup>7</sup>(b<sup>7</sup>), b<sup>2</sup> and g<sup>2</sup> are equivalent, of course). The position with the black king on g<sup>8</sup> and knight on g<sup>7</sup> is one of the worst defensive formations and is quite often lost if the white king is nearby (for example, with the king on f<sup>6</sup> and rook on al Black loses even if he moves firsts).

The second category consists of positions in which the king and knight are separated and cannot join up. Sometimes the win is quite simple, but in others subtle play is required to keep the king and knight apart while at the same time making progress. If the knight cannot be trapped directly, then it is important to keep the defender's king restricted. The attacker sometimes has to use his own king for this purpose, even though it is counterintuitive to move it away from the enemy knight.



A. Karpov – L. Ftačnik Thessaloniki Olympiad 1988

#### 83...4)c4

Or. 83...\$93.84 Ec?! \$\frac{1}{2}\$13 (84...\) \( \overline{9}\) 8.5 \( \overline{9}\) 2.86 \( \overline{1}\) \( \overline{9}\) 4.87 \( \overline{9}\) 4.07 \( \

# 84 IIf3+! \$\psig4

White wins easily after 84... 2 g2 85 ■c3! ②a5 86 2 d5 ②b7 87 ■a3 ②d8 88 ■a7. followed by ■d7.

# 85 IId3 ⊈g5

The knight cannot move, for example 85...2\(\text{as}\) 86 \(\phi\)d5, 85...2\(\text{bb}\)6 86 \(\beta\)d5. 87 \(\beta\)5 or 85...2\(\text{bb}\)2 86 \(\beta\)d2!. 86 \(\phi\)d5! \(\chi\)b6+

The alternative is 86...20b2 87 IIId. #U5 88 & Cof. (not 88 & Cof.? & Cof.) with zugrwang; White must use triangulation to ensure that this position anseswith Black to move) 88...& Cof. 89 & Cof. & Cof. (10 & Cof.) & Cof. & Cof

#### 87 Se5 9 c4+

Black has little choice, for example 87...\$\pm\$g4 (87...\$\time\$c8 88 \$\pm\$e6 \( \time\$\) \$25 89 \$\pm\$d4 wins similarly) 88 \$\pm\$e6 \$\pm\$g5 89 \$\pm\$d4 \$\pm\$g6 90 \$\pm\$d4 or 87...\$\time\$a4 88 \$\pm\$b5 \( \time\$\) \$25 \$9 \$\pm\$b6.

## 88 \$e4 (D)

Karpov could have won more rapidly by 88 \$\pie6, e.g. 88...\$\pig6 89 \$\pig3+ \$\pi\h5 \pi \pi 65 \pi



88...4\h6?

Flachik collapses. He should have tried 88...\$4f6, when White can only win with extremely precise play: 89 III.41. \$\int\_{\text{2.6}}\$9. II.44. \$\int\_{\text{2.6}}\$9. II.45. \$\int\_{\text{2.6}}\$9. II.46. \$\int\_{\text{2.6}}\$10. II.46. \$\int\_{\text{2

## 89 **IId**8 ᡚc4

White threatened 90 \$\psid\$4, and if 89...\( \Darksymbol{2}\) a4 then White wins by 90 \$\psid\$4 \( \Darksymbol{2}\) b6 91 \$\psic5 \( \Darksymbol{2}\) a4+ 92 \$\psid\$b4.

90 IId4 4\h6

Or 90... ♠b2 (90... ♠a3 91 \$\d3) 91 \$\dagger e3 \$\dagger f5 92 \$\dagger e42 \$\dagger e5 93 \$\dagger b4 \dagger and wins

91 \$e5 \( \text{\text{\text{0}}} \) c8 92 \$\( \text{\text{e}} \) 6 \( \text{\text{0}} \) a7 93 \$\( \text{\text{d}} \) 1-0

# Rook and minor piece vs Rook

This occurs quite often in practice. The general position is a draw, whether the minor piece is a bishop or a knight, but the practical winning chances depend very much on which minor piece is involved.

The ending of  $\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{\hat{C}}$  vs  $\mathbf{I}$  should be a simple draw as there are only a few winning positions. Almost all of these have the defending king badly placed near a corner, and nothing like this can be forced from a normal starting position. The general feeling amongst GMs has been that there is no point in carrying on this ending because there are no real winning chances.

However, the following ending may cause this judgement to be modified (D):

# 70 \$h5

A perfectly reasonable move, but 70 IIR+2\(\)\( \)\( 1 \) IIg8 would have been slightly more comfortable for Black. After 71...IIn1+72\(\)\( 2 \)\( \)\( 2 \)\( 1 \)\( 3 \)\( \)\( \)\( 4 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 3 \)\( \)\( 4 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 3 \)\( \)\( 4 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 3 \)\( \)\( 4 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 1 \)\( 3 \)\( \)\( 1

# 70.... 2g3+ 71 **\$h6**Thanks to the unfortunate position

of White's rook, her king cannot escape from the edge: 71 \$26 €e4+ and



J. Polgar - G. Kasparov Dos Hermanas 1996

now 72 \$65 and 72 \$67 drop the rook. However, 71 \$96 \cdot \cdot \cdot 4 - 72 \$66 \cdot \cdot 4 \cdot 2 \cdot \cdot 61 \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot 2 \cdot \cdot

71...2f5+ 72 \$h7 \$f4 73 \$b8 \$\textbf{Ig7} + 74 \$\text{\$h8}\$\$

White's king is now uncomfortably placed in the corner of the board. The position is still drawn, but care is needed.

# 74...**⊒**d7 75 **⊒**e8

As an example of how close White is to losing, 75 El89 would lose after 75...\$\phi\_5\$ 75 El88 \$\phi\_6\$. One line rms 77 Elg84 \$\phi\_6\$ 18 Elg1 Eld84 79 Elg8 Id3 (this square is chosen to avoid tricks such as 79...\$\pi\_6\$ 28 Elg3 80 Elg1 Elg3 Elg4 Cep 78 Elg4 \$\phi\_6\$ 85 Elg1 Blg H738 Ig46 Cep 78 Elg4 \$\phi\_6\$ 85 Elg1 \$\phi\_6\$ 86 \$\phi\_7\$ \$\phi\_7\$ 87 \$\phi\_8\$ \$\phi\_6\$ \$\phi\_1\$ \$\phi\_6\$ \$\

75...\$\psig5 76 \textbf{I}e6 \textit{D}d4 77 \textbf{I}e1 \textbf{S}f6 78 \textbf{I}d1?! (D)

78 **I**f1+ was simpler, for example 78...全f5 79 **\$\psi\_g8 I**g7+ 80 **\$\psi\_f8 I**a7 81 **\$\psi\_g8** 



# 78...Id5! 79 IIa1??

This is actually the losing move. The only move to draw is 79 \( \mathbb{I}f1+! \) and after 79...\( \hat{Q}\) f5 one line runs 80 \( \mathbb{I}f2 \) \( \mathbb{I}d4 \) 81 \( \mathre{Q}\) g8!.

79...⊕e6!

Kasparov, once given his chance, finds the only winning move.

# 80 Ia6 \$67 81 Ia7+ \$96 82 Ia8 Id7 83 Ib8 Ic7 84 \$98 Ic5 85 Ia8 Ib5 86 \$h8 Ib7 87 Ic8 \$2c7

87... ■b6 is the winning idea. The plan is to play ... Dg5 without allowing White to check on the sixth rank. Then ... Dh7-f6 (possibly with ... ■c to keep the king confined) will fatally restrict the white king.

Kasparov's move retains the win, but loses time.

#### 88 Ig8+ \$h6 89 Ig1


It would probably have been a better practical chance to try 89 **I**f8 and see if Kasparov could find the winning idea (89... ab6!) mentioned in the pre-

It is up to the individual whether to continue this ending, but I would only regard it as worthwhile in the case of a quick-play finish.

If one is the defender, then the main advice is perfectly obvious: try to keep your king away from the edge of the board or, failing that, try to keep it away from the corner. However, even if you do find yourself in a less favourable position, don't despair – even with the king in the corner many positions are drawn.

The ending of M+2 vs M is one of the most common pawnless endings to arise in practice. In general it should be a draw, but the defence requires considerable accuracy and grandmasters have been known to lose it even in the days of adjoumments. There are two basic drawing techniques, and it is worth knowing both of them because the position you find yourself in may be more suited to one rather than the other.

The following diagram is the basic position of the 'Cochrane Defence'. The black rook is pinning the enemy bishop and this prevents the white king approaching its counterpart. The only way to unpin is to play \$\delta d5\$ or \$\ddot d5\$ or \$\ddot d3\$, but then the black king moves



I. Rogers - M. Illescas Spanish Team Championship 1996

along the edge of the board away from the white king. Thus Black avoids the most dangerous situation, that in which White creates mating threats by having his king directly opposite Black's.

78 **\$**d5

Of course 78 \$\daggerd3\$ is answered by 78...\$\daggerd35.

78...**⊈a**3

It is worth pointing out that the Cochrane Defence is most effective when the black king is near the mid-point of one edge. If, for example, the same formation were set up along the third rank, then the corresponding move would take the black king to a2, danserously near the corner.

79 ⊈d3 **Eb**4

Black takes the chance to release his king from the edge.

80 Ih8 Ig4 81 Ac4 \$b4 82 Ae2 Ig7

Now Black can meet 83 \$\dd by 83...\(\textbf{Z}\)d7+. Black should try to maintain a good checking distance for his rook, and it is helpful to position the rook so that it can check along both files and ranks

83 Ib8+ \$c3 84 Ic8+ \$d2 85 \$f3 \$c3 86 Ic3+ \$d2 87 Ia3 Id7+ 88 \$c4 Ic7+ 89 \$d4 Id7+ 90 \$d5 Id8 91 Ia2+ \$d1 (D)



All White's efforts have only resulted in the Cochrane Defence reappearing on the lower edge of the hoard.

92 \$e4 \$c1 93 \$c4 \$d2 94 \$a8 \$\$d7 95 \$d3 \$b2 96 \$b8+ \$c3 97 \$\$c8+ \$b4 98 \$c4 \$b7

Ensuring the maximum checking distance.

99 2 c6 Th4+ 100 2 d5 Th5+ 101

★d6 **E**h6

Even when there is no Cochrane

Defence, pinning the bishop is an ef-


102 Ic4+ \$a3 103 Ic3+ \$b2 104 Ig3 \$c2 105 \$e5 Ib8 106 \$f5+ \$d2 107 Ic3 Ic8+ 108 \$f4 If8

Again a useful pin.

fective defensive tactic

109 Ed3+ \$c1 110 Ed5 \$b2 111 \$e3 \$c3 112 \$e4 Eh8 113 Ec5+ \$b4 114 \$c4 Eh4

Cochrane again.



European Team Championship, Pula 1997

In this position White is in no position to use the Cochrane Defence. Any attempt to switch the rook behind the black king would lose, for example \$\tilde{T}\_{\tilde{B}} = \tilde{T}\_{\tilde{B}} =

## 87 IId2

The basic idea is to defend passively with both king and rook on the second rank. White will just oscillate with his rook between c2 and d2 until Black undertakes positive action.

#### 87 ... Ib5 88 Ic2 Ib2+ 89 Dd1

This is the first of the two main noints behind the second-rank defence. Black can drive the enemy king to the edge of the board with a check, but then his own rook is attacked so he has no time to approach with his king.

89.. Th1+ 90 \$e2 Th2+ 91 \$d1 IIh3 92 re2 ac3 (D)



This is Black's other winning attempt. At first it seems that White is in zugzwang as any rook move loses instantiv (93 Icl Ih2+ 94 9d1 4d3).


93 46411

Now 93... d3 is answered by the stalemate defence 94 Id2+ and the king has to retreat.

93... II h1+ 94 de2 de4 95 de3 Given the chance, White's king

slips away. 95...Ef1+ 96 Ef2 Ea1 97 \$g4 Ea8 98 II g2 1/2-1/2

If you have the rook and bishop, there is one winning position which you must be aware of - the 'Philidor position'. This winning position arises relatively often as a result of inferior defence, but it is quite tricky to win. If you don't know the correct method, it is easy to go round and round in circles, until you give up in frustration.



Philidor, 1749

This is the characteristic Philidor position. The kings face each other with Black's king trapped on the edge of the board, and his rook restricted to one file by mating threats.

# 1 Hf8+! He8 2 Hf7!

First White improves the position of his rook with gain of tempo, and confines Black's king to the first rank. The immediate threat is 3 \$27.

#### 2...IIe2

White can force Black's rook to c2 by playing \$\mathbb{\pi}\$a7 and this side-to-side switch, with possible checks on d7 thrown in, gives rise to so many possibilities that confusion is easy. What is hard to grasp is that White can only win by means of appropriate bishop manoeuvres; the bishop appears ideally placed on d5, so the idea of moving it away is counter-intuitive.

Black cannot run with his king, as 2... \$\psi c 8 loses to 3 \$\pm a 7 \$\pm d8 + 4 \$\pm c 6\$ \$\psi\_b8 5 \bar{a}b7+ \psi\_a8 6 \bar{a}b1 \psi\_a7 7 \psi\_c7. forcing mate or win of the rook. Thus he must play his rook down the e-file, in order to meet 227 by a switch to the c-file. It turns out that e2 is the best square for Black's rook and e3 is the worst: el is somewhere in between. The win after 2... Re3 runs 3 Ed7+ \$28 (3...\$28 4 \$27 wins at once, because 4... 153 is impossible) 4 1a7 1f8 5 If7+ \$e8 (White has forced the king from d8 to e8 with gain of tempo) 6 If4 (threatening 7 Ac6+) 6... 2d8 (6... Id3 fails to 7 Ig4 because Black lacks the reply ... If3) 7 &e4 (the final blow for Black; d3 is covered) 7... 2e8

8 2c6+ and mates in two more moves.

If Black plays 2... It is a reflection of the position after
White's fifth move in the main line.

After 2... **Z**e2, White's ultimate aim is to force Black's rook to the third rank

#### 3 **⊒h**7

A waiting move to force Black's rook to the slightly inferior square e1. After 3... Ze3 White wins as in the previous note.

#### 3...Ee1 4 Eb7

White's winning line only works when his rook is on f7 or b7. The side-to-side manoeuvres are typical of this ending; Black is forced to follow suit and oscillate with his own rook between e1 and c1, but this gives White the chance to transfer his rook from h7 to b7 with gain of tempo.

# 4...Ec1 (D)

4... \$\psi c8 loses to 5 \$\pm b2 \$\pm d1 6 \$\pm h2\$
\$\pm b8 7 \$\pm a2\$.



# 5 🕸 b3

This is the key idea, without which white cannot make progress, and it explains why el is an inferior square to e2. This position is a genuine zug-zwang and if White were now to play, his quickest win would be 1 &c Adl + 2 &d5 Ael 3 &b3, passing the move to Black

#### 5...Ec3

Or 5...\$\pic8 6 \( \exists \) 4 (threatening 7 \( \hat{Re6} +) 6...\$\pic8 68 7 \( \exists \) 14 \( \exists \) 2 (7...\$\pic8 8 \( \hat{Re5} \) 8 \( \hat{Re3} \) 4 \( \pic8 \) 9 \( \hat{Re6} \) 16 \( \exists \) 14 \( \hat{Re5} \) 17 \( \hat{Re5} \) 18 \( \hat{Re

# 6 **åe**6

Now that Black's rook has been forced onto the inferior third rank, White transfers his bishop back to d5 with gain of tempo.

#### 6. Hd3+ 7 & d5! Hc3

Here the win is analogous to the note to Black's second move.

8 Ed7+ \$c8

8...\$ce8 9 **I**g7 and f3 is out of bounds.

9 Eh7 \$\psi b8 10 Eb7+ \$\psi c8 11 Eb4 \$\psi d8 12 \$\pri c4 \$\psi c8 13 \$\pri e6+\$ and White mates.

# Quick-play finishes

These days the normal method of finishing a long game is the 'quick-play finish' in which, from a certain point on, the players have a fixed amount of time to complete the game, no matter how many moves this might take. In international competitions, the quickplay finish normally comes into effect at move 60, and players are generally given half an hour (sometimes an hour), in addition to any time they still have, to complete the game.

Outck-play firmshes only affect a relatively small percentage of tournament games, but it is important to be aware of the impact such a finish may have on certain endgames. There are many endings in which the odds would favour a draw at a traditional timelimit, but in a quick-play finish the halance of probabilities is changed. Quick-play finishes also put a premium on memorized knowledge; after the exhaustion of six hours' play, and with limited time on the clock, working out a complex ending is very difficult - you just have to know how to play certain positions.

- It should be noted that in most cases the speeding up of play will favour the sade trying to win, because he can go round and round several times, each time hoping for a mistake, whereas the defender only has to go wreng once. Here is a quick round-up of the most common endings where the result might be affected:
- Rook and bishop vs rook. The drawing techniques are fairly wellknown, but to apply them in practice requires considerable thought. I would not care to defend this in a quick-play finish.
- Rook and knight vs rook. Should be comfortably drawn at a normal time-limit, but in a quick-play finish it might be worth continuing (as Kasparov showed).
- 3) Queen and pawn vs queen. Of course, some positions are objectively lost, but even many of the drawn positions require very accurate defence. I imagine that the 'marginal' drawn positions would be almost impossible to defend in a quick-play finish, and even some of the fairly comfortable draws would probably be difficult.
- 4) Rook and pawn vs rook. Positions which are drawn by the standard 'third-rank' defence would still be drawn in quick-play, in more complex positions, there would of course be more errors. but in these endings the attacker also has to play accurately, so the accelerated tempo probably makes the task equally difficult for both players.

If one can liquidate to a variety of different endings, then the fact that there is a quick-play finish might affect one's decision as to which to aim for. If one evaluates \( \mathbb{\mathcal{H}} \) \( \mathcal{\mathcal{H}} \) \( \mathcal{H} \)

positional advantage but not necessarily a win.

It is perhaps unfortunate that modifications to the time-limit can cause what amounts to an alteration in the evaluation of certain endings, but that is the price one has to pay for the elimination of adjournments.

# 5 Using a Computer

Computers are wonderful tools. In half a century they have moved from a few specialized applications to occupy a central position in our society. Modern civilisation probably could not function without them, so dependent have we become on their services. With the growth of the Internet, a further communications revolution as great as the introduction of radio and television is upon us.

Computers have also had an impact on chess. Early chess computers were laughably weak but, after Deep Blue's defeat of Kasparov in 1997, nobody is laughing now. For a relatively small price, you can buy a chess program in a shop which, running on a standard PC, can defeat virtually anybody except for IMs and GMs. You can also purchase a database of up to a million sames.

The question arises as to how these tools can best be used for personal improvement. The discussion that follows refers to the database program *ChessBase* and the playing program *Fritz*. This is not because ChessBase have paid me a wad of money to mention their products, but because these are the products I am most familiar with. The discussion is as general as possible and doubtless applies to other, similar, products.

# Game databases

When non-chess players think of a grandmaster making use of a computer, they probably think of playing programs. However, at this level the main use of a computer is to access a large database of games.

There are two main uses for a database. For the professional, examining the games of prospective opponents is part of the job. If you are participating in a round-robin tournament, some of this may be done before the event, but in a Swiss event it can only be done when the pairings are known, which normally does not allow much time for preparation.

The second use is to look at the games played in specific opening lines. If you are intending to play a particular variation in the afternoon, a quick scan of the database to see if there are any recent games is very helpful. You might get a new idea, or you might see something potentially dangerous for your opponent. For home preparation, a database is also extremely useful. Instead of searching through dozens of Informators, New in Chess Yearbooks and other standard references, you can call up all the games in a particular line with a few keystrokes. The games can then be

merged into a single game with variations, so that you can easily see the general structure of the variation. If the database program has an interface to a playing module, then at a keystroke you can set the computer to work analysing any given position.

The range of features available is truly astounding, and these days any serious player is virtually obliged to use a database.

The main features which I regard as essential for a database program are:

- It should handle databases of up to a million games without struggling.
   Of course, you will need a powerful computer to handle such large databases, but even so operations on very large databases can be rather slow.
- It should have facilities for entering both variations and text annotations, and manipulating these.
- It should run under the current version of Windows. DOS is dead; forget anything running under DOS. Mac users will have to make do with what is available.
- It should support openings keys of unlimited depth, and should have facilities for users to modify and expand these.
- 5) The ability to merge several games into one game with variations is critical. Once you have used this feature, you will not want to do without it.
- 6) There should be an interface to a playing program, so that you just have to hit a key to see the analysis of the

current position. A method of pasting this analysis into the game is highly desirable.

desirable.

That deals with the program, but what about the data? Nobody is going to enter a million games by hand, so one is utterly dependent on commercial offerings. However, here the situation is much less satisfactory than with the programs. Even the best databases contain a siguificant number of errors. Poor-quality data is commonplace; indeed, sometimes it is so poor as to make the data practically useless. Some 'commercial' databases are little more than games collected from every available source, and just lumped together—the 'kitches sin'; approach.

Typical problems are:

- I) Inconsistent spelling of names.

  This is perhaps the most irritating, If you are considering buying a data-base, have a look to see if Korchnoi is spelt more than one way in the data-base. If it is, then just forget it. There is nothing more irritating than missing a critical game because you have failed to guess whether the player is Korchnoi, 'Korchnoi,' Korchnoi, 'Korchnoi,' Korchnoi, 'Korchnoi,' Korchnoi, 'Gron the same curvament described as 'Wijk aan Zee', 'Wijk', 'Hoogovens,' WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc. 'WaZ', etc.
- Duplicate games. This is often a result of problem 1. Sometimes whole tournaments are duplicated because of some minor difference in the spelling of the event name.

3) Incorrect results. This is one of the most common errors. When entering data, most programs have a default option. If the operator forgets to enter the result, you will just get the default result – with a two-thirds chance of being wrong. You may even find combinations of these errors, for example Korchnoi beat Bareev, but in an amazingly similar game Kortschnoj lost to Barerew.

4) Incorrect moves. The above errors are often fairly noticeable, but incorrect moves are trickier to spot. Of course, if the error is such as to leave one player's queen en prise then you might be a bit suspicious, but if it is the wrong rook to di, then you might never know unless you compare the game with another source. Once, when dealing with a collection of games that contained many errors, I came across a particularly grotesque example. I later mentioned it to the grandmaster concerned:

"Do you know how your game was mangled in this game collection? According to their score, your opponent could have mated in two, but instead left his queen en prise with check", I lauehed.

"But that really happened", he replied.

Employing a poor-quality database causes immense frustration and waste of time; the small amount of money saved is not worth it. 'But they are both databases with the same games...',

you may say. Well, a Trabant and a Rolls-Royce are both cars with four wheels. Unfortunately, the defects of a database are not visible by looking at the shiny surface of the CD-ROM; you actually have to use it before you spot the problems.

At the end of the day much of the blame for this situation must be laid at the door of the chess players themselves. Copying of data is commonlace. Why should a company invest thousands of man-hours producing bigh-quality data if it is just going to be stolen (because that is what copying is in this cases)? Software piracy is illegal—don't do ti.

Once you have a database you will probably want to keep it up to date. There are various commercial services which offer regular 'top-ups' for your database. These days much of the information can be downloaded from the Internet, although then you have all the problems of inconsistent names. forgetting which tournaments you have already included, etc. For really up-to-the-minute material, the Internet is unbeatable, but it requires considerable effort to keep on top of the flow of data. Unless you really need new games on a week-by-week basis. the pre-packaged commercial offerings are probably better. The Internet is wonderful for e-mail, news and specific enquiries for which you can use a search engine. Otherwise it strikes me as being a great time-waster.

# Playing programs

The availability of cheap but very strong playing programs for the home PC provides many new opportunities for training and self-improvement. If you already have a computer, I would strongly recommend buying such a program. The most obvious use, that of checking over one's own games, is also one of the most useful. It is amazing how often a computer check reveals missed tactical ideas. Even if nothing shattering is found, the computer often suggests interesting alternative ideas which were overlooked during the game. It is important not only to play over the game itself, but the tactical lines on which your decisions were based. For this reason, you should only consider buying a program that supports the entry of variations, and can afterwards store the games and variations in a database. You may well find a pattern in the ideas you have missed, and this will provide you with useful information about which areas of your game need special attention.

Another use is to play out training positions against a computer. The famous Russian trainer Mark Dvoretsky recommends the method of 'playing out' interesting positions. The idea is that if, for example, one of his students is weak in tactics, Dvoretsky would set the student to play tactical positions against a strong opponent. Afterwards they would go over the course

of the 'game' and see where the student could have played better. Most players don't have a suitable opponent on hand for such exercises, but the computer can perform a similar job and can also help in the post-mortem analysis. Even though computers play endings less strongly than the middlegame, they can still be useful. As discussed on page 131, if you have trouble winning rook and pawn endings with an extra pawn, play out such a position against the computer. It is a good idea to play out the same position several times, trying different plans. You will soon develop a feeling for which plans work and which are meffective. If you experience trouble winning at all, you may get some ideas by reversing the colourst

The computer does have several limitations; in the areas of positional judgement and plan-forming it is of practically no help, and long-term sacrifices are almost always rejected by the machine. Analysing the Najdorf Poissoned Pawn with the aid of a computer is a futile exercise; White's compensation is so long-term that the computer does not see it at all, and resolutely assesses every position as winnine for Black.

Curiously, I find playing normal games against computers much less helpful. Computers have a particular style of play and one soon leams how to avoid their strengths and exploit their weaknesses. This knowledge is of no value against human players, who (normally!) have a very different set of strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, it is quite easy to become depressed playing against the computer. All one really learns is that it is common to overlook tactical points.

Playing programs are just starting to have a major impact on grandmaster chess. Here is one example:

> A. Shirov - L. van Wely Monaco Amber (rapid) 1997 Sicilian, Najdorf

1 e4 c5 2 2 13 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 2xd4 2 16 5 2 c3 a6 6 2 e3 e6 7 g4 h6 8 f4

b5 9 2g2 2b7 10 g5

This move was introduced in the garne Ivanchuk-Topalov, Las Palmas 1996 as an improvement over the pre-

viously played 10 a3. 10...hxg5 11 fxg5 Dh5

12 g6 2f6 13 gxf7+ \$xf7 14 0-0 \$\dot bd7 (D)

Now Kulaots-Gavrikov, Hallsberg 1996/7 continued 15 e5 全xg2 16 exf6 业xf1 17 ②xe6 管xf6 18 ①g5+ 验g6 19 管d5 and here Black could have gained a large advantage by 19...重h4 20 ②ce4 星g4+ 21 ②g3 星xg5 22 兔xg5 管xg5 23 管xa8 兔h3.



15 @xe6!!

An absolutely stunning innovation, which gives White a clear advantage in every variation. After the game Sbirov announced that this move had not been discovered by him, but by Fritz. Sure enough, when I set up the position on my Fritz, the program found £xe6 in less than a minute. It is perhaps slightly surprising that Shirov used up his innovation in a rapid event, but he probably felt that since anyone with a Fritz could find this move, it would only be a matter of weeks before someone else played it.

# 15...\$xe6 16 e5 £xg2

Black is lost after 16... 2xe5 17 2xb7 2b8 or 16... 2c7 17 exf6 2xf6 18 2d5 2xd5 19 2xf6+ 2xf6 20

#### 17 exf6 @xf6 18 @xg2 Ec8

18... \$\vec{w}\$e8 is no improvement, owing to 19 \$\prec{\pi}\$xf6+ \$\prec{\pi}\$xf6 (19... gxf6 20 \$\vec{\pi}\$d5+ \$\pi\$e7 21 \$\vec{\pi}\$D7+ \$\pi\$e6 22 \$\vec{\pi}\$e1 e1 wins) 20 \$\vec{\pi}\$d5 \$\vec{\pi}\$g6 (20... \$\vec{\pi}\$xs 3 21 \$\vec{\pi}\$c4+ \$\vec{\pi}\$e7 22 \$\vec{\pi}\$d6+ \$\vec{\pi}\$d8 24 \$\vec{\pi}\$d1+ injates) 21 \$\vec{\pi}\$d3+ \$\vec{\pi}\$7 22 \$\vec{\pi}\$d4+ \$\vec{\pi}\$7 22 \$\vec{\pi}\$d5

**全**g8 23 **省**d5+ **全**h7 24 **日**f3 **全**e7 25 **日**h3+ **全**g6 26 **省**e6+ **全**f6 27 **日**g3+ **全**h7 28 **省**f5+ and wins

19 第f3 &c7 20 国ae1 全f7 21 第d5+ 全f8 22 第f5 第c7 23 &d4 第b7+ 24 全g1 (D)

Of course 24 2d5  $\equiv xc2+25 \equiv xc2$  $\equiv xd5+26 \equiv c4 \equiv h5 27 \equiv xd5 \equiv xd5$ 28  $\equiv f4$  is also good, but Black could put up considerable resistance in the ending.



# 24... Ic4 25 If4 ₩c8 26 Ie6

All White's pieces are in perfect central positions, while Black's are scattered randomly around the edge of the board.

# 26..,≌xd4

Losing at once, but after 26...\$\frac{1}{2}f^2\) (or 26...\$\frac{1}{2}f^2\) 27 \(\frac{1}{2}\) 28 \(\frac{1}{2}\) 31 \(\frac{1}{2}f^2\) + the result would be the same.

# 27 Exf6+ 1-0

It isn't clear if this is the first instance in which a top-level opening

line was refuted by a computer, but it may be the first in which the human 'innovator' was honest enough to admit it! The question naturally arises as to how many opening innovations are capable of being found by a computer. Every four months a panel of leading grandmasters votes on the most important opening innovations. The results are published in Informator. At the time of writing, the most recent issue for which the results of this vote are available is Informator 68. I set Fritz4 to work on the positions in which the top 15 novelties of Informator 68 were played, to see how many the machine would find. In each case I allowed sufficient time for a complete analysis down to 11 ply (although many lines were taken far deeper, of course). The result: Fritz found 3 of the 15 innovations

Of course, there are many problems with such a test, for example some of the 'innovations' may in fact not be good, and will perhaps be refuted in the near future. Another point is that sharp, clear-cut innovations tend to head the Informator list, because a subtle finesse which can only be anpreciated by specialists in a particular opening line will not score well in 'democratic' voting. In a couple of cases the innovation was Fritz's second choice, which would certainly alert a human operator to the fact that there was something of interest present. However, to summarize I would say that Fritz was only of value for

finding opening innovations in certain types of position. Having said that, to find 3 of the world's top 15 innovations in less than a day is quite an achievement!

Here are two of Fritz's successes and one of its failures.



V. Miluydas - S. Muraviov corr 1994

Here Fritz took less than five seconds to find the innovation 24... 2b3+!! (exclamation marks as given in Informator: 24...9)xe6 would have been good for White) 25 2g2 2g5!. The game concluded in spectacular fashion with 26 \( \psi f2! \( \Delta f3 + 27 \( \psi f1 \) f4 28 g4 \hat{\psi}h3+ 29 \hat{\psi}e1 \De6 xe6 30 \De5 \De5 31 Exa6!! £xg4 32 £c4!! De4 33 ₩f3!! ₩b4+ (33....\$xf3 34 £167+ \$g8 35 9)h6+ is also a draw) 34 Wg3 and the players agreed to a draw in view of 34...fxg3 35 2 f7+ \$28 36 2 h6+.

In the following position from the French Defence, 20 2f5!! was already



O. Korneev - Y. Piskov Linares Open 1996

at the top of Fritz's list within 2 seconds, and in 75 seconds it was being assessed as winning for White. The game concluded 20... Exf5 21 @xe6+ \$e7 22 ₩xf5 @xd4?! 23 @xd4 ₩xd4 24 Efe1+ 1.0

In the following example, Fritz failed to find Timoshenko's innovation although, as we shall see, it is not clear that the new idea was any improvement over the move previously played.

# G. Timoshenko – B. Itkis Raile Herculane 1996 French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 D c3 Df6 4 e5 Dfd7 5 f4 c5 6 9f3 9c6 7 &e3 cxd4 8 @vd4 掌b69 掌d2 掌vb2 10 罩b1 掌a3 11 2 b 5 2) xd4 12 2 xd4 2 b 4 13 0-0 a6 14 Eh3 Wa5 15 Efb1 &a3 (D) 16 f511





The innovation (with Informator's exclamation marks), deviating from 16 &xd7+ Fritz probably failed to find it for two reasons: firstly, it is not clear if it is really better than taking on d7; secondly, the combination would be simply too deep for Fritz, even were it sound.

16...axb5 17 Exa3! ∰xa3 18 ⊕xb5 ∰xa2 19 ⊕d6+ фf8 20 Ea1 ∰xa1+ 21 £xa1 Exa1+ 22 фf2 (D)

This is really the critical moment of the whole combination, and we are already 12 ply away from the starting point. Fritz still feels that Black can survive after the obvious 22... \( \infty \) \( \infty \)

22...里a8? 23 譽g5!

Now Fritz agrees that White is winning.

23...f6 24 Wh5 g6

23...16 24 gh 2 go 25 gh 6+ de 28 26 Qe 8 de 7 27 Qd 6+ de 28 Qe 8 de 7 27 Qd 6+ de 28 Qe 8 de 7 29 ge 7+ de 28 30 gh 8+ 968 31 exf6 1-0